Simon Aldovino vs Comelec - GR No 184836 FACTS: The respondent Wilfredo F.

Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160. The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.

The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption

of the three-term limit rule; and 2. Whether or not preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as

contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160

HELD: Preventive suspension whether under the Local Government Code,[17] the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[18] or the Ombudsman Act[19] is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official who have been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is theabsence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayanimposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by no less than the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of law WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and accordingly NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term.

2. Gov. Castillo Co vs Robert Barbers - GR No 129952

FACTS: On 27 June 1997, Quirino Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor. Congressman Cua because of uncovered irregularities in the purchase of heavy equipment by the Governor and the Provincial Engineer. Congressman Cua charged that the equipment purchased was "reconditioned" instead of "brand new" as Other irregularities claimed to have been committed included overpricing, lack of public bidding, lack of inspection, advance payment prior to delivery in violation of Section 338 of the Local Government Code, and an attempt to cover up such irregularities. Congressman Cua thus accused Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Ringor of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Ringor thereafter filed separate motions for reconsideration. Both motions were denied in a "Joint Order" and approved by Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero. On 12 August 1997, Governor Castillo-Co filed the present petition. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion upon the Deputy Ombudsman for issuing the order of preventive suspension against her. As may be deduced from the petition, the grounds invoked in support thereof are: 1) The Deputy Ombudsman is not authorized to sign the order of preventive suspension. (2) The issuance of such order was hasty and selective, and deprived petitioner of due process, and (3) The conditions required to sustain petitioner's preventive suspension have not been met and that, at any rate, the duration thereof is excessive.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is authorized to sign the order of preventive suspension HELD: Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong. and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or gross misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis supplied). 3. Hon. Juan Hagad vs Mercedes Dadole - GR No 108072 FACTS: Criminal and administrative complaints were filed against respondents (Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor Paterno Caete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol, allpublic officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O.Bercede) by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede with the Officeof the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. The respondents were charged with having violatedR.A No. 3019, as amended; Articles 170 and 171 RPC; and R.A. No. 6713. Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing

the allocated appropri ation thereinfrom P3,494,364.57 to P7M without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of MandaueCity.Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials prayed forthe dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was deprived of of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, underSection 63 LGC, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said localofficials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. Issue: WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the present case Held: Yes Ratio: The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13(1,) ArticleX1, of the 1987 Constitution, while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints iscontained in Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770. Section 21 of the same statute names the officials whocould be subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. Thus, respondents insist, conformably with Section 63 of the Local Government Code,preventive suspension can only be imposed by: ". . . the President if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city; . . ."

There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly orimpliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specificmatter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to onlyuphold one and strike down the other. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implicationare not favored, and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The twolaws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before theinference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare etconcordare leqibus esf optimus interpretendi, i e, every statute must be so interpreted andbrought into accord with other laws as to form a

uniform system of jurisprudence. Thefundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on thesubject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved againstany implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to alllaws on the subject.Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason thatunderlies the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate saidoffice from the long tentacles of officialdom." Quite interestingly, Sections 61 and 63 of thepresent Local Government Code run almost parallel with the provisions then existing under theold code. The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventivesuspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.ANo. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant TheLocal Government Code of 1991 (R.A No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from whatalready prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister)of Local Government by the Office of the President.Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without payunder Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60day preventivesuspension provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even now maintain itsapplication. The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a)the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonestly, oppression or gravemisconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) that charges should warrant removal fromthe service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed againsthim. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials,whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand, in imposingthe shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the LocalGovernment Code of 1991 on

an elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), itwould be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent hascommitted the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong,(c) the gravityof the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence thewitnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The contention is without merit. The records reveal that petitioner issued the order of preventive suspension after the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on the motionfor preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of his memorandum in compliance with thedirective of petitioner Be that, as it may, we have heretofore held that, not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation aftercharges are brought and even before the charges are heard. Naturally, such a preventivesuspension would occur prior to any finding of guilt or innocence.Moreover, respondent officials were, in point of fact, put on preventive suspension onlyafter petitioner had found, in consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda vs. Flavier, that theevidence of guilt was strong.Finally, it does appear, as so pointed out by the Solicitor General that respondent officials'petition for prohibition, being an application for remedy against the findings of petitionercontained in his 21 September 1992 order, should not have been entertained by the trial court. 4. Garcia vs Mojica - GR No 139043 FACTS: On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract withF.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001,which period was to commence on September 1998 when the first delivery should havebeen made by F.E. Zuellig.Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalouspurchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This promptedthe Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter. [1]

Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of theOmbudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-990132. After hisinvestigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgradedto criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officia lsinvolved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved thisrecommendation. ISSUES:1. WON Garcia may be held administratively liable.

HELD: NO. In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior termof office. [24] The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back intooffice, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, includinghis past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then suchreelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into bypetitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just four days before the date of the elections. It wasnot made an issue during the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have votedfor petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character. For his part, petitioner contends that the only conclusive determining factor as regards the peoples thinking on the matter is an election. On this point, we agree withpetitioner. That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character ispresumed, precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of thisknowledge. Such an undertaking will obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the matterdo not distinguish the precise timing or period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date of the officials reelection, except that it must be prior to said date.

5. Ombudsman vs CA - GR No 160675

Joan and Thomas Corominas, and Maria Constancia Corominas-Lim filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) a criminal complaint for violation of Article 281 (Other Forms of Trespass) of the Revised Penal Code against herein Edmondo Arregadas, Nicomedes Armilla, Delia Batasin-in, James Fuentes, Oscar Gador, Santos Guigayoma, Jr., Clarito Mioza, Nelson Obeso, Senen Serio, Ernesto Naraja, and Martin Yase, all employees of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office No. VII, Banilad, Mandaue City. The case was docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-99-1227. The same criminal complaint was also treated by the Office of the Ombudsman as an administrative complaint for abuse of authority and misconduct. The administrative case was docketed as OMB-VIS-ADM-99-1044. It was alleged that the above-named DENR employees conspired to enter the parcel of land owned by the Corominas family without seeking permission from the latter or their representative and despite the big "NO TRESPASSING" sign attached to the perimeter fences enclosing the said property. Except for Arregadas, who executed his own affidavit, Armilla, et al. executed a joint counter-affidavit decrying the charge against them as malicious, unfounded and untrue. By way of refutation, they alleged that they entered the Corominas landholding pursuant to the Order dated September 14, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 9 thereof, in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-17639 (entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Larrazabal, et al.), involving a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title. The said Order stated: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby Grants the Motion. The Court hereby orders the relocation survey of the questioned lots and the Sudlon National Park based on the technical description of the official government cadastral survey duly approved by the Republic of the Philippines, Bureau of Lands. Expenses for the relocation survey shall be shouldered jointly by plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenors. Reasonable notice of the date/dates of relocation survey should be furnished the defendants through their counsels and to this Court.

6. Gobenciong vs CA - GR No 159883

The Petitions Before the Court are these three petitions, two interposed under Rule 45 and one under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. These petitions stemmed from OMBVIS-ADM-97-0370 entitled Dr. Flora de la Pea v. Dr. Rafael C. Omega, Chief of Hospital, Dr. Pedro F. Gobenciong, Administrative Officer IV, Crisologo R. Babula, Supply Officer IV, et al., all of Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center, Tacloban City. The first, a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 159883, seeks to nullify the Decision[1]and Resolution[2] dated November 26, 2002 and August 27, 2003, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 49585, denying petitioner Gobenciongs petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 and, thus, effectively affirming the assailed Order[3]dated August 24, 1998 of the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas, preventively suspending him from office. In the second, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 168059, the Office of the Ombudsman assails, as tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the Decision[4] dated April 29, 2005 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 61687, which set aside the Ombudsmans Decision[5] of March 21, 2000 and Order of August 10, 2000 Order[6] in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370 but only insofar as it imposed a penalty of one-year suspension on Gobenciong. The third, a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 173212, seeks to set aside the Decision and Resolution[7] dated April 29, 2005 and May 29, 2006, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 61687, which sustained the aforesaid March 21, 2000 and August 10, 2000 rulings in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370. On January 17, 2006, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 159883 with G.R. No. 168059, both to be considered as en banc cases.[8] The consolidation of G.R. No. 173212 with the first two cases later followed.[9] The Facts During the period material, Gobenciong held the position of Administrative Officer IV in Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC), a public hospital in Tacloban City. On December 3, 1996, the appropriate EVRMC office issued Requisition and Issue Voucher No. (RIV) EO-1-96 for one unit hemoanalyzer (also called particle counter), among other items. On its face, RIV EO-1-96 carried, for the hemoanalyzer, the specifications electric 220V, 50 feed shelves capacity with a handwritten unit price quotation of PhP 1,195,998. After public bidding where Alvez Commercial, Inc. (Alvez) emerged as the best bidder, Purchase Order No. (PO) EO-5-96 dated December 9, 1996 was issued covering two units of nebulizer and one unit particle counter with specifications 23 Parameters, Genius, Italy, electric 220V, fully automated at the unit price as aforestated.

As hospital documents would show, the nebulizers and the hemoanalyzer appeared to have been delivered on December 20, 1996 and accepted by Engr. Jose M. Jocano, Jr. and Supply Officer III Crisologo R. Babula, per Certification of Acceptance they signed to attest having accepted all the articles delivered by Alvez per Sales Invoice No. 0786. Similarly, Babula signed Sales Invoice No. 0786 to acknowledge receipt in good condition of the articles covered thereby. In addition, it was made to appear in a Commission on Audit (COA) Inspection Report that Jocano and Gobenciong had certified as correct the finding/recommendation that the two nebulizers and the hemoanalyzer had been inspected as to quality and quantity as per Sales Invoice No. 0786. On December 26, 1996, Disbursement Voucher No. (DV) 101-9612-1986, for PhP 1,161,817.35, net of creditable VAT, was prepared. Gobenciong, among others, signed the voucher to attest that the expense covered thereby was necessary, lawful, and incurred under his direct supervision. Appended to DV 101-9612-1986 were documents adverted to earlier, such as Sales Invoice No. 0786, the Certification of Acceptance, the COA Inspection Report, PO EO-5-96, and RIV EO-1-96. The issuance on December 27, 1996 of Landbank Check No. 456359 in the amount of PhP 1,161,817.35 in favor of Alvez, which then purportedly issued Receipt No. 0815, followed. On March 31, 1997, or little over three months after the supposed delivery of the hemoanalyzer, Alvez addressed a letter to EVRMC to assure the hospital that it would be replacing the yet to-be-delivered slightly defective hemoanalyzer with another unit. On April 1, 1997, Alvez actually delivered the promised replacementa Genius particle counter with Serial No. 36162. It was installed on April 2, 1997 and inspected the following day by Jocano and Gobenciong. The instant case started when Dr. Flora dela Pea, Head of the EVRMC Laboratory Unit, filed, on June 20, 1997, an administrative complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, charging Gobenciong, Jocano, Babula, and three other EVRMC officers with Falsification of Public Documents and Misconduct. The complaint was docketed as OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370.

In a related move, dela Pea also filed a complaint with the Department of Health (DOH) which forthwith formed a committee to look likewise into the alleged anomalous purchase of the expensive hemoanalyzer. The investigation culminated in the filing by the DOH Secretary of a Formal Charge[10] dated October 29, 1997 for Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against Gobenciong and three others. Ombudsman Ordered Preventive Suspension On August 24, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas, upon dela Peas motion, issued an Order, placing all, except one, of the respondents in OMB-VISADM-97-0370 under preventive suspension and directed the proper DOH officer to immediately implement the Order.[11] Following his receipt on November 9, 1998 of a copy of the said order, Gobenciong wrote Dr. Lilia O. Arteche, DOH Regional Director for Region VIII, requesting the deferment of the implementation of the preventive suspension until after his to-be-filed motion for reconsideration shall have been resolved.

Conformably with the Ombudsmans directive,[12] Arteche, via a Memorandum[13] dated November 11, 1998, informed the affected respondents in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370 that their six-month preventive suspension shall take effect immediately upon their receipt of the memorandum. On November 12, 1998, Gobenciong sought reconsideration of the August 24, 1998 preventive suspension order. But due to the virtual denial of his plea for the deferment of his preventive suspension, Gobenciong, without awaiting the Office of the Ombudsmans action on his motion for reconsideration, went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a plea for the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO). The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49585. On November 19, 1998, the CA issued a TRO enjoining then Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas Arturo Mojica and Arteche from implementing the order of preventive suspension in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370.[14]

As later developments would show, the TRO, while duly served, evidently went unheeded, for Gobenciong failed to get back to his work or get his salary until after the lapse of the suspension period in May 1999. This turn of events impelled Gobenciong to move that Arteche and Mojica be cited in contempt. The CA, however, did not act on the motion. The Ruling of the Ombudsman in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370 Before the CA could resolve CA-G.R. SP No. 49585, the Ombudsman rendered on March 21, 2000 a Decision, finding Gobenciong and several others guilty in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370. The decretal portion of the Ombudsmans Decision partly reads: WHEREFORE, finding substantial evidence to hold respondents RAFAEL C. OMEGA, PEDRO F. GOBENCIONG, CRISOLOGO R. BABULA, and JOSE M. JOCANO of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, it is respectfully recommended that they be meted the penalty of SUSPENSION FROM THE SERVICE FOR ONE (1) YEAR WITHOUT PAY.[15] (Emphasis added.)

The above guilty verdict was mainly predicated on the finding that the Certification of Acceptance and the COA Inspection Report, among other documents, were falsified, there being no actual delivery on December 20, 1996 of the covered hemoanalyzer. There was thus no legal basis for the issuance of DV 101-9612-1986 and the corresponding Landbank check for PhP 1,161,817.35. Subsequently, Gobenciong, et al. moved for reconsideration, but the Ombudsman, by an Order of August 10, 2000, denied their motion. In due time, Gobenciong appealed from the above decision and order to the appellate court, the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61687. On November 16, 2000, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, through Director Virginia P. Santiago, by an Order,[16]directed the DOH Regional Office No. VIII to immediately implement its Decision and impose the penalties decreed

therein, which, in the case of Gobenciong, was one-year suspension from office without pay. On December 11, 2000, Gobenciong moved that Santiago be cited in contempt of court[17] for issuing the November 16, 2000 Order despite being notified of his appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 61687. Like his earlier similar motion, this motion was neither denied nor granted by the CA.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49585 Long after the issuance of the Decision dated March 21, 2000 in OMB-VISADM-97-0370, the CA, on November 26, 2002, rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 49585, denying Gobenciongs petition for certiorari assailing the directive, and the implementation thereof, for the immediate execution of his preventive suspension. Dispositively, the CA wrote: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition for certiorari is DENIED DUE COURSE and hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[18]

The CA dismissed Gobenciongs petition on the strength of Section 24 in relation to Sec. 27 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. The interplay of both sections expressly empowers the Ombudsman, under defined conditions, to preventively suspend, for a maximum period of six months, all but three categories of public officials and employees under investigation by his office and to direct the immediate implementation of the corresponding suspension order. Gobenciongs motion for reconsideration of the above decision was rejected by the appellate court on August 27, 2003. Hence, the Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 159883.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61687

On April 29, 2005, the CA, on the postulate that the disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman is merely recommendatory, rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61687, partially granting due course to Gobenciongs appeal and effectively modifying the Decision dated March 21, 2000 of the Ombudsman. The decretal portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this case and SETTING ASIDE the Decision dated March 21, 2000 and the Order dated August 10, 2000 rendered and issued by the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370 insofar as said office directly imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of suspension from the service for one (1) year without pay.[19]

Invoked as part of the ratio decidendi of the CA Decision was Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,[20] which the appellate court viewed as declaring that the disciplinary power of the Ombudsman in administrative cases is limited only to recommending to the disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out. In the concrete, as gleaned from the CA Decision, this means that the Ombudsman cannot compel the DOH to impose the penalty recommended in its underlying Decision of March 21, 2000. Therefrom, the parties availed themselves of different remedies to contest before this Court the above decision of the CA. The Office of the Ombudsman, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court, assailed the above decision through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as G.R. No. 168059.[21] On the other hand, Gobenciong filed his Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision dated April 29, 2005,[22] which the CA denied via its Resolution dated May 29, 2006. Thus, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Gobenciong, now docketed as G.R. No. 173212. In the meantime, on January 16, 2005, Gobenciong retired from the service.

The Issues In G.R. No. 159883, petitioner Gobenciong submits that the CA erred: A. x x x WHEN IT UPHELD THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDER DESPITE THE [TRO] IT ISSUED AND THE CONTINUED DEFIANCE OF PUBLIC RESPONDENTS OF THE [TRO].
B. x x x IN NOT HOLDING PUBLIC RESPONDENTS GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR DEFYING THE [TRO]. C. x x x WHEN IT UPHELD THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDER 1. DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS IMPLEMENTATION VIOLATED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW; 2. DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS IMPLEMENTATION VIOLATED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS; AND 3. DESPITE THE FACT THAT TO DO SO WOULD SANCTION AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 27(1) AND THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 24 OF [RA] 6770.

In G.R. No. 168059, petitioner Office of the Ombudsman raises the following grounds for the allowance of its petition:
I. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT BAR THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FROM EXERCISING ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OVER PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES IN GENERAL.

II. CONGRESS CONSTITUTIONALLY CLOTHED THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN WITH FULL ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY IN GENERAL, COMPLETE WITH ALL THE REQUISITE COMPONENTS AS CONTAINED IN [RA] 6770, CONSIDERING THAT: A. THE 1987 CONSTITUTION EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED CONGRESS TO GRANT THE OMBUDSMAN ADDITIONAL POWERS; B. CONGRESS, BOTH PURSUANT TO ITS EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY IN THE CASE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS PLENARY LEGISLATIVE POWERS, ENACTED [RA] 6770 PROVIDING THEREIN THE OMBUDSMANS FULL AND COMPLETE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER AND DUTY; C. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE SAID STATUTORY GRANT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER WHICH CAN BE REMOTELY CONSIDERED INCONSISTENT WITH THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND D. VESTING THE OMBUDSMAN WITH FULL DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY IS ABSOLUTELY IN CONSONANCE WITH THE SOVEREIGN INTENT, AS EXPRESSED BY THE LETTER OF, AND IN THE DELIBERATIONS ON, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, I.E., THE INTENT TO CREATE AN EFFECTIVE, RATHER THAN EFFETE, PROTECTOR OF THE PEOPLE INSULATED FROM POLITICAL INFLUENCE. III. THE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY GRANTED TO THE OMBUDSMAN INCLUDES THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE PENALTY AND TO CAUSE THE SAME TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE HEAD OF AGENCY CONCERNED, CONSIDERING THAT:

A. [RA] 6770 CONTAINS EXPRESS PROVISIONS GRANTING THE OMBUDSMAN THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE AND CAUSE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES; B. A DISCIPLINARY POWER BEREFT OF THE NECESSARY COMPONENT OF DETERMINING THE PENALTY AND CAUSING THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF IS OTIOSE; C. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PENALTIES ASSESSED BY THE OMBUDSMAN IS SUBJECT TO SECTION 13(3), ART. XI OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE INDEPENDENT FIRST PART OF SECTION 15(3) OF [RA] 6770, THE LATTER PROVISIONS STILL EMPOWER THE OMBUDSMAN TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH ITS RECOMMENDATIONS; AND D. A CONTRARY RULE CAN ONLY RESULT IN FURTHER LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ABSURDITIES. IV. THE RELIANCE BY THE HONORABLE [CA] ON THE OBITER DICTUM IN TAPIADOR VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, x x x DISPOSSESSING THE OMBUDSMAN OF ITS DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY, CONSITUTES A GRAVE ERROR CONSIDERING THAT: A. SUCH A PASSING STATEMENT MUST BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT THE OMBUDSMAN CANNOT DIRECTLY IMPLEMENT ITS ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS; AND B. SUCH A STATEMENT IS AND HAS REMAINED AN OBITER DICTUM WHICH DOES NOT HAVE THE STATUS OF A LEGAL DOCTRINE.

In G.R. No. 173212, petitioner Gobenciong argues that the CA committed errors of law: A.

x x x WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL [RA] 6770, SECTIONS 15 (1), 19, AND 21, [INSOFAR] AS THEY GRANT TO THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS DEPUTIES THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE ANY ACT OR OMISSION, ADMINISTRATIVE OR OTHERWISE, OF ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE, OR TO TAKE OVER, AT ANY STAGE, FROM ANY INVESTIGATORY AGENCY OF GOVERNMENT, THE INVESTIGATION OF SUCH CASES, FOR BEING AN INVALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. B. x x x WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL [RA] 6770, SECTIONS 15 (1), 19, 21, 24 AND 25, [INSOFAR] AS THEY GRANT TO THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS DEPUTIES THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE, PROSECUTE AND PENALIZE, ANY ACT OR OMISSION, ADMINISTRATIVE OR OTHERWISE, OF ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE, OR TO TAKE OVER, AT ANY STAGE FROM ANY INVESTIGATORY AGENCY OF GOVERNMENT, THE INVESTIGATION OF SUCH CASES, AND TO IMPOSE SUSPENSION, EITHER PREVENTIVE OR AS PENALTY, FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. C. x x x WHEN IT ACQUIESCED TO THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS)S VIOLATION OF [RA] 6770, THE OMBUDSMAN LAW. D. x x x WHEN IT UPHELD THE DECISION OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF CONDUCT GROSSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE. E. x x x IN REFUSING TO CITE DIRECTOR VIRGINIA PALANCASANTIAGO OF THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.

The grounds relied upon and the errors assigned may be reduced into three issues, to wit: first, whether the preventive suspension ordered by the Ombudsman is immediately executory, the filing in due time of a motion to reconsider the corresponding order notwithstanding; second, whether the disciplinary power of the Ombudsman is merely recommendatory and excludes the authority to ensure compliance of his recommendations; and third, whether RA 6770, on the ground of undue delegation of legislative authority and under the equal protection clause, is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the Ombudsman and his deputies the authority to investigate, prosecute and penalize any act or omission, administrative or otherwise, of any public officer or employee, or to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases. The Courts Ruling There is nothing novel about the underlying determinative issues raised by any of the petitioners. The Court, in a catena of recent cases, has for the most part fully settled them; and the corresponding dispositions in those cases militate against Gobenciongs cause, as articulated in his twin Petitions for Review on Certiorari, but augur well for the Ombudsmans petition. First Main Issue: Provisionary Orders of the Ombudsman Immediately Executory As Gobenciong argues, his timely filing of a motion for reconsideration of the subject preventive suspension order stripped such order of its otherwise quality of immediacy. He points out that while Sec. 27 of RA 6770 provides for the immediate execution of provisionary orders of the Ombudsman, Sec. 8, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, which is purportedly derived from said Sec. 27, intentionally omitted the matter of immediate execution. Pushing the point, Gobenciong would then argue that this omission contextually worked to repeal part of said Sec. 27. To Gobenciong, the repeal is within the Ombudsmans power to effect under the last paragraph of Sec. 27, RA 6770.

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, Gobenciong would posit the view that the immediate implementation of his preventive suspension, despite his having moved for reconsideration, violated his right to due process and to the equal protection of law. In this regard, he cites the more lenient, but just as applicable and effective, Civil Service law which allows an appeal from an order of preventive suspension and does not consider the same as immediately executory. Finally, Gobenciong makes reference to the matter of the CA having issued a TRO, which both the DOH and the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas ignored, and to the CAs subsequent refusal to resolve his contempt motion. We are not convinced. Repeals by implication are not favored, as laws are presumed to be passed with full knowledge of all existing legislations on the subject. In order that one law or what passes for one may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must be inconsistent, that is, the former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act.[23] Even as we concede the Ombudsmans authority to amend certain procedural rules of RA 6770, we agree with the CAs holding on the absence of an irreconcilable conflict, vis--vis the implementation of a preventive suspension order, between Sec. 27 of RA 6770 and Sec. 8, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure. For reference, we reproduce the pertinent provisions of both issuances: Sec. 27 of RA 6770
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds: (1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movants. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing; Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. x x x Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one months salary shall be final and unappealable.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.[24]

Sec. 8, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure

Sec. 8. Motion for Reconsideration or reinvestigation; Grounds.Whenever allowable, a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the decision by the respondent on any of the following grounds:
a) New evidence had been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision; b) Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant.

Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the hearing officers shall resolve the same within five (5) days from receipt thereof.

Indeed, there exists no irreconcilable inconsistency between the two sets of provisions respecting the immediate implementability of a preventive suspension order emanating from the Ombudsman. As it were, the conflict concerns only the period for filing a motion for reconsideration. What was once the five-day reglementary period fixed under Sec. 27(2), RA 6770 is now 10 days under Sec. 8, Rule III, Ombudsman Rules of Procedure. Apart from this change, both sections in question can validly be harmonized and given effect at the same time.

We cannot, accordingly, subscribe to Gobenciongs contention that Sec. 27(1), RA 6770 is deemed repealed for not being incorporated or carried into the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure. For, if this outlandish posture of Gobenciong is, under the premises, pushed to its logical conclusion, then any and all related provisions of RA 6770 not touched upon in the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure would be considered abrogated, regardless of the absence of real conflicts. The Court need not belabor the absurdity of Gobenciongs logic. Reading and harmonizing together the aforequoted Sec. 27(1) of RA 6770 and Sec. 8, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, it is at once apparent that the immediately executory quality of a preventive suspension order does not preclude the preventively suspended respondent from seeking reconsideration of such order. In fine, the existence and availment, if this be the case, of the right to move for reconsideration does not motu proprio stay the immediate execution of the provisionary order of preventive suspension. The unqualified use of the phrase immediately effective and executory in Sec. 27(1) of RA 6770 suggests this conclusion. An order of preventive suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. And it is usually made immediately effective and executory to prevent the respondent from using his/her position or office to influence prospective witnesses or tamper with the records which may be vital to the prosecution of the case.[25] At any rate, RA 6770 itself contains limiting bars to the exercise by the Ombudsman or his deputies of the power to impose preventive suspension. Sec. 24 of RA 6770 thus provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension.The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Expounding on the limitation adverted to, the Court has held that a preventive suspension order shall issue only if the Ombudsman, or any of his deputies, exercising sound judgment, determines that the evidence of guilt is strong and that any of the three conditions set forth in Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is present. Thus, in Garcia v. Mojica, the Court held that the Ombudsman and his deputies have the discretion to exercise such determination, thus:
There can be no question in this case as to the power and authority of respondent Deputy Ombudsman to issue an order of preventive suspension against an official like the petitioner, to prevent that official from using his office to intimidate or to influence witnesses or to tamper with records that might be vital to the prosecution of the case against him.[26]

As things thus stand, the Office of the Ombudsman can, as a matter of statutory empowerment, validly order the immediate execution of a preventive suspension after determining the propriety of the imposition, regardless of the remedy of reconsideration made available under the law to the suspended respondent. Accordingly, Gobenciongs lament about his right to due process, being violated as a result of the immediate implementation of his preventive suspension, has really no legal leg to stand on. And if only to stress a point, a preventive suspension, not being a penalty for an administrative infraction, is imposable without prior hearing. The foregoing considered, the matters of the issuance by the CA of a TRO bearing on the implementation of the preventive suspension in question and Gobenciongs unacted contempt motions have become moot and academic, for the preventive suspension had been served and the CA had, for all intents and purposes, denied the said motions.

This brings us to the issue of the alleged violation of the equal protection clause. Gobenciong parlays the theory that the application of RA 6770, which authorizes the Ombudsman to impose a six-month preventive suspension, instead of the civil service provisions of the Administrative Code, which limits the disciplining authoritys prerogative to only imposing a prevention suspension for a period not exceeding 90 days, violates the equal protection guarantee. We are not persuaded. At its most basic, the equal protection clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination; it does not demand absolute equality. The fundamental guarantee is not breached by a law which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and provided further that there is a substantial distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.[27] In Miranda v. Sandiganbayan, where the issue of equal protection was raised, albeit the 60-day preventive suspension limit under the Local Government Code was involved, we ruled against any violation of the constitutional proscription against the equal protection of the law, thus:
In essence, [the dissenting opinion] avers that there is no substantial distinction between preventive suspensions handed down by theOmbudsman and those imposed by executive officials. On the contrary, there is a world of difference between them. The Constitution has endowed the Ombudsman with unique safeguards to ensure immunity from political pressure. Among these statutory protections are fiscal autonomy, fixed term of office and classification as an impeachable officer. This much was recognized by this Court in the earlier cited case of Garcia v. Mojica. Moreover, there are stricter safeguards for imposition of preventive suspension by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 requires that theOmbudsman determine: (1) that the evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) that any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or ( c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.[28]

Second Main Issue: Ombudsman has power to ensure compliance with imposition of penalties pursuant to his administrative disciplinary authority The Office of the Ombudsmans assertion, about being in possession of full administrative disciplinary authority over public officials and employees, except impeachable officials, members of Congress, and the Judiciary, including the power to determine the penalty therefor and to cause the same to be implemented by the head of the government agency concerned, is correct. Jurisprudence on the matter is settled. Accordingly, any suggestion that its power to remove, suspend, or censure is merely advisory or recommendatory has to be rejected outright. And the CAs reference to Tapiador[29] to underpin its conclusion on the recommendatory nature of the Ombudsmans disciplinary authority is misplaced and erroneous, the cited portion of Tapiador being a mere obiter dictum. The Court made this abundantly clear in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals[30] and subsequently in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals.[31] In Ledesma, we held that the pronouncement in Tapiador on the authority of the Ombudsman is at most an obiter dictum, which cannot be cited as a doctrinal pronouncement of the Court, ratiocinating as follows: Petitioner insists that the word recommend be given its literal meaning; that is, that the Ombudsmans action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, thus:
. . . Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were (sic) administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned. For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue that the word recommend must be taken in conjunction with the phrase and ensure compliance therewith. The proper interpretation of the Courts statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty

imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and not itsjurisdiction. We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents. Several reasons militate against a literal interpretation of the subject constitutional provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.[32] (Emphasis ours.)

For good measure, we further stated:

x x x That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. x x x By stating that the Ombudsman recommends the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions of the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.[33]

In Office of the Ombudsman, on the core issue of whether the Ombudsman can only recommend, but cannot impose, administrative sanctions over erring public officers and employees, the Court reiterated its ruling in Ledesma, observing:
In the present case, the Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsmans power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.[34]

And to put to rest any uncertainty that might have been occasioned by a misreading of Tapiador, we proceeded to explain inOffice of the Ombudsman that the Office of the Ombudsmans basic constitutional mandate as [protector] of the people is embodied in Sec. 13[35] of RA 6770, while its specific constitutional functions are substantially reiterated in Sec. 15[36] of the same RA. Thus, the authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is of constitutional origin, proceeding as it does from Sec. 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution,[37] which reads:
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

Not to be overlooked of course is RA 6770 which grants, as it were, the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority as said statute is replete with provisions that, to borrow from Office of the Ombudsman:
cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty.[38]

Among others, the provisions cited in Office of the Ombudsman were Secs. 19, 21,[40] 22,[41] 23,[42] and 25[43] of RA 6770. As a final point, in Office of the Ombudsman, we stressed that the history of RA 6770 bears out the conclusion that Congress intended the Office of the Ombudsman to be an activist watchman, not merely a passive one,[44] possessing full administrative disciplinary authority, including the power to impose the penalty of removal and to prosecute a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The Court, in Uy v. Sandiganbayan,[45] gave validation to the legislative intent adverted to.
[39]

The parallel holdings in Ledesma and Office of the Ombudsman would later be echoed in a slew of cases, among the latest of which were Commission on Audit, Regional Office No. 13, Butuan City v. Hinampas[46] and Office of the Ombudsman v. Santiago.[47] Third Main Issue: RA 6770 provisos granting investigative, prosecutorial and disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman not unconstitutional We now come to the concluding inquiry. Gobenciong asseverates that the grant unto the Ombudsman under RA 6770 of the power to take over a disciplinary case, at any stage of the investigation, to investigate any act or omission, administrative, or otherwise, and to direct the implementation of a preventive suspension order constitutes unconstitutional delegation of authority. He describes the exercise by the Ombudsman and his deputies of such powers as a roving commission, devoid of any limitation and check-and-balance mechanism, adding that RA 6770 does not provide any guiding standard. To Gobenciong, such unbridled power and wide and sweeping authority are laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. We are not persuaded. As earlier discussed, the Office of the Ombudsman is a creature of the Constitution. The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the office to be strong and effective, with sufficient bite and muscle to enable it to carry out its mandate as protector of the people against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government. They, however, left it to Congress to invest the office with more broad powers to enforce its own action.[48] And so it was that RA 6770 was enacted empowering, under Sec. 15(1) thereof, the Ombudsman to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of cases [of which he has primary jurisdiction].

Clearly then, the espoused theory of undue delegation of authority is untenable. For, in the ultimate analysis, it is the 1987 Constitution no less which granted and allowed the grant by Congress of sweeping prosecutorial, investigatory, and disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman. Lest it be overlooked, the unconstitutionality of a law must clearly be demonstrated. It cannot be predicated on speculations or hypothetical fears that its provisions may be perverted or the powers granted abused. All powers are susceptible to misuse and abuse, but that is hardly a reason to strike down the law. While the Court may declare a law or portions thereof unconstitutional, it is imperative that the petitioner shows a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one.[49] And it is basic that the matter of constitutionality shall, as a rule, be considered if it is the lis mota of the case and raised and argued at the earliest opportunity. Estarija v. Ranada formulates the rule in the following wise:
When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy; (2) a person and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case. For our purpose, only the third requisite is in question. Unequivocally, the law requires that the question of constitutionality of a statute must be raised at the earliest opportunity. In Matibag v. Benipayo, we held that the earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, if it was not raised in the pleadings before a competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.[50]

The issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest possible opportunity; this means before the Office of the Ombudsman, or at least before the CA. Withal, it cannot now be considered in Gobenciongs petitions for review.

This is not to say, however, that what Gobenciong considers as a question of a constitutional nature is absolutely necessary to the disposition of this case. Finally, Gobenciongs submission about the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the case from the DOH strikes us as a clear case of a misleading afterthought. For the fact of the matter is that the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas did not wrest jurisdiction from the DOH over the administrative aspect of this ghost delivery case. Far from it. The records tend to show that the Office of Ombudsman-Visayas took cognizance of and assumed jurisdiction of what would later be OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370 on June 20, 1997 when dela Pea filed her complaint for falsification and misconduct against Gobenciong and other hospital officials. This was four months before the DOH formally charged Gobenciong, et al. on October 29, 1997 with an offense arising from the anomalous procurement of a hemoanalyzer. The mere filing of the formal charge, without more, did not as it cannot oust the Office of the Ombudsman of its jurisdiction over the administrative case. Jurisdiction, once it attaches, continues until the case is concluded.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 159883 and 173212 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the appealed Decision and Resolution dated November 26, 2002 and August 27, 2003, respectively, of the CA in CAG.R. SP No. 49585 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 168059 is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution dated April 29, 2005 and May 29, 2006, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 61687 areANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 21, 2000 and the Order dated August 10, 2000 of the Ombudsman in OMB-VISADM-97-0370 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

7. Alejandro vs Office of the Ombudsman, Fact finding and Intelligence Group - GR No 173121 DECISION BRION, J.:

\Ve resolve the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by Franklin Alejanctro (petitioneJ), assailing the February 21, 2006 decision2 and the June 15, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88544. The CA dismissed for prematurity the petitioner's appeal on the August 20, 2004 decision4 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman in OiviB-C-A-03-031 0-I him administratively liable for grave misconduct. Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate .Justice Esteb M. Perlas-Bernabe, per Special Order No. 1437 dated Marcil25. 2013. 1 Filed under Rule 45 ofthe Rules of Court; rol/o, pp. 9-25. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezcr R. de los Santos. and concurred in by Associe1te Justices Jose C. Reyes, .Jr. and Arturo G. Tayag; id. at 168-172. ld.at!89-190. I d. m 98-1 OS.

8. Ombudsman vs Delijero - GR No 172635

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the June 7, 2005 Decision[2] and May 2, 2006 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 00017. The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows: Respondent Pedro Delijero, Jr., was a public school teacher at the Burauen Comprehensive National High School, Burauen,Leyte and was administratively charged for Grave Misconduct. A complaint against respondent was filed before petitioner Office of the Ombudsman as a Request for Assistance (RAS) from the President of the Burauen Watchdog Committee for Good Government. Philip Camiguing, Graft Prevention & Control Officer I, submitted his final evaluation report and recommended that the RAS be upgraded into an administrative and criminal complaint against respondent.[4] The complainant, Cleofas P. dela Cruz, was the mother of the alleged victim Myra dela Cruz (Myra). At the time of the incident, Myra was only 12 years old and a first year high school student at the Burauen Comprehensive National High School. Respondent, on the other hand, was Myra's 52-year-old Mathematics teacher.[5] Sometime in May 2003, complainant learned from her cousin that respondent was courting her daughter Myra. Complainant then immediately confronted Myra, who admitted having received from respondent several handwritten love letters, a Valentine's card and Two Hundred Pesos as allowance.[6] In her Affidavit,[7] Myra gave the following declarations, to wit:
xxxx 2. Sometime on August 12, 2002, our Mathematics teacher, Mr. Pedro Delijero, started courting me, by sending love notes, valentines cards thru my classmates Angelyn del Pilar, Maricel Gayanes, Irene Cajote;

