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Asia Journal of Global Studies Vol 4, No 2 (2010-11), 56-67

Asia Association for Global Studies

Balancing Development and Environmental Concerns: The Case of Singapore


Choon Yin Sam
PSB Academy, Singapore

ABSTRACT
Pollution and other threats to nature originate in particular countries, but global coordination and cooperation are often needed when seeking solutions because of the transnational implications of environmental problems. The Singaporean case shows that regional and international cooperation can be forthcoming even if nationalism is a driving force behind a desire to mitigate harm to the environment. A significant reason is that failure to address industries' environmental impact can impose enormous costs on a domestic economy. Hence, although nation-states are seen as usually putting their individual economic interests above those of the global environment, Singapore demonstrates that policies can be devised in ways that reconcile national economic selfinterest with global environmental protection.

Singapore does not accept the thesis that environmental deterioration is the necessary consequence of rapid economic growth. Hon Sui Sen, former Finance Minister and founding EDB Chairman (Hon, 2004, p. 333

INTRODUCTION
It is well known that due to their preoccupation with economic growth nation-states have not appropriately managed climate change. While it is necessary for states to cut back on greenhouse gas emissions to prevent long-term environmental damage, they also need to support industry and business in the short and medium terms to create jobs and sustain economies. Major countries around the world, including China, India and the United States, face this dilemma. The result unfortunately has been inadequate commitment from the international community in the global effort to offset environmental damage from industry. The Kyoto Protocol is a case in point where the perceived unfair distribution of responsibility among stakeholders has resulted in refusal from the United States to sign the agreement. This study considers the case of Singapore to assess the significance of environmental protection sentiments in relation to the nation's drive to achieve higher economic growth. With most of the nation less than 15 metres above sea level, Singapore is naturally concerned with the threat posed by global warming. Ng and Mendelsohn (2005) have demonstrated that sea level inundation could lead to a loss of dry land of up to 17 square kilometers (2.7 percent of Singapore's total land area). Water availability is also a major issue in Singapore
*The material presented by the authors does not necessarily portray the viewpoint of the editors and the management of the Asia Journal of Global Studies (AJGS).

VOL 4, No 2.2010-11.PRINT ISSN 1884-0337, ONLINE ISSN 1884-0264


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Balancing Development and Environmental Concerns: The Case of Singapore

as supply cannot meet demand from a growing population and economy. From a different angle, the decision by EU countries and the US federal government to use biofuels such as ethanol (made from corn) and biodiesel (made from soybeans or other crops) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is a concern, as it has recently led to rising food prices in food dependent countries like Singapore (GAO, 2008). Singapore understands that every emission-control measure entails costs and potentially diminishes its economic prospects, but its government's position is that it will confront environmental problems only so long as the measures are economically feasible. The underlying argument of this paper is as follows. While it is true that a collective action problem is perpetuated when national economic interests prevail over environmental concerns, economic nationalism is also a powerful motivating factor to compel nation states to act collectively. Domestic and collective actions to deal with global problems are possible if the parties concerned find the national economic costs of failing to do so to be prohibitive. Like many other nations, this is the case for Singapore. The nation desires continued economic development, but also adheres to national, regional and global initiatives aiming to prevent further environmental degradation to further its self-interest. As such, environmental-related initiatives are assessed by Singapore in terms of how the nation can reconcile its economic interests with global environmental sustainability. The following section reviews the relationship between economic growth and environmental standards. It argues that this relationship involves the interactions of multiple variables, suggesting that a case study approach is appropriate to take into consideration the actions and reactions of stakeholders. The paper then proceeds to analyze Singapore's approach in dealing with climate change and environmental issues. As an "economy-first" mentality prevails in Singapore, it is argued that initiatives to combat climate change and environmental problems must be seen as economically feasible if they are to succeed. However, an economics-driven environmental protection mentality should not be viewed as a zero-sum game where only one nation benefits at the expense of others. Singapore demonstrates clearly how regional and international cooperation can be forthcoming even if nationalism is the driving force behind environmental protection.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION: A BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW


The Environment Kuznets Curve (EKC) is well known for depicting the relationship between economic growth and environmental quality. The EKC hypothesizes the existence of an inverted "U" relationship between indicators of environmental degradation and economic growth. This means that degradation is inevitable in the early stages of national development largely because poorer countries do not have the institutional capacity and political will to regulate polluters. However, as the economy becomes more industrialized and wealthier, higher value is attached to the environment and regulatory institutions become more effective. If this hypothesis is accepted, pressure on the environment exerted by growth induced factors is justified so long as environmental degradation does not exceed the threshold irreversible level. To test the EKC hypothesis, studies have estimated quadratic reduced form equations with a negative value expected for the coefficient of the squared variable (income per capita). Several empirical studies support the hypothesis (Cole, 2003; Frankel & Rose, 2005; Grossman & Krueger, 1995; Seldon & Song, 1994; Shafik & Bandhyopadhyay, 1992; Stern, Common, & Barbier, 1996; World Bank, 1992). However, many studies have failed to pay adequate attention to statistical properties within the data such as serial dependence to account for possible spurious regressions (Stern, 2004). Perman and Stern (2003) performed diagnostic statistics and specification tests and rejected the EKC hypothesis, concluding that the EKC literature was econometrically weak because studies assumed that if the regression coefficients were nominally, individually and jointly significant and

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have the expected signs, then an EKC relation would exist (Stern, 2004, p. 1420). To Faber (2008), a desire to retain competitiveness in the United States amidst intensified competition from foreign capital has led to corporate environmental abuses or what he terms "environmental injustice," such as the dumping of toxic pollutants in poor working class neighborhoods and communities of color. Faber questions the validity of past studies on EKC using cross sectional data since they fail to capture redistributive effects at the national level. In addition, it is necessary to assess the effect of various dimensions of economic growth on environmental quality. While economic growth measured in income per capita (or in percentage change in real GDP) can affect environmental quality, the real situation is more aptly characterized as a complex system that includes structural change and the effects of socio-cultural perceptions on resource values. Arrow et al. (2005) argue that it is important to consider the interaction of multiple variables such as the effect of production on the carrying capacity or the resilience of the ecosystem. They note that empirical studies that support the existence of the EKC ignore the capacity of the environment in absorbing greenhouse gases without any long-term consequences. It is worth noting that the estimation technique has been modified to take into consideration technological improvements and structural change (De Bruyn, van den Bergh, & Opschoor, 1998), institutional developments in the countries sampled (Bhattarai & Hammig, 2001), and the interactions among multiple independent variables (Ezzati, Singer, & Kammen, 2001). Two issues are worth mentioning at this point. First, incorporating interactions among variables demands a great deal of data. However, not all events and variables are quantifiable. The selective use of variables, depending on data availability, means that some social, economic and political imperatives remain hidden. Moreover, as Ezzati and Singer (2001) point out, even "measurement of the more 'traditional' development variables such as income by GNP or purchasing power parity - or health - by life expectancy, mortality, morbidity, or disability adjusted life years (DALY) - is not universally agreed upon" (p. 1428). Without the availability of valid data, cross-sectional empirical studies have to be read cautiously to merit any serious policy consideration. Second, even if economic growth can lead to environmental degradation, limiting economic growth is not always realistic. On the contrary, it is necessary to work with the assumption that nations around the world value economic growth. To Arrow et al. (1995), what matters is the "content of growth - the composition of inputs (including environmental resources) and outputs (including waste products)" (p. 521). Similarly, as Jotzo (2008) has pointed out, "Slowing economic growth to achieve climate change mitigation is not a realistic policy option. . . . [A]ddressing climate change will require a drastic change in the nature of economic growth; 'de-carbonization' of global energy and industrial systems is needed so that increasing economic activity is compatible with lower emissions" (p. 18). On this basis, it is necessary to consider both domestic and regional specificity. A case study approach is appropriate to ascertain the nature of nationalist sentiment and its relation to environmental degradation. As shown in this paper, the case of Singapore demonstrates that economic nationalism does have potentially negative implications for environmental sustainability. However, this has not prevented the city-state from being a socially responsible member of the global community in several instances.

