c o r p o r a t e f i n a n c e

DECEMBER 2008

Financial crises, past

and present
Past financial crises had very different effects on the real economy.
Though the lessons of the past don’t give much cause for optimism, they
do provide hints on how companies should prepare this time around.

David Cogman and Richard Dobbs

Financial crises occur with surprising frequency—in every decade in the past
century there has been at least one big shock to a major economy’s financial
system. Judging from that history, the current upheaval will probably rank
among the largest, and we face the prospect of a severe, painful recession. Yet
comparing the current financial crisis with those of the 20th century may
provide some comfort: the impact of past crises on the real economy was by no
means uniform, and it depended, critically, on the way governments acted to
recapitalize the banking system and to restore stability and confidence.

The boom that preceded the present crisis uniquely combined several
leverage-driven bubbles: a residential-mortgage bubble, an associated one in
the real-estate market, and a bubble in corporate earnings. At the time of
writing, US financial institutions had taken total credit crisis–related write-offs
of almost $1 trillion.1 McKinsey estimates that the total eventual credit losses
in the United States are likely to be between $1.4 trillion to $2.2 trillion in a
base case.2 The losses will be greater if another major asset area (such as
credit default swaps) collapses or if a misguided policy response exacerbates
the problems, as it did in Japan during the 1990s. This base case range of
possible losses represents 10 to 15 percent of US GDP.

By historical standards, that is substantial. In the past century, it was exceeded

only three times: during the banking crisis that inaugurated Japan’s “lost
decade” in the early 1990s, the Asian financial crisis of the late ’90s, and the
Great Depression. In the first two, the afflicted banking systems recorded total
losses of 15 and 35 percent of GDP, respectively. Losses in the Great
Depression were around 20 percent of GDP in 1929,3 but this occurred in a very
different industry environment from today. Due to a combination of runs on
deposits, high levels of bank leverage, progressive deleveraging of the economy,
and limited ability of the Fed to intervene,4 this quickly became a protracted
economic downturn in which more than 9,000 financial institutions either went
into bankruptcy or sought governmental assistance, and the economy
experienced massive deflation.

From a company standpoint, the critical issue is the impact such shocks and
subsequent downturns can have on the availability of credit—and the impact of
a credit shortage on the real economy and on consumer and corporate
confidence. The downturn after the S&L crisis of the 1980s and ’90s, when
bank write-offs equaled some 4 percent of GDP, lasted about two years. GDP
ended up about 4 to 5 percent lower than it would have been given the pre-crisis
trend line. This is in line with McKinsey’s current estimate that the present
credit crisis will cut real GDP by around 3 to 7 percent from trend growth.5

1
If the US economy were to follow the same path as in the more severe crises,
the total lost GDP could be two to three times greater than that estimate. After
the bursting of Japan’s asset bubble, the country’s economy grew by less than
half a percent a year in real terms for a decade, and GDP ended up around 18
percent lower than it would have given its pre-crisis trend line. In the countries
hardest hit by the 1990s’ Asian financial crisis—Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand—GDP shrank by an average of 8
percent in 1998 in local-currency terms. Since their currencies halved in value,
on average, in US dollar terms the damage was catastrophic—bankrupting
many companies and causing widespread social unrest. And during the Great
Depression, from 1929 to 1933, 28 percent of real GDP was lost.

As of December 5, 2008, US unemployment stood at 6.7 percent.6 That is

slightly above its level during the 2001–02 recession but still some way below
the level associated with the oil shocks of the 1970s (8.5 percent) and the S&L
crisis (nearly 10 percent). It is far short of unemployment during the Great
Depression, which conservative estimates put at around 25 percent.

How long it takes an economy to emerge from a downturn depends heavily on

what kind of cleanup and stimulus package governments employ—especially in
repairing the banking system’s ability to provide credit efficiently and restoring
confidence among companies and consumers. On average, countries have
needed two years to emerge from past recessions after major banking crises7
and up to twice as long to return to trend growth.8 Only in two cases did a
downturn last substantially longer: in Japan during the lost decade, as a result
of counterproductive government policies, and in the Great Depression, when
the government was far less able to mount a coordinated response than it is
today.