3. Last April 7, 2003, at about 10:00 a.m., more or less, my math teacher, Mr. Pedro Delijero, who was inside his room, [called] my attention, and as I got inside the said room, he abruptly closed the open door, thereby, immediately kissed my cheek, out of fear, I pushed him away from me, and I rushed to the door of said room and went outside. [8]

Maricel Gayanes, Irene Cajote and Angelyn del Pilar, all classmates of Myra, submitted their Joint Affidavit[9] the pertinent portions of which read:
xxxx In several instances, which we cannot anymore recall the dates, we were requested by our Math teacher Mr. Pedro Delijero, Jr. to handed the letters to my classmate Myra Dela Cruz, 4. We have the knowledge of all the letters sent to her, as LOVE LETTERS as it was confirmed by our classmate Myra dela Cruz, that those letters which we brought to her, were all love letters from our Math teacher, Mr. Pedro Delijero, since Mr. Delijiro is courting her, same were true with regard to Valentine's Cards, as well as the 2 pieces of One Hundred Peso Bill (P100.00) being inserted at the intermediate pad paper, x x x

Respondent submitted a Counter-Affidavit[10] in his defense. Respondent denied kissing Myra in the morning of April 7, 2003. Moreover, respondent claimed that Myra fell in love with him and wrote him love letters. Respondent claimed that he was merely forced to answer her letters as she threatened him that she would kill herself if he would not answer her and reciprocate her love. Lastly, respondent claimed that their relationship was merely platonic. Petitioner called the parties to a preliminary conference and, after which, ordered them to submit their respective position papers. Respondent, however, did not submit a position paper but instead submitted a Manifestation[11] stating that the administrative aspect of the complaint

was likewise the subject of a complaint filed by complainant before the Office of the Regional Director, Department of Education, Regional Office VIII, Palo, Leyte. On May 17, 2004, petitioner rendered a Decision[12] finding respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct and meted him the penalty of dismissal, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds respondent PEDRO DELIJERO, JR. guilty of Grave Misconduct and, pursuant to Section 46 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, he is, therefore, meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from public service, forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold public office. SO DECIDED.[13]

Respondent moved for a reconsideration[14] of petitioner's decision. Respondent asked that the order of dismissal be reconsidered and, instead, be changed to a penalty of suspension. On May 14, 2004, petitioner issued an Order[15] denying respondent's motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, respondent then appealed to the CA. On June 7, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision ruling in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this case and SETTING ASIDE the Decision dated May 17, 2004 and the Order dated July 30, 2004 rendered and issued by the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-VIS-A-03-0506-4. IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]

The CA, without ruling on the issues raised by respondent, instead tackled the issue of jurisdiction motu proprio. The CA ruled that petitioner had no jurisdiction to investigate the complaint filed before it as Republic Act No. 4670 (RA 4670), the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, specifically covers and governs administrative proceedings involving public school teachers. The CA held that petitioner should have immediately dismissed the case after respondent had informed it, through a manifestation, of the pendency of an administrative complaint before the DECS. Moreover, the CA ruled that even assumingarguendo that petitioner had the power to investigate the complaint, it still had no power to directly impose sanctions against respondent as its power is limited to only recommend the appropriate sanctions, but not to directly impose the same. Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration[17] assailing the Decision of the CA. OnMay 2, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion. Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following issues for this Court's resolution, to wit:
I. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS FULL AND COMPLETE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OVER PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS, WHICH AUTHORITY IS CONCURRENT WITH OTHER DISCIPLINING AUTHORITIES SANCTIONED BY NO LESS THAN REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS, AND THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW (PD 807, BOOK V OF EO 292). II. SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 (MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS) HAS NOT ADDED PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS TO THE LIST OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGED CLASSES OF PUBLIC SERVANTS EXEMPTED FROM THE OMBUDSMAN'S ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND ANY SUCH

INTERPRETATION SUFFERS UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.

FROM

THE

VICE

OF

III. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE OMBUDSMAN HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY OF AN ERRING PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE, AND TO DIRECT AND COMPEL THE HEAD OF THE CONCERNED OFFICE OR AGENCY TO IMPLEMENT THE PENALTY IMPOSED, HAS ALREADY BEEN SETTLED BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF LEDESMA VS COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 465 SCRA 437 (2005).[18]

The petition is meritorious. This Court shall jointly discuss the first and second issues as the same are interrelated. Petitioner mainly argues that its administrative disciplinary authority over public school teachers is concurrent with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) disciplining authority. Petitioner is correct. The issue is not novel. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Medrano,[19] (Medrano) this Court ruled that the administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the DECS, to wit:
In resolving the second issue whether petitioner has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint against respondent it is necessary to examine the source, nature and extent of the power and authority of the Ombudsman vis--vis the provisions of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution created the independent Office of the Ombudsman. Hailed as the protectors of the people, the Ombudsman and his Deputies are bestowed with overreaching authority, powers, functions, and duties to act on

complaints against public officials and employees, as provided in Sections 12 and 13 thereof, thus: Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form ormanne r against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, inclu dinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any p erson, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office oragency, when such act or omission appears to be il legal, unjust, improper, or inefficient; (2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties; (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; (4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents; (6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence; (7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency; and (8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions o r duties as may be providedby law. (Underscoring supplied)

The above enumeration of the Ombudsmans far-reaching powers is not exclusive as the framers of the Constitution gave Congress the leeway to prescribe, by subsequent legislation, additional powers, functions or duties to the Ombudsman, as mandated in Section 13(8), quoted above. Pursuant to the constitutional command, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) providing for the functional, structural organization, and the extent of the administrative disciplinary authority of the petitioner. The provisions of this law apply to all kinds ofmalfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure in office. The acts or omissions which the petitioner may investigate are quite extensive: SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts oromissi ons which: (1) Are contrary to law or regulation; (2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; (3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions, though in accordance with law; (4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; (5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or (6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification. Its mandate is not only to act promptly on complaints against such public officers or employees, but also to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to pr omote efficient service by the Government to the people. its R.A. No. 6770, however, restrains the petitioner from exercising disciplinary authority over

officials who may be removed only byimpeachment or over Members of Congress and the Judiciary, thus: SEC. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinaryauthority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except overofficials who may be removed o nly by impeachment or over Members of Congress and the Judiciary.

SEC. 22. Investigatory Power. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, ifwarranted. In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a private person, the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person in the investigation and proceed against such private person as the evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the private person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities. (Underscoring supplied) The above constitutional and statutory provisions taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow upon the petitioner fulladministrative disciplinary power over public officials and employees except those impeachable officials, Members of Congress and of the Judiciary. When an administrative charge is initiated against a public school teacher, however, Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers specifically provides that the same shall be heard initially by an investigating committee composed of the school superintendent of the division, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization, and a supervisor of the division, as members, thus: SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committeecomposed of the corresponding Schools Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization and a supervisor of the Divi sion, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public

Schools. The committee shall submit its findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within t hirty days from termination of the hearings; Provided, however, That where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education. (Underscoring supplied) In Fabella v. Court of Appeals, the Court held: The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically coversadministrative proceedings involving public sc hool teachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public school teachers administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers organization, and a supervisor of the division. x x x. xxxx The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore, reflects the legislative i ntent to impose a standard and a separate set of proceduralrequireme nts in connection with administrative proceedings involving public s choolteachers. x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Significantly, The Ombudsman Act of 1989 recognizes the existence of some proper disciplinary authorit[ies], such as the investigating committee of the DepEd mentioned in Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Thus, Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the petitioner may refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate admini strativeproceedings against erring public officers or employees. In light of this, the Court holds that the administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is notan exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd.

In the instant case, respondent, although designated as then OIC of a public school and concurrently the school principal of another public school, is undoubtedly covered by the definition of the term teacher under the second paragraph of Section 2 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers which provides: SEC 2. Title Definition. This Act shall x x x apply to all public school teachers except those in the professorial staff of state colleges and universities. As used in this Act, the term teacher shall mean all persons engaged in the classroom, in any level of instruction; on full time basis, including guidance counselors, school librarians, industrial arts or vocational instructors, and all other persons performingsupervisory an d/or administrative functions in all schools, colleges and universities operated by the Government or its politicalsubd ivisions; but shall not include school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other school employees. (Underscoring supplied) Thus, the administrative complaint against respondent should have been referred by petitioner to the proper committee of the DepEd for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings, in light of Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989.[20]

Based on the foregoing, while petitioner has concurrent administrative disciplinary authority with the DECS over public school teachers, Section 23 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that the Ombudsman may refer a complaint to the proper disciplinary authority. Under the circumstances obtaining herein, it would have been more prudent for petitioner to have referred the complaint to the DECS given that it would have been in a better position to serve the interest of justice considering the nature of the controversy. Respondent is a public school teacher and is covered by RA 4670, therefore, the proceedings before the DECS would have been the more appropriate venue to resolve the dispute.

In any case, the foregoing pronouncement does not automatically mean that this Court is nullifying the proceedings before the Ombudsman as estoppel has already set in. In Medrano, this Court ruled that the active participation of an individual before the administrative proceedings and the belated challenge to the jurisdiction of the said body bars him from assailing such acts under the principle of estoppel, to wit:
x x x While petitioner should have desisted from hearing the administrative complaint against respondent and referred it to the proper DepEd committee, given that it had already concluded the proceedings and had rendered a decision thereon, respondent is now barred from assailing petitioners acts under the principle of estoppel. He had actively participated in the administrative proceedings before petitioner. In his Counter-Affidavit, he asked petitioner for affirmative relief by seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint allegedly for being baseless. From then on,he was assisted by counsel in filing several motions. When he was preventively suspended for six months without pay, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that a new Order be issued reversing or setting aside the preventive suspension Order. When this was denied, he again filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for the lifting of his suspension since he was already replaced as OIC, which motion was granted. It was only after petitioner had rendered an adverse Decision that he, in a Motion for Reconsideration, impugned petitioners assumption of jurisdiction over his case. Verily, respondent cannot be permitted to challenge petitioners acts belatedly. (Underscoring supplied).[21]

Likewise, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Galicia,[22] this Court ruled that the right to due process was not violated, notwithstanding that the DECS had original jurisdiction to hear the complaint, thus:
In the present case, records show that Galicia was given the right to due process in the investigation of the charges against him. He participated in the proceedings by making known his defenses in the pleadings that he submitted. It was only when a decision adverse to him was rendered did he question the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.

Under the principles of estoppel and laches, We rule that it is now too late for Galicia to assail the administrative investigation conducted and the decision rendered against him. xxxx The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. During the proceedings before the Ombudsman, Galicia filed a Counter-Affidavit, Rejoinder-Affidavit, Comment on the Certification of the CCPC Registrar, and a Rejoinder to Reply. He also submitted documents in support of his contentions. Likewise, there is no indication that the proceedings were done in a manner that would prevent him from presenting his defenses. Verily, these suffice to satisfy the requirements of due process because the opportunity to be heard especially in administrative proceedings (where technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied) is not limited to oral arguments. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the parties submit to present their charges and defenses. In sum, We reiterate that it is the School Superintendent and not the Ombudsman that has jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers. Yet, Galicia is estopped from belatedly assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. His right to due process was satisfied when he participated fully in the investigation proceedings. He was able to present evidence and arguments in his defense. The investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was therefore valid.[23]

In the case at bar, respondent actively participated in the proceedings before the Ombudsman. He submitted his counter-affidavit, an affidavit of his witness, and attached annexes. Respondent even filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking for affirmative relief from the Ombudsman.

The case at bar is, however, somewhat peculiar because when petitioner asked the parties to submit their position papers, respondent did not submit one and

instead filed a Manifestation[24] informing petitioner of another proceeding before the DECS, to wit:

xxxx 2. That the administrative aspect of the complaint is likewise the subject of a complaint filed by the complainant before the Office of the Regional Director, DepEd, Regional Office VIII, Government Center, Palo, Leyte, a copy of which complaint is hereto attached and also made as part of this manifestation. 3. The with the investigation being made by this office, and the filing of the complaint with the Court as regard the criminal aspect of the complainant, and the pendency of the administrative complaint before the DepEd, it appears that the respondent is being charged and made to answer twice for the same offense. 4. That with the submission of the foregoing manifestation, and the respondent having already filed his counter affidavit and the affidavit of his witnesses and the exhibits attached thereto, the respondent submits the same for the resolution of this Office.[25]

The CA ruled that in view of respondent's manifestation, petitioner should have immediately dismissed the case filed before it as the DECS has the proper jurisdiction to hear and determine the administrative complaint over respondent. We disagree. To this Court's mind, the foregoing manifestation cannot by any stretch be considered as a direct attack on the proceedings before the Ombudsman. A plain reading of such manifestation would even lead to a conclusion that respondent had in fact submitted himself to the body's jurisdiction as he had already submitted his counter-affidavit, an affidavit of his witness and exhibits. If respondent wanted to assail the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, he should have clearly prayed for the same through a motion to dismiss, a manifestation ad cautelam, or any other

document of similar import. The phrase, the respondent submits the same for the resolution of this Office, is indicative of respondent's submission to the Ombudsman's jurisdiction. Such conclusion is even bolstered by the fact that when respondent filed his petition for review before the CA, he made the following declaration, to wit:
9. That with the filing of his counter-affidavit, and the affidavit of his witnesses, and the filing of a criminal case by the respondent against petitioner, which criminal case is now still pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Burauen, Leyte, and another administrative complaint with the Regional Director, Region VIII, of DepEd, Government Center, Palo, Leyte, petitioner filed a manifestation with the Ombudsman-Visayas, submitting this case for resolution. x x x[26]

Lastly, anent the third issue raised by petitioner, the same is again meritorious. The CA ruled that the power of the Ombudsman is only recommendatory and that it cannot impose sanctions against respondent. Petitioner, for its part, argues that the Office of Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of an erring public official or employee, and to direct and compel the head of the concerned officer or agency to implement the penalty imposed. Petitioner is correct. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[27] this Court settled that the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory, to wit:
We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we emphasized that the Ombudsmans order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory. Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be

coursed through the proper officer. Recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, we also held While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to recommend x x x removal, suspension, demotion x x x of government officials and employees, the same Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of RA 6770. (Emphasis supplied.)[28]

This Court notes that the CA granted respondent's petition on the sole ground of petitioner's alleged lack of jurisdiction which it tackled motu proprio. The CA did not discuss the other issues raised by respondent involving the appreciation of the findings of fact of the Ombudsman as well as respondent's appeal for the imposition of a lesser penalty. Just like in Medrano, given the evidentiary nature of respondent's appeal, this Court deems that justice would be best served to remand the case to the CA for it to decide the case on the merits. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated June 7, 2005 and Resolution dated May 2, 2006, in CAG.R. SP No. 00017, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is directed to decide the case on the merits.
9. Lastimosa vs Ombudsman - GR No 116801

This case requires us to determine the extent to which the Ombudsman may call upon government prosecutors for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his office and the conditions under which he may do so. Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and the Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal charge as ordered by the Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime was filed against her and the Provincial Prosecutor and a charge for indirect contempt was brought against them, both in the Office of the Ombudsman. In the meantime the two were placed under preventive suspension. This is a petition

for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner to set aside the orders of the Ombudsman with respect to the two proceedings. The background of this case is as follows: On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. 1 The cases were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas where they were docketed as OMB-VIS(CRIM)-93-0140 and OMB-VIS-(ADM)-93-0036, respectively. The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who, after an investigation, found no prima facieevidence and accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint. After reviewing the matter, however, the Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court. 2 Accordingly, in a letter dated May 17, 1994, the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, respondent Arturo C. Mojica, referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar for the "filing of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, . . ." 3 The case was eventually assigned to herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa. It appears that petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. 4 With the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, she filed on July 4, 1994 an information for acts of lasciviousness against Mayor Ilustrisimo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa Fe. 5 In two letters written to the Provincial Prosecutor on July 11, 1994 and July 22, 1994, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica inquired as to any action taken on the previous referral of the case, more specifically the directive of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape. 6 As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered on July 27, 1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman. 7 For this purpose a hearing was set on August 1, 1994. Petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were given until August 3, 1994 within which to submit their answer. 8 An answer 9 was timely filed by them and hearings were thereupon conducted. It appears that earlier, on July 22, 1994, two cases had been filed against the two prosecutors with the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas by Julian Menchavez, a resident of Santa Fe, Cebu. One was an administrative complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and P.D. No. 807 (the Civil Service Law) 10and another one was a criminal complaint for violation of 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code. 11 The complaints were based on the alleged refusal of petitioner and Kintanar to obey the orders of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape. In the administrative case (OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189) respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Mojica issued an order on August 15, 1994, placing petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa and Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months, 12 pursuant to Rule III, 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman

(Administrative Order No. 7), in relation to 24 of R.A. No. 6770. The order was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on August 16, 1994 and on August 18, 1994 Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon J. Liwag designated Eduardo Concepcion of Region VII as Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. On the other hand, the Graft Investigation Officer II, Edgardo G. Canton, issued orders 13 in the two cases, directing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar to submit their counter affidavits and controverting evidence. On September 6, 1994, petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and Department of Justice: (a) Letter dated May 17, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and related orders, referring to the Office of the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor the records of OMB-VIS-CRIM-93-0140, entitled Jessica V. Dayon vs. Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, "for filing of the appropriate action (for Attempted Rape) with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City. (b) Order dated July 27, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and related orders directing petitioner and Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar to explain in writing within three (3) days from receipt why they should not be punished for indirect Contempt of the Office of the Ombudsman "for refusing and failing . . . to file the appropriate Information for Attempted Rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. (c) The 1st Indorsement dated August 9, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Ramon J. Liwag, ordering the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to comply with the directive of the Office of the Ombudsman that a charge for attempted rape be filed against respondent Mayor Ilustrisimo in recognition of the authority of said Office. (d) Order dated August 15, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica, duly approved by Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, and related orders in OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189, entitled Julian Menchavez vs. Oliveros Kintanar and Gloria Lastimosa, placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months, without pay. (e) The 1st Indorsement dated August 18, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Liwag directing Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Eduardo O. Concepcion (Region VII) to implement the letter dated August 15, 1994 of Ombudsman Vasquez, together with the Order dated August 15, 1994, placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension. (f) Department Order No. 259 issued by Acting Secretary Liwag on August 18, 1994, designating Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Concepcion Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Petitioner raises a number of issues which will be discussed not necessarily in the order they are stated in the petition. I.

The pivotal question in this case is whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo. Lastimosa claims that the Office of the Ombudsman and the prosecutor's office have concurrent authority to investigate public officers or employees and that when the former first took cognizance of the case against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to the exclusion of the latter. It then became the duty of the Ombudsman's office, according to petitioner, to finish the preliminary investigation by filing the information in court instead of asking the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to do so. Petitioner contends that the preparation and filing of the information were part and parcel of the preliminary investigation assumed by the Office of the Ombudsman and the filing of information in court could not be delegated by it to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner defends her actuations in conducting a preliminary investigation as having been made necessary by the insistence of the Ombudsman to delegate the filing of the case to her office. In any event, petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office. For this reason it is argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal. Petitioner's contention has no merit. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute. In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides: Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control. (Emphasis added) It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez and Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu to file an information for attempted rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrismo. It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary investigation and all that remained to be done was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under 31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision. 16 Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman.

II. The records show that despite repeated orders of the Ombudsman, petitioner refused to file an information for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo, insisting that after investigating the complaint in the case she found that he had committed only acts of lasciviousness. 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in another context, the preliminary investigation of a case, of which the filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial in character. Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance, disobedience or resistance of a lawful process, order or command of the Ombudsman thus making her liable for indirect contempt under Rule 71, 3 of the Rules of Court is for respondents to determine after appropriate hearing. At this point it is important only to note the existence of the contempt power of the Ombudsman as a means of enforcing his lawful orders. III. Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be found that she is guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under preventive suspension. The pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 state: 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. 22. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. A. Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid because the order was issued without giving her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar the opportunity to refute the charges against them and because, at any rate, the evidence against them is not strong as required by 24. The contention is without

merit. Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia: 17 In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the opportunity to prove his innocence. (Emphasis added). It is true that, under 24 of the Ombudsman's Act, to justify the preventive suspension of a public official, the evidence against him should be strong, and any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, 18 however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in that case:
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint. . . . 19

In this case, respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica justified the preventive suspension of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar on the following grounds: A careful assessment of the facts and circumstances of the herein cases and the records pertaining thereto against respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] clearly leads to the conclusion that the evidence on record of guilt is strong and the charges involved offenses of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty and dishonesty which will warrant respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] removal from the service. Moreover, considering the unabashed attitude of respondents in openly announcing various false pretexts and alibis to justify their stubborn disregard for the lawful directives of the Ombudsman as their official position in their pleadings filed in OMB-VIS-0-94-0478 and in print and broadcast media, the probability is strong that public service more particularly in the prosecution of cases referred by the Office of the Ombudsman to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's office will be disrupted and prejudiced and the records of said cases even be tampered with if respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] are allowed to stay in the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's Office during the pendency of these proceedings.

Indeed respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica had personal knowledge of the facts justifying the preventive suspension of petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor since the acts alleged in the administrative complaint against them were done in the course of their official transaction with the Office of the Ombudsman. The administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar was filed in connection with their designation as deputies of the ombudsman in the prosecution of a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Respondent Deputy Ombudsman did not have to go far to verify the matters alleged in determine whether the evidence of guilt of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor was strong for the purpose of placing them under preventive suspension. Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper prosecution of that case may not be hampered. 20 In addition, because the charges against the two prosecutors involve grave misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges, if proven, can lead to a dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in ordering their preventive suspension. B. Petitioner questions her preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay and contends that it should only be for ninety (90) days on the basis of cases decided by this Court. Petitioner is in error. She is referring to cases where the law is either silent or expressly limits the period of suspension to ninety (90) days. With respect to the first situation, we ruled in the case of Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan 21 that To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the guidance of all concerned that this Court set forth the rules on the period of preventive suspension under the aforementioned laws, as follows: 1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuances thereof, and this applies to all public officers, (as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged under said Act. 2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or employees whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided under Sections 3 and 4 of said Pres. Decree 807, and shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days from issuance, except where there is delay in the disposition of the case, which is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of delay shall both be counted in computing the period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the person suspended is a presidential appointee, the continuance of his suspension shall be for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the case may warrant. On the other hand, petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were placed under preventive suspension pursuant to 24 of the Ombudsman Act which expressly provides that "the preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay." Their preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus according to law. C.

Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that the contempt charge should first be resolved before any action in the administrative complaint case can be taken because the contempt case involves a prejudicial question. There is simply no basis for this contention. The two cases arose out of the same act or omission and may proceed hand in hand, or one can be heard before the other. Whatever order is followed will not really matter. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED.