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On
CNBC's
Squawk
Box
this
morning,
Thomas
Hoenig,
former
Kansas
City
Federal
Reserve
Bank
president
and
current
FDIC
board
member,
made
the
case
for
his
proposal
to
end
the
so-called
too
big
to
fail
problem
with
large
banks.
Similar,
but
not
identical
to
Sandy
Weill's
comments,
Hoenig
is
pushing
for
a
modified
restoration
of
the
Depression
era
Glass-Steagall
Act.
I
disagree
with
Hoenigs
proposal
in
total,
but
here
are
three
specific
instances
where
I
believe
his
responses
to
key
questions
miss
their
mark.
This
is
a
fundamentally
different
global
economy
than
the
era
Hoenig
yearns
for
Hoenig
argues
that
U.S.
banks
will
not
be
at
a
competitive
disadvantage
if
we
reduce
the
size
of
our
banks
because
in
the
past,
we
had
a
dynamic
economy
even
with
smaller
banks.
I
have
made
this
point
before,
but
it
bears
repeating:
the
global
economy
has
grown
exponentially
over
the
past
25
years
and
it's
only
going
to
get
bigger,
and
much
faster.
While
the
banking
system
of
the
post-World
War
II
era
may
have
been
sufficient
for
the
economy
of
the
immediate
post-World
War
II
era,
that
banking
system
is
certainly
not
sufficient
for
today's
economy.
The
volume,
diversity,
speed,
and
breadth
of
both
trade
and
capital
flows
are
breathtaking.
Total
global
financial
assets,
excluding
derivatives,
have
increased
four
times
the
rate
of
the
global
economy
over
the
past
20
years.
This
seems
difficult
for
big
bank
critics
to
grasp
even
ones
with
Hoenig's
deep
experience.
U.S.
currency
exchange
activity
alone
is
approaching
a
billion
dollars
a
day
in
transaction
more
than
a
ten-fold
increase
since
1986.
On
a
global
level,
foreign
exchange
activity
tops
$4
billion
a
day.
I
could
list
dozens
of
more
statistics,
but
the
point
is
clear:
the
world
is
exponentially
bigger
and
more
connected
than
ever
before
and
this
process
is
not
slowing
down.
More
germane
to
the
current
discussion,
it
is
the
global,
diversified
banks
that
are
the
ones
providing
financial
services
to
companies
and
individuals
so
they
can
participate
in
the
global
economy.
Yes,
our
economy
grew
faster
in
the
immediate
post
World
War
II
decades,
but
it
wasn't
because
of
our
banking
system.
Correlation
is
not
causation.
Portfolio
805
15th
St.
NW,
Suite
700 Washington,
DC
20005
HPSInsight
HPSinsight.com
investment
was
neither
so
large,
nor
so
mobile.
And
today
the
global
nature
of
manufacturing
--
sourcing
commodities
and
components
is
enormous.
The
bottom
line
is
this:
If
we
revert
to
a
model
of
smaller,
domestically-oriented
U.S.
banks
today,
the
global
needs
of
companies
and
individuals
will
not
go
away.
Those
needs
will
simply
be
met
by
the
larger
European
and
Asian
banks.
Not
only
would
this
be
more
costly
for
U.S.
firms,
it
will
reduce
the
influence
of
our
regulators.
The
false
choice
between
the
European
model
and
breaking
up
the
banks
After
writing
off
real
competitiveness
concerns,
Hoenig
suggests
that
we
should
break
up
the
banks
because
the
European
universal
banking
model
is
broken.
He
is
right;
we
do
not
want
Europes
banking
system.
And
thankfully,
we
dont
have
it
--
and
I
don't
expect
we
ever
will.
U.S.
banks
have
more
capital,
liquidity
and
lower
loan-to-deposit
ratios.
Our
system
is
also
less
concentrated
with
the
top
5
U.S.
banks
having
less
bank
assets
as
a
percentage
of
home
country
GDP
than
the
G20
average.
And,
despite
the
hyperbolic
fears
about
big
U.S.
banks,
U.S.
banks
are
smaller
than
their
foreign
counterparts.
We
do
not
have
a
single
bank
in
the
top
eight
in
the
world
by
asset
size.
And,
based
on
the
measurement
of
asset
size
relative
to
home
country
GDP,
i.e.
the
most
important
metric
for
anyone
concerned
about
taxpayer
exposure,
we
do
not
have
a
bank
ranked
in
the
top
40.
Hoenigs
point
is
moot
we
do
not
have
Europes
banking
system,
and
we
never
will.
Capital
levels
are
the
answer
to
moral
hazard
concerns
Moral
hazard
is
one
of
the
core
reasons
advocates
push
to
break
up
the
banks.
Moral
hazard
concerns
have
two
dimensions:
the
banking
operations
side
and
the
funding
side.
On
the
operations
side,
I
agree
with
Hoenig
bankers
do
not
take
government
guarantees
into
account
when
making
loans
or
trades.
But
Hoenig's
greater
concern
is
on
the
funding
side.
If
bondholders
believe
banks
will
be
bailed
out,
big
banks
can
raise
debt
more
cheaply,
giving
them
a
funding
advantage
over
smaller
banks.
I
think
the
evidence
of
this
is
far
over-estimated,
if
it
exists
at
all.
Regardless,
whatever
benefit
might
exist
is
balanced
by
higher
capital
requirements
for
big
banks
today.
Banks
cannot
simply
leverage
up
on
cheap
debt,
as
they
will
have
to
maintain
higher
capital
levels.
Therefore,
rather
than
simply
focusing
on
the
price
of
debt,
we
should
also
examine
the
price
of
equity,
which
is
currently
high
for
big
banks.
805
15th
St.
NW,
Suite
700 Washington,
DC
20005
HPSInsight
HPSinsight.com
With enforced capital requirements, banks will have to choose between facing the high cost of equity or reducing what are deemed risky assets. Either way, we will have a significantly less leveraged banking sector and the size of our banks will be determined by the market, not the government. Moral hazard on the funding side of banks could be a concern, but if it exists, it is being addressed both in the U.S. and globally with Basel III. There is no need to break up U.S. banks. Doing so will raise costs for U.S. businesses and reduce our competitiveness in this industry. Tony Fratto is a Managing Partner at Hamilton Place Strategies, former Assistant Secretary at the U.S. Treasury Department, and a former White House official. He is also an on-air contributor for CNBC.