Introspection, Schizophrenia, and The Fragmentation of Self

Introspection, Schizophrenia, and the Fragmentation of Self Author(s): Louis A. Sass Source: Representations, No. 19 (Summer, 1987), pp.
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LOUIS
A. SASS
Introspection,Schizophrenia, and of Self the Fragmentation

customs ofthings, course normal illusion.... In the ofa subjective Weare victims seem puerile. from ourownalways greatly varying
-Claude Levi-Strauss
with different"-one these something phenomena "Itis hightime forus tocompare illnesses. e.g.,ofmental may say.-I am thinking,
-Ludwig Wittgenstein'
Introduction symptomsare the BIZARRE of all psychiatric THE MOST PERHAPS patients. of schizophrenicand schizophreniform self-disturbances on. in ordernottobe trampled I haveno hands,I go intoa doorway WhenI am melting I can gather thepiecesofmy together me.In thedoorway is flying awayfrom Everything in me asunder. in me,bursts Whydo I dividemyself is thrown It is as ifsomething body. and that is melting my I am without I feelthat mypersonality poise,that different pieces?
The skin
Thereis no connection thedifferent piecestogether. meansofkeeping is theonly possible ofmybody.2 parts between thedifferent Such experiences-which can involvethe loss of the sense of volitionand activity, or over time-can be difficult or consistency discreteness, or of the self's unity, one of the contradict to the normal for They imagine. person even impossible most fundamental assumptions of our culture-what anthropologistClifford Geertz has described as "the Westernconception of the person as a bounded, and cognitiveuniverse,a dynamic unique, more or less integratedmotivational centerof awareness,emotion,judgment, and action organized into a distinctive both against other such wholes and against its social whole and set contrastively and naturalbackground."3 these self-disturbances "medical-model"psychiatry, By much of mainstream, have been considered to be the key symptomsfor the diagnosis of schizophrenia-that strangestand, supposedly,most incomprehensibleof mental illnesses. In the various psychoanalyticschools, such symptoms have been experience, indicationsof regressionto earlyinfantile understoodas the primary which is assumed to be the central explanatoryfact to that state of primitivity and psychoanalysis about schizophrenicpsychosis.But itis not onlyin psychiatry
pulls me apart.... ego disappears and thatI do not existanymore.Everything
REPRESENTATIONS
19 * Summer 1987 C Louis A. Sass
have been important;theyhave also played a centralrole in thatthese symptoms the imaginationof the twentieth-century literary avant-garde-serving there as the objectivecorrelative forwhat FredricJamesonhas called "the persistent conrhetoric of a fragmentation of the subject."4 temporary in workslike Andre Breton's"Surrealist Throughout the twentieth century, Manifesto"of 1924 and in more recentbooks like R. D. Laing's ThePolitics ofExperience, Norman O. Brown'sLifeAgainst Death,and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatthe schizophrenichas been celebrated as the "true hero of tari'sAnti-Oedipus, desire" or as "an emblem of creativeinsurrection against rationalist repression linked to social power."5The prevailingimage has been Nietzsche'svision of a and "self-forgetfulness"-where "Dionysian madness" of "self-abnegation" the "principiumindividuationis" collapses to make wayforthe "endemic ecstasies"of "primordialunity."6 Over the last ten or fifteen years,the influenceof poststrucinterestin notions of a decentered existence,which is turalismhas intensified oftentreatedas a more authenticand vitalmode of being than is the integrated which Nietzscheconsidered to be a fiction, self of normalcy, "somethingadded and inventedand projectedbehind whatthereis."7 Thus, in A Future forAstyanax: and Desirein Literature, an often brilliantcontemporaryinvestigation Character (and valorizing) of such decentering or dispersal, Leo Bersani compares the schizophrenicloss of self to the ecstaticsurrenderof self ("the delightsof selfof Rimbaud, Lautreamont,Genet, and scattering") thathe findsin the writings withtraditionalliterature, Artaud, and which he contrasts where the self exists as "an ordered and orderingpresence."In the former cases, saysBersani,itis the of desublimatedpre-Oedipal desire thatburststhe coherence and heterogeneity of its yearnings and boundedness of identity-both through the multiplicity toward fusion with the desired throughan inherenturge object.8 The presentessay is a critiqueof these images whichhave so dominated the understandingof madness in the twentieth century-in psychiatry, psychoanalysis,and the modernistand postmodernist avant-garde.Through takinga closer and, I hope, less polemical look at the livedworldof schizophrenicpatients,I will them.Againstthe medical model's propose a verydifferent wayof understanding of interpreting thisconditionand the psychoanalytic denialof the possibility and I will show that the schizophrenic selfavant-gardistchoiceof interpretation, but not on the analogy of infancy or the unfetdisturbancesare comprehensible, teredid. To demonstrate this,itwillbe necessaryto tracean alternative genealogy fordissolutionof the self-one thatis characteristic of certaindevelopmentsboth in philosophyand in fiction and thatwill be illustratedthrougha discussion of works by William James and Nathalie Sarraute. While hardly unknown in modern thought, this line of development seems to be readily forgottenor ignored bythose who are inclinedto denigrateselfhoodas a falsetranscendence loss of selfas if it were necessarily a more authenticand liberated and to glorify expression of the free play of desire.9 My alternativereading of schizophrenia
2
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willbe developed througha comparativephenomenologicalmethod. In order to understand schizophrenic loss of self, a phenomenon that, in my view, has remained obscure or misunderstood,I will compare it to cases where the alternativegenealogyforthe dissolutionof selfis somewhateasier to see. But, though my main purpose is to develop a new and, I think,more accurate reading of certain schizophrenicphenomena, there are also implicationsfor the contemto widespread current porarydiscourse on the self. We shall see that,contrary and no selfcan be no less imaginary, the decenteredor fragmented assumptions, thanis itsopposite. call the illusionsof thecogito, less a productof whatone might (Perhaps I should emphasize before proceeding that my purpose is to illubetween a certainkind of schizophrenicexperience and minateformalaffinities a certainphilosophicaland aestheticattitudeor stance. I am not sayingthatthese phenomena are alike in all respects;nor,of course, am I assertingthat the oriAlso, as should become clear,any entationofJamesor Sarraute is schizophrenic. notion that there is a sharp boundary between the "schizophrenic"and other human beings is quite foreignto my thesis. I am certainlynot tryingto reify and I bracket[ratherthan accept or deny] all assumptionscon"schizophrenia," basis of thisendlesslyproblematic cerningthe purportedgeneticor physiological dis-ease. But to avoid the diagnosticterm itselfwould not only be awkward; it a critiqueof traditional would obscure the ways in which my thesisconstitutes approaches to thisformof life.)'0 of Traditional Interpretations Schizophrenia approaches, Before turningto the medical-modeland psychoanalytic of selfitwillbe usefulto considerthreeadditionalautobiographicaldescriptions disturbancebyschizophrenicpatients: is in meand howmuch I am no longer howmuchofmyself ableto distinguish Gradually modelled aneweachday. a monstrosity, I am a conglomeration, is already in others. thatis erected Just themostsacredmonument as theChurch wasrentapartbyschisms, apartbyitself. todo,is torn and decideand will tothink spirit, i.e.,itsability bythehuman partofthedayandjudgeswhat with every other itmingles outwhere Finally, itis thrown that seems they are donebysomething to do things, ithas left behind.Insteadofwishing toor not and yet unabletowant becauseitis abletodo things and frightening mechanical to come longing is outside a person thatshoulddwellwithin to wantto.... The feeling toreturn. backand yethaving with itthepower taken It talks outofme."I "doctrine Such experienceswere the primary source of Karl Jaspers'sinfluential of the abyss"-the notion that the trulyschizophrenicsymptomsare "entirely inaccessibleto us" since theyare "mad in the literalsense." Though Jaspers,a ofSelf and theFragmentation Schizophrenia, Introspection, 3
before he turned to philosophy,was in general the champion of a psychiatrist of meaning or of understanding), he "verstehende" psychiatry (a psychiatry argued that such an approach was impossiblein the case of the schizophrenic, the patientwho no longer feels himselfmasterof his own thoughtsand "seems 12 to suffer under the yoke of an elusive strangepower." which first Thus, according to Jaspers'sGeneral Psychopathology, appeared in of all othertypesof mentalillness-including the delusions 1913, the symptoms of those withmanic-depressive or pure paranoid formsof psychosis-are comprehensibleas exaggerationsof normalstatesof euphoria, depression,fear,granand the like. But the trulyschizophrenicpatients,with their profound diosity, to imagine,and difficult disturbancesof selfhood,are "quite incomprehensible, 3 (Jaspers assumed that the schizophrenicdisorder was not open to empathy."' intothe purelythe resultof an as yetunknownorganicfactorthatintrudeditself not be understood so could It and was thus psychological sphere psychologically. The personality of such a patient a candidate for"Erklaren"but not "Verstehen") Manfred Bleuler, "totallystrange,puzzling, is, in the words of the psychiatrist inconceivable,uncanny,and incapable of empathy,even to the point of being Such patientsevoke the famous "praecox-feeling"sinisterand frightening."'4 which many European psychiathat aura of strangenessand otherworldliness forthe schizophrenicdiagnosis. have seen as the singlebest criterion trists Kurt Schneider,a member of Jaspers'sschool of The German psychiatrist psychopathologicalphenomenology,systematizedthis diagnostic criterionof unbridgeable alienness with his list of "FirstRank Symptoms"-delusions and hallucinationsthathe believed to be especiallycharacteristic of psychosisof the are quite specific, and all involvepassivschizophrenictype.All these symptoms of the normal self-world ization or other fundamentaldistortions relationship. for his The patientfeels, example,that thoughts, or perceptions actions,feelings, are imposed on him, or are under the controlof some externalbeing or force. He may hear his thoughtsaloud, as if spoken outside him, or may feel that his thoughtsare broadcast throughoutthe world.'5 Elementsof thislistand of Jaspers's doctrineof the abyssare incorporatedinto the currentofficial diagnostic systemof the American Psychiatric Association,whichstatesthatsuch "bizarre" delusions-defined as beliefs"whichhave no possiblebasis in fact"-are a signof The schizophrenic, it seems,is psychiatry's quintessential Other-the patient whose veryessence is "incomprehensibility" itself.
16 schizophrenia.
But there has been an influential alternative to this"medical-model"viewthe developmental perspectiveof psychoanalysis, which offers the possibility of both an empathicunderstandingand a theoreticalgrasp of thisseeminglyalien formof life.Anna Freud sums up the essence of the psychoanalytic viewof such 4
REPRESENTATIONS
levels "thoseprimitive patients.Supposedly,theymanifest deteriorated" "severely of mental life where the distinctionbetween the self and the environmentis lacking,"where the "most primitiveprocesses of mergingwith the object" are prevalent,and where thoughtprocesses have undergone "loweringto the level a Schizophrenia, of the 'primaryprocess.'"'v According to the authors of Chronic of consciousforms infantile a knowledgeof such essentially study, psychoanalytic to cross the gap which separates us from ness "thereforeaids us in attempting continues hypothesis 8 Some versionof thisregression patient."' theschizophrenic withschizoof those who do psychotherapy to be accepted by the vast majority phrenicpatients.'9 approach to "loss of ego boundaries"as a consequence of The psychoanalytic worked out in a famous paper by Victor Tausk, an ill-fated regressionwas first member of Freud's original circle. The delusion discussed in Tausk's "On the InfluencingMachine in Schizophrenia" (1919) incorporatesmost of the Schneiexcerpt,it derian FirstRank Symptoms.And, as one can see fromthe following evokes the praecox-feeling: certainly She ofphilosophy. a student old,formerly years A.,thirty-one is MissNatalija The patient of an electrical declaresthatforsix and a halfyearsshe has been undertheinfluence
It has the formof a human body,indeed, the patient'sown
thelidof hastheshapeofa lid,resembling notin all details.... The trunk though form, see thehead-she saysthatshe is silkor velvet.... She cannot a coffin and is linedwith bysomeonein a is thatitis beingmanipulated factaboutthemachine The outstanding strikes Whensomeone toithappens alsotoher. that occurs andeverything certain manner, ofherownbody.... The inner part theblowin thecorresponding shefeels this machine, the whichare supposedto represent batteries, of electric consist partsof the machine subproducea slimy Those whohandlethemachine ofthehumanbody. organs internal she herwhile and disturb feelings, thoughts, dreams, smells, inhernose,disgusting stance inher wereproduced sexualsensations stage, Atan earlier orwriting. reading is thinking,
