2 25 13 To 3 14 13 0204 071437 65630 63341 67980 All Emails From Lindsay's Rbrucelindsaylaw@Yahoo - Com Address

Re: Notice of Appearances filed in which cases?
From: Robert Lindsay (rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com) This sender is in your safe list.

Sent: Thu 3/14/13 9:33 AM
To: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Dear Mr. Coughlin:

I need to clarify with you that Mr. Lindsay was appointed to the following cases in Court to wit;

RCR2013-71437 the contempt charges that you were reinstated into DAS and CCP

RCR2011-063341 petty larceny matter that you were already convicted on but again for the contempt of court matters.

RCR 12-067980 obstructing justice and resisting case that has been set for a pretrial on April 16, 2013.

Apparently the case that is going to trial on Tuesday 03-19-13, is Case No. RCR2012-065630 and as you indicated the Judge specifically stated that no additional counsel
would be appointed on this case, as you had one appointed and they withdrew, you then requested to represent yourself. I believe this accurate.

Mr. Lindsay would like to schedule an appointment with you for Friday March 15, 2013 to go over these matters. However, you need to make sure to take your medication
and be in a rational state of mind when you meet with him.

Also, Mr. Lindsay informed you that you were to provide a list of the medications that you are currently taking as well as the name of the psychologist that will be performing the
evaluation with and that you are suppose to meeting with regularly.

Furthermore Zach: Please do not send me a large email I simply need you to pleas just follow the instructions as outlined above and make an appointment with our office. I
apologize for any confusion, but as I specifically informed you a couple of days ago I needed to review our files and consult with Mr. Lindsay before offering any information and
have now done so.

Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation.

Diana Sims
Legal Assistant to
ROBERT BRUCE LINDSAY
From: Zach Coughlin <zachcoughlin@hotmail.com>
To: Robert Lindsay <rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 12, 2013 4:29 PM
Subject: Notice of Appearances filed in which cases?
Dear Mr. Lindsay,
Would you please communicate with me a bit more with regard to what the overall plan is, the contigencies, worst case, best
case, etc. For instance, what if no global resolution is worked out by 3/19/13, the trial date for 12-065630 before Judge
Clifton.
I like you personally, Bruce, and Diana too, but I am frustrated. Everytime I go into court I don't know if I will be allowed to go
home that day. I have offered the County, the WCDA, etc., etc. everything I could think they want, but no deals get done...the
WCDA is shielding DDA Young from any emails, faxes, voice mails from me (See the letter ADA Helzer recently resent),
which I think impermissibly attempts to absolve him of his obligations under the RPC. I am very unhappy about what happened
on 2/13/13 (not a huge deal, but I am working on a brief to save my law license, and five days in jail doesn't help). Its not clear
to me what happened yesterday before Judge Pearson. I can chill out, but how about seeking clarification as to what occurred,
and if, in fact, I am now subject to some 3 year probation requiring me to check in with CCP, in addition, to checking in with
DAS, every week...how is that a good deal for me? Keep me out of jail? From what? What was I in danger of going to jail
over? An allegation of calling the wrong number at the RJC to check the time for a hearing? Hardly colorable for the RJC to
assert a justification for 6 months in jail? What else? A DAS probation violation? Well, did I have an email from DAS Officer
Brown excusing such violation? Was the arrest after 7pm in violation of NRS 171.136? I dont' like going to court, checking in
with probation, giving people my medical records. These are positives. Having limites on my ability to travel, to move...Giving
the RJC leverage to put me back in jail should I point out how their various egregiously incorrect under the law eviction order
contributed mightily to a tremendously painful and unhappy 18 months of my life. And you, so far, have always assumed I was
wrong, and that they only way is to give up any leverage I have, for....what? 5 days in jail for being late to court (no
consultation with you prior to appearing before Judge Clifton is hardly "representation"...If some binding order issued yesterday
from Judge Pearson, its not as though I received any analysis from you before hand. That is why I didn't agree to anything
beyond a two week continuance, which I was you confirmed in my initial phone call to you afterwards, then, later, you changed
your position and asserted something else...I think we need to work together here, and that, if you really think about it, neither
you nor I "agreed" to any such consent Order that Judge Pearson for the WCDA may alleged occurred. Further, any such Order
was issued in AO12-01...which is not even a "case", nor was it issued upon "a properly made motion"....as such, and CCP Order
is void...somehow I think we could influence Judge Pearson to adopt that viewpoint to whatever extent he does not yet...But I
am not even sure he entered an order, or "rendered", etc...I need something in writing telling me what, if anything, I am required
to do to comply with any such "Order" should it be the case that there is one. If there is, I want to file a motion to stay
probation, correct illegal sentence, notice of appeal thereto, etc., and the time frame is extremely limited. Maybe Judge Pearson
would rather "clarify" things than have a Notice of Appeal filed divesting him of the ability to do so.
It seems you feel that going in to CCP would be a good thing, that it likely wouldn't be three years in duration, would provide
me an opportunity to sell myself to Judge Pearson more, etc...But that's assumign stupid things don't happen, like me being late
to a check-in, continued issues with a Bailiff or two, ADA Helzer telling DAS Officer Ramos to arrest me when he needs
leverage on something (if that is what happened), etc., etc. It just doesn't seem that thought out to go, in two weeks, and enter
some CCP Consent Order to dispose of two rather dubious Show Cause Orders or Probation Violations...Were were the
witnesses yesterday? No witnesses, no contempt...so that adds credence to the view that yesterday was more of a status
conference in which no orders issued, an certainly not a CCP obligation for 3 years where the only discernible benefit to the
client is getting an Order paying for a Dr. Yasar evaluation when such an Order was already rendered on 2/2/13 (Pearson has
just failed to have a check cut...). I dont' need my meds paid for by CCP, NNAHMS is doing that, and my future psychiatrist
visits are paid for too. So any consenting to an Order that anyone alleges you did yesterday on behalf of your client would not
be supportable much under a theory that your client obtained much benefit from it...beyond a dubious assertion that jail time
was likely. At some point the RJC Judges have to consider the PR on the horizon attendant to any jailing me for 6 months
incident to a RJC Bailiff detaining me just long enough for DAS to close its doors on 1/23/13, upon which some suspect
revocation of probation would be based...
Will you please email me or fax me something in writing indicating, by case number, which cases you are attorney of record for
me on, and to what extent? I have been told by your office and the RJC, and the WCDA's Office that you are my attorney of
record in 12-065630, for which the Trial is set to occur on 3/19/13 at 8:30 am. If that is the case, I would like to meet with you
and prepare for trial, and your being listed as attorney of record therein has now limited my ability to have subpoenas issued, to
make filings, etc.
My understanding of the hearing yesterday before Judge Pearson is that it was a combination hearing involving three separate
and distinct matters:
12-067980, the case in which you are listed as attorney of record by the RJC, though the Motion I filed on 12/3/12 therein has
never been addressed by the RJC
AO12-01, the "case" wherein the "Caption" reads "In the Administrative Matter of Zachary Coughlin...Administrative Order 12-
01" from which the 12/20/12 "Administrative Order 12-01" by then Chief Judge Sferrazza issued, though service thereof I
believe should be quashed, as, should be, the 2/25/13 Order to Show Cause that shares the same "caption", and
11-063341, the iPhone petty larceny conviction case currently on appeal in CR12-2025 (where I was granted In Forma Pauperis
status on 1/9/13 and have an Order (see attached) requiring the preparation of some 15 hours of trial transcripts).
I believe the AO12-01 of 2/25/13 is void for lack of jurisidiction and for the other reasons set out in my various attached
filings. Please note t
Please indicate whether you were compensated by anyone in any way for your appearing in 12-065630 on 2/13/13 and how you
came to appear at such hearing, whether such hearing involved criminal or civil contempt, and whether you are attorney of
record on the appeal thereof (please see the Notice of Appeal I filed in that matter on 2/25/13, within the 10 days under NRS
189.010, as to the 5 day summary incarceration Order for some type of contempt...I gather. Given you were late to court
yesterday, I noted that you were not taken into custody following the hearing and yourself subject to such a Contempt Hearing).
Please indicate when, and in exactly what matters, and to what extent, you have complied with the local rules with respect to
filing a notice of appearance in any of my cases. I am sorry to come across as so formal and technical, but there are significant
consequences to me possible in these various matters.
Given the proximity of the 3/19/13 Trial date in 12-065630 and your statement to me on the phone today, that you could not
speak with me about any of the matters for which you are listed as my attorney of record, including the case wherein there is a
trial date on calendar of 3/19/13 at 8:30 am, I believe it is necessary for a stipulation to a continuance be sought from DDA
Young and and Order granting such continuance from the RJC.
Additionally, I have my medication and pyschiatrist viists paid for by NNAMHS. I have no interest in joining a CCP with the
RJC, much less for 3 years. You indicated to me that nothing occurred in court at the combination hearing yesterday (which,.
from my understanding combined the Show Cause Order of 2/25/13 incident to the 12/20/12 Administrative Order 12-
01...which I have called "case number AO12-01...and I object to such Order be recharacterized at this point as being incident to
11-063341 (There was a Show Cause Hearing, continued from 2/25/13 in 11-063341 that was to take place yesterday 3/11/13,
though it did not take place as far as I know, and any Order that was entered (I did not agree to any Order being entered, and you
represented to me that no Orders were going to be entered in any matter or case being addressed in court yesterday 3/11/13
incident to the 9 am combination hearing of that date beyond a 2 week continuance being entered, sufficient to allow you and I
and DDA Young to work together towards a global resolution, involving both the matters in which you are attorney of record,
and to which I have so consented to you being attorney of record, and those where you and I are co-counsel, and those where I
am self representing, whichever the case may be (and at this point, that seems to be up for debate and in the eye of the beholder).
Please indicate whether you will be seeking a continuance as to the 3/19/12 Trial date at 8:30 am in 12-065630 before Judge
Clifton, and, if not, when you and I can meet to address matters related thereto.
NNAHMS is paying for my medication and future psychiatrist visits, and I am starting counseling there with a psychologist. As
such, I don't know why it would be necessary to provide my prescription records. I would like the RJC to fulfill the Order
rendered on 2/2/13 that it would pay for a mental health evaluation with my private psychiatrist (Dr. Suat Yasar) whom I have
gone to for years, and who, thus, I feel would be able to provide a more in depth and better mental health evaluation.
To the extent that during the hearing yesterday (I was only able to speak with you very, very briefly yesterday prior to the 9:00
am hearing, given your arriving at 9:20 am for yesterday's hearing, which was set for 9:00 am). I would like to consult with you
further regarding the possibilities of entering the RJC's CCP program, though at this point, I don't see how doing such provides
much benefit to me beyond being subject to more Orders To Show Cause should I fail to appear to a check in or arrive late. I
have no interest in being subject to such a program for 36 months. I do not believe I consented to any Order being entered
which would place me in such a CCP program for 36 months or require me to check in at the RJC a second time per week in
addition to my usual Wednesday DAS check ins. You mentioned some possibile benefit of being enrolled in the CCP program
or, in the future, after more consulation and informed consent being garned from me, upon any such Consent Order being
entered requiring me to participate in the CCP program, as involving having my medications and psychiatrist visits paid for.
However, NNAHMS is currently providing such a service, and NNAHMS does not subject me to Order to Show Cause if I am
late to an appointment, and given my ADHD/ADD and Major Depressive Disorder diagnosis, being late from time to time is a
distinct possibility.
If your understanding of what occurred in court yesteday before Judge Pearson is different than mine, please let me know in
writing. I know I was crying in court and very distraught and indicated to you that I had not had my medication in two days, and
I feel that likely augured towards your moving for a Competency Evaluation or otherwise seeking a stay of the
proceedings...further, you were provided the 2/2/13 Order for Competency Evaluation by Judge Pearson, and even where Judge
Pearson may have purported to set aside such Order only an hour after entering it, I don't believe he has the jurisdiction to do
that, but rather, that I must be examined by a a mental health care professional with the requisite certifcation to perform such
evaluations prior to any matter, in any department of the RJC proceeding.

While I granted you a limited right to pursue a global resolution in a civil context of the various matters involved here, in a co-
counsel arrangement in which I retain final say on everything, including your continue participation in any such matters (and, in
the proper order, and prior to giving up any leverage I may have, I am in favor of you being compensated by the State as much
and in as many cases as possible, just not before a deal is worked out in a civil context disposing of these various matters and
where, any subsequent filing by you of a notice of appearance in a criminal matter is as my co-counsel).
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Zach has 11 files to share with you on SkyDrive. To view them, click the links below.
2 25 12 0204 Order to Show Cause Order 2012-01 RJC Sferrazza Pearson.pdf
2 25 13 Notice of Appeal of Order of 2 13 12 5 Day Incarceration for Contempt 065630 0204.pdf
2 25 13 Request to RJC Chief Judge Pearson for Order for Yasar Evaluation.pdf
2 28 13 0204 063341 WCDA DDA Hezler 2 25 13 letter with new handwritten note remailed threatening TRO TPO.pdf
2 28 13 0204 AO12-01 Motion for Extension of Time to File Responsive Document to 2 25 13 Order in AO12-01 for 3 5 13 Hearing by 4pm on 2 28 13.pdf
2 28 13 0204 RJC AO12-01 Motion for Extension of Time to Filed Responsive Document to 2 25 13 Order in AO12-01 re Right to Counsel.pdf
3 1 13 0204 063341 Coughlin's Motion to for Check for Dr. Yaser Pursuant to Order Rendered on 2 13 13 , Subm of Proposed Order for Mental Eval.pdf
Re: Notice of Appearances filed in which cases?
3 1 13 0204 AO12-01 Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss Show Cause Order Lack Specificity Insuff Service, Mtn for Continuance of 3 5 13 Hearing, Set Aside AO12-01 Void Lack Juris
067980 063341 065630.pdf
3 11 13 0204 063341 067980 AO12-01 filign in relation to what occurred before Judge Pearson today.pdf
12 3 12 067980 Motion to Substitute Out Leslie and Conflict out wcda wcpd motion for mistrial notice of leslie and young's failure to hold msc on 11 20 12.pdf
12 20 12 438pm RJC Chief Judge Sferrazza 12-01 Administrative Order 0204 063341 065630 067980 1048 607 599 074328 ocrd tagged.pdf
Download all

Sent: Wed 3/13/13 8:57 AM
Dear Zach: Thank you for the email. Please note that I am working on putting together three separate files with case numbers and discovery .

I will contact the court this morning and talk with them regarding the upcoming court dates (especially tuesday) and then I will call you this morning.
Sent: Tuesday, March 12, 2013 4:29 PM
Subject: Notice of Appearances filed in which cases?
Dear Mr. Lindsay,
Would you please communicate with me a bit more with regard to what the overall plan is, the contigencies, worst case, best
case, etc. For instance, what if no global resolution is worked out by 3/19/13, the trial date for 12-065630 before Judge
Clifton.
I like you personally, Bruce, and Diana too, but I am frustrated. Everytime I go into court I don't know if I will be allowed to go
home that day. I have offered the County, the WCDA, etc., etc. everything I could think they want, but no deals get done...the
WCDA is shielding DDA Young from any emails, faxes, voice mails from me (See the letter ADA Helzer recently resent),
which I think impermissibly attempts to absolve him of his obligations under the RPC. I am very unhappy about what happened
on 2/13/13 (not a huge deal, but I am working on a brief to save my law license, and five days in jail doesn't help). Its not clear
to me what happened yesterday before Judge Pearson. I can chill out, but how about seeking clarification as to what occurred,
and if, in fact, I am now subject to some 3 year probation requiring me to check in with CCP, in addition, to checking in with
DAS, every week...how is that a good deal for me? Keep me out of jail? From what? What was I in danger of going to jail
over? An allegation of calling the wrong number at the RJC to check the time for a hearing? Hardly colorable for the RJC to
assert a justification for 6 months in jail? What else? A DAS probation violation? Well, did I have an email from DAS Officer
Brown excusing such violation? Was the arrest after 7pm in violation of NRS 171.136? I dont' like going to court, checking in
with probation, giving people my medical records. These are positives. Having limites on my ability to travel, to move...Giving
the RJC leverage to put me back in jail should I point out how their various egregiously incorrect under the law eviction order
contributed mightily to a tremendously painful and unhappy 18 months of my life. And you, so far, have always assumed I was
wrong, and that they only way is to give up any leverage I have, for....what? 5 days in jail for being late to court (no
consultation with you prior to appearing before Judge Clifton is hardly "representation"...If some binding order issued yesterday
from Judge Pearson, its not as though I received any analysis from you before hand. That is why I didn't agree to anything
beyond a two week continuance, which I was you confirmed in my initial phone call to you afterwards, then, later, you changed
your position and asserted something else...I think we need to work together here, and that, if you really think about it, neither
you nor I "agreed" to any such consent Order that Judge Pearson for the WCDA may alleged occurred. Further, any such Order
was issued in AO12-01...which is not even a "case", nor was it issued upon "a properly made motion"....as such, and CCP Order
is void...somehow I think we could influence Judge Pearson to adopt that viewpoint to whatever extent he does not yet...But I
am not even sure he entered an order, or "rendered", etc...I need something in writing telling me what, if anything, I am required
to do to comply with any such "Order" should it be the case that there is one. If there is, I want to file a motion to stay
probation, correct illegal sentence, notice of appeal thereto, etc., and the time frame is extremely limited. Maybe Judge Pearson
would rather "clarify" things than have a Notice of Appeal filed divesting him of the ability to do so.
It seems you feel that going in to CCP would be a good thing, that it likely wouldn't be three years in duration, would provide
me an opportunity to sell myself to Judge Pearson more, etc...But that's assumign stupid things don't happen, like me being late
to a check-in, continued issues with a Bailiff or two, ADA Helzer telling DAS Officer Ramos to arrest me when he needs
leverage on something (if that is what happened), etc., etc. It just doesn't seem that thought out to go, in two weeks, and enter
some CCP Consent Order to dispose of two rather dubious Show Cause Orders or Probation Violations...Were were the
witnesses yesterday? No witnesses, no contempt...so that adds credence to the view that yesterday was more of a status
conference in which no orders issued, an certainly not a CCP obligation for 3 years where the only discernible benefit to the
client is getting an Order paying for a Dr. Yasar evaluation when such an Order was already rendered on 2/2/13 (Pearson has
just failed to have a check cut...). I dont' need my meds paid for by CCP, NNAHMS is doing that, and my future psychiatrist
visits are paid for too. So any consenting to an Order that anyone alleges you did yesterday on behalf of your client would not
be supportable much under a theory that your client obtained much benefit from it...beyond a dubious assertion that jail time
was likely. At some point the RJC Judges have to consider the PR on the horizon attendant to any jailing me for 6 months
incident to a RJC Bailiff detaining me just long enough for DAS to close its doors on 1/23/13, upon which some suspect
revocation of probation would be based...
Will you please email me or fax me something in writing indicating, by case number, which cases you are attorney of record for
me on, and to what extent? I have been told by your office and the RJC, and the WCDA's Office that you are my attorney of
record in 12-065630, for which the Trial is set to occur on 3/19/13 at 8:30 am. If that is the case, I would like to meet with you
and prepare for trial, and your being listed as attorney of record therein has now limited my ability to have subpoenas issued, to
make filings, etc.
My understanding of the hearing yesterday before Judge Pearson is that it was a combination hearing involving three separate
and distinct matters:
12-067980, the case in which you are listed as attorney of record by the RJC, though the Motion I filed on 12/3/12 therein has
never been addressed by the RJC
AO12-01, the "case" wherein the "Caption" reads "In the Administrative Matter of Zachary Coughlin...Administrative Order 12-
01" from which the 12/20/12 "Administrative Order 12-01" by then Chief Judge Sferrazza issued, though service thereof I
believe should be quashed, as, should be, the 2/25/13 Order to Show Cause that shares the same "caption", and
11-063341, the iPhone petty larceny conviction case currently on appeal in CR12-2025 (where I was granted In Forma Pauperis
status on 1/9/13 and have an Order (see attached) requiring the preparation of some 15 hours of trial transcripts).
I believe the AO12-01 of 2/25/13 is void for lack of jurisidiction and for the other reasons set out in my various attached
filings. Please note t
Please indicate whether you were compensated by anyone in any way for your appearing in 12-065630 on 2/13/13 and how you
came to appear at such hearing, whether such hearing involved criminal or civil contempt, and whether you are attorney of
record on the appeal thereof (please see the Notice of Appeal I filed in that matter on 2/25/13, within the 10 days under NRS
189.010, as to the 5 day summary incarceration Order for some type of contempt...I gather. Given you were late to court
yesterday, I noted that you were not taken into custody following the hearing and yourself subject to such a Contempt Hearing).
Please indicate when, and in exactly what matters, and to what extent, you have complied with the local rules with respect to
filing a notice of appearance in any of my cases. I am sorry to come across as so formal and technical, but there are significant
consequences to me possible in these various matters.
Given the proximity of the 3/19/13 Trial date in 12-065630 and your statement to me on the phone today, that you could not
speak with me about any of the matters for which you are listed as my attorney of record, including the case wherein there is a
trial date on calendar of 3/19/13 at 8:30 am, I believe it is necessary for a stipulation to a continuance be sought from DDA
Young and and Order granting such continuance from the RJC.
Additionally, I have my medication and pyschiatrist viists paid for by NNAMHS. I have no interest in joining a CCP with the
RJC, much less for 3 years. You indicated to me that nothing occurred in court at the combination hearing yesterday (which,.
from my understanding combined the Show Cause Order of 2/25/13 incident to the 12/20/12 Administrative Order 12-
01...which I have called "case number AO12-01...and I object to such Order be recharacterized at this point as being incident to
11-063341 (There was a Show Cause Hearing, continued from 2/25/13 in 11-063341 that was to take place yesterday 3/11/13,
though it did not take place as far as I know, and any Order that was entered (I did not agree to any Order being entered, and you
represented to me that no Orders were going to be entered in any matter or case being addressed in court yesterday 3/11/13
incident to the 9 am combination hearing of that date beyond a 2 week continuance being entered, sufficient to allow you and I
and DDA Young to work together towards a global resolution, involving both the matters in which you are attorney of record,
and to which I have so consented to you being attorney of record, and those where you and I are co-counsel, and those where I
am self representing, whichever the case may be (and at this point, that seems to be up for debate and in the eye of the beholder).
Please indicate whether you will be seeking a continuance as to the 3/19/12 Trial date at 8:30 am in 12-065630 before Judge
Clifton, and, if not, when you and I can meet to address matters related thereto.
NNAHMS is paying for my medication and future psychiatrist visits, and I am starting counseling there with a psychologist. As
such, I don't know why it would be necessary to provide my prescription records. I would like the RJC to fulfill the Order
rendered on 2/2/13 that it would pay for a mental health evaluation with my private psychiatrist (Dr. Suat Yasar) whom I have
Re: proposal that might be your office some more money and resolve this whole
thing.
gone to for years, and who, thus, I feel would be able to provide a more in depth and better mental health evaluation.
To the extent that during the hearing yesterday (I was only able to speak with you very, very briefly yesterday prior to the 9:00
am hearing, given your arriving at 9:20 am for yesterday's hearing, which was set for 9:00 am). I would like to consult with you
further regarding the possibilities of entering the RJC's CCP program, though at this point, I don't see how doing such provides
much benefit to me beyond being subject to more Orders To Show Cause should I fail to appear to a check in or arrive late. I
have no interest in being subject to such a program for 36 months. I do not believe I consented to any Order being entered
which would place me in such a CCP program for 36 months or require me to check in at the RJC a second time per week in
addition to my usual Wednesday DAS check ins. You mentioned some possibile benefit of being enrolled in the CCP program
or, in the future, after more consulation and informed consent being garned from me, upon any such Consent Order being
entered requiring me to participate in the CCP program, as involving having my medications and psychiatrist visits paid for.
However, NNAHMS is currently providing such a service, and NNAHMS does not subject me to Order to Show Cause if I am
late to an appointment, and given my ADHD/ADD and Major Depressive Disorder diagnosis, being late from time to time is a
distinct possibility.
If your understanding of what occurred in court yesteday before Judge Pearson is different than mine, please let me know in
writing. I know I was crying in court and very distraught and indicated to you that I had not had my medication in two days, and
I feel that likely augured towards your moving for a Competency Evaluation or otherwise seeking a stay of the
proceedings...further, you were provided the 2/2/13 Order for Competency Evaluation by Judge Pearson, and even where Judge
Pearson may have purported to set aside such Order only an hour after entering it, I don't believe he has the jurisdiction to do
that, but rather, that I must be examined by a a mental health care professional with the requisite certifcation to perform such
evaluations prior to any matter, in any department of the RJC proceeding.

