Dela Victoria v Burgos Facts: Assistant City Fiscal Bienvenido N.

Mabanto was ordered to pay herein private respondent Raul Sesbreo P11,000.00 as damages. A notice of garnishment was served on herein petitioner Loreto D. de la Victoria as City Fiscal of Mandaue City where Mabanto was detailed. V was directed not to disburse, transfer, release or convey to any other person except to the deputy sheriff concerned the salary checks or other checks, monies, or cash due or belonging to Mabanto, Jr., under penalty of law. Later, V was directed to submit his report showing the amount of the garnished salaries. V moved to quash the notice of garnishment claiming that he was not in possession of any money, funds, credit, property or anything of value belonging to Mabanto, Jr., except his salary and RATA checks, but that said checks were not yet properties of Mabanto, Jr., until delivered to him. He further claimed that, as such, they were still public funds which could not be subject to garnishment. TC: denied his motion ISSUE: W/N a check still in the hands of the maker or its duly authorized representative is owned by the payee before physical delivery to the latter. RULING: Garnishment is considered as a species of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. As Assistant City Fiscal, the source of the salary of Mabanto, Jr., is public funds. He receives his compensation in the form of checks from the Department of Justice through petitioner as City Fiscal of Mandaue City and head of office. Under Sec. 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As ordinarily understood, delivery means the transfer of the possession of the instrument by the maker or drawer with intent to transfer title to the payee and recognize him as the holder thereof. Inasmuch as said checks had not yet been delivered to Mabanto, Jr., they did not belong to him and still had the character of public funds. In Tiro v. Hontanosas 8 we ruled that The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the Government. Rationale: The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank v. Court of Appeals . 11 Our precise ruling in that case was that "[I]t is not incumbent upon the garnishee to inquire or to judge for itself whether or not the order for the advance execution of a judgment is valid." But that is invoking only the general rule. We have also established therein the compelling reasons, as exceptions thereto, which were not taken into account by the trial court, e.g., a defect on the face of the writ or actual knowledge by the garnishee of lack of entitlement on the part of the garnisher. In the case at bench, it was incumbent upon petitioner to inquire into the validity of the notice of garnishment as he had actual knowledge of the non-entitlement of private respondent to the checks in question. Concurring and Dissenting: Davide This Court may take judicial notice of the fact that checks for salaries of employees of various Departments all over the country are prepared in Manila not at the end of the payroll period, but days before it to ensure that they reach the employees concerned not later than the end of the payroll period. As to the employees in the provinces or cities, the checks are sent through the heads of the corresponding offices of the Departments. Thus, in the case of Prosecutors and Assistant Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the checks are sent through the Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors, as the case may be, who shall then deliver the checks to the payees.

I respectfully submit that if these salary and RATA checks corresponded, respectively, to a payroll period and to a month which had already lapsed at the time the notice of garnishment was served, the garnishment would be valid, as the checks would then cease to be property of the Government and would become property of Mabanto. Upon the expiration of such period and month, the sums indicated therein were deemed automatically segregated from the budgetary allocations for the Department of Justice under the General Appropriations Act. National Amnesty Commission v COA Facts: Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347.The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members. It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038. On September 1, 1998, the NGAO upheld the auditors order and notices of disallowance were subsequently issued Meanwhile, on April 28, 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules and Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada on October 19, 1999. Section 1, Rule II: The ex officio members may designate their representatives to the Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law. Issue: COA Memo No. 97-038 was not published, valid? Ruling: 1. The Constitution mandates the Commission on Audit to ensure that the funds and properties of the government are validly, efficiently and conscientiously used. It is in accordance with this constitutional mandate that the COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038 on September 19, 1997: The Commission received a copy of Senate Committee Report No. 509 urging the Commission on Audit to immediately cause the disallowance of any payment of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions, and to effect the refund of any and all such additional compensation given to and received by the officials concerned, or their representatives, from the time of the finality of the Supreme Court ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary to the present. In the Civil Liberties Union case, the Supreme Court ruled that Cabinet Secretaries, their deputies and assistants may not hold any other office or employment. It declared Executive Order 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to hold other offices in addition to their primary office and to receive compensation therefor. 2. Contrary to petitioners claim, COA Memorandum No.97-038 does not need, for validity and effectivity, the publication required by Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art. 2 .Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. We clarified this publication requirement in Tanada vs. Tuvera: [A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,

directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of instruction which does not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule or regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and receiving double compensation 3. Sections 54 and 56 of the Administrative Code of 1987 reiterate the constitutional prohibition against multiple positions in the government and receiving additional or double compensation. The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere designation from the ex officio members who were themselves also designated as such. Again, in Civil Liberties Union, we held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and assistants, who hold positions in ex officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional compensation because their services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to their principal offices. Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex officio members were not entitled to, and were in fact prohibited from, collecting extra compensation, whether it was called per diem, honorarium, allowance or some other euphemism. Such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution. Furthermore, in de la Cruz vs. COA[17] and Bitonio vs. COA,[18] we upheld COAs disallowance of the payment of honoraria and per diems to the officers concerned who sat as ex officiomembers or alternates. The agent, alternate or representative cannot have a better right than his principal, the ex officio member. The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover the ex officio member apply with equal force to his representative. In short, since the ex officio member is prohibited from receiving additional compensation for a position held in an ex officio capacity, so is his representative likewise restricted 4. Petitioner further contends that with the new IRR issued by the NAC authorizing the ex-officio members to designate representatives to attend commission meetings and entitling them to receive per diems, honoraria and other allowances, there is now no legal impediment since it was approved by the President. This Commission begs to disagree. Said provision in the new IRR is null and void for having been promulgated in excess of its rule-making authority. 5. The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were not appointed but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own principals are prohibited from receiving. Neither can they claim good faith, given the express prohibition of the Constitution and the finality of our decision in Civil Liberties Union prior to their receipt of such allowances. PCSO v Lapid Facts: Records show that the present case is rooted on the Sworn Statement executed by Mr. Lolito O. Guemo, Chief Lottery Operations Officer, Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Bataan Provincial District on June 23, 2005. Said Sworn Statement documented an incident which allegedly occurred on June 17, 2005, wherein respondent-appellant Marie Jean C. Lapid, Casual Clerk (Acting Teller), confronted, badmouthed and shouted invectives at Mr. Guemo, in the presence of other employees and patients seeking assistance from the PCSOBataan Provincial District Office. The PCSO Legal Department, through Investigating Officer Atty. Victor M. Manlapaz, sent a Memorandum to Lapid on June 27, 2005, asking the latter to respond to the Affidavit-Complaint of Guemo. In her Answer, Lapid stated that Guemos complaint against her must be dismissed on the ground that the said complaint does not conform to the essential requisites prescribed by Section 8 of the Uniform Rules in Administrative

Cases in the Civil Service. She also asserted that the administrative offense of Discourtesy of Official Function does not exist under Civil Service Rules. On August 11, 2005, the Legal Department of the PCSO submitted its recommendation to the PCSO General Manager and Board of Directors for the issuance of the Formal Charge against respondent-appellant for Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties and Grave Misconduct. Respondent-appellant received her Notice of Termination from Reynaldo P. Martin, OIC-Regional Operations Manager of the PCSO on October 17, 2005 with a copy of the PCSO Board Resolution which contained the board decision to terminate her services CSC dismissed her appeal. Records clearly show that respondent-appellant was never formally charged for the administrative offense of Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties and Grave Misconduct, for which she was dismissed from service. However, PCSOs failure to observe due process is irrelevant in this present case and the real issue for the Commissions determination is the termination of Lapids casual employment. Based on the status of Lapids employment [as] a casual employee , this Commission finds this present appeal moot and academic and all proceedings conducted pursuant to the aforementioned incidents, bereft of any legal effects. Further, the fact that Lapid was employed by the PCSO as a casual employee, means that she does not enjoy security of tenure. Lapids services are terminable anytime, there being no need to show cause. Lapids allegations that there is no substantial evidence to sustain the finding of her guilt for Grave Misconduct and her dismissal from the service is irrelevant in the present case as she is a casual employee, without any security of tenure. CA ruled that while it was previously held that casual employees were not protected by security of tenure as they may be removed from the service with or without cause, a recent case decided by the Court held otherwise. In the said case, entitled, Re: Vehicular Accident involving SC Shuttle Bus No. 3 with Plate No. SEG357 driven by Gerry B. Moral, Driver II-Casual,[8] the Court ruled that since there was no evidence supporting the charge against the respondent therein, it could not sustain his recommended dismissal on the mere ground that he was a casual employee, for even a casual or temporary employee enjoys security of tenure and cannot be dismissed except for cause enumerated in Sec. 