Equity markets are the most visible and dramatic indicators as crises unfold.
At the end of October 2008, the S&P 500 index had fallen by 46 percent from
its peak a year before (October 9, 2007, to October 27, 2008). By late
November 2008, the US equity market had given up almost all of its gains
since the 2001–02 dot-com bust. Although nobody knows if the market has
reached bottom, the fall so far isn’t unusual by historical standards. Japan’s
Nikkei 225 fell by 48 percent from peak to trough (December 29, 1989, to
October 1, 1990) during the banking crisis, though the market has subsequently
fallen still further; at the end of October 2008, it retained less than 20 percent
of the peak value reached in 1999. During the Asian financial crisis, the equity
markets of Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand fell by 65, 72, and 85
percent, respectively, in local-currency terms. In the United States, the S&P 500
index fell by 49 percent from March 24, 2000, to October 9, 2002, after the
tech bubble burst.

2
There is, however, one important difference in the current crisis. In previous
ones, market valuations, as measured by price-to-earnings (P/E), hit excessive
levels before the crash.9 This time, corporate earnings, which were around 50
percent above their long-run trend line as a proportion of GDP, experienced a
bubble as well. Before the onset of the credit crisis, US corporate earnings were
substantially above their trend growth (exhibit).1 0 Both the numerator and the
denominator of P/E ratios were inflated.

EX HI B IT
Coming back in sync

By historical standards, the real-estate market bubble is more worrisome,

because of the medium-term impact on household wealth. From the mid-1970s
to the end of the last century, US housing values enjoyed average nominal
growth of around 5.4 percent a year, according to the House Price Index of the

3
Office of Federal Housing Oversight. There were two major cycles during this
period: in the late 1970s and the late 1980s. In both, national average home
prices climbed, at most, 5 to 6 percent above the trend line. From 2000 to
2007, however, home prices climbed to 40 percent above the previous trend.

Going into the present crisis, the US economy was more exposed to real estate
than ever before. In the run-up to the S&L crisis, the total stock of US
residential property was worth around 104 percent of GDP, and mortgage debt
financed a third of that property. In 2001, it was worth around 121 percent of
GDP1 1 and more than 40 percent of it was financed by mortgages. At the end
of 2007, Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies estimates, the total stock
of US residential property was worth $19 trillion, around 140 percent of US
GDP, and more than half was financed by mortgages. If commercial
mortgages are included, total mortgage debt was $14.4 trillion, more than 100
percent of GDP.

Since the peak, housing prices have fallen by more than 20 percent, as
measured by the Case–Shiller housing index, whose futures imply a further fall
of more than 10 percent from current levels. Losses in housing, when realized,
could be of the same order as in the stock market as of early December 2008.

What does the future hold?

Despite the shared features of the past century’s financial crises—usually,

excess leverage somewhere in the financial system and then a breakdown in
confidence—the recessions following them were quite different. What
determined the length and severity of those recessions was how governments
responded: in particular, whether they managed to restore confidence among
consumers, companies, investors, and lenders.

An economic crisis becomes a catastrophic recession only if it blocks the

provision of capital to businesses long enough to generate widespread
corporate failures. This blockage is what made the Asian financial crisis so
devastating. Net capital inflows to the region, $93 billion in 1996, turned into
net outflows of $12 billion in 1997. Local banking systems just couldn’t provide
the capital to plug this gap, foreign banks weren’t prepared to extend credit,
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) moved too slowly. As a result,
businesses couldn’t finance working capital, let alone investment, and failed to
obtain the export financing these countries needed given the high share of
exports in their GDPs. Once the flow of credit had been restored, the economies
affected by the crisis recovered quickly.