While I granted you a limited right to pursue a global resolution in a civil context of the various matters involved here, in a co-
counsel arrangement in which I retain final say on everything, including your continue participation in any such matters (and, in
the proper order, and prior to giving up any leverage I may have, I am in favor of you being compensated by the State as much
and in as many cases as possible, just not before a deal is worked out in a civil context disposing of these various matters and
where, any subsequent filing by you of a notice of appearance in a criminal matter is as my co-counsel).
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
2 25 12 0204 Order to Show Cause Order 2012-01 RJC Sferrazza Pearson.pdf
2 25 13 Notice of Appeal of Order of 2 13 12 5 Day Incarceration for Contempt 065630 0204.pdf
2 25 13 Request to RJC Chief Judge Pearson for Order for Yasar Evaluation.pdf
2 28 13 0204 063341 WCDA DDA Hezler 2 25 13 letter with new handwritten note remailed threatening TRO TPO.pdf
2 28 13 0204 AO12-01 Motion for Extension of Time to File Responsive Document to 2 25 13 Order in AO12-01 for 3 5 13 Hearing by 4pm on 2 28 13.pdf
2 28 13 0204 RJC AO12-01 Motion for Extension of Time to Filed Responsive Document to 2 25 13 Order in AO12-01 re Right to Counsel.pdf
3 1 13 0204 063341 Coughlin's Motion to for Check for Dr. Yaser Pursuant to Order Rendered on 2 13 13 , Subm of Proposed Order for Mental Eval.pdf
3 1 13 0204 AO12-01 Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss Show Cause Order Lack Specificity Insuff Service, Mtn for Continuance of 3 5 13 Hearing, Set Aside AO12-01 Void Lack Juris
067980 063341 065630.pdf
3 11 13 0204 063341 067980 AO12-01 filign in relation to what occurred before Judge Pearson today.pdf
12 3 12 067980 Motion to Substitute Out Leslie and Conflict out wcda wcpd motion for mistrial notice of leslie and young's failure to hold msc on 11 20 12.pdf
12 20 12 438pm RJC Chief Judge Sferrazza 12-01 Administrative Order 0204 063341 065630 067980 1048 607 599 074328 ocrd tagged.pdf
Download all

Sent: Tue 3/05/13 11:03 AM
Zack I did not receive the email with the five page attachment. I will be faxing the letter I read to you before lunch so I was hoping to get that attachments.
To: Robert Lindsay <rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com>; "zyoung@da.washoecounty.us" <zyoung@da.washoecounty.us>;
"mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us" <mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us>; "dwatts@da.washoecounty.us"
<dwatts@da.washoecounty.us>; "mcovington@da.washoecounty.us" <mcovington@da.washoecounty.us>;
"plippar@da.washoecounty.us" <plippar@da.washoecounty.us>; "plipparelli@da.washoecounty.us"
<plipparelli@da.washoecounty.us>; "jhelzer@da.washoecounty.us" <jhelzer@da.washoecounty.us>
Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2013 9:14 PM
Subject: proposal that might be your office some more money and resolve this whole thing.
Dear Mr. Lindsay and WCDA's Office,
I respectfully submit this in the hopes that a global deal can be entered into, as without that, I will certainly be disbarred
irrevocably, and Judge Clifton and Judge Pearson, I am pretty sure, will be sentencing me to substantial amounts of jail time, in
addition to what may issue incident to the 3/6/13 arraignment on allegations of violating the SBN TPO/EPO and the 12-01
Administrative Order by Judge Sferrazza. It would mean so much to me and be so very appreciated. I lived here my whole life,
its would be pretty sad to see things continue where they are going (ie, me disbarred permanently, doing lots of time, etc...). I
realize I am not special and I haven't handled things very well in many instances, but, I am doing my best, and have been. I don't
get help from my family, in fact, my Dad often seems to be trying to sabotage my life in some misguided attempt to twelve step
me/hijack my mental health care...
I complete my intake with Northern Nevada Adult Mental Health this Monday, and am starting counseling and am set to meet
with a Dr. Kim on 3/13/13 to see about arranging for my medications to always be available to me if I cannot afford them (and
therefore, hopefully avoid the free fall my life had been in since that occurred and was followed by a string of arrests and
evictions starting in August 2011 (please see my email to Bar Counsel detailing that and attaching proof thereof with my
complete prescription history since about 2008, showing I went off Adderall and Wellbutrin in early August 2011...Please see
my 5/14/12 email to SBN Bar Counsel detailing the fall out of my not being able to afford my medications starting in August
2011, the string of arrests and eviction occurring immediately thereafter, etc.
Judge Weller, Judge McGee, and Judge Van Walraven are all mentors to me and I believe would be willing to indicate that I am
probably not competent to stand trial at this point, and that I am not such a bad person in the grand scheme...I have been attending
Coe Swobe's Thursday Night 7pm Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers meeting, and Coe would confrim that at 322-2154. I truly
do want to resolve all these criminal matters and don't want to pursue any civil claims. I just want to get back to normal life and
am sorry to have upset so many people. I did my best under some extremely trying circumstances that one likely could not fully
understand without living through them.
Please note, I have not filed the attached 2/27/13 Motion for Continuance or whatever, its just a proposed thing to provide some
suggestions for how all the various criminal/civil/administrative things might be resolved, if I am very, very lucky and fortunate.
Maybe the State can pay Mr. Lindsay in exchange for appearing for me in these various criminal matters and brokering this global
resolution. The Gagnon case set out below provides support for such right to counsel under these circumstances. Today, I
checked in with DAS. Upon checking in the RJC Bailfifs served me a new Order to Show Cause for the Administrative Order
12-01 entered on 12/20/12 by Judge Sferrazza. the hearing to be held on 3/5/13 at 2 pm. See both the 2/25/13 Show Cause
Order and the underlying 12/20/12 Administrative Order 12-01 attached. I believe I am still an attorney, even where suspended
(under Florida Bar v. Ross) and, as such, am immune from service of such process (in addition to the service of process
attempted by RJC Bailiffs during other DAS Check ins for the WCPD and SBN Protection Orders against me in 607 and 599.
attorney's exemption from service of process, see Am. Jur. 2d, Process 35. While DDA Watts made a nice argument in
objecting to my subpoenas on 2JDC personnel in my formal bar hearing, based upon my being suspending, I believe Florida Bar
v. Ross, the fact that I was given permission to issue my own subpoenas therein (ie, even if NRCP 45(a)(3) applies, I was
"authorized to appear" in that "court") would provide a counter to any extension of that argument that would suggest that my
being suspended by the State Bar of Nevada (but not the USPTO, therefore, I am still a patent attorney, I think...) would vitiate
any "attorney immune from service of process of the TPO/EPO applications or Orders while doing his DAS probation check-ins
in the RJC filing office"argument...Try to ease up on me a little here, I am doing the best I can everyone. I took in about $13,800
in fees while practicing law between July 2011 and my suspension in June 2012, and lost way, more money than that (especially
counting the sanctions awards that remain unpaid, etc.)...One cost saving measure to the county would be to work out a deal very
soon (like before the 3/5/13 Show Cause Hearing in the RJC, that would avoid the preparation of about 15 hours of trial
transcript at public expense incident to the 1/9/13 Order by Judge Elliott in the appeal of the conviction in 11-063341 (CR12-
2025). I'll sign away any civil law claims I have against any County entities, personnel, etc., especially if my SBN woes, RJC
criminal law woes, and hopefully a thing or two else, can be bargained away (if that is legal...I think it is, but the WCDA's Office
would need to approve of it, I believe...).
II. AMENABILITY TO SERVICE OF PROCESS
B. Persons Immune to Service of Process
2. Persons Attending Court or Governmental Hearings
c. Attorneys
Topic Summary Correlation Table References
35. Generally
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Federal Civil Procedure k415, 416
West's Key Number Digest, Process k117, 118
Attorneys at law at times enjoy certain privileges and exemptions not generally enjoyed by
lay persons, when they are considered necessary for the due administration of justice and the
protection of a client's rights.[FN1] At common law, an attorney was exempt from the service
of civil process while attending court.[FN2]
Currently, whether an attorney at law is exempt from the service of process in a civil action
while attending court may turn upon the attorney's residence within the state or county of
suit. Immunity from the service of civil process has been extended to a nonresident attorney
while going to, remaining at, or returning from the place where the client's business is transacted,
upon the ground that the administration of justice demands such an exemption,[FN3]
even though resident attorneys have no such immunity.[FN4]
Some jurisdictions take the view that an attorney is privileged from the service of process
while attending court in a professional capacity in a county other than the county of his or her
residence,[FN5] while others hold that the attorney is not immune from service.[FN6]
[FN1] Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law 196.
[FN2] Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 55 S. Ct. 21, 79 L. Ed. 208 (1934); Lamb v.
Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932).
[FN3] Durst v. Tautges, Wilder & McDonald, 44 F.2d 507, 71 A.L.R. 1394 (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1930).
[FN4] Williams v. Hatcher, 95 S.C. 49, 78 S.E. 615 (1913).
[FN5] Ada Dairy Products Co. v. Superior Court, Seminole County, 258 P.2d 939
(Okla. 1953) (holding that a duly licensed and practicing attorney of one county, while
present in another county to represent the client, may not be served with summons of a
suit against a corporation of which he is the president, in the second county).
[FN6] Parker v. Reddick, 196 Tenn. 472, 268 S.W.2d 357, 45 A.L.R.2d 1096 (1954).
Here's an idea...the 3/6/13 arraingment for the felony and gross EPO/TPO violations, what about a Motion to Set Aside both the
WCPD and SBN, or just the SBN EPO itself based upon Coughlin's immunity from service of process while attending court,
especially where his attending was at least tangentially related to the basis or subject matter of the TPO/EPO. If the service was
no good, the violation charge fails...
Please consider:
" 25. The role of retained counsel; in generalSettlement or disposition without hearing; form of release
Settlement is the ideal goal in every case. Seldom can any good come from having a hearing. Even though the
accused attorney claims complete innocence, the committee members may wonder why the matter was not
disposed of earlier. They are quite aware of the fact that such matters do not get to the hearing stage without
the recommendation of the investigating bar attorney, who must have found evidence of wrongdoing to justify
filing formal charges. Thus, the defense is faced with a suspicion of some act of misconduct. Logically,
therefore, the goal of avoiding a hearing is the most desirable one, and the approach taken should be one that
is least likely to lead
to a hearing. It makes little sense to set one's goal for a hearing when the use of diplomacy can avoid it.
Settlement is possible only up to a point prior to the hearing, however. Once the hearing commences, it is
usually too late for the accused attorney to settle with the complainant. The most satisfactory and beneficial
settlements are those reached within two weeks of the filing of the complaint. The potential for various
settlement possibilities are plentiful, but, unfortunately, they are usually predicated on a commodity in short
supply for most attorneys: money. Often it will be necessary for the client to contact family members and give
promissory notes for loans in order to bargain with cash that may be easily replaced, rather than his license,
which cannot. It should be noted that while it is unethical conduct to "buy off" complaining witnesses, nearly
all states provide that if the district attorney either approves or encourages a civil settlement, then
disciplinary proceedings may be avoided. Retained counsel must make certain he violates none of the
canons of ethics himself. The key to avoiding trouble is to be open and candid with all concerned. Retained
counsel should immediately make clear to the accused attorney that he is to take no action whatever following
representation, and a careful inquiry should be made to determine what action he has taken to date. Invariably,
steps will have to be taken to straighten out the harm that he may already have done. The single most
important ingredient for success is the attitude of the accused attorney. If the grievance committee receives
the impression that he is merely interested in a "dodge" to avoid the consequences of his acts, then great
difficulty can be expected. If on the other hand the accused is genuinely contrite, both in his words and his
actions, few committees are likely to take severe action, even in serious cases. On the other hand, some
attorneys may attempt some sort of cover-up. They may lie to the committee or may otherwise do great
disservice to their own cause when they are not represented. It should always be kept in mind that a contrite
attitude by the accused attorney is a difficult one for a grievance committee to resist, particularly when it is
coupled with a clear and definite plan of corrective action. Contrition, however, must always be coupled with
cooperation, and cooperation must always be coupled with corrective action. Should one of these elements be
missing, a good result cannot be expected. Once defense counsel takes the client firmly in hand, directs a
corrective-action program, and, most importantly, establishes and maintains a good relationship with bar
counsel, he may expect good results, even in serious cases." from "Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary
Proceedings"m 31 AMJUR TRIALS 633.
Coughlin would stip to anything that would essentially put the EPOs back in place thereafter, he doesn't want to bother anybody
or any drama, etc. Coughlin realizes it would be a mistake to try to "expose" Bar Counsel King, and anyways, Coughlin
generally likes Mr. King, that whole formal hearing just got a bit contentious, but Mr. King need not be worried about any
damage to his reputation or allegations of his being a "fraud". There may be some issue with the manner in which the WCSO
carries out 24 hour lockout ORders incident to evictions. Coughlin doesn't intend to pursue having DDA Watts-Vial answer
his SCR 110 subpoenas, especially if all this SBN/criminal/civil stuff can be resolved, hopefully with Coughlin still having a
law license at some point, but if necessary, a disbarment by consent contingent upon all the criminal stuff (an, if permissible
things like the $42K attorney fee civil award in 03628 being addressed) may be a path to pursue. Doesn't sound like the most
heart warming resolution, but if everybody is that mad at Coughlin and truly cannot see any basis for mitigation or why he
contested this or that or how the manner in which the eviction in 1708 was carried out may have been a bit harsh, well...
As to the manner in which the WCSO carries out 24 hours eviction orders to mean "within 24 hours" as meaning that the Sheriff
can race over to a house right after the hearing, versus, must wait at least 24 hours...Coughlin would enter a confidentiality
agreement or some agreement whereby he will be quite about that/relinquish any claims he may have, forego any qui tam action
(just kidding, really), etc., etc.
How about this, I apply tomorrow for appointed counsel for the 3/5/13 Show Cause Hearing, and to officially have Bruce
appointed for the 3/11/13 DAS Probation Violation Hearing, in addition to in the appeal in CR12-2025 (the 1/9/13 Order
granting me IFP by Judge Elliott might help with that) and in the appeal I filed from the 2/13/13 hearing wherein Bruce
appeared, for the Contempt Hearing, "free of charge" as you indicated (under Feick, I believe Bruce should have been paid). I
filed a Notice of Appeal of that 5 day contempt conviction (not sure if it was civil or criminal, if its criminal, I have to report it
to the SBN and USPTO, thus I appealed it, but the RJC probably just viewed that as me being more a pain in the ass and not
getting the picture...I don't want to fight it unless its a criminal contempt conviction....). I think filing the Notice of Appeal in
12-065630 may have resulted in the 2/25/13 Show Cause Order, that, or Judge Pearson was upset that the 2/25/13 DAS
Probation Violation Hearing didn't go on as scheduled on 2/25/13.... See the language in the 2/25/13 Show Cause Order that
suggests that, if I apply for counsel by 4pm on 2/28/13, that some will be appointed (ie, money for your office, a good thing in
my opinion).
More money hopefully upon your office being appointed in the appeal in cr12-2025 and the new appeal I filed within the 10 days
pursuant to NRS 189.010 from the 5 day incarceration order for Contempt ( I guess) from 2/13/13 (the hearing Bruce appeared
at, to my surprise).
Right to Counsel
here is no absolute due process right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings. (Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at 790.) On the other
hand, there are "cases in which fundamental fairness - the touchstone of due process - will require that the State provide at its
expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees." (Ibid.) Although there are no rigid guidelines, the United States Supreme
Court has suggested that counsel should be provided anytime the defendant makes a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not
committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public
record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate,
and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present.(Ibid.) In California, however, the Supreme Court has
proclaimed a right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings as a judicially declared rule of procedure. (Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d
at 461-462.)
The totality of the circumstances, including the DAS materials Coughlin was provided, extreme health problems (including a reaction
preventing Couglin from appearing at a 1/3/13 EPO hearing in 12-599 and 12-607, even to contest service, process, or juridiction,
includign to assert an attorney's (even a suspended attorney appearing pro se) immunity from service of process at the courthouse,
including under courthouse sanctuary doctrine, situational stress incident to Coughlin's formal disciplinary hearing regarding the
irrevocable revocation of his law license, misleading sworn statements by both SBN Bar Counsel Pat King and WCPD Jim Leslie, and
verbal statements and writings to Coughlin by DAS staff, including Officer Celeste Brown, support this colorable claim by Coughlin
that he has not violated the terms of his probation , much less in a manner sufficient to support a summary arrest. Coughlin has received
indications from DAS staff including Officer Brown that, in exigent circumstances calling or writing, especially ahead of time, may
provide a basis for not finding a probation violatin, and Coughlin submits that both alleged probation violation (incident to DAS
Officer Ramos's PC sheet of 2/1/13, which indicate such violation occured on 1/3/13 and 1/24/13...which just happend to be days
where Coughlin had deadlines in 62337 and where Couglin now faces felony and gross charges upon allegations of TPO and EPO
violations occuring on those dates) augers towards either dismissing the charge of an alleged probation violation or affording Coughlin
representation at publice expense, especially where, apparently B. Lindsay, Esq. Showed up to the 12-067980 contempt hearing on
2/13/13 as a freebie, upbeknownst to Coughlin and counter to at least the implicit representation made to him by the Court and
Lindsay upon being led into court in restraints that morning, absent any consultations with Lindsay beforehand whatsoever..
I think Mr. Lindsay and his paralegal Diana are doing a good job and we are making progress towards ultimately (hopefully,
fingers crossed) getting the original plea deal that I voluntarily accepted on 8/27/12 put back on the record and accepted by the
RJC, even disposing of the appeal of the convictions in 11-063341 (now on appeal in CR12-2025):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BnQWmL4_chY That is the audio of the 8/27/12 hearing in 11-063341 where Couglin voluntarily accepted the plea, though it was rejected.
Next time, Coughlin promises, he will hit his mark more cleanly and get his lines right.
The other stupid youtube stuff is coming down. The plea deal was as follows:
From: Leslie, Jim
Sent: Friday, August 24, 2012 11:17 AM
To: 'Zach Coughlin'
Subject: Coughlin: Settlement of RCR11-063341, RCR12-065630 and RCR12-067980
Mr. Coughlin:
As I had noted earlier, I had relayed the offer you had sent for a settlement. You had sent it to Zach Young directly, as well
as me and other recipients. I then forwarded your email offer to Mr. Young and asked him to reply.
Mr. Young took the position that any prior State offers had been rejected by you or had expired by their terms or by virtue
of lapse of reasonable time. Nevertheless, he has replied indicating willingness to settle as follows:
The entry of plea pursuant to this settlement must occur in Reno Justice Court no later than Monday August 27, 2012.
The plea would be to two misdemeanor disturbing the peace charges, one such charge in RCR11-063341 (the iPhone
case) and once such charge in RCR12-065630 (the 911 case);
Sentence would be 90 days jail on each charge, suspended and concurrent to each other, with the following conditions: (1)
obey all laws (except that the parties agree that traffic violations do not constitute violation of this condition), (2) mental
health counseling as recommended by your psychiatrist or mental health treatment provider, with regular reports every 60
days for a period of one year, (3) take medications and engage in counseling as recommended by said psychiatrist or
mental health treatment provider.
In exchange for this plea settlement, the State will dismiss RCR12-067980 (resisting case).
Please note that Mr. Young was emphatic that this plea settlement must be entered by the August 27, 2012, expiration date
or it is rescinded. The August 29 trial in RCR11-063341 will not be vacated until the settlement plea is entered on
monday.
Time is of the essense, since any settlement must be entered at RJC by monday, so please reply via email with your
acceptance and I will set up a hearing for monday.
Thank you,
James B. Leslie, Esq.
Chief Deputy Public Defender
Washoe County Public Defender's Office
I would absolutely voluntarily agree to that plea deal right now, especially if it could dispose of the appearl in CR12-
2025 in a manner that would allow for a SCR 111(10) application like that in the setting aside of the conviction of former
Pahrump DA Beckett in In Re Beckett.
The only reason I went into court is because I am self representing on 063341. Bruce Lindsay is not my attorney of record on
that case, nor have I ever consented to his becoming my attorney of record therein. I believe
I am asking in writing if Bruce Lindsay, Esq. was appointed as my counsel of record in 2012-065630 for the 2/13/13 Contempt
Hearing, at which I received 5 days in jail for being late, wherein Judge Clifton alleged I had already had the benefit of a warning,
yet I maintain that Robbin Baker told me the start time of the trial in that matter on 12/11/11 had been moved from 9 am to 1:30
pm. Judge Clifton maintained that he did not change the start time, then insisted Robbin Baker did not tell me that, then refused
to indicate just how he could possibly know what Robbin Baker had told me. Subsequently it was learned that Robbin Baker
was not even at work that day, and that no one had called her that day to inquire as to whether I was correct in my assertion as to
her having communicated the start time of the trial as having changed. I believe it is situations like that that resulted in the
current Administrative Order 12-01 (which may not even still be binding considering it was from 2012 and by former Chief
Judge Sferrazza) wherein I seemingly am prevented from communicating with any court personnel besides the Bailiff's, based
upon some unnoticed finding that I had caused distruptions in the filing office, an accusation to which I was never provided an
opportunity to be heard on.
Previously, Judge Sferrazza refused to allow me to appear on my own behalf, despite my having been a licensed attorney in
Nevada at the time in 11-063341, and despite my having filed a Notice of Appearance therein, and an Authorization to represent.
Then Judge Sferrazza, at trial on 8/27/12 and 8/29/12 refused to allow me to self represent still. Then he refused to accept the
plea agreement that would have disposed of all three matters to which I am a defendant in the RJC (11-063341, which is now on
appeal in CR12-2025, with the Appeal Brief, per the attached Briefing Schedule, on March 9th, 2013, and where Judge Elliott
entered an Order granting my IFP on 1/9/13 providing for the preparation of the transcript at public expense; 11-065630, which
stemmed form a 1/14/12 "misuse of emergency communications" gross misdemeanor arrest, that had the trial start on 12/11/12,
where the WCPD was releived on 11/27/12 (the day pre-trial motions were due, I maintain I was forced to proceed pro se due to
Biray Dogan's complete lack of representation, including failing to appear where required at the 2/14/12 arraignment on a gross
misdemeanor (indigent defendnans entitled to representation on gross misdo and felonies "at all stages"...); and the matter
wherein Bruce is counsel of record, 12-067980, where Bruce has stipulated to several continuances...and now today apparently
DDA Young tried to pull something where he failed to stip to the continuance in 11-063341, refuses to take my calls or respond
to any written communications. Further WCDA Legal Assistant Tina Galli informed me today that I am not to call their office
on 11-063341 and that "Diana from Bruce Lindsay's Office is handling it". That is not true at this point, as far as I understand,
but I think Mr. Lindsay and Diana could be very instrumental in resolving these various matters, saving the County a great deal
of money and resources expended prosecuting me, etc. and help me to save myself from myself. I am self representing, I never
consented to Bruce Lindsay, Esq. appearing as attorney of record in 11-063341. Further, I never expressly consented to Lindsay
appearing in 11-065630 at the 2/13/13 Contempt Hearing, wherein I was brought in upon being summarily taken into custody
the day before, and without consulting with Lindsay at all or ever consenting to his appearing on my behalf, Lindsay was seated
at the defendants desk.
From: Charles M. McGee(judgemcgee@msn.com) This sender is in your safe list.
Sent: Fri 1/18/13 1:39 PM
To: zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Dear Zach,
I can, I think, but only with your assistance and approval, help you.
And the only avenue that I think is left to you Zack (my godson is Zach--sorry for the misspell) is a SCR 117 Disability Petition.
You, in my opinion, after considerable though on the matter, need to realize that you need some help.
You shoot you own self in the foot every time.
But if I am wasting my time, let me know.
My heart is in the right place.
Chuck"
I would prefer that all three matters be resolved (and hopefully the appeal of 11-063341 in CR12-2025 before Judge Elliott can
be included in such a global resolution) in accordance with the terms I agreed to on the record on 8/27/13 in 11-063341 (a
hearing which arguably was combined with the other two matters).
B. Due Process Rights 1. Background The loss of liberty entailed in the revocation of probation is a serious deprivation
requiring that the defendant be accorded certain due process rights. The minimum due process requirements for a probation
revocation proceeding are: (1) written notice of the claimed violation of probation; (2) disclosure of the evidence against the
probationer; (3) an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation); (5) a neutral and detached hearing body; and (6) a written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied on
and the reasons for revoking probation. (Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778, 786.) In Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at pp. 781-
782, the United States Supreme Court applied its parole revocation due process jurisprudence to probation revocation. Parole-
14- revocation due process rights were established in Morrissey v. Brewster (1972) 408 U.S. 471. Before Gagnon was decided,
however, The California Supreme Court, in People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 457-458, had applied the Morrissey parole
revocation requirements to probation. In Vickers, supra, at 458, the court said: [T]he precise nature of the proceedings for such
[probation] revocation need not be identical [to parole revocation proceedings] if they assure equivalent due process
safeguards. Subsequent California cases concerning the sufficient amount of due process required before probation may be
revoked have relied on Vickers. The few that have indirectly addressed the question of whether Gagnon requires greater due
process than Vickers have disagreed. (Compare People v. Mosley (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1167, 1173- 1174 [noting that any
uncertainty remaining in the wake of Vickers appears to have been quelled by...Gagnon... which explicitly requires written notice
of any claimed violation as part of the minimal due process requirements in probation revocation cases] with People v. Buford
(1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 975, 981 [which continues to cite Vickers and Morrissey as allowing for flexible due process standards
without any due process sine qua nons]). 2. Written notice Concerning written notice, People v. Mosley, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d
at p. 1174, held that where the defendant was given written notice of certain grounds for violation, it was improper to base a
revocation on other grounds not included in the notice, even though the other grounds were shown at the hearing. (See also In re
Moss (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 913, concerning the importance of written notice.) However, in People v.-15- Felix (1986) 178
Cal.App.3d 1168, 1171-1172 [First Dist., Div. 3], the court held that the trial court's offer to grant a continuance where the
defendant clFelix (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1171-1172 [First Dist., Div. 3], the court held that the trial court's offer to
grant a continuance where the defendant claimed he had not received notice of certain grounds for revocation was sufficient to
meet constitutional concerns. Felix did not address Gagnon, and its ruling may not meet the due process standards of that case.
(See People v. Mosley, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1173-1174). 3. Motion for revocation There is scant case law on the
question of when a motion to revoke has been made too long after the defendants violation of probation to satisfy due process
concerns. People v. Villines (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1298, 1303-1304, cites two federal appellate decisions concerning the
timeliness of motions to revoke probation: United States v. Tyler (5th Cir. 1979) 605 F.2d 851 [due process concerns not
satisfied when the alleged violation of probation occurred more than one year before the motion to revoke and a probation
officer had previously made a decision not to make a motion] and United States v. Hamilton (9th Cir. 1983) 708 F.2d 1412
[unreasonable delay when probation was revoked three years after the violation and the defendant attempted to bring the default
to the courts attention]. 4. Waiver Probationers due process rights may be expressly waived, and may be deemed to have been
waived if the defendant, with knowledge of the rights, fails to assert them in a timely manner. (In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d
146, 153; People v. Dale (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 191, 195.) 5. Summary Revocation A summary revocation of probation, upon
probable cause that a violation of probation has occurred, is accepted practice. Summary revocation tolls the clock on the term
of probation, and is simply a device by which the defendant may be brought before the court, and jurisdiction retained, before
formal revocation proceedings begin. (People v. Pipitone (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1117; People v. Barkins (1978) 81
Cal.App.3d 30, 32-33; Pen. Code 1203.2, sub. a.) If, however, it is determined at a subsequent revocation hearing that the
defendant did not violate the terms of probation, the defendant gets back the time that passed between the summary revocation
and the determination that no violation, in fact, occurred. (People v. Tapia (2000) 91 Cal.App.4th 738, 743.) Though Gagnon,
supra, 411 U.S. at 781-782, would seem to require both a preliminary hearing and a final revocation hearing before probation
may be revoked, People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 895, held that a unitary hearing will usually suffice in probation
revocation cases to serve the purposes of the separate preliminary and formal revocation hearings outlined in Morrissey. 6.
Right to Counsel 6. Right to Counsel-17- There is no absolute due process right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings.
(Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at 790.) On the other hand, there are "cases in which fundamental fairness - the touchstone of due
process - will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees." (Ibid.) Although there
are no rigid guidelines, the United States Supreme Court has suggested that counsel should be provided anytime the defendant
makes a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at
liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which
justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to
develop or present.(Ibid.) In California, however, the Supreme Court has proclaimed a right to counsel in probation revocation
proceedings as a judicially declared rule of procedure. (Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at 461-462.) 7. Standard of Proof/Review The
standard of proof applicable to probation revocation proceedings is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v.
Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 441.) In order to overturn a trial court decision that the defendant violated the terms of
probation, an appellate court would determine, looking at the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether the
record discloses substantial evidencethat is,-18- evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid valuesuch that a
reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant violated the terms of probation. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557,
578.) C. Evidentiary Issues 1. Hearsay Documentary evidence, whose source is not live testimony, may be admitted when it is
accompanied by reasonable indicia of reliability. (People v. Maki (1985) 39 Cal.3d 707,716 [defendants signature on a car
rental invoice seized from defendants home]; People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1156-1157.) However, a different rule
applies to testimonial hearsay. Any attempt by the prosecution to introduce a preliminary hearing transcript in lieu of live witness
testimony requires a showing of good cause before a defendant's right of confrontation at a probation revocation hearing can be
dispensed with.... (People v. Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 714-716.) The California Supreme Court has held that it is improper to
revoke probation based upon hearsay statements of the sole percipient witness to the claimed violation where there has been no
showing of the witness's legal unavailability and no specific finding of good cause to deny the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses. (People v. Winson (1981) 29 Cal.3d 711, 719; People v. Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1159.) In People v.
Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp.1158-1159, the court stated: If the declarant is available and the same -19- information can be
presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor
of the declarant, there is little justification for relying on the weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence are
available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, applicable as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better
evidence. In People v. OConnell, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at 1066-1067, the court attributed no error to the trial courts
decision to allow into evidence an Adult Drug Program Termination Report prepared by...the program manager... to show
that the defendant had failed to satisfactorily participate in drug counseling sessions as required by the terms of probation. The
court analogized this report to the documentary evidence Maki prong of the Arreola hearsay analysis, determining that the
report was prepared contemporaneously to, and specifically for, the hearing where appellant's lack of compliance with the
deferred entry of judgment program was at issue, and such reports were routinely received without undertaking the added
burden of calling the author to authenticate it because the reports were prepared in response to a referral from the court.
(People v. OConnell, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp.1066-1067.) -20- 2. Exclusionary Rule Generally, the exclusionary rule
does not apply to probation revocation proceedings. (People v. Harrison (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 803, 808.) However, evidence
that has been previously suppressed at a preliminary hearing because of an illegal search or seizure may not be introduced at a
probation revocation hearing if the criminal charges were dropped and a new complaint or indictment was never filed. (People v.
Zimmerman (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 673, 676 [statutory interpretation of Pen. Code 1538].) Illegally seized evidence will be
excluded, moreover, if the police conduct was so egregious as to shock the conscience. (People v. Washington (1987) 192
Cal.App.3d 1120, 1128.) 3. Probationers testimony The testimony of a probationer at a probation revocation hearing, and its
fruits, cannot be used in a later criminal prosecution. (People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at 891-892.) However, if the
probationer takes the stand at a later criminal trial, the earlier revocation hearing testimony can be used to impeach the
probationers truthfulness. (Id. at p. 892.) -21- 4. Collateral Estoppel The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not generally apply
to issues raised in both probation revocation hearings and criminal trials. Thus, facts and issues may be relitigated regardless of
which hearing was held first and what determination was made. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 347-349.)
Likewise, refiling of a motion to revoke probation, following dismissal of the first revocation proceeding, is permissible.
(People v. Villines, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at 1305.) It is within the reasonable discretion of the trial court to decide whether to
hold a revocation hearing before or after trial for a new offense. (People v. Jasper (1983) 33 Cal.3d 931, 935.)
MORE ON THE IDEA OF THE TPO/EPO'S BEING SET ASIDE BASED UPON VIOLATIONS OF COURTHOUSE
SANCTUARY DOCTRINE OR AN ATTORNEY'S IMMUNITY FROM SERVICE OF PROCESS AT THE COURT, ETC.:
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-district-court/1372465.html
"THE LAW
(COURTHOUSE SANCTUARY)
Despite antagonistic dicta to the contrary; most modern era precedent dealing with the issue of Courthouse Sanctuary from service
of process have held that New York State residents receive no such immunity protections. Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, 273 A.D.
411, 77 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1st Dept.1948); Department of Housing Preservation, City of New York v. Koenigsberg, 133 Misc.2d 893,
509 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. Civ.Ct.1986); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Bobo, N.Y.L.J., 1 Misc.3d 901(A), 2003 WL 22928513 (Dec. 17,
2003, J. Miller, Nassau Co. Dist. Ct.) These cases hold that the Courthouse Sanctuary is only available to foreign state residents who
come into New York's Courts to contest jurisdiction. This doctrine has been slightly expanded to include New York residents who
enter the jurisdiction of a New York Court of limited territorial jurisdiction to contest jurisdiction. See Palazzo v. Conforti, 50
N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Civ.Ct.1944); Singer v. Reising, 154 Misc. 239, 276 N.Y.S. 714 (Queens County 1935).
The Baumgartner Appellate Division panel also acknowledges a limited Courthouse Sanctuary rule for New York residents if
such service would constitute a disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of the Court or to impair the respect
due its authority. This rule by itself would not be applicable to the instant case as service of process was effected in the
Courtroom but outside the Court's presence and in between calendar calls.
STATE RESIDENCY IMMUNITY DISTINCTION?
The English Common Law made no New York State residency distinction. The doctrine of immunity from arrest of a litigant
attending a trial of an action to which he is a party found early recognition and dates back to the book of 13 Henry IV, J.B. Sampson
v. Graves, 208 A.D. 522, 203 N.Y.S. 729 (1st Dept.1924). This is for the obvious reason that England had no sovereign states. The
privilege is not a creature of statute, but was created and deemed necessary for the due administration of justice. See Matthews v.
Tufts, 87 N.Y. 568 (1882); citing to Van Lien v. Johnson (N.Y. Ct. Appeals, unreported 1871).
The logical question now arises, exactly when did New York's Appellate Court's recognize a residency distinction for application of
the Courthouse Sanctuary? The answer is that the Court of Appeals never established such a rule. In contra point of fact, the
Court of Appeals has opined that:
It is the policy of the law to protect suitors and witnesses from arrests upon civil process while coming to and attending the
court and while returning home. Upon principle as well as upon authority their immunity from the service of process for the
commencement of civil actions against them is absolute eundo, morando et redeundo. Person v. Grier, 66 N.Y. 124 (1876).
Emphasis Added.
In this unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals expressly addressed the New York State resident immunity distinction and established
in its dicta that whether any distinction should or does in fact exist, is at least doubtful. This immunity is one of the necessities of the
Administration of Justice, and Court's would often be embarrassed if suitors or witnesses, while attending Court, could be molested
with process. It is noted that Person involved a foreign state resident. In establishing the sanctuary doctrine, the Court stated that
this rule is especially applicable in all its foreign suitors . By direct implication, the Court of Appeals is also applying the
protective rule to New York residents.
The basis of the Courthouse Sanctuary rule is that parties should be allowed to contest jurisdiction without submitting to it.
Allowing Re-service makes a mockery of the traverse hearing and essentially allows the plaintiff to use a defective default
judgment as a weapon to compel the defendant to submit to the service of process. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Bobo; cite supra. The
location of an individual's residence does little to legitimize such a mockery. Absent the compulsion of clear controlling precedent;
this Court will not condone such a situation..."
a. In General
21. Generally
West's Key Number Digest, Process k117 to 120
Litigants, their attorneys, and witnesses are immune from service of process while attending
court.[FN1] The basis for this rule, sometimes known as the "Courthouse Sanctuary" rule,
is that parties should be allowed to contest jurisdiction without submitting to it.[FN2] Process
immunity is not for the convenience of the person seeking it but is for the convenience of the
court, and should be made available only to further the administration of justice.[FN3] The
test is whether the privilege, if allowed, would so obstruct judicial administration in the cause
for the protection of which it is invoked as to justify withholding it; this depends on the nature
of the proceeding in which the service is made and its relation to the principal suit.[FN4] Because
the privilege is designed for the court's convenience, it is not automatic, and the party
must affirmatively show that it is in the court's own interest in the furtherance of the administration
of justice to quash the summons.[FN5]
Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the defendant
seeking immunity from the service of process to produce evidence establishing immunity
by showing that he or she was attending a judicial proceeding.[FN6]
Caution:
In at least one state, the immunity rule is no longer the law, whether the person seeking immunity
is a nonresident witness or a nonresident party.[FN7]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
AMJUR PROCESS 21 Page 1
62B Am. Jur. 2d Process 21
Service of process effected in courtroom, but outside court presence and in between calendar
calls, was not affected by limited courthouse sanctuary rule, which provided immunity
from service of process for New York residents if such service would constitute a disturbance
directly tending to interrupt proceedings of court or to impair respect due its authority. North
Fork Bank v. Grover, 3 Misc. 3d 341, 773 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Dist. Ct. 2004).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932); Stewart v.
Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192 (1916); Moreo v. Regan, 140
A.D.2d 313, 527 N.Y.S.2d 547 (2d Dep't 1988); Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. District
Court of Fourteenth Judicial Dist. In and For Tulsa County, 1980 OK 3, 605 P.2d
1323 (Okla. 1980).
[FN2] North Fork Bank v. Grover, 3 Misc. 3d 341, 773 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Dist. Ct. 2004).
[FN3] Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932); Page Co. v.
MacDonald, 261 U.S. 446, 43 S. Ct. 416, 67 L. Ed. 737 (1923); Stewart v. Ramsay,
242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192 (1916); ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre,
45 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1995).
[FN4] Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932).
[FN5] ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1995); Republic
Productions, Inc v. American Federation of Musicians of U S and Canada, 173 F.
Supp. 330 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
[FN6] LaRose v. Curoe, 343 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1983).
[FN7] Silverman v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 145, 249 Cal. Rptr. 724 (2d Dist.
1988).
a. In General
25. Remedies for violation of rule of immunity
West's Key Number Digest, Process k126
The service of process on one who is privileged or exempt from service is not void but
voidable.[FN1] To secure the right to claim privilege or immunity from service of process, the
party must appear and move to quash the service or proceed otherwise as required by the applicable
rules of practice. It is insufficient to file a motion giving notice to the court of a claim
of immunity; the party must appear and submit the question to the court for decision.[FN2]
[FN1] Northwestern Casualty & Surety Co. v. Conaway, 210 Iowa 126, 230 N.W. 548,
68 A.L.R. 1465 (1930); Beckham v. Johnson, 220 Tenn. 572, 421 S.W.2d 94 (1967).
68 A.L.R. 1465 (1930).
b. Litigants
27. Generally
There is conflicting authority on the question of whether a party litigant may claim an exemption
from service of process while attending trial.[FN1] The generally prevailing rule is
that nonresident litigants are privileged from service of civil process while going to, attending,
or returning from, court.[FN2] The rule is especially true where parties may be examined as
witnesses,[FN3] or where such a party is attending a trial to testify as a witness.[FN4] The
privilege is generally limited to nonresidents and to residents attending court in a county outside
their county of residence, and does not extend generally to residents.[FN5]
In contrast, some jurisdictions have declined to extend to nonresident litigants protection
Re: update on NNAHMS, request for continuance of 2/25/13 Hearing in 067980
from the service of process in another action.[FN6]
[FN1] Mertens v. McMahon, 334 Mo. 175, 66 S.W.2d 127, 93 A.L.R. 1285 (1933).
Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192 (1916); Durst v. Tautges, Wilder &
McDonald, 44 F.2d 507, 71 A.L.R. 1394 (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1930); LaRose v. Curoe, 343
N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1983); Massengale v. Lester, 403 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. 1966); Commercial
Bank & Trust Co. v. District Court of Fourteenth Judicial Dist. In and For
Tulsa County, 1980 OK 3, 605 P.2d 1323 (Okla. 1980); Lox, Stock and Bagels, Inc. v.
Kotten Mach. Co. of California, Inc., 261 Pa. Super. 84, 395 A.2d 954 (1978); Parker
v. Reddick, 196 Tenn. 472, 268 S.W.2d 357, 45 A.L.R.2d 1096 (1954); State ex rel
b. Litigants
28. Parties who may claim privilege
The rule of immunity of litigants from a foreign jurisdiction from the service of process
while attending court typically includes both plaintiffs and defendants.[FN1] There is authority,
however, to the effect that nonresident plaintiffs are not privileged from the service of
process,[FN2] on the theory that a plaintiff who voluntarily seeks the aid and protection of
courts of another state should not be shielded from the processes of those courts, a condition
which should not apply to a defendant whose attendance is compulsory.[FN3] Moreover,
some courts, while usually extending the exemption to nonresident plaintiffs, hold that nonresident
plaintiffs who voluntarily come within the jurisdiction of the courts of a state to attend
the trial of litigation commenced by them against citizens of that state are not exempt
from service of a summons in an action by defendants for relief connected with the subject of
the litigation commenced by them, where a full and complete adjustment of the rights of the
parties cannot be had in the first action, and where full relief would be denied the citizens of
that state in courts of the state of the plaintiffs' residence.[FN4]
[FN1] Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192 (1916); Marlowe
v. Baird, 301 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1962); Lyf-Alum, Inc. v. C & M Aluminum Supply
Corp., 29 Wis. 2d 593, 139 N.W.2d 601 (1966); State v. District Court of Eighth Judicial
Dist. in and for Cascade County, 73 Mont. 265, 235 P. 766 (1925).
[FN2] Wilson Sewing Mach. Co. v. Wilson, 51 Conn. 595, 1884 WL 1053 (1884);
Livengood v. Ball, 1916 OK 1008, 63 Okla. 93, 162 P. 768 (1916).
Sincerely,
Sent: Thu 2/28/13 2:19 PM
Zach I have spoken with the Public Defenders office and we will have Bruce appointed on all of the Reno Muni Court Cases, so please do not fret, and do not contact the Court,
If you need anything you must go through this office. I promise you we have this covered, but you have to listen, stop thinking and let us take care of things, please trust me,
please. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2013 12:10 PM
Subject: RE: update on NNAHMS, request for continuance of 2/25/13 Hearing in 067980
Getting a continuance was pretty awesome, thank you. I did the orientation at NNAHMS yesterday with Dr. JIm Diss and signed up for counseling to begin next
week, I believe.
Zach has a file to share with you on SkyDrive. To view it, click the link below.
Re: proposal that might be your office some more money and resolve this whole
thing.
2 11 13 very redacted just first two pages of 063341 0204 NNAHMS materials including social worker report.pdf

