Board of Optometry vs. Angel B. Colet G.R. No.

122241, July 30, 1996 Prayer of the Petitioners: The petitioners seek to annul and set aside the order rendered by herein public respondent Judge Angel B. Colet, who granted the writ of preliminary injunction restraining, enjoining, and prohibiting the herein petitioners in enforcing and implementing the Revised Optometry Law or any regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder. Prayer of Respondents: Herein private respondents prayed that the writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent. Facts: Congress enacted R.A. No. 8050, entitled An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes," otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995. Herein private respondents filed with a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They cited the following as grounds for their petition: 1. that there was derogation in the legislative process and vitiation of legislative consent; 2. that RA No. 8050 violates the due process clause of the Constitution; 3. that RA No. 8050 violates the principle against undue delegation of legislative power; and 4. that it is violation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and press. Meanwhile, upon examination of the petition, it was found out that the body of the petition gave no details as to the juridical personality and addresses of the alleged herein associations OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP, except for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. The petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74770, merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home addresses. As to herein petitioners, they filed an opposition to the application for preliminary injunction and alleged that: 1. respondents do not possess the requisite right as would entitle them to the relief they sought; 2. respondents have no legal existence or capacity to file the case; 3. that the implementation of the questioned law carries no injurious effect; and 4. that herein respondents failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the questioned law. The Regional Trial Court granted the writ of preliminary injunction. The court was inclined to find prima facie, that petitioners have legal rights affected by the Revised Optometry Law, and that in its operation, said Law is likely to inflict serious and irreparable injury to such legal rights. Thus, herein petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Issue: Whether or not herein private respondents have legal existence or capacity (locus standi) to question the constitutionality of RA No. 8050. Ruling: Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members. There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP. For one, the body of the petition in Civil Case No. 9574770 makes no mention of these associations nor states their addresses. Further, nowhere is it claimed therein that they are juridical entities. These run counter to Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party must be averred. Second, not even in the sworn statements of the alleged presidents representing the "associations," which were offered in evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, were such "associations" mentioned or

named. Finally, in their Comment on the instant petition, the private respondents chose to remain silent on the issue of the juridical personality of their "associations." For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoid of legal personality to bring an action, such as herein questioned petition. Therefore, since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical entities, they cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real parties in interest. Thus, petitioners prayer is granted. The questioned order rendered by the Regional Trial Court granting the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and the writ of preliminary injunction are hereby annulled and set aside. Principle: An association can only be considered as a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members. Mariano v COMELEC Facts: Petitioners contend that Sec. 2, 51, and 52 of RA 7854 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: Sec. 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, as required by Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, in relation to Sec. 7 and 450 of the LGC; Sec. 51 attempts to alter or restart the threeconsecutive term limit for local elective officials; Sec. 52 increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (not what is provided for in Art. VI, Sec. 5(4), Consti), not expressed in the title of the bill, and survey is 450,000 people only. Issue: WON Sec. 52, RA 7854 is unconstitutional. Ruling: Negative. Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as a charter of a new city. LA BUGAL-B'LAAN vs DENR Jan. 21, 2004 Facts: R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements. Petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order alleging that at the time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares, 64 of which applications are by fully foreign-owned corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas. Issue: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited to technical or financial assistance only? Ruling: Only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements may be entered into, and only for large-scale activities. These are contract forms which recognize and assert our sovereignty and ownership over natural resources since the foreign entity is just a pure contractor and not a beneficial owner of our economic resources. The proposal recognizes the need for capital and technology to develop our natural resources without sacrificing our sovereignty and control over such resources by the safeguard of a special law which requires two-thirds vote of

all the members of the Legislature. It is true that the word technical encompasses a broad number of possible services. However, the law follows the maxim casus omisus pro omisso habendus est which means a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. LA BUGAL-B'LAAN vs DENR Dec. 1, 2004 Facts: On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts, which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation. Issue: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited to technical or financial assistance only? Ruling: Only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements may be entered into, and only for large-scale activities. Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a private corporation: the performance of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board retains full residual control of the business. Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (and other consolidated cases) DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: I. THE FACTS On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus: NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent

or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger. Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence. II. 1. 2. THE ISSUE Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid? Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

III. THE RULING [The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.] 1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid. [S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and x x x. Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria Now and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. 2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid. [T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives. Warth v Seldin Warth v Seldin Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs claimed that a local zoning ordinance excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in a certain community. Defendants responded by claiming that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A plaintiff must generally allege a specific case or controversy between herself and the defendant in order to have standing. Facts. The Plaintiffs were various organizations and individuals residing in Rochester, New York (Rochester). The Plaintiffs brought suit against the town of Penfield, New York (Penfield) and members of Penfields Zoning, Planning, and Town Boards (Defendants). Plaintiffs contended that Penfields zoning ordinance effectively excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in the town, in contravention of constitutional and statutory rights. The lower federal courts held that none of the Plaintiffs had standing. Issue. Have the Plaintiffs established that a case or controversy exists between themselves and the Defendants within the meaning of Article III of the United States Constitution (Constitution), in order to have standing?

Held. Yes. Judgment affirmed. In order for a federal court to have jurisdiction, the plaintiff himself must have suffered some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively legal action. Additionally, standing will generally not be found when: a generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens a plaintiff attempts to claim relief on the legal rights of third parties. Congress may create standing for individuals through statutes who would otherwise lack standing, so long as the plaintiff alleges a distinct and palpable injury to himself. In the present case, the Plaintiffs claimed the enforcement of zoning ordinances against third parties had the effect of precluding the construction of housing suitable to their needs. For standing, a plaintiff must allege that the challenged practices affect him specifically and that court intervention would personally benefit the plaintiff. In order for an organization to have standing, it must claim that all or any one of its members are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action. Plaintiffs in this case fail to do so. Dissent. The Plaintiffs have submitted a sufficient pleading to avoid a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The majoritys opinion is based instead on the merits of the claim. Los Angeles v Lyons Brief Fact Summary. Adolph Lyons (Lyons) was pulled over by a Los Angeles police officer for a traffic violation. He offered no resistance, and without provocation, the police officer seized Lyons and placed him in a chokehold, rendering Lyons unconscious. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A plaintiff who wants to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court must allege an actual case or controversy. Further, the injury complained of by plaintiff must be immediate. Past exposure to illegal conduct does not, by itself, show a present case or controversy. Facts. In 1976, Lyons was pulled over by a Los Angeles police officer for a traffic violation. Although Lyons offered no resistance, the officer asked him to step out of the car, and proceeded to place Lyons in a chokehold, rendering Lyons unconscious. Lyons sued the municipality and sought damages and injunctive relief in District Court for the Central District of California. He asked the court to issue an injunction preventing the police department from using chokeholds in the future unless circumstances were to result in death or serious bodily injury if force was withheld. The District Court entered such an injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The municipality appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue. Does this case present an actual case or controversy that can be determined by the Supreme Court? If so, does Lyons have standing to seek injunctive relief against the municipality of Los Angeles? Held. This case does not present an actual case or controversy as required in the Constitution under Article III. Past illegal conduct, by itself, is insufficient to establish an actual case or controversy for injunctive relief. Even though Lyons was injured by the police in the past, this act alone does not establish that Lyons is threatened with immediate injury or that he will be pulled over and placed in a chokehold again. Lyons did not have standing to bring this case to the Supreme Court. In order to have standing, a

plaintiff must show 1) an actual or likely injury in fact, 2) that the injury is sufficiently concrete and individually affects the plaintiff, 3) that the challenged action is the cause in fact of the injury, and 4) that the Court will be able to redress the injury by its decision. In this case, injunctive relief against the municipality may or may not address the injury suffered by Lyons. He could seek damages for any injuries he sustained from the chokehold (i.e. hospital bills, etc.), but he did not have standing to enforce an injunction where it was not clear if others would be placed in a chokehold in the future. Furthermore, it was speculative, at best, that Lyons himself would be placed in a chokehold in the future, and therefore injunctive relief would not clearly redress any potential injury. Dissent. Lyons did have standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief against the municipality because he did present an actual case or controversy and had suffered damages relating to the chokehold. Standing has always depended on whether a plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. The Dissent explained that Lyons request for injunctive relief was coupled with his claim for damages based on past injury. Because he has an actual claim for damages, he need not rely solely on the threat of future injury to establish his personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. Discussion. Past exposure to illegal conduct does not, by itself, establish a present case or controversy, and therefore cannot meet the Article III Constitutional requirement of actual case or controversy. DeFunis v Odegaard Brief Fact Summary. Marco DeFunis, Jr. applied for admission as a first-year student at the University of Washington Law School, a state-operated institution. When he was denied admission, he brought suit in a Washington trial court claiming that the admissions committee procedures were racially discriminatory. Synopsis of Rule of Law. In federal cases before the Supreme Court, there must be an actual case and controversy which exists at the stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated. Facts. Marco DeFunis, Jr. sued the University of Washington Law School, a state operated university. DeFunis argued that the Universitys admissions policies and criteria were racially discriminatory. However, DeFunis was allowed to attend the law school during the case and was in his third year when the case was heard by the Court. Further, the University has agreed to let him graduate upon completion of his last year. Issue. Does an actual controversy exist between the parties, capable of redress by the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court)? Held. The Court ordered the parties to address the issue of mootness before they proceeded to any other claims in the petition. The Court reasoned that federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the cases before them. This requirement stems from Article III of the Constitution, under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy. No amount of public interest would be sufficient to create an actual case or controversy, and the case was rendered moot because DeFunis was going to graduate from the law school regardless of the Courts ruling. Thus, the

case was rendered moot. [T]he controversy between the parties has thus clearly ceased to be definite and concrete. Dissent. There were numerous potential litigants who would be affected by a decision on the legal issues presented. Further, 26 amici curiae briefs were filed by parties in this case. The public interest would be best served by reviewing these issues now, as they would inevitably find their way back into the federal court system. There was a stronger interest in litigating these issues immediately to avoid repetitious litigation that would inevitably occur due to the high public interest in this issue. Discussion. A case is considered moot if a justiciable controversy existed when a case was filed, but circumstances after filing indicate the litigant no longer has a stake in the controversy. In such a situation, the Supreme Courts jurisdiction is not invoked, and the Court will not even hear the other issues presented. Craig v Boren Brief Fact Summary. Oklahoma State maintained different drinking ages between men and women for the consumption of 3.2% alcohol beer. The Appellant, Craig (Appellant), now alleges that this difference violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Gender-based classifications must satisfy intermediate scrutiny requirements to pass constitutional muster. Facts. The State of Oklahoma prohibited the sale of nonintoxicating 3.2% alcohol beer to men under the age of 21 and women under the age of 18. Suit was brought against the State, alleging the law violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Issue. Does the Oklahoma statute violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? Held. Yes. Appeals Court ruling reversed and remanded. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) argues that case precedent dictates that an intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied in analyzing the statute. Specifically, the gender-based classification must serve an important government objective and be substantially related to the achievement of such objective. The District Court unequivocally found that the objective to be served by the statute is increased traffic safety. J. Brennan is not persuaded by the Appellees, Craig and others (Appellees), statistics that the statute closely serves the stated objective. As such, it is not constitutional. Dissent. Justice William Rehnquist (J. Rehnquist) dissents on two levels. He believes that rational basis analysis is the appropriate level of scrutiny for gender-based classification. Furthermore, he believes that the intermediate scrutiny applied by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is so diaphanous and elastic as to encourage judicial prejudice. Discussion. Craig v. Boren establishes intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate level of review for gender-based classification. Intermediate scrutiny is distinguished from strict scrutiny at both the objective and means levels. Important government objectives (intermediate) v. compelling government objectives (strict) and substantially related (intermediate) v. narrowly tailored (strict).

