SECOND DIVISION [A.C. No. 3745. October 2, 1995.] CYNTHIA B. ROSACIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN B. BULALACAO, respondent.

SYLLABUS LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; LOYALTY TO CLIENT SUBSISTS EVEN AFTER THE TERMINATION OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case. It behooves respondent not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. The relation of attorney and client is one of confidence and trust in the highest degree. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. An attorney not only becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of the case. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained while the confidential relation of attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by the loss of the confidence of the people. Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. We note that respondent is new in the profession as he was just admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990, when the breach of his oath of office occurred more than a year after. Having just hurdled the bar examinations which included an examination in legal ethics, surely the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility to keep inviolate the client's trust and confidence even after the attorney-client relation is terminated must have been still fresh in his mind. A lawyer starting to establish his stature in the legal profession must start right and dutifully abide by the norms of conduct of the profession. This will ineluctably redound to his benefit and to the upliftment of the legal profession as well. RESOLUTION FRANCISCO, J p: Complainant Cynthia B. Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly registered corporation, filed a complaint for disbarment dated October 25, 1991, against herein respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao. Acting on the complaint, the Court in a resolution dated February 24, 1992, resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, the IBP investigating commissioner, found that respondent breached his oath of office and accordingly recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. 1 In a resolution dated July 30, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the commissioner's report and recommendation. 2 As found by the IBP, the undisputed facts are as follows: "On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement (Exh. "3-a"), respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel of a corporation by the name of Tacma Phils., Inc. "On October 31, 1990, the lawyer-client relationship between the respondent and Tacma Phils., Inc. was severed as shown by another agreement of even date (Exh. "3-b"). "On July, 1991, or after almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's retainer agreement with Tacma, Phils., Inc. was terminated, several employees of the corporation consulted the respondent for the purpose of filing an action for illegal dismissal. Thereafter, he agreed to handle the case for the said employees as against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission, and appearing in their behalf." 3 The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not respondent breached his oath of office for representing the employees of his former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the termination of their attorney-client relationship. We agree with the findings of the IBP that respondent breached his oath of office. Respondent does not now dispute this. In fact, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted that he "did commit an act bordering on grave misconduct, if not outright violation of his attorney's oath." 4 However, respondent is pleading for the Court's compassion and leniency to reduce the IBP recommended three months suspension to either fine or admonition with the following proffered grounds: that he is relatively new in the profession having been admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990 at the age of 46 when the complained conduct was committed on August 1991; that he is of humble beginnings and his suspension will deprive his family of its only source of livelihood he being the sole bread winner in the family; that he has fully realized his mistake and the gravity of his offense for which he is fully repentant; that he has severed his attorney-client relationship with the employees of Tacma, Phils., Inc. by inhibiting himself and withdrawing his appearance as counsel in the labor case against Tacma, Phils., Inc.; and that he pledges not to commit the same mistake and to henceforth strictly adhere to the professional standards set forth by the Code of Professional Responsibility. cdll The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case. 5 It behooves respondent not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to

avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 6 The relation of attorney and client is one of confidence and trust in the highest degree. 7 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 8 An attorney not only becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of the case. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained while the confidential relation of attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by the loss of the confidence of the people. 9 Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. We note that respondent is new in the profession as he was just admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990, when the breach of his oath of office occurred more than a year after. Having just hurdled the bar examinations which included an examination in legal ethics, surely the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility to keep inviolate the client's trust and confidence even after the attorney-client relation is terminated 10 must have been still fresh in his mind. A lawyer starting to establish his stature in the legal profession must start right and dutifully abide by the norms of conduct of the profession. This will ineluctably redound to his benefit and to the upliftment of the legal profession as well. ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three months. Let this resolution be attached to respondent's record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof furnished to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. LexLibris Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Narvasa, C.J., on official leave. SECOND DIVISION [A.C. No. 2736. May 27, 1991.] LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION represented by Mr. SOLOMON U. LORENZANA, JR., as its President and General Manager, and/or Mrs. ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, as its Vice-President,petitioners, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO L. DARIA, respondent. Jose Feliciano Loy, Jr. for petitioners. SYLLABUS 1.LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE; VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. In an effort to extricate himself from this charge, the respondent submits that since he was able to persuade the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal to set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and to remand the case for further proceedings, then the charge of negligence should be considered moot and academic already. We find this submission not meritorious. Instead, we agree with the position of the Solicitor General: Respondent's plea is untenable. The setting aside of the adverse Decision of the Labor Arbiter cannot obliterate the effects of respondent's negligence. Indeed, had respondent attended the two scheduled hearings and filed the required position paper, then at least, there would have been no delay in the resolution of the case, which, perhaps, would have been in favor of complainant. The delay, by itself, was prejudicial to complainant because it deprived successor-counsel Atty. Loy of time which he should be devoting to other cases of complainant. In fact he had to prepare complainant's position paper which respondent should have done earlier. From the foregoing, it is manifest that the respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE, Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. 2.ID.; ID.; A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. The Solicitor General further found that the respondent assisted Roberto San Juan in the preparation of the counter-affidavit, submitted in defense of the latter in the accusation of estafa filed against San Juan by LFC. As a matter of fact, the respondent signed the jurat of the San Juan counter-affidavit he (respondent) helped prepare. It is also a fact that the respondent investigated this same charge of estafa while he was still the lawyer of the complainant and San Juan still likewise an employee of LFC. Again, we concur with the findings and evaluation of the Office of the Solicitor General: . . . Respondent, however, tried to extricate himself from his predicament by testifying that the counteraffidavit was prepared by a lawyerfriend, Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez, who had his (respondent's) name typed on it; that after reading it, he called up Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and signature thereon; that he instructed San Juan to bring the counteraffidavit to Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and signature, but San Juan did not obey him; and that San Juan filed the counteraffidavit with the office of the Provincial Fiscal with his name and signature still on it. It is submitted that, apart from being a mere afterthought, respondent's explanation is incredible. His foregoing testimony is not reflected in his comment on the complaint . . . We are convinced that the respondent had betrayed the confidences of the complainant, his former client. . . . An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and it is not a good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from and independent of the former case.

RESOLUTION PER CURIAM p: The respondent lawyer, Atty. Francisco L. Daria, is administratively charged 1 on two counts, to wit: 1.Negligence and 2.Betrayal of his former client's confidences. A verified complaint dated February 22, 1985 was filed by Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC, hereinafter), and received by the Court on February 25, 1985. 2 The Court, on June 10, 1985, resolved to refer this case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation. After proper proceedings, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation," dated February 21, 1990 and received by the Court on February 26, 1990. From the findings made by the Solicitor General, the pertinent facts may be summarized as follows: Respondent Francisco L. Daria is charged with negligence and betrayal of his former client's confidences. The following facts are in connection with the charge of negligence: Respondent was hired by complainant Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC) on January 8, 1981 as its legal counsel and was designated as its personnel manager six months later (tsn. pp. 6-7, Dec. 9, 1985). On May 23, 1983, LFC employee, Violeta Hanopol, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against complainant before the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment (MOLE). On May 30, 1983, summons was served on the parties with the requirement that position papers be submitted (Exh. G). During the initial hearing on June 13, 1973 * (sic) Hanopol and respondent tried to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement. Since no agreement was reached the hearing was reset to June 17, 1983. On the pretext that Hanopol was supposed to go to his office on that date respondent failed to appear for the second setting (tsn. pp. 14-15, Dec. 9, 1985). So, the Labor Arbiter was constrained to further reset the hearing to June 23, 1983. Respondent received on June 23, 1983 the Order for the resetting to June 1983 (Exh. J). In the meantime, on June 20, 1983, respondent received an Order in another labor case, setting the hearing therein also on June 28, 1983 (Exh. H-6). Faced with a conflicting schedule, respondent decided to move to postpone the hearing in the Hanopol case. However, instead of filing a written motion for postponement, he opted to call, through his secretary, the Office of the Labor Arbiter to move for postponement (Exh. H-5; tsn. p. 16, Dec. 9, 1985). Respondent's telephone message apparently failed to reach the Labor Arbiter, because at the hearing on June 28, 1983, he considered the case submitted for decision on the basis of Hanopol's complaint and affidavit (Exh. G-1). Respondent had not submitted a position paper. After a month, on July 29, 1983, the Labor Arbiter issued a Decision directing LFC to pay Hanopol the total sum of P6,469.60 in labor benefits, on the basis of Hanopol's evidence alone. Respondent Daria appealed the Decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on August 23, 1983 (Exh. 4), The case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. The case was set for hearing on June 25, 1984 and July 12, 1984 wherein attempts for an amicable settlement still proved futile. The Labor Arbiter set two more dates for hearing: July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984 (tsn. pp. 21-22, Dec. 9, 1985). In the meantime, the middle of June 1984, respondent signified to management his intention to resign. In the light of this development, management hired Atty. Rogelio Udarbe to take his place on July 16, 1984, the effective date of his resignation (Exh. 2). Respondent endorsed the cases of complainant to Atty. Udarbe (tsn. pp. 23-25, Dec. 9, 1985). During the hearings in the Hanopol case on July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984, no one appeared for complainant. So, on August 15, 1984, Hanopol filed a "Manifestation and Motion" praying that the earlier Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated July 29, 1983 be revived. (Exh. 5) On September 1, 1984, Atty. Jose Loy, Jr. was hired by complainant LFC vice Atty. Udarbe and he immediately came across the above-mentioned "Manifestation and Motion". On September 5, 1984, he

filed an Opposition (Exh. 6) thereto, and on September 19, 1984, he followed this up with a position paper for LFC (Exh. 7). However, the Labor Arbiter had already revived his earlier Decision dated July 29, 1983 in another Decision dated September 4, 1984, thereby prompting Atty. Loy to appeal the latter Decision (Exh. 3). In a resolution dated May 9, 1985, the NLRC ordered anew the remand of the case for further proceedings (Exh. 8). In connection with the other charge of betrayal by respondent of his former client's confidences, the following facts appear on record: While respondent was still connected with complainant, its general manager, Sebastian Cortes, issued a memorandum dated February 28, 1984 (Exh. C) to its employee, Roberto San Juan, requiring him to submit a written explanation for his alleged double liquidation and unliquidated cash advances. Another memorandum dated March 15, 1984 (Exh. D) was issued this time by complainant's internal auditor, Rosario L. Bernardo, addressed to complainant's president, summing up San Juan's unliquidated advances amounting to P9,351.15. Respondent was furnished a copy of this memorandum (Exh. D-3). The executive committee, to which respondent belongs, investigated San Juan on his unliquidated advances. On account of the gravity of the charge, respondent placed San Juan under preventive suspension, per his letter to him dated April 25, 1984 (Exh. E). On September 20, 1984, when respondent had already resigned, complainant sent a demand letter to San Juan requiring him to restitute the amount of P9,351.15 (Exh. N-2). Since he failed to pay the amount demanded, a complaint for estafa was lodged against him before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. San Juan thereafter resigned and sought the assistance of respondent in the preparation of his counteraffidavit in January 1985 (tsn. p. 35, Nov. 5, 1985). Respondent prepared San Juan's counteraffidavit and signed it (Exh. F). San Juan then submitted his counteraffidavit to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal (tsn. p. 42, Nov. 5, 1985).3

xxx xxx xxx For failure to appear in two consecutive hearings and to submit a position paper in the Hanopol case which resulted in complainant LFC's default and judgment against it by the Labor Arbiter, the respondent is faulted for negligence. The respondent avers that Hanopol should have seen him in his office to work out a compromise agreement, on the scheduled day of the second hearing, June 17, 1983, but did not. 4 It is the finding of the Solicitor General that this excuse by the respondent is not borne by the Constancia 5 setting the case for hearing. The Constancia clearly states: "By agreement of the parties, case reset to June 17, 1983 at 2:00 p.m. as previously scheduled." 6 Since it was signed by both Hanopol and the respondent, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent's explanation is manifestly unsatisfactory. cdll With regard to his second non-appearance for the hearing on June 2, 1983, the respondent justified his absence by claiming that he had another hearing on the same date and that he told his secretary to call up the Office of the Labor Arbiter to have the hearing of the Hanopol case postponed. 7 The Solicitor General avers: . . . It is submitted that respondent's actuation was not warranted by the circumstances. As it turned out, the telephone request apparently did not reach the Labor Arbiter, thereby constraining him to declare complainant in default and render judgment against it. 8 In an effort to extricate himself from this charge, the respondent submits that since he was able to persuade the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal to set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and to remand the case for further proceedings, then the charge of negligence should be considered moot and academic already. 9 We find this submission not meritorious. Instead, we agree with the position of the Solicitor General: Respondent's plea is untenable. The setting aside of the adverse Decision of the Labor Arbiter cannot obliterate the effects of respondent's negligence. Indeed, had respondent attended the two scheduled hearings and filed the required position paper, then at least, there would have been no delay in the resolution of the case, which, perhaps, would have been in favor of complainant. The delay, by itself, was prejudicial to complainant because it deprived successor-counsel Atty. Loy of time which he should be devoting to other cases of complainant. In fact he had to prepare complainant's position paper which respondent should have done earlier (Exh. 7). 10 From the foregoing, it is manifest that the respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility: 11 CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. The other accusation against the respondent by the Solicitor General was that he had betrayed complainant LFC's confidences in violation of the then Canon 37 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, to wit: It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his employees and neither of them should accept employment which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the private advantages of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though there are other available sources of such information. A lawyer should not continue employment when he discovers that this obligation prevents the performance of his full duty to his former or to his new client. xxx xxx xxx Superseded by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the appropriate Canon now is: CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. The Solicitor General further found that the respondent assisted Roberto San Juan in the preparation of the counteraffidavit, 12 submitted in defense of the latter in the accusation of estafa filed against San Juan by LFC. As a matter of fact, the respondent signed the jurat of the San Juan counter-affidavit he (respondent) helped prepare. It is also a fact that the respondent investigated this same charge of estafa while he was still the lawyer of the complainant and San Juan still likewise an employee of LFC. prLL Again, we concur with the findings and evaluation of the Office of the Solicitor General: . . . Respondent, however, tried to extricate himself from his predicament by testifying that the counteraffidavit was prepared by a lawyer-friend, Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez, who had his (respondent's) name typed on it; that after reading it, he called up Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and signature thereon; that he instructed San Juan to bring the counteraffidavit to Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and signature, but San Juan did not obey him; and that San Juan filed the counteraffidavit with the office of the Provincial Fiscal with his name and signature still on it (tsn. pp. 4751, Dec. 9, 1985). It is submitted that, apart from being a mere afterthought, respondent's explanation is incredible. His foregoing testimony is not reflected in his comment on the complaint . . . 13 We are convinced that the respondent had betrayed the confidences of the complainant, his former client. . . . An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and it is not a good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from and independent of the former case. 14 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is found guilty of both the charge of negligence, a transgression of Rule 18.03, Canon 18, and the charge of betrayal of his former client's confidences, in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. Let this Decision be entered in the personal records of the respondent and copies thereof furnished to all courts and IBP chapters. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur. SECOND DIVISION [A.C. No. 801 . June 27, 1978.] CESARIO ADARNE, complainant, vs. ATTY. DAMIAN V. ALDABA, respondent. SYNOPSIS

At the hearing of Civil Case No. 632 for forcible entry before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent attorney was prevailed upon be complainant to appear for him and his co-defendants and to ask for the postponement of the trial as their counsels of record had not arrived. Respondent entered a special appearance and was able to obtain favorable action on a motion to dismiss. On appeal, however, this order was set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. At the hearing of the case where respondent was again requested by complainant to appear in his behalf, respondent argued that defendants be allowed to file an action for quieting of title to be heard jointly with the pending action for forcible entry. On the day of the scheduled hearing of both cases, the defendants were declared in default for nonappearance, a decision was rendered and a writ of execution therefor was issued. Because of this, respondent was charged with gross negligence, misconduct and malpractice. The Supreme Court ruled that the judgment by default rendered against complainant cannot be attributed to respondent attorney as the blamed lies with the former for having engaged the services of several lawyers to handle his case without formally withdrawing the authority he had given them to appear in his behalf as to place the responsibility upon the respondent. Finding no convincing proof to warrant the disbarment of respondent attorney, the administrative complaint filed against him was dismissed. Administrative complaint dismissed. SYLLABUS 1.LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; SUBSTITUTION OF, REQUIREMENTS. The rule followed on matters of substitution of attorneys as laid down by this Court is that no substitution of attorneys will be allowed unless there be filed: (1) a written application for such substitution; (2) the written consent of the client; (3) the written consent of the attorney substituted; and (4) in case such written consent can not be secured, there must be filed with the application proof of service of notice of such motion upon the attorney to be substituted, in the manner prescribed by the rules. Unless the foregoing formalities are complied with, substitution will not be permitted, and the attorney who properly appeared last in the cause, before such application for substitution, will be regarded as the attorney of record and will be held responsible for the proper conduct of the cause. 2.ID.; ID.; DUTY TO ACT TO THE BEST OF HIS SKILL AND KNOWLEDGE. An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Prone to err like any other human being, he is not answerable for every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge. 3.ID.; ID.; DISBARMENT; CONVINCING PROOF NECESSARY. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent attorney must be established by convincing proof. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO SUFFICIENT PROOF TO WARRANT DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT ATTORNEY. There is no malpractice to warrant the exercise of the court of its disciplinary powers where the respondent lawyer honestly believed that he had appeared for the complainant and agreed to contact his attorney of record to handle his case after said appearance, so that he (the lawyer) did nothing more about it. And if a judgment by default is rendered against the complainant, the same cannot be attributed to the respondent. The blame lies with the complainant for having engaged the services of several lawyers to handle his case without formally withdrawing the authority he had given to them to appear in his behalf as to place the responsibility upon the respondent. DECISION CONCEPCION, JR., J p: Administrative action against the respondent attorney for gross negligence and misconduct, for failure to give his entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, and exertion of his utmost learning and ability in the prosecution and defense of his client, and for not taking steps to protect the interests of his client in the face of an adverse decision. The record shows that sometime in 1958, Raymunda Cumpio and her husband, Rufo Cumpio, filed an action for forcible entry against herein complainant Cesario Adarne, Aning Arante, and Miguel Inokando with the Justice of the Peace of Alangalang, Leyte. The case was docketed in the said court as Civil Case No. 96. Atty. Isauro Marmita represented the defendants who raised the issue of ownership of the land in question. After hearing the parties, the Justice of the Peace dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the plaintiffs therein appealed to the Court of First Instance of Leyte and the case was assigned to Branch VI of Carigara, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 556. Resolving the issue interposed by the appellants, the Judge of the Court of First Instance found that the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction over the case and returned the same to the lower court for trial on the merits. After trial on the merits, the Justice of the Peace again dismissed the case and the plaintiffs again appealed to the Court of First Instance of Leyte where the case was docketed anew as Civil Case No. 632. Attys. Arturo Mirales and Generoso Casimpan filed the answer for the defendants. 1 At the hearing of the case on August 7, 1961, the herein complainant Cesario Adarne, one of the defendants in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 632, noting that his attorneys had not yet arrived, prevailed upon the respondent Atty. Damian Aldaba, who was then present in court to attend the trial of an electoral case, to appear as counsel for them and ask for the

postponement of the trial. The respondent, who is a third degree cousin of the complainant, agreed, and entered a special appearance. Upon noticing that the plaintiffs and their counsel were not also present in court, the respondent, instead of asking for a postponement, moved for the dismissal of the case. His motion was granted and the case was again dismissed. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order, 2 to which the respondent filed an opposition in behalf of the defendants, 3 and the motion was denied. 4 Whereupon, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals. After appropriate proceedings, the appellate court set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings. At the hearing of the case on October 23, 1964 before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, the respondent was again prevailed upon by the complainant to appear in his behalf. The respondent entered a "special appearance" for the complainant and thereafter argued that the interest of justice would best be served if the defendants were allowed to file an action for quieting of title and the case heard jointly with the action for forcible entry. Finding merit in the argument, the court ordered the defendant Cesario Adarne to file an action for quieting of title within one (1) week and the plaintiffs to answer the same within the reglementary period, after which both cases would be tried jointly. The hearing was deferred until after the filing of the action for quieting of title. 5 On June 17, 1965, the court declared the defendants in default for their failure to appear at the hearing set for that day and directed the plaintiffs to present evidence to support their claim. 6 On September 17, 1965, the court rendered a decision and a writ of execution was issued thereafter. 7 Because of this, Cesario Adarne filed the present complaint against the respondent Atty. Damian V. Aldaba on August 3, 1967, praying: LLjur "Dahil dito, isinusumbong ko po ang aking Abogado ng 'Mal Practice' pabaya at pahamak sa kliente at sinisingil ko po siya ng pinsala katumbas sa sinisingil sa kin ng akin kalaban. O kaya lakarin niya na mapigil ang decision ng Hukom sa C.F.I. at ulitin ang hearing sa Forcible Entry. Kung hindi niya magagawa ito, ipinauubaya kona po sa kataas taasan Hukoman ang paglapat ng parusa. Sapagkat kung hindi po susugpoin ang masamang gawa na ito ng mga ibang abogado na nabibili lala'la' ang sakit na ito sa profession ng mga abogado, at lilikha ng maraming api at habang naghahari ang pang aapi, lalaganap ang kriminalidad ng walang tigil at walang katahimikan ang ating Demukrasya, at kung magkakagayon ang mga mamamayan at sapilitan sa kumunista sasamba." The respondent denied that he ever had any agreement with the complainant with respect to the handling of the latter's case in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Carigara Branch, except for the "special appearance" that he entered for the complainant on August 7, 1961 and October 23, 1964, in view of the non-availability of the complainant's lawyers on said dates. The case referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation, 8 after which a complaint for the disbarment of the respondent attorney was filed. 9 The judgment by default rendered against the complainant cannot be attributed to the respondent attorney. The blame lies with the complainant for having engaged the services of several lawyers to handle his case without formally withdrawing the authority he had given to them to appear in his behalf as to place the responsibility upon the respondent. To add to the confusion, the complainant had also requested the clerk of court of the Court of First Instance of Leyte that he (complainant) be furnished with summons and subpoena accorded to him. 10 He also filed a motion by himself, 11 thus implying that he was handling his case personally.

It appears that there have been three changes made of the attorneys for the complainant in the forcible entry case. The complainant wad originally represented by Atty. Isauro Marmita who, upon his appointment to the Department of Labor, engaged Atty. de Veyra to take his place. 12 Than came Atty. Arturo Mirales and later, Atty. Generoso Casimpan. However, no formalities whatever were observed in those changes such that the respondent entered a "special appearance" for the complainant in order that he could ask for the dismissal of the case for the failure of the adverse party to prosecute. The rule followed on matters of substitution of attorneys as laid down by this Court is that no substitution of attorneys will be allowed unless there be filed: (1) a written application for such substitution; (2) the written consent of the client; (3) the written consent of the attorney substituted; and (4) in case such written consent can not be secured, there must be filed with the application proof of service of notice of such motion upon the attorney to be substituted, in the manner prescribed by the rules. Unless the foregoing formalities are complied with, substitution will not be permitted, and the attorney who properly appeared last in the cause, before such application for substitution, will be regarded as the attorney of record and will be held responsible for the proper conduct of the cause. 13 Besides, the respondent honestly believed that he had appeared for the complainant only for a special purpose and that the complainant had agreed to contact his attorney of record to handle his case after the hearing of October 23, 1964, so that he did nothing more about it. 14 It was neither gross negligence nor omission to have entertained such belief An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Prone to err like any other human being, he is not answerable for every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge.

It is well settled that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent attorney must be established by convincing proof. In the instant case, there is no sufficient proof to warrant the disbarment of the respondent attorney. Neither is there culpable malpractice to justify his suspension. LexLib WHEREFORE, the present administrative complaint is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Santos andGuerrero, JJ., concur. Fernando (Chairman) and Aquino, JJ., took no part. Antonio, J., concurs in the result. Separate Opinions BARREDO, J., concurring: Concurs in the results since respondent made only a special appearance on Oct. 23, 1964, when he made a creditably showing for complainant, the counsel of record of complainant should have been the one to take the corresponding subsequent steps. THIRD DIVISION [A.C. No. 5835. April 15, 2005.] CARLOS B. REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, respondent. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p: A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence 1 and never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Indeed, it is his sworn duty not to delay no man for money or malice; and to conduct himself in a proper manner not only to his client, but also to the court, the legal profession and society at large. 2 This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Carlos Reyes against Atty. Jeremias Vitan for gross negligence. The complaint alleges that sometime in June 2001, complainant Carlos Reyes hired the services of respondent Atty. Jeremias Vitan for the purpose of filing the appropriate complaint or charge against his sister-in-law, Estelita Reyes, and the latter's niece, Julieta P. Alegonza; that both women refused to abide with the Decision of Judge Juan C. Nabong, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Manila, in Civil Case No. 99-92657 ordering the partition of the properties left by complainant's brother Damaso B. Reyes; and that respondent, after receiving the amount of P17,000.00, did not take any action on complainant's case. We referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro issued several orders to respondent directing him to file his answer to the complaint, but he failed to do so. He only sent his secretary to represent him during the proceedings. ACTIcS On April 18, 2001, 3 IBP Commissioner Navarro submitted to the IBP Board of Governors her Report and Recommendation quoted as follows: ". . . . After going over the evidence on record, the undersigned noted that respondent ignored all the Orders issued by this Commission and neither did he comply with any of those Orders. Respondent even failed to submit the responsive pleadings he himself requested in his motion and only sent his assistant secretary to represent him in the scheduled hearings of this case. Up to and until the present, no pleadings was submitted despite respondent's allegations that he was collating evidence to prove his side of the case. It was complainant who submitted the supposed letters of the respondent Estelita Reyes and Juliet Alegonza but there were no proofs when they sent and when the same were received by the addressee. Likewise, the complaint submitted by the complainant was only a format in the sense that it was not signed by the respondent; the RTC Branch No. was left blank; there was no Civil Case No. and there was

no proof that said pleading was filed which amounts only to a mere scrap of paper and not a pleading or authenticated document in the legal parlance. As it is, nothing had been done by the respondent for the complainant as his client for the legal fees he collected which was paid by the complainant as reflected in the receipts issued by the respondent in handwritten forms and signed by him. Respondent not only violated Rule 18.03 and 18.04 of Cannon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for having neglected a legal matter entrusted to him and did not inform complainant the status of his case but also disregarded the orders of the Commission without reasons which amounted to utter disrespect of authority and unethical conduct in the practice of his profession, thus, should be sanctioned. EICScD Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the respondent be suspended from the practice of his profession for a period of two (2) years from receipt hereof; and refund to the complainant the amount of P17,000.00 paid to him for not having extended his legal services to the complainant on a lawyer-client relationship within six (6) months from receipt hereof." On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-406 adopting and approving the above Report and Recommendation of IBP Commissioner Navarro. When respondent accepted the amount of P17,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take up the latter's case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve his client, herein complainant, with competence and attend to his cause with fidelity, care and devotion. The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainant's case and subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. More specifically, Rule 18.03 states: "Rule 18.03.A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights. 4 An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. EcaDCI In Santos vs. Lazaro, 5 we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, above-quoted, is a basic postulate in legal ethics. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society. 6 Significantly, respondent also violated his oath as a lawyer, which declares in part, that he will not delay any man for money or malice and will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his client. However, the recommended penalty by the IBP is too harsh. Jurisprudence shows that lighter sanctions have been imposed for violations of this nature, taking into consideration the gravity of the offense and the necessity of preserving the integrity of the legal profession. The facts of Sencio vs. Calvadores 7 bear a striking similarity to the present case. Respondent lawyer in Sencio did not return the money to complainant despite demand following his failure to file the case. During the proceedings before the IBP, respondent did not file his answer to the complaint nor appeared during the hearing notwithstanding his receipt of notices. We found him guilty of violation of the lawyer's oath, malpractice and gross misconduct and suspended him for six (6) months, and ordered to return to his client the amount of P12,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of our Resolution until the return of the amount. In Garcia vs. Manuel, 8 we suspended respondent lawyer from the practice of law for six (6) months and ordered him to render an accounting of all monies he received from the complainant. We found him guilty of gross misconduct. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon notice of this Decision. He is ordered to return to complainant within five (5) days from notice the sum of P17,000.00 with interest of 12% per annumfrom the date of the promulgation of this Decision until the full amount shall have been returned. cDCEIA

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for distribution to all courts of the land, the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and entered into respondent's personal records as an attorney and as a member of the Philippine Bar. SO ORDERED. Panganiban, Corona, Carpio Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur. SECOND DIVISION [A.C. No. 4380. October 13, 1995.] NICANOR GONZALES and SALUD B. PANTANOSAS, complainants, vs. ATTY. MIGUEL SABACAJAN, respondent. SYLLABUS LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYERS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATED FOR FAILURE TO EXERCISE GOOD FAITH AND DILIGENCE REQUIRED IN HANDLING THE LEGAL AFFAIRS OF THEIR CLIENTS. As a lawyer, respondent should know that there are lawful remedies provided by law to protect the interests of his client. The Court finds that respondent has not exercised the good faith and diligence required of lawyers in handling the legal affairs of their clients. If complainants did have the alleged monetary obligations to his client, that does not warrant his summarily confiscating their certificates of title since there is no showing in the records that the same were given as collaterals to secure the payment of a debt. Neither is there any intimation that there is a court order authorizing him to take and retain custody of said certificates of title. Apparently, respondent has disregarded Canon 15, Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall impress upon his client the need for compliance with the laws and principles of fairness. Rule 19.01 ordains that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present unfounded charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent has closely skirted this proscription, if he has not in fact transgressed the same. DECISION REGALADO, J p: This resolves the administrative case filed by Nicanor Gonzales and Salud B. Pantanosas against Atty. Miguel Sabacajan on February 14, 1995, 1 the verified complaint wherefore alleges: cdasia xxx xxx xxx 4.That sometime in October, 1994, complainants were informed by the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City that the complainants' owner's duplicate of title covering their lands, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-91736 and T-91735 were entrusted to the office secretary of the respondent who in turn entrusted the same to respondent; 5.That respondent admitted and confirmed to the complainants that their titles are in his custody and has even shown the same (to) the complainant Salud B. Pantanosas but when demanded (sic) to deliver the said titles to the complainant in a formal demand letter, marked as ANNEX "A", respondent refused and continues to refuse without any justification to give their titles (and) when confronted, respondent challenged the complainants to file any case in any court even in the Honorable Supreme Court; 6.That respondent's dare or challeng(e), is a manifestation of his arrogance taking undue advantage of his legal profession over the simplicity, innocence and ignorance of the complainants, one of whom is his blood relative, his aunt, for which complainants shudder with mental anguish; cdtai 7.That due to his challeng(e), the complainants sent a letter to the Honorable Supreme Court for enlightenment, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "B", for which the Honorable Supreme Court required 19 legible copies of a verified complaint; 8.That in spite of repeated demands, request(s) and pleas towards (sic) respondent, respondent still fail(ed) and stubbornly refused without justification to surrender the said titles to the rightful owners, the complainants here(in), which act is tantamount to wilful and malicious defiance of legal and moral obligations emanating from his professional capacity as a lawyer who had sworn to uphold law and justice, to the prejudice and damage of the complainants; 2 xxx xxx xxx On March 22, 1995, the Court required respondent to comment on the foregoing complaint. In his unverified "Answer" thereto, respondent admitted having met Salud Pantanosas but claims that, to his recollection, "Nicanor Gonzales/Serdan" has never

been to his office. Respondent likewise denied that he challenged anyone to file a case in any court, much less the Supreme Court. He also claims that he referred complainant Pantanosas to his client, Mr. Samto M. Uy of Iponan, Cagayan de Oro City, for whom he worked out the segregation of the titles, two of which are the subject of the instant case. 3 Respondent likewise denies complainants' allegation that he is arrogant, in contrast to the innocence, simplicity and ignorance of said complainants. He contends that the truth of the matter is that complainants have been charged with a number of criminal and civil complaints before different courts. He also asserts that he was holding the certificates of title in behalf of his client, Samto M. Uy. 4 Atty. Sabacajan stresses, by way of defense, that "the instant action was chosen precisely to browbeat him into delivering the Certificates of Title to them without said certificates passing the hands of Mr. Samto Uy with whom the complainants have some monetary obligations." 5 In its resolution dated June 26, 1995, 6 for internal administrative purposes the Court referred this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the corresponding evaluation, report and recommendation. aisadc From the foregoing proceedings taken on this matter, the Court finds that respondent admitted having taken possession of the certificates of title of complainants but refused to surrender the same despite demands made by the latter. It follows, therefore, that it was incumbent upon him to show that he was legally justified in doing so. Instead, all he did was to inform this Court that "his obligation to deliver the certificates to Mr. Samto Uy excludes the delivery of said certificates to anyone else." 7 Respondent attached some certifications to his "Answer" to support his contention that complainants are notorious characters. However, the certifications indicate that most of the cases stated therein, especially those involving fraud, have been dismissed. With respect to those still pending, there is no indication as to the identity of the party who instituted the same, aside from the consideration that the remedy thereon is judicial in nature. At any rate, these aspersions on the character of complainants have no bearing on the misconduct of respondent charged in the present case. Respondent likewise submitted xerox copies of certain certificates of title in an effort to explain why he kept the certificates of title of complainants, that is, supposedly for the purpose of subdividing the property. However, an examination of the same does not show any connection thereof to respondent's claim. In fact, the two sets of certificates of title appear to be entirely different from each other. cdta As a lawyer, respondent should know that there are lawful remedies provided by law to protect the interests of his client. The records do not show that he or his client have availed of said remedies, instead of merely resorting to unexplained, if not curt, refusals to accommodate the requests of complainants. Also, he cannot be unaware of the imposable sanctions on a counsel who resorts to unlawful means that would cause injustice to the adversaries of his client. The Court accordingly finds that respondent has not exercised the good faith and diligence required of lawyers in handling the legal affairs of their clients. If complainants did have the alleged monetary obligations to his client, that does not warrant his summarily confiscating their certificates of title since there is no showing in the records that the same were given as collaterals to secure the payment of a debt. Neither is there any intimation that there is a court order authorizing him to take and retain custody of said certificates of title. Apparently, respondent has disregarded Canon 15, Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall impress upon his client the need for compliance with the laws and principles of fairness. Instead, he unjustly refused to give to complainants their certificates of titles supposedly to enforce payment of their alleged financial obligations to his client and presumably to impress the latter of his power to do so. cdasia Canon 19, Rule 19.01 ordains that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present unfounded charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent has closely skirted this proscription, if he has not in fact transgressed the same. On the foregoing considerations, the Court desires and directs that respondent should forthwith return the certificates of title of complainants. To ensure the same, he should be placed under suspension until he presents to the Court proof of receipt by complainants of their respective copies of Certificates of Title Nos. T-91735 and T-91736 or a judicial order or document authorizing or justifying the retention of possession thereof by respondent or his aforenamed client. WHEREFORE, Atty. Miguel Sabacajan is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until he can duly show to this Court that the disputed certificates of title have been returned to and the receipt thereof duly acknowledged by complainants, or can present a judicial order or appropriate legal authority justifying the possession by him or his client of said certificates. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar or any other administrative misconduct will be punished more severely. cdtai

Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the personal records of respondent and have copies thereof furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly circularized to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur. FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. L-29184. January 30, 1989.] BENEDICTO LEVISTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE LUIS B. REYES, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, ROSA DEL ROSARIO, RITA BANU, CARMEN DE GUZMAN-MARQUEZ, JESUS R. DE GUZMAN, RAMON R. DE GUZMAN, JACINTO R. DE GUZMAN, & ANTONIO R. DE GUZMAN, respondents. Benedicto Leviste for and in his own behalf. Gatchalian, Ignacio & Associates for respondents de Guzman. SYLLABUS 1.CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; REPUDIATION; ARTICLE 1052 OF THE CIVIL CODE DOES NOT APPLY TO COUNSEL OF A PROSPECTIVE HEIR. Article 1052 of the Civil Code protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AMOUNT OF SHARE, MERELY A BASIS FOR COMPUTATION OF CONTINGENT ATTORNEY'S FEES. Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition for probate of the decedent's will, she lost her right to inherit any part of the latter's estate. There is nothing for the petitioner to accept in her name. This Court had ruled in the case of Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 1427, that "the contract (for contingent attorney's fees) neither gives, nor purports to give, to the appellee (lawyer) any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her (Mrs. Harden's) aforesaid share in the conjugal partnership. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees." 3.ID.; ID.; NOT EVERY WILL SHOULD BE FOLLOWED. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for mandamus, for while it is true that, as contended by the petitioner, public policy favors the probate of a will, it does not necessarily follow that every will that is presented for probate, should be allowed. The law lays down procedures which should be observed and requisites that should be satisfied before a will may be probated. Those procedures and requirements were not followed in this case resulting in the disallowance of the will. There being no valid will, the motion to withdraw the probate petition was inconsequential. 4.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; PROBATE; PERSONS INDIRECTLY EXCLUDED THEREIN. In Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, We had occasion to rule that one who is only indirectly interested in a will may not interfere in its probate. Thus: ". . . the reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the court maybe prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto." (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, 246.) DECISION GRIO-AQUINO, J p: The issue in this case is whether or not an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee basis may, in order to collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his client's refusal to appeal the decision of the trial court. On September 7, 1963, the petitioner, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement with the private respondent Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will, a piece of real property at Sales Street, Quiapo, Manila, was bequeathed to Del Rosario. It was agreed that petitioner's contingent fee would be thirty-five per cent (35%) of the property that Rosa may receive upon the probate of the will (Annex "A", p. 59, Rollo). In accordance with their agreement, Leviste performed the following services as Del Rosario's counsel: (1)Thoroughly researched and studied the law on probate and succession;

(2)Looked for and interviewed witnesses, and took their affidavits; (3)Filed the petition for probate is Special Proceeding No. 58325; (4)Made the proper publications; (5)Presented at the trial the following witnesses: a)Eleuterio de Jesus b)Lucita de Jesus c)Purita L. Llanes d)Rita Banu e)Jesus Lulod. On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that she was terminating his services as her counsel due to "conflicting interest." This consisted, according to the letter, in petitioner's moral obligation to protect the interest of his brother-in-law, Gaudencio M. Llanes, whom Del Rosario and the other parties in the probate proceeding intended to eject as lessee of the property which was bequeathed to Del Rosario under the will (Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo). cdrep On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a "Motion to Intervene to Protect His Rights to Fees for Professional Services." (Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo.). In an order dated November 12, 1965 the trial court denied his motion on the ground that he had "not filed a claim for attorney's fees nor recorded his attorney's lien." (p. 3, Rollo.) On November 23, 1965, petitioner filed a "Formal Statement of Claim or Attorney's Fees and Recording of Attorney's Lien," which was noted in the court's order of December 20, 1965 (Annexes "D" and "E", pp. 63 & 64, Rollo). Although the order denying his motion to intervene had become final, petitioner continued to receive copies of the court's orders, as well as the pleadings of the other parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings. The case was submitted for decision without the respondents' evidence. On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-legatee, filed a "Motion To Withdraw Petition for Probate" alleging that Del Rosario waived her rights to the devise in her favor and agreed that the De Guzman brothers and sisters who opposed her petition for probate, shall inherit all the properties left by the decedent. (Annex "F", p. 65, Rollo.) In an order of April 13, 1967 the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the petition for being contrary to public policy (Annex "G", pp. 66-67, Rollo). Nonetheless, on August 28, 1967, the court disallowed the will, holding that the legal requirements for its validity were not satisfied as only two witnesses testified that the will and the testatrix's signature were in the handwriting of Maxima Reselva. The petitioner filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner was not a party in interest. The petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss his appeal, claiming that he has a direct and material interest in the decision sought to be reviewed. He also asked that he be substituted as party-petitioner, in lieu of his former client, Ms. Del Rosario. On March 28, 1968, the trial judge dismissed the appeal and denied petitioner's motion for substitution: The petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus (CA-G.R. No. 41248) praying that the trial court be ordered to give due course to his appeal and to grant his motion for substitution. llcd On May 22, 1968, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form and substance as the petitioner did not appear to be the proper party to appeal the decision in Special Proceeding No. 58325 (Annex I, p. 77, Rollo). Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed by certiorari to this Court, assigning the following errors against the Court of Appeals' resolution: 1.The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner appears not to be the proper party to appeal the decision in Sp. Proc. No. 58325 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. 2.Assuming the petitioner's right of appeal is doubtful, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his petition for mandamus; and

3.The Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision in Sp. Proc. No. 58325 denying the probate of the holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva, said decision being patently erroneous. Under his first assignment of error, petitioner argues that by virtue of his contract of services with Del Rosario, he is a creditor of the latter, and that under Article 1052 of the Civil Code which provides: "ART. 1052.If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir. "The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. The excess, should there be any, shall in no case pertain to the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance with the rules established in this Code, it may belong." he has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof the devise in her favor (which she in effect repudiated) to protect his contingent attorney's fees. The argument is devoid of merit. Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee. Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition for probate of the decedent's will, she lost her right to inherit any part of the latter's estate. There is nothing for the petitioner to accept in her name. This Court had ruled in the case of Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 1427, that "the contract (for contingent attorney's fees) neither gives, nor purports to give, to the appellee (lawyer) any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her (Mrs. Harden's) aforesaid share in the conjugal partnership. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees."

The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for mandamus, for while it is true that, as contended by the petitioner, public policy favors the probate of a will, it does not necessarily follow that every will that is presented for probate, should be allowed. The law lays down procedures which should be observed and requisites that should be satisfied before a will may be probated. Those procedures and requirements were not followed in this case resulting in the disallowance of the will. There being no valid will, the motion to withdraw the probate petition was inconsequential.prLL Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no direct interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as former counsel for a prospective heir. In Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, We had occasion to rule that one who is only indirectly interested in a will may not interfere in its probate. Thus: ". . . the reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the court maybe prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto." (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, 246.) Similary, in Morente vs. Firmalino, 40 O.G. 21st Supp. 1, We held: "We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in holding that notice of an attorney's lien did not entitle the attorney-appellant to subrogate himself in lieu of his client. It only gives him the right to collect a certain amount for his services in case his client is awarded a certain sum by the court." WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur. THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 91958. January 24, 1991.] WILFREDO D. LICUDAN and CRISTINA LICUDAN-CAMPOS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. TEODORO O. DOMALANTA, respondents.

Arnold V . Guerrero & Associates for petitioners. Teodoro O. Domalanta for and on his behalf as private respondent. DECISION GUTIERREZ, JR., J p: The practice of law is a profession rather than trade. Courts must guard against the charging of unconscionable and excessive fees by lawyers for their services when engaged as counsel. Whether or not the award of attorney's fees in this case is reasonable, being in the nature of contingent fees, is the principal issue. This petition for review on certiorari assails: 1)The Decision of the public respondent dated September 12, 1989 which dismissed the petitioners' appeal thereby upholding the reasonableness of the respondent lawyer's lien as attorney's fees over the properties of his clients; and 2)The Resolution of the public respondent dated January 30, 1990 which denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are as follows: "The respondent Court, in upholding the entitlement of private respondent-attorney on the attorney's fees he claimed, decided the question in a manner not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Tribunal. "The respondent Court, in refusing to review and determine the propriety, reasonableness and validity of the attorney's fees claimed by the private respondent-attorney, departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings. LibLex "The respondent Court, in failing to declare the attorneys fees claimed by the private respondentattorney as unconscionable, excessive, unreasonable, immoral and unethical, decided the question in a way not in accord with law and with applicable decisions of this Honorable Tribunal." (Petition, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 16-17) The following are the antecedent facts pertinent to the case at bar: The respondent lawyer was retained as counsel by his brother-in-law and sister, the now deceased petitioners' parents, spouses Aurelio and Felicidad Licudan. His services as counsel pertained to two related civil cases docketed as Civil Case No. Q12254 for partition and Civil Case No. Q-28655 for a sum of money in connection with the redemption of the property subject matter of the two cases covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In both cases, the respondent lawyer obtained a judgment in favor of his clients. On August 13, 1979, the respondent lawyer filed a Petition for Attorney's Lien with Notification to his Clients which substantially alleged that his clients executed two written contracts for professional services in his favor which provided that: "a)The undersigned counsel is entitled to own 97.5 square meters of the plaintiffs' share of the lot in question. b)The undersigned counsel shall have a usufructuary right for a period of ten (10) years of plaintiffs' share of the lot in question. c)And that all damages accruing to plaintiffs to be paid by the defendant is for the undersigned counsel." (Annex "H" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 54) On September 19, 1979, the trial court handling Civil Case No. Q-12254 ordered the annotation at the back of TCT No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City of the respondent lawyer's Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 signed by petitioner Wifredo Licudan and Aurelio Licudan on his own behalf and on behalf of his daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos. The said trial court's Order, being one of two Orders being essentially challenged in this petition, is reproduced below: "Before the court for consideration is a 'Petition for Attorney's Lien filed by Atty. Teodoro D. Domalanta, counsel for the plaintiff, praying that his attorney's fees be annotated as a lien at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, subject matter of this case. For the protection of the plaintiffs, the court required the plaintiff Aurelio Licudan as well as his son to appear this morning. Plaintiff Aurelio Licudan together with his son Wilfredo Licudan, who appears to be

intelligent and in fact he speaks (the) English language well, appeared. Both Aurelio and Wilfredo Licudan manifested that they have freely and voluntarily signed the Contract for Professional Services, dated August 30, 1979 and notarized before Notary Public Amado Garrovillas as Doc. No. 32, Page 8, Book No. XIX, Series of 1979. Considering the manifestation of plaintiff, Aurelio Licudan and Alfredo (sic) Licudan that they have entered freely and voluntarily in the said contract of professional services, let the same be annotated at the back of TCT 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, upon payment of the required legal fees." (CA Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 36-37) The Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 differs from the earlier contractual provisions in that it entitled the respondent lawyer to one-third (1/3) of the subject property or 90.5 square meters and provided for usufructuary rights over the entire lot in question in favor of the respondent lawyer's son, Teodoro M. Domalanta, Jr. for an agreed consideration. (Annex "J" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 59) On July 25, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a motion ex parte to amend the Order dated September 19, 1979 so as to conform with an additional professional fee covering 31 square meters more of the lot for services rendered in Civil Case No. Q28655 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 1, 1983 executed by Aurelio Licudan in favor of the respondent lawyer. prcd On September 6, 1985, the trial court ordered the respondent lawyer to submit a subdivision plan in conformity with his attorney's fees contract under which one-third (1/3) of the property or 90.5 square meters was alloted to him. On September 23, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration praying for the amendment of the Order dated September 19, 1979 to conform with the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 1, 1983 which was executed after the annotation of the original attorney's lien of 90.5 square meters. On September 30, 1985, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that the respondent lawyer cannot collect attorney's fees for other cases in the action for partition. On October 4, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a second motion for reconsideration of the Order dated September 6, 1985 explaining that what he sought to be included in the Order dated September 19, 1979 is the additional attorney's fees for handling the redemption case which was but a mere offshoot of the partition case and further manifesting that the additional 31 square meters as compensation for the redemption case must be merged with the 90.5 square meters for the partition case to enable the said respondent lawyer to comply with the Order dated September 6, 1985 which directed him to submit a subdivision plan as required. On October 21, 1985, the trial court issued the second Order being assailed in this petition. The said Order reads: "Acting on the 'Second Motion for Reconsideration' filed by Atty. Teodoro Domalanta and finding the same to be justified, let an attorney's lien be annotated in the title of the property for 31 square meters as attorney's fees of said Atty. Teodoro Domalanta in addition to the original 90.5 square meters." (CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 37) On August 22, 1986, more than ten (10) months after the Orders of September 6, 1985 and October 21, 1985 had become final and executory, the petitioners as substituted heirs of the respondent lawyers' deceased clients filed a motion to set aside orders on the ground that the award of professional fees covering 121.5 square meters of the 271.5 square meter lot is unconscionable and excessive. After the respondent lawyer filed his Opposition to the above petitioners' motion, the lower court, on August 29, 1986, finding that the petitioners as substituted plaintiffs are not in full agreement with the respondent lawyer's claim for attorney's fees, set aside its Orders dated September 6, 1985 and October 21, 1985. On September 16, 1986, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration stressing the fact that the payment of the professional services was pursuant to a contract which could no longer be disturbed or set aside because it has already been implemented and had since then become final. This motion was denied on October 3, 1986. On November 15, 1986, the respondent lawyer filed a motion to set aside the orders dated August 29, 1986 and October 3, 1986 reiterating his position that the Orders of September 6, 1985 and October 21, 1985 have become final and are already implemented. The respondent lawyer further asked for the modification of the October 21, 1985 Order to reflect 60.32 square meters instead of 31 square meters only since the stipulation in the Additional Contract for Professional Services entitled him to 60.32 square meters. cdll After the petitioners' Opposition to the said motion was filed, the trial court, on February 26, 1987, rendered an Order with the following dispositive portion:

"WHEREFORE, this Court has no alternative but to set aside its orders of 29 August 1986 and 3 October 1986 and declare its Orders of 19 September 1979 and 21 October 1985 irrevocably final and executory." (CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 34) On Appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondent lawyer by dismissing the appeal and the prayed for writ of preliminary injunction. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners filed the instant petition. The petitioners fault the respondent Court for its failure to exercise its inherent power to review and determine the propriety of the stipulated attorney's fees in favor of the respondent lawyer and accuse the respondent lawyer of having committed an unfair advantage or legal fraud by virtue of the Contract for Professional Services devised by him after the trial court awarded him attorney's fees for P1,000.00 only instead of respecting the trust and confidence of the highest level reposed on him considering the close blood and affinal relationship between him and his clients.

The petitioners contend that under the award for professional services, they may have won the case but would lose the entire property won in litigation to their uncle-lawyer. They would be totally deprived of their house and lot and the recovered damages considering that of the 271.5 square meters of the subject lot, the respondent lawyer is claiming 121.5 square meters and the remaining portion of 150 square meters would also go to attorney's fees since the said portion pertains to the lawyer's son by way of usufruct for ten (10) years. The aforesaid submissions by the petitioners merit our consideration. It is a well-entrenched rule that attorney's fees may be claimed in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered or as an incident of the main action. The fees may be properly adjudged after such litigation is terminated and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. (see Camacho v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 604 [1989];Quirante v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 769 [1989]). It is an equally deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the recently promulgated Code of Professional Responsibility. However, as we have held in the case of Tanhueco v. De Dumo (172 SCRA 760 [1989]): ". . . When it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must and will protect the aggrieved party. (Ulanday v. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil. 540 [1923]; Grey v. Insular Lumber Co., 97 Phil. 833 [1955]). In the case at bar, the respondent lawyer caused the annotation of his attorney's fees lien in the main action for partition docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12254 on the basis of a Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979. We find reversible error in the Court of Appeals' holding that: "When the reasonableness of the appellee's lien as attorney's fees over the properties of his clients awarded to him by the trial court had not been questioned by the client, and the said orders had already become final and executory, the same could no longer be disturbed, not even by the court which rendered them (Taada v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 419)." (CA Decision p. 7; Rollo, p. 36) On the contrary, we rule that the questioned Orders dated September 19, 1979 and October 21, 1985 cannot become final as they pertain to a contract for a contingent fee which is always subject to the supervision of the Court with regard to its reasonableness as unequivocally provided in Section 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which reads: "13.Contingent Fees. A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." (Emphasis supplied). There is no dispute in the instant case that the attorney's fees claimed by the respondent lawyer are in the nature of a contingent fee. There is nothing irregular about the execution of a written contract for professional services even after the termination of a case as long as it is based on a previous agreement on contingent fees by the parties concerned and as long as the said contract does not contain stipulations which are contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order. LLphil Although the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 was apparently voluntarily signed by the late Aurelio Licudan for himself and on behalf of his daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos and by the petitioner Wilfredo Licudan who both manifested in open court that they gave their free and willing consent to the said contract, we cannot allow the said contract to stand as the law between the parties involved considering that the rule that in the presence of a contract for

professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the same becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but admits an exception - that the stipulations therein are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order (see Philippine American Life Insurance Company v. Pineda, 175 SCRA 416 [1989]; Syjuco v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 111 [1989]). Under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. In determining whether or not the lawyer's fees are fair and reasonable, Rule 20-01 of the same Code enumerates the factors to be considered in resolving the said issue. They are as follows: a)The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required; b)The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; c)The importance of the subject matter; d)The skill demanded; e)The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proferred case; f)The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs; g)The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service; h)The contingency or certainty of compensation; i)The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and j)The professional standing of the lawyer." A similar provision is contained under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which partly states that: "SEC. 24.Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney . . . A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable." All that the respondent lawyer handled for his deceased sister and brother-in-law was a simple case of partition which necessitated no special skill nor any unusual effort in its preparation. The subsequent case for redemption was admittedly but an offshot of the partition case. Considering the close blood and affinal relationship between the respondent lawyer and his clients, there is no doubt that Atty. Domalanta took advantage of the situation to promote his own personal interests instead of protecting the legal interests of his clients. A careful perusal of the provisions of the contract for professional services in question readily shows that what the petitioners won was a pyrrhic victory on account of the fact that despite the successful turnout of the partition case, they are now practically left with nothing of the whole subject lot won in the litigation. This is because aside from the 121.5 square meters awarded to Atty. Domalanta as attorney's fees, the said contract for professional services provides that the remaining portion shall pertain to the respondent lawyer's son by way of usufruct for ten (10) years. There should never be an instance where a lawyer gets as attorney's fees the entire property involved in the litigation. It is unconscionable for the victor in litigation to lose everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer. llcd The respondent lawyer's argument that it is not he but his son Teodoro M. Domalanta, Jr. who is claiming the usufructuary right over the remaining portion of the subject lot is inaccurate. The records show that the matter of usufruct is tied up with this case since the basis for the said usufructuary right is the contract for professional services the reasonableness of which is being questioned in this petition. We find the ten-year usufruct over the subject lot part and parcel of the attorney's fees being claimed by the respondent lawyer. In resolving the issue of reasonableness of the attorney's fees, we uphold the time-honoured legal maxim that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession so that his basic ideal becomes one of rendering service and securing justice, not money-making. For the worst scenario that can ever happen to a client is to lose the litigated property to his lawyer in whom all trust and confidence were bestowed at the very inception of the legal controversy. We find the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979, unconscionable and unreasonable. The amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, in lieu of the 121.5 square meters awarded to the respondent lawyer and the ten-year usufructuary right over the remaining portion of 150 square meters by the respondent lawyer's son, is, in the opinion of this Court, commensurate to the services rendered by Atty. Domalanta. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' decision of September 12, 1989 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Atty. Domalanta is awarded reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.

SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur. SECOND DIVISION [A.C. No. 1388. March 28, 1980.] ANA F. RETUYA, complainant, vs. ATTY. IEGO A. GORDUIZ, respondent. DECISION AQUINO, J p: This disbarment case is linked to Administrative Case No. 1431-MJ which was filed by Ana F. Retuya against Municipal Judge Paulo A. Equipilag of Maasin, Leyte and which was decided on July 16, 1979 (Retuya vs. Equipilag). The facts of that case, which also gave rise to this disbarment case, are as follows: cdphil "Ana F. Retuya, a widow with four minor children, filed a claim for workmen's compensation against Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the employer of her husband who died in 1968. In a decision dated December 4, 1970 the Workmen's Compensation Unit at Tacloban City awarded to Ana the sum of P8,792.10 consisting of (a) P6,000 as compensation benefits, (b) P2,292.10 for medical and hospitalization expenses, (c) P200 as burial expenses and (d) P300 as attorney's fees of Atty. Iego Gorduiz (Case No. 9728). "The employer appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, the employer proposed to compromise the claim by paying P4,396.05 or only one-half of the total award. Ana accepted the proposal and directed that the amount be remitted to Fiscal Mamerto Daclan through the Philippine National Bank's branch at Maasin, Southern Leyte. "The employer paid the reduced award on November 16, 1972. Ana sent to the employer the receipt and release signed by her with a covering letter dated December 19, 1972 wherein she explained that her lawyer, Gorduiz, did not sign the joint motion to dismiss the claim because he wanted twenty percent of the award as his attorney's fees. She was willing to give him ten percent. "After she had cashed the checks for P4,396.05, she was not able to contact Gorduiz and pay his fee. Then, unexpectedly, in February, 1973, she was served with a warrant of arrest issued in Criminal Case No. R-2362 of the municipal court of Maasin. To avoid detention, she had to post bail in the sum of one thousand pesos. "It turned out that on January 12, 1973 Atty. Gorduiz executed an affidavit stating that Ana had misappropriated his attorney's fees amounting to three hundred pesos and that he had demanded payment of the amount from her but she refused to make payment and, instead, she went to Cebu and stayed there for a long time. "On the basis of that affidavit, the acting chief of police filed against Ana a complaint for estafa in the municipal court of Maasin. After posting bail, she filed a motion to quash wherein she explained that she did not pay the fees of Atty. Gorduiz because he was demanding one third of the award, that when she did not accede to his demand, he lowered his claim to eight hundred pesos, and that she bargained for six hundred fifty pesos but he refused to accept that amount. Ana averred that the estafa case was filed just to harass her. "Judge Paulo A. Equipilag denied the motion to quash. He granted the motion of Atty. Gorduiz requiring Ana to produce a copy of the decision awarding her workmen's compensation for her husband's death. "The estafa case was not tried. Atty. Erasmo M. Diola, as lawyer of Ana, offered to Atty. Gorduiz the sum of five hundred pesos as settlement of the case. The offer was accepted. "On November 22, 1973, the acting chief of police filed a motion to dismiss the case on the basis of the affidavit of Atty. Gorduiz executed on that date stating that the prosecution witnesses had allegedly become hostile and that he was no longer interested in further prosecuting the case. Also, on that same day, Judge Equipilag dismissed the case. "In spite of the dismissal of the estafa case, Ana F. Retuya felt aggrieved by the proceedings therein. In a complaint dated July 24, 1974 but filed in this Court on October 30, 1974, she asked for the disbarment or suspension of Atty. Gorduiz and Judge Equipilag. The disbarment case against Gorduiz was referred to the Solicitor General.

"The case against Judge Equipilag was investigated by the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte." This Court found that there was no justification for suspending respondent Judge. However, he was admonished to be more prudent and circumspect in the discharge of his duties so as to obviate the suspicion that, for an ulterior motive, he was in cahoots with the offended party in a criminal case for the purpose of using the strong arm of the law against the accused in an oppressive and vindictive manner. The Solicitor General asked the provincial fiscal of Southern Leyte to investigate the case against Gorduiz. The fiscal in her report of July 8, 1975 recommended the dismissal of the case. The Solicitor General, disagreeing with that recommendation, filed in this Court against Gorduiz a complaint wherein he prayed that Gorduiz be suspended for six months because the latter, in filing the estafa case, had promoted a groundless suit against his client. LLphil Ana F. Retuya testified before the investigating Fiscal that in December, 1972 she was willing to pay Gorduiz six hundred fifty pesos as his attorney's fees but he demanded a bigger amount. He lodged a complaint for estafa against her and she was arrested. She had to post bail in the sum of one thousand pesos. As already stated above, the estafa case was later dismissed when Ana paid Gorduiz the sum of five hundred pesos. In his testimony before the investigating fiscal and this Court's legal officer, respondent Gorduiz denied that he demanded as attorney's fees an amount higher than three hundred pesos. He explained that he filed the estafa case because after Ana had received payment of the award, she did not turn over to him the attorney's fees of three hundred pesos in spite of her promises to pay the same and his demands for payment (Exh. 7 and 8). Gorduiz declared that Ana filed the disbarment case against him in order that she could evade the payment of his attorney's fees in the other cases which he had handled for her. It was also possible that someone who had a score to settle with Gorduiz had instigated the filing of this case against him. He further declared that he filed the estafa case because he thought that Ana had absconded when she stayed in Cebu City for a long time (23-24 tsn, June 26, 1979). He claimed that he spent one hundred pesos of his own money in gathering evidence which was presented in the workmen's compensation case. He had also advanced around two hundred pesos to cover the expenses in the other cases which he had handled for Ana. After reflecting on the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that there is justification for suspending the respondent. Respondent acted precipitately in filing a criminal action against his client for the supposed misappropriation of his attorney's fees. It is not altogether clear that his client had swindled him and, therefore, there is some basis for concluding that, contrary to his lawyer's oath, he had filed a groundless suit against her and had harassed and embarrassed her. Paragraph 14 of the Canons of Legal Ethics prescribes that "controversies with clients concerning compensation are to be avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his self-respect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense for his services; and lawsuits with clients should be resorted to only to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud". llcd WHEREFORE, the respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months counted from notice of this decision. A copy of this decision should be attached to his record in the Bar Confidant's office. SO ORDERED. Baredo (Chairman), Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ. concur. Separate Opinions ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting: There was no case of estafa against Ana F. Retuya, respondent's client. When he filed one against her he was guilty of harassment and filing an unfounded suit. I am far suspension for six months as recommended by the Solicitor General. FIRST DIVISION [A.C. No. 6210. December 9, 2004.] FEDERICO N. RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. PATRICIO A. NGASEO, respondent. DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p: This is a complaint for suspension of respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Article 1491 of the Civil Code by demanding from his client, complainant Federico N. Ramos, the delivery of 1,000 square meters of land, a litigated property, as payment for his appearance fees. The facts as narrated by the complainant are as follows: Sometime in 1998, complainant Federico Ramos went to respondent Atty. Patricio Ngaseo's Makati office to engage his services as counsel in a case 1 involving a piece of land in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Respondent agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of P20,000.00, appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing and the cost of meals, transportation and other incidental expenses. Complainant alleges that he did not promise to pay the respondent 1,000 sq. m. of land as appearance fees. 2 On September 16, 1999, complainant went to the respondent's office to inquire about the status of the case. Respondent informed him that the decision was adverse to them because a congressman exerted pressure upon the trial judge. Respondent however assured him that they could still appeal the adverse judgment and asked for the additional amount of P3,850.00 and another P2,000.00 on September 26, 2000 as allowance for research made. 3 Although an appeal was filed, complainant however charges the respondent of purposely failing to submit a copy of the summons and copy of the assailed decision. Subsequently, complainant learned that the respondent filed the notice of appeal 3 days after the lapse of the reglementary period. On January 29, 2003, complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent asking for the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land which he allegedly promised as payment for respondent's appearance fee. In the same letter, respondent also threatened to file a case in court if the complainant would not confer with him and settle the matter within 30 days. Respondent alleged that sometime in the late 1997, a former client, Federico Ramos and his brother, Dionisio, went to his Makati office to engage his professional services in connection with a 2-hectare parcel of land situated in San Carlos, Pangasinan which the complainant's family lost 7 years earlier through an execution sale in favor of one Alfredo T. Castro. Complainant, who was deaf and could only speak conversational Tagalog haltingly, was assisted by his brother Dionisio. They came all the way from Pangasinan because no lawyer in San Carlos City was willing to handle the case. Complainant, through Dionisio, avers that he has consulted 2 local lawyers but did not engage their services because they were demanding exorbitant fees. One local lawyer was willing to handle the case for at least one-half of the land involved as his attorney's fee, plus cash expenses, while the other asked for 1/4 of the land in addition to a large sum of money. Respondent agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of P60,000.00 plus an appearance fee of P3,000.00 per hearing. Complainant told him that he would consult his siblings on the matter. Six months later, i.e., in April 1998, complainant, assisted by one Jose Castillo, went to respondent's office to discuss the legal fees. Complainant, through Castillo, told respondent that he was willing to pay an acceptance fee of P40,000.00, P20,000.00 of which shall be paid upon engagement and the remaining P20,000.00 to be paid after their treasure hunt operations in Nueva Viscaya were terminated. Further, complainant offered, in lieu of P3,000.00 per appearance, 1,000 sq. m. of land from the land subject matter of the case, if they win, or from another piece of property, if they lose. In addition, complainant also offered to defray the expenses for transportation, meals and other incidental expenses. Respondent accepted the complainant's offer. Respondent claims that after the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. SCC 2128, he filed a timely notice of appeal and thereafter moved to be discharged as counsel because he had colon cancer. Complainant, now assisted by one Johnny Ramos, implored respondent to continue handling the case, with an offer to double the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land earlier promised and the remaining balance of P20,000.00 acceptance fee. Johnny Ramos made a written commitment and gave respondent's secretary P2,000.00 of the P3,850.00 expenses for the preparation of the appellant's brief. aTADCE On July 18, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a favorable decision ordering the return of the disputed 2-hectare land to the complainant and his siblings. The said decision became final and executory on January 18, 2002. Since then complainant allegedly failed to contact respondent, which compelled him to send a demand letter on January 29, 2003. On February 14, 2003, complainant filed a complaint before the IBP charging his former counsel, respondent Atty. Ngaseo, of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding the delivery of 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land which was the subject of litigation. In a report dated July 18, 2003, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. 4 On August 30, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-47 the full text of which reads: 5 RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on

record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering that respondent have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a petition for review assailing IBP Resolution No. XVI-2003-47 for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction. 6 Respondent argues that he did not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code because when he demanded the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. of land which was offered and promised to him in lieu of the appearance fees, the case has been terminated, when the appellate court ordered the return of the 2-hectare parcel of land to the family of the complainant. Respondent further contends that he can collect the unpaid appearance fee even without a written contract on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit. He claims that his acceptance and appearance fees are reasonable because a Makati based legal practitioner, would not handle a case for an acceptance fee of only P20,000.00 and P1,000.00 per court appearance. Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession. 7The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private individuals but also public or judicial sales. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. 8 It is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. 9 However, the said prohibition applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's property. Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches. Invariably, in all cases where Article 1491 was violated, the illegal transaction was consummated with the actual transfer of the litigated property either by purchase or assignment in favor of the prohibited individual. In Biascan v.Lopez, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct and suspended for 6 months from the practice of law when he registered a deed of assignment in his favor and caused the transfer of title over the part of the estate despite pendency of Special Proceedings No. 98037 involving the subject property. 10 In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v. Cabanting, 11 the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6) months from the practice of law when he purchased his client's property which was still the subject of a pending certiorariproceeding. In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical, respondent's act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491. The letter of demand dated January 29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in Civil Case No. SCC-2128 became final and executory on January 18, 2002. acEHSI We note that the report of the IBP Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-47, does not clearly specify which acts of the respondent constitute gross misconduct or what provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility have been violated. We find the recommended penalty of suspension for 6 months too harsh and not proportionate to the offense committed by the respondent. The power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty. 12 All considered, a reprimand is deemed sufficient and reasonable.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the legal profession in violation of Rule 20.04 of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C .J ., Quisumbing, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur. FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. L-26096. February 27, 1979.] THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. SILVERETRA ABABA, ET AL., claimants, JUAN LARRAZABAL, MARTA C. DE LARRAZABAL, MAXIMO ABARQUEZ and ANASTACIA CABIGAS,petitioners-appellants, ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, adverse claimant-appellee. Juanito Ll. Abao for petitioners-appellants.

Alberto B. Fernandez in his own behalf. SYNOPSIS After winning a case for annulment of a contract of sale with right of repurchase and recovery of the parcels of land subject matter thereof, petitioner Abarquez refused to comply with his contractual obligation to his counsel to give the latter 1/2 of the property recovered as attorney's fees, and instead offered to sell the whole parcels of land to the petitioner-spouses Larrazabal. Hence, his counsel, Atty. Fernandez, filed an affidavit of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Cebu, annotating his claim on petitioner Abarquez' Transfer Certificate of Title. Despite said annotation, Abarquez sold 2/3 of the lands to petitioner-spouses Larrazabal. Subsequently, the latter filed a cancellation proceeding of the adverse claim before the trial court where it was dismissed. The petitioner-spouses appealed from the order of dismissal directly to the Supreme Court contending among others that a contract for a contingent fee is violative of Article 1491 of the New Civil Code. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision and held that a contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 of the New Civil Code since the transfer of 1/2 of the property in litigation takes effect only after the finality of a favorable judgment and not during the pendency of the litigation of the property in question; that Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics expressly recognizes contingent fees as an exception to Canon 10; that the adverse-claimant's contingent fee is valid; and that the registration thereof as the only remedy open to him, substantially complied with Section 110 of Act 496. SYLLABUS Of the Ruling of the Court 1.ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; CONTINGENT FEES; PROHIBITION UNDER ARTICLE 1491, N.C.C. CONSTRUED. The prohibition in Article 1491 of the New Civil Code applies only to a sale or assignment to the lawyer by his client of the property which is the subject of litigation. For the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. The prohibition does not apply to cases where after completion of litigation the lawyer accepts on account of his fee, an interest in the assets realized by the litigation. There is a clear distinction between such cases and one in which the lawyer speculates on the outcome of the matter in which he is employed. 2.ID.; ID.; SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. Spanish civilists differ in their views on whether or not a contingent fee contract (quota litis agreement) is covered by Article 1491, with Manresa advancing that it is covered and Castoln maintaining that it is not covered. The Supreme Court of Spain, in its sentencia of 12 November 1917, has ruled that Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code (Article 1491 of our Civil Code) does not apply to a contract for a contingent fee because it is not contrary to morals or to law. 3.ID.; CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, NOT INFRINGED BY CONTRACT FOR CONTINGENT FEE. Contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines. They are impliedly sanctioned by law and are subject to the supervision of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON FOR ALLOWANCE. The reason for allowing compensation for professional services based on contingent fees is that of a person could not secure counsel by a promise of large fees in case of success, to be derived from the subject matter of the suit, it would often place the poor in such a condition as to amount to a practical denial of justice. It not infrequently happens that persons are injured through the negligence or willful misconduct of others, but by reason of poverty are unable to employ counsel to assert their rights. In such event their only means of redress lies in gratuitous service, which is rarely given, or in their ability to find someone who will conduct the case for a contingent fee. That relations of this kind are often abused by speculative attorneys or that suits of this character are turned into a sort of commercial traffic by the lawyer does not destroy the beneficial result to one who is so poor to employ counsel. 5.ID.; CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT SUBJECT TO SUPERVISION OF COURTS. A contingent fee contract is always subject to the supervision of the courts with respect to the stipulated amount and may be reduced or nullified. So that in the event that there is any undue influence or fraud in the execution of the contract or that the fee is excessive, the client is not without remedy because the court will amply protect him. 6.ID.; PROFESSIONAL ETHICS; CONTRACT FOR CONTINGENT FEE IS VALID. Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics expressly recognizes contingent fees by way of exception to Canon 10. For while Canon 10 prohibits a lawyer from purchasing ". . . any interest in the subject matter of the litigation he is conducting", Canon 13, on the other hand, allows reasonable contingent fee contract, thus: "A contract for a contingent fee where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." The distinction is between buying an interest in the litigation as a speculation, which Canon 10 condemns, and agreeing, in a case which the lawyer undertakes primarily in his professional capacity, to accept his compensation contingent on the outcome. 7.ID.; ID.; NATURE. Canons of Professional Ethics have already received judicial recognition by being cited and applied by the Supreme Court of the Philippines in its opinion. And they have likewise been considered sources of Legal Ethics. More importantly, the American Bar Association, speaking through Chairman Howe of the Ethics Committee, opined that "The Canons of Professional Ethics are legislative expressions of professional opinion." Therefore, the Canons have some binding effect.

8.LAND REGISTRATION; SECTION 110, REGISTRATION OF INTEREST OR ADVERSE CLAIM, ALLOWED. An adverse claim may be registered only by whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, if no other provision is made in this Act (496) for registering the same. A contract for a contingent fee being valid, it vested in the adverse-claimant an interest or right over the lots in question to the extent of onehalf thereof. The interest become vested in adverse-claimant after the case was won on appeal because only then did the assignment of the one half portion of the lots in question became effective and binding. Since the interest or claim of counsel in the lots in question arose long after the original registration, there is no other provision of the Land Registration Act under which the interest or claim may be registered except as an adverse claim under Section 110 of the Act. The interest or claim cannot be registered as an attorney's charging lien. There being substantial compliance with Section 110 of Act 496, the registration of the adverse claim is valid. Being valid, its registration should not be canceled because it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration thereof may be canceled. 9.ID.; ID.; EFFECT. The annotation of an adverse claim is an measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest in the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof. 10.PLEADING AND PRACTICE; RULE 138, SECTION 37, SCOPE. A charging lien under Section 37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited only to money judgments and not to judgments for the annulment of a contract or for delivery of real property. DECISION MAKASIAR, J p: This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dated March 19, 1966 denying the petition for the cancellation of an adverse claim registered by the adverse claimant on the transfer certificate of title of the petitioners. The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez was retained as counsel by petitioner, Maximo Abarquez, in Civil Case No. R6573 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Maximo Abarquez vs. Agripina Abarquez", for the annulment of a contract of sale with right of repurchase and for the recovery of the land which was the subject matter thereof. The Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered a decision on May 29, 1961 adverse to the petitioner and so he appealed to the Court of Appeals. Litigating as a pauper in the lower court and engaging the services of his lawyer on a contingent basis, petitioner, unable to compensate his lawyer whom he also retained for his appeal, executed a document on June 10, 1961 in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect whereby he obliged himself to give to his lawyer or one-half (1/2) of whatever he might recover from Lots 5600 and 5602 should the appeal prosper. The contents of the document as translated are as follows: Cdpr "AGREEMENT "KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: "That I, MAXIMO ABARQUEZ, plaintiff in Case No. R-6573 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, make known through this agreement that for the services rendered by Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez, who is my lawyer in this case, if the appeal is won up to the Supreme Court, I promise and will guarantee that I will give to said lawyer one-half (1/2) of what I may recover from the estate of my father in Lots No. 5600 and 5602 which are located at Bulacao, Pardo, City of Cebu. That with respect to any money which may be adjudged to me from Agripina Abarquez, except 'Attorney's Fees', the same shall pertain to me and not to said lawyer.

"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have caused my right thumbmark to be affixed hereto this 10th of June, 1961, at the City of Cebu. THUMBMARK MAXIMO ABARQUEZ" (p. 5, Petitioner-Appellant's Brief, p. 26, rec.). The real property sought to be recovered in Civil Case No. R-6573 was actually the share of the petitioner in Lots 5600 and 5602, which were part of the estate of his deceased parents and which were partitioned among the heirs which included petitioner Maximo Abarquez and his elder sister, Agripina Abarquez, the defendant in said civil case. This partition was made pursuant to a project of partition approved by the Court which provided, among others, that Lots Nos. 5600 and 5602 were to be divided into three equal parts, one third of which shall be given to Maximo Abarquez. However, Agripina Abarquez claimed the share of her brother, stating that the latter executed an instrument of pacto de retro prior to the

partition conveying to her any or all rights in the estate of their parents. Petitioner discovered later that the claim of his sister over his share was based on an instrument he was induced to sign prior to the partition, an instrument he believed all along to be a mere acknowledgment of the receipt of P700.00 which his sister gave to him as a consideration for taking care of their father during the latter's illness and never an instrument ofpacto de retro. Hence, he instituted an action to annul the alleged instrument of pacto de retro. The Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 27, 1963 reversed the decision of the lower court and annulled the deed of pacto de retro. Appellee Agripina Abarquez filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution dated January 7, 1964 (p. 56, Record on Appeal; p. 13, Rec.) and the judgment became final and executory on January 22, 1964. cdrep Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31841 was issued on May 19, 1965 in the name of Maximo Abarquez, married to Anastacia Cabigas, over his adjudged share in Lots Nos. 5600 and 5602 containing an area of 4,085 square meters (p. 110, ROA; p. 13, rec.). These parcels of land later became the subject matter of the adverse claim filed by the claimant. The case having been resolved and title having been issued to petitioner, adverse claimant waited for petitioner to comply with his obligation under the document executed by him on June 10, 1961 by delivering the one-half (1/2) portion of the said parcels of land. Petitioner refused to comply with his obligation and instead offered to sell the whole parcels of land covered by TCT No. 31841 to petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal. Upon being informed of the intention of the petitioner, adverse claimant immediately took steps to protect his interest by filing with the trial court a motion to annotate his attorney's lien on TCT No. 31841 on June 10, 1965 and by notifying the prospective buyers of his claim over the one-half portion of the parcels of land. Realizing later that the motion to annotate attorney's lien was a wrong remedy, as it was not within the purview of Section 37, rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, but before the same was denied by the trial court, adverse claimant filed an affidavit of adverse claim on July 19, 1966 with the Register of Deeds of Cebu (p. 14, ROA; p. 13, rec.). By virtue of the registration of said affidavit. the adverse claim for one-half (1/2) of the lots covered by the June 10, 1961 document was annotated on TCT No. 31841. Notwithstanding the annotation of the adverse claim, petitioner-spouses Maximo Abarquez and Anastacia Cabigas conveyed by deed of absolute sale on July 29, 1965 two thirds (2/3 of the lands covered by TCT No. 31841 to petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal. When the new transfer certificate of title No. 32996 was issued, the annotation of adverse claim on TCT No. 31841 necessarily had to appear on the new transfer certificate of title. This adverse claim on TCT No. 32996 became the subject of cancellation proceedings filed by herein petitioner-spouses on March 7, 1966 with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (p. 2, ROA; p. 13, rec.). The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez, filed his opposition to the petition for cancellation on March 18, 1966 (p. 20, ROA; p. 13, rec.). The trial court resolved the issue on March 19, 1966, when it declared that: ". . . the petition to cancel the adverse claim should be denied. The admission by the petitioners that the lawyers (Attys. Fernandez and Batiguin) are entitled to only one-third of the lot described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32966 is the best proof of the authority to maintain said adverse claim" (p. 57, ROA; p. 13 rec.). Petitioner-spouses decided to appeal the order of dismissal to this Court and correspondingly filed the notice of appeal or April 1, 1966 with the trial court. On April 2, 1966, petitioner-spouses filed the appeal bond and subsequently filed the record on appeal on April 6, 1966. The records of the case were forwarded to this Court through the Land Registration Commission of Manila and were received by this Court on May 5, 1966. prLL Counsel for the petitioner-spouses filed the printed record on appeal on July 12, 1966. Required to file the appellants' brief, counsel filed one on August 29, 1966 while that of the appellee was filed on October 1, 1966 after having been granted an extension to file his brief. The case was submitted for decision on December 1, 1966. Counsel for the petitioners filed a motion to expunge appellees' brief on December 8, 1966 for having been filed beyond the reglementary period, but the same was denied by this Court in a resolution dated February 13, 1967. The pivotal issue to be resolved in the instant case is the validity or nullity of the registration of the adverse claim of Atty. Fernandez, resolution of which in turn hinges on the question of whether or not the contract for a contingent fee, basis of the interest of Atty. Fernandez, is prohibited by the Article 1491 of the New Civil Code and Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Petitioners contend that a contract for a contingent fee violates Article 1491 because it involves an assignment of a property subject of litigation. That article provides: "Article 1491.The following persons cannot acquire by purchase even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:

"xxx xxx xxx "(5)Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession" (emphasis supplied). This contention is without merit. Article 1491 prohibits only the sale or assignment between the lawyer and his client, of property which is the subject of litigation. As WE have already stated "The prohibition in said article applies only to a sale or assignment to the lawyer by his client of the property which is the subject of litigation, In other words, for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" (Rosario Vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-26882, November 21, 1978). cdphil Likewise, under American Law, the prohibition does not apply to "cases where after completion of litigation the lawyer accepts on account of his fee, an interest in the assets realized by the litigation" (Drinker, Henry S., Legal Ethics, p. 100 [1953], citing App. A, 280; N.Y. Ciu 714). "There is a clear distinction between such cases and one in which the lawyer speculates on the outcome of the matter in which he is employed" (Drinker, supra, p. 100 citing A.B.A. Op. 279). A contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 because the transfer or assignment of the property in litigation takes effect only after the finality of a favorable judgment. In the instant case, the attorney's fees of Atty. Fernandez, consisting of one-half (1/2) of whatever Maximo Abarquez might recover from his share in the lots in question, is contingent upon the success of the appeal. Hence, the payment of the attorney's fees, that is, the transfer or assignment of one-half (1/2) of the property in litigation will take place only if the appeal prospers. Therefore, the transfer actually takes effect after the finality of a favorable judgment rendered on appeal and not during the pendency of the litigation involving the property in question. Consequently, the contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491. While Spanish civilists differ in their views on the above issue whether or not a contingent fee contract (quota litis agreement) is covered by Article 1491 with Manresa advancing that it is covered, thus: "Se ha discutido si en la incapacidad de los Procuradores y Abogados esta incluido el pacto de quota litis. Consiste este, como es sabido, en la estipulacion de que el Abogado o el Procurador han de hacer suyos una parte alicuota de la cosa que se litiga, si la sentencia es favorable. Con este concepto a la vista, es para nosortros indudable que el articulo que comentamos no menciona ese pacto; pero como la incapacidad de los Abogados y Procuradores se extinede al acto de adquirir por cesion; y la efectividad del pacto de quota litisimplica necesariamente una cesion, estimamos que con solo el num. 5x del articulo 1459 podria pedirse con exito la nulidad de ese pacto tradicionalmente considerado como ilicito. "xxx xxx xxx

"Debe tenerse tambien en cuenta, respecto del ultimo parrafo del articulo 1459, la sentencia del Tribunal Supreme de 25 de Enero 1902, que delcara que si bien el procurador no puede adquirir para si los bienes, en cuanto a los cuales tiene incapacidad, puede adquirirlos para otra persona en quien no concurra incapacidad alguna" (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, Tomo X, p. 110 [4a ed., 1931] emphasis supplied). Castan, maintaining that it is not covered, opines thus: "C.Prohibiciones impuestas a las personas encargadas, mas o menos directamente, de la administracion de justicia. El mismo art 1.459 del Codigo civil prohibe a los Magistrados, Jueces, individuos del Ministerio fiscal, Secretarios de Tribunales y Juzgados y Oficiales de Justicia adquirir por compra (aunque sea en subasta publica o judicial por si ni por persona alguna intermedia), 'Los bienes y derechos que estuviesen en litigio ante el Tribunal en cuya jurisdiccion on teritorio ejercieran sus respectivas funciones, extendiendo se esta prohibicion al acto de adquirir por cesion', y siendo tambien extensiva 'A los Abogados y Procuradores respecto a los bienes y derechos que fueran objeto del un litigio en que intervengan por su profesion y oficio.' "El fundamento de esta prohibicion es clarisimo. No solo se trata dice Manresa de quitar la ocasion al fraude; persiguese, ademas, el proposito de rodear a las personas que intervienen en la administracion de justicia de todos los prestigios que necesitan para ejercer su ministerio, librando los de toda sospecha, que, aunque fuere infundada, redundaria en descredito de la institucion. "Por no dar lugar a recelos de ninguna clase, admite el Codigo (en el apartado penutimo del art. 1.459) algunos casos en que, por excepcion, no se aplica el principio prohibitivo de que venimos hablando. Tales

son los de que se trate de acciones hereditarias entre coherederos, de cesion en pago de creditos, o de garantia de los bienes que posean los funcionarios de justicia. 'Algunos autores (Goyena, Manresa, Valverde) creen que en la prohibicion del art. 1.459 esta comprendido el pacto de quota litis (o sea el convenio por el cual se concede al Abogado o Procurador, para el caso de obtener sentencia favorable, una parte alicuota de la cosa o cantidad que se litiga), porque dicho pacto supone la venta o cesion de una parte de la cosa o drecho que es objecto del litigio. Pero Mucius Scaevola oberva, con razon, que en el repetido pacto no hay propiamente caso de compraventa ni de cesion de derechos, y bastan para estimario nulo otros preceptos del Codigo como los relativos a la ilicitud de la causa'" (Castan, Derecho Civil Espaol, Tomo 4, pp. 68-69, [9a ed., 1956], emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court of Spain, in its sentencia of 12 November 1917, has ruled that Article 1469 of the Spanish Civil Code (Article 1491 of our Civil Code) does not apply to a contract for a contingent fee because it is not contrary to morals or to law, holding that: ". . . que no es susceptible de aplicarse el precepto contenido en el nun. 5 del art. 1.459 a un contrato en el que se restringen los honorarios de un Abogado a un tanto por ciento de lo que se obtuviera en el litigio, cosa no repudiada por la moral ni por la ley" (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 36, Vol. V [1959]; Castan,supra; Manresa, supra). In the Philippines, among the Filipino commentators, only Justice Capistrano ventured to state his view on the said issue, thus: "The incapacity to purchase or acquire by assignment, which the law also extends to lawyers with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession, also covers contracts for professional services quota litis. Such contracts, however, have been declared valid by the Supreme Court" (Capistrano, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 44, Vol. IV [1951]). Dr. Tolentino merely restated the views of Castan and Manresa as well as the state of jurisprudence in Spain, as follows: "Attorneys-at-law Some writers, like Goyena, Manresa and Valverde, believe that this article covers quota litis agreements, under which a lawyer is to be given an aliquot part of the property or amount in litigation if he should win the case for his client. Scaevola and Castan, however, believe that such a contract does not involve a sale or assignment of rights, but it may be void under other articles of the Code such as those referring to illicit cause. On the other hand, the Spanish Supreme Court has held that this article is not applicable to a contract which limits the fees of a lawyer to a certain percentage of what may be recovered in litigation, as this is not contrary to morals or to law ." (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 35, Vol. V [1959]; Castan, supra, emphasis supplied). Petitioners further contend that a contract for a contingent fee violates the Canons of Professional Ethics, this is likewise without merit. This posture of petitioners overlooked Canon 13 of the Canons which expressly recognizes contingent fees by way of exception to Canon 10 upon which petitioners relied. For while Canon 10 prohibits a lawyer from purchasing ". . . any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting", Canon 13, on the other hand, allows a reasonable contingent fee contract, thus: "A contract for a contingent fee where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." As pointed out by an authority on Legal Ethics: LexLib "Every lawyer is intensely interested in the successful outcome of his case, not only as affecting his reputation, but also his compensation. Canon 13 specifically permits the lawyer to contract for a contingent fee which, of itself, negatives the thought that the Canons preclude the lawyer's having a stake in his litigation. As pointed out by Professor Cheatham on page 170 n. of his Case Book, there is an inescapable conflict of interest between lawyer and client in the matter of fees. Nor, despite some statements to the contrary in Committee opinions, is it believed that, particularly in view of Canon 13, Canon 10 precludes in every case an arrangement to make the lawyer's fee payable only out of the results of the litigation. The distinction is between buying an interest in the litigation as a speculation, which Canon 10 condemns, and agreeing, in a case which the lawyer undertakes primarily in his professional capacity, to accept his compensation contingent on the outcome" (Drinker, Henry S., Legal Ethics, p. 99, [1953], emphasis supplied). These Canons of Professional Ethics have already received "judicial recognition by being cited and applied by the Supreme Court of the Philippines in its opinion" Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 9 [1949]). And they have likewise been considered sources of Legal Ethics. More importantly, the American Bar Association, speaking through Chairman Howe of the Ethics Committee, opined that "The Canons of Professional Ethics are legislative expressions of professional opinion (A.B.A. Op. 37 [1912])" [See footnote 25, Drinker, Legal Ethics, p. 27]. Therefore, the Canons have some binding effect. Likewise, it must be noted that this Court has already recognized this type of a contract as early as the case of Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co. (45 Phil. 540 [1923]), where WE held that "contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines, and since impliedly sanctioned by law 'Should be under the supervision of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust

charges' (Canons of Professional Ethics)". The same doctrine was subsequently reiterated in Grey vs. Insular Lumber Co. (97 Phil. 833 [1955]) and Recto vs. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]). In the 1967 case of Albano vs. Ramos (20 SCRA 171 [1967]), the attorney was allowed to recover in a separate action her attorney's fees of one-third (1/3) of the lands and damages recovered as stipulated in the contingent fee contract. And this Court in the recent case of Rosario Vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), which involved a contingent fee of one-half (1/2) of the property in question, held that "contingent fees are recognized in this jurisdiction (Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the Philippine Bar association in 1917 [Appendix B, Revised Rules of Court]), which contingent fees may be a portion of the property in litigation." LexLib Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer "especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation" (Francisco, Legal Ethics, p. 294 [1949], citing Lipscomb vs. Adams 91 S.W. 1046, 1048 [1906]). Oftentimes, contingent fees are the only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries sustained and have their rights vindicated. Thus: "The reason for allowing compensation for professional services based on contingent fees is that if a person could not secure counsel by a promise of large fees in case of success, to be derived from the subject matter of the suit, it would often place the poor in such a condition as to amount to a practical denial of justice. It not infrequently happens that person are injured through the negligence or willful misconduct of others, but by reason of poverty are unable to employ counsel to assert their rights. In such event their only means of redress lies in gratuitous service, which is rarely given, or in their ability to find some one who will conduct the case for a contingent fee. That relations of this kind are often abused by speculative attorneys or that suits of this character are turned into a sort of commercial traffic by the lawyer, does not destroy the beneficial result to one who is so poor to employ counsel" (id., at p. 293, citing Warvelle, Legal Ethics, p. 92, emphasis supplied).

Justice George Malcolm, writing on contingent fees, also stated that: ". . . the system of contingent compensation has the merit of affording to certain classes of persons the opportunity to procure the prosecution of their claims which otherwise would be beyond their means. In many cases in the United States and the Philippines, the contingent fee is socially necessary " (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 55 [1949], italics supplied). Stressing further the importance of contingent fees, Professor Max Radin of the University of California, said that: "The contingent fee certainly increases the possibility that vexatious and unfounded suits will be brought. On the other hand, it makes possible the enforcement of legitimate claims which otherwise would be abandoned because of the poverty of the claimants. Of these two possibilities, the social advantage seems clearly on the side of the contingent fee. It may in fact be added by way of reply to the first objection that vexatious and unfounded suits have been brought by men who could and did pay substantial attorney's fees for that purpose" (Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 Cal. L. Rev. 587, 589 [1940], emphasis supplied). Finally, a contingent fee contract is always subject to the supervision of the courts with respect to the stipulated amount may be reduced or nullified. So that in the event that there is any undue influence or fraud in the execution of the contract or that the fee is excessive, the client is not without remedy because the court will amply protect him. As held in the case of Grey vs. Insular Lumber Co., supra, citing the case of Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., supra: LibLex "Where it is shown that the contract for a contingent fee was obtained by any undue influence of the attorney over the client, or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is so clearly excessive as to amount to extortion, the court will in a proper case protect the aggrieved party." In the present case, there is no iota of proof to show that Atty. Fernandez had exerted any undue influence or had perpetrated fraud on, or had in any manner taken advantage of his client, Maximo Abarquez. And, the compensation of one-half of the lots in question is not excessive nor unconscionable considering the contingent nature of the attorney's fees. With these considerations, WE find that the contract for a contingent fee in question is not violative of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Consequently, both under the provisions of Article 1491 and Canons 10 and 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a contract for a contingent fee is valid. In resolving now the issue of the validity or nullity for the registration of the adverse claim, Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) should be considered. Under said section, an adverse claim may be registered only by:

"Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration . . . if no other provision is made in this Act for registering the same . . ." The contract for a contingent fee, being valid, vested in Atty. Fernandez an interest or right over the lots in question the extent of one-half thereof. Said interest became vested in Atty. Fernandez after the case was won on appeal because only then did the assignment of the one half (1/2) portion of the lots in question became effective and binding. So that when he filed his affidavit of adverse claim his interest was already an existing one. There was therefore a valid interest in the lots to registered in favor of Atty. Fernandez adverse to Maximo Abarquez. Moreover, the interest or claim of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in question arose long after the original registration which took place many years ago. And, there is no other provision of the Land Registration Act under which the interest or claim may be registered except as an adverse claim under Section 110 thereof. The interest or claim cannot be registered as an attorney's charging lien. The lower court was correct in denying the motion to annotate the attorney's lien. A charging lien under Section 37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited only to money judgments and not to judgments for the annulment of a contract or for delivery of real property as in the instant case. Said Section provides that: LLphil "Section 37.An attorney shall have a hen upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his oppossession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments, for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client . . ." (emphasis supplied). Therefore, as an interest in registered land, the only adequate remedy open to Atty. Fernandez is to register such interest as an adverse claim. Consequently, there being a substantial compliance with Section 110 of Act 496, the registration of the adverse claim is held to be valid. Being valid, its registration should not be cancelled because as WE have already stated, "it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration thereof may be cancelled" (Paz Ty Sin Tei vs. Jose Lee Dy Piao, 103 Phil. 867 [1958]). The one-half (1/2) interest of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in question should therefore be respected. Indeed, he has a better right than petitioner-spouses, Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal. They purchased their two thirds (2/3) interest in the lots in question with the knowledge of the adverse claim of Atty. Fernandez. The adverse claim was annotated on the old transfer certificate of title and was later annotated on the new transfer certificate of title issued to them. As held by this Court: "The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act. and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof" (Sanchez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 332 [1976]; Paz Ty Sin Tei vs. Jose Le Dy Piao, supra]. Having purchased the property with the knowledge of the adverse claim, they are therefore in bad faith. Consequently, they are estopped from questioning the validity of the adverse claim. WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DENYING THE PETITION FOR THE CANCELLATION OF THE ADVERSE CLAIM SHOULD BE, AS IT IS HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANTS JUAN LARRAZABAL AND MARTA C. DE LARRAZABAL. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur. EN BANC [A.C. No. 1890. August 7, 2002.] FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAFAEL G. SUNTAY, respondent. Agaton Yaranon for complainant. SYNOPSIS A complaint for disbarment was filed by the complainant against his nephew, Atty. Rafael G. Suntay. Complainant alleged that respondent was his legal counsel, adviser and confidant who was privy to all his legal, financial, and political affairs from 1956 to 1964. However, since they parted ways because of politics, respondent had been filing complaints and cases against complainant, making use of confidential information gained while their attorney-client relationship existed. Thereafter, this case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation. After almost four years in 1982, the OSG submitted its report and recommendation finding respondent guilty as charged. Resolution of this case

was delayed due to several motions filed by the respondent. In 1988, the case was forwarded to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Finally in 2001 the IBP recommended that respondent Suntay be suspended from the practice of law for two years for immoral conduct. The investigating commissioner adopted in toto the report and recommendation of the OSG. In view of the penalty involved, the case was referred to the Court en banc for final action. For violating the confidentiality of lawyer-client relationship and for unethical conduct, respondent Suntay was suspended by the Supreme Court from the practice of law for two years. After review of the records of this case, the Court found the IBP recommendation to be well taken. As found by both the OSG and the IBP investigating commissioner, respondent acted as counsel for clients in cases involving subject matter regarding which he had either been previously consulted by complainant or which he had previously helped complainant to administer as the latter's counsel and confidant from 1956 to 1964. DScTaC SYLLABUS LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION; CONSTRUED. A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after termination of the attorney-client relation. As his defense, respondent averred that complainant failed to specify the alleged confidential information used against him. Such defense is unavailing. As succinctly explained in Hilado v. DavidCommunications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause. And the theory would be productive of other unsalutary results. To make the passing of confidential communication a condition precedent, i.e., to make the employment conditioned on the scope and character of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an investigation of what information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation be held, the court should accept the attorney's inaccurate version of the facts that came to him . . . Hence, the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice . . . It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste . . . [T]he question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. cDTCIA DECISION BELLOSILLO, J p: This Complaint for disbarment was filed by Federico C. Suntay against his nephew, Atty. Rafael G. Suntay, alleging that respondent was his legal counsel, adviser and confidant who was privy to all his legal, financial and political affairs from 1956 to 1964. However, since they parted ways because of politics and respondent's overweening political ambitions in 1964, respondent had been filing complaints and cases against complainant, making use of confidential information gained while their attorney-client relationship existed, and otherwise harassing him at every turn. Complainant enumerated the following cases filed by respondent to harass him: (a) Civil Case No. 4306-M 1 for injunction and damages in 1975, "Carlos Panganiban v. Dr. Federico Suntay," where respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff involving fishponds which respondent had previously helped to administer; (b) Civil Case No. 4726-M, 2"Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay," in 1970 where respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff to determine the real contract between the parties likewise involving the two (2) fishponds which respondent had previously helped to administer; (c) Civil Case No. 112764, 3 "Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for damages where respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff; and, (d) I.S. No. 77-1523, "Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for false testimony and grave oral defamation before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan involving complainant's same testimony subject of the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 112764. In addition, complainant alleged that respondent relentlessly pursued a case against him for violation of PD No. 296 4 for the alleged disappearance of two (2) creeks traversing complainant's fishpond in Bulacan covered by TCT No. T-15674. Complainant alleged that respondent's possession and examination of the TCT and the blueprint plan of the property while he was still counsel for complainant provided him with the information that there used to be two (2) creeks traversing the fishpond, and that since respondent helped in the administration of the fishpond, he also came to know that the two (2) creeks had disappeared. Required to answer the charges respondent filed a "Motion to Order Complainant to Specify His Charges" alleging that complainant failed to specify the alleged "confidential information or intelligence" gained by him while the attorney-client relationship existed but which he allegedly used against complainant when the relationship terminated. Complainant filed his Comments thereon as required in our Resolution of 26 July 1978. Thereafter this case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report, and recommendation in our Resolution dated 23 October 1978.

After almost four (4) years the OSG submitted its Report and Recommendation dated 14 October 1982 enumerating the following findings against respondent, to wit: The evidence presented by complainant which was largely unrebutted by respondent establish two counts of malpractice against respondent, one count of violating the confidentiality of client-lawyer relationship and one count of engaging in unethical conduct. 1.Respondent committed malpractice when he represented Magno Dinglasan in the case for false testimony and grave oral defamation filed by Magno Dinglasan against complainant before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan (I.S. No. 77-1523). The case stemmed from the testimony given by complainant on December 21, 1976, before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3930-M. When asked why Magno Dinglasan had testified against him in that case, complainant stated that he once declined the demand of Magno Dinglasan, a former official of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for P150,000.00 as consideration for the destruction of complainant's record in the Bureau. On account of that testimony, Magno Dinglasan charged complainant on July 29, 1977 with the crime of false testimony and grave oral defamation (Exhibits G and G-1). During the preliminary investigation of the case by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, respondent acted as counsel for Magno Dinglasan. When the case was dismissed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and it was elevated to the Ministry of Justice on appeal, respondent continued to be the lawyer of Magno Dinglasan. Complainant testified in this disbarment proceeding that he consulted respondent, who was then his counsel, about the demand made in 1957 or 1958 by Magno Dinglasan for P150,000.00 as consideration for the destruction of complainant's record in the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Respondent's advice was for complainant to disregard the demand as it was improper. Later, when Magno Dinglasan reduced the amount to P50,000.00, complainant again consulted respondent. Respondent likewise advised complainant not to heed the demand (pp. 61-62, tsn, May 21, 1981). Respondent's representation of Magno Dinglasan in I.S. No. 77-1523 constitutes malpractice (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) for respondent was previously the lawyer of complainant and respondent was consulted by complainant regarding the very matter which was the subject of the case. By serving as the lawyer of Magno Dinglasan, in I.S. No. 77-1523, respondent thus represented an interest which conflicted with the interest of his former client.

2.Respondent again committed malpractice when he served as lawyer of Magno Dinglasan in Civil Case No. 112764 before the Court of First Instance of Manila. Civil Case No. 112764 was an action for damages filed by Magno Dinglasan against complainant based, among others, on the same testimony that complainant gave on December 21, 1976 before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3930-M. For the same reasons set forth above, respondent's representation of Magno Dinglasan in Civil Case No. 112764 constitutes malpractice as thereby he represented conflicting interests. 3.In filing a charge against complainant for alleged illegal destruction of dikes, respondent violated the confidentiality of information obtained out of a client-lawyer relationship. In his capacity as lawyer of complainant from 1956 to 1964, respondent had the following functions: "Witness "A:He was my lawyer from 1956 from the time he passed the bar up to sometime in 1964 and my legal adviser on political matters and legal matters. "ATTY. AQUINO: "Q:As your lawyer from 1956 to 1964, will you kindly inform the Honorable Hearing Officer what was the nature of the work of Atty. Suntay? "A:He handled my cases on the titling of our properties. He served as my legal counsel in the Hagonoy Rural Bank of which my family is the majority stockholders. He used to help me manage my fishpond. He is our legal adviser on legal matters. He is our confidant. We have no secrets between us. He has complete access in our papers (tsn, May 21, 1981)

Complainant owned several fishponds in Bulacan, among them, the fishpond covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15674. This fishpond was previously traversed by two creeks, Sapang Malalim and Sapang Caluang. The existence of the creeks is shown by the certificate of title and the blue print plan of the fishpond. In the certificate of title, the fishpond is bounded on the north and northeast by Sapang Caluang and on the west by Sapang Malalim (please see Exhibit 6). In a letter dated March 17, 1973, respondent reported the disappearance of the two creeks to the authorities. The Chief State Prosecutor referred the letter to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan required the Public Works to conduct a re-survey. (Exhibit 6). In 1974, the Ministry of Public Works conducted a relocation survey of the fishpond. The relocation survey disclosed that there were no more creeks traversing the fishpond. Sapang Malalim and Sapang Caluang had disappeared. Respondent was requested to file a formal complaint with supporting affidavits, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 296. Respondent did so and the complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 74-193. (Exhibit 6) From the foregoing facts, it is clear that respondent made use of the information he gained while he was the lawyer of complainant as basis for his complaint for the building of illegal dikes. His possession and examination of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15674 and the blueprint plan provided him the information that there used to be two creeks traversing the fishpond covered by the title. Since he helped in the administration of the fishpond, he also came to know that the two creeks had disappeared. Thus, he gained the data which became the basis of his complaint when he was a lawyer and part administrator of complainant. Under the circumstances, there is a violation of professional confidence. 4.The evidence also establishes the commission of unethical conduct by respondent for serving as lawyer of Panganiban and Lopez . . . and for himself filing criminal charges against complainant which were later dismissed. The cases wherein respondent served as lawyer for the adversary of complainant or filed by respondent himself against complainant are the following: 1.Carlos Panganiban v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4306-M, CFI, Branch VII, Malolos, Bulacan; 2.Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4726-M, CFI, Branch II, Malolos, Bulacan; 3.Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, I.S. No. 77-1523, Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan; 4.Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 112764, CFI, Branch XX, Manila; and 5.Rafael G. Suntay and Magno Dinglasan v. Federico C. Suntay, I.S. No. 74-193, Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, for violation of P.D. 296. While there may be validity to respondent's contention that it is not improper for a lawyer to file a case against a former client, especially when the professional relationship had ended several years before, yet under the over-all circumstances of the case at bar it can not be said that respondent acted ethically. Complainant was not a mere client of respondent. He is an uncle and a political benefactor. The parties for whom respondent filed cases against complainant were former friends or associates of complainant whom respondent met when he was serving as the lawyer and general adviser of complainant. The cases filed by respondent were about properties which respondent had something to do with as counsel and administrator of complainant. xxx xxx xxx IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, undersigned respectfully submit that the evidence establishes commission by respondent of malpractice for violating the confidentiality of client-lawyer relationship and engaging in unethical conduct . . . 5 Resolution of this case was delayed despite receipt of the foregoing Report and Recommendation in view of theOmnibus Motion to Remand Case to the Office of the Solicitor General; Motion to Disqualify Solicitor Rogelio Dancel to Act on this Case and Motion to Suspend Period to File Answer dated 18 January 1983 filed by respondent principally accusing handling Solicitor Dancel of having given unwarranted advantage and preference to the complainant in the investigation of the case. After several pleadings on the issue were filed by both respondent and Solicitor Rogelio Dancel, the Court in itsResolution dated 22 August 1983 denied respondent's motion to disqualify Solicitor Dancel and required the OSG to proceed with the

investigation of this case. However, no further proceedings were conducted by the OSG until the records of the case together with other cases were turned over to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 19 May 1988. After almost three (3) years from the time the records of this case were turned over to it, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline submitted to this Court on 11 May 2001 Resolution No. XIV-2001-169 adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner finding respondent guilty as charged. The IBP recommended that respondent Atty. Suntay be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years for immoral conduct. In so recommending the Investigating Commissioner adopted in toto the findings of the OSG in its Report and Recommendation dated 14 October 1982. In our Resolution of 5 September 2001 we noted the foregoing IBP Resolution. However, in view of the penalty involved, this case was referred to the Court En Banc for final action pursuant to our Resolution dated 18 January 2000, Sec. 2, par. (b), in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC. 6 After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds the IBP Recommendation to be well taken. As found by both the OSG and the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent Atty. Rafael G. Suntay acted as counsel for clients in cases involving subject matters regarding which he had either been previously consulted by complainant or which he had previously helped complainant to administer as the latter's counsel and confidant from 1956 to 1964. Thus in Civil Cases Nos. 4306-M and 4726-M respondent acted as counsel for estranged business associates of complainant, namely, Carlos Panganiban and Narciso Lopez, the subject matter of which were the two (2) fishponds which respondent had previously helped to administer. On the other hand, I.S. No. 77-1523 for false testimony and grave oral defamation before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Civil Case No. 112764 for damages before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, were filed in behalf of Magno Dinglasan, a former Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) official, regarding whose alleged demand for P150,000.00 from complainant in exchange for the destruction of the latter's record in the BIR, respondent had previously advised complainant to disregard. Civil Case No. 117624 and I.S. No. 77-1523 were precisely filed against complainant because the latter had previously testified on the alleged demand made by Dinglasan. Although respondent denied that there was ever such a demand made by Dinglasan, the point is that his word on the matter, i.e., whether there was in fact such a demand, would carry much weight against complainant considering that he was the latter's counsel in 1957 or 1958 when the alleged demand was made. In addition, respondent initiated the prosecution of complainant in I.S. No. 74-193 for violation of P.D. No. 296 7 for the disappearance of the two (2) creeks, namely, Sapang Malalim and Sapang Caluang, previously traversing complainant's fishpond in Bulacan covered by TCT No. T-15674 by using information obtained while he was in possession of the certificate of title and the blueprint plan of the property. As the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 21.01. A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except: a)When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure; b)When required by law; c)When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action. Rule 21.01. A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after termination of the attorney-client relation. 8As his defense to the charges, respondent averred that complainant failed to specify the alleged confidential information used against him. Such a defense is unavailing to help respondent's cause for as succinctly explained in Hilado v. David 9 Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause. And the theory would be productive of other unsalutary results. To make the passing of confidential communication a condition precedent, i.e., to make the employment conditioned on the scope and character of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an investigation of what information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation be held, the court should accept the attorney's inaccurate version of the facts that came to him . . .

Hence, the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice . . . It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste . . . [T]he question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and doubledealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, IBP Resolution No. XIV-2001-169 dated 29 April 2001 is adopted and approved. For violating the confidentiality of lawyer-client relationship and for unethical conduct, respondent Atty. Rafael G. Suntay is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon the finality hereof. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C. J., Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago; Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez and Corona, JJ., concur. FIRST DIVISION [A.M. No. 4215. May 21, 2001.] FELICISIMO M. MONTANO, complainant, vs. INTEGRATED BAR of the PHILIPPINES and Atty. JUAN S. DEALCA, respondents. RESOLUTION KAPUNAN, J p: In a verified complaint filed before this Court on March 9, 1994, complainant Felicisimo M. Montano charged Atty. Juan Dealca with misconduct and prays that he be "sternly dealt with administratively." The complaint 1 is summarized as follows: IcCDAS 1.On November 14, 1992, the complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 37467 wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-appellant. 2.The parties agreed upon attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00, fifty percent (50%) of which was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining balance upon the termination of the case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent the amount of P7,500.00 representing 50% of the attorney's fee. CAcIES 3.Thereafter, even before respondent counsel had prepared the appellant's brief and contrary to their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after the termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment from complainant. Complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4,000.00. 4.Prior to the filing of the appellant's brief, respondent counsel again demanded payment of the remaining balance of P3,500.00. When complainant was unable to do so, respondent lawyer withdrew his appearance as complainant's counsel without his prior knowledge and/or conformity. Returning the case folder to the complainant, respondent counsel attached a Note dated February 28, 1993, 2 stating: 28 February 1994 Pepe and Del Montano, For breaking your promise, since you do not want to fulfill your end of the bargain, here's your reward: Henceforth, you lawyer for yourselves. Here are your papers. Johnny Complainant claimed that such conduct by respondent counsel exceeded the ethical standards of the law profession and prays that the latter be sternly dealt with administratively. Complainant later on filed motions praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment.

After respondent counsel filed his comment on the complaint, the Court in the Resolution of August 1, 1994, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner found respondent counsel guilty of unprofessional conduct and recommended that he be "severely reprimanded." However, in a Resolution 3 by the IBP Board of Governors on July 26, 1997, it was resolved that the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner meted to respondent be amended to "three (3) months suspension from the practice of law for having been found guilty of misconduct, which eroded the public confidence regarding his duty as a lawyer." Respondent counsel sought reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution of the IBP, alleging that the latter misapprehended the facts and that, in any case, he did not deserve the penalty imposed. The true facts, according to him, are the following: 1.Complainant is being represented by Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in his case on appeal; 2.Due to the ailment of Atty. Gerona's daughter, he could not prepare and submit complainant's appellant's brief on time; 3.Complainant went to the respondent to do just that, i.e., prepare and submit his appellant's brief on time at the agreed fee of P15,000.00, 50% down and 50% upon its completion; ITEcAD 4.Working overtime, respondent was able to finish the appellant's brief ahead of its deadline, so he advised the complainant about its completion with the request that the remaining balance of P7,500.00 be paid. Complainant paid P4,000.00 only, promising to pay the P3,500.00 "tomorrow" or on "later particular date." Please take note that, at this juncture, there was already a breach of the agreement on complainant's part. 5.When that "tomorrow" or on a "later particular date" came, respondent, thru a messenger, requested the complainant to pay the P3,500.00 as promised but word was sent that he will again pay "tomorrow" or on a "later date." This promise-non-payment cycle went on repeatedly until the last day of the filing of the brief. Please take note again that it was not the respondent but the complainant who sets the date when he will pay, yet he fails to pay as promised; 6.Even without being paid completely, respondent, of his own free will and accord, filed complainant's brief on time; EISCaD 7.After the brief was filed, respondent tried to collect from the complainant the remaining balance of P3,500.00, but the latter made himself scarce. As the records would show, such P3,500.00 remains unpaid until now; 8.Sensing that something was amiss, respondent sent the February 28, 1993 note and case folder to the complainant, hoping that the latter would see personally the former about it to settle the matter between them; 9.However, instead of seeing the respondent, complainant filed this case; IDSETA 10.Respondent was constrained to file his withdrawal with the Court of Appeals because of this case to avoid further misunderstanding since he was the one who signed the appellant's brief although Atty. Gerona was his counsel of record. Such withdrawal was accordingly granted by the appellate court; xxx xxx xxx 4 Respondent counsel further averred that complainant's refusal to pay the agreed lawyer's fees, measly as it was, was deliberate and in bad faith; hence, his withdrawal as counsel was "just, ethical and proper." Respondent counsel concluded that not only was the penalty of suspension harsh for his act of merely trying to collect payment for his services rendered, but it indirectly would punish his family since he was the sole breadwinner with children in school and his wife terminally ill with cancer. In its Resolution No. XIII-97-129 dated October 25, 1997, the IBP denied Atty. Dealca's motion for reconsideration, to wit: xxx xxx xxx RESOLVED TO DENY Atty. Dealca's Motion For Reconsideration of the Board's Decision in the aboveentitled case there being no substantive reason to reverse the finding therein. Moreover, the motion is improperly laid the remedy of the respondent is to file the appropriate pleading with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of said Decision pursuant to Sec. 12 [c] of Rule 139-B. 5

On December 10, 1997, this Court noted the following pleadings filed in the present complaint, (a)notice and a copy of Resolution No. XII-97-154 dated July 26, 1997 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines amending the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of reprimand to three (3) months suspension of respondent from the practice of law for having been found guilty of misconduct which eroded the public confidence regarding his duty as a lawyer; (b)complainant's motion praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment; TSaEcH (c)motion dated September 15, 1997 of respondent for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution of July 26, 1997; (d)comment/opposition of respondent praying that the motion for the imposition of the maximum penalty be denied; (e)comment of complainant praying that the penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law as recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines pursuant to Resolution No. XII-97154 be raised to a heavier penalty; (f)comment/manifestation/opposition of complainant praying that the respondent be disbarred; and (g)rejoinder of respondent praying that this case be dismissed for being baseless. 6 and referred the same to the IBP for evaluation and report. In compliance therewith, on March 28, 1998, the IBP issued Resolution No. XIII-98-42 referring the above-entitled case to Commissioner Vibar for evaluation, report and recommendation "in view of the Motion for Reconsideration granted by the Supreme Court." The Investigating Commissioner, after referring the case, recommended that his original recommendation of the imposition of the penalty of reprimand be maintained, noting that respondent counsel had served the IBP well as President of the Sorsogon Chapter. 7 Accordingly, on February 23, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors, issued the following resolution: RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-48 xxx xxx xxx RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration be granted and that the penalty ofREPRIMAND earlier recommended by the Investigating Commissioner be imposed on Atty. Juan S. Dealca. 8 Complainant asked the IBP to reconsider the foregoing resolution but the motion was denied. 9 On April 10, 2000, complainant filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari in connection with Administrative Case No. 4215 against the IBP and respondent counsel averring that the IBP Board of Governors committed grave abuse of discretion when it overturned its earlier resolution and granted respondent counsel's motion for reconsideration on February 23, 1999. He claimed that the earlier resolution denying the motion for reconsideration issued on October 25, 1997 had already become final and executory; hence, any further action or motion subsequent to such final and executory judgment shall be null and void. When the Court issued the resolution of December 10, 1997 treating the several pleadings filed in the present complaint, it should be noted that the IBP resolution denying respondent's motion for reconsideration (Resolution No. XIII-97-129) dated October 25, 1997, for some reason, had not yet reached this Court. As of that date, the only IBP resolution attached to the records of the case was Resolution No. XII-97-54 amending the administrative sanction from reprimand to three months suspension. Hence, at the time the pleadings were referred back to the IBP in the same resolution, the Court was not aware that the IBP had already disposed of the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent counsel.

Thus, when the IBP was informed of the said Court resolution, it construed the same as granting Atty. Dealca's motion for reconsideration and as an order for IBP to conduct a re-evaluation of the case. The IBP assumed that its resolution of October 25, 1997 was already considered by this Court when it referred the case back to the IBP. It failed to notice that its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was not among those pleadings and resolution referred back to it.

Hence, on the strength of this Court's resolution which it had inadvertently misconstrued, the IBP conducted a re-evaluation of the case and came up with the assailed resolution now sought to be reversed. The Court holds that the error is not attributable to the IBP. It is regrettable that the procedural infirmity alleged by complainant actually arose from a mere oversight which was attributable to neither party. HSATIC Going into the merits, we affirm the findings made by the IBP that complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer only for the preparation and submission of the appellant's brief and the attorney's fees was payable upon the completion and submission of the appellant's brief and not upon the termination of the case. There is sufficient evidence which indicates complainant's willingness to pay the attorney's fees. As agreed upon, complainant paid half of the fees in the amount of P7,500.00 upon acceptance of the case. And while the remaining balance was not yet due as it was agreed to be paid only upon the completion and submission of the brief, complainant nonetheless delivered to respondent lawyer P4,000.00 as the latter demanded. This, notwithstanding, Atty. Dealca withdrew his appearance simply because of complainant's failure to pay the remaining balance of P3,500.00, which does not appear to be deliberate. The situation was aggravated by respondent counsel's note to complainant withdrawing as counsel which was couched in impolite and insulting language. 10 Given the above circumstances, was Atty. Dealca's conduct just and proper? We find Atty. Dealca's conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services,11 under the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca's withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorney's fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondent's contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member of the bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. Rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant, respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code. The Court, however, does not agree with complainant's contention that the maximum penalty of disbarment should be imposed on respondent lawyer. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreed where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. 12 In the present case, reprimand is deemed sufficient. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca is REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardoand Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. SECOND DIVISION [A.C. No. 5485. March 16, 2005.] ELMER CANOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, respondent. DECISION TINGA, J p: There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of the client in the midst of litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legal practice on account of what might be perceived as a higher calling, election to public office, does not mitigate the dereliction of professional duty. Suspension from the practice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason to deviate from the norm in this case. A Complaint 1 dated 10 April 2001 was filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant by Elmer Canoy (Canoy) accusing Atty. Jose Max Ortiz (Atty. Ortiz) of misconduct and malpractice. It was alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his former employer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines. The complaint was filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Board VI in Bacolod City. 2 Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding. In 1998, the labor arbiter hearing the complaint ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers. Canoy submitted all the necessary documents and records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the progress of the case. After a final visit at the office of Atty. Ortiz in April of 2000, during which Canoy was told to come back as his lawyer was not present, Canoy decided to follow-up the case himself with the NLRC. He was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998, for failure to prosecute, the parties not

having submitted their position papers. 3 The dismissal was without prejudice. Canoy alleged that Atty. Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the case, much less the fact that he failed to submit the position paper. aScITE The Comment 4 filed by Atty. Ortiz is the epitome of self-hagiography. He informs the Court that since commencing his law practice in 1987, he has mostly catered to indigent and low-income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz claims that for more than ten years, his law office was a virtual adjunct of the Public Attorney's Office with its steady stream of non-paying clients in the "hundreds or thousands." 5 At the same time, he hosted a legal assistance show on the radio, catering to far-flung municipalities and reaching "the people who need legal advice and assistance." 6 Atty. Ortiz pursued on with this lifestyle until his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, a victory which he generously attributes to the help "of the same people whom he had helped by way of legal assistance before." 7 Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. The lawyer was apparently confident that the illegal dismissal case would eventually be resolved by way of compromise. He claims having prepared the position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit the same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order dismissing the case. 8 Atty. Ortiz admits though that the period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, "he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local government official and as a practicing lawyer." Eventually, "his desire to help was beyond physical limitations," and he withdrew from his other cases and his "free legal services." 9 According to Atty. Ortiz, "Mr. Canoy should have at least understood that during all that time, he was free to visit or call the office and be entertained by the secretary as [he] would normally report to the office in the afternoon as he had to attend to court trials and report to the Sanggunian office." 10 He states that it was his policy to inform clients that they should be the ones to follow-up their cases with his office, as it would be "too difficult and a financial burden to attend making follow-ups with hundreds of clients, mostly indigents" with only two office personnel. 11 Nonetheless, Atty. Ortiz notes that the dismissal of Canoy's complaint was without prejudice, thus the prescriptive period had been tolled. He claims not being able to remember whether he immediately informed Canoy of the dismissal of the case, though as far as he could recall, Canoy had conveyed a message to him that he had a lawyer to handle the case, thus his office did not insist on refiling the same. 12 The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 13Canoy eventually submitted a motion withdrawing the complaint, but this was not favorably acted upon by the IBP in view of the rule that the investigation of a case shall not be interrupted or terminated by reason of withdrawal of the charges. 14 Eventually, the investigating commissioner concluded that "clearly, the records show that [Atty. Ortiz] failed to exercise that degree of competence and diligence required of him in prosecuting his clients' (sic) claim," and recommended that Atty. Ortiz be reprimanded. 15 The IBP Commission on Discipline adopted the recommendation, with the slight modification that Atty. Ortiz be likewise warned that a repetition of the same negligence shall be dealt with more severely in the future. The Court is sensitive to the difficulties in obtaining legal representation for indigent or low-income litigants. Apart from the heroic efforts of government entities such as the Public Attorney's Office, groups such as the IBP National Committee on Legal Aid and the Office of Legal Aid of the UP College of Law have likewise been at the forefront in the quest to provide legal representation for those who could not otherwise afford the services of lawyers. The efforts of private practitioners who assist in this goal are especially commendable, owing to their sacrifice in time and resources beyond the call of duty and without expectation of pecuniary reward. jur2005cda Yet, the problem of under-representation of indigent or low-income clients is just as grievous as that of nonrepresentation. Admirable as the apparent focus of Atty. Ortiz's legal practice may have been, his particular representation of Canoy in the latter's illegal dismissal case leaves much to be desired. CEIHcT Several of the canons and rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility guard against the sort of conduct displayed by Atty. Ortiz with respect to the handling of Canoy's case. CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. xxx xxx xxx Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. xxx xxx xxx

CANON 22 A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. xxx xxx xxx Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter. IAaCST Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing to his duty as counsel of Canoy to attend to this legal matter entrusted to him. His failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 16 If indeed Atty. Ortiz's schedule, workload, or physical condition was such that he would not be able to make a timely filing, he should have informed Canoy of such fact. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his/her interests are being defended. 17 There could have been remedies undertaken to this inability of Atty. Ortiz to file on time the position paper had Canoy been told of such fact, such as a request for more time to file the position paper, or maybe even the hiring of collaborating counsel or substitution of Atty. Ortiz as counsel. Since Atty. Ortiz did not exercise the necessary degree of care by either filing the position paper on time or informing Canoy that the paper could not be submitted seasonably, the ignominy of having the complaint dismissed for failure to prosecute could not be avoided.

That the case was dismissed without prejudice, thus allowing Canoy to refile the case, hardly serves to mitigate the liability of Atty. Ortiz, as the failure to file the position paper is per se a violation of Rule 18.03. 18 Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty. Ortiz's election as a City Councilor of Bacolod City, as his adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior. The Code of Professional Responsibility does allow a lawyer to withdraw his legal services if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office.19 Statutes expressly prohibit the occupant of particular public offices from engaging in the practice of law, such as governors and mayors, 20 and in such instance, the attorney-client relationship is terminated. 21 However, city councilors are allowed to practice their profession or engage in any occupation except during session hours, and in the case of lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz, subject to certain prohibitions which are not relevant to this case. 22 In such case, the lawyer nevertheless has the choice to withdraw his/her services. 23 Still, the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case. 24 Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. 25 Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no further action on the case was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming that were true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel. aDHCAE In fact, it took nearly two years before Canoy had learned that the position paper had not been filed and that the case had been dismissed. This was highly irresponsible of Atty. Ortiz, much more so considering that Canoy was one of the indigent clients whom Atty. Ortiz proudly claims as his favored clientele. It does not escape the Court's attention that Atty. Ortiz faults Canoy for not adequately following up the case with his office. 26 He cannot now shift the blame to complainant for failing to inquire about the status of the case, since, as stated above, it was his duty as lawyer to inform his clients of the status of cases entrusted to him. 27

The appropriate sanction is within the sound discretion of this Court. In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Court consisted of either a reprimand, a fine of five hundred pesos with warning, suspension of three months, six months, and even disbarment in aggravated cases. 28 Given the circumstances, the Court finds the penalty recommended by the IBP too lenient and instead suspends Atty. Ortiz from the practice of law for one (1) month. The graver penalty of suspension is warranted in lieu of an admonition or a reprimand considering that Atty. Ortiz's undisputed negligence in failing to timely file the position paper was compounded by his failure to inform Canoy of such fact, and the successive dismissal of the complaint. Lawyers who devote their professional practice in representing litigants who could ill afford legal services deserve commendation. However, this mantle of public service will not deliver the lawyer, no matter how well-meaning, from the consequences of negligent acts. It is not enough to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of legal representation. They deserve quality representation as well. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose Max S. Ortiz is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the same negligence will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all the courts in the land. SO ORDERED. aIETCA Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. EN BANC [B.M. No. 793 . July 30, 2004.] IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA RESOLUTION TINGA, J p: May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction? There is a Rule of Court provision covering this case's central issue. Up to this juncture, its reach and breadth have not undergone the test of an unsettled case. In a Letter dated August 20, 1996, 1 the District Court of Guam informed this Court of the suspension of Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam for two (2) years pursuant to the Decision rendered by the Superior Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in Special Proceedings Case No. SP0075-94, 2 a disciplinary case filed by the Guam Bar Ethics Committee against Maquera. The Court referred the matter of Maquera's suspension in Guam to the Bar Confidant for comment in its Resolutiondated November 19, 1996. 3 Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided the foreign court's action is by reason of an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyer's oath. In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997, then Bar Confidant Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa recommended that the Court obtain copies of the record of Maquera's case since the documents transmitted by the Guam District Court do not contain the factual and legal bases for Maquera's suspension and are thus insufficient to enable her to determine whether Maquera's acts or omissions which resulted in his suspension in Guam are likewise violative of his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar. 4 Pursuant to this Court's directive in its Resolution dated March 18, 1997, 5 the Bar Confidant sent a letter dated November 13, 1997 to the District Court of Guam requesting for certified copies of the record of the disciplinary case against Maquera and of the rules violated by him. 6 The Court received certified copies of the record of Maquera's case from the District Court of Guam on December 8, 1997. 7 Thereafter, Maquera's case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from the IBP's receipt of the case records. 8 The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to appear before the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline on July 28, 1998. 9 However, the notice was returned unserved because Maquera had already moved from his last known address in Agana, Guam and did not leave any forwarding address. 10

On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the Court its Report and Recommendation and its Resolution No. XVI-2003-110, indefinitely suspending Maquera from the practice of law within the Philippines until and unless he updates and pays his IBP membership dues in full. 11 The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On October 18, 1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. He was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his client's property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client's case. 12 In its Decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that on August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente, the creditor of a certain Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case. Maquera served as Castro's counsel in said case. Castro's property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold at a public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right of redemption over the property for one year. The right of redemption could be exercised by paying the amount of the judgment debt within the aforesaid period. 13 At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castro's property for Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$500.00), the amount which Castro was adjudged to pay him. 14 On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maquera's legal services in the civil case involving Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter. 15 On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castro's right of redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in his name. 16 On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00). 17 On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee (Committee) conducted hearings regarding Maquera's alleged misconduct. 18 Subsequently, the Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam praying that Maquera be sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.5 19 and 1.8(a) 20 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its Petition, the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an unreasonably high fee for his services. The Committee further alleged that Maquera himself admitted his failure to comply with the requirement in Rule 1.8(a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms governing the lawyer's acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed to, and understood by the client and reduced in writing. 21 The Committee recommended that Maquera be: (1) suspended from the practice of law in Guam for a period of two [2] years, however, with all but thirty (30) days of the period of suspension deferred; (2) ordered to return to Castro the difference between the sale price of the property to the Changs and the amount due him for legal services rendered to Castro; (3) required to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings; and (4) publicly reprimanded. It also recommended that other jurisdictions be informed that Maquera has been subject to disciplinary action by the Superior Court of Guam. 22 Maquera did not deny that Castro executed a quitclaim deed to the property in his favor as compensation for past legal services and that the transaction, except for the deed itself, was oral and was not made pursuant to a prior written agreement. However, he contended that the transaction was made three days following the alleged termination of the attorney-client relationship between them, and that the property did not constitute an exorbitant fee for his legal services to Castro. 23 On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam rendered its Decision 24 suspending Maquera from the practice of law in Guam for a period of two (2) years and ordering him to take the Multi-State Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within that period. The court found that the attorney-client relationship between Maquera and Castro was not yet completely terminated when they entered into the oral agreement to transfer Castro's right of redemption to Maquera on December 21, 1987. It also held that Maquera profited too much from the eventual transfer of Castro's property to him since he was able to sell the same to the Changs with more than US$200,000.00 in profit, whereas his legal fees for services rendered to Castro amounted only to US$45,000.00. The court also ordered him to take the MPRE upon his admission during the hearings of his case that he was aware of the requirements of the Model Rules regarding business transactions between an attorney and his client "in a very general sort of way." 25 On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence to establish that [Maquera] committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines." 26 However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court. 27 The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found inSection 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992, which states:

Section 27.Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor . A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. ECcaDT The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis supplied). The Court must therefore determine whether Maquera's acts, namely: acquiring by assignment Castro's right of redemption over the property subject of the civil case where Maquera appeared as counsel for him; exercising the right of redemption; and, subsequently selling the property for a huge profit, violate Philippine law or the standards of ethical behavior for members of the Philippine Bar and thus constitute grounds for his suspension or disbarment in this jurisdiction. The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his client's property by exercising the right of redemption previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal services. Such transaction falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 28 prohibits the lawyer's acquisition by assignment of the client's property which is the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492, 29 the prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption. The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client 30 and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. The case of In re: Ruste 31 illustrates the significance of the aforementioned prohibition. In that case, the attorney acquired his clients' property subject of a case where he was acting as counsel pursuant to a deed of sale executed by his clients in his favor. He contended that the sale was made at the instance of his clients because they had no money to pay him for his services. The Court ruled that the lawyer's acquisition of the property of his clients under the circumstances obtaining therein rendered him liable for malpractice. The Court held: . . . Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses driven by financial necessity, as contended by the respondent, or at the latter's behest, as contended by the complainant, is of no moment. In either case an attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a harassed client, in breach of the "rule so amply protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and client, and of the rights of both". 32 The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maquera's acquisition of Castro's right of redemption, his subsequent exercise of said right, and his act of selling the redeemed property for huge profits were tainted with deceit and bad faith when it concluded that Maquera charged Castro an exorbitant fee for his legal services. The court held that since the assignment of the right of redemption to Maquera was in payment for his legal services, and since the property redeemed by him had a market value of US$248,220.00 as of December 21, 1987 (the date when the right of redemption was assigned to him), he is liable for misconduct for accepting payment for his legal services way beyond his actual fees which amounted only to US$45,000.00. Maquera's acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year suspension from the practice of law in that jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the Philippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyer's sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him;" and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain one's good's standing in the legal profession. 33 It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment ordering Maquera's suspension from the practice of law in Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines. Under Section 27, 34 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. 35 Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutesprima facie evidence of Maquera's unethical acts as a lawyer. 36 More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the

charges against him. It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex parte. 37 The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf regarding the charges of unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did receive the Notice of Hearing earlier sent by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to ascertain Maquera's current and correct address in Guam in order that another notice, this time specifically informing him of the charges against him and requiring him to explain why he should not be suspended or disbarred on those grounds (through this Resolution), may be sent to him. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law for non-payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the present. 38 Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court, nonpayment of membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year shall be ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 39 WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of thisResolution, why he should not be suspended or disbarred for his acts which gave rise to the disciplinary proceedings against him in the Superior Court of Guam and his subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction. cDTaSH The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and correct address of Atty. Maquera in Guam and to serve upon him a copy of this Resolution. In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR or until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever comes later. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Maquera's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Chico-Nazario, JJ ., concur. Corona, J ., is on leave. RULE 139 Disbarment or Suspension of Attorneys SECTION 1. Motion or complaint. Proceedings for the removal or suspension of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court on its own motion or upon the complaint under oath of another in writing. The complaint shall set out distinctly, clearly, and concisely the facts complained of, supported by affidavits, if any, of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and shall be accompanied with copies of such documents as may substantiate said facts. SECTION 2. Service or dismissal. If the complaint appears to merit action, a copy thereof shall be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within ten (10) days from the date of service. If the complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court that the complaint is not meritorious, the same shall be dismissed. SECTION 3. Investigation by Solicitor General. Upon the issues raised by the complaint and answer, or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the case shall be referred to the Solicitor General for investigation to determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of the respondent. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, the respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte. SECTION 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently. SECTION 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of respondent. If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen (15) days. SECTION 6. Evidence produced before Solicitor General available. The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation may be considered by the Supreme Court in the final decision of the case, if the respondent had an opportunity to object and cross-examine. If in the respondent's answer no statement is made as to any intention of introducing additional

evidence, the case shall be set down for hearing, upon the filing of such answer or upon the expiration of the time to file the same. SECTION 7. Commissioner to investigate and recommend. Rules of evidence. Upon receipt of the respondent's answer, wherein a statement is made as to his desire to introduce additional evidence, the case shall be referred to a commissioner who, in the discretion of the court, may be the clerk of the Supreme Court, a judge of first instance, or an attorney-at-law for investigation, report, and recommendation. The Solicitor General or his representative shall appear before the commissioner to conduct the prosecution. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to produce additional evidence in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte. The rules of evidence shall be applicable to proceedings of this nature. SECTION 8. Report of commissioner and hearing. Upon receipt of the report of the commissioner, copies of which shall be furnished the Solicitor General and the respondent, the case shall be set down for hearing before the court, following which the case shall be considered submitted to the court for its final determination. SECTION 9. Procedure in Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance. As far as may be applicable, the procedure above outlined shall likewise govern the filing and investigation of complaints against attorneys in the Court of Appeals or in Courts of First Instance. In case of suspension of the respondent, the judge of the court of first instance or Justice of the Court of Appeals shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which same is based. SECTION 10. Confidential. Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential, except that the final order of the court shall be made public as in other cases coming before the court.) RULE 139-A Integrated Bar of the Philippines SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the Integrates Bar of the Philippines, composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. SECTION 2. Purpose. The fundamental purposes of the Integrated bar shall be to elevate the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. SECTION 3. Regions. The Philippines is hereby divided into nine Regions of the Integrated Bar, to wit: (a) Northern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Batanes, Benguet, Cagayan, Ifugao, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, La Union, Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, and Quirino; (b) Central Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Zambales; (c) Greater Manila, consisting of the City of Manila, and Quezon City; (d) Southern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque, Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Quezon and Rizal. (f) Eastern Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern Samar, Samar, and Southern Leyte; (g) Western Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Palawan, Romblon, and Siquijor; (h) Eastern Mindanao, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Mindoro, Misamis Oriental, Surigao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur; and (i) Western Mindanao, consisting of the cities of Basilan and Zamboanga, and the provinces of Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Misamis Occidental, South Cotabato, Sulu, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur. In the event of the creation of any new province, the Board of Governors shall, with the approval of the Supreme Court, determine the Region to which the said province shall belong. SECTION 4. Chapters. A Chapter of the Integrated Bar shall be organized in every province. Except as hereinbelow provided, every city shall be considered part of the province within which it is geographically situated. A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the following political subdivisions or areas;

(a) The sub-province of Aurora; (b) Each congressional district of the City of Manila; (c) Quezon City; (d) Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas; (e) Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte; (f) Cebu City; and

(g) Zamboanga City and Basilan City Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter. Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by uniform rules to be prescribed by the Board of Governors and approved by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 19 of this rule notwithstanding. Chapters belonging to the same Region shall hold regional conventions on matters and problems of common concern. SECTION 5. House of Delegates. The Integrated Bar shall have a House of Delegates of not more than one hundred twenty members who shall be apportioned among all the Chapters as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. On or before December 31, 1974, and every four years thereafter, the Board of Governors shall make an apportionment of Delegates. The term of the office of Delegates shall begin on the date of the opening of the annual convention of the House and shall end on the day immediately preceding the date of the opening of the next succeeding annual convention. No person may be a Delegate for more than two terms. The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board of Governors at any time during the month of April of each year for the election of Governors, the reading and discussion of reports including the annual report of the Board of Governors, the transaction of such other business as may be referred to it by the Board and the consideration of such additional matters as may be requested in writing by at least twenty Delegates. Special conventions of the House may be called by the Board of Governors to consider only such matters as the Board shall indicate. A majority of the Delegates who have registered for a convention, whether annual or special, shall constitute a quorum to do business. SECTION 6. Board of Governors. The Integrated bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation basis of one Governor from each Region. Each Governor shall be chosen from a list of nominees submitted by the Delegates from the Region, provided that not more than one nominee shall come from any Chapter. The President and the Executive Vice President, chosen by the Governors from outside of themselves as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto become members of the Board. The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a Governor for more than two terms. The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date at such time and place as it shall designate. A majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business. Special meetings may be called by the President or by five members of the Board. Subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board shall adopt By-Laws and promulgate Canons of Professional Responsibility for all the members of the Integrated Bar. The By-laws and the Canons may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors. The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the Integrated bar as well as the provisions of this Rule. SECTION 7. Officers. The Integrated Bar shall have a President and an Executive Vice President who shall be chosen by the Governor immediately after the latter's election; either from among themselves or from other members of the Integrated Bar, by the vote of at least five Governors. Each of the regional members of the Board shall be ex officio Vice President for the Region which he represents.

The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and until their successors shall have duly qualified. The Executive Vice President shall automatically become the President for the next succeeding full term. The Presidency shall rotate from year to year among all the nine Regions in such order of rotation as the Board of Governors shall prescribe. No person shall be President or Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar for more than one term. The Integrated Bar shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers and employees as may be required by the Board of Governors, to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board, and to hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as it may fix. Said officers and employees need not be members of the Integrated Bar. SECTION 8. Vacancies. In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice President; and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President during the remainder of the term of the office thus vacated. In the event of the death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President to hold office until the next succeeding election or during the period of disability. The filing of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of Governors, and all other positions of Officers of the Integrated bar shall be as provided in the By-Laws. Whenever the term of an office or position is for a fixed period, the person chosen to fill a vacancy therein shall serve only for the unexpired term. SECTION 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof. SECTION 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. SECTION 11. Voluntary termination of membership; reinstatement. A member may terminate his membership by filing a written notice to that effect with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court. Forthwith he shall cease to be a member and his name shall be stricken by the Court from the Roll of Attorneys. Reinstatement may be made by the Court in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors and approved by the Court. SECTION 12. Grievance procedures. The Board of Governors shall provide in the By-Laws for grievance procedures for the enforcement and maintenance of discipline among all the members of the Integrated Bar, but no action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal of his name from the Roll of Attorneys shall be effective without the final approval of the Supreme Court. SECTION 13. Non-Political Bar. The Integrated Bar shall be strictly non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, Officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasijudicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. SECTION 14. Positions honorary. Except as may be specifically authorized or allowed by the Supreme Court, no Delegate or Governor and no national or local Officer or committee member shall receive any compensation, allowance or emolument from the funds of the Integrated Bar for any service rendered therein or be entitled to reimbursement for any expense incurred in the discharge of his functions. SECTION 15. Fiscal matters. The Board of Governors shall administer the funds of the Integrated Bar and shall have the power to make appropriations and disbursements therefrom. It shall cause proper Books of Accounts to be kept and Financial Statements to be rendered and shall see to it that the proper audit is made of all accounts of the Integrated Bar and all the Chapters thereof. SECTION 16. Journal. The Board of Governors shall cause to be published a quarterly Journal of the Integrated Bar, free copies of which shall be distributed to every member of the Integrated Bar. SECTION 17. Voluntary bar associations. All voluntary Bar associations now existing or which may hereafter be formed may co-exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-purposes therewith. SECTION 18. Amendments. This Rule may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors or any Chapter of the Integrated Bar.

SECTION 19. Organizational period. The Commission on Bar Integration shall organize the local Chapters and toward this end shall secure the assistance of the Department of Justice and of all Judges throughout the Philippines. All Chapter organizational meetings shall be held on Saturday, February 17, 1973. In every case, the Commission shall cause proper notice of the date, time and place of the meeting to be served upon all the lawyers concerned at their addresses appearing in the records of the Commission. The lawyers present at the meeting called to organize a Chapter shall constitute a quorum for the purpose, including the election of a President, a Vice President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and five Directors.

The Commission shall initially fix the number of Delegates and apportion the same among all the Chapters as nearly as may be in proportion to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. The President of each Chapter shall concurrently be its Delegate to the House of Delegates. The Vice President shall be his alternate, except where the Chapter is entitled to have more than one Delegate. The Board of Directors of the Chapter shall in proper cases elect additional as well as alternate Delegates. The House of Delegates shall convene in the City of Manila on Saturday, March 17, 1973 for the purpose of electing a Board of Governors. The Governors shall immediately assume office and forthwith meet to elect the Officers of the Integrated Bar. The Officers so chosen shall immediately assume their respective positions. SECTION 20. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on January 16, 1973. (Rule 139-A which ordained the integration of the Philippine Bar and the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines did not withdraw from the courts the authority to investigate and decide complaints against erring members of the Bar.) RULE 139-B Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys SECTION 1. How Instituted. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the government service; Provided, however, that all charges against Justices of the Court of Tax Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court; Provided, further, that charges filed against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment in the Judiciary, shall immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication. Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapters who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an investigator. (As amended by Bar Matter No. 1960, effective May 1, 2000) A. Proceedings in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines SECTION 2. National Grievance Investigators. The Board of Governors shall appoint from among the IBP members an Investigator or, when special circumstances so warrant, a panel of three (3) investigators to investigate the complaint. All investigators shall take an oath of office in the form prescribed by the Board of Governors. A copy of the Investigator's appointment and oath shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court. An Investigator may be disqualified by reason of relationship with the fourth degree of on sanguinity or affinity to any of the parties or their counsel, pecuniary interest, personal bias, or his having acted as counsel for either party, unless the parties sign and enter upon the record their written consent to his acting as such Investigator. Where the Investigator does not disqualify himself, a party may appeal to the IBP Board of Governors, which by majority vote of the members present, there being a quorum, may order his disqualification. SECTION 3. Duties of the National Grievance Investigator. The National Grievance Investigators shall investigate all complaints against members of the Integrated Bar referred to them by the IBP Board of Governors. SECTION 4. Chapter assistance to complaint. The proper IBP Chapter may assist the complainant[s] in the preparation and filing of his complaints. SECTION 5. Service or dismissal. If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the date of service. If the complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the Investigator that the complaint is not meritorious, the same may be dismissed by the Board of Governors upon his recommendation. A copy of the resolution of

dismissal shall be furnished the complainant and the Supreme Court which may review the case motu propio or upon timely appeal of the complainant filed within 15 days from notice of the dismissal of the complaint. No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the distance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complaint to prosecute the same. SECTION 6. Verification and service of answer. The answer shall be verified. The original and five (5) legible copies of the answer shall be filed with the Investigator, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the complaint or his counsel. SECTION 7. Administrative counsel. The IBP Board of Governors shall appoint a suitable member of the Integrated Bar as counsel to assist the complainant or the respondent during the investigation in case of need for such assistance. SECTION 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte. The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three(3) months from the date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application. Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth in the Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendation, which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty. SECTION 9. Depositions. Depositions may be taken in accordance with Rules of Court with leave of the Investigators. With the Philippines, depositions may be taken before any member of the Board of Governors, the President of any Chapter, or any officer authorized by law to administer oaths. Depositions may be taken outside the Philippines before a diplomatic or consular representative of the Philippine Government or before any person agreed upon by the parties or designated by the Board of Governors. Any suitable member of the Integrated Bar in the place where a deposition shall be taken may be designated by the Investigator to assist the complainant or the respondent in taking a deposition. SECTION 10. Report of Investigator. Not later than thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the Investigator shall submit a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations to the IBP Board of Governors, together with the stenographic notes and the transcript thereof, and all the evidence presented during the investigation. The submission of the report need not await the transcription of the stenographic notes, it being sufficient that the report reproduce substantially from the Investigator's personal notes any relevant and pertinent testimonies. SECTION 11. Defects. No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigator's Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings. SECTION 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report. (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. (c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board of the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.

(d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court. B. Proceedings in the Supreme Court SECTION 13. Investigation by Solicitor General. In proceedings initiated motu propio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. SECTION 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations together with the record and all the evidence presented in the investigation for the final action of the Supreme Court. C. Common Provisions SECTION 15. Suspension of attorney by Supreme Court. After receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of the period therefor, the Supreme Court, motu propio, or at the instance of the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigators, may suspend an attorney from the practice of his profession for any of the cause specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the pendency of the investigation until such suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court. SECTION 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in Rule 138, Section 27, until further action of the Supreme Court in the case. SECTION 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the case and may revoke, shorten or extend the suspension, or disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant. SECTION 18. Confidentiality. Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases. SECTION 19. Expenses. All reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in relation to disciplinary and disbarment proceedings are lawful charges for which the parties may be taxed as costs. SECTION 20. Effectivity and Transitory Provision. This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988. All cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been substantially completed.