Sent: Thu 2/28/13 10:40 AM
Zach I don't even know where to begin. You have the right idea here and then you just keep going on and on. Can you please contact our office so that we can make an
appointment to have you come in and go over all of the facts and documents. 324-3333 or 230-4697. The sooner the better.
To: Robert Lindsay <rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com>; "zyoung@da.washoecounty.us" <zyoung@da.washoecounty.us>;
"mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us" <mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us>; "dwatts@da.washoecounty.us"
<dwatts@da.washoecounty.us>; "mcovington@da.washoecounty.us" <mcovington@da.washoecounty.us>;
"plippar@da.washoecounty.us" <plippar@da.washoecounty.us>; "plipparelli@da.washoecounty.us"
<plipparelli@da.washoecounty.us>; "jhelzer@da.washoecounty.us" <jhelzer@da.washoecounty.us>
Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2013 9:14 PM
Subject: proposal that might be your office some more money and resolve this whole thing.
Dear Mr. Lindsay and WCDA's Office,
I respectfully submit this in the hopes that a global deal can be entered into, as without that, I will certainly be disbarred
irrevocably, and Judge Clifton and Judge Pearson, I am pretty sure, will be sentencing me to substantial amounts of jail time, in
addition to what may issue incident to the 3/6/13 arraignment on allegations of violating the SBN TPO/EPO and the 12-01
Administrative Order by Judge Sferrazza. It would mean so much to me and be so very appreciated. I lived here my whole life,
its would be pretty sad to see things continue where they are going (ie, me disbarred permanently, doing lots of time, etc...). I
realize I am not special and I haven't handled things very well in many instances, but, I am doing my best, and have been. I don't
get help from my family, in fact, my Dad often seems to be trying to sabotage my life in some misguided attempt to twelve step
me/hijack my mental health care...
I complete my intake with Northern Nevada Adult Mental Health this Monday, and am starting counseling and am set to meet
with a Dr. Kim on 3/13/13 to see about arranging for my medications to always be available to me if I cannot afford them (and
therefore, hopefully avoid the free fall my life had been in since that occurred and was followed by a string of arrests and
evictions starting in August 2011 (please see my email to Bar Counsel detailing that and attaching proof thereof with my
complete prescription history since about 2008, showing I went off Adderall and Wellbutrin in early August 2011...Please see
my 5/14/12 email to SBN Bar Counsel detailing the fall out of my not being able to afford my medications starting in August
2011, the string of arrests and eviction occurring immediately thereafter, etc.
Judge Weller, Judge McGee, and Judge Van Walraven are all mentors to me and I believe would be willing to indicate that I am
probably not competent to stand trial at this point, and that I am not such a bad person in the grand scheme...I have been attending
Coe Swobe's Thursday Night 7pm Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers meeting, and Coe would confrim that at 322-2154. I truly
do want to resolve all these criminal matters and don't want to pursue any civil claims. I just want to get back to normal life and
am sorry to have upset so many people. I did my best under some extremely trying circumstances that one likely could not fully
understand without living through them.
Please note, I have not filed the attached 2/27/13 Motion for Continuance or whatever, its just a proposed thing to provide some
suggestions for how all the various criminal/civil/administrative things might be resolved, if I am very, very lucky and fortunate.
Maybe the State can pay Mr. Lindsay in exchange for appearing for me in these various criminal matters and brokering this global
resolution. The Gagnon case set out below provides support for such right to counsel under these circumstances. Today, I
checked in with DAS. Upon checking in the RJC Bailfifs served me a new Order to Show Cause for the Administrative Order
12-01 entered on 12/20/12 by Judge Sferrazza. the hearing to be held on 3/5/13 at 2 pm. See both the 2/25/13 Show Cause
Order and the underlying 12/20/12 Administrative Order 12-01 attached. I believe I am still an attorney, even where suspended
(under Florida Bar v. Ross) and, as such, am immune from service of such process (in addition to the service of process
attempted by RJC Bailiffs during other DAS Check ins for the WCPD and SBN Protection Orders against me in 607 and 599.
attorney's exemption from service of process, see Am. Jur. 2d, Process 35. While DDA Watts made a nice argument in
objecting to my subpoenas on 2JDC personnel in my formal bar hearing, based upon my being suspending, I believe Florida Bar
v. Ross, the fact that I was given permission to issue my own subpoenas therein (ie, even if NRCP 45(a)(3) applies, I was
"authorized to appear" in that "court") would provide a counter to any extension of that argument that would suggest that my
being suspended by the State Bar of Nevada (but not the USPTO, therefore, I am still a patent attorney, I think...) would vitiate
any "attorney immune from service of process of the TPO/EPO applications or Orders while doing his DAS probation check-ins
in the RJC filing office"argument...Try to ease up on me a little here, I am doing the best I can everyone. I took in about $13,800
in fees while practicing law between July 2011 and my suspension in June 2012, and lost way, more money than that (especially
counting the sanctions awards that remain unpaid, etc.)...One cost saving measure to the county would be to work out a deal very
soon (like before the 3/5/13 Show Cause Hearing in the RJC, that would avoid the preparation of about 15 hours of trial
transcript at public expense incident to the 1/9/13 Order by Judge Elliott in the appeal of the conviction in 11-063341 (CR12-
2025). I'll sign away any civil law claims I have against any County entities, personnel, etc., especially if my SBN woes, RJC
criminal law woes, and hopefully a thing or two else, can be bargained away (if that is legal...I think it is, but the WCDA's Office
would need to approve of it, I believe...).
c. Attorneys
35. Generally
West's Key Number Digest, Process k117, 118
Attorneys at law at times enjoy certain privileges and exemptions not generally enjoyed by
lay persons, when they are considered necessary for the due administration of justice and the
protection of a client's rights.[FN1] At common law, an attorney was exempt from the service
of civil process while attending court.[FN2]
Currently, whether an attorney at law is exempt from the service of process in a civil action
while attending court may turn upon the attorney's residence within the state or county of
suit. Immunity from the service of civil process has been extended to a nonresident attorney
while going to, remaining at, or returning from the place where the client's business is transacted,
upon the ground that the administration of justice demands such an exemption,[FN3]
even though resident attorneys have no such immunity.[FN4]
Some jurisdictions take the view that an attorney is privileged from the service of process
while attending court in a professional capacity in a county other than the county of his or her
residence,[FN5] while others hold that the attorney is not immune from service.[FN6]
[FN1] Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law 196.
[FN2] Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 55 S. Ct. 21, 79 L. Ed. 208 (1934); Lamb v.
Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932).
[FN3] Durst v. Tautges, Wilder & McDonald, 44 F.2d 507, 71 A.L.R. 1394 (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1930).
[FN4] Williams v. Hatcher, 95 S.C. 49, 78 S.E. 615 (1913).
[FN5] Ada Dairy Products Co. v. Superior Court, Seminole County, 258 P.2d 939
(Okla. 1953) (holding that a duly licensed and practicing attorney of one county, while
present in another county to represent the client, may not be served with summons of a
suit against a corporation of which he is the president, in the second county).
[FN6] Parker v. Reddick, 196 Tenn. 472, 268 S.W.2d 357, 45 A.L.R.2d 1096 (1954).
Here's an idea...the 3/6/13 arraingment for the felony and gross EPO/TPO violations, what about a Motion to Set Aside both the
WCPD and SBN, or just the SBN EPO itself based upon Coughlin's immunity from service of process while attending court,
especially where his attending was at least tangentially related to the basis or subject matter of the TPO/EPO. If the service was
no good, the violation charge fails...
Please consider:
" 25. The role of retained counsel; in generalSettlement or disposition without hearing; form of release
Settlement is the ideal goal in every case. Seldom can any good come from having a hearing. Even though the
accused attorney claims complete innocence, the committee members may wonder why the matter was not
disposed of earlier. They are quite aware of the fact that such matters do not get to the hearing stage without
the recommendation of the investigating bar attorney, who must have found evidence of wrongdoing to justify
filing formal charges. Thus, the defense is faced with a suspicion of some act of misconduct. Logically,
therefore, the goal of avoiding a hearing is the most desirable one, and the approach taken should be one that
is least likely to lead
to a hearing. It makes little sense to set one's goal for a hearing when the use of diplomacy can avoid it.
Settlement is possible only up to a point prior to the hearing, however. Once the hearing commences, it is
usually too late for the accused attorney to settle with the complainant. The most satisfactory and beneficial
settlements are those reached within two weeks of the filing of the complaint. The potential for various
settlement possibilities are plentiful, but, unfortunately, they are usually predicated on a commodity in short
supply for most attorneys: money. Often it will be necessary for the client to contact family members and give
promissory notes for loans in order to bargain with cash that may be easily replaced, rather than his license,
which cannot. It should be noted that while it is unethical conduct to "buy off" complaining witnesses, nearly
all states provide that if the district attorney either approves or encourages a civil settlement, then
disciplinary proceedings may be avoided. Retained counsel must make certain he violates none of the
canons of ethics himself. The key to avoiding trouble is to be open and candid with all concerned. Retained
counsel should immediately make clear to the accused attorney that he is to take no action whatever following
representation, and a careful inquiry should be made to determine what action he has taken to date. Invariably,
steps will have to be taken to straighten out the harm that he may already have done. The single most
important ingredient for success is the attitude of the accused attorney. If the grievance committee receives
the impression that he is merely interested in a "dodge" to avoid the consequences of his acts, then great
difficulty can be expected. If on the other hand the accused is genuinely contrite, both in his words and his
actions, few committees are likely to take severe action, even in serious cases. On the other hand, some
attorneys may attempt some sort of cover-up. They may lie to the committee or may otherwise do great
disservice to their own cause when they are not represented. It should always be kept in mind that a contrite
attitude by the accused attorney is a difficult one for a grievance committee to resist, particularly when it is
coupled with a clear and definite plan of corrective action. Contrition, however, must always be coupled with
cooperation, and cooperation must always be coupled with corrective action. Should one of these elements be
missing, a good result cannot be expected. Once defense counsel takes the client firmly in hand, directs a
corrective-action program, and, most importantly, establishes and maintains a good relationship with bar
counsel, he may expect good results, even in serious cases." from "Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary
Proceedings"m 31 AMJUR TRIALS 633.
Coughlin would stip to anything that would essentially put the EPOs back in place thereafter, he doesn't want to bother anybody
or any drama, etc. Coughlin realizes it would be a mistake to try to "expose" Bar Counsel King, and anyways, Coughlin
generally likes Mr. King, that whole formal hearing just got a bit contentious, but Mr. King need not be worried about any
damage to his reputation or allegations of his being a "fraud". There may be some issue with the manner in which the WCSO
carries out 24 hour lockout ORders incident to evictions. Coughlin doesn't intend to pursue having DDA Watts-Vial answer
his SCR 110 subpoenas, especially if all this SBN/criminal/civil stuff can be resolved, hopefully with Coughlin still having a
law license at some point, but if necessary, a disbarment by consent contingent upon all the criminal stuff (an, if permissible
things like the $42K attorney fee civil award in 03628 being addressed) may be a path to pursue. Doesn't sound like the most
heart warming resolution, but if everybody is that mad at Coughlin and truly cannot see any basis for mitigation or why he
contested this or that or how the manner in which the eviction in 1708 was carried out may have been a bit harsh, well...
As to the manner in which the WCSO carries out 24 hours eviction orders to mean "within 24 hours" as meaning that the Sheriff
can race over to a house right after the hearing, versus, must wait at least 24 hours...Coughlin would enter a confidentiality
agreement or some agreement whereby he will be quite about that/relinquish any claims he may have, forego any qui tam action
(just kidding, really), etc., etc.
How about this, I apply tomorrow for appointed counsel for the 3/5/13 Show Cause Hearing, and to officially have Bruce
appointed for the 3/11/13 DAS Probation Violation Hearing, in addition to in the appeal in CR12-2025 (the 1/9/13 Order
granting me IFP by Judge Elliott might help with that) and in the appeal I filed from the 2/13/13 hearing wherein Bruce
appeared, for the Contempt Hearing, "free of charge" as you indicated (under Feick, I believe Bruce should have been paid). I
filed a Notice of Appeal of that 5 day contempt conviction (not sure if it was civil or criminal, if its criminal, I have to report it
to the SBN and USPTO, thus I appealed it, but the RJC probably just viewed that as me being more a pain in the ass and not
getting the picture...I don't want to fight it unless its a criminal contempt conviction....). I think filing the Notice of Appeal in
12-065630 may have resulted in the 2/25/13 Show Cause Order, that, or Judge Pearson was upset that the 2/25/13 DAS
Probation Violation Hearing didn't go on as scheduled on 2/25/13.... See the language in the 2/25/13 Show Cause Order that
suggests that, if I apply for counsel by 4pm on 2/28/13, that some will be appointed (ie, money for your office, a good thing in
my opinion).
More money hopefully upon your office being appointed in the appeal in cr12-2025 and the new appeal I filed within the 10 days
pursuant to NRS 189.010 from the 5 day incarceration order for Contempt ( I guess) from 2/13/13 (the hearing Bruce appeared
at, to my surprise).
Right to Counsel
here is no absolute due process right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings. (Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at 790.) On the other
hand, there are "cases in which fundamental fairness - the touchstone of due process - will require that the State provide at its
expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees." (Ibid.) Although there are no rigid guidelines, the United States Supreme
Court has suggested that counsel should be provided anytime the defendant makes a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not
committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public
record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate,
and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present.(Ibid.) In California, however, the Supreme Court has
proclaimed a right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings as a judicially declared rule of procedure. (Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d
at 461-462.)
The totality of the circumstances, including the DAS materials Coughlin was provided, extreme health problems (including a reaction
preventing Couglin from appearing at a 1/3/13 EPO hearing in 12-599 and 12-607, even to contest service, process, or juridiction,
includign to assert an attorney's (even a suspended attorney appearing pro se) immunity from service of process at the courthouse,
including under courthouse sanctuary doctrine, situational stress incident to Coughlin's formal disciplinary hearing regarding the
irrevocable revocation of his law license, misleading sworn statements by both SBN Bar Counsel Pat King and WCPD Jim Leslie, and
verbal statements and writings to Coughlin by DAS staff, including Officer Celeste Brown, support this colorable claim by Coughlin
that he has not violated the terms of his probation , much less in a manner sufficient to support a summary arrest. Coughlin has received
indications from DAS staff including Officer Brown that, in exigent circumstances calling or writing, especially ahead of time, may
provide a basis for not finding a probation violatin, and Coughlin submits that both alleged probation violation (incident to DAS
Officer Ramos's PC sheet of 2/1/13, which indicate such violation occured on 1/3/13 and 1/24/13...which just happend to be days
where Coughlin had deadlines in 62337 and where Couglin now faces felony and gross charges upon allegations of TPO and EPO
violations occuring on those dates) augers towards either dismissing the charge of an alleged probation violation or affording Coughlin
representation at publice expense, especially where, apparently B. Lindsay, Esq. Showed up to the 12-067980 contempt hearing on
2/13/13 as a freebie, upbeknownst to Coughlin and counter to at least the implicit representation made to him by the Court and
Lindsay upon being led into court in restraints that morning, absent any consultations with Lindsay beforehand whatsoever..
I think Mr. Lindsay and his paralegal Diana are doing a good job and we are making progress towards ultimately (hopefully,
fingers crossed) getting the original plea deal that I voluntarily accepted on 8/27/12 put back on the record and accepted by the
RJC, even disposing of the appeal of the convictions in 11-063341 (now on appeal in CR12-2025):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BnQWmL4_chY That is the audio of the 8/27/12 hearing in 11-063341 where Couglin voluntarily accepted the plea, though it was rejected.
Next time, Coughlin promises, he will hit his mark more cleanly and get his lines right.
The other stupid youtube stuff is coming down. The plea deal was as follows:
From: Leslie, Jim
Sent: Friday, August 24, 2012 11:17 AM
To: 'Zach Coughlin'
Subject: Coughlin: Settlement of RCR11-063341, RCR12-065630 and RCR12-067980
Mr. Coughlin:
As I had noted earlier, I had relayed the offer you had sent for a settlement. You had sent it to Zach Young directly, as well
as me and other recipients. I then forwarded your email offer to Mr. Young and asked him to reply.
Mr. Young took the position that any prior State offers had been rejected by you or had expired by their terms or by virtue
of lapse of reasonable time. Nevertheless, he has replied indicating willingness to settle as follows:
The entry of plea pursuant to this settlement must occur in Reno Justice Court no later than Monday August 27, 2012.
The plea would be to two misdemeanor disturbing the peace charges, one such charge in RCR11-063341 (the iPhone
case) and once such charge in RCR12-065630 (the 911 case);
Sentence would be 90 days jail on each charge, suspended and concurrent to each other, with the following conditions: (1)
obey all laws (except that the parties agree that traffic violations do not constitute violation of this condition), (2) mental
health counseling as recommended by your psychiatrist or mental health treatment provider, with regular reports every 60
days for a period of one year, (3) take medications and engage in counseling as recommended by said psychiatrist or
mental health treatment provider.
In exchange for this plea settlement, the State will dismiss RCR12-067980 (resisting case).
Please note that Mr. Young was emphatic that this plea settlement must be entered by the August 27, 2012, expiration date
or it is rescinded. The August 29 trial in RCR11-063341 will not be vacated until the settlement plea is entered on
monday.
Time is of the essense, since any settlement must be entered at RJC by monday, so please reply via email with your
acceptance and I will set up a hearing for monday.
Thank you,
James B. Leslie, Esq.
Chief Deputy Public Defender
Washoe County Public Defender's Office
I would absolutely voluntarily agree to that plea deal right now, especially if it could dispose of the appearl in CR12-
2025 in a manner that would allow for a SCR 111(10) application like that in the setting aside of the conviction of former
Pahrump DA Beckett in In Re Beckett.
The only reason I went into court is because I am self representing on 063341. Bruce Lindsay is not my attorney of record on
that case, nor have I ever consented to his becoming my attorney of record therein. I believe
I am asking in writing if Bruce Lindsay, Esq. was appointed as my counsel of record in 2012-065630 for the 2/13/13 Contempt
Hearing, at which I received 5 days in jail for being late, wherein Judge Clifton alleged I had already had the benefit of a warning,
yet I maintain that Robbin Baker told me the start time of the trial in that matter on 12/11/11 had been moved from 9 am to 1:30
pm. Judge Clifton maintained that he did not change the start time, then insisted Robbin Baker did not tell me that, then refused
to indicate just how he could possibly know what Robbin Baker had told me. Subsequently it was learned that Robbin Baker
was not even at work that day, and that no one had called her that day to inquire as to whether I was correct in my assertion as to
her having communicated the start time of the trial as having changed. I believe it is situations like that that resulted in the
current Administrative Order 12-01 (which may not even still be binding considering it was from 2012 and by former Chief
Judge Sferrazza) wherein I seemingly am prevented from communicating with any court personnel besides the Bailiff's, based
upon some unnoticed finding that I had caused distruptions in the filing office, an accusation to which I was never provided an
opportunity to be heard on.
Previously, Judge Sferrazza refused to allow me to appear on my own behalf, despite my having been a licensed attorney in
Nevada at the time in 11-063341, and despite my having filed a Notice of Appearance therein, and an Authorization to represent.
Then Judge Sferrazza, at trial on 8/27/12 and 8/29/12 refused to allow me to self represent still. Then he refused to accept the
plea agreement that would have disposed of all three matters to which I am a defendant in the RJC (11-063341, which is now on
appeal in CR12-2025, with the Appeal Brief, per the attached Briefing Schedule, on March 9th, 2013, and where Judge Elliott
entered an Order granting my IFP on 1/9/13 providing for the preparation of the transcript at public expense; 11-065630, which
stemmed form a 1/14/12 "misuse of emergency communications" gross misdemeanor arrest, that had the trial start on 12/11/12,
where the WCPD was releived on 11/27/12 (the day pre-trial motions were due, I maintain I was forced to proceed pro se due to
Biray Dogan's complete lack of representation, including failing to appear where required at the 2/14/12 arraignment on a gross
misdemeanor (indigent defendnans entitled to representation on gross misdo and felonies "at all stages"...); and the matter
wherein Bruce is counsel of record, 12-067980, where Bruce has stipulated to several continuances...and now today apparently
DDA Young tried to pull something where he failed to stip to the continuance in 11-063341, refuses to take my calls or respond
to any written communications. Further WCDA Legal Assistant Tina Galli informed me today that I am not to call their office
on 11-063341 and that "Diana from Bruce Lindsay's Office is handling it". That is not true at this point, as far as I understand,
but I think Mr. Lindsay and Diana could be very instrumental in resolving these various matters, saving the County a great deal
of money and resources expended prosecuting me, etc. and help me to save myself from myself. I am self representing, I never
consented to Bruce Lindsay, Esq. appearing as attorney of record in 11-063341. Further, I never expressly consented to Lindsay
appearing in 11-065630 at the 2/13/13 Contempt Hearing, wherein I was brought in upon being summarily taken into custody
the day before, and without consulting with Lindsay at all or ever consenting to his appearing on my behalf, Lindsay was seated
at the defendants desk.
From: Charles M. McGee(judgemcgee@msn.com) This sender is in your safe list.
Sent: Fri 1/18/13 1:39 PM
To: zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Dear Zach,
I can, I think, but only with your assistance and approval, help you.
And the only avenue that I think is left to you Zack (my godson is Zach--sorry for the misspell) is a SCR 117 Disability Petition.
You, in my opinion, after considerable though on the matter, need to realize that you need some help.
You shoot you own self in the foot every time.
But if I am wasting my time, let me know.
My heart is in the right place.
Chuck"
I would prefer that all three matters be resolved (and hopefully the appeal of 11-063341 in CR12-2025 before Judge Elliott can
be included in such a global resolution) in accordance with the terms I agreed to on the record on 8/27/13 in 11-063341 (a
hearing which arguably was combined with the other two matters).
B. Due Process Rights 1. Background The loss of liberty entailed in the revocation of probation is a serious deprivation
requiring that the defendant be accorded certain due process rights. The minimum due process requirements for a probation
revocation proceeding are: (1) written notice of the claimed violation of probation; (2) disclosure of the evidence against the
probationer; (3) an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation); (5) a neutral and detached hearing body; and (6) a written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied on
and the reasons for revoking probation. (Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778, 786.) In Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at pp. 781-
782, the United States Supreme Court applied its parole revocation due process jurisprudence to probation revocation. Parole-
14- revocation due process rights were established in Morrissey v. Brewster (1972) 408 U.S. 471. Before Gagnon was decided,
however, The California Supreme Court, in People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 457-458, had applied the Morrissey parole
revocation requirements to probation. In Vickers, supra, at 458, the court said: [T]he precise nature of the proceedings for such
[probation] revocation need not be identical [to parole revocation proceedings] if they assure equivalent due process
safeguards. Subsequent California cases concerning the sufficient amount of due process required before probation may be
revoked have relied on Vickers. The few that have indirectly addressed the question of whether Gagnon requires greater due
process than Vickers have disagreed. (Compare People v. Mosley (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1167, 1173- 1174 [noting that any
uncertainty remaining in the wake of Vickers appears to have been quelled by...Gagnon... which explicitly requires written notice
of any claimed violation as part of the minimal due process requirements in probation revocation cases] with People v. Buford
(1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 975, 981 [which continues to cite Vickers and Morrissey as allowing for flexible due process standards
without any due process sine qua nons]). 2. Written notice Concerning written notice, People v. Mosley, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d
at p. 1174, held that where the defendant was given written notice of certain grounds for violation, it was improper to base a
revocation on other grounds not included in the notice, even though the other grounds were shown at the hearing. (See also In re
Moss (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 913, concerning the importance of written notice.) However, in People v.-15- Felix (1986) 178
Cal.App.3d 1168, 1171-1172 [First Dist., Div. 3], the court held that the trial court's offer to grant a continuance where the
defendant clFelix (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1171-1172 [First Dist., Div. 3], the court held that the trial court's offer to
grant a continuance where the defendant claimed he had not received notice of certain grounds for revocation was sufficient to
meet constitutional concerns. Felix did not address Gagnon, and its ruling may not meet the due process standards of that case.
(See People v. Mosley, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1173-1174). 3. Motion for revocation There is scant case law on the
question of when a motion to revoke has been made too long after the defendants violation of probation to satisfy due process
concerns. People v. Villines (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1298, 1303-1304, cites two federal appellate decisions concerning the
timeliness of motions to revoke probation: United States v. Tyler (5th Cir. 1979) 605 F.2d 851 [due process concerns not
satisfied when the alleged violation of probation occurred more than one year before the motion to revoke and a probation
officer had previously made a decision not to make a motion] and United States v. Hamilton (9th Cir. 1983) 708 F.2d 1412
[unreasonable delay when probation was revoked three years after the violation and the defendant attempted to bring the default
to the courts attention]. 4. Waiver Probationers due process rights may be expressly waived, and may be deemed to have been
waived if the defendant, with knowledge of the rights, fails to assert them in a timely manner. (In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d
146, 153; People v. Dale (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 191, 195.) 5. Summary Revocation A summary revocation of probation, upon
probable cause that a violation of probation has occurred, is accepted practice. Summary revocation tolls the clock on the term
of probation, and is simply a device by which the defendant may be brought before the court, and jurisdiction retained, before
formal revocation proceedings begin. (People v. Pipitone (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1117; People v. Barkins (1978) 81
Cal.App.3d 30, 32-33; Pen. Code 1203.2, sub. a.) If, however, it is determined at a subsequent revocation hearing that the
defendant did not violate the terms of probation, the defendant gets back the time that passed between the summary revocation
and the determination that no violation, in fact, occurred. (People v. Tapia (2000) 91 Cal.App.4th 738, 743.) Though Gagnon,
supra, 411 U.S. at 781-782, would seem to require both a preliminary hearing and a final revocation hearing before probation
may be revoked, People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 895, held that a unitary hearing will usually suffice in probation
revocation cases to serve the purposes of the separate preliminary and formal revocation hearings outlined in Morrissey. 6.
Right to Counsel 6. Right to Counsel-17- There is no absolute due process right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings.
(Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at 790.) On the other hand, there are "cases in which fundamental fairness - the touchstone of due
process - will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees." (Ibid.) Although there
are no rigid guidelines, the United States Supreme Court has suggested that counsel should be provided anytime the defendant
makes a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at
liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which
justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to
develop or present.(Ibid.) In California, however, the Supreme Court has proclaimed a right to counsel in probation revocation
proceedings as a judicially declared rule of procedure. (Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at 461-462.) 7. Standard of Proof/Review The
standard of proof applicable to probation revocation proceedings is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v.
Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 441.) In order to overturn a trial court decision that the defendant violated the terms of
probation, an appellate court would determine, looking at the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether the
record discloses substantial evidencethat is,-18- evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid valuesuch that a
reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant violated the terms of probation. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557,
578.) C. Evidentiary Issues 1. Hearsay Documentary evidence, whose source is not live testimony, may be admitted when it is
accompanied by reasonable indicia of reliability. (People v. Maki (1985) 39 Cal.3d 707,716 [defendants signature on a car
rental invoice seized from defendants home]; People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1156-1157.) However, a different rule
applies to testimonial hearsay. Any attempt by the prosecution to introduce a preliminary hearing transcript in lieu of live witness
testimony requires a showing of good cause before a defendant's right of confrontation at a probation revocation hearing can be
dispensed with.... (People v. Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 714-716.) The California Supreme Court has held that it is improper to
revoke probation based upon hearsay statements of the sole percipient witness to the claimed violation where there has been no
showing of the witness's legal unavailability and no specific finding of good cause to deny the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses. (People v. Winson (1981) 29 Cal.3d 711, 719; People v. Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1159.) In People v.
Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp.1158-1159, the court stated: If the declarant is available and the same -19- information can be
presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor
of the declarant, there is little justification for relying on the weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence are
available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, applicable as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better
evidence. In People v. OConnell, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at 1066-1067, the court attributed no error to the trial courts
decision to allow into evidence an Adult Drug Program Termination Report prepared by...the program manager... to show
that the defendant had failed to satisfactorily participate in drug counseling sessions as required by the terms of probation. The
court analogized this report to the documentary evidence Maki prong of the Arreola hearsay analysis, determining that the
report was prepared contemporaneously to, and specifically for, the hearing where appellant's lack of compliance with the
deferred entry of judgment program was at issue, and such reports were routinely received without undertaking the added
burden of calling the author to authenticate it because the reports were prepared in response to a referral from the court.
(People v. OConnell, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp.1066-1067.) -20- 2. Exclusionary Rule Generally, the exclusionary rule
does not apply to probation revocation proceedings. (People v. Harrison (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 803, 808.) However, evidence
that has been previously suppressed at a preliminary hearing because of an illegal search or seizure may not be introduced at a
probation revocation hearing if the criminal charges were dropped and a new complaint or indictment was never filed. (People v.
Zimmerman (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 673, 676 [statutory interpretation of Pen. Code 1538].) Illegally seized evidence will be
excluded, moreover, if the police conduct was so egregious as to shock the conscience. (People v. Washington (1987) 192
Cal.App.3d 1120, 1128.) 3. Probationers testimony The testimony of a probationer at a probation revocation hearing, and its
fruits, cannot be used in a later criminal prosecution. (People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at 891-892.) However, if the
probationer takes the stand at a later criminal trial, the earlier revocation hearing testimony can be used to impeach the
probationers truthfulness. (Id. at p. 892.) -21- 4. Collateral Estoppel The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not generally apply
to issues raised in both probation revocation hearings and criminal trials. Thus, facts and issues may be relitigated regardless of
which hearing was held first and what determination was made. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 347-349.)
Likewise, refiling of a motion to revoke probation, following dismissal of the first revocation proceeding, is permissible.
(People v. Villines, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at 1305.) It is within the reasonable discretion of the trial court to decide whether to
hold a revocation hearing before or after trial for a new offense. (People v. Jasper (1983) 33 Cal.3d 931, 935.)
MORE ON THE IDEA OF THE TPO/EPO'S BEING SET ASIDE BASED UPON VIOLATIONS OF COURTHOUSE
SANCTUARY DOCTRINE OR AN ATTORNEY'S IMMUNITY FROM SERVICE OF PROCESS AT THE COURT, ETC.:
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-district-court/1372465.html
"THE LAW
(COURTHOUSE SANCTUARY)
Despite antagonistic dicta to the contrary; most modern era precedent dealing with the issue of Courthouse Sanctuary from service
of process have held that New York State residents receive no such immunity protections. Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, 273 A.D.
411, 77 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1st Dept.1948); Department of Housing Preservation, City of New York v. Koenigsberg, 133 Misc.2d 893,
509 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. Civ.Ct.1986); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Bobo, N.Y.L.J., 1 Misc.3d 901(A), 2003 WL 22928513 (Dec. 17,
2003, J. Miller, Nassau Co. Dist. Ct.) These cases hold that the Courthouse Sanctuary is only available to foreign state residents who
come into New York's Courts to contest jurisdiction. This doctrine has been slightly expanded to include New York residents who
enter the jurisdiction of a New York Court of limited territorial jurisdiction to contest jurisdiction. See Palazzo v. Conforti, 50
N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Civ.Ct.1944); Singer v. Reising, 154 Misc. 239, 276 N.Y.S. 714 (Queens County 1935).
The Baumgartner Appellate Division panel also acknowledges a limited Courthouse Sanctuary rule for New York residents if
such service would constitute a disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of the Court or to impair the respect
due its authority. This rule by itself would not be applicable to the instant case as service of process was effected in the
Courtroom but outside the Court's presence and in between calendar calls.
STATE RESIDENCY IMMUNITY DISTINCTION?
The English Common Law made no New York State residency distinction. The doctrine of immunity from arrest of a litigant
attending a trial of an action to which he is a party found early recognition and dates back to the book of 13 Henry IV, J.B. Sampson
v. Graves, 208 A.D. 522, 203 N.Y.S. 729 (1st Dept.1924). This is for the obvious reason that England had no sovereign states. The
privilege is not a creature of statute, but was created and deemed necessary for the due administration of justice. See Matthews v.
Tufts, 87 N.Y. 568 (1882); citing to Van Lien v. Johnson (N.Y. Ct. Appeals, unreported 1871).
The logical question now arises, exactly when did New York's Appellate Court's recognize a residency distinction for application of
the Courthouse Sanctuary? The answer is that the Court of Appeals never established such a rule. In contra point of fact, the
Court of Appeals has opined that:
It is the policy of the law to protect suitors and witnesses from arrests upon civil process while coming to and attending the
court and while returning home. Upon principle as well as upon authority their immunity from the service of process for the
commencement of civil actions against them is absolute eundo, morando et redeundo. Person v. Grier, 66 N.Y. 124 (1876).
Emphasis Added.
In this unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals expressly addressed the New York State resident immunity distinction and established
in its dicta that whether any distinction should or does in fact exist, is at least doubtful. This immunity is one of the necessities of the
Administration of Justice, and Court's would often be embarrassed if suitors or witnesses, while attending Court, could be molested
with process. It is noted that Person involved a foreign state resident. In establishing the sanctuary doctrine, the Court stated that
this rule is especially applicable in all its foreign suitors . By direct implication, the Court of Appeals is also applying the
protective rule to New York residents.
The basis of the Courthouse Sanctuary rule is that parties should be allowed to contest jurisdiction without submitting to it.
Allowing Re-service makes a mockery of the traverse hearing and essentially allows the plaintiff to use a defective default
judgment as a weapon to compel the defendant to submit to the service of process. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Bobo; cite supra. The
location of an individual's residence does little to legitimize such a mockery. Absent the compulsion of clear controlling precedent;
this Court will not condone such a situation..."
a. In General
21. Generally
West's Key Number Digest, Process k117 to 120
Litigants, their attorneys, and witnesses are immune from service of process while attending
court.[FN1] The basis for this rule, sometimes known as the "Courthouse Sanctuary" rule,
is that parties should be allowed to contest jurisdiction without submitting to it.[FN2] Process
immunity is not for the convenience of the person seeking it but is for the convenience of the
court, and should be made available only to further the administration of justice.[FN3] The
test is whether the privilege, if allowed, would so obstruct judicial administration in the cause
for the protection of which it is invoked as to justify withholding it; this depends on the nature
of the proceeding in which the service is made and its relation to the principal suit.[FN4] Because
the privilege is designed for the court's convenience, it is not automatic, and the party
must affirmatively show that it is in the court's own interest in the furtherance of the administration
of justice to quash the summons.[FN5]
Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the defendant
seeking immunity from the service of process to produce evidence establishing immunity
by showing that he or she was attending a judicial proceeding.[FN6]
Caution:
In at least one state, the immunity rule is no longer the law, whether the person seeking immunity
is a nonresident witness or a nonresident party.[FN7]
AMJUR PROCESS 21 Page 1
62B Am. Jur. 2d Process 21
Service of process effected in courtroom, but outside court presence and in between calendar
calls, was not affected by limited courthouse sanctuary rule, which provided immunity
from service of process for New York residents if such service would constitute a disturbance
directly tending to interrupt proceedings of court or to impair respect due its authority. North
Fork Bank v. Grover, 3 Misc. 3d 341, 773 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Dist. Ct. 2004).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192 (1916); Moreo v. Regan, 140
A.D.2d 313, 527 N.Y.S.2d 547 (2d Dep't 1988); Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. District
Court of Fourteenth Judicial Dist. In and For Tulsa County, 1980 OK 3, 605 P.2d
1323 (Okla. 1980).
[FN2] North Fork Bank v. Grover, 3 Misc. 3d 341, 773 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Dist. Ct. 2004).
[FN3] Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932); Page Co. v.
MacDonald, 261 U.S. 446, 43 S. Ct. 416, 67 L. Ed. 737 (1923); Stewart v. Ramsay,
242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192 (1916); ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre,
45 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1995).
[FN4] Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932).
[FN5] ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1995); Republic
Productions, Inc v. American Federation of Musicians of U S and Canada, 173 F.
Supp. 330 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
[FN6] LaRose v. Curoe, 343 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1983).
[FN7] Silverman v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 145, 249 Cal. Rptr. 724 (2d Dist.
1988).
a. In General
25. Remedies for violation of rule of immunity
The service of process on one who is privileged or exempt from service is not void but
voidable.[FN1] To secure the right to claim privilege or immunity from service of process, the
party must appear and move to quash the service or proceed otherwise as required by the applicable
rules of practice. It is insufficient to file a motion giving notice to the court of a claim
of immunity; the party must appear and submit the question to the court for decision.[FN2]
68 A.L.R. 1465 (1930); Beckham v. Johnson, 220 Tenn. 572, 421 S.W.2d 94 (1967).
68 A.L.R. 1465 (1930).
b. Litigants
27. Generally
There is conflicting authority on the question of whether a party litigant may claim an exemption
from service of process while attending trial.[FN1] The generally prevailing rule is
that nonresident litigants are privileged from service of civil process while going to, attending,
or returning from, court.[FN2] The rule is especially true where parties may be examined as
witnesses,[FN3] or where such a party is attending a trial to testify as a witness.[FN4] The
privilege is generally limited to nonresidents and to residents attending court in a county outside
their county of residence, and does not extend generally to residents.[FN5]
In contrast, some jurisdictions have declined to extend to nonresident litigants protection
from the service of process in another action.[FN6]
[FN1] Mertens v. McMahon, 334 Mo. 175, 66 S.W.2d 127, 93 A.L.R. 1285 (1933).
Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192 (1916); Durst v. Tautges, Wilder &
McDonald, 44 F.2d 507, 71 A.L.R. 1394 (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1930); LaRose v. Curoe, 343
N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1983); Massengale v. Lester, 403 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. 1966); Commercial
Bank & Trust Co. v. District Court of Fourteenth Judicial Dist. In and For
Tulsa County, 1980 OK 3, 605 P.2d 1323 (Okla. 1980); Lox, Stock and Bagels, Inc. v.
Kotten Mach. Co. of California, Inc., 261 Pa. Super. 84, 395 A.2d 954 (1978); Parker
v. Reddick, 196 Tenn. 472, 268 S.W.2d 357, 45 A.L.R.2d 1096 (1954); State ex rel
b. Litigants
28. Parties who may claim privilege
The rule of immunity of litigants from a foreign jurisdiction from the service of process
while attending court typically includes both plaintiffs and defendants.[FN1] There is authority,
however, to the effect that nonresident plaintiffs are not privileged from the service of
process,[FN2] on the theory that a plaintiff who voluntarily seeks the aid and protection of
courts of another state should not be shielded from the processes of those courts, a condition
which should not apply to a defendant whose attendance is compulsory.[FN3] Moreover,
some courts, while usually extending the exemption to nonresident plaintiffs, hold that nonresident
plaintiffs who voluntarily come within the jurisdiction of the courts of a state to attend
the trial of litigation commenced by them against citizens of that state are not exempt
from service of a summons in an action by defendants for relief connected with the subject of
the litigation commenced by them, where a full and complete adjustment of the rights of the
parties cannot be had in the first action, and where full relief would be denied the citizens of
that state in courts of the state of the plaintiffs' residence.[FN4]
[FN1] Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192 (1916); Marlowe
v. Baird, 301 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1962); Lyf-Alum, Inc. v. C & M Aluminum Supply
Corp., 29 Wis. 2d 593, 139 N.W.2d 601 (1966); State v. District Court of Eighth Judicial
Dist. in and for Cascade County, 73 Mont. 265, 235 P. 766 (1925).
[FN2] Wilson Sewing Mach. Co. v. Wilson, 51 Conn. 595, 1884 WL 1053 (1884);
Livengood v. Ball, 1916 OK 1008, 63 Okla. 93, 162 P. 768 (1916).
Sincerely,
Sent: Mon 2/25/13 1:57 PM
Zach: Please do not second guess me when I tell you I have things handled. There is no need for you to cause more confusion. It does not help. You wanted the continuance I
told you I would take care of it and I did. You going into the court after the fact does not look good. Your next court date is for March 11, 2013 for the Order to show cause
hearing and the Pretrial on the resisting arrest. In addition the other two tpo violations are scheduled for March 6, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. I will be in touch with the Court to verify if
the DA actually filed charges. So relax and lets work together like we said we would.
Sent: Sunday, February 24, 2013 4:50 PM
Hi Diana,
Oh WOW. I am so happy to hear that. That is wonderful news. The further out for the resetting the better as far as I am
concerned. Nice job. I will make sure to get the forward progress going.
Thanks and I will give you and Suta a call about dinner tonight to see if that is still on. I got some potatos if that helps.
Sincerely,

Sent: Sun 2/24/13 2:53 PM
Yes both of the cases have been continued. I will call Robin in the morning and reset them for a couple weeks out. I explained to Zach that you are doing everything possible to
get on your feet and that you are working with NAHMS as well as counseling etc. If you do everything required by DAS over the next few weeks maybe when you go to court
on the probation violation it will work out so that the violation is dismissed or time served. Hang in there your doing well, try to breathe and stay out of trouble ok!!! 775-230-
4697 is my cell but it also transfers calls from the office which is 324-3333. I will contact the bar to correct the address, phone number and fax.
Sent: Saturday, February 23, 2013 10:10 PM
Hi Diana,
I am not sure I ever had your phone number beyond the one for your office listed at http://www.nvbar.org/.
When you wrote, below, "Zach I got a call from Zach and your hearing has been continued. Please call me"
Does that mean my hearing in 11-063341 on the DAS Probation Violation (arrest of 2/2/13 alleging that I failed to check in on 1/3/13/ and 1/23/13, $500 cash bail posted)
Show Cause to show why my probation on a 180 suspended sentence should not be revoked has been continued AS WELL?
That's the hearing I really wanted continued because, as specifically mentioned by Judge Pearson at a 2/3/13 Show Cause hearing on the morning of 2/3/13 (I was bailed out at
1 am and found out about the hearing when I called the RJC to inquired about the start time of my continued trial in a different case in 12-065630...that DAS hearing in 063341
was incorrectly noticed on my Jail Release papers for 2/5/13 or something...At that 2/3/13 Hearing I got an Order for Competency Evaluation from Pearson, then went and
provided that to Judge Clifton at the resumption of the 065630 trial immediately thereafter, which, under NRS 178.405, required Clifton to suspend the trial in 065630. Of
course, he did not. He has demonstrated a willingness to fail to apply the law as written in certain instances, invariably to the benefit of the State. Somehow, Judge Clifton then
allowed DDA a recess to go to the counter and request and Emergency Hearing before Judge Pearson to have that Order for Competency Evaluation entered an hour before in
063341 vacated. DDA Young was successful in getting a hearing and having that Order vacated. Judge Pearson was evasive during that hearing when questioned as to
whether he had extra-judicial discussions with Clifton (whom had just exited the Bench in Courtroom D long enough for Judge Pearson to hold the Emergency Hearing to
Vacate his just entered Order for Competency Evaluation, which he claimed to have been reviewing, unprompted, following his entry of that Order, in his chambers,
unprompted...).
I seem to recall having your cell number at one point (I called once when you were at the Dentist office, so...but I can't find it).
I am attaching a pdf of what is held out to the public as Bruce's contact information on the www.nvbar.org website. It includes an email address that seems to not be valid
(though I have not received any "bounceback" error messages when sending emails to it...).
If you wish to update the information held out there, you can at this link:
http://nvbar.org/node/84
Some attorneys choose not to even list an email address there, or even a fax number. However, where an attorney does list an email address there, arguably,
there is some duty to check it or for it to work and such an attorney is arguably placed on notice of various things email to it, whether copied via USPS mail or
otherwise in hard copy or not. Just saying.
Thanks,
Fw: update on NNAHMS, request for continuance of 2/25/13 Hearing in 067980
Zach has a file to share with you on SkyDrive. To view it, click the link below.
State Bar Of Nevada nvbar Robert Bruce Lindsay, Esq. contact information held out to the public.pdf
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2013 16:37:16 -0800From: rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.comSubject: Re: update on NNAHMS, request for continuance of 2/25/13 Hearing in 067980
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Zach I got a call from Zach and your hearing has been continued. Please call me
To: "rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com" <rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com>; "rbl@robertbrucelindsay.com" <rbl@robertbrucelindsay.com>;
"zyoung@da.washoecounty.us" <zyoung@da.washoecounty.us>
Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2013 4:08 PM
Subject: update on NNAHMS, request for continuance of 2/25/13 Hearing in 067980
Dear Mr. Lindsay and DDA Young,
I am writing to request from DDA Young a stipulation to a continuance of the 2/25/3 Show Cause Hearing in 063341, which I
understand may have been combined with 067980, so I am copying Mr. Lindsay.
I got this yesterday from NNAHMS. I completed the last part of the intake yesterday, and have a request for whatever social worker evaluation report my intake on
2/11/13 will yield. They indicate it should be ready in a day or two, so.
I passed a drug test with DAS yesterday and checked in on time.
Will you inquire with DDA Young if he will stip to a continuance of the 2/25/13 hearing?
Thanks,
2 19 13 more NNAHMS materials for DAS 063341 2025 065630 067980.pdf
2 11 13 Nnahms intake mental health eval proof for now 12-067980 063341 cr12-2025.pdf
Download all

Sent: Sat 2/23/13 2:39 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
so I emailed you yesterday and have not heard from you. Hello please call me. this is diana 230-4697
----- Forwarded Message -----
Thanks,
Re: sorry for the delay
Download all

Sent: Fri 2/22/13 4:37 PM
Zach I got a call from Zach and your hearing has been continued. Please call me
Thanks,
Download all

From: Robert Lindsay (rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com)
Sent: Wed 2/20/13 12:06 PM
To: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com); rbl@robertbrucelindsay.com (rbl@robertbrucelindsay.com)
Good Morning: Just checking in with you? Don't forget about the meeting tonight 5:30 Triangle club upstairs. Hope you are well. Thinking about you. Let me know when you
get any documentation from NAMHS. Did you get your phone yet Blah Blah Blah. Call any time ok?
To: "rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com" <rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com>; "rbl@robertbrucelindsay.com" <rbl@robertbrucelindsay.com>
Sent: Friday, February 8, 2013 2:21 AM
Subject: FW: sorry for the delay
I need to see something out of your office soon. So far I got Bruce failing to file a Motion for Order for Competency Evaluation and stipping to everything to make DDA
Young's routine easier...and generally seeming out of it, and he has provided absolutely zero legal advice so far...zip...nothing. Please respond to my written requests below. I
need to know what your office is willing to do immediately, otherwise its time to refund the $700.00Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949
667 7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.comTo: rbl@robertbrucelindsay.comSubject: sorry for the delayDate: Fri, 11 Jan 2013 14:45:21 -0800
Dear Mr. Lindsay,
https://skydrive.live.com/redir?resid=43084638F32F5F28%21118
Please find very relevant materials to the defense of this case attached and at the above link. I have scanned everything therein for viruses and it is 100% safe and virus free.
Sorry for the delay, I am not flaking on you, its just been hectic, i'll get to getting it scanned and returned, very busy addressing a
recent Order of the NNDB seeking to disbar me, but I will get to it.
I don't want much, okay. Just a few simple things.If you get me this stuff, as far as I am concerned, we are straight (assuming
you don't pull a Jim Leslie and insist on remaing on my case as long as possible to purposefully torpedo it....) There was talk of
Cape Fear with Leslie well before he moved to withdraw and got a TPO, and now an EPO (though courthouse sanctuary
doctrine makes the "service" thereof rather suspect. Leslie was not all "terrified" back then...What changed? Oh, that's right, he
was finished puttin' in work for the County (ie, makign sure I got convicted on both counts in 063341, thanks to his making the
NRS 171.136 (or trying to, at least, ...he failed) citizen's arrest arguments that went completely over DDA Young head (or, more
likely DDA Young just couldn't stomach anymore of the farce and chose not to make such arguments to the tirbunal). Can you
serve the WCDA with request for discovery and subpoena the RJC and WCSO for the following (assuming the won't just copy
the stuff an provide it all nice'n'easy like):
certified audio transcripts of the following hearings in the RJC:
1. 7/5/12 in RJC Rev2012-001048 hearing granting a default victory incident to a 6/28/12 motion to set aside the fraudulently
procurred 6/27/12 Lockotu Order at the rental where the 067980 arrest occurred.
2. 7/31/12 hearing in rjc rev2012-001048 before Judge Pearson (this was a hearing noticed on 7/23/12 to address my Motion
to Set Aside the 6/27/12 eviction Order signed by Judge Schroeder despite my 6/26/12 email and fax to the RJC, SJC, WCSO,
and City of Reno regarding my filign the Tenant's Answer in the SJC, and the deficiencies in the 5 day notice. (please see the
attached police report by the RPD incident to the pretextual (and Soldal v. Cook Co violating, not that it matters, this is nevada
after all) arrest shortly upon my bailing out on the 067980 charge in RMC 12 CR 12420(wherein the "approach" by the RPD (to
which RPD Sargent Sifre incidates some level of complicity between the RPD and RJC in a recording only recently propound by
the WCDA just 2 judicial days before the 12/11/12 Trial stemming from the 1/14/12 misuse of 911 arrest in rcr2012-065630
(a witness just sadly passed away unexpectedly 2 days after the DA complete his direct examination of her, EComm's Kariann
Beechler).
2.1 the audio transcript of the one hearing in REV 2012-075658 Zach Coughlin vs Jeff Nichols. This is relevant to 067980 because its another eviction scenario and
establishes a pattern and practice by the RPD, WCSO and RJC to refuse to uphold my rights while aggressively applying an overly rigid and formulaic application of rules to me
as a pro se tenant, and even going beyond that, some might say, at times. Please, this one is important, I need it. A former WCSO Deputy pu
3. I would like you to serve on the WCDA a request for discovery and also a subpoena/FOIA (I know, NRS Open Records
REquest) on ECOMM for any 911 calls, RPD Dispatch calls from civilians, or recordings between the RPD or wcso or Reno
sparks Indian colony Police or dispatch/ECOMM in any way connected to me, Zach Coughlin, or suspected to be connected to
me. I am not going to ask for much more, if you get me all that, I'll be good, if not...I'll be tedious.
4. any and all recordings made by anyone (RPD, WCSO, Northwinds Staff, bystanders, and especially Jeff Chandler or Ryan
WRay or anyone else associate with Nevada Court Services) of ANY interactions with me in any way connected to Northwinds
Apartments and my tenancies there (i had three rentals, units 29, 45, and 71). Please have served a subpoena duces tecum on
Nevada Court Services directed to anythign (documentation, recordings, etc) related to Zach Coughlin and serve a witness
subpoena on NCS's Ryan Wray (might have stopped working there, but still subpoena him please) as well as Jeff Chandler.
5. The RMC audio transcript of the (it woudl cost my $35 i don't have, and they probably have to waive the fee for you, the RJC
does when Leslie and the WCPD request recordings) 7/5/12 unnoticed bail hearing in RMC 12 CR 12420 wherein my bail was
impermissibly raise from a bondable $1,415 to a cash only $3,000 for charges that were plainly manufacture anyways.
6. the 12/3/12 Trial audio transcript in RMC 12 CR 12420.
7. the 12/18/12 audio transcript of the hearing in 067980 (the case you are on) wherein Jim Leslie (without DDA Young there)
was able to get some things done...you likely are required to, or at least, might want to, have this anyways.... I dont' necessarily
need the hard copies (you can sign up for a free hotmail account at www.outlook.com and skydrive them to me, its totally easy,
or I can pick them up, copy them, and deliver them to you...i just dont' have the money and the court's nickel and dime me like
crazy).
8. The 12/6/12 filing in the appeal of an associated RJC prosecution in rcr2012-063341 (it is the Record on Appeal, basically,
but I think they titled it "Notice of Appeal" on the docket...and the RJC has failed to provide me a copy of it...not even the brand
new filings listing the index of documents included in that 12/6/12 filing (which is basically a Notice of Appeal). YES, IT is
relevant to this case...it goes to conflicts analysis to both the RJC (even across departments, especially given some admission by
Clifton as to looking over "submission on subpoenas" from that 063341 case before Sferrazza, on the record in 065630...DDA
Young is an efiler and could easily email you that 20 mb or so 12/6/12 Notice of Appeal (804 page) filign in CR12-2025 (the
appeal of rcr2011-063341, the first of 10 arrest/incarcerations of me since 8/20/11).
Please subpoena Nevada Court Services Ryan Wray (he may not work there anymore, but he was present at the scene of the
arrest and, obviously, along with Northwinds Manager Duane Jakobs (who testified on that 7/31/12 audio transcript I am
requesting you obtain and copy me on in rev2012-001048 about the events in question in 067980) participated in attempted
break in an fraudulent Declaration of Service of the 6/14/12 5 Day UD Notice.
9. Lastly, please serve the RJC Custodian of Records a Subpoena duces tecum for all records/fax
logs/information/documentation related to any faxing of Orders by RJC Judges to the WCSO between October 24th, 2011 and
November 2nd 2011 (each fax has a job number, etc. I want a sequential printout or log of those faxes as it goes to whether the
RJC, in accord with its admitted policy, faxed to the WCSO the two different ORders by Judge SFerrazza related to the Eviction
(a 10/25/11 "Eviction ORder and Decision" and a 10/27/11 "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and ORder for Summary
Eviction". I need to know if and when such items were faxed or transmitted to the WCSO...it is very relevant given the same
WCSO Deputy Machen conducted the lockout on 11/1/11 from my former home law office, according to the locksmith, REno
Carson Messenger receipts, the transcript of th 6/18/12 criminal trespass trial in RMC 11 Cr 26405 (sworn testimony of Casey
Baker, eSq. and Richard G. HIll, eSq.) demonstrates that the WCSO's Office is being obstructive, as is the RJC (whom failed to
comply with my SCR 105(4)/SCR 119 properly issued and served supboena and subpoena decus tecums of 10/30/12 in the
formal disciplinary matter (espeically consiering the 4/11/12 volunteering of information and documents by RJC judges
secretary Lori Townsend), and further specify the subpoena duces tecum is for the "file stamped cover page" of any filign by
Couglin in RJC rev2012-000374.
10. the audio transcript of the 8/7/12 TPO Hearing in RJC RCP2012-000287) for Milan Krebs v. Zach Coughlin (Krebs was
NOrthwinds Apts maintenance man (the one doing the sawzalling to the metal door of unit 29 incident to the arrest in
067980...He testified under oath the matters of material direct relevane to the defense of this case. This is a no brainer, and the
fact that Leslie continuously refused to obtain a copy of this hearing (again, the RJC waives the $35 fee for th wCPD...so what
was Leslie's excuse? That Northwind's Apartments sent him some photgraphs of a microwave? Please. Jim Leslie is a joke.
That might be relevant to an evictio hearing, but not to a NRS 199.280 defense. What Krebs testified to at that TPO extension
hearing on cross examination is obviously extremely relevant, particularly where there was extensive questioning directed to the
circumstances of the arrest in 067980.
11. Lastly, a subpoena duces tecum on the Custodian of Records for the Reno muni Court and the Custodian of Records for the
City of REno Marshals for any an all documentation, marshal's reports, or recordings (Thompsons admitted to makign at least
on on or about 3/22/12) in any way related to Coguhlin (obviously, there shoudl be an arrest report from the 2/27/12 direct
contempt arrest wherein Marshal Harley, as testified to by Judge Nash Holmes at my disciplinary hearing on 11/14/12 via her
hearsay of what Harley told her, has apparently alleged some "disassemblign of a recording device and hiding a component of it
in the restroom during arestroom break that was begrudingly granted immediately after Holmes began interrogating Coughlin
about hwether he was "recording the proceedings" and or whether he "had a recording device", upon which, alleged Holmes,
Coughlin immediately got "all squirmy and begged to use the restroom"....Okay, lets see the documentation, marshal's report etc.
for anything, but especially including that. IF they move to QUash I want be copied on it (please copy me on anything anyone
sends you ever in any way related to me) as I have some authority and opposition work I woudl like for you to at least consider
incident to any reply you may wish to file....this is relevant. RJC Clifton signed an ORder for Competency eval on 2/27/12 at
1:31 pm...JUDge Nash holmes could nto be found by her staff at that time, despite the traffic citaiton trial connected to Richard
G. Hill, Esq.'s office and the trespass arrest being schedule to occur then...both HOlmes and Clifton were mysteriously
transferred criminal cases involving Coughlin on 2/27/12...both are lifelong prosecutors, formerly Holmes was Clifton's boss
from about 91 to 94 ish (not to mention Linda Gardner was a coworker (see 54844 and 60302), and Nash Holmes 3/14/12
grievance against Coughli nto the SBN admits to communications with the WCPD about Coughlin.
12. please subpoena duces tecum the WCPD as to anything in any way related to HOlmes admission regarding the WCPD in her
3/14/12 grievance...
13. Lastly, please serve a subpoena duces tecum on the custodian of REcords for Richard G. HIll, ESq. and his former
associates new firm in Kentucky, Casey D. Baker, Esq's Baker and Baker or whatever tey call themsleves narrowly tailored to
any documentation, recordings, or information baring on when and if their office provided the two different eviction ORders to
the wcso office (Baker's testimony at the 6/18/12 crimnal trespass trial (there is an oficial transcript at te link) sheds some light
on this vis a vis October 28th, 2011...and familiarzie yourslef with the void/stale order concept incident to NRS 40.253's
requirement that the lockout be done "within 24 hours" of "receipt of the order"....by the WCSO...the same deputy makign the
arrest in 067980 conducted that lockout and filed a fraudulent affidavit of service on 11/7/11 alleging to have "personally
served" me...which his supervisor was ofrced to admit, in writing, he did not, but rather merely posted the order on the door (hill
lied at the 6/18/12 trespass trial in testying "they posted it to the door because you ran away" despite that being completely false,
and where HIll admits he was not even present that day, and his associate completely failes to back up hill's baseless, defamatory
accusation (one of many by Hill).
And that's it. You do all that and provide a reasonable return and attempt to counter all the bs MOtions to Quash sure to ensue,
and we are straight. You can move to withdraw and I will give you glowing review, I promise. Hell, I will even draft all these
subpoenas for your approval and the oppositions to the motions to quash if you like, and provide the authority in support of
them. But I need you to issue the subpoenas and have them served, and get the recordings, etc....even if they make you pay for
them, none of this adds up to more than $200 (perhaps you can file a notice of appearance, if an efiler on the cr12-2025 under
some justification that is is necessary to the defense herein or I would allow you to appear as co-counsel provided you dont'
insist on hijacking things..., but obviously paying $1 page for all 804 pages hard copy from aint goign to work....
I really appreciate any help you can provide.
Sifre's admissions as to said complicity may provide a basis for your filing a Motion to conflict out the rjc and the wcda's
office (in addition to DDA Kandaras' involvement in the turning over of my smartphone and data card to the City of Reno
Marshals and the RMC in 11 TR 26800, as admitted to by WCSO Hodge to me, in front of local attorney Pam Willmore (I was
arrested incidnet to a contempt finding at the 2/27/12 trial before judge Nash Holmes, and it was not until after my property was
booked into my personal secured property and well after any time for a "search incident to arrest" that the WC Jail released to the
RMC and its Marshals on 2/28/12 my property, which was returned 37 days later wiped of all data incident to an Order of
3/30/12 that seems to have clearly be responsive to a filing by me in NVB 10-05104 before Judge Nash Holmes and Washoe
Legal Services Exec. Director Elcano 1977 McGeorge SOL classmate, NVB Judge B. Beesley....all three of whom testified at
my 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing at the SBN, despite SCR 105(2)(c) being desecrated in every way imaginable, another
Mirching to besmirch the judicial system in Nevada. DDA Kandaras is on the NNDB and refuses to deny that she or David
Hamilton, Esq. (Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s best friend) were on my screening Panel. This IS revelvant to what you are getting seven
bones for, under a conflict or disqualification analysis (I would like a reason why this case was transferred on 2/27/12 from
Judge Lynch, same day another case in the RMC was transferred to jUdge Holmes (the 1/12/12 custodial arrest for jaywalkign
cuz richard g. hill said to cas in rmc 12 CR 12420.
7/5/12 in RJC Rev2012-001048 (this is the summary eviction from the very unit #29 rental at Northwinds Apartment, 1680
Sky Mountain Drive that I was arrested at on 6/28/12 in the matter you were assigned and contracted to handle for $700.00). I
did not attend the hearing because I was rearrested on 7/3/12 by the Reno Police Department just blocks from Northwinds
Apartments in RMC 12 CR 12420 (a custodial arrest involving three charges, one, a simple traffic citation for failure to secure a
load on one's vehicle (they allege an empty plastic storage tub fell off my vehicle), two, no proof of vehicle insurance (despite
RPD Officer Alan Weaver admitting that I showed him a high resolution pdf of my then current USAA auto insurance on a 4.7
inch smart phone screen...he said it had to be a paper printout), and three, "disturbing the peace" based upon the criminal
complaint signed by Northwind's Apartments maintenance man, 23 year old Milan Krebs (whom obtained a TPO against me
from the RJC in RCP2012-000287 on 7/5/12 after the RPD fraudulently urged Krebs to apply for one incident to the 7/3/12
arrest, as further confirmed by the commentary by the same RPD Sargent Sifre (only finally propounded to me following a
12/5/12 email from the WCDA informing me of the availability of such discovery
please let me know, in writing, and with specifics, whether or not you will move, in writing, to obtain the above indicated
materials, and provide an indication of how soon you will do so, with proof thereof. Sorry to have to ask for that, but
time is of the essence and I need to know if this is going to work out with you or not. If it does, I will absolutely credit you
for being a faithful defender of the Sixth Amendment, and maybe more.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin1471 E. 9th St.Reno, NV 89512Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
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9/07/11
NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
To zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
From:NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent: Wed 9/07/11 9:36 PM
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS E-MAIL****

Your online report has been successfully received and the
temporary report number is T11005956.
You will be notified via email of any problems with your
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a case number and you will receive a PDF copy as an attachment
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Reno Police Department

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Your Online Police Report T11005956 Has Been Rejected
9/07/11
Sent: Wed 9/07/11 10:51 PM

We're sorry the following problem was found during review
of your submitted report T11005956:

THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT HOWEVER THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE OFFICER'S SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL BE ADDRESSED.

Thank you,

Officer WOZNIAK,

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tracking number is T12000219.

system.

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To: ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM


system.

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Your Online Police Report 120100300 Has Been Approved
1/11/12
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Your report has been approved report and the permanent number of the case is
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the delicate information in his report has been replaced for *** to support isolation in this email.

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in your email within approximately ten business days.

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SIFRE v. WELLS FARGO BANK: Defendant does not have standing to
foreclose and fraudulently induced him into entering into the mortgage
contract
posted by Moe Bedard on January 3, 2011 in Mortgage News - LoanSafe.org
LoanSafe.org (Source: United States District Court, D. Nevada) -Plaintiff does not allege he is not in default but rather that
Defendant does not have standing to foreclose and fraudulently induced him into entering into the mortgage contract.
He also appears to plead claims for unjust enrichment, quiet title, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, TILA, HOEPA, and RESPA. CourtPAUL SIFRE, Plaintiff,v.WELLS FARGO BANK, Defendant.No. 3:10-cv-00572-RCJ-
VPC.December 29, 2010.ORDERROBERT C. JONES, District Judge.This case arises out of the foreclosure of Plaintiffs mortgage. The Court previously entered a temporary
restraining order and set a preliminary injunction hearing, but the order expired and the Court vacated the hearing when Plaintiff failed to serve Defendant with the notice of the
hearing within the time ordered. Plaintiff has now served Wells Fargo Bank C/O Trustees Corps, in Sacramento, California, and the Clerk has entered default against
Defendant based on this service. The Court reset the preliminary injunction hearing and has heard oral argument. For the reasons given herein, the Court denies the motion.I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORYPlaintiff Paul Sifre owns real property located at 3660 Hawking Ct., Sparks, NV 89436. (Mot. 1:16-17, Sept. 15, 2010, ECF No.
2).1 The gravamen of the Complaint is that Plaintiff was fraudulently induced into signing a mortgage, although most of the Complaint is a generalized grievance against the
mortgage industry. Plaintiff does not allege he is not in default but rather that Defendant does not have standing to foreclose and fraudulently induced him into entering into the
mortgage contract. He also appears to plead claims for unjust enrichment, quiet title, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, TILA, HOEPA, and RESPA. It is not clear from the Complaint whether any entity has in fact foreclosed.II. LEGAL
STANDARDSThe Ninth Circuit in the past set forth two separate sets of criteria for determining whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief:Under the traditional test, a plaintiff
must show: (1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring
the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public interest (in certain cases). The alternative test requires that a plaintiff demonstrate either a combination of probable success on the
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor.Taylor v. Westly, 488 F.3d 1197, 1200
(9th Cir. 2007). These two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success
decreases. Id.The Supreme Court recently reiterated, however, that a plaintiff seeking an injunction must demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible. Winter
v. NRDC,129 S.Ct. 365, 374-76 (2008) (rejecting the Ninth Circuits alternative sliding scale test). The Ninth Circuit has explicitly recognized that its possibility test was
definitively refuted in Winter, and that [t]he proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate `that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. Stormans,
Inc. v. Selecky,586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374) (reversing a district courts use of the Ninth Circuits pre-Winter, sliding-scale
standard and remanding for application of the proper standard).
A recent Ninth Circuit ruling relying largely on the dissenting opinion in Winter parsed the language of Winter and subsequent Ninth Circuit rulings and determined that the sliding
scale test remains viable when there is a lesser showing of likelihood of success on the merits amounting to serious questions/ but not when there is a lesser showing of
likelihood of irreparable harm. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Coitrell, 622 F.3d 1045, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2010). This case presents some difficulty in light of Winter and
prior Ninth Circuit cases. To the extent Cottrells interpretation of Winter is inconsistent with Selecky, Selecky controls. Miller v. Gammie,335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc) (holding that, in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court decision, only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a three-judge panel). In any case, the
Supreme Court stated in Winter that [a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm
in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374 (citing Munaf v.
Geren,128 S.Ct. 2207, 2218-19 (2008); Amoco Prod Co. v. Gambell,480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982)) (emphases
added). The test is presented as a four-part conjunctive test, not as a four-factor balancing test, and the word likely modifies the success-on-the-merits prong in exactly the
same way it separately modifies the irreparable-harm prong. In rejecting the sliding-scale test, the Winter Court specifically emphasized the fact that the word likely modifies the
irreparable-injury prong, see id. at 375, and the word modifies the success-on-the-merits prong the same way, id. at 374. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg opined that she did not
believe the Court was abandoning the rule that it was permissible to award[ preliminary injunctive] relief based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood of success is
very high. Id. at 392 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But Justice Ginsburg, like the majority, did not address whether she believed relief could be granted when the chance of success
was less than likely. A lower likelihood is still some likelihood. We are left with the language of the test, which requires the chance of success on the merits to be at least
likely.In summary, to satisfy Winter, a movant must show that he is likely to succeed on the merits. Likely means having a high probability of occurring or being true.
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/likely. Blacks defines the likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits test as [t]he rule that a litigant who
seeks [preliminary relief] must show a reasonable probability of success. . . . Blacks Law Dictionary 1012 (9th ed. 2009). The Court must reconcile the cases by interpreting
the Cottrell serious questions requirement to be in harmony with the Winter/Selecky likelihood standard, not as being in competition with it. The movant must therefore show
that there are serious questions as to the merits of the case, such that success on the merits is likely. A claim can be weaker on the merits if it raises serious questions and the
amount of harm the injunction will prevent is very great, but the chance of success on the merits cannot be weaker than likely.III. ANALYSISBecause there is no evidence of
what entity, if any, has initiated a foreclosure, it is impossible to determine that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, or even whether he has any chance at all beyond blind
speculation. In order to make such a finding, the Court would have to compare the notice of default against the deed of trust and any intervening substitutions of the trustee to see
whether an improper entity filed the notice of default. See Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.080(2)(c). As to the claims based in fraud, Plaintiff specifically disclaims that any actors had the
intent required to engage in fraud or conspiracy, but only that the real culprit is the system itself. (Mot. 2:42-47).2 Most of the other claims, such as unjust enrichment, breach
of fiduciary duty, and negligence, are almost certainly unmeritorious if grounded purely in a foreclosure and directed against a lender. The only claims that appear possiblenot to
say plausibleare the TILA, HOEPA, and RESPA claims, not all of which support rescission, and none of which can be assessed without examining the loan documents.
CONCLUSIONIT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may re-file the motion with copies
of the deed of trust and notice of default.IT IS SO ORDERED.Footnotes1. Plaintiff attaches no evidence to his motion, which is essentially a reproduction of the Complaint, to
which there is also no evidence attached.Back to Reference2. Some of Plaintiffs criticisms of the dysfunctional system of motivations that currently pervade the mortgage industry
are valid, and perhaps Congress or the State Assembly should address these issues, but unfortunately these arguments do not support a legal claim.Back to Reference
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Moe Bedard
About Moe Bedard
I am the founder of LoanSafe.org, RealEstateSmart.TV and KnightsTemplar.TV. My work has been featured in the New York Times, LA Times, Fox Business and many other
media publications. My goal is to help people with my websites and restore hope through the internet. I was born and raised in Southern California and currently reside in
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Todays Wells Fargo Mortgage Rates for 1/3/2011
One Response to SIFRE v. WELLS FARGO BANK: Defendant does not have standing to foreclose and fraudulently induced him
into entering into the mortgage contract
1. Darryl Hutchinsons says:
January 3, 2011 at 11:11 am
Thanks for the site Moe.Heres something for the readers;Stop Foreclosure for the Holidays!Simply look over your loan application (i.e. form 1003). Review it to
determine if the occupancy, employment, income and asset information is the same as you submitted to the loan officer. If not, get out your Deed of Trust and use this link
to join our Group and get details at no cost, are website has all the docs you need to get started: http://www.bigtent.com/groups/mrsc
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RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Attachment
10/12/12
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net
Zach Coughlin
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 10/12/12 5:51 AM
Attachments:
1 attachment
~WRD000.jpg (0.8 KB)
Keith, it sure comes across like you are interrogating indigent criminal defendants, using all experience as the District Attorney for Lyon County, essentially being an
investigator/prosecutor for the City of Reno. You got upset to the extent I didn't permit you to demand answers to any an all question in the trespass case 11 cr 26405, and
grew retaliatory, refusing to subpoena materials witnesses, refusing to make completely valid arguments (ever heard of AB226?). I am disgusted by you.
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: keithloomis@earthlink.netTo: zachcoughlin@hotmail.comSubject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motionDate: Tue, 7 Aug 2012 16:25:40 -0700
You have already had two bail hearings. You are out on bail now. I decline to file a new request for a bail hearing.
I will be out of town on vacation from Friday August 10 and will return on Monday Aug. 20. That makes attendance at a bail hearing problematic and unlikely to be heard before your
trial.
I do think the complaint fails to allege the charge of disturbing the peace. I will make the motion to dismiss it at the time of trial.
The fact that the officer did not observe you committing a misdemeanor means he was not entitled to arrest you. You have a civil claim against RPD and the officer. That
does not mean the charge of DTP is subject to dismissal.
I will review the case involving Mr. Krebs and his request for a temporary protective order.
I need your description of what happened on the 3
rd
of July. Will you provide it?

From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 3:38 PM
To: Keith Loomis
Subject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion

Are you refusing to file the motions o requested?
-----Original Message-----
From: Keith Loomis
Sent: 7 Aug 2012 16:55:44 GMT
To: 'Zach Coughlin'
Subject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Zach

Why dont you move to represent yourself. That way you will be completely satisfied with the services you provide yourself and can do all of the things you believe are necessary.

If you want me to continue to represent you, what I asked you to provide to me was a description of the events which lead to the charge of disturbing the peace. I still need that
description.

Keith Loomis

Sent: Monday, August 06, 2012 3:54 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
Subject: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion

Dear Mr. Loomis and City Attorney Kadlic and Deputy City Attorney Drake,

I am writing to request that you file some motion to alter, amend, reconsider, set aside, or modify my bail in the case stemming from my JUly 3, 2012 arrest for distrubing the peace, failure to provide
proof of insurance, and failure to secure a load. I am writing to request that you file a pre trial motion (Motion to Dismiss, request for a pre trial motion and bail motion, and motion to supress police
report based upon the DTP arrest occuring for alleged conduct outside the officer's presence). If you will not file these motion (and please provide me a draft of such motions for my review prior to
filing them as well as prior to making any communication on my behalf to either the RMC or the City of Reno Prosecutor), please provide me a written indication of your rationale for so refusing, and
then please file a Motion to Withdrawal as soon as practicable. I ask this respectfully.