THE CASE OF SINGAPORE


Singapore is located at the southern tip of the Malaysian peninsula and just over 100 km north of the equator. It consists of the island of Singapore and about 60 islets within its territorial waters, covering a total land area of 712.4 sq. km. With a total population of 5.08 million persons occupying this small area, Singapore has an extremely high density of 7,126 per sq. km.
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Singapore has a parliamentary system based on the Westminster model. The country is led by one-dominant party - the People's Action Party (PAP) - which was formed in 1954 by anti-colonial and English educated individuals. Since being elected in 1959, the PAP has won every election. The party's popularity is mainly due to the rapid economic growth that many perceive to have been brought about by the PAP's high standards of public governance. Since gaining independence on August 9, 1965, Singapore's nominal per capita GDP has risen from S$1,580 in 1965 to S$59,813 in 2010 (Data extracted from the Singapore Department of Statistics website at http://www.singstat.gov.sg). Table 1 shows the air pollution levels in Singapore based on four indicators. As can be seen, sulphur dioxide emissions declined from an average of 20 g/m3 in the 1990s to 11 g/m3 in 2008. The other indicators, namely emissions of nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide and ozone, are stable, indicating that there has not been any significant reduction of emissions at the national level. However, the air quality levels in Singapore are well within those established by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). Without any significant agricultural land or landfill sites, Singapore has no problems with methane gases. CO2 is the primary greenhouse gas emitted in the city state is produced by the use of fossil fuels in power generation. Most of Singapore's CO2 is produced by industry (54%), transportation (19%), buildings (16%) and consumer households (9%). CO2 emissions in Singapore rose from an average 5.26 million tonnes per capita in the 1970s-1980s to 10.29 million tonnes per capita in the mid-1990s, stabilizing at an average of 10.19 million tonnes per capita in the period 1995-2008 (Figure 1). Table 1 Air Pollution Levels in Singapore (selected years) Year Sulphur dioxide (g/m3) (mean) 22 18 11 17 32 27 22 27 25 23 19 22.3 19 12 11 14 15 10 8 11 Nitrogen dioxide (g/m3) (mean) 20 22 26 22.7 39 33 23 31.7 34 35 22 30.3 25 26 26 25.7 22 25 17 21.3 Carbon monoxide (mg/m3)(2nd maximum 24-hourly mean) n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.4 3.4 3.3 3.0 0.8 1 0.8 0.9 2.1 2.8 2.2 2.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 Ozone (g/m3) (4th maximum 8hourly mean) n/a n/a n/a n/a 103 83 84 90 112 126 104 114 117 143 127 129 93 96 85 91.3
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1992 Industrial Urban Sub-urban Average 1996 Industrial Urban Sub-urban Average 2000 Industrial Urban Sub-urban Average 2004 Industrial Urban Sub-urban Average 2008 Industrial Urban Sub-urban Average

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Notes: (1) Data for ozone levels for 2000 are based on readings for 2001. (2) All measurements of air quality are correlated to a reference temperature of 250C and pressure of 760 mm of mercury. (3) Data for sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide prior to 1992 are not consistent. Prior to 1992, readings for sulphur dioxide were derived from total acidity in the ambient air. Readings prior to 1992 were for nitrogen oxides and not nitrogen dioxide. (4) Standards for Air Quality in accordance with the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) are: . Sulphur dioxide <_ 80 g/m3 (annual mean) . Nitrogen dioxide <_ 100 g/m3 (annual mean) . Carbon monoxide <_ 10 mg/m3 (2nd maximum 8-hourly daily) . Ozone <_ 157 g/m3 (4th maximum 8-hourly mean)
Source: Yearbook of Statistics, Singapore (various issues).

