ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS SEC AGRARIAN REFORMS constitutionality of some of the measures mentioned in the CARL Payment of just

t compensation is not always required to be made fully in money; Other modes of payment which are available to the landowner at his option are not unreasonable because payment made in shares of stocks, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits and other things of value are equivalent to the amount of just compensation. SUMULONG V GUERRERO Facts: On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees, covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This included the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667 sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings. Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Natl Bank, representing the total market value of the subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which defines the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon paym ent of just compensation. On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero issued a writ of possession pertaining to the subject parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1224, as amended. Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed under the topics of public use, just compensation, and due process. Issues: (1) Whether socialized housing as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people, bereft of public character, hence it is not a valid exercise of the States power of eminent domain. (2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the size of the property/properties to be expropriated.

(3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors. (4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their parcels of land were immediately possessed by the NHA by virtue of the writ of possession ordered by the respondent judge. Held: (1) P.D. 1224 defines socialized housing as, the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities. The public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Ergo, socialized housing falls within the confines of public use. (2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the NHAs choice and the size of the site for the project. The right to use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the common good. (3) Yes. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decrees No. 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions found in P.D. No.s 76, 464, 794, and 1533 which were declared unconstitutional for being encroachments on judicial prerogative. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitute for just compensation. (4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due process. P.D. 1224, as amended, violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing. CITY Gov v Ericta Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The Establishment, Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within The Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof" provides: Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside

for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of the ordinance would be enforced. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question. Respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. Issue: Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. Held: Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practiced in the City. Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 that reads as follows: To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, , and for the pro tection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled. The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely

regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. LUZ FARMS V SEC DAR Section II of the CARL which includes private agricultural lands, devoted to commercia l livestock, poultry and swine raising in the definition of commercial farms is invalid; Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming; agricultural land CARIDAY V CA

Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Treasurer of Ormoc City G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968 ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, Defendants-Appellees.

Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed a municipal tax ordinance imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. one percent per export sale to the US and other foreign countries. Said company filed before the CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc, its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging sasid ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, among other things. Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. was the only sugar central in Ormoc City at the time. Issue: WON the constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the EPC and uniformity of taxation, were infringed. Held: Yes. Though Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. is the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc at the time, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. Said ordinance shoouldnt be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for coverage of the tax.

EPC applies only to persons or things identically situated and doesnt bar a reasonable classificationof the subject of legislation. A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC Facts: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already received retirement benefits and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the same local elective office from which he has retired.

Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal protection and due process rights.

Held: No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification based on reasonable and real differentiations. In the present case, employees 65 years of age have been classified differently from younger employees. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the latter are not. Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials because there can be retirees who are even younger and a 65 year old retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official who is not a retiree. But there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run for office because there is the need for new blood to assume relevance. When an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work. WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. KOREMATSU V US Brief Fact Summary. During World War II, a military commander ordered all persons of Japanese descent to evacuate the West Coast. The Petitioner, Korematsu (Petitioner), a United States citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted for failing to comply with the order.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Legal restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are subject to the most rigid scrutiny. But, pressing public necessity may sometimes justify such restrictions. Facts. President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt (President Roosevelt) issued an executive order authorizing military commanders to prescribe military areas from which any or all persons may be excluded. Thereupon, a military commander ordered all persons of Japanese descent, whether or not they were United States citizens, to leave their homes on the West Coast and to report to Assembly Centers. The Petitioner, a United States ci tizen of unchallenged loyalty, but of Japanese descent, was convicted under a federal law making it an offense to fail to comply with such military orders. Issue. Was it within the power of Congress and the Executive to exclude persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast at the time that they were excluded? Held. Yes. At the time the exclusion was ordered, it was justified. Justice Hugo Black stated that although the exclusion order imposed hardships upon a large number of American citizens, hardships are part of war. When, under conditions of warfare, our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect them must be commensurate with the threatened danger. Dissent. Justice Frank Murphy (J. Murphy) argued that the exclusion at issue here goes over the brink of constitutional power and falls into the abyss of racism. Although we must extend great deference to the judgments of the military, it is essential that there be definite limits to military discretion. Moreover, the military order is not reasonably related to the dangers it seeks to prevent. Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) stated he would not distort the United States Constitution (Constitution) to approve everything the military may deem expedient. Discussion. Ironically, this case establishes the strict scrutiny standard of review, thereby leading to the invalidation of much race-based discrimination in the future. PLESSY vs FERGUSON Facts Plessy (P) attempted to sit in an all-white railroad car. After refusing to sit in the black railway carriage car, Plessy was arrested for violating an 1890 Louisiana statute that provided for segregated separate but equal railroad accommodations. Those using facilities not designated for their race were criminally liable under the statute. At trial with Justice John H. Ferguson (D) presiding, Plessy was found guilty on the grounds that the law was a reasonable exercise of the states police powers based upon custom, usage, and tradition in the state. Plessy filed a petition for writs of prohibition and certiorari in the Supreme Court of Louisiana against Ferguson, asserting that segregation stigmatized blacks and stamped