The police showed up to the hearing, yet I was not noticed of that fact in advance, or of the hearing itself. Further, Judge Gardner explicilty indicated he was basing his decision to raise the bail based
upon "public safety" and "concern for the defendant's safety", which are impermissible rationale for so increasin one's bail.

NRS
178.498. Many courts use a bail schedule to determine the amount, but note the
initial amount can be increased if good cause is shown. NRS 178.499. Additionally, in
determining the amount of bail, the judge should look at the following factors (NRS
178.498):
The nature and circumstances of the offense charged
The defendants financial ability to post bail
The defendants character; and
The factors listed in NRS 178.4853.
Bail can not be excessive. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. It should be limited to a
reasonable amount designed to ensure the defendants presence in court. It should not
be a corrective or preventative detention device.

NRS 178.484. The Court should take care in imposing any restrictions on a defendants constitutional rights (i.e.,
search and seizure) and only imply such restrictions if warranted by the underlying facts
of the alleged crime. Section 11 of NRS 178.484 describes the document that must
be signed by the defendant before he/she can be released on bail.

My bail hearing contained what seems to be an impermissible coercive attempt to condition my release or the possibility thereof upon my providing confidential medical records (Lake's Crossing etc) to
the Reno Municipal Court, even where the same judge presiding over the bail hearing found me competent enough to face a criminal trepass trial less than two weeks before teh bail hearing in 11 CR
26405.

The friend of mine who posted my bail, Jared Swanson, has a serious form of cancer and a one year old baby. I request a reduction of the bail for his benefit and for the proof of insurance charge to be
dismissed, as (and I am trying to avoid this in any way I can), if I am rearrested, such a proof of insurance charge may present another basis for imposing an unduly burdensome bail upon me, as it did
on July 5th, 2012 where, despite my having produced a legible pdf copy of my proof of insurance card on my large screened zoomable smart phone, Officers Weaver and Dye still charged me with that
violation, and the bail was subsequently increase. Further, none of the events or accusations forming the basis of the distrubing the police charge occurred in the officer's presence, and the police
report contains no indication whatsoever that the arrest was made based upon NRS 171.1771. I provided Officer Weaver my driver's license prior to the arrest. I did not
refuses to give a written promise to appear in court as provided in NRS 171.1773.

When a person is believed to have committed a misdemeanor offense, the peace officer has the discretion to
either issue a citation or arrest and detain the person. NRS 171.1771 states that a person can be arrested if
his identity is questionable or if the peace officer does not believe the person will appear in court. A person
can also be arrested for a misdemeanor offense if a warrant has been issued.

Additionally, I am requesting that you file a Motion to Dismiss the Disturbing the Peace charge based upon a lack of evidence and or insufficiency of pleading in that the allegations do not amount to a
prima facie case of a DTP violation. Further, please subpoena and or collect the Protection Order application filed by Milan Krebs on July 5th, 2012, and interview Krebs as to why he mentions
Coughlin often carrying around a large knife in a menacing manner in that protection order application, yet completely failed to mention that in his July 3rd, 2012 police report. Additionally, please
determine why Kreb's TPO appliication has a different style of handwriting on the caption compared to the descriptive sections, indicating someone pushed the filing of the TPO on Krebs, perhaps his
employer, Northwind Apartments or the RPD, which has in the days preceding the arrest threatend to arrest Coughlin for criminal trespass if he returned to any part of the premises of Northwind
Apartments, in consideration of Coughlin's eviction from unit 29, despite the fact Coughlin still had a valid right to go to his other two rentals, units 45 and 71, in addition to the fact that Northwinds
essentially withdrew or rescinded its June 28th, 2012 eviction of Coughlin by posting an Amended 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice on unit 29 on June 28th, 2012 shortly after Coughlin pointed out to
Northwinds and Nevada Courts Services that the July 14th, 2012 5 Day notice was not "personally served" (NCS's R. Wray lied about effecting personal service, as he could not possibly have verified
someone of "suitable age and discretion" was within the windowless room with a metal door closed and locked and where no Wray admits that he received no verbal response from the unit or anyone
therein upon his knocking on the door and or attempting to break into the unit, please see Soldal v. Cook County in that regard, a US S. Ct case) and therefore Coughlin would have had until at least
noon on July 28th, 2012 to file a Tenant's Answer, whereas the eviction/lockout/arrest of June 28th, 2012 took place two hours before noon at 10 am).

Additionally, RPD Officer Weaver had previously attempted to break into one of my rentals at Northwind at a time when he lacked a warrant and or an exigent rationale for doing so, much less an
eviction Order. I just want this case to be dismissed and to try to move on in life, and difuse the tensions incident to this case.

I did not disturb the peace at Northwinds as alleged, nor did I make the threats Kreb's accuses me of or stalk him or follow him in a threatening manner at any time. Additionaly, I never broke into nor
did I ever attempt to break into Krebs' truck, and in fact, I filed a police report in June 2012 reporting extortionate threats by another maintenance man at Northwinds ("Luke" is his name, I believe) and
Northwind's Manage Dwayne Jakob, wherein they threatened to make such a spurious allegation, but subsuquently refrained from doign so when it apparently occurred to them that I may have
excuplatory video evidence disproving such an allegation as well as capturing their baseless and extortionate threats and accusations. Additionally, please subpoene the police reports I filed with the
RPD and any emails I sent to any officers (including Weaver, Barnes, Sargent MIiller, LIeutenant Brown) and any reports of or recording of phone conversations I had with any of those RPD
personnel. Further, please see the attached june 26th, 2012 email to the RPD, WCSO, RJC, Sparks Justice Court and others pointing out the insufficiency of the 5 day Notice drafted and posted by
non-lawyers Nevada Court Services, in that under NRS 40.253 it listed the wrong forum for the tenant to file a Tenant's Answer, and under the Aiken decision of the Nevada Supreme Court and NRCP
60(b)(4), any lockout order stemming therefrom is void for lack of jurisdiction.

NRS 171.136 When arrest may be made.

1. If the offense charged is a felony or gross misdemeanor, the arrest may be made on any day, and at any time of day or night.
2. If it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., except:
(a) Upon the direction of a magistrate, endorsed upon the warrant;
(b) When the offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer;
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the public and:...
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for another alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense is committed;...
(g) When the person is already in custody as a result of another lawful arrest; or

Krebs did not immediately arrest me under NRS 171.136(2)(d), nor was the DTP arrest for an offense alleged to have occurred in the officer's presence.

the attached videos are of the incident on June 5th, 2012, not from July 3rd, 2012, but they support my contentions and the relevancy of subpoening the police incident reports and other
documentation should this case not be dismissed, nolle prosequi, de minimis, etc....

I will forward to you my emails to the RPD et all from June 26th, and July 2nd, 2012. I realize their tone was not a smart one to take or appropriate and am only sending them in hopes of having this
matter dismissed. I do not have any interest in pursuing anything like Wheeler v Cross 344 Fed Apps 420 (2008) .

Sincerely,

Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax949 667 7402
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RE: Motion to Withdraw
8/21/12
Zach Coughlin
Sent: Tue 8/21/12 6:27 PM
Dear Mr. Loomis, Why does your Motion to Withdraw indicate withdrawing was your idea, when on the
phone you indicated you withdrew because you say I asked you to? Are you going ot withdraw from your
paycheck too?
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402

From: keithloomis@earthlink.netTo: ZachCoughlin@hotmail.comSubject: Motion to WithdrawDate: Fri, 10 Aug 2012 11:07:42 -0700
Motion to Withdraw is attached

Keith Loomis

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description of the events relevant to the 7 3 12 arrest
8/08/12
Zach Coughlin
Sent: Wed 8/08/12 12:41 AM
Mr. Loomis,
Nothing in Mr. Krebs witness statement or TPO application contains any truth. I dissected him on cross examination today in
the TPO extension hearing, please order the audio cd. I did not fail to provide Officer Weaver with all necessary contact
information sufficient to issue a citation, yet he continued on to make a custodial arrest then proceeded to show up to an
impromptu hearing and deprive me of my freedom for 20 days.
Cause of Action for Malpractice Against Defense Attorney for Ineffective Representation During Pretrial Phase of Criminal
Case, 42 Causes of Action 2d 707 Criminal defendant brought a civil action under 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 against a public
defender, alleging that he, the criminal defendant, had been deprived of his civil rights under color of state law by reason of the
public defender's professional malpractice in defending him. Such cases are collected in the annotation entitled "Court-appointed
attorney as subject to liability under 42 U.S.C.A. 1983," appearing at 36 A.L.R. Fed. 594. Attorney's liability for malpractice
in connection with defense of criminal case, 53 A.L.R.3d 731 In each of the following cases, a public defender was held not to
be immune from liability for professional malpractice. In Spring v Constantino (1975) 168 Conn 563, 362 A2d 871, an action
by a state criminal defendant against a public defender for malpractice, the court held that an attorney occupying the position of
public defender and assigned to represent an indigent defendant did not enjoy immunity from liability for professional
malpractice. Stating that a public defender is like any other attorney whose duties as an officer of the court and to an individual
client and whose principled and fearless conduct of the defense are not deterred by the prospect of liability, the court rejected the
contention of the public defender that the doctrine of judicial immunity should be extended to public defenders on the ground
that the immunity rule is designed to promote principled and fearless decisionmaking by removing the fear that unsatisfied
litigants might bring harassing actions. The court also rejected the contention that the common-law doctrine of sovereign
immunity which extends to public officials applied to a malpractice action brought against a public defender, saying that a public
defender, in representing an indigent, is not a public official, since even though the state must insure that indigents are
represented by competent counsel, it could not be argued that the actual conduct of the defense of an individual is a
governmental act. The court also rejected the third suggested ground of immunity: the statutory immunity of public officers and
state employees. The court said that while it was true that a public defender could be told when he is to work and within what
area, those elements of control were indicia of the master-servant relationship and incidents of a public defender's employment
which are not within the scope of the attorney-client relationship. Stating that the independence of the public defender was a key
constitutional underpinning of the public defender system, the court said that other than the source of the public defender's
compensation, the relationship of public defender and client is the same as that of privately employed counsel and client. A
public defender was held not to be immune from liability for malpractice, in Reese v Danforth (1979) 486 Pa 479, 406 A2d
735, 6 ALR4th 758, In holding that the public defender was not a public official entitled to immunity, the court said that the
overriding duty of zealous representation of a client's interest attaches to the role of the public defender and thus the
performance of that duty by the defender was similar to the performance of privately retained counsel. Stating that the
relationship between the county and the public defender was similar to that between an independent contractor and the party
contracting his services, the court said that while the availability of court-appointed counsel to represent indigents is indubitably
the public business, once the appointment of a public defender in a given case is made, his state or public function ceases and
thereafter he functions purely as a private attorney concerned with servicing his client, and his professional relationship with his
client takes on all the obligations and protections attendant upon a private attorney-client relationship except that the public pays
the attorney's fee. The court also rejected the contentions that not granting immunity to the public defender would hinder the
recoupment of able lawyers to represent indigents, and would inhibit the defender's professional discretion in declining to press
the frivolous, to assign priorities between indigent litigants, and to make strategic decisions with regard to a particular litigant as
to how his interest may best be advanced. In the following case, a public defender was held not liable for the malpractice of one
of his deputies. A public defender was held not to be liable solely by virtue of his office, for the malpractice of one of his
deputies, in Sanchez v Murphy (1974, DC Nev) 385 F Supp 1362. Stating that the professional relationship between court-
appointed counsel and indigent criminal defendants under public defender systems is no different than that between a client and
privately retained counsel, the court went on to say that the relationship of the public defender and his deputies among
themselves was not a partnership relationship, since the economic justification for holding one partner liable for the misconduct
of another partner was grounded on the fact that fees for services are shared, whereas each of the public defender attorneys was
compensated independently by salary for his own services. Stating that a deputy public defender is an independent officer, the
court noted that there was substantial authority in support of the rule that in the absence of statute imposing liability or of
negligence on his part in appointing or supervising his assistants, a public officer is not liable for the default and misfeasance of
assistants appointed by him. Related Annotations are located under the Research References heading of this Annotation.
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: Plaintiff's malpractice action against public defender was not precluded by quasi-
judicial immunity. Wilcox v. Brummer, 739 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1999). Public defender attorneys were not
entitled to sovereign immunity from legal malpractice claims brought by former client convicted in criminal case and later
exonerated.
Please subpoena both RPD Officers Weaver and Dye, in addition to Officer Barnes, who twice came to Northwind with Officer
Weaver on two separate occasions to harrass me.
Please serve a supboena duces tecum for all the 10 or so incident reports the RPD testified about. They are relevant beyond the
bail hearing, they provide context as to the legitimacy of the disturbing the peace allegations. If you refuse to do this or file a
pret-trial motion to dismiss, please move to have yourself removed from the case immediately.
Stages Of A Criminal Case Pretrial Motions
Pretrial motions arguments concerning what is and is not admissible during a criminal trial are made after the preliminary hearing, yet before the case is taken to trial. They are
presented to the criminal court judge. Pretrial motions can be made by both the prosecution and the defense in criminal cases, and are made in order to set limits on the trial.
Often, either the defense or the prosecution will make arguments as to what evidence can be used in the criminal trial, or what testimonies should be allowed or disallowed in the
trial. For example, the defense or prosecution may argue that a particular person should or should not be allowed to testify during the trial. Pretrial motions can also be made to
dismiss the criminal trial entirely. For obvious reasons, the defense will make a pretrial motion for dismissal of trial. Generally, there are two major arguments that are used for a
pretrial motion for dismissal: the lack of personal jurisdiction and the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A common example of a defense's pretrial motion is the exclusion of a
police officer's testimony. For example, if the suspects' responses to the officer were made before the officer read the suspect his or her Miranda rights, the defense would
request that these statements be excluded from the trial proceedings. In other cases, the defense may request that the trial be dismissed due to the fact that the police officer did
not have probable cause to arrest the suspect. If the defendant's attorney has substantial evidence that the police officer did not have probable cause for arresting the suspect, it is
very likely that the trial will be dismissed. A prosecution's pretrial motion could include the exclusion of a particular witness. For example, the prosecution could argue that an
elderly witness with Alzheimer's is not legally competent to testify, and ask that this witness be excluded at trial.Some other examples of common pretrial motions include motion
for a change of venue, motion for exclusion of physical evidence, motion to suppress a warrantless search, motion for exculpatory evidence, motion for interpreter, motion to
transfer pleadings and motion for continuance.Pretrial motions set the boundaries of the trial, and can even address the issue of whether or not the defendant should be forced to
stand trial. There are nearly endless possibilities of pretrial motions, but all must be settled before the trial proper can begin.
I had a TPO extension hearing today involving Milan Krebs, a maintenance man at Northwind Apartments. Please order a copy
of the audio cd from the hearing and provide me with a copy of it or email me a link to it or the files. He was a percipient
witness, a material one in RCR2012-067980 (he was the person utilizing the sawzall to cut open the door on the rental). The
RJC case number for that TPO is RCP2012j-000287.
I you will not order and provide a copy of that hearing to me, please indicate so immediately. I have sensed from you an utter
derision towards me in everything you have done in any of the cases for which you have sought to appear on my behalf. Further,
you have so far failed to reply to most every material inquiry I have made of you, and when you have, it has unfailingly been to
refuse to perform some basic and completely essential task or filing necessary to my defense. I need to know right away if you
are going to go to bat on this or not.; attorneys' duty to client arose independently of their state employment. Johnson v.
Halloran, 312 Ill. App. 3d 695, 245 Ill. Dec. 408, 728 N.E.2d 490 (1st Dist. 2000), appeal allowed, 189 Ill. 2d 688 (2000). The
court in Dziubak v Mott (1993, Minn) 503 NW2d 771 held that a public defender is immune from liability for malpractice: In
contrast, the court in Veneri v Pappano (1993, Pa Super) 622 A2d 977 noted that a public defender is not immune from liability
for malpractice.Further, I have not met with any response or action from you, Mr. Goodnight, Ms. Rains, Mr. Bosler, Mr.
Dogan, or anyone else with your office with respect to the Mental Health Court breaching the contract I signed with it, causing
me reputational damage and prejudice in the eyes of Judges Pearson, Clifton, and Sferrazza. Both Judge Pearson and Judge
Sferrazza indicated to me in open Court that they were told, essentially, that I flunked out of Mental Health Court. That is clearly
not the case. Rather, the Mental Health Court sought to unilaterally alter materials terms of the contract I entered into with it.
The materials Joe Goodnight forwarded to me from the Mental Health Court and the materials provided directly to me by the
Mental Health Court made clear what medications were not permissible for participants to take. None of the listed medications
or classes of medications in any way related to stimulant based medications prescribed for treatment of either Adult ADHD or
treatment resistant depression. Only after I agreed to the offer put forth by the Mental Health Court and the matter was
transferred there from District Court (and the same could be said for a criminal trespass case I defended against in the RMC
11CR26405, for which I received a criminal trespass conviction that I reported to both the State Bar of Nevada and the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)).
11. Failure to adequately investigate case
[Cumulative Supplement]
A criminal malpractice claim may be stated against former defense attorneys by alleging that they
neglected their reasonable duties by, among other misconduct, failing to investigate the criminal case,
where the plaintiff's imprisonment was proximately caused by the neglect and the plaintiff initiated
postconviction relief premised on ineffective assistance of counsel, successfully obtaining vacation of
the judgment of conviction. Dow v. Jones, 232 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D. Md. 2002) (applying Maryland
law). The issue of whether a criminal defense attorney fulfilled the duty to the client to thoroughly investigate
the facts surrounding the criminal charge may preclude summary judgment in the attorney's
favor on the client's criminal malpractice claim. Canady v. Shwartz, 62 Ohio App. 3d 742, 577
N.E.2d 437 (10th Dist. Franklin County 1989). A criminal malpractice claim against appointed defense
attorney grounded partly on avowed failures to investigate victims for impeachment purposes,
to locate and interview known witnesses, and to locate experts, has been rejected. Browne v. Robb,
583 A.2d 949 (Del. 1990) (conclusory allegations regarding former counsel's bad faith and gross negligence
were insufficient to overcome statutory grant of qualified immunity).
It is typically difficult enough for a criminal malpractice plaintiff to succeed in avoiding summary
judgment for the defendant. Thus, to obtain outright summary judgment in the plaintiff's favor is even
more challenging. For example, a court has denied a former prisoner's summary judgment motion
against the defense attorneys who represented him in a murder prosecution, reasoning that his cause
of action, grounded on a failure to locate and interview eyewitnesses, came exceedingly close to
demonstrating the attorneys' malpractice as a matter of law but was just barely lacking. Sullivan v.
Wiener, 1989 WL 65163 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (unreported decision) (applying Illinois law). For a discussion
of summary judgment in criminal malpractice actions generally, see 27.
Illustration:
In an earlier opinion in the course of the Sulllivan case, the court described the actions of counsel and
cocounsel which allegedly constituted criminal malpractice in failing to investigate the case. The
state's discovery response and the police reports of the crime disclosed the names, addresses, and
some of the phone numbers of five eyewitnesses to the alleged murder. These reports disclosed that
the testimony of each of the witnesses would be exculpatory. However, before trial defense counsel
failed to seek appointment of an investigator to locate the witnesses and did not seek a continuance to
have further time to locate them. Furthermore, the attorney did not claim that he tried once to reach
the witnesses by mail and then asked the client's aunt to try to locate them; however, these efforts
were unavailing. Before trial, defense counsel turned the case over to cocounsel who also failed to try
to locate the five witnesses. Sullivan v. Wiener, 1989 WL 18243 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (unreported opinion).
A former defense counsel who does not succeed in obtaining summary judgment may nonetheless
establish on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support a plaintiff's verdict. Thus, in one
case, the plaintiff's evidence, establishing that the attorney failed to call certain witnesses, to procure
certain evidence, and to investigate matters of defense, and that the plaintiff was convicted even
though someone else later confessed to the crime, did not establish a prima facie case. The trial court
was thus found to have erred in denying defense counsel's motion for a directed verdict. Olson v.
North, 276 Ill. App. 457, 1934 WL 2941 (2d Dist. 1934).
Illustration:
A court dismissed a convicted criminal's legal malpractice complaint against his former defense lawyer,
where the convict had unsuccessfully moved to vacate his conviction on the basis of ineffective
assistance, involving the trial lawyer's purported failure to call two alibi witnesses and to interview an
unnamed witness. The convict alleged only vague and general failure of the lawyer to locate and interview
witnesses who would have rendered suitable support for the defense and failed to identify
what these witnesses would have testified to and how they would have supported a defense that
would have led to his acquittal. Bigelow v. Knight, 737 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1990) (apparently ap-
plying District of Columbia law).
A criminal malpractice claim will not be established on the basis of a failure to adequately investigate
merely because the client was show to have been factually innocent. Thus, a public defender
was found to have fully investigated a case prior to advising a client to enter into a plea bargain and,
thus, was not liable to the former client for criminal malpractice, following the client's release from
prison after the actual perpetrators of the robbery confessed to the crime, counsel had reviewed the
transcript of the preliminary hearing, received full discovery from the prosecution, and discussed the
case with the client several times before the plea hearing. The attorney's inability to establish the defense
was due to the client's insufficient memory as to his whereabouts at the time of the robbery
rather than attorney malfeasance, the court concluded. Pearson v. Sublette, 730 P.2d 909 (Colo. App
1986) (affirming summary judgment for counsel).
Cases:
Issue of whether attorney's alleged failure to fully explore effect of subordination agreement that
was listed in title insurance commitment, relating to loan transaction between former client and third
party, amounted to malpractice was for jury in former client's legal malpractice action against law
firm. Manios v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP, 697 S.E.2d 644 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010).
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
12. Failure to depose or subpoena witnesses
Courts that have addressed legal malpractice claims against a criminal defense attorney for an alleged
failure to depose or subpoena witnesses during pretrial proceedings have usually rejected these
claims. Underwood v. Woods, 406 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1969) (applying Missouri law) (barred by statute
of limitations, but merits addressed); State ex rel. O'Blennis v. Adolf, 691 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. Ct.
App. E.D. 1985) (plaintiff was collaterally estopped by guilty plea from relitigating in criminal malpractice
suit the alleged failures to subpoena and call witnesses to establish misidentification and
alibi defenses); Alberici v. Tinari, 374 Pa. Super. 20, 542 A.2d 127 (1988) (a prior ruling that defense
counsel had provided effective assistance at a mail fraud prosecution precluded relitigation on the issue
of a purported failure to arrange for the attendance of various witnesses or potential suspects at
the criminal trial).
Illustration:
A former client suing former attorneys for damages for negligence in connection with their defense of
a criminal action against him failed to prove any injury resulting from any negligence of the attorneys
in failing to take depositions of certain witnesses for a criminal case that had been ultimately dismissed.
The case explained that even if the statute were not a bar to the action, the purported negligence
could not be predicated on the attorneys' failure to take the requested depositions of persons
prior to the time when they were entitled to take the depositions in a criminal action under the then-
governing Missouri rule of practice. The depositions could not be taken as steps in the defense of a
criminal action until an indictment or information was filed. Furthermore, the Missouri criminal rule
authorized a defendant in any criminal case pending in any court to obtain the deposition of a witness.
Under case law precedent, a criminal case is not deemed instituted or pending until an information
is filed or an indictment returned. Underwood v. Woods, 406 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1969).
A failure to adequately allege proximate cause may defeat a convict's legal malpractice action
against appointed trial counsel for, inter alia, failing to subpoena helpful witnesses. The complaint
must allege how or on what ground the convict would have been successful in securing postrelief relief,
including freedom from prison. Ibn-Sadiika v. Riester, 380 Pa. Super. 397, 551 A.2d 1112
(1988) (convict's allegations about witnesses who should have been called were appallingly vague
and conclusory). Thus, on review of the dismissal of a convict's criminal malpractice claim alleging
a failure to subpoena witnesses, the trial court may properly exercise discretion to deny leave to
amend the complaint to cure defects, where the convict's appellate brief does not contain additional
factual averments demonstrating how defense counsel's omissions affected the outcome of the trial or
would have provided a basis for posttrial relief. Ibn-Sadiika v. Riester, 380 Pa. Super. 397, 551 A.2d
1112 (1988). For discussion of pleading generally, see 22.
In cases displaying quite outrageous conduct of defense counsel relating to pretrial witness issues,
however, criminal malpractice plaintiffs have succeeded in at least stating a claim for relief, if not always
or prevailing at trial or even managing to survive summary judgment motions of the defendant.
Former clients have been successful in cases alleging a failure to interview or even try to interview
any of the prosecution witnesses. Thus, one court explained that even the untutored eye could
identify the egregious blundering of defense counsel. Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir.
1987) (applying Massachusetts law). Counsel claimed to have relied on the police as his sole source
of information about the facts surrounding the case which the court described as asking the fox to
guard the chicken coop. Another aggravating factor in this case was that counsel had tried to procure
the client's release by engaging, against the client's wishes, in deal-making with the police rather than
requesting a formal hearing before the judge; consulting appropriately with the arrestee; establishing
a psychiatric case for competency; or interviewing witnesses. Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196
(1st Cir. 1987) (applying Massachusetts law) (affirming a $50,000 damages award which had been
reduced by remittitur from $500,000).
13. Failure to appear or to adequately argue pretrial motions
Counsel may be sued for failing to properly arrange for a continuance of pretrial proceedings in a
criminal matter. The claim may succeed in a case of egregious misconduct, and indeed, enhanced
damages may be appropriate, as for emotional distress. See discussion generally at 34. For example,
in one case, an arrestee who was charged with issuing a worthless check contacted defense counsel
who had assisted him within other legal matters and who purportedly stated that he would take care
of an upcoming court appearance. Although defense counsel arranged for a continuance with an assistant
prosecutor, no continuance was arranged for with the trial court, which declared a bond forfeiture
and issued an arrest warrant when the arrestee failed to appear as scheduled. Weeks later, after
the arrestee received a sheriff's letter notifying him that he was in contempt of court and would be arrested
if he failed to turn himself in. The arrestee showed the letter to defense counsel who allegedly
said that would take care of the matter but then took no action. The arrestee was taken into custody
for the failure to appear and was jailed for up to three hours. Later, when counsel failed to appear at a
hearing, the trial judge recommended that the arrestee hire new counsel who then resolved both of the
criminal matters. In evaluating whether emotional damages were warranted, the court noted that the
general rule applicable in cases of unintentional negligencethat mental suffering unaccompanied by
bodily injury will not support recoverydoes not apply in cases of wanton or willful acts or where
the act it is committed with malice and intended to cause mental distress, and here the arrestee did not
contend that he suffered physical injury but argued instead that counsel's conduct was wanton. According
to the court, counsel should have realized that the bond would be forfeited and his client
placed in jail if the matter was not properly handled. The court explained that someone being negligently
deprived of freedom suffers an injury that can cause mental distress and that a question of fact
was presented for the jury to determine on whether emotional distress was caused by counsel's actions.
Furthermore, remand was required because the extent of the arrestee's emotional distress was
not fully developed at trial due to a partial summary judgment before trial against the arrestee on the
issue. Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 686 P.2d 112 (1984).
In a Colorado case, the failure to argue a motion to suppress an identification which had been
filed with the trial court did not render a public defender liable to the former client for legal malpractice,
following the client's release from prison, where the defender investigated and researched the
motion and believed that it was groundless, and the district attorney had represented to the defender
that the plea bargain would no longer be available to the client if the defender proceeded on the motion.
Pearson v. Sublette, 730 P.2d 909 (Colo. App 1986). Collateral estoppel has been applied to bar
a plaintiff from asserting in a criminal malpractice action that trial counsel had negligently failed to
make any pretrial, trial, or posttrial motions to suppress evidence concerning a search warrant. Hall v.
Barrett, 412 N.W.2d 648 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987).
A former client contended that as a direct result of the defendants' negligent acts he was forced to
seek substitute counsel to defend him with short notice and preparation, resulting in his conviction in
federal court, a criminal malpractice action was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel where
after a full and fair opportunity to pursue his argument, the federal appellate court had on appeal had
determined that his defense of the criminal action was not prejudiced. Indeed, the Second Circuit had
stated that the former client had made only generalized allegations of prejudice and had not shown
any specific way in which the defense was hampered and explained that not only was the continuance
not shown to be an abuse of discretion but that, furthermore, the record established that the former
client was represented vigorously and competently by his counsel. Rastelli v. Sutter, Moffatt, Yannelli
& Zerin, P. C., 87 A.D.2d 865, 449 N.Y.S.2d 305 (2d Dep't 1982).
213. Handling criminal defense matters
West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client 106, 107, 109
A.L.R. Library
Legal malpractice in defense of criminal prosecution, 4 A.L.R.5th 273
Public defender's immunity from liability for malpractice, 6 A.L.R.4th 774
Trial Strategy
Inadequate Factual Investigation of Case by Attorney, 104 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 317
Legal MalpracticeInadequate Case Investigation, 16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 549
Actions Against Attorneys for Professional Negligence, 14 Am. Jur. Trials 265
An attorney may incur liability for malpractice through negligence in handling matters of
criminal defense.[1] Failure of an attorney to take steps to reduce a sentence in excess of the
maximum penalty,[2] failure to file a petition for certiorari,[3] failure to file a postconviction
relief motion,[4] or failure to raise an appropriate defense may constitute negligence.[5]
In criminal cases, the legal standard of ineffective assistance of counsel and the standard
for legal malpractice are equivalent, and where the issue of competent counsel is litigated, collateral
estoppel will bar a malpractice action.[6] However, constitutional protections afforded
a criminal defendant through the appellate process and post-conviction filings should not be
used by an attorney as a liability shield.[7]
A public defender is not protected from liability for malpractice, because the public de-
7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law 213
fender, as advocate, owes a duty to his or her client indistinguishable from that of privately retained
counsel.[8]
An attorney may be liable to a prisoner for malpractice where the attorney accepts a fee
from the prisoner but does not pursue post-conviction relief within the limitations period.[9]
While a criminal legal malpractice action requires all the proof essential to a civil malpractice
claim, a criminal malpractice action will fail if the claimant does not allege and prove, by
a preponderance of the evidence, actual innocence.[10] The statute of limitation for legal malpractice
does not begin to run until the client has been exonerated of the criminal offense
through reversal on direct appeal, post-conviction relief, or otherwise.[11]
Cases:
Where a plaintiff does not claim to be innocent of the crime for which he was convicted,
he cannot bring a suit for legal malpractice arising out of the conviction. Herrera-Corral v.
Hyman, 408 Ill. App. 3d 672, 350 Ill. Dec. 173, 948 N.E.2d 242 (1st Dist. 2011).
Criminal legal malpractice based on client's claim that his defense counsel failed to timely
file state proceedings related to his convictions in order to toll one-year limitations period
governing federal habeas corpus review required client to prove his actual innocence on
charges of conviction. Gaylor v. Jeffco, 999 A.2d 290 (N.H. 2010).
There is no cause of action for legal malpractice, arising from the negligent representation
of a client in a criminal proceeding, as long as the determination of the client's guilt for that
offense remains undisturbed. Humphries v. Detch, 712 S.E.2d 795 (W. Va. 2011).
Attorney appointed by federal court to represent criminal defendant, in a federal criminal
prosecution, had absolute immunity from purely state law claims of legal malpractice that derived
from attorney's conduct in underlying criminal proceedings; federal law provided immunity
from legal malpractice for lawyers appointed by Federal Public Defender Office, Legislature
provided immunity to appointed defense attorneys, and if appointed attorneys were
subject to unbridled legal malpractice claims, it would have negative impact on quality and
number of attorneys who would agree to accept appointment by federal courts to represent indigents.
West's Ann.W.Va.Code, 292120. Mooney v. Frazier, 693 S.E.2d 333 (W. Va.
2010).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1978), writ denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1978).
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate
the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.
Caston v. State, 823 So. 2d 473 (Miss. 2002).
[FN2] Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1978), writ denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1978).
[FN3] Moultrie v. State, 542 S.W.2d 835 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
[FN4] Baldayaque v. U.S., 338 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2003).
[FN5] Martin v. Hall, 20 Cal. App. 3d 414, 97 Cal. Rptr. 730, 53 A.L.R.3d 719 (2d
Dist. 1971).
[FN6] McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
[FN7] Bailey v. Tucker, 533 Pa. 237, 621 A.2d 108 (1993).
[FN8] Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 100 S. Ct. 402, 62 L. Ed. 2d 355 (1979); Sullivan
v. Freeman, 944 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1991).
[FN9] Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d 1242 (Miss. 1991).
[FN10] Rodriguez v. Nielsen, 259 Neb. 264, 609 N.W.2d 368 (2000); Mahoney v.
Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, P.A., 143 N.H. 491, 727 A.2d 996 (1999).
[FN11] Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221, 851 P.2d 556 (1993).
AMJUR ATTNYS 213
IV. Remedies or Relief
33. Generally
In addition to compensatory damages, plaintiffs in criminal malpractice actions have been awarded
or have at least stated claims for emotional damages ( 34). However, punitive damages may be
difficult to establish in light of the demanding standard of malfeasance that is required ( 35).
The fact that a defendant might have a remedy within the criminal justice system under a postconviction
hearing act does not preclude the defendant from pursuing civil remedies based on allegedly
negligent conduct of his court-appointed attorney. ei bon ee baya ghananee v. Black, 350 Pa. Super.
134, 504 A.2d 281 (1986) (applying 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 9541 et seq.). One court has described
the difference in the remedies that are sought when a criminal defendant challenges a conviction
on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel and when a former criminal defendant brings a
civil suit complaining of ineffective representation that amounts to criminal malpractice. In the criminal
context, due process is at stake and the remedy for a failure to provide it is to afford the defendant
new trial. In a civil damages action against the defendant's attorney, by contrast, traditional tort
concepts apply, and thus one who claims damages for such negligence must allege and prove that the
malfeasance proximately caused damages for which recompense is sought. Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435
So. 2d 1237 (Ala. 1983) (holding modified on other grounds by, Morrison v. Franklin, 655 So. 2d
964 (Ala. 1995)). The actual innocence requirement for a criminal legal malpractice case applies regardless
of whether the former criminal defendant is seeking damages for a wrongful conviction or a
longer sentence or seeks attorney's fees. Lynch v. Warwick, 95 Cal. App. 4th 267, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d
391 (4th Dist. 2002).
34. Emotional damages
Emotional damages may be available in a criminal malpractice suit. Bowman v. Doherty, 235
Kan. 870, 686 P.2d 112 (1984); Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying Massachusetts
law) (due to conduct of attorney, client was involuntarily committed to mental institution
and injury was reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances). A criminal defendant stated a legal
malpractice cause of action against his court-appointed attorney by alleging that the attorney had a
legal duty to represent him, that the attorney failed to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge, and that
the attorney's failure to get his case dismissed resulted in prolonged incarceration and irreversible
harm to the criminal defendant's reputation as well as any wrongful imprisonment and mental, physical,
and psychological harm. Hill v. Thorne, 430 Pa. Super. 551, 635 A.2d 186 (1993). An attorney
could be found liable for legal malpractice for the emotional distress suffered by a client from his loss
of liberty caused by the attorney's alleged negligent representation, if the client would have obtained
release from prison but for the attorney's alleged legal malpractice. Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F.
Supp. 1451 (D.N.J. 1989) (applying New Jersey law). Furthermore, another court, also applying New
Jersey law, has ruled that a client could recover damages for emotional distress when the relationship
with the former attorney was predicated upon a liberty interest rather than a purely economic interest.
Illustration:
A client was permitted to prove damages for emotional distress attributable to the extra 20 months of
confinement in a maximum-security penitentiary which were allegedly due to the negligent representation.
The client conceded that, on the advice of retained defense counsel, he pleaded guilty and received
a 25-year prison sentence in a maximum-security penitentiary. The plaintiff alleged that defense
counsel recommended the acquiesced in the guilty plea without investigating whether a factual
basis existed for it, especially concerning an element involving the use of weapons. After obtaining
partial relief with the assistance of a different attorney, the client was released from prison after
serving about five years and then contended that absent the negligent representation, he would have
served no more than 40 months in prison. The client brought an action for criminal malpractice, seeking
compensation for emotional anguish that he allegedly suffered during the additional 20 months of
confinement. In awarding relief, the court distinguished a case in which damages for the plaintiff clients'
emotional distress was denied, explaining that a merely economic relationship was at stake there
rather than an interest in liberty. The court drew an analogy with a case that allowed the recovery of
emotional damages for a failure to inform the parents of a Down syndrome child of the availability of
an amniocentesis prior to birth. Lawson v. Nugent, 702 F. Supp. 91 (D.N.J. 1988) (applying New Jersey
law).
A plaintiff may succeed in a legal malpractice action, recovering emotional distress damages for
unlawful confinement, where the prison confinement was under a sentence that exceeded the maximum
penalty for the crime. Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 1978), writ denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1978). In this case, the parties stipulated that the sole
issues before the appellate court were the trial judge's method of calculating the term of excessive incarceration
and the amount of the award. Although the court did not examine the propriety of emotional
distress damages for wrongful confinement, in reducing the plaintiff's award, the court implicitly
approved the trial court's decision to allow proof of emotional damages. Geddie v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1978), writ denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La.
1978). One court has determined that the defense attorney negligence was the failure to act, causing
the client to be placed in jail and deprived of his freedom. The negligent deprivation of freedom
causes an injury that could result in mental distress, the court explained. Bowman v. Doherty, 235
Kan. 870, 686 P.2d 112 (1984) (reversing a lower court's ruling that limited proof of emotional distress
damages).
Damages for emotional distress have been awarded to the prevailing party in a criminal malpractice
action where the attorney negligently withdrew from the case. Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d
116, 9 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1196 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying Louisiana law) (alleging attorney's withdrawal
from her case only two months before trial after he had represented client for 15 years). Although
the issue on appeal was whether the trial court acted properly in granting a remittitur, the
court found that the evidence supported a finding that the plaintiff suffered some emotional distress
from counsel's withdrawal and thus, the court implicitly approved the trial court's decision to allow
proof of plaintiff's emotional distress. Ordering a remittitur of the $25,000 verdict to $10,000 was
found not to be an abuse of discretion, since the verdict was not clearly within the range of possible
awards supported by the evidence and the record did not indicate a greater award than $10,000. The
appellate court was influenced by the client's admission that she was able to find new counsel to obtain
an extension of time for trial shortly after the attorney withdrew. Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666
F.2d 116, 9 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1196 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying Louisiana law).
Illustration:
In one case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant refused to render assistance to the decedent because
his fees remained unpaid, had failed to return the plaintiff's phone messages, and did not visit
the decedent in jail at any time after his not guilty plea was entered. The court explained that these
facts certainly alleged sufficiently egregious or extraordinary circumstances under the governing
judicial precedent, and thus the plaintiff could proceed to prove damages for the emotional distress
suffered by the decedent from the loss of liberty allegedly caused by the defendant's negligent representation.
The court noted, however, that the plaintiff had the formidable burden of proving that absent
the malpractice the decedent would have obtained release from prison. Nonetheless, the court
reasoned, whether a recovery is remote or even unlikely is not the standard in determining whether a
pleading can withstand a motion to dismiss, and thus the plaintiff was entitled to offer evidence to
prove her claim. Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451 (D.N.J. 1989) (applying New Jersey law).
A client's failure to prove actual innocence may preclude recovery on a legal malpractice claim,
even though the client sought compensation not for his or her conviction but only for civil contempt
fines and fees the client paid to attorneys. Thus, in one case, after the client was convicted of numerous
felonies in connection with an alleged Medicaid fraud, he brought a legal malpractice action
against the attorneys who represented him during the grand jury investigation that led to his convictions,
seeking damages for civil contempt fines and attorney's fees that he claimed were incurred as
result of the attorneys' flawed legal representation. The court reasoned that the attorneys' conduct that
the client challenged consisted of professional judgments intended to avert indictment and ultimate
conviction, and this conduct could not be logically disentangled from the process of representing the
defendant in the criminal proceeding. Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, P.A., 143
N.H. 491, 727 A.2d 996 (1999).
35. Punitive damages
In those somewhat rare cases in which a plaintiff succeeds in establishing liability for criminal
malpractice, (having overcome the onerous burdens often imposed by requirements to demonstrate
exoneration or even innocence and the danger of an adverse application of issue preclusion), the facts
may evince egregious malfeasance that will authorize an award of punitive damages against the
former defense counsel. The actual malice necessary to recover punitive damages in tort actions
means evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud, and this standard applies to criminal malpractice
actions. Dow v. Jones, 232 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D. Md. 2002) (applying Maryland law). Thus, a complaint
in a criminal malpractice action against former trial attorneys, stating, without more, that they
made intentional misrepresentations to the client regarding their experience and expertise and that
this conduct constituted actual malice sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages, may lack the
level of specificity and factual detail required under state law to state a claim for actual malice. Dow
v. Jones, 232 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D. Md. 2002) (applying Maryland law).
V. Appendix
36. Sample case
COA Synopsis
The requirement that a client asserting a legal malpractice claim against an attorney representing
him or her in a criminal matter must prove actual innocence did not apply to a client who did not
challenge any tactical or strategic decision bearing upon his convictions but rather alleged that the attorney's
alleged filing of an unauthorized motion to withdraw the guilty pleain violation of conditions
of a plea agreement that would permit the client to petition for a suspension of part of his sentence
resulted in a denial of the client's motion to suspend a portion of the sentence. The client in
Hilario v. Reardon, 158 N.H. 56, 960 A.2d 337 (2008), sought to be compensated for the breach of
the plea agreement resulting from the alleged malpractice of his attorney which occurred well after
the client accepted criminal responsibility for his acts.
37. Sample complaint
Adapted from Hood and Henry, Alabama Criminal Trial Practice Forms 9:4 (2007 ed.).
IN THE COURT OF [NAME OF COUNTY], ALABAMA
[Name of plaintiff],
Plaintiff,
v.
[List of names of defendants], Civil Action No. [civil action number]
and A through F, being those
attorneys who were members of
Defendant law firm
[name of defendant law firm],
LLP, whose names are otherwise unknown to
plaintiff, but whose names
will be substituted by amendment when ascer-
tained,
Defendants.
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through [his/her] undersigned counsel and makes this complaint
against Defendants:
Parties
1. Plaintiff, [name of plaintiff], is over the age of nineteen years and is a resident of [name of
county], [name of state].
2. At all relevant times hereto, Defendant [name of defendant law firm], LLP (hereinafter sometimes
referred to as Defendant law firm) was a law firm comprised of attorneys licensed to and
conducting business in the State of [name of state]. Upon information and belief, at all relevant
times, Defendant [name of defendant law firm], LLP had its principal place of business in the
City of [name of city], County of [name of county], State of [name of state]. Defendant law firm
and fictitious Defendants A through F are in the legal business of representing citizens of the
State of [name of state] in civil and criminal matters. Upon information and belief fictitious Defendants
A through F are over the age of 19 years and residents of [name of county], [name of
state].
3. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendant [name of defendant attorney],
Esq. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Defendant attorney) was an attorney licensed to practice
law and was an owner, shareholder, partner, employee, agent and/or principal of the Defendant
law firm [name of defendant law firm], LLP. Upon information and belief, Defendant [name
of defendant attorney], Esq. is a resident of [name of county], [name of state].
4. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendant [name of defendant private investigator]
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as Defendant private investigator) was a private
investigator licensed in the State of[name of state] and/or had [his/her] principal place of business
in the State of [name of state]. Upon information and belief, Defendant [name of defendant
private investigator] is a resident of [name of county], [name of state].
FACTS
5. On or about the [date of arrest], Plaintiff was arrested and charged with armed robbery, carjacking,
and destruction of property in the case of United States v. [name of plaintiff], Felony No.
[number of felony. Plaintiff was held without bond in this matter, and thus, was not released from
prison until the [date of release from prison].
6. On or about the [name of defendant attorney], Defendant attorney was appointed by the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama to represent Plaintiff in this serious criminal
matter.
7. Defendant private investigator was hired by Defendant attorney to assume the responsibilities
of private investigation for this serious criminal matter.
8. On or about the [date of commencement of trial], the criminal trial commenced before the Honorable
Judge [name of judge] in the U.S. District Court.
9. During the criminal trial, Defendant attorney's actions were grossly negligent. Furthermore,
Defendant attorney's legal representation of the Plaintiff was seriously ineffective and displayed
wanton and willful conduct.
10. Examples of Defendant attorney's ineffective and grossly negligent legal representation of the
Plaintiff, include but are not limited to, imbibing in alcohol during the day while the trial was taking
place; failing to properly protect Plaintiff's rights; failing to provide effective assistance of
counsel; failing to properly investigate the case; failing to properly direct or supervise the investigator;
failing to file appropriate pre-trial motions; failing to properly inform the Plaintiff of developments
in the case; failing to prepare the Plaintiff to give testimony; failing to prepare witnesses
for testimony; failing to properly coordinate with counsel for the co-defendant; failing to
order the preliminary hearing transcript; failing to present corroborating witnesses on behalf of
the Plaintiff; failing to exploit concessions and revelations in the government's case; and failing to
provide conflict-free representation of the Plaintiff.
11. On or about the [date of conviction], Plaintiff was convicted by the jury on all charges, including,
armed robbery, carjacking, and destruction of property.
12. Plaintiff was sentenced to 15 years in prison for the convictions in this matter.
13. While incarcerated Plaintiff suffered numerous injuries and damages, including but not limited
to, loss of freedom, liberty and enjoyment of life; being stabbed; fear of violence against
[his/her] person; feelings of fright, humiliation, shame, mortification and indignation; loss of employment,
wages and wage earning capacity; and communication with [his/her] family and loved
ones.
14. On or about the [date of granting motion for new trial], almost five years later, the Honorable
Judge [name of judge], in a lengthy opinion, granted the Plaintiff's motion for a new trial based
on Plaintiff's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Judge [name of judge] specifically found
that Defendant attorney's legal representation of Plaintiff was so deficient that Plaintiff was
denied [his/her] right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Furthermore, Judge [name of judge] found that there was a reasonable probability that, but
for Defendant attorney's unprofessional conduct, the result of the trial would have been different.
Judge [name of judge] specifically found, amongst other items, that Defendant attorney made
harmful statements in argument to the jury; failed to present corroborating witnesses; failed to
properly investigate the case; failed to prepare Plaintiff and co-defendant for testimony; failed to
ask questions on re-direct of client; failed to exploit concessions and revelations in government's
case; failed to provide Plaintiff with conflict-free representation; imbibed alcohol during the trial;
and that [his/her] consumption of alcohol was a contributing factor towards [his/her] poor performance.
15. Plaintiff was finally released from incarceration on [date].
16. On or about [date of disciplinary action], Bar Counsel of the State of [name of state] disciplined
Defendant attorney for [his/her] woeful representation of Plaintiff in the underlying criminal
matter. The discipline is Bar Proceeding No. [number].
COUNT I (Legal Malpractice)
17. The Plaintiff incorporates, by reference, paragraphs 1 through 16, and further alleges that Defendant
law firm and Defendant attorney, were appointed by the Court to represent Plaintiff in
[his/her] criminal matter brought by the United States, and that the Defendant attorney and the
lawyers of Defendant's law firm, had a duty to provide Plaintiff with competent, reasonable and
effective legal representation and advice as required by the applicable standard of care for attorneys
acting under the same or similar circumstances.
18. Plaintiff further alleges that notwithstanding the legal, ethical and contractual duties to the
Plaintiff, Defendant law firm and its individual attorneys, including Defendant attorney, breached
the duties to Plaintiff by failing to provide Plaintiff with the competent reasonable and appropriate
legal representation [he/she] was entitled to under the circumstances.
19. Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm's breaches of the
duties owed to Plaintiff and the violation of the standard of care owed by reasonable and competent
practitioners under the circumstances include, but are not limited to, imbibing in alcohol during
the day while the trial was taking place; failing to properly protect Plaintiff's rights; failing to
provide effective assistance of counsel; failing to properly investigate the case; failing to file appropriate
pre-trial motions; failing to properly inform the Plaintiff of developments in the case;
failing to prepare the Plaintiff to give testimony; failing to prepare witnesses for testimony; failing
to properly coordinate with counsel for the co-defendant; failing to order the preliminary hearing
transcript; failing to present corroborating witnesses on behalf of the Plaintiff; failing to exploit
concessions and revelations in the government's case; failing to provide conflict-free representation
of the Plaintiff; failing to place Plaintiff's interests primary to [his/her] own; failing to
zealously represent the Plaintiff; failing to provide competent representation of the Plaintiff; failing
to serve the Plaintiff with skill and care commensurate with that generally afforded to clients
by other lawyers in similar matters; failing to act as reasonable and prudent attorneys under the
circumstances; and otherwise breaching the standard of care owed by attorneys and/or law firms
under the same or similar circumstances.
20. Plaintiff further alleges that as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant attorney and Defendant
law firm's combined negligent acts and/or omissions, the Plaintiff was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel.
21. As a further direct proximate result of Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm's negligent
acts and/or omissions, Plaintiff was unjustly convicted and wrongly imprisoned for a period of
nearly five years.
22. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm's negligent
acts and/or omissions, the Plaintiff suffered numerous injuries and damages, including but
not limited to, loss of freedom, liberty and enjoyment of life; being stabbed; fear of violence
against [his/her] person; feelings of fright, humiliation, shame, mortification and indignation; loss
of employment, wages and wage earning capacity; and communication with [his/her] family and
loved ones.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm,
including Defendants A through F, separately and severally, in such sum of compensatory, special
and punitive damages as the jury may assess after a full and fair consideration of the facts, plus
interest and costs, and any equitable relief to which the Plaintiff may be justly entitled.
COUNT II (Breach of Fiduciary Duty)
23. The Plaintiff incorporates, by reference, paragraphs 1 through 22 above, and further alleges
that Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm, and its individual attorneys, had fiduciary and
ethical duties, created at the commencement of their undertaking to represent Plaintiff to act
primarily for Plaintiff's benefit with an undivided duty of loyalty in all matters connected with
such representation.
24. Plaintiff further alleges that at the time the Court appointed Defendant attorney and Defendant
law firm, and its individual attorneys, to represent Plaintiff in this serious criminal matter, the Defendants,
represented to Plaintiff that the law firm and the attorneys in the firm had substantial experience
and expertise in litigating serious criminal matters.
25. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm owed Plaintiff an ethical
and fiduciary duty to provide representation with the requisite legal knowledge, skill and diligence
necessary for the representation.
26. Plaintiff further alleges, that notwithstanding the representations made by the Defendant law
firm and its individual attorneys concerning their expertise and experience in handling serious
criminal matters, and notwithstanding the ethical and fiduciary duties the Defendant law firm and
its individual attorneys owed to Plaintiff, the Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm
breached the applicable fiduciary and ethical duties owed to Plaintiff.
27. Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm's breaches of the
duties owed to Plaintiff and the violation of the standard of care owed by reasonable and competent
practitioners under the circumstances include, but are not limited to, imbibing in alcohol during
the day while the trial was taking place; failing to properly protect Plaintiff's rights; failing to
provide effective assistance of counsel; failing to properly investigate the case; failing to file appropriate
pre-trial motions; failing to properly inform the Plaintiff of developments in the case;
failing to prepare the Plaintiff to give testimony; failing to prepare witnesses for testimony; failing
to properly coordinate with counsel for the co-defendant; failing to order the preliminary hearing
transcript; failing to present corroborating witnesses on behalf of the Plaintiff; failing to exploit
concessions and revelations in the government's case; failing to provide conflict-free representation
of the Plaintiff; failing to hold Plaintiff's interests primary to [his/her] own; failing to
zealously represent the Plaintiff; failing to provide competent representation of the Plaintiff; failing
to serve the Plaintiff with skill and care commensurate with that generally afforded to clients
by other lawyers in similar matters; failing to act as reasonable and prudent attorneys under the
circumstances; and otherwise breaching the standard of care owed by attorneys and/or law firms
under the same or similar circumstances.
28. Plaintiff further alleges that as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant attorney and Defendant
law firm's breaches of their ethical and fiduciary duties, the Plaintiff was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel.
29. As a further direct proximate result of Defendant attorney's and Defendant law firm's breaches
of their fiduciary duties, Plaintiff was unjustly convicted and wrongly imprisoned for a period of
nearly 10 years.
30. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendant attorney's and Defendant law firm's
breaches of their fiduciary duties, the Plaintiff suffered numerous injuries and damages, including
but not limited to, loss of freedom, liberty and enjoyment of life; being stabbed; fear of violence
against [his/her] person; feelings of fright, humiliation, shame, mortification and indignation; loss
of employment, wages and wage earning capacity; and communication with [his/her] family and
loved ones.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm,
including Defendants A through F, separately and severally, in such sum of compensatory, special
and punitive damages as the jury may assess after a full and fair consideration of the facts, plus
interest and costs, and any equitable relief to which the Plaintiff may be justly entitled.
COUNT III (Private Investigation Malpractice)
31. The Plaintiff incorporates, by reference, paragraphs 1 through 30, and further alleges that Defendant
private investigator was hired by Defendant attorney to perform the duties of a private investigator
in this criminal matter and had a duty to provide Plaintiff with competent and reasonable
private investigation services as required by the applicable standard of care for private investigators
acting under the same or similar circumstances.
32. Plaintiff further alleges that notwithstanding the legal, ethical and contractual duties to the
Plaintiff, Defendant private investigator breached the duties to Plaintiff by failing to provide
Plaintiff with the competent reasonable and appropriate private investigation services [he/she]
was entitled to under the circumstances.
33. Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant private investigator's breaches of the duties owed
to Plaintiff and the violation of the standard of care owed by reasonable and competent practitioners
under the circumstances include, but are not limited to, failing to properly investigate the underlying
criminal matter; failing to visit the crime scene, failing to investigate the Plaintiff's theory
of the case; failing to recognize Defendant attorney's inability to effectively represent the
Plaintiff; and otherwise breaching the standard of care owed by private investigators under the
same or similar circumstances.
34. Plaintiff further alleges that as a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' combined negligent
acts and/or omissions, the Plaintiff was deprived of effective assistance of a private investigator.
35. As a further direct proximate result of Defendants' negligent acts and/or omissions, Plaintiff
was unjustly convicted and wrongly imprisoned for a period of nearly 10 years.
36. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants' negligent acts and/or omissions, the
Plaintiff suffered numerous injuries and damages, including but not limited to, loss of freedom,
liberty and enjoyment of life; being stabbed; fear of violence against [his/her] person; feelings of
fright, humiliation, shame, mortification and indignation; loss of employment, wages and wage
earning capacity; and communication with [his/her] family and loved ones.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against all Defendants, separately and severally, in
such sum of compensatory, special and punitive damages as the jury may assess after a full and
fair consideration of the facts, plus interest and costs, and any equitable relief to which the
Plaintiff may be justly entitled.
COUNT IV (Punitive Damages)
37. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates, by reference, all of the preceding paragraphs 1
through 36 and further states as follows:
38. The Defendants acted with actual malice toward the Plaintiff or acted under circumstances
amounting to a willful and wanton disregard of the Plaintiff's rights, and/or acted with conscious
indifference towards the rights of and safety of the Plaintiff such that an award of punitive damages
to the Plaintiff to punish the Defendants for their actions and/or omissions, and to serve as
example to prevent others from acting in a similar way, is appropriate here, especially because the
acts necessary for Defendants to have prevented and/or remedied their willful and wanton, and/or
malicious, conduct could have been accomplished at minimal cost to the Defendants.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against all Defendants, separately and severally, in
such sum of compensatory, special and punitive damages as the jury may assess after a full and
fair consideration of the facts, plus interest and costs, and any equitable relief to which the
Plaintiff may be justly entitled.
JURY DEMAND
The Plaintiff respectfully requests a trial by jury on all of the above claims.
___________________
[Name of attorney for plaintiff]
Attorney for Plaintiff
[Address of attorney for plaintiff]
[Telephone number of attorney for plaintiff]
[State bar number of attorney for plaintiff]
SERVE DEFENDANTS:
[List of names and addresses of defendants]
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
Back to messages
FW: respectfully submitted
Attachment
8/07/12
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net, jleslie@washoecounty.us, zyoung@da.washoecounty.us, drakej@reno.gov, kadlicj@reno.gov
Zach Coughlin
Sent: Tue 8/07/12 11:01 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; jleslie@washoecounty.us; zyoung@da.washoecounty.us; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
Attachments:
6 attachments
20120605_101513 Northwind manager handy man attacks from golf cart 6 5 12.mp4 (3.1 MB) , landlord tenant law manual for police in minnesota.pdf
(735.1 KB) , Police_manual_-_final_as_adopted_by_State's_Attorney.pdf (263.7 KB) , trespass criminal civil evictdion.pdf (69.8 KB) , 6 8 12 fax to
northwind with page numbers.pdf (50.7 KB) , northwind fax 6 4 12 habitability retaliation etc.pdf (45.8 KB)
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.comTo: weavera@reno.gov; barnesm@reno.govSubject: respectfully submittedDate: Fri, 8 Jun 2012 16:41:49 -0700
Dear Officer Weaver and Officer Barnes,
I am respectfully submitting this supplementary material to the police report I submitted to you in person on June 6, 2012
regarding the assault I was the victim of at the hands of maintenance staff member Luke of Northwind Apartments on June 5th,
2012, and the attempts at unlawful entry committed by Northwind Manager Dwayne Jakob on or about June 4, 2012.
I am attaching an article you may find of interest regarding the intersection of landlord tenant law and police work, vis a vis
criminal/civil matters and the fine distinctions that sometimes arise. I didn't see anything in there on Officer Weavers fine
hypothetical regarding entry without permission when a burglary may be occurring. That situation probably does not come up
that often because hardly anybody but the police would be brave enough to enter such a dangerous situation.
I appreciate the brave service both of you provide. I am attaching this materials just because they are interesting to me and may
be to you and in no way wish for so attachign these to be interpreted as a criticism of either of your police work.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Back to messages
RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
8/07/12
To: Keith Loomis
Zach Coughlin
Sent: Tue 8/07/12 3:38 PM
To: Keith Loomis (keithloomis@earthlink.net)
Are you refusing to file the motions o requested?-----Original Message-----From: Keith LoomisSent: 7 Aug 2012 16:55:44 GMTTo: 'Zach Coughlin'Subject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail
motion
Zach

Why dont you move to represent yourself. That way you will be completely satisfied with the services you provide yourself and can do all of the things you believe are necessary.