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations and other pertinent laws. Issue: WON respondent was validly dismissed Held: No Ratio: As stated in Rule III, Section 2(f) of the Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions: f. Casual issued only for essential and necessary services where there are not enough regular staff to meet the demands of the service. Plantilla of casual employees: The abovenamed personnel are hereby hired/appointed as casuals at the rate of compensation stated opposite their/his name(s) for the period indicated. It is understood that such employment will cease automatically at the end of the period stated unless renewed. Any or all of them may be laid-off any time before the expiration of the employment period when their services are no longer needed or funds are no longer available or the project has already been completed/finished or their performance are below par. Thus, by the nature of their employment, casual employees were deemed to be not covered by the security of tenure protection as they could be removed from the service at anytime, with or without cause. Then came the recent case of Moral,[13] which was the basis of the CA Decision where the Court resolved the issue of whether or not a shuttle bus driver could be terminated from his casual employment without cause. Despite this new ruling on casual employees, it is not the intention of the Court to make the status of a casual employee at par with that of a regular employee, who enjoys permanence of employment. [14] The rule is still that casual employment will cease automatically at the end of the period unless renewed as stated in the

Plantilla of Casual Employment. Casual employees may also be terminated anytime though subject to certain conditions or qualifications with reference to the abovequoted CSC Form No. 001. Thus, they may be laidoff anytime before the expiration of the employment period provided any of the following occurs: (1) when their services are no longer needed; (2)funds are no longer available; (3) the project has already been completed/finished; or (4) their performance are below par. Equally important, they are entitled to due process especially if they are to be removed for more serious causes or for causes other than the reasons mentioned in CSC Form No. 001. This is pursuant to Section 2, Article IX(B) of the Constitution and Section 46 of the Civil Service Law. The reason for this is that their termination from the service could carry a penalty affecting their rights and future employment in the government. In the case at bench, the action of petitioners clearly violated Lapids basic rights as a casual employee. As pointed out by the CSC itself, Lapid was NEVER formally charged with the administrative offenses of Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties and Grave Misconduct. According to the CSC, the Formal Charge, was even unsigned, and it categorically stated that PCSO failed to observe due process Section 3(2), Article XIII of the Constitution guarantees the rights of all workers not just in terms of selforganization, collective bargaining, peaceful concerted activities, the right to strike with qualifications, humane conditions of work, and a living wage but also to security of tenure. Likewise, Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.[18] Apparently, the Civil Service Law echoes this constitutional edict of security of tenure of the employees in the civil service. Thus, Section 46 (a) of the Civil Service Law provides that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law after due process.[19] Vinzons-Chato v Natividad Facts: President Ramos issued E.O. No. 132, entitled "Approving the Streamlining of the Bureauof Internal Revenue." Pursuant to this order, Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato issued Revenue Administrative Order No. 5-93, "Redefining the areas of jurisdiction and renumbering of regional district offices." The order subdivided the 19 revenue regions provided for under the National Internal Revenue Code into 115 revenue districts and renumbered the resulting revenue district office (RDOs). In addition, it abolished the previous classification of RDOs into Class A-1,A, B, C, and D and provided that henceforth all RDOs shall be treated as the same class. Comm. Chato, citing the exigencies of the revenue service," issue Revenue TravelAssignment Order No. 80-93 directing 90 revenue district officers to report to new assignments in the re-designated and re-numbered revenue district offices nationwide. Among those affected by the reassignment was Salvador Nori Blas, who was ordered to report to Revenue District No. 14 in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In turn, Solon B. Alcantara was ordered to report to Blas' former post in San Fernando, Pampanga, now known as Revenue District No. 21. Blas wrote to Commissioner Chato requesting a reconsideration of his transfer. He felt that his accomplishments and performance had not been taken into consideration in the reshuffle and that his transfer from what he thought is the larger revenue district of San Fernando, Pampanga to the smaller district in Tuguegarao, Cagayan was a demotion. He claimed that he was among the top ten examiners of Revenue Region No. 5 for six consecutive years and that he was a model employee in 1981. In addition, he mentioned that he was a diabetic and that he needed to be near his doctor, and could not endure long travels. With his letter unacted upon, Blas filed with the RTC a verified complaint for "Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" against the Commissioner and Alcantara. He alleged that the transfer without his consent from the revenue district in San Fernando, which was formerly designated as a Class "A," to the revenue district in Tuguegarao, which was classified as a Class "C," with a smaller pool of