Kilosbayan vs Guingona 7 Apr GR No. 113375, May 5, 1994 FACTS: Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities, the PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, a multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia, became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the medium through which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO. Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. On 15 August 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to the PCSO. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the countrys on-line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993 for final clearance and approval by the Chief Executive. On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that only a court injunction can stop Malacaang, and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition. Petitioner claims that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Taada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Taada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines. The public respondents, meanwhile allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing the Courts resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi 2. Whether or the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign. is legal and valid. HELD: We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to

raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169 is indisputably clear. The PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. Undoubtedly, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood that any arrangement between them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical, operations, and management aspects of the on-line lottery system while the PSCO would, primarily, provide the franchise. The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be. Woven therein are provisions which negate its title and betray the true intention of the parties to be in or to have a joint venture for a period of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery system. We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law. This conclusion renders unnecessary further discussion on the other issues raised by the petitioners. Kilosbayan vs. Morato (G.R. No. 118910. July 17, 1995) 25 Apr KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners, vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents. Ponente: MENDOZA FACTS: [T]his suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case [decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC)]. Petitioners maintain (1) that the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges of a joint venture which were found in the Contract of Lease nullified in the prior case; (2) that the ELA did not have to be submitted to a public bidding because it fell within the exception provided in E.O. No. 301, 1 (e); (3) that the power to determine whether the ELA is advantageous to the government is vested in the Board of Directors of the PCSO; (4) that for lack of funds the PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery equipment and has had to enter into a lease contract; (5) that what petitioners are

actually seeking in this suit is to further their moral crusade and political agenda, using the Court as their forum. ISSUE: Whether or not the ELA between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. is invalid. HELD: NO. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction was dismissed. Pertinent to the issue, the SC held: xxx (3) that the ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is not contrary to the charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office; (4) that under 1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office has authority to enter into a contract for the holding of an on-line lottery, whether alone or in association, collaboration or joint venture with another party, so long as it itselfholds or conducts such lottery; and (5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) in question did not have to be submitted to public bidding as a condition for its validity. RATIO: E.O. No. 301, 1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment. It does not refer to contracts of lease of equipment like the ELA. The provisions on lease are found in 6 and 7 but they refer to the lease of privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government-owned buildings or spaces for private use, and these provisions do not require public bidding. It is thus difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can be applied to the ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may be thought of as close to a contract of purchase and sale is the option to buy given to the PCSO. An option to buy is not of course a contract of purchase and sale. Indeed the question is not whether compared with the former joint venture agreement the present lease contract is [more] advantageous to the government. The question is whether under the circumstances, the ELA is the most advantageous contract that could be obtained compared with similar lease agreements which the PCSO could have made with other parties. Petitioners have not shown that more favorable terms could have been obtained by the PCSO or that at any rate the ELA, which the PCSO concluded with the PGMC, is disadvantageous to the government. SEPARATE OPINIONS: PADILLA, concurring I join the majority in voting for the dismissal of the petition in this case. As to whether or not the ELA is grossly disadvantageous to the government, it should be stressed that the matter involves, basically, a policy determination by the executive branch which this Court should not ordinarily reverse or substitute with its own judgment, in keeping with the time honored doctrine of separation of powers. VITUG, concurring I most humbly reiterate the separate opinion I have made in Kilosbayan, Inc., et al., vs. Teofisto Guingona, Sr., etc., et al. (G.R. No. 113375, promulgated on 05 May 1994). Back to the core of the petition, however, the matter of the legal standing of petitioners in their suit assailing the subject-contract appears to me, both under substantive law and the rules of procedure, to still be an insuperable issue. I have gone over carefully the pleadings submitted in

G.R. No. 118910, and I regret my inability to see anything new that can convince me to depart from the view I have expressed on it in G.R. No. 113375. FELICIANO, dissenting With very great respect, it is submitted that the above conclusion has been merely assumed rather than demonstrated and that what is in fact before this Court does not adequately support such conclusion. REGALADO, dissenting I am constrained to respectfully dissent from the majority opinion premised on the constitutional and procedural doctrines posed and interpreted in tandem therein. I also regret that I have to impose on the majority with this virtual turno en contra when I could have indicated my disaccord by just joining Mr. Justice Davide in his commendably objective presentation of the minority position. I feel, however, that certain views that have been advanced require a rejoinder lest they lapse into the realm of unanimous precedents. DAVIDE, dissenting I register a dissenting vote. I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings in Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Guingona, et al. (hereinafter referred to as the first lotto case) regarding the application or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO (R.A.. No. 1169), as amended by B.P. Blg. 442, and on the issue of locus standi of the petitioners to question the contract of lease involving the on-line lottery system entered into between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). Such reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and stare decisis. It puts to jeopardy the faith and confidence of the people, specially the lawyers and litigants, in the certainty and stability of the pronouncements of this Court. It opens the floodgates to endless litigations for re-examination of such pronouncements and weakens this Courts judicial and moral authority to demand from lower courts obedience thereto and to impose sanctions for their opposite conduct. Francisco v. Fernando EN BANC ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,G.R. No. 166501 Petitioner, - versus - HON. BAYANI F. FERNANDO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, and METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondents.November 16, 2006 x--------------------------------------------------x RESOLUTION CARPIO,J.: Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA (respondents) from further implementing its wet flag scheme (Flag Scheme). The Mandamus writ is to compel respondents to respect and uphold the x x x rights of pedestrians to due process x x x and equal protection of the laws x x x.

Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDAs governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates pedestrian rights as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards. In their Comment, respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for petitioners lack of standing to litigate and for violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Alternatively, respondents contended that the Flag Scheme is a valid preventive measure against jaywalking. Petitioner filed a Reply, claiming that the Court should take cognizance of the case as it raises issues of paramount and transcendental importance. Petitioner also contended that he filed this petition directly with the Court because the issues raised in the petition deserve the directx x x intervention of the x x x [C]ourt x x x. We dismiss the petition. A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury. On the other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. Petitioner meets none of the requirements under either category. Nor is there merit to petitioners claim that the Court should relax the standing requirement because of the transcendental importance of the issues the petition raises.As an exception to the standing requirement, the transcendental importance of the issues raised relates to the merits of the petition. Thus, the party invoking it must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition. Petitioner has not shown such clear constitutional or statutory violation. On the Flag Schemes alleged lack of legal basis, we note thatall the cities and municipalities within the MMDAs jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic managementcodes with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations.After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance instyle="font-size: 14pt; line-height: 28px; "Valenzuelastyle="font-size: 14pt; line-height: 28px; "Citydoes not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that city. Further, the petition ultimately calls for a factual determination of whether the Flag Scheme is a reasonable enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar enactments.This Court is not a trier of facts. The petition proffers mere surmises and speculations on the potential hazards of the

Flag Scheme.This Court cannot determine the reasonableness of the Flag Scheme based on mere surmises and speculations. Lastly, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this petition directly with us. This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief. We relax this rule only in exceptional and compelling circumstances. This is not the case here. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. SO ORDERED.

PHILCONSA vs Enriquez 9 May GR No. 113105, August 19, 1994 FACTS: House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval. On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows: 1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987. 2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), 3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance. 4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675). 5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval of

the Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers 5. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. 7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi 2. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional 3. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional. HELD: Locus Standi We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]). Veto of the Provisions The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution. The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law. In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Managements Procurement Service). The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other

hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]). The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the congressional or legislative veto. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed. Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended. On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines. IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anticrime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time

when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. Issues: (1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review (2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was

incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP. People v Vera Political Law Delegation of Powers Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power. HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

DECISION
(En Banc) BUENA, J.: I. THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. II. THE ISSUE Was the VFA unconstitutional? III. THE RULING [The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.] NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it. xxx xxx xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty. xxx xxx xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution. Gonzales v Narvasa G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000 Facts: On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. In his capacity as citizen and as taxpayer, he seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner also prays that the Executive Secretary be compelled through a mandamus to furnish the petitioner with information requesting the names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacaang. Issue: Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a citizen and as taxpayer. Ratio Decidendi: The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to bring suit as citizen. Petitioner did not in fact show what particularized interest they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they still fall short of the requirements to maintain action. Their interest in assailing the EO does not present to be of a direct and personal character. Furthermore, they do not sustain or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement. As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropriation granted from Congress but only an authorization by the president. There being exercise by Congress of its taxing and spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the PCCRs creation. The petitioner has failed to show that he is a real party in interest. With regards to the petitioners request of disclosure to public information, the Court upheld that citizens may invoke before the courts the right to information. When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with the exception that respondent Executive Secretary is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested.