Bernardita Macariola vs Judge Elias Asuncion On February 27, 2012 31 May 1982, 114 SCRA 77 Civil Law Law

w on Sales Contract of Sale Subject Matter Under Litigation In 1963, Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a dispute over their inheritance involving parcels of land located in Leyte. A trial ensued and Judge Macariola, after determining the legibility of the parties to inherit rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter, the counsels of the parties submitted a project partition reflecting the preference of the parties. The project partition was, however, unsigned by Macariola. But her lawyer assured Asuncion that he is duly authorized by Macariola as counsel. The judge then approved the project partition. The decision became final in 1963 as well. Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold the property to judge Asuncion in 1965. On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with acts unbecoming a judge on the ground that he bought a property (formerly owned by Macariola) which was involved in a civil case decided by him; this act by Asuncion is averred by Macariola to be against Art. 1491, par 5 of the Civil Code which provides: Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another: xxx xxx xxx

by her and that what was given to her in the partition were insignificant portions of the parcels of land. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provision. HELD: No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought the property in 1965 2 years after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion did not buy the property directly from any of the parties since the property was directly bought by Galapon, who then sold the property to Asuncion. There was no showing that Galapon acted as a dummy of Asuncion. Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a gross inequality in the partition; or that what she got were insignificant portions of the land. The Supreme Court however admonished Judge Asuncion to be more discreet in his personal transactions De Leon vs. Esguerra 153 SCRA 602 No. L-78059, August 31, 1987 FACTS: On May 17, 1982, Alfredo De Leon won as Brgy. Captain and other petitioners won asCouncilmen of Brgy. Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. Under the Barangay Election Act of 1982, their terms of office shall be six years, which commenced on June 7, 1982 up to June 7, 1988. On Feb.8, 1987, while the petitioners still have one year and four months, Gov. Benjamin Esguerra of Rizal Province, issued a memorandum designating Florentino Magno as the new Brgy. Captainand other respondents as the new Councilmen of the said barrangay. The respondents relied onthe Provisional Constitution of 1986, which grants the governor to appoint or designate newsuccessors within the one year period which ended on Feb. 25 1987. They also contended thatthe terms of office of the petitioners were already been abolished and that they continued inoffice simply because no new successors were appointed yet; and that the provision in theBarangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials up to six years must have been deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Provisional Constitution. Petitionersinstituted an original action for prohibition to review the order of the governor. ISSUE:

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. Also, Macariola said that Asuncions act tainted his earlier judgment. Macariola said that the project partition was unsigned

Whether the designation was valid? HELD: The Supreme Court held that the memoranda issued by Gov. Esguerra has no legaleffect. Though the designation was within the one year period which ended on Feb. 25, 1987,however, it was cut short when the 1987 Constitution took effect on Feb. 2, 1987. When the1987 Constitution was in effect, the governor no longer had the authority to designate successorsunder the Provisional Constitution which was deemed to have been superseded. There has beenno proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials; and theBarangay Election Act is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The writ of prohibition wasgranted and the petitioners have acquired the security of tenure. Notes: When did the 1987 Constitution take effect? - The Supreme Court, with only one dissent, ruled in De leon vs. Esguerra that the 1987 Constitution took effect onFebruary 2, 1987 which is the date of its ratification in the plebiscite, by virtue of its provision under Article XVIII,Section 27 that it shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebisciteheld for the purpose. (This provision was unanimously approved by thirty-five votes in favor and none against inthe Con Com of 1986)- The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date of the ratification that is the date the people havecast their votes in favor of the Constitution. The act of voting by the people is the act of ratification. It should not beon the date of the proclamation of the President since it is the act of the people. In fact, there should be no need towait for any proclamation on the part of the President, if there is, it is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act done by the people. The COMELEC, on the other hand, should make the official announcement that the votesshow that the Constitution was ratified, but the canvass is merely a mathematical confirmation of what was doneduring the plebiscite TANADA v TUVERA146 SCRA 446ESCOLIN; April 24, 1985 Nature Petition for Mandamus Facts

- Invoking the people's right to be informed onmatters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 PhilippineConstitution, as well as the principle that laws tobe valid and enforceable must be published in theOfficial Gazette or otherwise effectivelypromulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamusto compel respondent public officials to publish. and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazetteof various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.- Respondents contend that publication in theOfficial Gazette is not a sine qua non requirementfor the effectivity of laws where the lawsthemselves provide for their own effectivity dates.The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of theCivil Code:"Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in theOfficial Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, x xx Issue WON publication is a condition sine qua non for theeffectivity of laws Held Yes.Presidential issuances of general application,which have not been published, shall have no forceand effect . Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, theconclusion is easily reached that Article 2does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of itseffectivity. Sec of CA 638 provides: S e c t i o n 1 . T h e r e s h a l l b e p u b l i s h e d i n t h e Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of theCongress of the Philippines; [2] all executiveand administrative orders and proclamations,except such as have no general applicability,(3) decisions or abstracts of decisions of theSupreme Court and the Court of Appeals asmay be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published, [4] suchdocuments or classes of documents as may berequired so to be published by law, and [5]such documents or classes of documents asthe President of the Philippines shalldetermine from

time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.The word "shall" used therein imposes uponrespondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional righto f t h e p e o p l e t o b e i n f o r m e d o n m a t t e r s o f public concern is to be given substance andreality. The clear object of the quoted provision is togive the general public adequate notice of thevarious laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice andpublication, there would be no basis for theapplication of the maxim "ignorantia legis nonexcusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for thetransgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever not even a constructive one.- Perhaps at no time since the establishment of thePhilippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance than at this time whenthe people have bestowed upon the President apower heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.While the people are kept abreast by the massmedia of the debates and deliberations in theBatasan Pambansa - and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records - no suchpublicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, thepeople have no means of knowing whatpresidential decrees have actually beenpromulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents andtexts of such decrees.- I t is needless to add that the publication o f presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of dueprocess. It is a rule of law that before a personmay be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. Disposition Court ordered respondents to publishin the Official Gazette all unpublished presidentialissuances which are of general application, andunless so published, they shall have no bindingforce and effect. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OFSERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. v TORRES212 SCRA 298GRIO-AQUINO, J.; August 6, 1992

Nature Petition for prohibition with temporary restrainingorder Facts :- On June 1, 1991, as a result of published storiesregarding the abuses suffered by Filipinohousemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLESecretary Ruben D. Torres issued DepartmentOrder No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarilysuspending the recruitment by privateemployment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpersgoing to Hong Kong". The DOLE itself, through thePOEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers:In view of the need to establish mechanismsthat will enhance the protection for Filipinodomestic helpers going to Hong Kong, therecruitment of the same by privateemployment agencies is hereby temporarily suspended effec QUA CHEE GAN V DEPORTATIONBOARD9 SCRA 27BARRERA; September 30, 1963 NATURE Appeal from a decision of CFI Manila FACTS - On In May 1952, Special Prosecutor Galang charged Qua Chee Gan et al before theDeportation Board, with having purchased U.S.d o l l a r s i n t h e t o t a l s u m o f $ 1 3 0 K , w i t h o u t t h e necessary license from the Central Bank, and of having clandestinely remitted the same toHongkong and other petitioners, with havingattempted to bribe officers of the Philippine andU.S. Governments. A warrant for the arrest of saidaliens was issued by the presiding member of theDeportation Board. Upon their filing surety bond for P10K and cash bond for P10K, Qua Chee Gan etal were provisionally set at liberty.- Qua Chee Gan et al filed a joint MTD because thecharges do not constitute legal ground fordeportation of aliens from this country, and thatsaid Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. MTC denied. So Qua Chee Gan et al fileda petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition,which petition was given due course, but madereturnable to the CFI Manila.- Boards answer: Deportation

Board, as an agentof the President, has jurisdiction over the chargesfiled against petitioners and the authority to ordertheir arrest; and that, while petitioner Qua CheeGan was acquitted of the offense of attemptedbribery of a public official, he was found in the same decision of the trial court that he did actuallyoffer money to an officer of the USAF in order thatthe latter may abstain from assisting the CentralBank official in the investigation of the purchase of $130K from the Clark Air Force Base, wherein QuaChee Gan was involved. 57 1987 CONSTITUTIONArticle IIISection 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatevernature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 1973 CONSTITUTIONArticle IVSection 3. The right of the people to besecure in their persons, houses, papers,and effects against unreasonablesearches and seizures of whatever natureand whatever purpose shall not beviolated, and no search warrant orwarrant of arrest shall issue except uponprobable cause to be determined by thejudge, or such other responsible officer as maybe authorized by law, afterexamination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describingthe place to be searched, and thepersons or things to be seized.

CFI alsosustained the power of the Board to issue warrantof arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporaryrelease pending investigation of charges against him, on the theory that the power to arrest and fixthe amount of the bond of the arrested alien isessential to and complement the power to deportaliens pursuant to Section 69 of the RevisedAdministrative Code. Hence, this appeal. . ISSUES 1. WON the Board, as agent of the President, haspower to investigate and deport undesirablealiens.2. WON, conceding without deciding that thePresident can personally order the arrest of thealien complained of, such power can be delegatedby him to the Deportation Board. HELD1. YES Ratio Investigation and deportation of anundesirable alien may be effected in two ways: byorder of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Sec.69 of the Revised AdministrativeCode (Act No. 2711) 2 , and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Boardof Commissioners, under Sec. 3 37 of C.A. 613. Reasoning [1] While it may really be contended that Sec. 69of Act No. 2711 did not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirablealiens, unlike the express grant to the 2 SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power . Asubject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shallnot be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islandsor repatriated to his own country by the President of thePhilippines except upon prior investigation, conducted bysaid Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such case theperson concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less thanthese days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or

Administrative

Law

A2010Dean Carlota - CFI upheld the validity of the delegation by thepresident to the Board of his power to conduct investigations for determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State.

counsel, toproduce witnesses in his own behalf, and to crossexamine the opposing witnesses." 3 Sec. 37 says to the effect that the Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to effect the arrest andexpulsion of an alien, after previous determination by theBoard of Commissioners of the existence of ground orgrounds therefore. Commissioner of Immigration under C.A. No. 613,but merely lays down the procedure to beobserved should there be deportation proceedings,the fact that such a procedure was provided forbefore the President can deport an alien whichprovision was expressly declared exempted fromthe repealing effect of the Immigration Act of 1940 i s a c l e a r indication of the recognition, a n d inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of theexistence of such power in the Executive. [2] Thecharges against Qua CHee Gan et al constitute anact of profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bankregulations an economic sabotage which is aground for deportation under the provisions of R.A.503 amending Sec.37 of the Philippine ImmigrationAct of 1940. The President may therefore order thedeportation of these petitioners if afterinvestigation they are shown to have committed the act charged. [3] The Deportation Board, beinga n a g e n t o f t h e E x e c u t i v e , m a y e x e r c i s e s u c h power by virtue of delegation. 2. NO - The exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretionby the one issuing the same, to determine whetherunder specific circumstances, the curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the Constitution itself, as well as the statuterelied upon, prescribe the manner by which the w a r r a n t m a y b e i s s u e d , c o n v e y s t h e i n t e n t t o make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of the existenceo f w h i c h r e q u i r e s t h e u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n b y t h e person issuing the same.- I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f w h e t h e r a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is PERSONAL tothe one upon whom the authority devolves.

Andauthorities are to the effect that while ministerialduties may be delegated, official functionsrequiring the exercise of discretion and judgment,may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of power, considering that no express authority w a s g r a n t e d b y t h e l a w o n t h e m a t t e r u n d e r discussion, that would serve the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person,such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning tothe guarantee contained in the Constitution 4 . If this 4 The right of the People to be secure in their persons,houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searchesand seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shallissue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the is so, then guarantee a delegation of that impliedp o w e r , n e b u l o u s a s i t i s , m u s t b e r e j e c t e d a s inimical to the liberty of the people. Theguarantees of human rights and freedom can notb e m a d e t o r e s t p r e c a r i o u s l y o n s u c h a s h a k y foundation.- T h u s , E O 3 9 8 , s e r i e s o f 1 9 5 1 , i n s o f a r a s i t empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrantof arrest upon the filing of formal charges againstan alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe theconditions for the temporary release of said aliens,is declared illegal. Disposition Decision appealed is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION insofar as the order of arrest issuedby the respondent Deportation Board is declarednull and void and the bonds filed pursuant to suchorder of arrest, decreed cancelled.