CO2 emissions in Singapore accounted for less than 0.2% of global emissions, although Singapore's contribution has increased from an average of 0.07% in the 1970s and 1980s to 0.17% in 1991-2008. Comparatively speaking, Singapore has been considered a high emitter of greenhouse gases. The Energy Information Administration (EIA), which provides energy statistics to the United States government, indicated in its 2006 data that Singapore emitted 141 million tonnes of CO2. The EIA ranked Singapore as the 33rd highest emitter of greenhouse gases among 215 countries. A recent study ranks Singapore as the worst environmental offender among 179 countries in terms of proportional environmental impact (Bradshaw, Giam, & Sodhi, 2010). Singapore's poor ranking is attributed to its drive for economic development and urbanization that has led to high proportional natural forest loss and greater release of CO2. In this study, however, Singapore is too small to assess in terms of its absolute environmental impact. Figure 1 Annual Carbon Dioxide Emissions (1971-2008)

Source: IEA (2010).

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Table 2 World Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 2006 (in millions metric tons of CO2) Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 13 55 68 81 110 112 126 Country Gibraltar Virgin Islands Qatar Netherlands Antilles Trinidad and Tobago Bahrain UAE Singapore Kuwait Brunei United States Malaysia China Thailand Indonesia Vietnam Philippines Emissions per capita 160.22 118.30 61.19 49.13 44.32 38.44 35.05 31.41 30.92 26.89 19.78 6.70 4.58 3.79 1.21 0.81 0.27 % change since 1996 38 51 75 -4 95 69 44 43 52 185 7 61 105 44 18 132 20

Source: Extracted from the Guardian website at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/datablog/2009/sep/02/carbon-emissions-per-person-capita (also published in "Singapore's Emission Levels Disturbing," 2009).

According to another report published in the Guardian, Singapore was ranked as the 8th highest emitter for 2006 at 31.41 million metric tons of CO2, ahead of the United States (ranked 13th) and China (68th) (Table 2). Over the 10-year period 1996-2006, CO2 growth in Singapore registered 43%, which was comparatively higher than that of the United States and the Netherlands. Singapore's Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources dismissed the report, claiming that the data was misleading because it "incorrectly included emissions from international aviation and marine bunker fuels sold by Singapore to ships and aircraft transiting Singapore" ("Singapore's Emission Levels 'Disturbing'," 2009; "Data is Misleading," 2009). The inclusion, MEWR officials argued, deviates from the internationally accepted norm - as established by the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) - which does not consider emissions that take place outside of a country in question. Using data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) that is comparable to the greenhouse gas inventories reported by countries to the UNFCCC, Singapore does compare more favorably with developed nations. Singapore's carbon intensity (CO2/GDP using PPP) in 2008 at 0.32 kg of CO2 per US$1 using 2000 prices was lower than that of Australia (0.59), Canada (0.52), United States (0.48), Germany (0.34), Finland (0.34), New Zealand (0.33) and the OCED average (0.38). Singapore's carbon intensity, however, was higher than that of the United Kingdom (0.28), Denmark (0.28), France (0.21), Norway (0.19), Switzerland (0.16) and Sweden (0.15) (IEA, 2010). Suresh (2010) suggests that these countries have access to nuclear and renewable energy sources, something not available to Singapore. Still, it is interesting that by arguing that the emissions took place outside of its territory, Singapore has disregarded the emissions as those produced domestically despite the obvious role they play in contributing to the pollution problem in the first place. As early as the late 1980s, Fortes (1988) reported that shipping accidents, spills, and operational shipping and refining activities resulted in more than 4.5 million tonnes of oily waste discharged into the South China Sea per annum.