throughmanipulationof the genitaliaof the machine.20 not sure about it and she does not know whetherthe machine bears her own head....
machine made in Berlin....
and actionsare lived as Normally(at least in our culture),perceptions,thoughts, or semiconscioussense of intentionand control. withan implicit if fromwithin, Also, it is normal to have the sense thatone's own consciousnessbelongs to oneself,and thatunless one communicatesone's innerlifethroughword or gesture, it will remain private.How, then,is one to understand Natalija's experience, in be feltas purposiveor purposeful-the movement whichall thatwould normally across a set of thoughts-is felt play of attention of an arm or the semicontrolled to be imposed upon her? And imposed in a mannerfarmore absolute than coercion (whichwould involvea sense of going along witha demand under duress). To Miss Natalija, it is as if her own actions and experiences are but epipheof whathappens nomena-only the automatic,immediate,and passivereflection to the machinewhose exact locationcan onlybe said to be "'elsewhere."21 Tausk interpretedNatalija's feeling of having her movements,sensations,
of Self Schizophrenia,and the Fragmentation Introspection,
and desires controlledby an externalforce,as well as her sense of her body as somethingseparate and apart (the Natalija-machinelyingelsewhere),as revivals of the foetal and nursing stages. He reasoned that,since these developmental boundaries or of a sense of compestages preceded the acquisitionof self-world tence and controlover one's physicalbeing, it would be a time when the body To the infant, bodily would feel to the infantlike part of a foreignenvironment. sensationsand impulseswould seem to come "as if froman alien outer world."22 Freud, in attendance at Tausk's presentationof his paper, agreed withthis of the loss of ego boundaries, and he suggested some regressioninterpretation all perof virtually writers additional nuances.23Since that time psychoanalytic and self-psychologicalobject-relational, suasions-classical, ego-psychological, of the normal sense of self as indihave interpretedsuch profound distortions mode of story"-to a primitive catinga deep regressionto the "originalinfantile wishfulfillbyhallucinatory experience dominated byprimaryprocess thinking, psychoanment,and bythe absence of an "observingego."24One contemporary a weak for example, describes schizophrenicsas manifesting alyticpsychiatrist, "deteego characterizedby "derangementof purposive and selectiveattention," on the selfand on riorationin conceptual powers,"and "littlecapacityto reflect nto thatall forms "125 are essenof psychopathology The notion immediateexperience. or regression-to immaturestages tiallyto be understood as formsof fixation-at and conative development is, in fact,probablythe most of cognitive,affective, theory-as unquestioned todayas in the fundamentalpremiseof psychoanalytic influential of the "object-relations" One psychoanalyst time of Tausk. currently givesus a windowon school recently wentso faras to writethatpsychopathology earlydevelopmentanalogous to the viewof ancientRome givenus byPompei.26 and the incomprehensiBroad orientingassumptions,like the primitivity than academic since theylargely are importance more of bilityinterpretations, determineboth our theoreticalunderstandingand our therapeuticapproach to For example, those who accept Jaspers'sdoctrineof the abysssuch patients.27 or implicitly-are likelyto have a low opinion of the imporwhetherexplicitly of therapeuticcommunicationwithsuch patients. tance, or even the possibility, and it may efforts, Such an attitudehas hardly encouraged psychotherapeutic well increase the patient'ssense of alienation fromthe social world. It is no accident that thisattitudeso often prevailsamong those who, on the basis of some would deny that psychologicalor formof biochemicalor geneticreductionism, role in the etiologyand maintenanceof the schizosocial factors playa significant phrenic condition. Such theoristsand therapistsoften assume that the strange actions, communications,and experiences of schizophrenics are not "meaningful"since they are but causal byproductsof an as yet unidentifiedstate of disorganization.28 neurophysiological has an appeal thatis different but equally powThe primitivity interpretation erful-what Wittgenstein, in his lectureson Freud, described as "the attraction
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which mythological explanations have, explanations which say that this is all a repetitionof somethingthat has happened before." And, as he pointed out, "When people do accept or adopt this,thencertainthingsseem much clearerand easier forthem."29 The seductiveness of such a viewmay,however, be dangerous. The primitivity interpretation seems to be inherentlycondescending since it implies that schizophrenicformsof experience and expression lack complexity, sophistication, and validity. Accordingto thisgrand orienting assumption-a sort of developmental"Great Chain of Being" thatlocates all formsof psychological on a single dimension of relativeperfection-psychological health functioning and psychological are virtually maturity synonymous. The conception takes for granted, among other things,that the Cartesian subject-objectdistinctionand the Westernconception of discrete and integral selfhoodrepresentobjectivetruth;thattheirabsence in the adult indicatesboth psychopathologyand-what is synonymous-psychological immaturity;and, of these concepts is the telos of normal developmentand finally, thatattainment the appropriate goal for psychotherapy. thisprimitivity view has often Further, needs to be broughtup or socialized, led to theassumptionthatthe schizophrenic and thatthe therapistshould play the role of benign and wise parent who gives the patienta second chance to be nurturedtowardmaturity. (Anna Freud wrote thatthe appropriate therapeutictechniques"are in manyrespectsidenticalwith the methodsused in the upbringingof infants.")30 Such a notionof schizophreniais remarkably reminiscent of the evolutionism where tribalman was assumed to that once prevailed in culturalanthropology, and to lack the capacityforabstraction be ruled byrampantinstinct and forselfawarenessattainedin laterstagesof ontogeneticand phylogenetic development. ... of that Levi-Straussdescribed "our traditionalpictureof this primitiveness creaturebarely emerged froman animal conditionand stilla preyto his needs and instincts who has so oftenbeen imagined . .. thatconsciousnessgovernedby emotionsand lostin a maze of confusionand [magical]participation.' Compare thisto psychoanalyst MargueriteSechehaye's vision of madness as the triumph of the id: of logicaland moralimperatives, of conscious Freedof socialcontrol, stripped deprived the sendsitsrootsto the veryheartof the desires, directives, [schizophrenic thinking] itis thecherished drives ofwhich instrument ofexpression. dreadsand thefundamental with an affective drawn from itcharges theinanimate world of Invested potential reality, itemanates.32 with and thestrength ofthedrives from which objects life, energy The romanticizedview taken by many antipsychiatrists and radical criticsof in its to thisorthodoxviewhas similar psychoanalysis been, essence,remarkably thoughthevaluejudgment is reversed.Thus, forNorman 0. Brown,R. D. Laing, Deleuze and Guattari,and their followers,schizophrenia has stood for life as against mind, instinct(the "desiring machines") as against oppressive selfofSelf Introspection, Schizophrenia, and theFragmentation 7
consciousness,the freedomof "nomad thought"as against the illusionsof logic Deleuze and Guattaribelieve that the schizophrenicis "closest and self-control. to an intensepoint identicalwiththe production to the beating heart of reality, that"whatbelongs specifically of the real"; theyquote WilhelmReich'sstatement to the schizophrenicpatient is that . . . he experiences the vital biology of the body.... Withrespectto theirexperiencingof life,the neuroticpatientand the pervertedindividual are to the schizophrenicas the pettythiefis to the daring assume that analysts, But the radicals,no less than the traditional safecracker."33 awareness of social convention, and the schizophrenic lacks the self-control, the of "civilized"consciousness. For both radicals and traditionalists, reflexivity thought-the moment could be said to existin thestageof mythical schizophrenic fromitsstupor.34 when,in Cassirer'swords,consciousnesshas notyetraised itself admitthattheseregressionand Dionysianinterpretations One mustcertainly Indeed, one of the loss of selfdo havea certaincompellingnessand plausibility. mightwell doubt whetherthere could be any other way of understandingsuch radical deviationsfromthe normal adult formof life. Is there an alternativeto of these interpretations and the accepthe condescension (or the glorification) tance of an absolute and unassimilableOtherness,Jaspers'sdizzyingabyss?To answer this question, I will begin by consideringthe meditationon selfhood of and a figurepoised at WilliamJames,the greatestof philosophicalpsychologists the thresholdof the modernistage. His chapteron "The Consciousness of Self" is perhaps the clearestexample of an alternativegenein Principles ofPsychology of self. For,though thisis not his purpose, James'sanalysisis a alogy of the loss of what one mightcall a central "paradox of the reflexive"lucid illustration yet widespread, process by which acute selfthat seemingly contradictory, the self, while simultaneously consciousness has the effectactually of effacing As we shall in this effacement. see, such a process is of the own role its obscuring utmostimportance for understandingwhat seem to be core featuresof many schizophrenicpatients.
Consciousness and the Self in James and Sarraute WilliamJames begins his discussionby assertingthat the feelingof a "centralnucleus of the Self,"somethingthatgives one's thoughtsand sensations the sense of being unified rather than of "flyingabout loose," is virtuallya definingfeatureof any consciousnesswe mightcall human.35Compared to this core, the otherelementsof the streamof subjectivelifeseem "transient unifying external possessions,of which each in turn can be disowned, whilstthat which disowns them remains."James then asks about this feeling of an "innermost centrewithinthe circle."Of what does this "sanctuarywithinthe citadel" really
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consist?If we choose to become aware of thisfeelingand to directour attention to it,what,he wantsto know,willwe then discover? First James gives one answer.He argues thatthe feelingof controlover and withone's streamof experience are related: the part or aspect of thatof identity allied to the self-that one's stream of experience that seems most intimately which one feels one is-tends to be the part fromwhich one's sense of activity emanates. This "activeelementin all consciousness"is, he says,a spiritualsomewhilst[thequalthing"whichseems to go outto meetthesequalitiesand contents, in to be receivedbyit. It is whatwelcomesor rejects.It presides ities]seem to come and and attention, over the perceptionof sensations"and "is the source of effort the place fromwhichappear to emanate the fiatsof the will."The two aspects of selfhood-unity and a sense of activeintentionality-seemto be inseparable and interdependent. But, having given this descriptionof the spiritualself,James immediately in it. Descriptions like "a spiritual something finds something unsatisfactory whichseems to go out to meet"or "whatwelcomes or rejects"seem to him to be too general and vague. Such descriptions-the findingsof what I shall call "casual" ratherthan "exigent"introspection-do not forJames have the feeling he takes a harder and more careful bottom.Consequently, thatcomes of hitting look. He tries,as it were, to seize a given momentof experience and to regard it more intently-to be a keener observer and thus to ferretout the microscopic and concretedetailsof the lived event.WhatJames thenfinds, adopting this"exigent" mode, is thatthereis no purelyspiritualelementat all: for,"whenevermy glance succeeds in turninground quicklyenough to catch one of introspective is in the act, all it can ever feel distinctively of spontaneity these manifestations the head." Jamesoffers some bodilyprocess,forthe mostparttakingplace within when attendingto a thoughtthat has several examples, but one should suffice: controlthatone has turns the sense of volitional some quasivisual representation, of on the "a fluctuating play of presto be based feeling on close scrutiny, out, sures, convergences,divergences,and accommodations in my eyeballs." Here, we see an importantfeatureof the exigent observationalstanceincidentally, self,whichis passive,a the radical separationit setsup betweenthe introspecting seems to and the watched self,the distantplace where all activity mere watcher, occur. Once itis carefully examined,Jamesfindsthatthe "Selfof selves,"the "citadel is reducibleto "a collectionof these peculiar motionsin the the sanctuary," within head or between the head and throat."It appears, then,that "all thatis experieven including that "imaginarybeing considered, objective," enced is, strictly denoted by the pronoun 'I."' When we scrutinizeour experience, we discover or physiologicalprocesses of kinesthetic nothinginner or active-only a variety happening out there all by themselves.But thisis tantamountto sayingthatthe does not exist,since the and intentionality, "I," the inner sanctuaryof identity ofSelf and theFragmentation Schizophrenia, Introspection, 9
