There is no fixed formula in determining the required probable cause in justifying the warrantless search and seizure but

it is resolved according to the facts of each case. Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The following cases illustrate how the Supreme Court tackles the significance of probable cause in warrantless search and seizure. In People vs. Gonzales, the police officers were tipped off a night before that the contraband was to be transported early in the morning. Certainly, the law enforcers had no time to secure the needed warrants and the only recourse left to the police was to arrest the courier in flagrante. The law enforcers, from the tipped information, had a definite target for their arrest: a woman with long hair, wearing maong pants and jacket and Ray Ban sunglasses, carrying a black traveling bag. There was a clear description about the identity of the person engaged in transporting prohibited drugs at a particular time and place. The law enforcers already had an inkling of the personal circumstances of the person they were looking for. Hence, when the police officers saw the woman who fitted the tipped description given earlier and who was later identified as the appellant they had probable cause to apprehend the appellant. In People vs. Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of accused-appellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only learned Mula's name and address after the arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when, SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him.With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest. In Savage vs. Taypin,in the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is therefore

defective on its face.Since the assailed search warrant is null and void, all property seized by virtue thereof should be returned to petitioners in accordance with established jurisprudence. In People vs. Baula, The police officers acted on a mere suspicion that accused-appellants could be responsible for the commission of the crime and only because of their being at the store where the victim was last seen. Mere suspicion cannot satisfy the requirement of probable cause which signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in them to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he can be charged. In People vs. Doria, Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his coaccused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house, with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. In Obra vs. CA, with regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.This is in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. In People vs. Chua Hon San, there was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense.

In People vs. Valdez, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. A crime was actually being committed by the appellant, thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under [states the law], which allow a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. In People vs. Malmstedt, the receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. In People vs. Bansil, the court ruled for the insufficiency to prove beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of the appellant for the crime charged. They find the testimony of SPO4 Clemente full of inconsistencies on material points and that there was no probable cause for the warrantless arrest of the appellant notwithstanding the putative application of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure based on the informant's tip and the "bulging waistline" of the accused. The arresting team was only armed with the knowledge of the suspect's "attire" which the prosecution witness admitted during trial that he cannot even remember. The team did not have a physical description of the suspect nor his name. They were not even given a specific place within which to target their search of the suspect, only a vicinity of the Muslim Area in Quiapo, near the Muslim Mosque. Yet the arresting team directly zeroed in on the accused and his companions who were only eating halo-halo at a small restaurant, surely not a crime in itself. While SPO4 Clemente claims that accused had a "bulging waistline", this alone, in the light of the availing circumstances, is insufficient to constitute probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Further, the essence of the crime of illegal possession is the possession, whether actual or constructive, of the subject firearm, without which there can be no conviction for illegal possession. Faced with outright denial of the accused of the possession of the gun, the prosecution had all the opportunity to cross-examine the accused and his witness in order to ferret out the truth and expose the falsity of their allegations. The public prosecution failed to do.