G.R. No. 179010 April 11, 2011 ELENITA M. DEWARA, epresented by her Attorney-in-Fact, FERDINAND MAGALLANES, Petitioner, vs.

SPOUSES RONNIE AND GINA LAMELA and STENILE ALVERO, Respondents. (Eduardo) and (Elenita) were married before the enactment of the Family Code. Elenita was working in California when Eduardo, while driving a jeep registered in her name ,4 hit (Ronnie). Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence5against Eduardo. The MTCC found Eduardo guilty of the charge. On appeal, the RTC6 affirmed the decision of the MTCC7 The writ of execution on the civil liability was served but Eduardo had no property in his name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff, to levy on a Lot in the name of "ELENITA and subsequently sold it in a public auction to spouses Ronnie and Gina. Thus, Elenita, filed a case for annulment of sale and for damages against respondent spouses and ex-officio sheriff Stenile. Petitioner claimed that the said property was her paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be made to answer for the personal liability of her husband. On the other hand, respondent spouses averred that the subject lot was the conjugal property of petitioner Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita during her marriage to Eduardo; that the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo because, at the time of the acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved in the accident was registered in the name of petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any objection pending the levy on execution of the property.13 On September 2, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The RTC declared that said property was paraphernal in nature. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The Issue 1. The sole issue for resolution is whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo. 2. The answer to this question will define whether the property may be subject to levy and execution sale to answer for the civil liability adjudged against Eduardo in the criminal case for serious physical injuries, which judgment had already attained finality. The Ruling of the Court All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.21 Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone

does not destroy this presumption.22 The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature.23 Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise.24 There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and Eduardo during their marriage. It is also undisputed that their marital relations are governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, since they were married before the enactment of the Family Code and they did not execute any prenuptial agreement as to their property relations. Thus, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property applies to the lot in question. There is no other evidence that would convince this Court of the paraphernal character of the property. The records are bereft of proof that the consent of petitioners father and her aunt were vitiated or that, in reality, they intended the sale to be a donation or some other contract. Before debts and obligations may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband or the wife, as a rule, may not be charged to the partnership. However, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if the property should be insufficient, the fines and indemnities may be enforced upon the partnership assets only after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered. In this case, it is just and proper that Ronnie be compensated for the serious physical injuries he suffered. It should be remembered that even though the vehicle that hit Ronnie was registered in the name of Elenita, she was not made a party in the said criminal case. That the conjugal properties of spouses Elenita Dewara and Eduardo Dewara shall be held to answer for the judgment of P72,598.70), plus an interest rate of twelve (12) percent per annum from the date of finality of the decision of the RTC after complying with the provisions of Article 161 of the Civil Code.

Sunday

10:08pm Darlene Alejandro Baquing Digest man pleaseeeee.... :))))

10:26pm Julius Harvey Prieto Balbas Awan met tay fountain pen kon, makasangit nak man

Today

11:25am F Anton Nicolas My share classmates-- Cases 31-35 2nd Batch G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012 WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner, vs. AVELINA AMORES, Respondent. FACTS: Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in 1980. After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental, declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of the formers psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership6 praying for the distribution of properties claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage. In 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision, dissolving the parties conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools and equipment in favor of petitioner as

his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties. Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. He insisted that the money used to purchase the foregoing properties came from his own capital funds and that they were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership. The CA affirmed in toto the judgment rendered by the RTC. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines."21 Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his claim for reimbursement. ISSUE: W/N UNDER THE FACTS ESTABLISHED, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE PETITIONERS ATTEMPT AT SUBSEQUENTLY ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT OF HALF OR WHOLE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE USED IN THE PURCHASE OF THE REAL PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS CASE. HELD: NO. The denial of his claim does not amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship.35 Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony36 and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect. VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE G. R. No. 183622, [February 08, 2012] DOCTRINE: Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which maybe recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid ac-cording to their national law. FACTS: Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen,allegedly obtained a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted asecond marriage with petitioner. When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters ofadministration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate. While the case was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases

were consolidated. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the ground of litis pendentia. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file the petition. Respondent further alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner by Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol. However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. The RTC took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petition-er for the crime of bigamy. The RTC also found that petitioner had never been married to Bristol. The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file said petition. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. ISSUES: 1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for bigamy meant that the marriage with Bristol was still valid. 2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under Philippine jurisdiction. HELD: It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando. Petition is partially granted. Case is remanded to RTC. 1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. It concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. 2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of for-eign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the

fact of divorce must still first be proven by the divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlandos divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce. G.R. No. 180572 June 18, 2012 SPOUSES ATTY. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA and JOENA B. ABRENICA Petitioners, vs. LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL and TIBAYAN, ATTYS. ABELARDO M. TIBAYAN and DANILO N. TUNGOL,Respondents. FACTS: On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim14 also with Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that she15 and her stepchildren16 owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied. She also insisted that she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as the house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216818, which formed part of the absolute community of property. She likewise alleged that the real property, being a family home, and the furniture and the utensils necessary for housekeeping having a depreciated combined value of one hundred thousand pesos (P 100,000) were exempt from execution pursuant to Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules

of Court. Thus, she sought their discharge and release and likewise the immediate remittance to her of half of the proceeds, if any. ISSUE: W/N the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage may be considered as absolute community of property of the new marriage. HELD: Petitioner Erlando was first married to a certain Ma. Aline Lovejoy Padua on 13 October 1983. They had three children: Patrik Erlando (born on 14 April 1985), Maria Monica Erline (born on 9 September 1986), and Patrik Randel (born on 12 April 1990). After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and Joena got married on 28 May 1998.31 In her Affidavit, Joena alleged that she represented her stepchildren; that the levied personal properties in particular, a piano with a chair, computer equipment and a computer table were owned by the latter. We note that two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to Patrik Randel, parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlandos children, her claim cannot be sustained. Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community regime.1wphi1 However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage. G.R. No. 164201 December 10, 2012 EFREN PANA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. and JOSE JUANITE, JR., Respondents. This case is about the propriety of levy and execution on conjugal properties where one of the spouses has been found guilty of a crime and ordered to pay civil indemnities to the victims' heirs. FACTS: The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murder before the. Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC rendered a decision2 acquitting Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and

sentenced them to the penalty of death. The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 each as moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages.\ On appeal the Court also affirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted the award for actual damages for lack of evidentiary basis. Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ,5 resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.6 Subsequently, a notice of levy7 and a notice of sale on execution8 were issued. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case. HELD: To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable against the properties of the marriage, the Court has first to identify the spouses property relations. Both the RTC and the CA are in error on this point. While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements. The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage. Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136. Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that marriage. QUIAO V. QUIAO G.R. No 176556, [July 04, 2012]

FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separationagainst petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugalliabilities. Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by theconjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse. Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned. RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation. ISSUES: 1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. Art 129 will govern. 2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights overof the properties in the conjugal partnership NO. 3. Is the computation of net profits earned in theconjugal partnership of gains the same with thecomputation of net profits earned in the absolute community? NO.

RATIO: 1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community orconjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife. Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnershipassets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. 2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife. While one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial courts ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process. 3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couples properties. And when the couples marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net profits. And since the legal separationshare decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing. On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime ofconjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon thedissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugalpartnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty partys favor.

12:08pm Julius Harvey Prieto Balbas Thanks ser

1:14pm Sheryll Ann Yago Rin case digest no.38. BAYOT VS. BAYOT [ G.R. No. 155635, November 07, 2008 ] MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. 163979] MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, MADRIGAL BAYOT, RESPONDENT. PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE

FACTS Vicente Madrigal Bayot and Marie Rebecca Makapugay were married on April 20, 1979. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen born in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American. On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican court granted the couples dissolution of marriage as well as settled the conjugal property of the spouses. Meanwhile, in the same year, Rebecca also filed for a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage but later moved to withdraw petition. On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente. On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000. Vicente filed for a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action and the petition barred by previous judgment of divorce. Rebecca interposed her Filipino citizenship as affirmed by DOJ and hence there was no valid divorce to speak of.