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Singapore represents a typical case where economic growth has assumed a high priority in a state's agenda. This is clearly manifested in the Singapore government's national report for the 1992 United Nations Conference, which stated that "the principles guiding Singapore's environmental policies can be summarized in this order of priority: (a) satisfy the people's economic needs first; (b) control population growth; (c) prevent pollution at source; (d) conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for all development projects . . ." (Anon, 1992, p. 9). This "economy-first" mentality prevails for a reason. When the PAP assumed power in 1959, the economy was suffering from high unemployment, corruption, rampant crime, a large budget deficit (US$4.7 million), rapid population growth, and a public housing crisis (50% of the population were living as squatters) (Quah, 2008). With elites concerned about a communist threat among the populace in the early years, rapid economic development was favored by the PAP as a remedy. The Economic Development Board (EDB) formed in 1961 was given the task of attracting multinational corporations (MNCs) to Singapore, successfully encouraging companies from the United States, Europe and Japan to establish factories and plants in the late 1960s. MNCs were attracted to Singapore by low production costs, as well as the nation's political stability and strategic location. As Singapore's economy diversified to include chemical and electronic industries, steps were taken to reduce the adverse effects of industrialization on the quality of the environment. In April 1970, the Anti-pollution Unit (APU) was formed. Established under the Prime Minister's Office, the APU was granted powers to reject industries from operating in Singapore if they were deemed harmful to the environment (Tan, 2008). The Ministry of Environment was instituted in 1972 to enforce the Environmental Protection and Management Act. According to the Act, any premises that cause pollution or are injurious to public health or safety are "guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding S$100,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or to both and, in the case of a continuing offence, to a further fine not exceeding S$2,000 for every day or part thereof during which the offence continues after conviction" (Chapter 94A, Act 39/2). This stringency in effluent and emission regulations was felt necessary as companies tend to view environmental protection as a deterrent to profit generation (Perry & Singh, 2002). However, owing to concerns over job creation, it was clear that antipollution mechanisms did not attract sufficient attention from the government until the 1970s. Reliance on the manufacturing sector and fossil fuels in Singapore means that emission of pollutants (like CO2) remains a concern as the economy develops. While certain industries such as iron ore smelting and pulp and paper manufacturing have been rejected outright because of the difficulty in dealing with waste products (Tan, 2008), other industries that contribute to the economy are welcomed in the city-state. For example, after it was estimated that the petrochemical industry would significantly raise the country's national output (the value added per worker was estimated to be around S$1 million), create well-paid hightech jobs, and reduce dependence on the electronics industry, the government welcomed it to Jurong Island, despite its processing of non-renewable fossil fuels (oil and natural gas) that are linked to serious pollution problems. Even environmentally related campaigns and nature conservation efforts appear economically motivated in Singapore. As stated by former Prime Minister Lee Kuan-yew, "in wooing investors, even trees matter" (as cited in Lye, 2008, p. 73). A clean and environmentallyfriendly Singapore is seen as generating economic growth through the arrival of tourists, foreign talent, and "green" companies (Teo, 1994). Thus, it has been argued that the real motivation for nature conservation initiatives such as the decision to retain the 87 hectare Sungai Buloh as a nature park is to derive political legitimacy through continual economic development. As Goh (2001) points out, "being environmentally sound and cleaning up after rapid industrialization prevents the erosion of its [the government's] legitimacy base, as adverse environmental degradation would be seen as stemming from the same stateengineered economic development" (p. 12). Geh and Sharp (2008) similarly conclude that