personnel and only one-fourth of the revenue capacity of Pampanga, would cause his "dislocation" and demotion or "a diminution in rank, status, and span of duties and responsibilities." He invoked E.O. No. 132 Sec. 2 which states that the redeployment of officials and other personnel on the basis of the streamlining embodied in this Executive Order shall not result in the dislocation of existing personnel nor in the diminution of rank and compensation and shall take into account pertinent Civil Service Law and rules. He contends that his transfer constitutes a demotion because, in effect, his span of control in terms of jurisdiction and personnel has been considerably diminished. He claims that he has earned, through hard work, as evidenced by his service record, the position at San Fernando, Pampanga which has a larger staff and revenue capacity and is much closer to Manila. RTC granted the writ of preliminary injunction stating that the issues presented before the court could be properly resolved when ventilated in a full-blown trial. Hence, this petition assailing the RTC Order. Issue: WON respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction Held: Yes. Ratio: Blas has shown no clear legal right to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunctionbut despite this fact the trial court issued his questioned order enjoining petitioner fromtransferrin g private respondent. The only reason given for the writ of preliminary injunction is that it is needed to preserve the status quo until the issues can be "threshed out in full blown trial." But the preservation of the status quo is not alone sufficient to justify the issuance of an injunction. The plaintiff must show that he has a clear legal right; that such right has beenviolated; and that he is entitled to the relief he demands, consisting in restraining thecommission of the acts complained of. Blas transfer is part of a nationwide reshuffle or reassignment of revenue district officers designed to improve revenue collection. More specifically the objective of the reassignment, as stated in Revenue Administrative Order No. 5-93, is "to strengthen the decentralization of the Bureau's setup for the purpose of maximizing tax assessments and revenue collections,intensifying enforcement of revenu e laws and regulations and bringing the revenue service closer to the taxpaying public." Blas perhaps is being transferred to a revenue district which he claims has less revenue capacity than San Fernando, Pampanga, precisely to improve thecapacity of the new assignment. His new assignment should therefore be considered by him a challenge to his leadership as revenue district officer rather than a demotion or a penalty. Blas failed to show patent illegality in the action of the Commissioner constituting violation of his right to security of tenure. To sustain his contention that histransfer constitutes ademotion simply because th e new assignment is not to his liking would be to subordinate government projects, along with the great resources and efforts they entail, to the individual preferences and opinions of civil service employees. Such contention would negate the principle that a public office is a public trust and that it is not the private preserve of any person. Ingranting an injunction despite the absence of any legal right to be protected, respondent committed a grave abuse of its discretion. Moreover, under the law, any employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to the Civil Service Commission. Judge Natividad should have dismissed the action below for Blas failure to exhaust administrative remedies Divinagracia v Sto. Tomas Facts: 1980 Filomena R. Mancita was appointed Municipal Development Coordinator (MDC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, in a permanent capacity. On 1 January 1985 the Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel

Administration approved the reorganization plan and staffing pattern of the Municipality of Pili. 3 In a letter dated 17 June 1985 Mayor Anastacio M. Prila notified Mancita that her services were being terminated effective at the close of office hours on 1 July 1985 on the ground that the Office of MDC was abolished as a result of the reorganization of the local government of Pili. Private respondent Prescilla B. Nacario who was then the Municipal Budget Officer was appointed MPDC on 10 June 1985 to take effect on 1 July 1985. October 1991, When control over the Local Government Officers Services was returned to the local government units by virtue of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160 as implemented by E.O. 503), San Luis was reappointed to the same position of Municipal Budget Officer on 22 June 1992, this time in a permanent capacity, by petitioner Delfin N. Divinagracia, Mayor of Pili. Meanwhile, Mancita appealed her termination to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB). 8 On 20 June 1989 the MSPB declared her separation from the service illegal, holding that the Office of the Municipal Development Coordinator was abolished by the Local Government Code of 1991 and not by the reorganization of the Municipality of Pili as claimed by Mayor Prila. The MSPB ordered Mayor Divinagracia to reinstate Mancita to the position of MPDC or to an equivalent position, and to pay her backwages from the date of her separation. On 8 November 1990 private respondent Prescilla B. Nacario filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court. Mancita then filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 before this Court questioning the denial of her motion. Through Mr. Justice Teodoro R. Padilla we granted the petition and held that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case since all decisions, orders and resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were subject to review only by this Court on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 11 While the petition of Mancita was pending with us, Nacario sent a query to public respondent Commission asking about her status as a permanent employee of the Municipality of Pili after she had accepted the position of MPDC. In a letter dated 8 December 1992 public respondent opined that the reinstatement of Mancita to the position of MPDC was not a valid cause for Nacario's termination, and since she was the former Municipal Budget Officer she had the right to return to that position. Petitioners contend that Sec. 13, Rule VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Revised Administrative Code (E.O. 292) does not apply to the present case because the rule covers only appointments in a chain of promotions and not where a public officer was merely transferred to another position of the same rank, grade and level. Petitioners further contend that Nacario was deemed to have vacated her position as Budget Officer when she accepted her appointment as MPDC considering that there were several appointments made to the Budget Office in the past eight (8) years since her transfer Upon the other hand, private respondent claims that she did not voluntarily apply for transfer from the Budget Office to the Office of MPDC but was constrained to "accept" the new position because of Mayor Prila. She was, in her own words, "a passive participant in the movement of personnel" in the municipal government of Pili having acted as a "subservient public official" in assuming the position of MPDC. Issue: WON Nacario should be reinstated as Municipal Budget Officer Held: No Ratio: 1. Sec. 13 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 provides that Sec. 13. All appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be submitted simultaneously for approval by the Commission. The disapproval of the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position invalidates the promotion of those in lower positions and automatically restores them to their former positions. However, the affected persons are entitled to the payment of salaries for services actually rendered at a rate fixed in their promotional appointments.

Under the aforecited section, before a public official or employee can be automatically restored to her former position, there must first be a series of promotions; second, all appointments are simultaneously submitted to the CSC for approval; and third, the CSC disapproves the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position. The essential requisites prescribed under Sec. 13 do not avail in the case at bench. To start with, the movement of Nacario from the Budget Office to the Office of MPDC cannot be considered a promotion for the term connotes an increase in duties and responsibilities as well as a corresponding increase in salary. 19 Conformably therewith, we find the movement of Nacario one of lateral transfer. 20 A careful examination of the qualifications, powers and duties of a Budget Officer and an MPDC provided under Secs. 475 and 476 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shows that the latter office is not burdened with more duties and responsibilities than the former. It is also interesting to note that there was, on the contrary, a reduction in the basic salary of Nacario Aside from the lack of a series of promotions, the other two (2) requisites are not also present, i.e., the appointments of the parties concerned were not simultaneously submitted to the CSC for approval the appointment (permanent) of Nacario was approved by the CSC on 13 June 1985 while the appointment (permanent) of San Luis was approved by the CSC on 9 February 1993 and, the ouster of Nacario from the Office of MPDC was a result of the MSPB decision directing the reinstatement of Mancita and not because the CSC disapproved her appointment as MPDC. 2. Re: validity of Nacarios transfer to the MPDC. Sec. 5, par. 3, of Rule VII provides that Transfer shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in which case, the employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefor. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the commission. (emphasis supplied) According to Nacario she never applied or sought appointment by transfer to the position of MPDC since she even had no prior knowledge of her appointment. 28 She assumed the new position only in order to comply with the move of Mayor Prila to supposedly "reorganize" the municipal government of Pili. Nacario did not question her transfer because she revered the mayor and did not in any way intend to displease him. The submissive attitude displayed by private respondent towards her transfer is understandable. Although Nacario was not informed of the reasons therefor she did not complain to the mayor or appeal her case to the CSC if in fact the same was not made in the interest of public service. For it is not common among local officials, even those permanent appointees who are more secured and protected in their tenurial right, to oppose or question the incumbent local executive on his policies and decisions no matter how improper they may seem. Mayor Prila was so determined in terminating Mancita that he conveniently pre-arranged her replacement by Nacario. Although Nacario continued to discharge her duties, this did not discourage her from trying to regain her former position. Undaunted, she applied with the Office of the Budget Secretary for the position of Budget Officer upon learning that it was placed under the Department of Budget and Management. She was not however successful. In Sta. Maria v. Lopez 31 we distinguished between a transfer and a promotion and laid down the prerequisites of a valid transfer thus A transfer is a "movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level and salary, without break in service." Promotion is the "advancement from one position to another with an increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law, and is usually accompanied by an increase in salary" . . . A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims to "lure the employee away from his permanent position, " cannot be done without the employees' consent. For that would constitute removal from office. Indeed, no permanent transfer can take place unless the officer or employee is first removed from the position held, and then appointed to another position. (emphasis provided) The rule that unconsented transfers amount to removal is not however without exception. As we further said in Sta.Maria, Concededly there are transfers which do not amount to removal. Some such transfers can be effected without the need for charges being proffered, without trial or hearing, and even without the consent of the employee . . . . The clue to such transfers may be found in the "nature of the appointment." Where the appointment does not indicate a specific station, an employee may be transferred or assigned provided the