4
Similar dynamics were at work during the Great Depression, when a
combination of bank runs and limited federal controls undermined the
financial economy. From 1929 to 1933, almost half of the banks operating in
the United States before 1929 either failed or needed government assistance, as
a result of falling prices, the doubling of the country’s debt-service ratio, and
the default of more than half of US farm debt.1 2 Many of the companies with
the strongest credit couldn’t obtain long-term debt capital in the years after the
crisis. Moreover, capital had minimal cross-border mobility in the 1930s. With
businesses starved of funding, corporate investment fell by more than 75
percent from 1929 to 1933, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data.

Under less extreme conditions, with the right kind of government intervention,
economies can weather even sizable credit crises. From 1981 to 1983, for
example, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) data show that 258
US banks failed or required assistance. Nonetheless, nonresidential US
investment fell by less than 1 percent in all. During the entire 1980s, almost
750 banks failed and more than 1,500 required assistance, as opposed to 35
during the preceding decade. Yet corporate investment increased by an average
of 4.5 percent a year in the ’80s.

Today, the real economy goes into the recession surprisingly well prepared: US
industrial companies had lower leverage and higher interest coverage than they
did going into the dot-com bust, the S&L crisis, or even the oil shocks of the
1970s. How the real economy fares will depend greatly on the way the current
policy debate plays out over the next few quarters.

What should companies do?

We do not yet know how the current crisis will evolve. The confidence of
consumers, corporations, and investors—a key factor—cannot be forecast. Nor
can government policy. Yet research shows that in past recessions, companies
pursuing a purely defensive strategy fared less well than their more active
counterparts.1 3 As the economy enters what will probably be a difficult
downturn, companies should prepare to seize their opportunities.

Examine the patterns

Although recessions differ, it’s worth understanding how different industries
performed during past downturns and what factors determined the speed of
recovery. In coming months, as the focus of government policy shifts from fire
fighting to economic stimulus, this kind of research will help companies
understand the implications for themselves and assess how the evolving
macroenvironment will affect them in the next few years.

5
Overprepare
Most companies already have contingency plans, but few plan as aggressively
as they should. It’s worth preparing for the worst—for example, major
customers filing for bankruptcy, capital expenditures needing to be cut in half
quickly, or a country sales operation losing access to local-currency working
capital. What seems improbable now could become a reality sooner than you
expect.

Scan for opportunities

Managing downside risk shouldn’t blind executives to potential upsides. Despite
the current turbulence, in most industries it isn’t hard to identify either the
companies that will find themselves under pressure or which consolidation and
reshaping scenarios might emerge. Instead of reacting to situations on short
notice as they arise, invest time now to understand how such forces might
affect your industry and what role you want your company to play.

About the Authors

David Cogman is an associate principal in McKinsey’s Shanghai office, and Richard Dobbs is a director in the Seoul
office.

The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of David Atkins, Kevin Buehler, Jared Chung, Jeff Gu,
Bin Jiang, Susan Lund, Christopher Mazingo, and Hamid Samandari to this article.

Notes

1
Source: Bloomberg. Numbers cited refer to total credit losses, irrespective of ownership of the debts.

2
Lowell Bryan and Diana Farrell, "Leading through uncertainty," mckinseyquarterly.com, December 2008.

3
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research. By 1933, total deposits in the more than 9,000 suspended banks
were $7 billion; nominal GDP was $58 billion in 1933.

4
The regulatory environment for the banking industry in 1929 was very different from today’s, particularly around
deposit insurance, which was instituted after the Great Depression; the Federal Reserve’s ability to act as lender of
last resort; and the degree of visibility that the Fed had into banks’ balance sheets.

5
Lowell Bryan and Diana Farrell, "Leading through uncertainty," mckinseyquarterly.com, December 2008.

6
“Employment situation summary,” US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, December 5, 2008.

7
Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “Is the 2007 sub-prime financial crisis so different? An international
historical comparison”, NBER working paper number 13761, January 2008.

8
“Financial Stress and Economic Downturns,” World Economic Outlook, October 2008: Financial Stress, Downturns,
and Recoveries, International Monetary Fund.

9
Marc Goedhart, Bin Jiang, and Timothy Koller, “Market fundamentals: 2000 versus 2007,” mckinseyquarterly.com,
September 2007.

