INTRODUCTORY NOTE NORMALLY DEATH OF A US CITIZEN ABROAD , NATURAL OR UNNATURAL IS INVESTIGATED IN A MOST SERIOUS MANNER.

HOWEVER IN THE AIR CRASH OF 17 AUGUST 1988 DEATH OF US AMBASSADOR AND HIS MILITARY ADVISOR WAS JUST TREATED AS A MINOR AFFAIR BY THE US. THE US GOVERNMENT TOOK LITTLE INTEREST IN THE AFFAIR AND EVERYTHING WAS CONVENIENTLY FORGOTTEN. THE PAKISTAN AIR FORCE INQUIRY POINTED OUT SABOTAGE AS A MAIN FACTOR.MYSTERIOUSLY THE MAIN BACK HATCH DOOR OF THE C 130 WHICH CAN BE LIFTED ONLY BY A CRAIN WAS STOLEN FROM THE PAKISTANI BASE AT MULTAN. NO EFFORT WAS MADE BY THE PAKISTANI MILITARY TO POST MORTEM THE DEAD BODIES TO FIND ANY FORENSIC EVIDENCE. PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS I WAS SERVING AS MTO 15 LANCERS ON 17 AUGUST 1988 AND 15 LANCERS WAS CHARGED WITH ADMINISRATIVE ISSUES OF ZIAS VISIT TO KANDEWALA RANGES ON 17 AUGUST 1988.

AGHA H AMIN

17 August 1988 by Agha Amin August 17, 2008 22:48 Print E-mail Interacts(32) Share 25

Tags: Pakistan Military Rule Dictator army history Zia ul Haq An army chief who should never have been the chief in the first place and should have instutionally retired by 1980 was finally terminated by divine design on 17 August 1988. It was a hot summer day when a C 130 military transporter crashed almost right on the site of a pre 1947 Hindu Shamshan Ghat on the Sutlej River near Bahawalpur. Pakistan's political equation was transformed within flash of a second. General Ziaul Haq's jaundiced shadow was removed from Pakistan's body politics by divine design and tangible endeavour of some mortals!

When Zia was suddenly promoted the army chief in 1976 he was an unknown man in the army. With no war record and known for no professional brilliance , Zia was a gift of the civilian prime minister Z.A Bhutto to the Pakistan Army. Late Maulana Kausar Niazi found an American connection in this dark horse when he stated that the US Ambassaor told the Maulana many days before his actual promotion that a man called Zia may be the army chief. Of humble background Zia did not see any action in any of Pakistan's wars except having been master mind of a dirty war of Jordan's punitive action called Black September against the Palestenians.His immediate superior Major General Nawazish found him unsuitable to be a commissioned officer but he survived by sheer luck , begging General Gul Hassan to save him .The infamous arbitrary retirements of more than 15 general officers by intrigue of General Gul Hassan and Z.A Bhutto in December 1971 created an enormous gap in the army in Pakistan and this helped Zia in quick promotion to the rank of major general in 1972.A reliable army source General Chishti states that while posted in Multan Zia practiced extreme sycophancy cultivating PPP stalwarts like Sahibzada Faruq, Hamid Raza Gillani, Sadiq Hussain Qureshi and Sajjad Hussain Qureshi.Chishti thought that the CIA may have successfully cultivated Zia much earlier in 1950s when Zia attended a military course in USA.Brigadier Z.A Khan remembers him as selling eggs as a colonel in mid 60s in Multan. Ironically the army never recommended Zia for promotion to the rank of COAS. General Chishti then the Military Secretary and directly responsible for promotion boards remembers that Zia was seventh in order of seniority in all lieutenant generals.The army chief Tikka did not even include Zia in the list of potential candidates and had recommended Lieutenant General Akbar Khan in an official letter addressed to Mr Z.A Bhutto for the job. Lieutenant General Sharif the seniormost was not recommended by Tikka in this letter.Generals Aftab and Azmat Baksh Awan the second and fourth in seniority according to Chishti were regarded as unsuitable for lack of ability by Tikka. Lieutenant General Ghulam Jillani Khan sixth in seniority and the then DG ISI was considered unsuitable for lack of formation command experience. Lieutenant Generals Malik Abdul Majeed and Zia ul Haq sixth and seventh in seniority were not even considered by the army high command to be even fit to be considered as they were newly promoted and had very little higher formation command experience. Zia however had ingratiated himself to Z.A Bhutto by his extreme servility and sycophancy. General Gul Hassan in his memoirs ascribes Zia's promotion to the fact that he took insults,snubs, and other similar indignities from Bhutto,whome he regarded as his his creator with inborn grace ! General Zia's tenure as army chief did not improve the Pakistan Army . Not at least in the period 1981 to 1988 when I saw it as a cadet and officer.Pakistan was transformed into a frontline state in the Soviet Afghan War not because of any religious reasons

but simply because Pakistan's military junta lacked legitimacy and was isolated. Seeking US and Saudi assistance was its only way of survival . In the process a dangerous affair with diasastorous consequences , which only became evident in mid 1990s was started with religious extremism. Chaudhry Sardar Ali then an Inspector General of police stated in an interview that Zia adopted draconian Islamic laws like Hudood and Qisas just to please the Saudis and to get financial aid. A dubious partnership was created between an illegitimate military junta,US and Saudi intelligence agencies and dubious banks like the Bank of Crooks and Cheats (BCCI) of the the infamous Agha Hassan Abedi. Pakistan was converted into a base for a so called Jihad to ensure Christian Anglo Saxon supremacy against Soviet Russia with US and Saudi dollars. The army became a one man organization with promotion and success for only those officers who were in Zia's good books. This anachronistic situation continued till 17 August 1988. Great preparations were made when Zia was comin to witness the tank demonstration at Kandewala Ranges. Baba ice cream a special ice cream that Zia loved was arranged from Multan. Special lotahs were bought for Zia and his party's ablution. Chefs were pooled in from various formations to prepare Zia's lunch at Tamewali Rest House on 17 August 1988. Zia never had that lunch. His death was fixed on the Hindu Shamshan Ghat at Basti Lal Kamal. An army chief who should never have been the chief in the first place and should have instutionally retired by 1980 was finally terminated by divine design on 17 August 1988. The harm that he inflicted on Pakistan purely motivated by his selfish policies to stay in power lingers on and haunts Pakistan's very existence today twenty years later on 17th August 2008. Today thanks to Zia political leadership in Pakistan has been nearly destroyed and military talent is non existent. A MAN WHO WENT TO THE LOWEST DEPTHS OF SYCOPHANCY AND SERVILITY TO PLEASE A PRIME MINISTER WHO HE LATER HAD HANGED IN A DUBIOUS TRIAL
HOW THE PAKISTAN ARMY WORKED UNDER ZIA
WHEN ONLY AN EME CAPTAIN HAD THE COURAGE TO DEFY A THIRD RATE SHABBY LOOKING GENERAL LTG FAIZ ALI CHISHTI THE LTG MAHMOOD OF 5 JULY 1977 WROTE ON PAGE 24 OF HIS BOOK BETRAYALS OF ANOTHER KIND--

CAPTAIN KAUSR THE EME CAPTAIN WHO HAD THE COURAGE TO DEFY A THIRD RATE SHABBY LOOKING GENERAL WHILE ALL OFFICERS OF THE CRACK SO CALLED FIRST ARMOURED DIVISION MEEKLY OBEYED ZIAS ILLEGAL AND ULTERIOR COMMANDS !

CAPTAIN KAUSR THE EME CAPTAIN WHO HAD THE COURAGE TO DEFY A THIRD RATE SHABBY LOOKING GENERAL WHILE ALL OFFICERS OF THE CRACK SO CALLED FIRST ARMOURED DIVISION MEEKLY OBEYED ZIAS ILLEGAL AND ULTERIOR COMMANDS !

" when zia was a corps commander in multan in 1975,and had invited the PM for lunch,the route nominated ran through the army officers colony there. general zia had asked the ladies and children to come out of their houses to welcome the PM by clapping.one of the officers objected.general zia then asked me to retire him from service.as military secretary i refused to do so,because the officer had done nothing wrong.but later after zia became COAS he retired this officer prematurely.

HOW THE ARMY WAS RUN AND IS RUN AND HOW PROMOTIONS ARE MADE

Mathew Mavaaks Questions Then why were so many generals killed along with the US Ambassador and the US military attache? Were these Pakistani generals (onboard) die-hard supporters of Zia and therefore had to be removed?

there are no die hard supporters my dear friend . there are just third rate careerists , apple polishers , pen pushers , sycophants ,B____LL LIFT___RS , men described by my Philosophic Prophet Francis Bacon as men who gain dignities through dignities.

And again Francis Bacon said the way to the top is through a winding stair ? What was Henry Kissingers modus operandi,read The Price of Power by Seymour Hersh .

you think there are anything like men of conviction in the generals who rise to the top ? a man of conviction is eliminated as a major or maximum a colonel or brigadier ? The average army officer who rose to two or three star was ready to k___ss the A___S of anyone who mattered in his promotion ?

The same general who zia who hanged prime minister bhutto was literally kissing bhuttos hand previously and when the prime minister bhutto came to multan garrison had ordered that wives of all officers be lined up to greet mr bhutto.only one officer a Major Kausar refused this illegal order and he was summarily dismissed from the army ? Read General Chishtis book who was first hand witness of this despicable episode :---

Just for your interest is link to an analysis of how promotions are made in the army ;-http://low-intensity-conflict-review.blogspot.com/2012/11/assessment-of-officers-andmilitary.html

that is history , even Francis Bacon was forced to be like that ? the system by which promotions are made requires a man either to be ready to be happily kicked or be a careful sycophant ? how do men come to grief ,Machiavelli tells us , not by being unprincipled but being principled in a society where principles have no value or relative value ? Social Psychologists in the US agreed a long time back that " FLATTERY WILL GET YOU SOMEWHERE" ! HOW WAS THE US ARMY RUN IN VIETNAM AND WHO MADE IT TO THE TOP --THE HOLE PUNCHERS ? NOT THE REAL SOLDIERS.

THE POSSIBLE US INVOLVLEMENT ? THE US SAW ZIA AS A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT IN THE END GAME PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN IN THE WAKE OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. US CIA ARCHIVES WHICH I FIRST READ AS RECEIVED FROM MR KEVIN C RUFFNER STATED THAT THE CIA ASSESSED THAT AFTER SOVIET

WITHDRAWAL PAKISTANS RELATIONS WITH USA WOULD BECOME COMPLICATED TO SOME EXTENT

There was just one US general on the plane I think and one ambassador from the US ? Now what is the value of two men in foreign policy ? None ? None for the success or failure of a nation which is a super power ? The Americans never took any interest in investigating this crash .Neither did the Pakistani successors of Zia . It was good riddance for all and a WIN-WIN situation for all.

The declassified archives of CIA which I got at the JMH annual meeting organised by the CIAs Centre for Study of Intelligence Operations in April 1996 shed some light on how it may have all happened:_--

The target were one but the others went to _____ by collateral damage . To kill the right man , innocents die also.That is history , the hard and the ugly albeit actual face of history .