transfer affects no substantial change in title, rank and salary . . . . Such a rule does not proscribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency . . . . Neither does illegality attach to the transfer or reassignment of an officer pending the determination of an administrative charge against him; or to the transfer of an employee, from his assigned station to the main office, effected in good faith and in the interest of the service pursuant to Sec. 32 of the Civil Service Act. Clearly then, the unconsented lateral transfer of Nacario from the Budget Office to the Office of MPDC was arbitrary for it amounted to removal without cause hence, invalid as it is anathema to security of tenure The guarantee of security of tenure is an important object of the civil service system because it affords a faithful employee permanence of employment, at least for the period prescribed by law, and frees the employee from the fear of political and personal prejudicial reprisal. 34 Consequently, it could not be said that Nacario vacated her former position as Budget Officer or abdicated her right to hold the office when she accepted the position of MPDC since, in contemplation of law, she could not be deemed to have been separated from her former position or to have terminated her official relations therewith notwithstanding that she was actually discharging the functions and exercising the powers of MPDC. The principle of estoppel, unlike in Manalo v. Gloria, 35 cannot bar her from returning to her former position because of the indubitable fact that private respondent reluctantly and hesitantly accepted the second office. The element of involuntariness tainted her lateral transfer and invalidated her separation from her former position. For another thing, the appointment of San Luis as Budget Officer carried with it a condition. At the back of his appointment is inscribed the notation Sa kondisyon nasa ayos ang pagkakatiwalag sa tungkulin ng dating nanunungkulan, which when translated means "Provided that the separation of the former incumbent is in order." Considering that the separation of Nacario who was the former incumbent was not in order, San Luis should relinquish his position in favor of private respondent Nacario. Dissenting: Davide From the foregoing facts, it is clear that private respondent Nacario voluntarily accepted her appointment as MPDC, thereby effectively relinquishing and abandoning her position as MBO. She held the new position continuously and uninterruptedly, even peacefully, until, at the earliest, 15 October 1990 when she was told to vacate it to comply with the decision of the MSPB reinstating Mancita. She was, as well, fully aware of the fact that several persons had succeeded her as MBO. Nacario's explanation that she assumed the new position only in order to comply with the move of Mayor Prila to reorganize the municipal government of Pili is implausible and simply incredible. On the contrary, she appeared to have relished the prestige and ascendancy of her new office and the challenge of a new role as coordinator of planning and development in the municipality. If indeed she was "forced" to accept the new position, then she could have requested the new mayor, Mayor Divinagracia, to return her to the position of MBO. On the other hand, the appointment of San Luis as MPDC was regularly done and without any protest from Nacario. If the latter honestly believed that she was illegally and arbitrarily transferred to the position of MPDC, she should have protested the appointment of San Luis. If there is any party whose security of tenure should be protected, it is San Luis. Hence, he should not be given his walking papers. GSIS v COA (2004) Facts: On April 16, 2002, the Court promulgated a decision on these two consolidated cases partially granting the petition in G.R. No. 138381 (first petition) thereby reversing the Commission on Audits (COA) disallowance of certain fringe benefits granted to GSIS employees. As a result, the Court ordered the refund of amounts representing fringe benefits corresponding to those allowed in the first petition in favor of the respondents in G.R. No. 141625 (second petition). On August 7, 2002, the respondents in the second petition, all GSIS retirees, filed a motion for amendatory and clarificatory judgment (amendatory motion). [1] They averred

that we did not categorically resolve the issue raised in the second petition, namely: whether or not the GSIS may lawfully deduct any amount from their retirement benefits in light of Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291. Thereafter, on January 10, 2003, respondents filed another manifestation and motion as well as supplement thereto, claiming that GSIS was deducting new and unspecified sums from the amount it was refunding to respondents. These new deductions purportedly pertain to another set of COA disallowances. [10] On January 21, 2003, respondents again filed a motion[11] praying for the inclusion in the refundable amount of dividends on the management contribution to the Provident Fund (motion for payment of dividends). Respondents claimed that the contribution, which amounted to Fifty Million Pesos (P50M), was retained by GSIS for more than five years and thus earned a considerable sum of income while under its control. GSIS declared and paid dividends on said contribution to incumbent officials and employees, but refused to extend the same benefits to respondents/retirees. Issue: WON COA disallowances could be legally deducted from retirement benefits on the ground that these were respondents monetary liabilities to the GSIS under the said provision Held: No Ratio: SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien.- The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS . It is clear from the above provision that COA disallowances cannot be deducted from benefits under RA 8291, as the same are explicitly made exempt by law from such deductions. Retirement benefits cannot be diminished by COA disallowances in view of the clear mandate of the foregoing provision. Moreover, if we are to accept the GSIS interpretation, then it would be unnecessary to single out COA disallowances as among those from which benefits under RA 8291 are exempt. In such a case, the inclusion of COA disallowances in the enumeration of exemptions would be a mere surplusage since the GSIS could simply consider COA disallowances as monetary liabilities in its favor. Such a construction would empower the GSIS to withdraw, at its option, an exemption expressly granted by law. That retirement pay accruing to a public officer may not be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government has been settled in several cases. In Cruz v. Tantuico, Jr.,[22] the Court, citing Hunt v. Hernandez,[23] explained the reason for such policy thus: x x x we are of the opinion that the exemption should be liberally construed in favor of the pensioner. Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the graciousness of the Government intended to reward past services and, at the same time, to provide the pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his family. Unless otherwise clearly provided, the pension should inure wholly to the benefit of the pensioner. It is true that the withholding and application of the amount involved was had under section 624 of the Administrative Code and not by any judicial process, but if the gratuity could not be attached or levied upon execution in view of the prohibition of section 3 of Act No. 4051, the appropriation thereof by administrative action, if allowed, would lead to the same prohibited result and enable the respondents to do indirectly what they can not do directly under section 3 of Act No. 4051 The latest GSIS enactment, RA 8291,[29] provides for a more detailed and wider range of exemptions under Section 39. Aside from exempting benefits from judicial processes, it likewise unconditionally exempts benefits from quasi-judicial and administrative processes, including COA disallowances, as well as all financial obligations of the member. The latter includes any pecuniary accountability of the member which arose out of the exercise or performance of his official functions or duties or incurred relative to his position or work. The only exception to such pecuniary accountability is when the same is in favor of the GSIS.

Thus, monetary liability in favor of GSIS refers to indebtedness of the member to the System other than those which fall under the categories of pecuniary accountabilities exempted under the law. Such liability may include unpaid social insurance premiums and balances on loans obtained by the retiree from the System, which do not arise in the performance of his duties and are not incurred relative to his work. The general policy, as reflected in our retirement laws and jurisprudence, is to exempt benefits from all legal processes or liens, but not from outstanding obligations of the member to the System. This is to ensure maintenance of the GSIS fund reserves in order to guarantee fulfillment of all its obligations under RA 8291 . Notwithstanding the foregoing, It cannot be denied that respondents were recipients of benefits that were properly disallowed by the COA. These COA disallowances would otherwise have been deducted from their salaries, were it not for the fact that respondents retired before such deductions could be effected. The GSIS can no longer recover these amounts by any administrative means due to the specific exemption of retirement benefits from COA disallowances. Respondents resultantly retained benefits to which they were not legally entitled which, in turn, gave rise to an obligation on their part to return the amounts under the principle of solutio indebiti. Under Article 2154 of the Civil Code,[30] if something is received and unduly delivered through mistake when there is no right to demand it, the obligation to return the thing arises. Payment by reason of mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law also comes within the scope of solutio indebiti.[31] The delivery of benefits to respondents under an erroneous interpretation of RA 6758 gave rise to an actionable obligation for them to return the same. While the GSIS cannot directly proceed against respondents retirement benefits, it can nonetheless seek restoration of the amounts by means of a proper court action for its recovery. Respondents themselves submit that this should be the case, [34] although any judgment rendered therein cannot be enforced against retirement benefits due to the exemption provided in Section 39 of RA 8291. However, there is no prohibition against enforcing a final monetary judgment against respondents other assets and properties. This is only fair and consistent with basic principles of due process. As such, a proper accounting of the amounts due and refundable is in order. In rendering such accounting, the parties must observe the following guidelines: (1) All deductions from respondents retirement benefits should be refunded except those am ounts which may properly be defined as monetary liability to the GSIS; (2) Any other amount to be deducted from retirement benefits must be agreed upon by and between the parties; and (3) Refusal on the part of respondents to return disallowed benefits shall give rise to a right of action in favor of GSIS before the courts of law. Finally, on respondents claim that the GSIS acted in bad faith when it deducted the COA disallowances from their retirement benefits, except for bare allegations, there is no proof or evidence of the alleged bad faith and partiality of the GSIS. Moreover, the latter cannot be faulted for taking measures to ensure recovery of the COA disallowances since respondents have already retired and would be beyond its administrative reach. Rabor v CSC Facts: Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the government service as a Utility Worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years. Sometime in May 1991, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already more than 68 years old. Rabor responded by showing a GSIS certificate with a notation to the effect that his service is extended for him to complete the 15-years requirement for retirement. The Davao City Government wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice as to what action should be takenon Rabors case. Director Caward replied by saying that Rabors continuedemployment is contrary to OP M.C. No. 65 hence, it is non-extendible. MayorDuterte furnished Rabor a copy of Cawads letter and order him not to work anymore.