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nature conservation projects in Singapore are sanctioned only insofar as they are "economically and politically affordable" (p. 184). As such assessments indicate, in an economically-focused nation-state like Singapore, nature conservation efforts reflect an opportunity cost in an increasingly globalized and competitive world. It can be argued that combatting environmental damage through fossil fuel emission reductions and recycling requires behavioral changes among citizens, not just modifications in official policy. In this regard, a reputable government should inculcate pro-environmental habits and attitudes among the public, for when official policy is obsessed with economic growth, citizens in turn usually show little concern for the environmental impact of such growth. As but one example of a typical government response to rising emission levels, Lee Kuan-yew, at a student forum on October 19, 2009, resisted attempts to list Singapore as an Annex 1 country at the December 2009 Copenhagen International Summit on Climate Change, since that would require the city-state to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 50% to 85% by 2050. Lee pointed out that the city-state relied on the manufacturing sector to boost its economy, and hence complying with the conditions would harm its economic growth (Ho, 2009). On October 30, 2009, the government of Singapore announced that it would not accept any emissions cuts as part of a global agreement to tackle climate change at Copenhagen, arguing that the nation's carbon dioxide emissions were "negligible" as a percentage of global totals and that it was "not obligated" to set targets ("Singapore Rejects Emission Cuts," 2009). Indeed, Singaporeans have yet to demonstrate the kind of environmental awareness expected from an advanced nation. Tan, Kim and Goh (1998) surveyed more than 1,000 Singapore students on their environmental knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors and concluded that the nation's school curriculum was ineffective in inculcating a culture of stewardship for the environment. Conducted in 2002, the World Values Survey of Singaporeans' environmental attitudes painted a more depressing picture. When asked whether protecting the environment or promoting economic growth should be prioritized, 58.7% of 1,512 respondents favored economic growth while only 34.7% showed concern for the environment. When asked if they would accept a tax increase if the money was used for environmental protection, 53.6% disagreed and 43.7% agreed. Christudason (2002) observes that concern for the environment does not come naturally to Singapore's citizens, mentioning how only punitive measures (such as shaming litterers by making them pick up trash in public) and strict fines generate appropriate behaviors (p. 256). This is particularly embarrassing since the Singapore Green Plan - the national blueprint on the environment - has envisaged the public as playing a more active role in promoting environmental sustainability. From a global perspective, Singapore's traditional position is that it cannot reduce greenhouse gas emissions at the cost of economic growth. Nonetheless, as the Deputy Director of the Energy Division (Ministry of Trade and Industry) pointed out, Singapore pledges to do "our fair share as part of a collective global effort" (Phua, 2008). This includes Singapore's official commitment to cut 16% of its greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, announced on December 2, 2009, just prior to the Copenhagen summit ("Singapore to Pledge 16% Cut in Gas Emissions," 2009). Singapore's commitment, however, is conditional in that it will only take action if other countries reduce emissions. Comparatively speaking, Singapore's commitment pales in comparison to 40%-50% reductions supported by China announced earlier, but it is similar to the United States' declaration to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 17% of 2005 levels by 2050 under the Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009.