10
Richard Dobbs, Bin Jiang, and Timothy Koller, “Preparing for a slump in earnings,” mckinseyquarterly.com, March
2008.

6
11
Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Federal Reserve Statistical Release, December 7, 2001.

12
See Ben S. Bernanke, “Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation of the Great Depression,”
American Economic Review, 1983, Volume 73, Number 3, pp. 257–76.

13
Richard F. Dobbs, Tomas Karakolev, and Francis Malige, “Learning to love recessions,” mckinseyquarterly.com,
June 2002.

This article has been updated to reflect factual corrections provided by the
authors.

Related Articles on mckinseyquarterly.com

“Market fundamentals: 2000 versus 2007”

“Preparing for a slump in earnings”

“A long-term look at ROIC”

“Anatomy of a bear market”

Copyright © 2008 McKinsey & Company. All rights reserved.

7
金融危机：过去与现在
过去，金融危机对实体经济的影响与现在大不相同。虽然过去的经验教训并不
会为乐观的看法提供太多理由，但它们确实可以为企业如何准备应对这一次的
金融危机提供一些启示。
2008年12月 • David Cogman and Richard Dobbs

金融危机的发生频率令人吃惊——在上个世纪，每过10年就至少会有一次对
主要经济体金融系统的严重冲击。根据历史的经验来判断，当前的金融动荡可能
会成为最严重的金融危机之一，而且我们面临着严峻的、令人痛苦的经济衰退前
景。然而，将当前的金融危机与20世纪发生的金融危机进行比较，可能会给我们
一些安慰：过去的金融危机对实体经济的影响并非一成不变，而是主要取决于政
府为调整银行系统的资本结构和恢复稳定与信心所采取行动的方式。

在发生当前这次金融危机之前的经济繁荣时期，几种由杠杆驱动的“泡沫”
独特地交织在一起：一种是住宅抵押贷款泡沫，一种是与房地产市场相关的泡
沫，还有一种是企业盈利的泡沫。到撰写本文时，美国财政部已经注销了与信贷
危机有关的总值近1万亿美元的坏账1 。据麦肯锡估计，在基准情形下，美国最终
的信贷损失总值可能在1.4万亿～2.2万亿美元之间。如果其他重要的资产领域
（如信用违约掉期）发生崩溃，或者因为错误的应对政策导致问题进一步恶化
（正如日本在上世纪90年代的情形一样），损失将会更为惨重。这些在基准情形
下可能遭受的损失规模会占到美国GDP的10％～15％。

按照历史的标准来看，这种损失相当惨重。在上个世纪，只有三次经济危机
的损失超过了这一次：一次是发生于90年代初期的银行业危机，它使日本开始陷
入“低迷的10年”；另一次是90年代后期的亚洲金融危机；还有一次是美国的
“大萧条”。在前两次危机中，饱受冲击的银行业系统有案可查的损失总额分别
达到GDP的15％和35％3 。“大萧条”的损失占到1929年美国GDP的20％左右，
但那次经济危机是发生在与今天截然不同的产业环境之中。由于存款挤兑、银行
杠杆水平较高、经济杠杆作用日益减弱，以及美联储有限的干预能力4 等因素的综
合作用，迅速演变成了一次旷日持久的经济低迷期，其间，有超过9,000家金融机
构要么宣告破产，要么寻求政府救助，经济也经历了严重的大规模通货紧缩。

从企业的角度来看，至关紧要的问题是这种金融危机以及随之而来的经济低
迷对信贷可能造成的影响，以及信贷短缺对实体经济、对消费者和企业信心的影
响。在上世纪80年代和90年代存贷（S&L）危机以后的经济低迷时期，银行的坏
账额相当于GDP的4％左右，这种情况持续了大约两年时间。最终的GDP比按危
机爆发前的趋势线可达到的水平下降了大约4％～5％。这与我们目前的估计一
致，即当前的信贷危机将使实际的GDP比趋势增长水平下降大约3％～7％5 。
 如果美国经济的走势与前几次更严重经济危机的走势相同，那么， GDP总的
损失可能会比估计的数额还要大2～3倍。日本的资产泡沫破灭以后，在长达10年
时间里，该国经济的实际年增长率还不到0.5％，最终的GDP比危机爆发前的趋势
线水平下降了大约18％。在那些受90年代爆发的亚洲金融危机冲击最猛烈的国
家——印度尼西亚、马来西亚、菲律宾、韩国和泰国，1998年的GDP平均缩减了
8％（按本国货币计算）。由于它们的货币按美元计算平均贬值了一半，因此，造
成了灾难性的损害——大量企业破产，并引起了广泛的社会动乱。而在1929～
1933年的“大萧条”时期，美国实际GDP的损失高达28％。

截至2008年12月5日，美国的失业率达到6.7％6 。这一数字略高于2001～
2002年经济衰退期间的失业率水平，但仍然低于上世纪70年代石油危机期间的失
业率（8.5％）和存贷（S&L）危机时的失业率（接近10％），与“大萧条”时期
的失业率相比则更要低得多，据保守的估计，当时的失业率高达25％左右。

一个经济体需要多长时间才能从经济低迷中重新崛起？这主要取决于政府采
取何种配套的政策措施，来清除积弊和刺激经济，尤其是修复银行系统有效提供
信贷的能力，以及重新恢复企业和消费者的信心。平均来看，在爆发金融危机以
后，各国需要两年时间才能走出经济低迷期7 ，大约需要四年时间才能恢复到趋势
增长水平8 。历史上只有两次，经济低迷期延续了更长的时间：一个是日本的
“10年低迷期”，原因是政府采取的政策其效果适得其反；还有就是美国的“大
萧条”时期，当时政府协调应对危机的能力很弱，不可与今天同日而语。

随着危机的逐步发展，股票市场成为最清晰可见、最引人注目的“风向
标”。到2008年10月底，标准普尔500指数已经从一年前的峰顶一路下跌了46％
（2007年10月9日～2008年10月27日）。到2008年11月末，美国股票市场已经损
失了自从2001～2002年互联网泡沫破灭以来的几乎所有盈利。尽管没有人知道美
国股票市场是否已经见底，但按照历史的标准来衡量，迄今为止的跌幅还算不上
非同寻常。在日本的银行业危机期间，日经225指数从峰顶到谷底（1989年12月
29日～1990年10月1日）下跌了48％，尽管日本股票市场随后仍然“跌跌不
休”；到2008年10月底，日本股票市场剩余的市值还不到它在1999年达到的峰值
的20％。在亚洲金融危机期间，印度尼西亚、韩国和泰国的股票市场分别下跌了
65％、72％和85％（按本国货币计算）。当网络技术泡沫破灭以后，从2000年3
月24日～2002年10月9日，美国股市的标准普尔500指数下跌了49％。

不过，当前的危机有一个重要的不同之处。在以前的危机中，用市盈率
（P/E）来衡量的市场估值在股市崩溃之前都会达到过高水平9 。而在这一次危机
中，企业盈利也出现了泡沫——它们在GDP中所占的比例比长期趋势线高出大约
50％。在信贷危机爆发之前，美国企业的盈利大大高于其趋势增长水平（见图）
10 。市盈率（P/E）中的分子和分母都大幅增长。
返回顶端

按照历史的标准，房地产市场的泡沫更加令人担忧，因为它对家庭财产的中
期影响很大。根据联邦住房监督办公室发布的住房价格指数，从上世纪70年代中
期到上世纪末期，美国的房产价值以平均每年大约5.4％的名义增长率上涨。在此
期间，有两个主要的发展时期，即70年代后期和80年代后期。在这两个时期，全
国的平均住房价格攀升，最高时比趋势线水平高出5％～6％。然而，从2000～
2007年，房价大幅飙升到比以前的趋势线水平高出了40％。