criteriathathad seemed to defineits presence,a sense of relativeinnernessand on more carefulexamination:"Atpresent, seem to be revealed as illusory activity, That (in some "theonlyconclusionI come to is the following: then," Jameswrites, feltturnsout Selfwhichis mostvividly personsat least) the partof the innermost or 'adjustments' to consistforthe mostpartof a collectionof cephalic movements and reflection, usuallyfailto be perceivedand classed which,forwantof attention as what theyare." An identicalconclusionwas reached by other earlytwentiethE. B. Titchener,who advocated like the psychologist century"introspectionists," inner and argued on the of observation an observationalmethodology exigent againstthe existenceof freewill.36 basis of his findings Unlike Titchener,however,the ever wise, ever reasonable James retained a about this seeming discovery-even though he did not degree of tentativeness followhis doubts to theirlogical conclusion. In another chapter of his Principles, itself seems inherently "The Streamof Thought,"he pointsout thatintrospection and the dismisleadingprejudice in favorof the definite to containa potentially prone As a result,introspection, especiallyin itsexigentform,is naturally tinct.37 the "substantive" parts of the streamof experito the errorof overemphasizing (the latterincludes such ence and neglectingwhat James calls the "transitive" to see and He compares trying thingsas feelingsof relationshipor of activity). to the futileattemptto grasp motionby seizinga spinning specifythe transitive top, or to see darkness by turningup a lamp veryquickly.The phenomenon effacedbythe veryact of looking forit. That is, as soon as one soughtis literally glance is likely aspect, one's introspective tries to introspectabout a transitive either to settleupon some substantivepart of the stream or else to distortthe one. part into a substantive of the streambyrenderingthe transitive lived reality in to of distortion inherent introspeca result this states as tendency that, James have been led to theoriesof conscioustion,manyphilosophersand psychologists ness that deny the veryexistence of that which cannot be unambiguouslyand observed. directly It is not difficult to see how thisillusionborn of observationalmethod might dissolvethe experience of the activeand integralself,forthe latteris an experiratherthan substantive partsof the stream ence likelyto be carried by transitive of consciousness. Indeed, James's own exigent analysisof the consciousness of bias forsubstanselfis a perfectillustration, just as his discussionof observation's of is a of perfectexplanation, tiveover transitive aspects of the stream experience how this loss can come about. His discussion shows how loss of self may develop notfroma weakeningof the observingego or a loweringof the level of conof attentive, self-reflexive from a hypertrophy sciousness but, to the contrary, awareness. Oddly enough, however,WilliamJames does not turn his analysis around reject upon himselfin the way one mightexpect; at no point does he explicitly the validityof his own "discovery"of the actual nonexistenceof the inner and
10
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and notaltogether activeself.As a result,his own positionseems to be transitional On the one hand, he clearlyhas a more than intuitive grasp of how consistent. the answer to a quasimetaphysicalquestion like that of thenature of the self depends on the stance of the observeror asker of the question. However,James of the nonexistenceof the inner does not actuallycontextualizehis "discovery" it as but one of severalequally valid even ifmutually and activeselfbypresenting truths(i.e., the self exists,the self does not exist). It seems that contradictory of a "sensaJames was not able to bringhimselfcompletelyto rejectthe validity or an introspectionist tionalist" methodology. metaphysics in reactionto whose laterthoughtdeveloped partially Ludwig Wittgenstein, criticizedsuch failuresto contextualize,whichhe James'sPrinciples ofPsychology, assertionsand unnecessaw as leading to all kinds of unjustified "metaphysical" he wrotein theBlue saryquandaries: "To getclear about philosophicalproblems," Book,"it is useful to become conscious of the apparentlyunimportantdetails of the particularsituationin whichwe are inclined to make a certainmetaphysical important assertion."In Wittgenstein's view,staringoften played a particularly role in what we mightcall the phenomenologyof philosophical illusion.38(He assertionsare more likelyto seem true when claims,forexample, thatsolipsistic one is passivelywatchingthan when one is walkingabout, activeand involvedin In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein takes up James'sclaim that life.)39 the self consistsmainlyof "peculiar motionsin the head and between the head and throat"and concludes thatthis"discovery" is a function of the introspector's attitude:"And James' introspection showed, not the meaning of the word 'self' like'person','human being','he himself', 'I myself'), (so faras it means something nor any analysisof such a thing,but the stateof a philosopher'sattentionwhen he says the word 'self' to himselfand triesto analyze its meaning. (And a good deal could be learned fromthis.)"40 wroteof the unnaturalnessof a mode of expressionor thought Wittgenstein that puts statesof consciousnessor of willingat a remove,as if theywere somethingthat,in the normal case, were contemplatedor willed (i.e., as if one had to thatone was consciousor,bya second act,had to willto will). It is not that perceive such an innerdivisionis impossiblebut that,when itoccurs,it setsup an aberrant stateof mind: "The sentence 'I perceive I am conscious' does not say I am conSuch a disscious, but that my attentionis disposed in such-and-sucha way."'4' position of attentiontends to undermine the usual modes of awareness and of intentional engagementin action and experience: "What does it mean to say e.g. that self-observation makes my actions, my movements,uncertain? I cannot observe myselfunobserved." "My own behavior is sometimes-but rarely-the object of myown observation.And thisis connected withthe factthat I intend The formof illusionWittgenstein is warningagainsthere is parmybehavior."42 to overcome; foritssource is the verythingthatcan so oftenbe difficult ticularly a prerequisite of clear understanding-withdrawal from activityinto dispasofSelf Introspection, Schizophrenia, and theFragmentation 11
sionate, disengaged contemplation. The condition underlying such illusion self-conscious seems,in fact,to be ratherparadoxical-a failureto be sufficiently of one's own self-consciousness, to adequately distance oneself about the effects fromdistanciation itself.43 Despite the factthatall the elementsof thisinsight are presentinJames'sown failed to turn the insightagainst himself analyses,James, unlike Wittgenstein, to transcendhis own mode of self-consciousness and thereby and the metaphysical conclusionsto whichit led. As we shall see, somethinglike thisfailureseems of manyschizophrenics-even (or perhaps especially)in also to be characteristic cases whereone mighthave mostexpected such transcending that self-awareness, is, where the involutionalurge is strongestand self-monitoring seems to be a constantand inescapable process.
While thereare earlier precedentsforthisloss of selfassociated withexigent such developments seem to have become especially common in introspection, and thought.44 One of the best discussions certainstrainsof modernistliterature of such developments,the novelistNathalie Sarraute's well-known essay "L'Ere du soupcon," considers the disappearance in the modernistnovel of the foundations of traditional narrative-consistent characters engaged in coherent Sarraute explicactions and an integratedand understandableauthor/narrator. itlydenies that such developments,which her own fictionexemplifies,can be understood as a regressionto an infantileform of consciousness. Rather, she Stenclaims,theyshow "an unusuallysophisticatedstateof mind" and illustrate dhal's statement about the modern age: "The genius of suspicion has appeared on the scene."45From novels like those of Sarraute,one can get a vivid sense of the lived world thatresultswhen everydaylife is pervaded by a kind of exigent introspection. Sarraute uses the termtropisms to referto the main topic of her own fiction. With this word that suggests a vegetable automaticity, she refersto the subtle of the inner lifethatusuallygo unnoticedyetthatforher constitute movements the true essence of human existence. For, according to a view that now seems almost orthodox in some circles,the truthabout human experience is veiled by the deceptive sense of unityand control,those illusions underlyingthe "bourgeois" notionsof Identityand Willpower.Human consciousnessis in factconstituted by tiny and virtuallyautonomous events that are at once exterior and interior-the fleetingmemories,half-remembered phrases, and semiconscious urges and sensations that move independentlyacross one's field of awareness, ratherlike waterbugs across a pond. Sarraute sees increasingintrospectionand objectification as the dominant trendin the developmentof the modern novel. In contrastwithearlier explorations of the inner life thattreatedthe "formless, softmatterthatyieldsand dis12
REPRESENTATIONS
of casual introspection, integratesunder the scalpel of the analysis" (the stuff perhaps), the universe of the contemporarynovel, though mental,is hard and is someone whose "relationto himself opaque. The typicalprotagonist-narrator is as though someone else were observing and speaking of him" (but from Rather like a man in a cartoon,he examines his thoughtsand actions within).46 to fillthe world.Thus as iftheyexistedapart fromhim,in a bubble thatthreatens Lifeand Death,sits alone, watching Alain, the protagonistof Sarraute's Between words and sensationsmove across his fieldof awareness,almost as if these phenomena had no special connection with him. Indeed, for this modernist Everyman,even his own "self"-if one can even use the termin such a contextseems to be somethinghe contemplatesfroma remove: then fall downagain. ina thin shove one another, mount jet,they dropsofwords The little drift happenagain.To letoneself still.... Thatmust absolutely and others Others mount, to theslightest eddy... subject curledup to oneself, float, oncemore.... To letoneself progressions, in thethickness of theooze thosehalting To waituntilthereare outlined transpires.47 something oncemore, until, retractions, those seems to look so hard at his own subjectivestreamof The protagonist-narrator even in a sense experience thatin the process his feelingof selfhoodis forgotten, destroyed.The harder he looks, the more the objects of his awareness come to seem to be all thatexists,the more the sense of a selftranscendingthisfluxdisis so pervasivethat one mighteven be appears. This process of externalization it not for the factthat the temptedto rejectthe veryterm"introspection"-were observed phenomena do retaina certainsubjectivequality: theyare sense data, not things.48 This phenomenalism, the product of a kind of exigent introspectionor thus leads to a dispersal. By a process thatPaul Valery involution, hyperreflexive of the self,"all the phenomena of awareness are, as it once called "a centrifuging And Sarraute ends ThePlanetarium byasserting were,spun outwardsand away.49 about him in him,everything reveals: "Everything thetruththatthiscentrifuging a like that."50 is coming apart.... I thinkwe're all of us, really, bit that should There is another possible consequence of such hyperreflexivity of whatwould normally be mentioned:itseems that,along withan externalization can also bring about a characbe feltto be inner or subjective,hyperreflexivity of is a subjectivization what usuallyexternaland objective. teristic internalization, avant"postmodernist" This is mostexplicitin certainworksof the contemporary garde where the loss of the sense of cohesive and activeselfhoodhas a somewhat and selfdifferent focus,where the dizzyingtendencytowardself-consciousness the audience or not much the character as the artist, so referencecharacterizes even the artworkitself.Many such worksseem in thisway to undermine or disattention upon theirown statusas novels or mantlethemselvesbyconcentrating or painting(or paintings-or even on theirephemeral existenceas acts of writing ofSelf and theFragmentation Schizophrenia, Introspection, 13
focus is on audience rather reading or looking,in cases where the self-conscious the world depicted seems to be subthan creator). Under these circumstances, This preoccupation is ordinated to the consciousnessby which it is constituted. imaged in the famous notion of the "aporia" or "mise en abime"-the infinite abyss,thatoccurs when two mirrors self-referential the vertiginously involution, are placed face to face, or when a photographshows a photograph in whichthe firstphotograph appears, thus depicting another photograph depicting itself, and so on, endlessly. itis not onlythe and linguistic self-awareness, In the presence of such artistic of both author and characterthat may easily selfhood and feltactuality distinct dissolve; also, subject matterand externalrealitymay be drained of all sense of lanThus, by a strangeparadox of the reflexive, importanceand substantiality. inadequate guage and consciousnessbegin to seem, on the one hand, pathetically outside themselvesand, on the other hand, anything to the taskof representing immenselypowerful since they seem to contain all that exists. This strange, somehow autisticcombinationof omnipotenceand impotence emerges in postmodernistnovelistGilbertSorrentino'sdescriptionof his own writing:"These people aren'treal. I'm makingthem up as I go along, any sectionthatthreatens to fleshthemout, or make them'walk offthe page,' willbe excised. They should, walk into the page, and break up, disappear."'51 rather, It would be a mistake,it seems to me, to equate the traditionof aesthetic withthistraditionof forAstyanax described in Bersani's A Future antirationalism True, what Bersani calls the self as an "ordered and ordering hyperreflexivity. presence" disappears forbothJames and Sarraute-as it does also in the works of Lautreamont,Rimbaud, and Genet. And the experientialworld depicted by Sarraute and Sorrentinomay also be reduced to a series of discontinuous,fragmentaryscenes that lack the solidityand constancyof real objects and that disof images. However, there are also solve one into another with all the fluidity between Bersani's phantasmagoriaof the desiringimagiimportantdifferences "mise en abime" thatwe have been examining.In nation and the self-referential at least as Bersani conceivesit,the poet "coercels]the world the formertradition, intobecomingan excitedversionof his desires"; "The person is dismemberedby dissolvedin "exuberantfusionwiththosescenes of itsresources," theveryfertility In this"triumph as the theatreof our desires."52 whichoffer literally, themselves, the inner selfdissolvesoutwardinto the objectsof itsyearnof desiringfantasy," through theselfis fragmented principally bycontrast, ings. In thelattertradition, inner experiences and turningawayfroma world of desired objects and toward it is not desire or emotionthatdominate devitalizedself; further, an increasingly but the relentlessimpulse to know. Though there may,of course, be some works thatmanage to include-perhaps even to synthesize-these two tendencies,the at least in fundamentaltensionwith trendsdo seem, if not exactlyincompatible, each other.53 14
REPRESENTATIONS
notionsof schizophrenia, Giventhe widespread acceptance of psychoanalytic we should not be surprisedthatBersani, like so manyothers,assimilatesschizoBut let us now turn to Dionysian tradition.54 phrenic loss of self to the former, the realm of madness to see whichof theseexamples-Bersani's phantasmagoria of the desiring imaginationor James's exigent introspection-might provide a bettermodel forunderstandingwhatoccurs in actual schizophrenicpatients.
Madness the loss In manycases of schizophrenia, itdoes make sense to interpret akin to thatof James and Sarraute. of selfas involvingan exigentintrospection In such cases, the suspicious scrutinizing seems to break beyond the realm of philosophicalspeculationor aestheticexperienceto supplantthe ordinarymodes life.Let us considerthe lived worldof Natalija, the patientdescribed of everyday by Victor Tausk who felther everythought,image, or sensation to be an epiphenomenon of whathappened to a Natalija-machinelyingelsewhere(a patient who, as the reader willrecall,manifestedmanyof the supposedly incomprehensible FirstRank Symptomsof schizophrenia). As we have seen throughour discussionofJames,the person who directsan to findany conintensestaretowardthe streamof his own experience is unlikely innerness,or volition.Even his own bodily crete evidence of his own identity, will sensationswill seem separate from him, since the very factof scrutinizing make them seem out there and apart. To experience one's own sensations as having theiroriginallocus in another versionof one's own body,an influencing machine not under one's own control,would seem an appropriate way of symbolizingsuch an experience (and of providinga subjectiveexplanationforit). On thisview,the velvetthatlines the lid of Natalija's machine mightbe understood as symbolizing Natalija's tactileawareness of her own body as lived in the mode intense Were it not forthe presence of the exigently of introspecintrospection. the kinesthetic sensationsof her own body would remain transitive tiveattitude, and implicitphenomena-more processlikethan objectlike.But, because of the mode, thesesensationstake on a staticand substanpresence of thisintrospective tive form; hence, theycome to be symbolizedin the formof a thing,a piece of velvet. machine as a late-stage I am suggestingthat we mightsee the influencing of a certainintroversion, a crystallization of a phenomenologicalworld symptom sensations in which explicitattentionhas come to be trained on the kinesthetic and body-imageexperiences that would usually be transparentand unthematized, that would normallyremain latentwhile the externalworld occupied the theinfluencing machineis a projected focusof awareness.On thisinterpretation, image not of the physicalbody but of the subjectivebody.It is as ifthe lived body and theFragmentation ofSelf Introspection, Schizophrenia, 15
of reifiedbythe intensity had been, so to speak, turnedinside out and solidified, theuniverse; thisinside-out body seems almostto fill a self-directed gaze. Further, the world beyond the self has been reduced to a room located in some vague elsewhere and peopled by phantoms whose only functionis to manipulate and describe the Natalija-machinelyingbeforethem. withsuch an In manycases, the progressionof the disease is quite consistent of schizophrenicsis The mostcommon "premorbidpersonality" interpretation. "schizoid"-characterized by intense social alienation and extreme selfclear and, in manyways,typicalautobiographconsciousness.In one particularly describeshimwho developed delusionsof influence ical account,a schizophrenic self as having been from "very early in life an observer of my own mental Tausk to a degree which I thinkmust be a veryrare exception."55 peculiarities, himselfpointed out thatthe illnessof such patientsoftenbegins withmild expeturnsinward, as was the case withNatalija. As attention riencesof estrangement, the patientmaybegin to notice and feel distanced fromwhat was previouslyfelt to be closely associated with the self. The saliva in the patient'smouth, or the sound of his own name, maybegin to feel odd to him,or his bodilysensationsor Such experiences feed upon themthoughtsmay seem to exist at a remove.56 and thoughtsattract his attention, own sensations selves. As the patient's strange which takes the sensationsas its object,can make the sensathisattentionitself, tions seem all the more distant,external,and concrete. The process seems to involvenot immersionin the sensoryworld but a detachmentakin to phenometo that contemplativestance that, as Maurice Merleaunological "reflection," Pontyput it, "slackensthe intentionalthreads which attach us to the world and bringsthemto our notice."57 may begin the patientwho thus steps back fromhis involvement Eventually, to feel as ifhis sensationsand thoughtsoriginatedoutside his own body or mind. He maybegin to hear his own thoughtsas if theywere words spoken outside his head, or to feel that his actions, sensations, or emotions are somehow being imposed upon him from without(Schneider's "First Rank Symptoms").Some catatonic patientsactually feel guiltyabout stopping their own ongoing moveapart from mentssincetheyexperiencetheirbodies and actionsas thingsexisting This can readilylead to a sense themwithwhichtheyhave no rightto interfere. sense of intention, the "Selfof selves"breaks of dispersal; for,withouta unifying up into bitsthatspin outwards: in front in thekneesand mychestis likea mountain of me,and mybody I getshaky from me and they actions are different. The armsand legsare apartand away go on their or elsestopand and copytheir own.That'swhenI feelI am theother movements, person I havetostoptofind or not. outwhether standlikea statue. myhandis in mypocket Anotherschizophrenicpatientsaid:
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REPRESENTATIONS
I feel I don'tknow myself. up so that up intobits.I getall mixed I feelmybodybreaking apartintobits.... I'm frightlikemorethanone personwhenthishappens.I'm falling in my nothing from there's me so that goesfleeing ened to saya wordin case everything going thandeath.There'sa kindofhypnotism that's worse It putsme intoa trance mind.
on.58
may end in the This progressionof simultaneousinvolutionand externalization of a systematized delusion thatovercomesthechaos and disintegration formation describedbythese patients.This seems to be the case withthe developmentof an it with delusion-a beliefthatstabilizesthe world by filling influencing-machine also providing while of consciousness, hyperreflexive the a quasi-externalsymbol for the patienta subjectiveexplanation of the distorted,passivized experiences she is undergoing. view,selfThe reader willrecall that,accordingto the traditionalprimitivity to in attenuated indeed, absent or schizophrenia; is severely awareness conscious the extentthatsuch formsof consciousnessare present,the illnessis assumed to Thomas Freeman,John Cameron, and writers be less severe.The psychoanalytic Andrew McGhie are quite expliciton this point: "As we regard the absence of awareness to be one of the chief aspects of the schizophrenicdisease reflective process,we must regard any appearance of such awareness as a therapeutically clear-cutand as it does, that the ego is momentarily hopeful sign, signifying, concepts,Freeman, et al., stable."59 Invokingboth Piagetian and psychoanalytic connected withdisconsciousnessis intimately argue thatweakness of reflective that the psychoanalysis, This in the of vocabulary means, turbancesof identity. capacityof the psyche) and attenuationof "observingego" (the self-monitoring and cohesivenessof one's being) discreteness, of "self" (the sense of the reality, of primitive stages of conare complementary-interdependentcharacteristics have recommended psychothermanypsychoanalysts sciousness.60 Accordingly, apeutic approaches whose main purpose is actuallyto encourage introspection and the development of an "observingego."6' This assumption of the interdeof both in schizopendence of selfand observingego, and of the diminishment of who an interpretation all writers attempt made byvirtually phrenia,has been whose orientationis not the schizophreniccondition-including psychologists avantand also, as we have seen, including manyin the literary psychoanalytic, in theBreakdown of theBicameralMind, for In The Originsof Consciousness Julian Jaynes portraysschizophrenia as a example, the cognitivepsychologist to the "bicameral"period prior to 1000 B.C. This was a throwback phylogenetic protohumans)acted timewhen,accordingto his thesis,human beings (or rather, on the basis of neurological commands because theyhad not yet automatically developed the capacityfor volitionalbehavior or fortrue consciousness-which he defines as requiring the capacity for consciousness of consciousness (selfgarde.62
ofSelf and theFragmentation Schizophrenia, Introspection,
17
consciousness). In Jaynes'sview,schizophrenicsare characterizedby a greater Instead of havingpsychological than normal "in-the-worldness." "distance"from the stimulusworld,such patientsare virtually drowningin sensorydata. Jaynes sees theloss in such patientsof theexperienceof selfhood-he calls itthe"erosion to introspect, to thinkabout of the analog 'I"'-as a consequence of theirinability thinking, and therebyto pay attentionto a kind of inner "Mind-Space" where one s consciousness is feltto be located. The famous auditoryhallucinationsso characteristic of schizophrenicsare, he argues, reallythe psychologicalmanifestationsof the neurologicalcommands that,in the "bicameral"period, served to orient and directthe actions of individualstoo unevolved to exercise conscious deliberationor personal controlover theirthoughtand behavior. (As a way of imaginingbicameralawareness, Jaynessuggeststheunconsciouspartof a driver's to the process of drivingan automind thatattendswithautomatized efficiency mobile along a familiarroad, withoutdeliberationor reflective awareness of the factthatone is driving.)63 of whatJaynescalls eroBut we have seen thatan alternative interpretation a sense of self,a sion of the analog "I" is possible: far fromnecessarily sustaining strongobservingego may actuallyundermine it. Dissolution of self need not, it seems, necessarilybe taken as indicatinga primitiveor Dionysian absence of awareness.But, thenone mustask ifthereis anywayof choosing.What reflective to the more reason, if any,is there to preferthe hyperreflexive interpretation usual ones-regression to infancyor the emergence of unrestraineddesire-as theseanomalies of schizophreniform a wayof understanding thoughtand action? In answeringthis question, I will first examine certain key instancesof schizophrenicFirstRank Symptoms, as exemplified bya patientnamed JonathanLang, of the schizoand then will consider aspects of the general mood and structure on these phenomena revealsthe crucialinadphrenicworld.A carefulreflection equacy of the traditional images of madness. Like other advocates of the primitivity interpretation, Jaynessuggeststhat in schizophreniais the "comthequintessential example of auditoryhallucination mand hallucination"obeyed withouthesitationor conscious reflection.64 In fact, however, the most characteristicschizophrenic auditory hallucinations,those listedbySchneideras FirstRank Symptoms, do not fit thisdescription.Schneider liststwo specifictypes,and both involvehesitationor self-monitoring: twovoices arguingabout what the patientshould do, or one voice mocking,criticizing, or on what he is doing or thinking.65 The followingis a descriptionby commenting JonathanLang, a schizophrenicwithparanoid and catatonicfeatures, of his own experience of these symptoms. Lang describeshearingtwotypesof voices,which he calls "thoughts-out-loud" and which,according to his own report,"the conscious selfneitherinitiates nor anticipates."I quote at lengthto conveya sense of thisschizophrenic's characteristic styleof experience and expression:
18
REPRESENTATIONS
correlate These tworespective styles fairly highly withvariousorientations of theego. Whentheego has an overt as in reading or writing, or in observation of the orientation, ofthethoughts-out-loud environment, theverbal productions taketheform ofa running of verbals presentation suitedto theactivity holding theinterest of theego, addingan totheego. Forexample, occasional sideremark addressed iftheindividual is reading, the ofthebooktheindividual thoughts-out-loud reproduce thewords is reading, sometimes on a passage. Whentheorientation making a comment oftheegoismorestrictly introvert, as forexamplein reflection, theverbal productions often taketheform of an imaginary conversation betweenthe individual and some personwithwhomthe individual is
acquainted.66
Such voices seem to representless a lackofself-monitoring and conscious deliberation(as Jaynessuggests)than an exaggeratedexpression ofsuch processes. Indeed, it seems that,when Lang's consciousnessis extroverted, the voices involvea consciousnessof consciousness,usually shadowingbut sometimesdisruptingthe intentionalact: "The thoughts-out-loud [tend] to provide verbalization of the thought trends of the ego whenever the ego develops a strong orientation. thethoughts-out-loud However,sometimes continuedto presentforto engage in activities eign ideas despite the factthe ego is trying whichdemand words."When he is introverted, the voices engage in an inner dialogue of deliband argument: eration,hesitancy, In connection with theexpression offoreign ideas,theverbal production ofthethoughtsout-loud usually takes theform ofmonologues to persuade attempting theego toadopta oftheagent belief intheauthority thethoughts-out-loud and toaccept behind a Messianic of thethoughts fixation. Attached to thesemonologues are expressions of theego conthearguments. Another variant is thepresentation ofarguments to percerning seeking tospecific suade theindividual acts.67 This is hardly the lived world Jaynes portrays-a nonconscious, automatized world devoid of inner mind-space. One mightmore accuratelycharacterizethe voices as an "externalization of involution"-a way in which the patient'sclosely the externalworld,virtually watchedinnerlifefills else. crowdingout everything of the influencingmachine that so (In this respect,the voices are reminiscent dominatesNatalija's experience of the "external"world.)The thoughts-out-loud seem, in fact,to representa bringingto explicitawareness of the essentialbut of human consciousness itself(which Lang seems to usually implicitstructures a realm of inner dialogue). One mighteven experience as primarily linguistic, in a speculate that, such world, command hallucinationswould functionprimarilyas an attemptto escapevia action fromsuch anxious self-awareness and paralyzingambivalence. In anotherarticle, JonathanLang describeshis consciousnessas divided into three selves-or perhaps one should say three nonselves, since each of these realms of being (even what he calls the "quasinormaloid stratum")is feltto exist
ofSelf and theFragmentation Introspection, Schizophrenia,
19
nor was the expressionof his will. at a remove,as ifit neitherbelonged to himself watchingas "conLang is a passive observer, Like one of Sarraute'sprotagonists, in what is to another" from one stratum usually a process cepts sometimesshift ever outward,away froma of increasingalienation-mental contentsmigrating towarda pointof nonexistence.Thus, "concepts"froma "selfcenterthatshrinks defense stratum"are oftentaken over by the more alien "hallucinoid stratum." of the self is obvious That the latterstratumitselforiginatesin a centrifuging fromLang's own description:"The hallucinoidideological stratumhas itsorigin That experienced by the writer. in the foreigncontentof the thoughts-out-loud allied phenomenon of minis, it is thatpart of ideas expressed bythe hallucinary subvocal speech which the writer'sself classifies as being imal, involuntary, foreign. Lang's whole discussion,in fact,closelyresemblesJames'sexigentanalysisof on substantive elementsof ratherthan transitive the self-with itsconcentration of the nonexistenceof any inner core, the streamof experience, its "discovery" use of self-consciousness (i.e., itsacceptance itsoddly un-self-critical and, finally, as discoveries).Thus, in the following of the products of exigent introspection passage fromLang, there seems to be a recognitionthatthe sense of externality factor")is related to the focal awareness of sub(whathe calls "the hallucinatory thatthe selfis nothingmore stantializedsensations;thisrecallsJames's"finding" the head," and italso illustrates the than some "bodilyprocess takingplace within of knowingwhetherthe objects observed (i.e., the "substantive" sensadifficulty tions) are discovered or created by the observingattitude: "In addition to the verbal productions,a minimaltonus of vocal musclesand a sensationof proprioceptivepressurealso are present,"writesLang withregard to his "thoughts-outfactorin the experience,the sensaloud." "In so faras thereis any hallucinatory tion of proprioceptivepressure probablyprovidesit."69 We have traced how James was led by his method to deny the realityof the the "Self of selves"-to conclude inner and active "citadel withinthe sanctuary," "all thatis to what appeared to be the case in casual introspection, that,contrary even including that "imaginary considered, objective," experienced is, strictly being denoted by the pronoun 'I."' Lang seems to have been led by a similar even "the writer'sself" and the process to a form of life in which everything, seem to existapart and to be watched fromafar. We "quasinormaloid stratum," delusion can be read as an exterhave seen that Natalija's influencing-machine nalizationof involution-the lived body turnedinside out and contemplatedat a remove. In similarfashion,Lang's "strata"can be understood as an externalization of the inner realm of thought-a projectionoutward of the usually implicit phenomena of inner speech and dialogue. Lang, it seems, does not inhabithis own inner speech-any more than Natalija inhabitsher perceptionsand bodily sensations. In the apt vocabulary of the philosopher Samuel Alexander, each And, as we mentalprocessesthatwould normallybe "enjoyed."70 "contemplates" 20
REPRESENTATIONS
a sense of self;ratherthan have seen, such a mode of experiencehardlyconfirms seems to be "It "I thinkthereforeI am," the formulaof existentintrospection to the Jasperian that contrary then, I am not."'" We see, and therefore thinks of FirstRank Sympassumption(the basis of Schneider'ssystem "medical-model" to "understand"theseclassically toms),itis in factpossible,at leastto some extent, inciof disturbedselfhoodand volition.(Lang might, symptoms "schizophrenic" about his own perspective, since self-criticalness be said to lack sufficient dentally, of tendenciesof his own consciousnessin the formof reified, his objectification of his about the effect externalized"strata"indicatesa failureto be self-conscious of that which In this sense, his position is reminiscent own self-consciousness. in WilliamJames.)72 criticizes Wittgenstein permeated worldis so frequently thattheschizophrenic It is surelysignificant have ofteninterpreted this bya feelingor beliefof being watched.Psychoanalysts of the of a certain primitivegrandiosityand egocentricity, as a manifestation unreflective sense of being at the centerof the universe.In fact,however, infant's thatsuggest of the patient'ssense being watched usually involvescharacteristics a level of cognitivedevelopmentwell beyond thatof the infantor youngchild.73 state,a Thus, during a period when he was emergingfroma semicatatonic patientof mine said, "I feel like a man in a cartoon. My thoughtsand actionsare outside my body,as if in a bubble." It seems clear enough that this patientwas in some sense of the word. However,his livingin a world thatwas "subjectivized" that,according to world hardly seems to have had the kindof subjectivization of an infant. of virtually all schools,is characteristic developmentalpsychologists has generallyunderstood itlived world-at least as psychology In the infant's subjective involvesa lackof self-consciousness; presumably, the "subjectivization" the external world projectionsnot recognized as such by the infanttransform into a magical universe largelyor completelydevoid of any senseofsubjectivity. But the patient'scomplaintthathis thoughtsand actionsfeltoutside himselfsugof his own consciousness.Indeed, he seems to gested thathe was self-conscious "inner" transforming as his object,thereby have been takingsubjectivity-as-such processesinto external"things." as the following descriptionsuggests,the belief or feelingof being Further, of the presence of other a sense consciousnesses; this involves watched typically too is quite foreignto any currentconception of infantileexperience. The passage comes froman autobiographicalaccount of schizophreniabyThomas Hennell,entitledTheWitnesses: ofthis forsome record tooka photographic scene, a powerful cine-camera I thought that forsomeweeksafterward. remained on me,and itseffects wasfocused suchinstrument wasthemiserable horrible and my part andinthis presence, AtanyrateI wasinthis gallery a photovictim.... A voicewhispered: "Theyhavetaken one ofa feeble, half-paralyzed Thomas."74 graphofyourmind, ofSelf and theFragmentation Schizophrenia, Introspection, 21
are Thus, itseems that,in contrast withthe traditional view,manyschizophrenics especiallyprone to takinga distanced stance in whichtheytreatthemselvesand theirexperiencesas objectsof awareness. Needless to say,such manifestations of hypertrophied self-consciousness are notlikely to facilitate normalformsof pragAs one schizophrenicpatientcomplained: "None of my maticand social activity. to me now. I've been thinkingtoo much about movementscome automatically them, even walking properly,talkingproperly,and smoking-doing anything. Before theywould be able to come automatically."75 of the schizophrenicworld is often devoid of strong That the feeling-tone affector desire (though often fraughtwith a profound, all-encompassing,yet withtheirextremeself-consciousness somehowabstract anxiety)seems consistent and self-objectification. Jonathan Lang's chillingly precise and depersonalized descriptionsof his inner life evoke a world thatcould hardlybe more different of his own psychotic fromthe traditional Dionysianimage. His descriptions experiences read, in fact,almost like a parody of a scientific monograph-as if this schizophrenicman had a natural predispositiontowardthe rigorousstance and the academic tone of introspectionist psychology.To be sure, one reason he adopted thisexaggeratedlydistanced and impersonal tone, withits reliance on the passive voice, may have been its seeming appropriateness to the occasion: Journal But Lang's articlesappeared in publicationsliketheAmerican ofPsychiatry. itis hard to dismissthe feelingthatthereis more to it than this-that such a tone is uncannilywell suited to the phenomenological realityof this patient'sactual and spontaneous formof experience. on a lightin order to see darkness, Withhisimage of turning Jamessuggested that introspectionon the nature of experience might transformexperience beyond recognition, thus misleading the introspectionistpsychologist into he had come to understand the phenomena in question when, in fact, thinking he had created them. But this was meant to apply to formsof experience that were notalready pervaded byself-consciousness-wherean act of self-monitoring intrudesa newelementthataltersessentialqualitiesof the prereflective reflection lived world. But withpatientslike Lang or Thomas Hennell, one mightsay that the light is already on; "distortions" caused by reflectionhave occurred even since pervasiveself-consciousness before theydescribe themselves, seems, paradoxicallyenough, to be theirnatural and spontaneous formof life. Unlike normals, a patient like Jonathan Lang is alreadyliving in a world of intense introspection-a depersonalized, divided world pervaded by what, following To such a world,already Michel Foucault,we mightcall an inner "panopticism." the objectifying stance of introspectionism is curipassivized and fragmented, ironic that such a condition should have been ously appropriate. It is certainly as a symbolof liberationintothe freeplayof desire. takenbythe antipsychiatrists In fact,the self-objectifying tendencyso oftenassociated withschizophrenicloss
22
REPRESENTATIONS
of selfusuallyresultsin a disappearance of desire. Thus, overtimeNatalija ceased in the factthat to experience sexual feelings-a developmentthatwas reflected (The poweroffixedassumpmachinegraduallylostitsgenitalia.76 herinfluencing bythe factthatboth Freud and Tausk saw even influencingtionsis demonstrated This machine symbolsas "always standing for the dreamer's own genitals."77 of Philip Rieff'sobserseems an especiallyglaringdemonstration interpretation vation-that Freud could not conceive of an excess of consciousness.)78 and rigidity pervadingthe worldsof We have considered how the reification and Lang (withhis "strata")give machine") both Natalija (withher "influencing to theirexperience a certainstability-thatof the chronicphases of psychosis.It can be involved in certain is also importantto understand how hyperreflexivity of the more "acute" phases of and chaos characteristic experiencesof destruction schizophrenia,forthese are even more readilyassumed to involveregressionof the ego or the ascendancyof the id. As we have seen, the schizophrenicoftenseems to be caught in an insoluble dilemma-driven to search forthe selfyetliable to destroythe selfin the act of herself:"When I suddenly realsearching.One patientwas afraid of forgetting to death. The unreality I frightened about myself was ized I hadn'tbeen thinking feelingcame. I must never forgetmyselffor a single instant.I watch the clock Anotherpatientdesperatelysought and keep busy or I won'tknowwho I am."79 the experientialcenterof her own consciousnessbut became confused when she eluded her attempts receding horizon,it constantly found that,like an infinitely to grasp it; she ended bynotbeing able to be sure thatthe thoughtsshe had really belonged to her. In the passage below,thispatient'sown words allow us almostto watch a "mise en abime"-a dizzyingprocess in which an intentobservingego underminesthe sense of selfin the veryact of searchingforit: Myreal selfis awaydown-it These thoughts go on and on. I'm goingovertheborder. It'sgetting down.I'm losing myself. butnowit'sgonefurther used tobejustat mythroat, butI'm scared.Myhead'sfullof thoughts, deeperand deeper.I wantto tellyouthings, I'm behindthe jealousies.Myhead can'tgripthem;I can'tholdon to them. hates, fears, is there. open myhead, splitting They're of mynose-I mean,myconsciousness bridge I havethese or not.I think know whether thoughts isn't it?I don't schizophrenic, oh,that's in ordertogettreated.80 I just madethem up lasttime "mise en abime" as a paradoxical combiPaul de Man has described the literary and self-cancellation-a process in which,as he says, nation of self-constitution each "thematiccategory"is "torn apart by the aporia that constitutesit, thus to the precise extentthattheyeliminatethe value makingthe categorieseffective is grounded."8' The patient just quoted seems in whichtheirclassification system is her desperate that at least analogous: in a dilemma roughly to be trapped what tearsthe selfapart. Thus, it seems the selfis precisely attemptto constitute the desperate attemptto locate a selfas solid as to be the exigentsearchingitself,
ofSelf and theFragmentation Schizophrenia, Introspection,
23
a thing,thatleads to the feelingof havingno self,no stillpoint at the centerof a turningworld. This experience of dissolution and fragmentation associated with hyperto the psychologicalself.We have already seen thatit reflexivity is not restricted the bodily self,and now we shall see how it can come also to involve may affect that the next example, the last of this series of the external world. It is fitting phenomenological illustrations,should come from the writingsof Antonin Artaud. Artaud was a schizophrenicwho, both as artistand as man, had a powerfulinfluenceon the imaginationof the antirationalist avant-gardein the twentiethcentury. Indeed, he has been held up as perhaps the supreme example of a Dionysian madness-described by SylvereLotringerand MartinEsslin as a sort of Wild Man whose literary productionssupposedlydisplaythe "uncontrollable, polymorphous movementof desire" or show that "emotion released from all In restraint of logic . .. can resultin a gloriousrhetoricof unbridled passion."82 he findsin likeningArtaud's aestheticprojectto the "exuberant"self-dissolution Rimbaud's Illuminations (itselfa "triumphof desiring fantasy"),Leo Bersani is But Artaud'sown writings verymuch in thistradition.83 suggestthe superficiality or,at least,the radical incompletenessof thiscommon portrayal. The mostconstantthemeof Artaud'swritings is, in fact,whathe describesas a failureof thecirculation of life"or "a disembodiment "an absence of mentalfire, in "there is me of reality."84 Artaud well knew that somethingdamaged froman emotional point of view." "In mattersof feeling,"he wrote, "I can't even find It in no waydiminishes thatwould correspondto feelings." thebrilliance anything of his writings to suggestthatthe sensual excesses of his "theaterof cruelty" may but as be betterunderstood not as expressionsof a naturally overflowing vitality and derealizationthathe feltto be the central defensesagainstthe devitalization tellsus as much: "I wanted a theatre factof his existence.Indeed, Artaud himself In thatwould be like a shock treatment, galvanize,shock people into feeling."85 withthe murderous anotherpassage, thisauthorwho would have likedto identify sensualistof his imagination,the emperor Heliogabalus, speaks of "the unprecis explained only by edented number of crimes whose perverse gratuitousness our powerlessness to take complete possession of life."86(There may be an thathospitalizedschizophrenics someanalogy here to the acts of self-mutilation in of their order to a own timescommit regain feeling physicalexistence.) It is true,of course, thatArtaud yearned for an eclipse of the mind in favor of ecstaticoneness with his body and fusion withthe ambient world. It seems, however, thatfarfrombeing his primordialcondition,thiswas an escape he never nor even his own quest for achieved-not throughdrugs, the theaterof cruelty, the primitive,the famous voyage to the land of the Taraliumara Indians of Mexico. Indeed, one mightsay thathis persistent and the most powerful misery, motivation forthe extremeantimentalism of his aesthetics, layin the factthatthe loss of selfhe actuallyexperienced-he called ita "constant leakage of the normal 24
REPRESENTATIONS
a "fundamentalslackeningof mybeing" or "dispossessionof my level of reality," vitalsubstance"-was more cerebral in character,closer,in fact,to the "mise en "We are of the inside of the mind, of the introspection. abime" of self-alienating because the Mind is not in lifeand lifeis interior of the head," he wrote."I suffer the Mind fromthe Mind as organ, the Mind as interpreter, not the Mind; I suffer of thingsto forcethemto enter the Mind." Thus, in 1925 Artaud as intimidator wrote of a physicalstate "presentingto the brain only images of limbs that are threadlikeand woolly,images of limbs that are far away and not where they he wrotethe same I am the onlywitnessof myself," should be." "I am the witness, of and "furtive abductions" his thoughtproyear when describingthe "pitfalls" and of bodilyselfof the sense of controlledmentalactivity cesses. This vitiation presence seems throughouthis life to have been accompanied by a disturbing A dozen years later,shortlyafterthe disillusionment of the self-consciousness.
voyage to the Tarahumara, he speaks of "this dislocated assemblage .
.
. this ill-
I had theimpression ofwitnessing assembled heap of organs which I was and which like a vastlandscape on the point of breakingup" (emphasis added). Such an extremeloss of selfis not, however,likelyto occur in totalisolation fromthe patient'sexperience of the rest of the world. In fact,it is common in to be accompanied schizophreniafor profound disturbancesof self-experience called the "WorldCatastrophe"delusion, an awesymptom bya well-recognized experience in which the verybeing of the universe seems somelydisconcerting theoristshave seen this to be undermined or even destroyed. Psychoanalytic of profound of an extremeprimitivization, WorldCatastropheas a manifestation and thus of regressionto a stage that precedes any consciousnessof distinction, any feelingof the existenceeitherof the selfor of the externalworld. In such a would, presumsubjectivity "primitive" state,awareness of self as a constituting ably,be absent or severelyattenuated(as is also true of the conditionof desublimated, pre-Oedipal desire imagined by Bersani, a point that Bersani explicitly in the following passage byArtaud-perhaps thebest makes). But whatis striking evocationof schizophrenicWorld Catastropheever written-is preciselythe fact is not attenuatedbut exagthatawareness of self-as-representing-consciousness
gerated. Artaud's reference to the "rootlets . . . trembling at the corners of my
mind'seye" demands to be read as a kindof literalizedor concretizeddescription an awareness of his own ongoing subjecof his own being-as-perceiving-mind; seems, in the formof thisstrangeontologicalhybridsomewhere between tivity actuallyto enter its own fieldof awareconsciousnessand thing(the "rootlets"), ness. What occurs here is, then, hardly a loweringof the psychiclevel to some it seems to involvea too acute awarecondition; rather, stuporousor unreflexive ness of the process of experiencing.As we saw above through the example of Sorrentino'sfiction, such an awareness tends to bringalong withit an accompanyingfeelingof the world'sfragiledependence on the consciousnessbywhichit is constituted.(Notice withregard to thispoint how Artaud talksof the "mental
of Self Schizophrenia,and the Fragmentation Introspection, 25
his padding" of space, and of feelingthatthe "mass" of space heaves as he shifts rendering explicitof what eye.) In short,what occurs here is a hyperreflexive foundationof experience; this would usuallybe theunseen but taken-for-granted and of the brings on the destructionand disappearance both of self-as-subject external world. (Thus, along with the tremblingof the mind's eye, there is a heaving and tremblingof space-followed by the nothingnessimplied in the homogeneous images of objectlessdarknessand of "totalfrost.") inwhich no thought wasyet clearorhad itswholemental padding Yes,spacewasyielding likea slimy and powerful Butlittle bylittle themassturned itsload ofobjects. replenished ofvast influx ofblood,vegetal and thundering. Andtherootlets which were nausea,a sort of mymind's withvertiginous at thecorners speed eye detachedthemselves trembling likea vagina bythe beingpillaged mass.Andall spacetrembled from thewind-contracted theconfused Andsomething likethebeakofa realdovepierced sky. globeoftheburning at themoment formed resolved became all profound itself, layers, thinking massofstates, mass and reduced.... And twoor threetimesmorethe wholevegetable transparent to a morepreciseposition. The verydarkness heaved,and each timemyeye shifted frost The total and without becameprofuse gainedclarity. object.
Conclusion is the notion Perhaps the mostfundamentalpremiseof psychoanalysis can in theiressence be understood as manifesthatall formsof psychopathology tationsof relative"primitivity"-aslowerstageson a sortof developmentalGreat and selfChain of Being of advancement toward the goals of self-monitoring controlof thought, action,and the passions. But we have seen thatcertaincentral and severe formsof psychopathology, the featuresof one of the mostimportant loss of self in schizophreniform psychosis,seems to be embedded in modes of consciousness that are hardly primitive-modes that, in fact, have much in of certainstrainsof the characteristic common withthe hypertrophied reflexivity To admit thisis to call intoquestion the modernistand postmodernist sensibility. and to suggest rathermonolithic conceptionsof psychopathology psychoanalytic models. of consideringquite different the necessity of rationalthoughtand of psychosisas the antithesis We are used to thinking conscious control and thus as necessarilyinvolvingwhat Pierre Janet called "a loweringof the psychiclevel."Indeed, it sometimesseems as ifwe were unable to break out of Westernthought'senduring opposition between reason and pasof Plato'sfamous metaphor, we were unable to sion-as if,like enchanted victims the overwhelming imagine madness except as a case of the dark horse of instinct charioteer'sabilityto be in control.But if,as I have argued, there are formsof of consciousness, but froma hypertrophy psychosisthatderive not froma lowering whatwe need is a psychopathology capable of tracingthe consequences of patho-
26
REPRESENTATIONS
of grasping the warning about "interiorization"that logical self-scrutiny, not eye oneself while Nietzsche,the avatar of modernism,once gave: "One must havingan experience; else the eye becomes 'an evil eye."'87What we need might be termed a post-Nietzscheanpsychopathology-for it would be capable of formsof madness, of recognizing,as did Nietzunderstandinghyperreflexive sche, that it is possible for "our knowledge [to] take its revenge on us, just as should That psychoanalysis ignoranceexacted itsrevengein the Middle Ages."88 is, perhaps, not so have been so largelyblind to these formsof psychopathology itselfis also an expression of psychoanalysis surprising.For,whateverits merits, thattendencywe have been studying-the desire forabsolute self-consciousness that,in the words of Foucault, Nietzsche'sdisciple,imbues the whole of modern of thinking the unthought," withthatinterminable, thoughtwith"the necessity and often self-defeating tendencyby which man attemptsto self-transforming, illuminateall the backgrounds or horizons of his own experience, and thus to drag all of his being out into the brightlightof the cogito.89 in schizoid and schizophrenicstates To accept the role of hyperreflexivity would not, of course, be to see such conditionsas purely volitional-as if they itwould explode cerwere simplyperversestrategies engaged in willfully; rather, tain received distinctions-by recognizing,for example, thatit is both true and not true that such patientslack awareness of and control over themselves.For, what patientslike those we have been consideringcannot seem to controlis selfcontrolitself;what theycannot get distance fromis theirown endless need for distancing;what theycannot be conscious of is their own hypertrophiedselfon theirworld. The patientThomas Hennell underconsciousnessand itseffect mind believes itselfbusy,yet produces stood these paradoxes: "The introverted "Its self-torture is partlyinvoluntary, but nothing,"he wrote in The Witnesses. directsit increasesits painfullabor."90 partlywillful:forthatwhichambitiously Such a reading of the lived world of schizophreniaalso casts a new lighton the "praecox feeling"-that sense of the schizophrenicpatient'sessentialstrangeness so emphasized byJaspers. It suggeststhatwhat is alienatingto the external Encounobserverabout such patientsis notjust the patient'ssheer differentness. teringsuch a patientis not,forexample, like encounteringsomeone froma radculture or who is in just any highlydifferent state or stage of ically different consciousness-as with,say,a delirious alcoholic, a euphoric manic, or a young child. In these instances,any sense of alienness the observer mightfeel would fromthe factthatthe people encounteringeach otherhave little resultprimarily in common. But it seems that what is alienating to the observer about schizophrenicslike Natalija and JonathanLang cannotbe separated fromthealienation feltwithinthe worlds of the patientsthemselves.If this is so, it has at least one ratherodd implication.It suggeststhatthe observer'salienationmaynot,in fact, alienation-a feelingevoked indicatea totalfailureof empathy;itmaybe a shared
ofSelf and theFragmentation Introspection, Schizophrenia,
27
of whatthe patientis actuallygoing through.Could itbe, byan accurate intuition then, that the dizzyingabyss we feel in the presence of certain schizophrenic patientsis related to the "mise en abime" into whichthe patientsthemselvesare falling?
Notes
I would like to thankJohn Boyd, Hubert Dreyfus,Marjorie Franklin,Cleo McNelly Kearns,StanleyMesser,and Tom Pison fortheirhelpfulcommentson earlierversions of this article. I am also grateful for fellowshipsupport from the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, NJ., and from the National Endowment for the Humanities,and fora Henry RutgersResearch FellowshipfromRutgersUniversity. 1. Claude Levi-Strauss,"The Archaic Illusion," in The Elementary Structures of Kinship Culture and Value(Chicago, 1980), 55. (Boston, 1969), 94-95; Ludwig Wittgenstein, 2. A schizophrenicpatient quoted in Julian Jaynes,The Originsof Consciousness in the Bicameral Mind (Boston, 1976), 425. Breakdown ofthe 3. Clifford Geertz,Local Knowledge (New York, 1983), 59. 4. FredricJameson,"Imaginaryand Symbolicin Lacan," in Shoshana Felman, ed., Litand Psychoanalysis erature (Baltimore,1982), 382. 5. Jean Broustra,quoted inJ. H. Matthews, andPoetry Insanity (Syracuse,N.Y., Surrealism, 1982), 4-5. trans.WalterKaufman 6. FriedrichNietzsche,TheBirth and theCase ofWagner, ofTragedy (New York, 1967), 21, 36-37, 40-41. 7. FriedrichNietzsche,TheWilltoPower, trans.WalterKaufman (New York, 1968), 267. 8. Leo Bersani,A FutureforAstyanax (New York, 1984), xi, xii,5-9, 234-36, 255-60, and to simplify characterto desublimated,discontinpassim. Bersani describes"attempts uous scenes of the desiringimagination"(263). 9. E.g., Bersani asserts that "all serious enterprisesof psychicdeconstruction" involve intrinsic to all desire"; ibid., 272 (emphasis added). "the pornographictyrannies 10. Perhaps even more than most psychiatric diagnoses, thatof schizophreniais ambigand thereare no universally uous and controversial, accepted criteriaforitsapplication. The adequacy of Schneider's First Rank Symptoms (discussed below) as has been questioned, as have both the traditional criteria offeredin diagnosticcriteria the classic works by Emil Kraepelin and Eugen Bleuler and the definitionrecently instituted Associationin DSM III: Diagnostic and Statistical bythe AmericanPsychiatric Manual, 3rd ed. (Washington,D.C., 1980). Further,each of these conceptions of "schizophrenia"is probablybest thoughtof not as offering a categorywitha singleor but ratheras a "family unambiguous essentialfeature, concept"withfuzzyboundaries a certaincultureboundedness). However,therecan be littledoubt of (and, probably, the existenceof patientswho do manifestthe syndromeSchneider and Jaspers have described, with its profound distortionsof normal self-worldboundaries. In this to referto such patients.Since some of these paper, I willuse the termschizophrenia also displaycertain"affective" symptoms or do not manifestthe full"schizophrenic" American diagnosticsystem(DSM syndromeas described in the most recentofficial III), some of them would be called "schizoaffective" or "schizophreniform" by that system.
28
REPRESENTATIONS
11. Patientsquoted in Thomas Freeman,John Cameron, and Andrew McGhie, Chronic (New York, 1973), 54; Eugene Meyer and Lino Covi, "The Experience Schizophrenia Psychiatry 23 (1960): 215; and Report by a Patient," of Depersonalization: A Written 21 (1958): States,"Psychiatry AlbertaSzalita, "Regressionand Perceptionin Psychotic 56. (New York, in Schizophrenia 12. Quoted in Marguerite Sechehaye, A New Psychotherapy 1956), 149. (Chicago, 1963), 577-82. Psychopathology 13. KarlJaspers,General Disorders (New Haven, 1978), 15. 14. Manfred Bleuler,TheSchizophrenic (New York, 1959), 88-145. 15. KurtSchneider,ClinicalPsychopathology 16. DSM III, 182, 183, 188. vii-viii. Schizophrenia, 17. Anna Freud, preface-toFreeman,Chronic 103. Schizophrenia, 18. Freeman,Chronic maintainthatin regression,states 19. Accordingto a recentreviewarticle,"Most writers and developmentallygain ascendancy and of mind more primitivechronologically those postulatedto be operative and function, thatthese statesresemble,in structure and earlychildhood."Thomas McGlashan, "IntensiveIndividual Psyduring infancy 40 (1983): 911. Archives Psychiatry ofGeneral chotherapyof Schizophrenia," 20. VictorTausk, "On the Origin of the InfluencingMachine in Schizophrenia" (1919), 2 (1933): 529-30. Quarterly Psychoanalytic 21. "She senses all manipulationsperformedon the correspondingpart of her own body and changes undergone by the apparatus take and in the same manner. All effects in the patient'sbody and viceversa."Ibid., 532. place simultaneously delusion are describedin Paul 22. Ibid., 549. Other examples of the influencing-machine of theHuman Body (New York, 1950), 223; and Schilder, The Image and Appearance 64-65. Schizophrenia, Freeman,Chronic 23. Tausk, "On the Origin of the InfluencingMachine,"536. (New York, 1925), ofPsychoanalysis 24. Sandor Ferenczi and Otto Rank, TheDevelopment 31. 25. Thomas Freeman,Psychopathology (New York,1969), 137, 163. For other Psychoses ofthe see Sandor Ferenczi, Sex in Psychoanalysis interpretations, examples of primitivity (New York, Theory ofNeurosis (Boston, 1916), 219-31; Otto Fenichel,ThePsychoanalytic awareness of bodilysensations,and grandi1945), 421, 423, and 46-51 (re passivity, osityas regressivephenomena); also see the major worksof Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg. and Borderline Disorders (New York, 1981), 187. 26. James Masterson,TheNarcissistic 27. A thirdmajor school of thought,thatof behaviorism(and the more recentvariant, "cognitivebehaviorism"),has had somewhatless influenceon the understandingof schizophreniaand willnot be discussed in thisessay. and throughoutthe twentieth cen28. The "medical-model"approach, both currently of a patient's has generallyaccepted the idea that certaindetails of the content tury, delusions or hallucinationsmay be comprehensibleas related to past or presentcircharacteristics-these would cercumstances. However, the more importantformal tainlyinclude the distortionsof selfhood and volitionimplicitin Schneider's First and of the experience of logicalthinking Rank Symptoms, as wellas certaindistortions of time and space-are assumed to be functionsof a schizophrenicprocess whose have genesis is essentiallyphysiological.Consequently,these essentialcharacteristics but not for "Verbeen assumed to be, in Jaspers'sterms,candidates for "Erklkren" of formstehen." In contrast,I willbe arguing that thisequation of the distinctions
of Self Introspection, Schizophrenia,and the Fragmentation
29
29. 30. 31.
32. 33.
34.
35. 36.
does not reallyhold: as we and of explanation-versus-understanding versus-content aspectsof consciousness,such as thoselistedbySchneider,can, at least shall see,formal be "understood." to some extent, consciousness can be Incidentally,to claim, as I shall, that schizophreniform mightplaya role in the factors understoodis not,of course,to deny thatphysiological etiologyor maintenanceof the schizophreniccondition.Phenomenologicalinterprecontradictory not mutually perspectives, tationand physicalexplanationare different ones. However, this is not the place to theorize about possible interrelationships between the physiologicaland the phenomenological realms, for this would necesand a highlyspeculativeenterprise.(Indeed, sarilybe both a verytime-consuming to asking one is temptedto saythataskingforan answerto thisquestionis tantamount fora solutionto the mind-bodyproblem.) and Conversations Lectures (Berkeley,1967), 43. Ludwig Wittgenstein, viii. Schizophrenia, Anna Freud, preface to Freeman,Chronic Claude Levi-Strauss,TheSavageMind (Chicago, 1966), 42. My argumentin thisessay has somethingin common withLevi-Strauss'sfamous critiqueof traditionalnotions between sophistiaffinities of deep structural of the "savage" and his demonstration thought. cated and so-called "primitive" 155. Sechehaye,A NewPsychotherapy, (New York, and Schizophrenia Capitalism Anti-Oedipus: GillesDeleuze and Felix Guattari, Death (New York, 1959), and 1977), 87-88. Also see Norman 0. Brown,LifeAgainst (New York, ofExperience Love'sBody(New York, 1966); and R. D. Laing, ThePolitics 1967). (New Haven, Thought vol. 2, Mythical Forms, ofSymbolic Ernst Cassirer,ThePhilosophy 1955), 13. of schizophreniaseem to have followeda genTo a greatextent,interpretations eral pattern for conceptualizingOtherness, which has been described by Stephen eitheras thatwhichis Greenblattas follows:"The alien is perceived by the authority unformed or chaotic (the absence of order) or that which is false or negative (the to organize demonic parody of order). Since accounts of the formertend inevitably and thematizeit, the chaotic slides into the demonic, and consequentlythe alien is Renaissance Self-Fashioning as the distortedimage of the authority"; alwaysconstructed oftentreatschizophreniaas (Chicago, 1980), 9. Thus, medical-modelinterpretations thechaotic,theabsence of order.As we saw,thisamounted injaspers's case to a refusal on the other hand, have or thematizethe illness. The antipsychiatrists, to interpret largelyconstrued schizophreniaas the demonic, in the formof the Dionysian-that interorder of normalcy. primitivity Psychoanalytic of the stifling is, as the antithesis pretationscan be seen as combining these two approaches. On the one hand, the processover secondaryprocess,suggeststhe ascendancyof id over ego, or of primary triumphof all thatis dark and demonic. On the otherhand, the supposed infantilism of the schizophrenic's ego suggeststhat the essential featureis the lack of a mature of the experientialworld. In a way,of course, the psychoorderingand categorization analyticalso domesticatesor denies the Otherness of the madman, for it views his as but the manifestation of an earlier stage of the Same. seemingdifferentness vol. 1 (New ofPsychology, WilliamJames,"The Consciousnessof Self,"in ThePrinciples York, 1890), 291-401; passages quoted below are on pp. 297, 298, 300, 301, 304, 305. and Theories ofPsychology On Titchener,see J.P. Chaplin and T. S. Krawiec, Systems (New York, 1968), 88-90. As James was well aware, his argumentwas also similarto
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REPRESENTATIONS
philosopherslike Hume and Johann Friedrich and empiricist thatof associationistic Herbart. Also see his ofPsychology. 37. WilliamJames, "The Stream of Thought," in ThePrinciples expressed on pp. 183-98 and 336ff.of thePrinciples. reservations 38. See P. M. S. Hacker's excellent discussion of Wittgensteinin Insightand Illusion (Oxford, 1972), 126-27. Books(Oxford, 1958), 66. TheBlue and Brown 39. Ludwig Wittgenstein, (Oxford, 1953), 124-25. Investigations Philosophical 40. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 41. Ibid., 125. Zettel (Berkeley,1970), 103. 42. Ludwig Wittgenstein, the traditionalhumanist 43. It is obvious, I hope, thatI am not arguing in favorof either now defend. The implication notionorthe nonselfdoctrinethatsome postmodernists since each can find validity, thateach visionmayhave equal, thoughlimited, is, rather, itselfto be "true" in its own context(that is, e.g., the contextsI have called "casual" pointof view,itwould be no less Froma Wittgensteinian and "exigent"introspection). (in the pejorativesense) to believe in the decentered subjectthan in its "metaphysical" and the mythof presence. It seems ironic,therefore, opposite, the Cartesian cogito at should proclaim the end of metaphysics that some followersof poststructuralism the same timeas theyespouse a doctrinethatcan onlybe considered metaphysical. 44. Compare James'sanalysisto thatof ErnstMach, who believed thatthe individualwas stablecomplex of sensationalelements."For discussionsof Mach, see only"a relatively and Art(New York, 1962); and David Literature WylieSypher,TheLoss ofSelfinModern 1880-1942 (Berkeley,1980), 82Musil and theCrisisofEuropeanCulture, Luft,Robert 88. (New York, 1963), 57. 45. Nathalie Sarraute,TheAge ofSuspicion 46. Ibid., 16-17. Lifeand Death (New York, 1969), 63-64. 47. Nathalie Sarraute,Between 48. One mightcontrastthese developmentswiththose discussed byLionel Trillingin Sinand Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass., 1971). Trillingtracesthe genealogyof a type cerity development of alienated self to Hegel's ideas about the intrinsic of disintegrated, the ideals of "integralselfhood"and Spirit.He showshow,in the eighteenthcentury, "simple placid consciousness"came to be seen as representingan undeveloped conof social role and therefore was notyetaware of the arbitrariness ditionin whichspirit could not yet experience alienation from that role. The examples of disintegrated selfhood I am consideringseem to occur at a level thatis more centraland profound; theyinvolvenot alienationfromsocial role, not a true selfversusfalseselfdistinction, and inconsistency but alienation fromone's own consciousness.Instead of insincerity Trilling'sprimaryexample), what seems to occur in (as in Diderot's Rameau' Nephew, and dissolutionof the "innerman" himself. these cases is fragmentation 49. Paul Valery, Cahiers (Paris, 1973), 295-96. Loss ofSelf,90. 50. Quoted in Sypher, Paradox(New York, Narrative: TheMetafictional 51. Quoted in Linda Hutcheon, Narcissistic 1984), 87. 236, 272. 52. Bersani,Future forAstyanax, in byHugo von Hoffmansthal 53. These trendscorrespondcloselyto those distinguished of the decentered selfhad become entrenched:"Today 1893, well beforethe rhetoric fromlife.... One two thingsseem to be modern: the analysisof life and the flight or fantasy, practisesanatomyon theinnerlifeof one's mind,or one dreams. Reflection mirrorimage or dream image.... Modern is the dissection of a mood, a sigh, a
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almostsomnambulistic surrenderto everyrevscruple; and modern is the instinctive, metaphor,to a wondrous elation of beauty,to a harmonyof colours, to a glittering allegory";quoted in James McFarlane, "The Mind of Modernism,"in Malcolm BradEng., 1976), 711890-1930 (Harmondsworth, buryand McFarlane,eds., Modernism: 94. For an example of what mightbe considered a partial synthesisof these two see the discussionof William impulses (bymeans of a kind of eroticizedintroversion), 86. in Hutcheon, Narcissistic Narrative, Gass's metafiction for example, Bersani points out that the 54. In a discussion of Rimbaud's Illuminations, is prevented loss of selfis nottotalin thisworksincecompletefusionor fragmentation in manyof the scenic "illuminations" by the appearance of the narratoras an element constituting (though,as Bersani emphasizes, awareness of the narratoras a distinct, the domof desire is absent). And, saysBersani,byso interrupting or subject subjectivity inant impulse of the work, the narrator"therebysaves himselffrom a schizophrenic at all betweenthe selfand the alien formsintowhichit has been failureto distinguish 245 (emphasis added). As we shall see, howforAstyanax, projected"; Bersani, Future mayactuallybe heightenedin schizophrenia. ever,awarenessof self-as-subject (New York, Experience of Psychopathological 55. Quoted in Carney Landis, ed., Varieties 1964), 193. Also see "The Case of Peter,"in R. D. Laing, TheDividedSelf(Harmondsworth,Eng., 1965), 120-36. States(London, 56. For other relevant descriptions,see Herbert Rosenfeld, Psychotic 1965), 13-33, 155-68; and Thomas Szasz, "The Psychologyof Bodily Feelings in 19 (1957): 11-16. Medicine Psychosomatic Schizophrenia," (London, 1962), xiii. Phenomenology ofPerception 57. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 58. Patientsquoted in James Chapman, "The Early Symptomsof Schizophrenia,"British Journal 112 (1966): 232. ofPsychiatry 95. Schizophrenia, 59. Freeman,Chronic in whichthereis no differentia60. Freeman,et al., writethat"we assume an egocentrism no capacityforreflective thinking tionbetweenego and externalworld,and therefore ibid., 84. throughwhichthe subjectcould comprehend his own symbolism"; 61. See, e.g., Charles Donnelly,"The Observing Self and the Development of CohesiveJournal 52 (1979): 277-79. ofMedicalPsychology ness,"British like thatofferedin Heinz Werner interpretations 62. See, e.g., cognitive-developmental Formation and Bernard Kaplan, Symbol (New York, 1963). Althoughsome psychoanahave criticizedcertainof the more extremeand monolithicimplications lyticwriters of the primitivity model, they have not questioned the fundamental equation of Mind (Chie.g., J.E. Gedo and A. Goldberg,Modelsofthe pathologywithimmaturity; cago, 1973). Even those analystswho emphasize the active,defensiveaspect of schizophrenic processes accept the regression model. Thus, according to Silvano Arieti's lapsing into schizophrenicmodes of thoughtserves notionof "teleologicregression," ofSchizophrenia, a purpose-escape fromthreateningmental contents;Interpretation 2nd ed. (New York, 1974). But he too understands the formof schizophreniccon(New York, sciousness as primitive.Harold Searles, Collected Paperson Schizophrenia 1965), presentsa similarposition. 63. Jaynes,Origins 84-85, 404-32. Also see Sheldon Bach, "On the NarofConsciousness, 58 (1977): 213, State of Consciousness,"InternationalJournal cissistic ofPsychoanalysis stateof consciousness should be compared to that who argues thatthe "narcissistic" and theIrrational (Berkeley, of ancient man as described by E. R. Dodds, The Greeks ofMind, trans.T. G. Rosenmeyer(Cambridge, 1951); and Bruno Snell, TheDiscovery 58, makes a similarargument. Mass., 1953). Szalita, "Regressionand Perception,"
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REPRESENTATIONS
95-96, 426-27, and passim. ofConsciousness, 64. Jaynes,Origins (Bristol,Eng., 1976), 92-95, Schizophrenia 65. See discussionin Max Hamilton,ed., Fish's 140, 157. 94 American Journal ofPsychiatry 66. JonathanLang, "The Other Side of Hallucinations," (1938): 1091. 67. Ibid., 1091-92. 68. Jonathan Lang, "The Other Side of the Ideological Aspects of Schizophrenia,"Psy3 (1940): 389-93. chiatry 69. Lang, "Other Side of Hallucinations,"1091. 70. Samuel Alexander,among other philosophers,has argued thatacts of consciousness assimilate cannotbe contemplated-that to thinkof themin thisway is to mistakenly Years theseprocessesto the thingsthatare theirobjects; see JohnPassmore,A Hundred 2nd ed. (New York, 1968), 267-69. But the example of schizophrenics ofPhilosophy, is possible,though it like Lang and Natalija demonstratesthatsuch "contemplation" phenomena and transparent maynotbe normal. For,in theirexperience,the implicit arc of consciousness lie close to the subjectpole of the intentional thatwould normally have, as it were, migratedout to the endpoint of thisarc, there to turnopaque. It is act of consciousnessthatis more invistrue,of course, thattheremustthenbe another the acts thathave an "enjoyed"act which,as it were, "contemplates" ible and implicit, been rendered explicit.In thissense, Alexander'sclaimsabout an act of consciousness however,that the necessarilyremainingimplicitseem to hold true. It is interesting, or enjoyed one; the contemplated contemplatedact willsometimesmimicthe implicit Thus, for example, of self-consciousness. process will oftenbe itselfa manifestation some schizophrenicpatients may hear voices that express their self-consciousness. (Schreber,the famous paranoid schizophrenicwrittenabout by Freud, frequently of now?") In such instances,we are faced heard voices saying"What are you thinking of the "miseen abime" so oftendiscoveredbydeconstrucwitha situationreminiscent artifacts. Here, as in those as infinitely reflexive readings of worksof literature tionist readings, the ultimatemeaning of the "text"seems to be the expression of its own said thatifhe staredlong enough (One schizoidyoung man, a visual artist, reflexivity. at any painting,he realized that the canvas was like an eye that watched, while the framewas like ears. He seemed, as it were,to see seeing.) Mind 71. Phrasingborrowed fromErich Heller's discussion of Kafka in TheDisinherited (New York, 1975), 202. critiqueconcentrateson the reifica72. It should be noted, however,that Wittgenstein's beliefs; my primaryconcern in this held "metaphysical" tions inherentin explicitly inherentin a certainkindof livedworld. In some withthe reifications paper is, rather, cases, like that of Jonathan Lang, such a mode of experience may also be explicitly or philosophicaldescription.(In more than a fewcases, articulatedas a psychological in fact,a patient's"delusions" can be read as just such a description.)In other cases, level. the mode of experience remainson a more prereflective however, that schizophreniagenerallydoes not have its be of significance 73. It may,incidentally, onset before adolescence, the stage of "formaloperations"when the capacityto think thensurely can be called "egocentric," is acquired. If the schizophrenic about thinking of the adolescent, which involvesan overvaluationof it is the "higher"egocentricity (New ofLogical Thinking thought.See Barbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, The Growth York, 1958), chap. 18. (New Hyde Park,N.Y., 1967), 123-24. 74. Thomas Hennell, TheWitnesses 239. Perhaps in thiswaywe can understand 75. Quoted in Chapman, "EarlySymptoms,"
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whysuch patientssometimesfinditeasier to describetheirexperiencesiftheyuse the person. "It would be easier if we talked of a notional third thirdratherthan the first person," said one. "I could more easily understand if we described this illness on a third person. Then I could understand it. I can't understand it if it is applied to myself"(228). 76. "Atan earlierstage,sexual sensationswere produced in her throughmanipulationof the genitaliaof the machine; but now the machine no longer possesses any genitalia, though whyor how theydisappeared she cannot tell. Ever since the machine lost its genitalia, the patient has ceased to experience sexual sensations"; Tausk, "On the Origin of the InfluencingMachine,"530. 77. Ibid., 528, 534, 554-55. Moralist Freud:TheMind ofthe (Chicago, 1979), 321. 78. Philip Rieff, the flattenedemotionalityof the schizoIn the view of some psychoanalysts, phrenicis to be explained as an indirectconsequence of the id-dominatednature of down in response to fear the illness,since itsupposedlyinvolvesan emotionalshutting emotion; see McGlashan, "Intensive Individual Psychoof overwhelming, primitive 914; also, see Tausk, "On the Origin of the InfluencingMachine," 549-50. therapy," The evidence forthiscontentionis ambiguous to say the least. However,even if such it would hardlydetract of such patients, were characteristic a defensiveconfiguration aspects; for these seem, in any fromthe importanceof studyingthe hyperreflexive case, to have taken on an independentlifeof theirown and to have giventheirstamp to the experience and the expressionof the illness. 79. Laing, DividedSelf,109. 80. Ibid., 151. the NewCriticism (Chicago, 1980), 179. After 81. Quoted in FrankLentricchia, 82. Sylvere Lotringer,"Libido Unbound: The Politics of 'Schizophrenia,"' in "AntiArtaud(Harmonds2, no. 3 (1977): 8-10; MartinEsslin,Antonin Oedipus," Semiotexte worth, Eng., 1976), 122-27. 236. forAstyanax, 83. Bersani,Future Artaud: noted are inAntonin Selected Writings, 84. All quotationsfromArtaud nototherwise ed. Susan Sontag (New York, 1976), 59, 60-62, 65, 75, 82, 103, 195, 294, 382-83. 37. 85. Quoted in Esslin,Artaud, and ItsDouble(New York, 1958), 9. 86. AntoninArtaud, TheTheatre Nietzsche (Middlesex, Eng., 1977), 517. 87. Quoted in WalterKaufman,ed., ThePortable of (South Bend, Ind., 1975), 241. In The Genealogy 88. Quoted in Karl Jaspers,Nietzsche Morals,Nietzsche describes the formof illness that can result froma burgeoning of consciousnessand an unhingingfromthe guidance of unconscious drives: reflective "They were forced to think,deduce, calculate, weigh cause and effect-unhappy people, reduced to theirweakest,mostfallibleorgan, theirconsciousness! . . . This is it alone provides the soil for the growthof what is what I call man's interiorization; later called man's soul. Man's interiorworld, originallymeager and tenuous, was expanding in everydimension,in proportionas the outwarddischargeof his feelings and confinedwithinan was curtailed.... Lacking externalenemies and resistances, man began rending, persecuting,terrifying oppressive narrownessand regularity, himself. . . his sickness of himself,brought on by the violent severance from his trans.G. Golffing and the (Garden animal past"; TheBirth ofMorals, Genealogy ofTragedy City, N.Y., 1956), 217-18. 89. Michel Foucault, TheOrder ofThings (New York, 1973), 327. 90. Hennell, TheWitnesses, 210.
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REPRESENTATIONS

Introspection, Schizophrenia, and The Fragmentation of Self

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Introspection, Schizophrenia, and the Fragmentation of Self Author(s): Louis A. Sass Source: Representations, No. 19 (Summer, 1987), pp.

Introspection,Schizophrenia, and of Self the Fragmentation

pulls me apart.... ego disappears and thatI do not existanymore.Everything

19 * Summer 1987 C Louis A. Sass

machine made in Berlin....

ofSelf and theFragmentation Schizophrenia, Introspection,

ofSelf and theFragmentation Introspection, Schizophrenia,

ofSelf and theFragmentation Schizophrenia, Introspection,

ofSelf and theFragmentation Introspection, Schizophrenia,

of Self Introspection, Schizophrenia,and the Fragmentation

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of Self Schizophrenia,and the Fragmentation Introspection,

of Self Schizophrenia,and the Fragmentation Introspection,

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