ISSUE/S Whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996 and whether the judgment of divorce is valid RULING It is true that Rebecca was granted a Filipino Citizenship as evidenced by Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. However the certificate shows that although the confirmation from the Bureau of Immigration was dated October 11, 1995, the affirmation from the Secretary of Justice was only issued on June 8, 2000. It is clearly suggested that before the affirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as Filipino citizen. It is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic. Going to the second issue whether the divorce decreed by the Dominican court was valid. First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees. Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid. Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. Rebecca no longer has a cause of action in the declaration of nullity of marriage since there is already no marriage to speak of. Petition denied.

Judge; gross misconduct and dishonesty. In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct. Among the questioned annulment decrees is Judge Indars Decision dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-581, entitled Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling. Despite the fact that no proceedings were conducted in the case, Judge Indar declared categorically, in response to the Australian Embassy letter, that the Decision annulling the marriage is valid and that petitioner is free to marry. In effect, Judge Indar confirms the truthfulness of the contents of the annulment decree, highlighting Judge Indars appalling dishonesty. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Indar. A.M. No. RTJ-102232, April 10, 2012. NSTANCE SHOWING SIMPLE MISCONDUCT OF A JUDGE (Judicial Ethics) Aida R. Campos, Alistair R. Campos, and Charmaine R. Campos v. Judge Eliseo M.Campos A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, February 8, 2012 Carpio, J. FACTS:This is a complaint for serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty filed bycomplainants against respondent, former Presiding Judge of the MTC of Bayugan,Agusan del Sur.Complainant Aida and respondent were married in 1981 and had two children,complainants Alistair and Charmaine. In 2008, respondent filed a petition for Declarationof Nullity of Marriage, alleging that he and Aida were both psychologically incapacitatedto comply with the essential marital obligations. For his part, respondent is a homosexualwho could not be intimate with his wife unless he imagined he was with another man,while his wife had affairs with other men as a result of his homosexuality. To her defense, Aida denied the allegations and filed for legal separation. According to her,respondent

wanted their marriage annulled so that he could marry another woman withwhom he was having a relationship.In the meantime, a separate case was pending against the respondent, to which a certain parcel of registered land might be taken from the their property in the event of loss. Factsshow that the title to such land was kept by respondent in his drawer. When respondentcould not find the title in his usual place for safekeeping, he sought the advice of theRegister of Deeds who told him to execute the affidavit of loss, to which he did.Respondent then registered the title but in the name of Alistair, a minor at that time.ISSUE:Is respondent guilty of immorality, dishonesty, and serious misconduct?HELD: NO, respondent is not guilty of immorality, dishonesty and serious misconduct but onlysimple misconduct.First, the complainants failed to present any proof of respondents alleged relationshipwith another woman, so as to justify a charge for immorality. There was no evidence presented that respondent engaged in scandalous conduct that would warrant theimposition of disciplinary action against him. However, the Court reminded respondentof the judge's duty to conduct himself in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. As such, he must comport himself at all times in such a manner that hisconduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public thatlooks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice Ablaza v. Republic, G. R. 158298, August 11, 2010 Post under case digests, Civil Law at Friday, December 16, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind HAD8J5EKCNKC FACTS: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother A and B. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between A and B had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage voidab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. ISSUE: Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the OLD Civil Code?

RULING: YES. Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003. Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit: Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003. Considering that the marriage between A and B was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-1110-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

Pacete vs Carriaga

Pacete vs Carriaga 231 SCRA 321

FACTS: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

HELD: The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.