在当前的危机中，房地产对美国经济的影响比以往任何时候都大。在存贷
（S&L）危机的酝酿时期，美国住宅地产总量的市值大约相当于GDP的104％，
而且这类房地产的1/3都是通过抵押贷款的方式购买的。到2001年，美国住宅地产
的总市值大约相当于GDP的121％11 ，并且其中40％以上都是通过抵押贷款购买
的。2007年底，据哈佛大学住房联合研究中心估计，美国住宅地产的总市值为19
万亿美元，大约相当于美国GDP的140％，并且其中有一半以上都是通过抵押贷
 款购买的。如果再将商业地产抵押贷款也包括在内，总的抵押贷款债务达到
了14.4万亿美元，相当于美国GDP的100％以上。

用Case–Shiller美国住房价格指数来衡量，美国住房价格已经从峰值下跌了
20％以上，今后的趋势表明，住房价格还将从现在的水平进一步下跌10％以上。
如果变现的话，住房和抵押贷款市场的损失可能会大大超过截至2008年12月初股
票市场的损失。

未来前景如何？
尽管上个世纪发生的金融危机都有一些共同的特点——通常是在金融体系的
某些领域杠杆水平过高，然后导致信心崩溃，但是，随之而来的经济衰退却有相
当大的差异。决定这些经济衰退的时间长短和严重程度的是政府采取的应对方
式，尤其是政府能否设法恢复消费者、企业、投资者和贷款方的信心。

在一次金融危机发生时，只有当它阻碍向企业提供资金的时间足够长，以致
造成大范围的企业破产时，金融危机才会演变成一场灾难性的经济衰退。这种对
融资渠道的阻断正是使亚洲金融危机具有如此大破坏性的原因。1996年，该地区
的资金净流入量为930亿美元，而1997年就逆转为资金净流出120亿美元。当地的
银行系统无法提供足够的资金来填补这种短缺，外国银行也未准备扩大信贷规
模，而国际货币基金组织（IMF）的救助行动又过于迟缓。结果，许多企业难以筹
措到运营资金（更不用说投资了），而且无法获得这些国家急需的出口融资，因
为出口在这些国家的GDP中占有很高比例。一旦信贷流动得以恢复，受到金融危
机影响的经济体就会迅速复苏。

“大萧条”时期也经历了类似的变化过程。当时，银行挤兑加上联邦政府控
制不力，损害了美国的金融系统。在1929～1933年期间，由于价格不断下跌、全
国的还本付息率翻了一番，以及超过一半的美国农场主拖欠债务，导致1929年以
前在美国运营的银行几乎有一半破产倒闭12 。在危机爆发后的几年时间里，许多
具有最好信用的企业也无法获得长期借贷资金。此外，在30年代，资金的跨国流
动性处在最低水平。根据美国经济分析局的数据，由于企业极度缺乏资金，从
1929～1933年，企业投资减少了75％以上。

在不太极端的条件下，只要政府采取正确的干预措施，各个经济体都能平安
渡过甚至相当严重的信贷危机。例如，联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）的数据表明，
从1981～1983年，共有258家美国银行破产或请求救助。尽管如此，美国非住宅
投资的下降幅度还不到全部投资的1％。在整个80年代，共有近750家银行破产，
1,500多家银行要求救助（与此相比，70年代只有35家银行请求救助）。但在80
年代，企业投资平均每年增长了4.5％。

而今天，非金融经济步入经济衰退时，准备之充分，令人惊讶：与互联网经
济泡沫破灭、存贷（S&L）危机，乃至上世纪70年代的石油危机时相比，如今美
国的工业企业具有更低的杠杆水平和更高的利息偿付率。实体经济的未来运营状
况在很大程度上将取决于当前这场政策辩论在今后几个季度的走向。

企业应该做些什么？
 我们尚不清楚当前的危机将会如何发展演变；作为关键要素的消费者、企业
和投资者的信心也难以预测；政府将要采取的政策也还是未知数。但是，研究表
明，在过去的经济衰退中，与行动更积极、更主动的企业相比，那些采取单纯防
御战略的企业日子并不好过13 。当经济步入可能会非常困难的低迷时期时，为了
抓住自身的发展机遇，企业应该做好充分准备。

研究不同模式
尽管每次经济衰退的情况千差万别，但值得去了解不同的行业在过去的经济
低迷时期表现如何，以及哪些因素决定了复苏的速度。在今后几个月里，随着政
府政策的关注焦点从“救火”转移到刺激经济，这种研究将帮助企业了解经济衰
退与它们自身的关系，并评估不断演变的宏观经济环境在未来几年将如何影响自
己。

做好充分准备
大多数企业都已制定了应急计划，但这些计划很少像它们应该的那样积极进
取。为可能出现的最坏的局面——例如，主要客户申请破产，所需要的资金支出
很快被削减一半，或者在一个国家的销售运营无法获得本地货币作为营运资金—
—早做准备是值得的。现在，一些似乎不太可能发生的事情很可能会变成现实，
而且比你预计的时间来得更快。

仔细审视机遇
企业高管在控制下滑风险时不应该对潜在的增长机会视而不见。尽管目前正
值动荡时期，但在大多数行业中，要确定企业是否正处于压力之下，或者可能会
出现合并和重组机会，这并非难事。你不能等到机会出现时才仓促地对局势做出
被动反应，你必须现在就投入时间，去了解这种力量可能会如何影响你所在的行
业，以及你希望自己的企业在其中扮演什么样角色。

作者简介：
David Cogman是麦肯锡上海分公司副董事；Richard Dobbs是麦肯锡首尔分公
司资深董事。

作者谨向对本文做出贡献的David Atkins，Kevin Buehler, Jared Chung, Jeff Gu,

Bin Jiang, Susan Lund, Christopher Mazingo和Hamid Samandari致谢。

返回顶端

注释：
1 资料来源：彭博社。所列举的数字是指总的信贷损失，与债务的权属无关。
Lowell Bryan and Diana Farrell所著“Leading through uncertainty”，《麦肯锡季
2

刊》，2008年12月。
资料来源：全国经济研究局。到1933年，在9,000多家宣布破产的银行中，储
3

蓄总额为70亿美元；1933年的名义GDP为580亿美元。
在1929年，银行业的监管环境与如今有很大的不同，特别是在储蓄保险（它是
4

在“大萧条”后才设立的）、联邦储备银行作为最后救助手段的贷款能力，以及美联
储对银行资产负债表的监测力度等方面，更是如此。
 Lowell Bryan and Diana Farrell所著“Leading through uncertainty”，《麦肯锡季
5

刊》，2008年12月。
6 “就业情况概要”，美国劳工部，劳工统计局，2008年12月5日。
Carmen M. Reinhart和Kenneth S. Rogoff撰写的“2007年的美国次贷危机非常
7

与众不同吗？国际历史比较”，美国经济研究局（NBER）工作报告编号13761，
2008年1月。
“金融压力与经济低迷”，《世界经济展望，2008年10月：金融压力、低迷与
8

复苏》（World Economic Outlook, October 2008: Financial Stress, Downturns, and

Recoveries），国际货币基金组织。
Marc Goedhart, Bin Jiang和Timothy Koller撰写的“2000年与2007年市场基本面比
9

较”，《麦肯锡季刊》，2007年9月。
10 Richard Dobbs, Bin Jiang和Timothy Koller撰写的“Preparing for a slump in
earnings”，《麦肯锡季刊》，2008年3月。

《美国基金账户的流动》（Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States），

11

联邦储备统计公告，2001年12月7日。
12参见Ben S. Bernanke撰写的“Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in
the propagation of the Great Depression”，《美国经济评论》（American
Economic Review），1983年，第73卷，第3期，第257～276页。
13 Richard F. Dobbs, Tomas Karakolev和Francis Malige撰写的“学会利用经济衰退
期”，《麦肯锡季刊》，2002年6月。

This article has been updated to reflect factual corrections provided by the authors.

本文译自： “Financial crises, past and present”

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