How General Zia Went Down! This article, by Edward Jay Epstein, published in Vanity Fair, June 1989, is about the air crash in 1988 which killed Gen Zia, the U.S. envoy and a number of senior officers. Since then, quite a number of publications came in the market, but this report

seems to be the most authentic and incisive. The investigation is thorough and analysis is methodical. This article about the crash is like Agatha Christie's thriller Murder on the Orient Express, in which everyone aboard the train had a motive for murder. The suspects here are, Americans, Indians, Russians, Afghans and even Pakistan Army. Please ignore the poor quality of paper as time takes its toll on papers also, human beings no exception. Please open the attachment and read the thrilling story

--

A MAJOR GENERAL WHO WAS GENERAL ZIAS CONTEMPORARY ON GENERAL ZIA A.H AMIN'S QUESTION:-What were your impressions about Zia as you saw him in the Army tenure? MAJOR GENERAL TAJAMMULS ANSWER (AND I AGREE WITH HIM 100 %) I had not intimately known him before he became the Chief of the Army Staff but from his conduct during the Divisional Commanders Conferences, he appeared to me an incompetent and low grade officer. In one of the Division Commanders promotion conferences, I even saw him sleeping with his mouth open. He surpassed all limits of sycophancy when meeting the Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. While in uniform, he used to bow when shaking hands with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. I remember my old Brigade Commander, Brigadier Hayat, with whom I served as his Brigade Major, once told me that he had written in Major Zia ul Haqs ACR when he served under his command, Not fit to go beyond the rank of a Major. It is an irony of fate that a person of such a calibre had ruled Pakistan for a long period of eleven years till he was finally killed in an air crash. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

16 November, 2012

Assessment of Officers and Military Training-Pakistan Army

Assessment of Officers and Military Training-Pakistan Army What was wrong with Assessment of Officers and Military Training-Pakistan Army and What continues to be wrong till to date as research indicates Click on scanned pages pictures to enlarge Major Agha H Amin (Retired)

http://www.scribd.com/doc/61839666/Indo-Pak-Wars-A-Pictorial-History http://www.scribd.com/doc/21686885/TALIBAN-WAR-IN-PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN-A-WRITERSPERCEPTIONS-FROM-2001-TO-2011

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22457862/Military-Decision-making-and-leadership http://www.scribd.com/doc/22151765/History-of-Pakistan-Army-from-1757-to-1971-PRINTINGENABLED-Do-acknowledge-to-the-author http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-CitadelJournal http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals http://www.scribd.com/doc/23701412/War-of-Independence-of-1857 http://www.scribd.com/doc/22107238/HISTORY http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONALANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN-THIS-BOOK-CAN-BE-PRINTED-FROM-THIS-SITE

Complete article for page above on --

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27384291/Intangible-Forces-Behind-a-Military-Manoeuvre-anExamination-of-the-Clausewitzian-Model-of-Military-Leadership Also see the military interviews conducted by this scribe with senior Pakistani officers to see role of sycophancy and unrealistic training and assessment in Pakistan Army specially interviews of Major Gen Tajammul and Brig Z.A Khan

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals

Selection and Assessment of Commanders in Pakistan Army-Pakistan Army Journal-CitadelCommand and Staff College

These articles published in military journals of Pakistan Army endeavour to subject the highly defective system of assessment of officers to criticism despite strict censorship.

One must add that some discussion became possible in the army only after 1988 when General M.A Baig took over . In the Zia era , with intellectual honesty buried and hypocrisy and sycophancy being hallmark of the army for 12 long years (1976-88) this was impossible. After 1998 once Brigadier Riaz took over as DG ISPR the situation improved. Three editors of Pakistan Army Journal were outstanding , all in succession , i.e Colonel I.D Hassan (a chronic bachelor and very cereberal and well read) , Lieutenant Colonel Syed Ishfaq Naqvi (outstanding) and Lieutenant Colonel Syed Jawaid Ahmad (soft spoken but bold as far as publishing articles and extremely knowledgeable). In the command and staff college there was Lieutenant Colonel Ashraf Saleem (later lieutenant general) , Lieutenant Colonel Tariq Khan (now lieutenant general) and Lieutenant Colonel Ahsan Mahmood (now major general) , all three were well read and had a high intellectual calibre particularly Tariq Khan. After these three the pedants came and pedants and the conformists off course are in preponderance ! I would say the assessments that I made in faulty and fallacious assessment of military commanders continue ! If Tariq Khan became a three star it was a triumph of destiny over a thoroughly rotten system !

But then we must remember that Moses survived in Pharohs palace and finally overcame the Pharoah ! This unfortunate country Pakistan needs a Moses , a man who purges this rotten country ! If not , then I dont have the least doubt that Pakistan will be destroyed ! It will cease to exist as a country ! This is my conviction ! This country Pakistan has no soft solutions !

WHEN ORDERS SHOULD BE OBEYED AND WHEN DISOBEYED OR MODIFIED AS SEEN IN MILITARY HISTORY-MARCH 1991

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27648037/Orders-and-Obedience

On the first page a question is raised " if selection and assessment system in an army is realistic" . There was a big question mark in 1991 when I wrote this , it remained when I retired in December 1993 because the army then was run on whims and likes and dislikes and no one bothered how good an officer was in real command and intellectual ability ! I fear that the large gaps and question marks remain to date ? The very Kargil operation proves that an overambitious man with myopic strategic vision like Musharraf can rise to the highest ranks ,shamelessly abandons bodies of soldiers and then proclaim Kargil as his greatest success ! One could see an

ambitious man in him in 1993 , who was obsessed with self projection ! I had asked Lieuenant Colonel Ashraf (then CO 46 Field and my platoon commander in PMA , also GSO 1 , 14 Division what he thought of Musharraf his brother gunner officer .Ashraf an outstandingly honest and straight man hailing from Kalar Saidan near Pindi stated " what can you make of a man who uses generator of his locating unit for his house "

http://www.scribd.com/doc/40295974/Resolution-Cardinal-Command-Virtue

No one in kargil had the courage to point out that the operation was a wild gamble ! Brigadier Simon confided that that General Tauqir Zia was against it but then Tauqir Zia never gave his dissent ? PROBLEM WITH MILITARY TRAINING , MILITARY EXERCISES AND ASSESSMENT OF OFFICERS

http://www.scribd.com/doc/40295974/Resolution-Cardinal-Command-Virtue

A real soldier in the peacteime environment of jee hazoori and yes man ship hardly has any chance of being promoted ! True in 1992 when I wrote this and true today ! Can Pakistan afford this ?

PROBABLY IN OUR SCENARIO A QUALITY TERMED AS LOYALTY , WHICH IN REALITY IS DOCILITY AND OVERCONFORMITY IS HIGHLY VALUED !AND LOYALTY OF A PERSONAL NATURE IS SHEER INTELLECTUAL DISHONESTY ! http://www.scribd.com/doc/40295974/Resolution-Cardinal-Command-Virtue

Complete article " Resolution-Cardinal Command Virtue" as published in the Pakistan Army Journal June 1992 may be downloaded from the following link--http://www.scribd.com/doc/40295974/Resolution-Cardinal-Command-Virtue

WHY ASSESSMENT OF OFFICERS QUALITIES IS OF CARDINAL IMPORTANCE

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27384291/Intangible-Forces-Behind-a-Military-Manoeuvre-anExamination-of-the-Clausewitzian-Model-of-Military-Leadership

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27384291/Intangible-Forces-Behind-a-Military-Manoeuvre-anExamination-of-the-Clausewitzian-Model-of-Military-Leadership

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27386132/Plain-as-Well-as-Subtle-Aspects-of-Military-Decision-Making

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27386132/Plain-as-Well-as-Subtle-Aspects-of-Military-Decision-Making

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27386132/Plain-as-Well-as-Subtle-Aspects-of-Military-Decision-Making

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27386132/Plain-as-Well-as-Subtle-Aspects-of-Military-Decision-Making

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22460733/The-Armoured-Thrust-Article-Based-on-Experiences-as-anUmpire-with-a-tank-regiment-in-December-1993

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22460733/The-Armoured-Thrust-Article-Based-on-Experiences-as-anUmpire-with-a-tank-regiment-in-December-1993

For letters as sent to the staff college including the above one see the following linkhttp://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-CitadelJournal For letters as published in various military journals see the following link-http://www.scribd.com/doc/28266915/Letters-to-Editor-as-Published-After-Censorship-in-PakistanArmy-Journal-and-Citadel

THE ABOVE ARTICLES MAY BE DOWNLOADED IN COMPLETE FROM FOLLOWING LINKS:---

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27648037/Orders-and-Obedience http://www.scribd.com/doc/40295974/Resolution-Cardinal-Command-Virtue http://www.scribd.com/doc/27384291/Intangible-Forces-Behind-a-Military-Manoeuvre-anExamination-of-the-Clausewitzian-Model-of-Military-Leadership

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27386132/Plain-as-Well-as-Subtle-Aspects-of-Military-Decision-Making http://www.scribd.com/doc/40295974/Resolution-Cardinal-Command-Virtue

Historical Proof of the argument presented above War Performance had nothing to do with promotion to higher ranks in Pakistan Army Major Agha H Amin (Retired) Altaf Gauhar Ayub's close confidant inadvertently proves this fact once he quite uncharitably, and for reasons, other than dispassionate objective historical considerations, described Yahya as one " selectedin preference to some other generals, because Yahya, who had come to hit the bottle hard, had no time for politics and was considered a harmless and loyal person". Major General Abrar, who had proved himself as the finest military commander, at the divisional level, at least by sub continental standards, was sidelined and ultimately retired in the same rank! Lieutenant Colonel Nisar of 25 Cavalry who had saved Pakistan's territorial integrity from being seriously compromised at a strategic level at Gadgor on the 8th of September 1965 was sidelined. Lieutenant Colonel Nisar of 25 Cavalry who had saved Pakistan's territorial integrity from being seriously compromised at a strategic level at Gadgor on the 8th of September 1965 was sidelined. This may be gauged from the fact that at the time of outbreak of the 1971 War Nisar although promoted to brigadier rank, was only commanding the Armoured corps recruit training centre, a poor appointment for a man who had distinguished himself as a tank regiment commander in stopping the main Indian attack. A man whose unit's performance was described by the enemy opposing him as one "which was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the 1st Indian Armoured Division and its objective"23 was considered by the Pakistani General Headquarters pedantic officers as fit

only to command a recruit training centre while one who was instrumental in failure of the main Pakistani intelligence failure as DMI was promoted to Major General rank and trusted later with the command of Pakistan's 1 Corps with disastorous results !

Brigadier Qayyum Sher who had distinguished himself as a brigade commander in 10 Division area in Lahore was also not promoted! Qayyum Sher was one of the few brigade commanders of the army who had led from the front. Major General Shaukat Riza who rarely praised anyone had the following to say about Sher's conduct while leading the Pakistan army's most important infantry brigade counter attack on Lahore Front as a result of which the Indian 15 Division despite considerable numerical superiority was completely thrown off balance. Shaukat stated that "Brigadier Qayyum Sher, in his command jeep, moved from unit to unit and then personally led the advance, star plate and pennant visible. This was something no troops worth their salt could ignore". But the Army's Selection Boards ignored Qayyum Sher once his turn for promotion came! Qayyum Sher did well in war and was awarded the Pakistani D.S.O i.e. the HJ!

But war performance or even performance in peacetime training manoeuvres was, and still is, no criteria for promotion in the Pakistan Army! Qayyum retired as a brigadier, remembered by those who fought under him as a brave and resolute commander, who was not given an opportunity to rise to a higher rank, which Qayyum had deserved, more than any brigadier of the Pakistan Army did. Brigadier Nisar of 25 Cavalry who was praised by Indian historians as outstanding in delaying battle in Shakargarh as commander of changez Force was also sidelined because he was not close to Tikka Khan and company and did not possess Zias mastery of art of sycophancy and appeasement of seniors !

It was typical of Pakistan Army that Brigadier Rahimuddin who did not join his brigade in Chamb on pretext of martial law duty was promoted to general rank while Nisar who fought both the 1965 and 1971 wars exceedingly well sidelined ! In 1965 Nisar by his singular action at Gadgor had literally saved Pakistan ! But promotion in Pakistan Army had nothing to do with war performance or real soldiering ! Pathetic ! Interestingly Brigadier Irshaad heading the military intelligence in 1965 and guilty of Pakistan Armys greatest intelligence failure of 1965 i.e disregarding a genuine report that Indian Armoured division was in kashmir , dismissing it as a deception plan , was promoted to two and three star after the war .He played hell with Pakistans 1 Corps in 1971 War ! Major General Sarfaraz whose conduct as GOC was outstanding in 1965 War was not promoted because his ability was regarded as a threat by Ayub Khan !

Brigadier Tajammul Hussain Malik was praised as an outstanding commander by a person no less than the Indian opponent of his Major General lachman Singh . A special commission was appointed by Indian Army to study Tajammuls brigade actions ! The tragedy is that all starting from Liaquat Ali Khan sidelined officers with outstanding war performance ! The first being the elevation of Ayub Khan to army chief with a proven record of tactical timidity in Burma ! Ayub Khan ,Tikka Khan and Bhutto sidelined the best officers of 1971 ! Tajammul was sidelined because he was not a pathetic sycophant with no war record like Zia ul Haq ! This is a man whose war performance was so outstanding that the Indians appointed a high level commission to study his epic brigade battle at Hilli where he literally repelled a division plus!

His direct Indian opponent Major General Lachman Singh praised him as an outstanding and very brave man in his book Indian sword penetrates East Pakistan ! But the Pakistani selection boards criterion for promotion was certainly not war performance ! Major General Abdul Ali Malik noted by Major General Fazal i Muqeem for launcjing the most ill planned and failed counter attacks of 1971 War in Shakargarh Bulge was promoted to three star rank after the war ! General K.M Arif who had no war record in 1971 and no command experience beyond a brigade command for few months was promoted to two three and four star rank ! Brigadier Ameer Hamza who conducted a brilliant brigade offensive battle at Sulaimanke was similarly sidelined as a Lieutenant General whereas many others who had no war record in 1971 war as brigade commanders became corps commanders ! Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik in an interview with this scribe in September 2001 summed up these promotions in the following words:-The peculiarity about these promotions was that except for Jahanzeb Arbab, who had been superseded earlier because of having been found guilty of embezzlement of huge amount of money while in East Pakistan by a Court of Inquiry, headed by Major General M H Ansari but continued to remain in an officiating Command of a Division with the rank of a Brigadier for nearly two years upto as late as February 1976 when he was promoted to the rank of a Major General, all others were those who were on staff in GHQ. Major General Iqbal was doing as Chief of General Staff, Major General Sawar Khan was Adjutant General, Major General Chishti was Military Secretary and Major General Ghulam Hassan was Director General Military Training. The Division Commanders that is to say myself, Major General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, Major General Fazal e Raziq, Major General Mateen, Major General Ch Abdur Rehman, Major General Jamal Said Mian, Major General Amir Hamza (DG Civil Armed Forces), Major General Wajahat Hussain (Commadant Staff College) were all superseded." General Zia ul Haq had seen my conduct during the Division Commanders conferences expressing my view very candidly. He, therefore, thought that he would not be able to control me. He selected a team of 'yes men' who were more docile and prepared to accept his command without any hesitation." Even the normal and highly defective ACR system in the army was disregarded in promotions. Thus while Major General Tajammul had been graded as "OUTSTANDING", as a Brigadier, in his last Annual Confidential Report and again as a Division Commander was graded "Above Average" by the then Corps Commander Lieutenant General Aftab Ahmad Khan, his contemporaries Lieutenant General Faiz Ali Chisti and Late General Akhtar Abdur Rehman were adjudged on the lower side of the "Average" grade were promoted to three star rank .Chishti in 1976 and Akhtar Abdul Rahman in 1977-78. Tajammul Hussain thus well summed up Pakistan Armys tradition of promotions when he stated:--

"In our Army, Field Marshal Ayub Khan since he became Commander-in-Chief in 1951, made sure that only those people were promoted to higher ranks, who proved their personal loyalty to him rather than loyalty to the state. He did so because he had the ambitions of becoming the Head of State from the very beginning. As I said before, he had a contempt for the politicians and with the passage of time he went on getting extension of his tenure till he finally took over in Oct 1958. From amongst the senior officers anyone who expressed his opinion against the Army indulging in politics was immediately retired. Some of the very capable generals who had passed out from Sandhurst were superseded when General Musa was appointed Commander-in-Chief. Now that he is dead, it is not proper for me to pass any remarks against him but I have no hesitation in saying that he was a typical Gorkha Soldier, who had learnt to obey the command of their superiors whether right or wrong. The junior officers following examples of the seniors, had also learnt that perhaps sycophancy, rather than professional capabilities, was the only criteria for attaining the higher command. Exceptions are always there, but as a general practice many good officers who would have become very good Generals could not go beyond the rank of Lieutenant Colonel because they were intellectually and professionally far superior to their seniors and always expressed their views without any hesitation whenever and wherever required. Commanders who attain the higher ranks through following the path of sycophancy soon crumble in the face of danger and cannot stand the test of battle fatigue. That has been an inherent weakness in our Army, which perhaps continues till today. I had not intimately known General Zia before he became the Chief of the Army Staff but from his conduct during the Divisional Commanders Conferences, he appeared to me an incompetent and low grade officer. In one of the Division Commanders promotion conferences, I even saw him sleeping with his mouth open. He surpassed all limits of sycophancy when meeting the Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. While in uniform, he used to bow when shaking hands with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

I remember my old Brigade Commander, Brigadier Hayat, with whom I served as his Brigade Major, once told me that he had written in Major Zia ul Haq's ACR when he served under his command, "Not fit to go beyond the rank of a Major". It is an irony of fate that a person of such a calibre had ruled Pakistan for a long period of eleven years till he was finally killed in an air crash."

There is no second opinion possible about how Pakistan Army suffered because of military rule.Thus Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan in an officially sponsored book admitted this cardinal fact when he wrote :-"We had been declining according to the degree of our involvement in making and unmaking of regimes. Gradually the officer corps, intensely proud of its professionalism was eroded at its apex into third class politicians and administrators. Due to the absence of a properly constituted political government, the selection and promotion of officers to the higher rank depended on one man's will. Gradually, the welfare of institutions was sacrificed to the welfare of personalities. To take the example of the army, the higher command had been slowly weakened by retiring experienced officers at a disturbingly fine rate. Between 1955 and November 1971, in about 17 years 40 Generals had been retired, of whom only four had reached their superannuating age. Similar was the case with other senior ranks. Those in the higher ranks who showed some independence of outlook were invariably removed from service. Some left in sheer disgust in this atmosphere of insecurity and lack of the right of criticism, the two most important privileges of an Armed Forces officer. The extraordinary wastage of senior officers particularly of the army denied the services, of the experience and training vital to their efficiency and welfare. Some officers were placed in positions that they did not deserve or had no training for" The tradition continued till to date.Lieutenant General Mahmood and Usmani with all their drawbacks was far superior to Generals Aziz Yusuf and Ahsan Saleem Hayat promoted to four star rank but sidelined because feared as more resolute and thus dangerous ! It would be actually comical to match these two groups at all ! Usmani was so upright that he risked

his career twice as a brigadier and major general when he took a righteous stand with his direct superiors Malik Saleem Khan in Karachi and Mumtaz Gul at Peshawar ! It is no secret that had Yusuf or Ahsan Saleem Hayat been commander 10 Corps in place of Mahmud on 12 October 1999 , Musharrafs coup would have failed ! Perhaps that was the key selection criterion for both ! Lack of resolution ! But that's what Pakistan is all about ! A Conspiracy against originality and boldness ! An undoubted failure !

Pakistan has no short of talent and military genius but our military system is a conspiracy against talent originality and boldness.Below is an article of this scribe published in Daily Nation summarising whats wrong with Pakistan Army published :---