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Table 3 Copenhagen Accord Pledges for Reductions in CO2 Emissions 2007 Level1 (million metric tons) 13,721 5,812 4,050 1,585 1,236 530 377 131 10,816 6,603 1,574 477 445 434 416 352 195 172 148 24,537 Reduction by 20202 17% from 2005; 83% by 2050 20% from 1990 (30% contingent); 80% by 2050 15-25% from 1990 25% from 1990 (contingent) 17% from 2005; 83% by 2050 5% (15-25% contingent) from 2000 10-20%, 30-40%, 20-30% from 1990, respectively

Annex 1 United States EU Russia Japan Canada Australia New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland Non Annex 1 China India Korea Mexico South Africa Indonesia Brazil Kazakhstan Argentina Singapore Total

40-45% cut in carbon intensity of GDP from 2005 level 20-25% cut in carbon intensity of GDP from 2005 level 30% cut from BAU 30% cut from BAU 34% cut from BAU 26% cut from BAU 36-39% cut from BAU 15% from 1992 No specific target 16% cut from BAU

1. Excludes deforestation. 2. BAU: business-as-usual baseline level by 2020.


Source: Cline (2010) (Table 1: 2).

That being said, Singapore was one of only 19 major economies that eventually submitted to the Copenhagen Accord (Table 3). The summit on climate change in Copenhagen was plagued by finger pointing, with the developing and emerging countries led by China, India, Venezuela and Brazil refusing to pledge emission reductions and demanding that their wealthier counterparts slash their emissions by at least 40% in 2020 compared to 1990 levels. Developed nations, on the other hand, expected the developing countries to take robust and transparent action to reduce carbon emissions. The meeting ended with Singapore, the United States, and 17 other major economies agreeing to meet targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, which, if achieved, would result in global emission reductions of 9.1% from the business-as-usual level but still an increase of 11% above 2007 levels. Singapore has also adhered to the Kyoto Protocol since 2006. The decision has been described as a significant shift in Singapore's policy towards CO2 emissions from its traditional stance of refusing to set emission targets by clinging to its developing nation status (Hamilton-Hart, 2006, pp. 369, 372). It has been argued that Singapore's decision to accede to the Kyoto Protocol was purely nationalistically orientated "to protect the country's international image and to benefit from the economic opportunities that the protocol opens up" (Hamilton-Hart, 2006, p. 375). The Singapore government is in fact very conscious of its international reputation. Displaying its green credentials allows the
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government to attain its dual objective of maintaining its reputation and boosting the economic performance of the city-state. The establishment of the Singapore Mercantile Exchange (SMX) (in the first quarter of 2009) to allow for the trading of carbon permits is a case in point, with the government essentially seeing this as an opportunity to reap economic rewards. The new exchange is expected to add to the stature of Singapore as a global financial center and increase foreign direct investment. Similarly, a concern for the national economic interest has prompted Singapore to confront the periodic problem of haze in the atmosphere, fearing that failure to take action might impact negatively on the economy. The haze problem results from the burning of peat land and forests by farmers and the activities of commercial enterprises in regions surrounding Singapore, particularly in Borneo. Singapore's Particular Matter (PM) readings skyrocketed to an average of 226.5 g/m3 and 217.3 g/m3 in 1997 and 2006, respectively, exceeding the 150 g/m3 USEPA Air Quality Standard. It was estimated that land and forest fires in Indonesia in 1997 imposed costs of between US$163.5 million to US$286.2 million on Singapore, largely from medical expenses, lost revenues from tourism, and disruption of air travel (Quah, 2002, p. 429). In view of the damage caused to the economy, the government of Singapore provided its Indonesian counterpart with information on the location of fires through high resolution satellite images obtained by the Center for Remote Imaging, Sensing and Processing (CRISP) at the National University of Singapore. At the regional level, Singapore pressed for the compliance of Indonesia to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Agreement on Trans-boundary Haze Pollution, which was signed in 2002 and put into effect one year later (see Jones, 2006). Economic concerns therefore prompted the government to combat the haze problem, taking actions that will undoubtedly bring benefits to Singapore and neighboring countries through better air quality. To recapitulate, Singapore assesses environmental policies not only for how they will affect the environment but also for the economic advantages they offer the city-state. Its position as such reflects the realistic policy choices confronting many countries around the world, with the government not hesitating to emphasize its national economic interests when supporting initiatives aimed at reducing environmental degradation. Exactly how to reconcile economic growth with environmental sustainability, however, will remain a challenge for Singapore as well as other countries.

CONCLUSION
Classical economic theory proposes trade and access to markets as essential ingredients for economic growth. A concern, however, is that high economic growth may lead to the destruction of nature through problems such as pollution and deforestation. This case study assessed the multiple interactions affecting the relationship between economic growth and environmental quality, going beyond abstract assessment. Instead, national policies and programs were analyzed to assess whether they are likely to promote the interest of the nation through active (albeit selective) participation in the global economy. It is fair to say that the government of Singapore has taken the route of adopting policies to generate economic growth and "green" the city-state concurrently. Singapore strongly believes that both objectives can be simultaneously attained. The main implication drawn from this is that environmental policies, in Singapore and elsewhere, should be seen in realistic terms that involve reconciling national economic self-interest with global environmental protection.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to thank the Editor in Chief of the Asia Journal of Global Studies, Derrick M. Nault, for his detailed comments and suggestions for improvement.

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Asia Journal of Global Studies

Balancing Development and Environmental Concerns: The Case of Singapore

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Vol 4, No 2 (2010-11)

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