ESTOPPEL #40 Ibaan Rural Bank Inc. v. The Court of Appeals and Mr. & Mrs.

Ramon Tarnate G.R. No. 123817 Facts: Sps. Cesar and Leonila Reyes were the owners of the 3 lots which were registered in the Register of Deeds Lipa City. The spouses mortgaged the said lots to Ibaan Rural Bank Inc. With the consent of petitioner, the spouses entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with Mr. & Mrs. Ramon Tarnate, herein private respondents. Private respondents failed to pay the loan and the bank extrajudicially foreclose on the mortgaged lots. The sheriff conducted a public auction of the lots and awarded them to the bank as the sole bidder. On Dec. 13, 1978, the Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered on Oct. 16, 1979. The certificate stated that the redemption period expires two years from the registration of the sale. No notice of the foreclosure was given to the private respondents. On Sept. 23, 1981, private respondents offered to redeem the foreclosed property and tendered the redemption amount but it was refused acceptance by the petitioners on the ground that they had consolidated the title over the lots. Private respondents filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the foreclosed lots. They argued that they were entitled to redeem the foreclosed lots because they offered to redeem and tendered the redemption price before October 16, 1981, the deadline of the redemption period. The bank opposed contending that the private respondents had no right to redeem the lots because their right to redeem had prescribed as more than one year had elapsed from the registration of Certificate of Sale. The trial court ruled in favor of the private respondents. This was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition. Issue: Is petitioner estopped in claiming that the redemption period is one year as provided by law considering that it did not object to the 2-year redemption period as provided in the Certificate of Sale? Ruling: YES, petitioners are now estopped in claiming 1 year redemption period. When petitioner received a copy of the certificate of sale registered in the office of the Register of Deeds, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its contents. For two years, it did not object to the 2-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said that petitioner consented to the 2-year redemption period specially since it had time to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent. By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe that they had two years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of 2 years, petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was only one year and that the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. TRUSTS #44 Consuelo N. Vda. De Gualberto, et al. v. Francisco Go, et al.

G.R. No. 139843, July 21, 2005 Facts: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Generoso Gualberto, former owner of a parcel of land situated in Siniloan Laguna under TCT No. 9203. Sometime in 1965, the subject land was sold by Generoso to respondents father Go S. Kiang for P9,000.00 as evidenced by a deed Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan. It was duly notarized and recorded in the notary publics entry book. Petitioner Consuelo even executed an affidavit to the effect that the land was truly sold by his father to Go Kiang, for the purpose of securing a new tax declaration in the name of Spouses Go. In an unlawful detainer case that was filed by a certain Demetria Garcia against herein petitioners, the latter alleged that the real party in interest are Generoso and Go S. Kiang as evidenced by TCT No. 9203. In a forcible entry case filed by respondents against petitioners before the MTC, a decision was rendered in favor of respondents, which decision was affirmed by the RTC. The said decision was also affirmed by the CA. In the meantime, on June 14, 1978, OCT No. 1388 was issued in the name of Rosa Javier Go, wife of Go S. Kiang. Such was the state of things when on August 10, 1995, petitioners filed against respondents for Conveyance, Accion Publiciana and Quieting of Title with Damages before the RTC of Siniloan, Laguna. The RTC dismissed petitioners complaint. It was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether a registered owners right to assail the validity of his defendants title and to thereafter seek reconveyance thereof, may be lost by prescription or laches. Ruling: Yes. An action for reconveyance has its basis in Sec. 53, P.D. 1529, which provides, In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder of the decree of registration on the original petition or application. This provision should be read in conjunction with Art. 1456 of the Civil Code, which provides: If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. Correlating Sec. 53 of P.D. 1529 and Art. 1456 of the CC with Art. 1144(2) of the CC, the prescriptive period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. An action for reconveyance of real property based on implied or constructive trust is not barred by the 10year prescriptive period only if the plaintiff is in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the property involved. Here, petitioners were not in actual possession of the property. It was found that respondents instead, had the actual possession of the property. Thus, the action for reconveyance in this case is not in a nature of quieting of title, hence, is not imprescriptible.