them with a badge of inferiority in violation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments. The court found for Ferguson and the Supreme Court granted cert. Issue Can the states constitutionally enact legislation requiring persons of different races to use separate but equal segregated facilities? Yes. The states can constitutionally enact legislation requiring persons of different races to use separate but equal segregated facilities.

Holding and Rule (Brown)

Thirteenth Amendment issue The statute does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime. Slavery implies involuntary servitude and a state of bondage. The Thirteenth Amendment however was regarded as insufficient to protect former slaves from certain laws which had been enacted in the south which imposed upon them onerous disabilities and burdens and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value; and that the Fourteenth Amendment was devised to meet this exigency. Fourteenth Amendment Issue All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are made citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside, and the States are forbidden from making or enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The proper construction of this amendment involves a question of exclusive privileges rather than race. Its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of former slaves, to give definitions of citizenship of the United States and of the States, and to protect the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States from hostile legislation of the states. It was intended to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but it was intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting and even requiring their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race. Such laws have generally been recognized as within the scope of the states police powers. The most common instance involves the establishment of separate schools, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights of blacks have been longest and most earnestly enforced. Disposition Judgment for Ferguson (Plessy loses). Note This case is often cited incorrectly as Plessey v. Ferguson.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Bakke (Respondent), a white applicant to the University of California, Davis Medical School, sued the University, alleging his denial of admission on racial grounds was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Although race may be a factor in determining admission to public educational institutions, it may not be a sole determining factor. Facts. The University of California, Davis Medical School reserved 16 spots out of the 100 in any given class for disadvantaged minorities. The Respondent, when compared to students admitted under the special admissions program, had more favorable objective indicia of performance, while his race was the only distinguishing characteristic. The Respondent sued, alleging that the special admissions program denied him equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Issue. Is the special admissions program of the University of California constitutional? Can race be considered as a factor in the admissions process? Held. The special admissions program is unconstitutional, but race may be considered as a factor in the admissions process. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell), writing for the court, says that the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) should not pay attention to past discrimination in reviewing the policies of the University, as this is tantamount to allowing political trends to dictate constitutional principles. J. Powell determines that accepting a minimum number of minorities simply to reduce the traditional deficit of such individuals in the medical profession is facially unconstitutional, as it gives preference to an individual on the basis of race alone. The major determination of the Supreme Court is whether or not racial preference may be used to promote diversity of the student body. J. Powell argues that setting aside a specified number of minority slots is not congruent to the purported goal minority students in themselves do not guarantee a diversity of viewpoints in the educational environment. Dissent. Justices William Brennan (J. Brennan), Byron White (J. Brennan), Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall), and Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun) dissent, believing the special admissions program to be constitutional. In particular, the Justices argue that the racial classification in the present case is remedial, serves an important government objective and also substantially related to that objective and thus insulated from the Fourteenth Amendments general prohibition of such classifications. J. Marshall writes separately in support of J. Brennan, J. White, J. Marshall, and J. Blackmun. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) dissents, citing that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the denial of any individual on the basis of race from participation in any program receiving federal funding. J. Stevens argues that prohibiting white students from participation in the special admissions program is a direct violation of Title VI.

