Arica v NLRC Date: February 28, 1989 Ponente: Paras Facts: Arica and others filed a complaint against

t STANFILCO (Standard Phil. Fruits Corp.) regarding their assembly time, and award of moral damages and attorney's fees. o They contend that the preliminary activities as workers of STANFILCO in the assembly area is compensable as working time (5:30-6:00 am) since these preliminary activities are necessarily and primarily for private respondent's benefit. First there is the roll call. This is followed by getting their individual work assignments from the foreman. Thereafter, they are individually required to accomplish the Laborer's Daily Accomplishment Report during which they are often made to explain about their reported accomplishment the following day. Then they go to the stockroom to get the working materials, tools and equipment. Lastly, they travel to the field bringing with them their tools, equipment and materials. LA dismissed the complaint. It held that the 30-minute assembly time cannot be compensated because it cannot be considered waiting time or work time. According to LA, this ruling has become the law of the case which can no longer be disturbed without doing violence to the time- honored principle of res-judicata. NLRC affirmed LA. MR denied. STANFILCO: Instant complaint is not new (i.e. ruling in Associated Labor Union v STANFILCO).

Issues: 1. WON 30-minute assembly time is compensable under the Labor Code 2. WON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion Held: No (for both). Ratio: Associated Labor Union v STANFILCO (Citing Minister of Labor Blas Ople): The thirty minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual consent of the parties under Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be considered as waiting time within the purview of Section 5, Rule I, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. Said time is a deeply- rooted, routinary practice of the employees, and the proceedings attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive the workers the time to attend to other personal pursuits. Also, employees are not subject to the absolute control of the company during this period, otherwise, their failure to report in the assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures. This, therefore, demonstrates the indubitable fact that the 30-minute assembly time was not primarily intended for the interests of the employer, but ultimately for the employees to indicate their availability or non-availability for work during every working day. NLRC cannot be faulted for ruling that petitioners' claim is already barred by res-judicata. The noncompensability of the claim having been earlier established (i.e. previous case), constitute the controlling legal rule or decision between the parties and remains to be the law of the case making this petition without merit. Moreover, as a rule, the findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence Dispositive: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. Sarmiento (Dissenting): GRANT THE PETITION. Res judicata is not a bar. ALU v STANFILCO is not a controlling precedent. It is evident that the Ople decision was predicated on the absence of any insinuation of obligatoriness in the course or after the assembly activities on the part of the employees. They are not subject to the absolute control of the company during this period, otherwise, their failure to report in the assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures. As indicated, however, by the petitioners in the instant case, things had since changed (for these substantial changes, see 4 preliminary activities above), and the latter had since been placed under a number of restrictions. My considered opinion is that the thirty-minute assembly time had become, in truth and fact, a "waiting time" as contemplated by the Labor Code; hence, compensable.