El acto de la designacin lo que hace es traer una cosa extralingstica en tanto que ousa, identificndola mediante un nombre que

conviene a su modo de ser subsistente. Esto es, traerla tanto en su capacidad de ser independiente, enfocndose en su individualidad (substancia primera), o enfocndose en su especie (indicada por el eidos) o en uno de sus gneros (substancia segunda). Lo que Aristteles quiere decir es que, cuando traemos a colacin algo del mundo, por enfocarnos sobre lo que primariamente o secundariamente es, es decir, no sobre lo que es una caracterstica coincidencial suya la traemos de acuerdo al modo primario de designacin. Por tanto, es claro que ousa refiere al ms propio (primario) modo de ser subsistente o a sus secuelas inmediatas, i.e., los modos de ser representados por el eidos o el gnero.

What Aristotle means to say is that, when we bring up something of the outside world by focussing on what it primarily or secondarily is that is to say, not after one of its coincidental features it is brought up according to the primary way of designating it. Hence it is clear that refers to the thing's most proper (primary) mode of subsistent being or its immediate sequels, viz. the modes of being conveyed by the names of its eidos or genera p.389

El intento llevado a cabo por Aristteles de identificar la el individuo (sustancia primera) con la especie (sustancia segunda) en Categoras, es el recurso ms importante en la polmica contra el platnico. Esto se evidencia en Cat.,2b 15-22 cuando el estagirita afirma que la especie es ms ousa que el gnero. Sin embargo, esta tentativa de Aristteles estar realizada en la Metafsica, libro Z, a travs de la distincin entre eidos, hyle, y synolon. Luego de la examinacin de estos tres candidatos al ttulo de ousa en el sentido ms eminente, el eidos se mostrar como aquello que cumple todos los criterios en sentido estricto, entonces; ser sustancia primera. El synolon tambin cumple con todos los criterios, pero no del mismo modo que el eidos, pues su determinacin es provista por este ltimo. De este modo, synolon es sustancia en un sentido que no es primario. En cuanto al gnero y el universal, sern descartados como sustancias por su amplia indeterminacin; diferencia notable en relacin con su status en Categoras.

Diferencia en cuanto a la predicacin esencial y predicacin accidental: El sustrato es el individuo, gnero y especie se dicen del individuo como su sujeto, mientras los accidentes se dicen en el individuo como su sujeto. Por tanto, aqu reside la diferencia entre la predicacin kat tonoma y la predicacin kat lgon, en este ltimo tipo de predicacin, la substancia primera puede ser definicionalmente sustituida por la especie y el gnero. Esto no sucede en el caso de la predicacin segn el nombre, pues el accidente no es subsistente por s, y, por ende, no-substancial. De ninguna manera el accidente puede sustituir al individuo, pues, este ltimo es sustancia en sentido primario; y resultara un contrasentido sustituir lo sustancial por lo no-sustancial. As, tiene sentido la afirmacin aristotlica de que el accidente, en cierto modo, es slo un nombre. Cat. 5, 3al5-21, 3a36-b2, 3b2-4, 3b4-5, 3b6-7, 3b7-8 As a matter of fact, unlike when you apply names signifying nonsubstantial forms, such as '(being) white', in which case you are not allowed to replace them with their definiens, when you make use of names signifying secondary ousiai, the substitution is always valid. p.394

Cat.,3bl0-23: Naturaleza de la relacin de subsistencia (p.396) The expression 'to signify a certain this' ( ) calls for further comment. As to the use of the verb , Ackrill (88) is of the opinion that Aristotle is careless when he speaks as if it were things (ousiai, 'substances'), and not names that signify, and so seems to confuse the ontic and the linguistic domain. But such a charge ignores what we have presented as one of the semantic Main Rules of Aristotelian (Ancient) semantics, to the effect that names are significative terms taken in thdr capacity of being significative of something, and, accordingly, by nature also convey the 'thing' signified. Hence, semantically speaking, the name used and the thing named tend to form an unarticulated unity. So it is understandable that there should be an easy transition from e.g. 'white' used as a name to the property whiteness referred to. p.397

What, then, is meant by 'signifying a certain this'? It is explained at 3bl2-13 as 'revealing something as being an individual and numerically one', and, some lines further on (3b 16-17) the one-ness is paraphrased in terms of lacking universal applicability, meaning that what is 'a certain this' does not belong to the 'things said of a substrate'. Thus to signify something as 'a certain this' comes to referring to it qua possessing oneness, definiteness and subsistence. From Aristotle's anti-Platonic point of view, all this is clear enough. However, what can we say about secondary ousiai, which are the specific and generic forms inhering in the primary ones? To Aristotle's mind, they cannot possibly have the this-ness and definiteness the Platonic Forms are supposed to have. Their ontic status must be looked for in this world. p.397

Cat., 4al0-22: Identidad numrica de la sustancia, y capacidad de recibir a los contrarios.

4. 48 What does Aristotle mean by ? 403

El significado de ousa: The focal meaning of is plain from its etymology: deriving as *ont-ia from the root 'es', which is common to the verb and the noun, it basically stands for 'being-ness' (medieval Latin 'entitas' or 'natura essendi'). Its focal meaning comes about both intensionally and extensionally. According to its intensional aspect, stands for a thing's ontic determinant, i.e. that which causes it to be (something); extensionally, it refers to the thing thus determined, (conceived of as) occurring in the outside world. p.403 Unlike Plato,125 to Aristotle the intensional and extensional aspecLs are ontologically complementary: no intensional occurs without its extensional counterpart, and the other way round. p. 403 [Cf. Met. 11, 1037a29-30 y Met. 16, 1040b23, Top. I, 9] ***Again, on this understanding it is easy to see why Aristotle sometimes calls130 a genus in spite of his common doctrine that being is not a genus.131 Speaking of as a genus, Aristotle has the extensional aspect of the word's focal meaning in mind, to the effect that a thing's subsistence or self-containedness is in the picture.

When, on the other hand, he denies the status of genus to 'be-ing', Aristotle is speaking from the intensional perspective by denying that the intension, 'being' or 'being-ness' can be considered a generic concept prior to 'being such and such'. In Aristotle's ontology, 'being-ness' is always invested in some specific mode of being as represented by the ten categories: necessarily, to be () is to be something ( ) 404