Concurrence. J. Brennan, J. White, J. Marshall, and J. Blackmun concur so much as the Supreme Courts opinion allows race to be considered as a factor in the admissions process. However, the Justices believe that in this particular example, race should be allowed as a single determining factor. J. Stevens concurs to the extent that the special admissions program is impermissible. However, J. Stevens holds that the constitutional issue is not reached, because the federal statutory ground (Title VI) prohibits the activity directly. Discussion. J. Powells basic problem with the special admissions program is this: there are 84 places open for white applicants and 100 positions open for minority applicants. This differential treatment solely on racial grounds is unconstitutional, according to J. Powell. It is important to note that in Bakke, the Court did not technically hold the special admissions program unconstitutional. J. Stevens and the three other Justices joining his opinion do not reach the constitutional issue because of the federal statute. GRATZ v BOLLINGER Synopsis of Rule of Law. Admission criteria based on race must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. Race may be considered in an individual assessment, but not as a sole or contributing factor for admission. Facts. The University of Michigan receives a high volume of applicants each year to its College of Literature, Science and the Arts (LSA). To help with admission decisions, the University implements a point system. This point system is out of 100 points. A student that is from an underrepresented group automatically receives 20 points towards his or her over all score. The groups of students typically come from African-American, Hispanic, and Native American backgrounds. A student with extraordinary artistic talent only receives 5 points under the admission system. Also every student that is from an underrepresented group, and is otherwise qualified, is typically accepted into the school. A group of white students, that were determined qualified by the University, where denied admission. Issue. Whether a Schools admission policy to automatically grant 20 out of 100 points to students of a minority ethnicity is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Held. Yes. Firstly, the Supreme Court has only upheld racial plans at a school or town where previous racial discrimination was being remedied. In previous cases, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court stated that each applicant should be individually assessed. Each students admission should be based on the students ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education. An admission system that grants points for certain characteristics such as race is not an individual assessment. When applicants are being chosen for a program and part of the reasoning is based on race, any discrimination made is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Since the White students are being discriminated based on race, they are a suspect class which deserves strict scrutiny review. Unless the school can show the system is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest of diversity, the admission system will be considered unconstitutional. Here the system is not narrowly tailored. Simply

Dissent. The previous school admission policies that were struck down made race sole reasons for denials or admission. Here the point system accounts for many things such residency, grades, essay, athletic ability, social-economic status. Surely the plan design is better fit than other plans to ensure diversity. Discussion. The School argues that with the volume of applications, a system with individual assessment will be impractical. However, this court states that just because it will be difficult to achieve such standards, it does not render their actions constitutional. BRADWELL V ILLINOIS Brief Fact Summary. Mrs. Myra Bradwell brought suit challenging Illinois denial of her right to practice law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Separate spheres ideology allowed Illinois to prohibit women from practicing law. Womens admission to the bar is not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is a matter reserved to the states. Facts. Mrs. Myra Bradwell was denied an application to practice law in the Illinois Supreme Court. Her petition included the requisite certificate attesting to her good character and qualifications. The United States Supreme Court affirmed. Issue. Does the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provide that one of the privileges and immunities of women as citizens is to engage in any profession? Held. The admission to the bar is a matter reserved to the states and Bradwells right to practice law is not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Concurrence. Justice Bradley. The Illinois Supreme Court requires a certificate from the court of some county of his good moral character, and is otherwise left to the discretion of the court. The court found itself bound by two limitations: to promote the proper administration of justice not to admit any class of persons not intended by the legislature to be admitted, even though not expressly excluded by statute. Historically the right to engage in every profession has not been one of the established fundamental privilege and immunities of the sex. The law has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. The harmony of interests and views that belong to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from her husband. Historically women had no legal existence, and were incapable of making binding contracts without her husbands consent. This played heavily in the Supreme Court of Illinois decision. The paramount destiny of women is to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. Discussion. The purpose of this concurring opinion is to demonstrate a classic statement of separate spheres ideology. GOESART V CLEARY Facts of the Case