Rabor asked Director Cawad for extension of his job until he completed the 15-year requirement but was denied. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990 provides, in part: 1. Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and shall be granted for a period of not exceeding one (1) year . Rabor then asked OP for an extension. His request was referred by OP to CSC and thereafter CSC denied Rabors request. Rabor asked for reconsidered of CSC ruling citing Cena case but was denied. Rabor reiterated his request to Mayor Duterte but was rebuffed. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON Rabor request for extension should be granted in view of Cena case Held: No. Ratio: Cena doctrine overturned. Factual background of Cena - Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metropolitan Manila, on 16 July 1987. He reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on 22 January 1991. By the latter date, his government service would have reached a total of eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six (6) days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, Cena requested the Secretary of Justice, through the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority ("LRA") that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the fifteen-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. Denied This Court granted Cena' s petition in its Decision of 3 July 1992. Speaking through Mr. Justice Medialdea, the Court held that a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the same time has not yet completed fifteen (15) years of government service required under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to qualify for the Old-Age Pension Benefit, may be granted an extension of his government service for such period of time as may be necessary to "fill up" or comply with the fifteen (15)year service requirement. The Court also held that the authority to grant the extension was a discretionary one vested in the head of the agency concerned. In Cena v. CSC, the Court reached itsconclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary meaning" of Section 11(b) of P.D. No. 1146. Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a member who (1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service; (2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and (3) is separated from the service. (b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at sixty-five-(65) years of age with at least fifteen (15) years of service; Provided, that if he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he shall he allowed to continue in the service to completed the fifteen (15) years. (Emphases supplied) While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age. These are CSC Circular No. 27, s. 1990 (quoted above andOPM.C. No. 65. - Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 yearsshall not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months. The Court in Cena resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2)administrative regulations by, firstly, considering as invali d Civil ServiceMemorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena. It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission Memorandum No. 27, took a very narrow view on the question of what subordinate rule-making by an administrative agency is permissible and valid. Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion) for implementing administrative regulations.

We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is the present Civil Service law found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of extension of service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is covered by both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146. It was on the basis of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the Commission was acting as "the central personnel agency of the governmentempowered to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration in the government." It was also discharging its function of "administering the retirement program for government officials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement." It is also incorrect to say that limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons. Grio-Aquino, J. in her dissenting opinion in Cena: Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various government examination but must wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational personnel administration and management in the Civil Service, are aggravated when Cena is considered together with the case of Toledo v. Civil Service Commission: Toledo involved the provisions of Rule III, Section 22, of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) which prohibited the appointment of persons fifty-seven (57) years old or above in government service without prior approval of the Civil Service Commission struck down in this case. Under these combined doctrines, a person sixty-four (64) years of age may be appointed to the government service and one (1) year later may demand extension of his service for the next fourteen (14) years; he would retire at age seventy-nine (79). The net effect is thus that the general statutory policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five (65) years is heavily eroded and effectively becomes unenforceable. That general statutory policy may be seen to embody the notion that there should be a certain minimum turn-over in the government service and that opportunities for government service should be distributed as broadly as possible, specially to younger people, considering that the bulk of our population is below thirty (30) years of age Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990