A Michigan statute required that all bartenders hold licenses in cities with populations greater than 50,000, but the statute also stated that a woman could not be issued a license unless she was "the wife or daughter of the male owner" of a liquor establishment. Two female bartenders challenged the law, requesting an injunction against its enforcement, on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three- judge panel of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan rejected the bartenders' claim. Question Did the Michigan statute, in denying female bartenders access to licenses, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court concluded that the Constitution "does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes" or "to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards." The Court found that the Michigan legislature, in enacting the statute, could have determined that allowing women to bartend could "give rise to moral and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures." The Court, Justice Frankfurter concludes, is in no position to "cross-examine either actually or argumentatively the mind of Michigan legislators."

GEDULDIG vs. AIELLO Brief Fact Summary. California operated a disability insurance system that paid benefits to employees of private employers when workers compensation did not cover certain disabilities that prevented those employees from working. However, many pregnancy related disabilities were excluded from coverage because of expenses to the program. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Underinclusive legislation is appropriate under the Equal Protection Clause, so long as the line drawn by the State is rationally supportable. Facts. California operated a disability insurance system that supplemented workers compensation, in that it provided for payments for disabilities not covered by workers compensation. The list of disabilities paid for by the State of California was not exhaustive. Among those disabilities not paid for were certain pregnancy related conditions. Suit was brought challenging the system as an unconstitutional gender-based classification. Issue. Does the exclusion of the pregnancy-related conditions violate the Fourteenth Amendments Equal Protection Clause? Held. No. Appeals Court ruling affirmed. The list of conditions covered by the disability insurance system is not exclusive. Furthermore, there are conditions not covered by the system that affect both men and women. The excluded conditions do not affect women alone. The savings given the program by the exclusion of such conditions benefit both men and women. That is, inclusion of the excluded conditions would result in lesser amounts of funding for all other conditions.

Dissent. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) argues that by disallowing payments related to pregnancy, the State inevitably discriminates against women. Discussion. The majority reaches its conclusions through viewing the problem as one of underinclusive legislation, while the dissent focuses on the inevitable connection of the unfunded conditions with a single sex. MISSISSIPPI vs SCHOOL FOR WOMEN Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Hogan (Respondent), was denied admission to Mississippi University for Womens (MUW) nursing program solely on the basis of gender. He now alleges this is a denial of equal protection. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state may not preclude one gender or the other from participating in a unique educational environment solely on the basis of gender. Facts. MUW is the only single-sex collegiate institution maintained by the State of Mississippi. The Respondent was otherwise qualified for admission to the schools nursing program, but he was denied admission on the basis of being male. Issue. Does the operation of a female only nursing school by a State violate Equal Protection? Held. Yes. Appeals Court ruling affirmed. Applying intermediate scrutiny, Justice Sandra Day OConnor (J. OConnor) notes that the State of Mississippi has not advanced an important state interest for operating a single sex nursing school. In particular, she notes that women did not lack opportunities to be trained as nurses in Mississippi without the presence of MUW. J. OConnor also argues that the means to achieving even an important governmental objective (although she found none) are absent, as MUW allows male auditors in the nursing classes. If men are already in the classroom, the state is not technically operating a single-sex nursing program. Dissent. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell) argues that the Respondent has not suffered a cognizable injury, as there were state-operated nursing programs that accepted men elsewhere in the state and there is no right to attend a state-run university close to ones hometown. Discussion. The majority focuses on whether Mississippi may discriminate against men in admission to nursing programs. However, there are two powerful arguments brought up by the dissent. The first is the lack of injury argument without injury a case is not ripe, and the constitutional issue may not be reached. There is also the argument that as there is no unique educational opportunity here (there are nursing programs accepting men in the State college system), the state is not denying opportunities to men.