If you want me to continue to represent you, what I asked you to provide to me was a description of the events which lead to the charge of disturbing the peace. I still need that
description.

Keith Loomis

Sent: Monday, August 06, 2012 3:54 PM
Subject: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion

Dear Mr. Loomis and City Attorney Kadlic and Deputy City Attorney Drake,

I am writing to request that you file some motion to alter, amend, reconsider, set aside, or modify my bail in the case stemming from my JUly 3, 2012 arrest for distrubing the peace, failure to provide
proof of insurance, and failure to secure a load. I am writing to request that you file a pre trial motion (Motion to Dismiss, request for a pre trial motion and bail motion, and motion to supress police
report based upon the DTP arrest occuring for alleged conduct outside the officer's presence). If you will not file these motion (and please provide me a draft of such motions for my review prior to
filing them as well as prior to making any communication on my behalf to either the RMC or the City of Reno Prosecutor), please provide me a written indication of your rationale for so refusing, and
then please file a Motion to Withdrawal as soon as practicable. I ask this respectfully.

The police showed up to the hearing, yet I was not noticed of that fact in advance, or of the hearing itself. Further, Judge Gardner explicilty indicated he was basing his decision to raise the bail based
upon "public safety" and "concern for the defendant's safety", which are impermissible rationale for so increasin one's bail.

NRS
178.498. Many courts use a bail schedule to determine the amount, but note the
initial amount can be increased if good cause is shown.NRS 178.499. Additionally, in
determining the amount of bail, the judge should look at the following factors (NRS
178.498):
The factors listed inNRS 178.4853.
Bail can not be excessive.U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. It should be limited to a

NRS 178.484. The Court should take care inimposing any restrictions on a defendants constitutional rights (i.e.,
of the alleged crime. Section 11 ofNRS 178.484 describes the document that must

My bail hearing contained what seems to be an impermissible coercive attempt to condition my release or the possibility thereof upon my providing confidential medical records (Lake's Crossing etc) to
the Reno Municipal Court, even where the same judge presiding over the bail hearing found me competent enough to face a criminal trepass trial less than two weeks before teh bail hearing in 11 CR
26405.

The friend of mine who posted my bail, Jared Swanson, has a serious form of cancer and a one year old baby. I request a reduction of the bail for his benefit and for the proof of insurance charge to be
dismissed, as (and I am trying to avoid this in any way I can), if I am rearrested, such a proof of insurance charge may present another basis for imposing an unduly burdensome bail upon me, as it did
on July 5th, 2012 where, despite my having produced a legible pdf copy of my proof of insurance card on my large screened zoomable smart phone, Officers Weaver and Dye still charged me with that
violation, and the bail was subsequently increase. Further, none of the events or accusations forming the basis of the distrubing the police charge occurred in the officer's presence, and the police
report contains no indication whatsoever that the arrest was made based upon NRS 171.1771. I provided Officer Weaver my driver's license prior to the arrest. I did not

either issue a citation or arrest and detain the person.NRS 171.1771 states that a person can be arrested if

Additionally, I am requesting that you file a Motion to Dismiss the Disturbing the Peace charge based upon a lack of evidence and or insufficiency of pleading in that the allegations do not amount to a
prima facie case of a DTP violation. Further, please subpoena and or collect the Protection Order application filed by Milan Krebs on July 5th, 2012, and interview Krebs as to why he mentions
Coughlin often carrying around a large knife in a menacing manner in that protection order application, yet completely failed to mention that in his July 3rd, 2012 police report. Additionally, please
determine why Kreb's TPO appliication has a different style of handwriting on the caption compared to the descriptive sections, indicating someone pushed the filing of the TPO on Krebs, perhaps his
employer, Northwind Apartments or the RPD, which has in the days preceding the arrest threatend to arrest Coughlin for criminal trespass if he returned to any part of the premises of Northwind
Apartments, in consideration of Coughlin's eviction from unit 29, despite the fact Coughlin still had a valid right to go to his other two rentals, units 45 and 71, in addition to the fact that Northwinds
essentially withdrew or rescinded its June 28th, 2012 eviction of Coughlin by posting an Amended 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice on unit 29 on June 28th, 2012 shortly after Coughlin pointed out to
Northwinds and Nevada Courts Services that the July 14th, 2012 5 Day notice was not "personally served" (NCS's R. Wray lied about effecting personal service, as he could not possibly have verified
someone of "suitable age and discretion" was within the windowless room with a metal door closed and locked and where no Wray admits that he received no verbal response from the unit or anyone
therein upon his knocking on the door and or attempting to break into the unit, please see Soldal v. Cook County in that regard, a US S. Ct case) and therefore Coughlin would have had until at least
noon on July 28th, 2012 to file a Tenant's Answer, whereas the eviction/lockout/arrest of June 28th, 2012 took place two hours before noon at 10 am).

Additionally, RPD Officer Weaver had previously attempted to break into one of my rentals at Northwind at a time when he lacked a warrant and or an exigent rationale for doing so, much less an
eviction Order. I just want this case to be dismissed and to try to move on in life, and difuse the tensions incident to this case.

I did not disturb the peace at Northwinds as alleged, nor did I make the threats Kreb's accuses me of or stalk him or follow him in a threatening manner at any time. Additionaly, I never broke into nor
did I ever attempt to break into Krebs' truck, and in fact, I filed a police report in June 2012 reporting extortionate threats by another maintenance man at Northwinds ("Luke" is his name, I believe) and
Northwind's Manage Dwayne Jakob, wherein they threatened to make such a spurious allegation, but subsuquently refrained from doign so when it apparently occurred to them that I may have
excuplatory video evidence disproving such an allegation as well as capturing their baseless and extortionate threats and accusations. Additionally, please subpoene the police reports I filed with the
RPD and any emails I sent to any officers (including Weaver, Barnes, Sargent MIiller, LIeutenant Brown) and any reports of or recording of phone conversations I had with any of those RPD
personnel. Further, please see the attached june 26th, 2012 email to the RPD, WCSO, RJC, Sparks Justice Court and others pointing out the insufficiency of the 5 day Notice drafted and posted by
non-lawyers Nevada Court Services, in that under NRS 40.253 it listed the wrong forum for the tenant to file a Tenant's Answer, and under the Aiken decision of the Nevada Supreme Court and NRCP
60(b)(4), any lockout order stemming therefrom is void for lack of jurisdiction.


(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for another alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense is committed;...

Krebs did not immediately arrest me under NRS 171.136(2)(d), nor was the DTP arrest for an offense alleged to have occurred in the officer's presence.

the attached videos are of the incident on June 5th, 2012, not from July 3rd, 2012, but they support my contentions and the relevancy of subpoening the police incident reports and other
documentation should this case not be dismissed, nolle prosequi, de minimis, etc....

I will forward to you my emails to the RPD et all from June 26th, and July 2nd, 2012. I realize their tone was not a smart one to take or appropriate and am only sending them in hopes of having this
matter dismissed. I do not have any interest in pursuing anything like Wheeler v Cross 344 Fed Apps 420 (2008) .

Sincerely,

Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax949 667 7402
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FW: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court
Attachment
8/06/12
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net, kadlicj@reno.gov, drakej@reno.gov
Zach Coughlin
Sent: Mon 8/06/12 3:55 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; kadlicj@reno.gov; drakej@reno.gov
Attachments: 2 attachments
coughlin v northwind 16_TenantsAffidavit_DeclarationOther_PrivateHousing other than nonpayment of rent.pdf (76.3 KB) , combined northwind v
coughlin eviction filings.pdf (1058.4 KB)
please view this in conjunction with the email I just sent. Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402

From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.comTo: kbrown@nvbar.org; milllerr@reno.gov; millerr@reno.gov; stuttle@washoecounty.gov; rsilva@washoecounty.us;
stuttle@washoecounty.us; jamchen@washoecounty.us; 037nor4@acg.com; info@acg-apmi.com; rjcweb@wasoecounty.us; jboles@callatg.com; apminfo@acg.comSubject:
FW: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice CourtDate: Mon, 2 Jul 2012 17:21:54 -0700
NOrthwind and Nevada Court Services served and "amended 5 day notice of unlawful detainer on July 29th,
2012"...giving me five days to get my stuff out of unit 29 (the one the subject of Judge Schroeer's Eviction
Order, which was effectively rescinded by their serving a new 5 day unlawful detainer notice....) as well as
units 71 and 45...whicih are two units to which i still have valide lease agreements, ie, I cannot be trespassing
for accessing them (the Reno PD has indicated they will arrest me for criminal trespass for accessing any units
in the complex, including those to which I still have a valid possessory or property interest, in violation of 42
usc 1983).

why does Sargent Miller have to give me a hard time? Isn't it enough for him to have his "Denzel" good looks
and a much higher paying job than I will ever have? What up wit that?

Northwind and Nevada Court Services (which is practicing eviction law without a license) screwed up and put
"Sparks Justice Court on Greenbrae" as the place for the tenant to file a Tenan'ts Answer or Affidavit. Doing
so will make the RJC Order by Judge Schroeder null and void (Karen Stancil, Chief Civil Clerk at RJC admits
this, but really, the fault lies with NCS and Northwind, not the committed professional at the RJC).
The Notice must identify the Court with jurisdiction. NRS 40.253(3)(a). ONe cannot be trespassing in a placwe where they have a
valid reason for being or a lawful right to be. NRS 207.200, RMC 8.10.040.

In
Aikins v. Andrews, 91 Nev. 746, 542 P.2d 734 (1975), the Supreme COUli construed the
predecessor statute to NRS 40.2516 to mean that the alternative five (5) day notice must be given
6
before the tenants can be dispossed and a lease can be validly terminated. The court stated that this
five (5) day notice requirement " ... neither can be waved nor neglected." 91 Nev. at 748.
ttp://www.constitution.org/ussc/506-056a.htm

U.S. Supreme Court
SOLDAL v. COOK COUNTY, 506 U.S. 56 (1992)
506 U.S. 56 SOLDAL, ET UX. v. COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 91-6516
Argued October 5, 1992
Decided December 8, 1992
While eviction proceedings were pending, Terrace Properties and Margaret Hale forcibly evicted petitioners,
the Soldal family, and their mobile home from a Terrace Properties' mobile home park. At Hale's request,
Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff's Department deputies were present at the eviction. Although they knew that
there was no eviction order and that Terrace Properties' actions were illegal, the deputies refused to take Mr.
Soldal's complaint for criminal trespass or otherwise interfere with the eviction. Subsequently, the state judge
assigned to the pending eviction proceedings ruled that the eviction had been unauthorized, and the trailer,
badly damaged during the eviction, was returned to the lot. Petitioners brought an action in the Federal District
Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Terrace Properties and Hale had conspired with the deputy sheriffs
to unreasonably seize and remove their home in violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Acknowledging that what had occurred was a "seizure" in the literal sense of the word, the court reasoned that
it was not a seizure as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment because, inter alia, it did not invade petitioners'
privacy.
Held:
The seizure and removal of the trailer home implicated petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights. Pp. 61-72.
(a) A "seizure" of property occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests in that property." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 . The language of
the Fourth Amendment - which protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures of "their
persons, houses, papers, and effects" - cuts against the novel holding below, and this Court's cases
unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects property even where privacy or liberty is not
implicated. See, e.g., ibid.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 . This Court's "plain view"
decisions also make untenable the lower court's construction of the Amendment. If the Amendment's
boundaries were defined exclusively by rights of privacy, "plain view" seizures, rather than being
scrupulously subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 -327,
would not implicate that constitutional provision at all. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' [506 U.S. 56,
57] position, the Amendment protects seizure even though no search within its meaning has taken
place. See, e.g., Jacobsen, supra, at 120-125. Also contrary to that court's view, Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 , does not require a court, when it finds that a wrong implicates more than one
constitutional command, to look at the dominant character of the challenged conduct to determine
under which constitutional standard it should be evaluated. Rather, each constitutional provision is
examined in turn. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 . Pp. 61-71.
(b) The instant decision should not foment a wave of new litigation in the federal courts. Activities
such as repossessions or attachments, if they involve entering a home, intruding on individuals'
privacy, or interfering with their liberty, would implicate the Fourth Amendment even on the Court of
Appeals' own terms. And numerous seizures of this type will survive constitutional scrutiny on
"reasonableness" grounds. Moreover, it is unlikely that the police will often choose to further an
enterprise knowing that it is contrary to the law, or proceed to seize property in the absence of
objectively reasonable grounds for doing so. Pp. 71-72.
942 F.2d 1073, reversed and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
John L. Stainthorp argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners.
Kenneth L. Gillis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Jack O'Malley, Renee G.
Goldfarb, and Kenneth T. McCurry. [*]
[ Footnote *] James D. Holzhauer, Timothy S. Bishop, John A. Powell, Steven R. Shapiro, Harvey M.
Grossman, and Alan K. Chen filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging
reversal.
Richard Ruda, Carter G. Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, and Mark E. Haddad filed a brief for the National League
of Cities et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
I
Edward Soldal and his family resided in their trailer home, which was located on a rented lot in the Willoway
Terrace mobile [506 U.S. 56, 58] home park in Elk Grove, Illinois. In May 1987, Terrace Properties, the owner of
the park, and Margaret Hale, its manager, filed an eviction proceeding against the Soldals in an Illinois state
court. Under the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 110, 9-101 et seq. (1991), a tenant
cannot be dispossessed absent a judgment of eviction. The suit was dismissed on June 2, 1987. A few months
later, in August 1987, the owner brought a second proceeding of eviction, claiming nonpayment of rent. The
case was set for trial on September 22, 1987.
Rather than await judgment in their favor, Terrace Properties and Hale, contrary to Illinois law, chose to evict
the Soldals forcibly two weeks prior to the scheduled hearing. On September 4, Hale notified the Cook
County's Sheriff's Department that she was going to remove the trailer home from the park, and requested the
presence of sheriff deputies to forestall any possible resistance. Later that day, two Terrace Properties
employees arrived at the Soldals' home accompanied by Cook County Deputy Sheriff O'Neil. The employees
proceeded to wrench the sewer and water connections off the side of the trailer home, disconnect the phone,
tear off the trailer's canopy and skirting, and hook the home to a tractor. Meanwhile, O'Neil explained to
Edward Soldal that "`he was there to see that [Soldal] didn't interfere with [Willoway's] work.'" Brief for
Petitioner 6.
By this time, two more deputy sheriffs had arrived at the scene, and Soldal told them that he wished to file a
complaint for criminal trespass. They referred him to deputy Lieutenant Jones, who was in Hale's office. Jones
asked Soldal to wait outside while he remained closeted with Hale and other Terrace Properties employees for
over 20 minutes. After talking to a district attorney and making Soldal wait another half hour, Jones told Soldal
that he would not accept a complaint because "`it was between the landlord and the tenant ... [and] they were
going to go ahead and continue to move [506 U.S. 56, 59] out the trailer.'" Id., at 8. 1 Throughout this period, the
deputy sheriffs knew that Terrace Properties did not have an eviction order and that its actions were unlawful.
Eventually, and in the presence of an additional two deputy sheriffs, the Willoway workers pulled the trailer
free of its moorings and towed it onto the street. Later, it was hauled to a neighboring property.
On September 9, the state judge assigned to the pending eviction proceedings ruled that the eviction had been
unauthorized, and ordered Terrace Properties to return the Soldals' home to the lot. The home, however, was
badly damaged.
[2]
The Soldals brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of their rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. They claimed that Terrace Properties and Hale had conspired
with Cook County deputy sheriffs to unreasonably seize and remove the Soldals' trailer home. The District
Judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Soldals had failed to adduce
any evidence to support their conspiracy theory and, therefore, the existence of state action necessary under
1983.
[3]

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, construing the facts in petitioners' favor, accepted their
contention that there was state action. However, it went on to hold that [506 U.S. 56, 60] the removal of the
Soldals' trailer did not constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment or a deprivation of due
process for purposes of the Fourteenth.
On rehearing, a majority of the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reaffirmed the panel decision.
[4]
Acknowledging that what had occurred was a "seizure" in the literal sense of the word, the court reasoned
that, because it was not made in the course of public law enforcement, and because it did not invade the
Soldals' privacy, it was not a seizure as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. 942 F.2d 1073, 1076 (1991).
Interpreting prior cases of this Court, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, absent interference with privacy or
liberty, a "pure deprivation of property" is not cognizable under the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 1078-1079.
Rather, petitioners' property interests were protected only by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
[5]

We granted certiorari to consider whether the seizure and removal of the Soldals' trailer home implicated their
Fourth Amendment rights, 503 U.S. 918 (1992), and now reverse.
[6]
[506 U.S. 56, 61]
II
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30
(1963), provides in pertinent part that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated... ."
A "seizure" of property, we have explained, occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interests in that property." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). In
addition, we have emphasized that "at the very core" of the Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man to
retreat into his own home." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). See also Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 -179 (1984); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 316 (1971); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 601 (1980).
As a result of the state action in this case, the Soldals' domicile was not only seized, it literally was carried
away, giving new meaning to the term "mobile home." We fail to see how being unceremoniously dispossessed
of one's home in the manner alleged to have occurred here can be viewed as anything but a seizure invoking
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Whether the Amendment was in fact [506 U.S. 56, 62] violated is, of
course, a different question that requires determining if the seizure was reasonable. That inquiry entails the
weighing of various factors, and is not before us.
The Court if Appeals recognized that there had been a seizure, but concluded that it was a seizure only in a
"technical" sense, not within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This conclusion followed from a narrow
reading of the Amendment, which the court construed to safeguard only privacy and liberty interests, while
leaving unprotected possessory interests where neither privacy nor liberty was at stake. Otherwise, the court
said,
"a constitutional provision enacted two centuries ago [would] make every repossession and eviction
with police assistance actionable under - of all things - the Fourth Amendment[, which] would both
trivialize the amendment and gratuitously shift a large body of routine commercial litigation from the
state courts to the federal courts. That trivializing, this shift, can be prevented by recognizing the
difference between possessory and privacy interests." 942 F.2d, at 1077.
Because the officers had not entered Soldal's house, rummaged through his possessions, or, in the Court of
Appeals' view, interfered with his liberty in the course of the eviction, the Fourth Amendment offered no
protection against the "grave deprivation" of property that had occurred. Ibid.
We do not agree with this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment protects the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures of "their persons, houses, papers, and effects." This language surely cuts
against the novel holding below, and our cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects property as
well as privacy.
[7]
This much [506 U.S. 56, 63] was made clear in Jacobsen, supra, where we explained that the
first Clause of the Fourth Amendment
"protects two types of expectations, one involving "searches," the other "seizures." A "search" occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A
"seizure" of property occurs where there is some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests in that property." 466 U.S., at 113 (footnote omitted).
See also id., at 120; Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328
(1987); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 -748 (1983)
(STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 , n. 6 (1980). Thus, having
concluded that chemical testing of powder found in a package did not compromise its owner's privacy, the
Court in Jacobsen did not put an end to its inquiry, as would be required under the view adopted by the Court
of Appeals and advocated by respondents. Instead, adhering to the teachings of United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696 (1983), it went on to determine whether the invasion of the owners' "possessory interests" occasioned
by the destruction of the powder was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Jacobsen, supra, at 124-125.
In Place, although we found that subjecting luggage to a "dog sniff" did not constitute a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes because it did not compromise any privacy interest, taking custody of Place's suitcase
was deemed an unlawful seizure, for it unreasonably infringed "the suspect's possessory interest in his
luggage." 462 U.S., at 708 . 8 Although lacking a privacy component, the property rights in both instances
nonetheless were not [506 U.S. 56, 64] disregarded, but rather were afforded Fourth Amendment protection.
Respondents rely principally on precedents such as Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), to
demonstrate that the Fourth Amendment is only marginally concerned with property rights. But the message of
those cases is that property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations. The Warden
opinion thus observed, citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), and Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961), that the "principal" object of the Amendment is the protection of privacy, rather than
property, and that "this shift in emphasis from property to privacy has come about through a subtle interplay of
substantive and procedural reform." 387 U.S., at 304 . There was no suggestion that this shift in emphasis had
snuffed out the previously recognized protection for property under the Fourth Amendment. Katz, in declaring
violative of the Fourth Amendment the unwarranted overhearing of a telephone booth conversation,
effectively ended any lingering notions that the protection of privacy depended on trespass into a protected
area. In the course of its decision, the Katz Court stated that the Fourth Amendment can neither be translated
into a provision dealing with constitutionally protected areas nor into a general constitutional right to privacy.
The Amendment, the Court said, protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion,
"but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all." 389 U.S., at 350 .
As for Cardwell, a plurality of this Court held in that case that the Fourth Amendment did not bar the use in
evidence of paint scrapings taken from and tire treads observed on the defendant's automobile, which had
been seized in a parking lot and towed to a police lockup. Gathering this evidence was not deemed to be a
search, for nothing from the [506 U.S. 56, 65] interior of the car and "no personal effects, which the Fourth
Amendment traditionally has been deemed to protect" were searched or seized. 417 U.S., at 591 (opinion of
BLACKMUN, J.). No meaningful privacy rights were invaded. But this left the argument, pressed by the
dissent, that the evidence gathered was the product of a warrantless, and hence illegal, seizure of the car from
the parking lot where the defendant had left it. However, the plurality was of the view that, because, under the
circumstances of the case, there was probable cause to seize the car as an instrumentality of the crime, Fourth
Amendment precedent permitted the seizure without a warrant. Id., at 593. Thus, both the plurality and
dissenting Justices considered the defendant's auto deserving of Fourth Amendment protection even though
privacy interests were not at stake. They differed only in the degree of protection that the Amendment
demanded.
The Court of Appeals appeared to find more specific support for confining the protection of the Fourth
Amendment to privacy interests in our decision in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). There, a state
prison inmate sued, claiming that prison guards had entered his cell without consent and had seized and
destroyed some of his personal effects. We ruled that an inmate, because of his status, enjoyed neither a right
to privacy in his cell nor protection against unreasonable seizures of his personal effects. Id., at 526-528, and
n. 8; id., at 538 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). Whatever else the case held, it is of limited usefulness outside
the prison context with respect to the coverage of the Fourth Amendment.
We thus are unconvinced that any of the Court's prior cases supports the view that the Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable seizures of property only where privacy or liberty is also implicated. What is
more, our "plain view" decisions make untenable such a construction of the Amendment. Suppose, for
example, that police officers lawfully enter a house, by either complying with the warrant requirement or
satisfying one of its recognized exceptions - [506 U.S. 56, 66] e.g., through a valid consent or a showing of
exigent circumstances. If they come across some item in plain view and seize it, no invasion of personal
privacy has occurred. Horton, 496 U.S., at 133 -134; Brown, supra, at 739 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). If the
boundaries of the Fourth Amendment were defined exclusively by rights of privacy, "plain view" seizures
would not implicate that constitutional provision at all. Yet, far from being automatically upheld, "plain view"
seizures have been scrupulously subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry. Thus, in the absence of consent or a
warrant permitting the seizure of the items in question, such seizures can be justified only if they meet the
probable-cause standard, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 -327 (1987), 9 and if they are unaccompanied
by unlawful trespass, Horton, 496 U.S., at 136 -137. 10 That is because, the absence of a privacy interest
notwithstanding, "[a] seizure of the article ... would obviously invade the owner's possessory interest." Id., at
134; see also Brown, 460 U.S., at 739 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). The plain-view doctrine "merely reflects
an application of the Fourth Amendment's central requirement of reasonableness to the law governing seizures
of property." Ibid.; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971); id., at 516 (WHITE, J., concurring
and dissenting).
The Court of Appeals understandably found it necessary to reconcile its holding with our recognition in the
plain-view cases that the Fourth Amendment protects property as such. In so doing, the court did not
distinguish this case on the ground that the seizure of the Soldals' home took place in a [506 U.S. 56, 67]
noncriminal context. Indeed, it acknowledged what is evident from our precedents - that the Amendment's
protection applies in the civil context as well. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 -335 (1985); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504 -506 (1978); Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 -313 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528
(1967). 11
Nor did the Court of Appeals suggest that the Fourth Amendment applied exclusively to law enforcement
activities. It observed, for example, that the Amendment's protection would be triggered "by a search or other
entry into the home incident to an eviction or repossession," 942 F.2d, at 1077. 12 Instead, the court sought to
explain why the Fourth Amendment protects against seizures of property in the plain-view context, but not in
this case, as follows:
"[S]eizures made in the course of investigations by police or other law enforcement officers are almost
always, as in the plain view cases, the culmination of searches. The police search in order to seize, and
it is the search [506 U.S. 56, 68] and ensuing seizure that the Fourth Amendment, by its reference to
"searches and seizures," seeks to regulate. Seizure means one thing when it is the outcome of a search;
it may mean something else when it stands apart from a search or any other investigative activity. The
Fourth Amendment may still nominally apply, but, precisely because there is no invasion of privacy,
the usual rules do not apply." Id., at 1079 (emphasis in original).
We have difficulty with this passage. The court seemingly construes the Amendment to protect only against
seizures that are the outcome of a search. But our cases are to the contrary, and hold that seizures of property
are subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny even though no search within the meaning of the Amendment has
taken place. See, e.g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S., at 120 -125; Place, 462 U.S., at 706 -707; Cardwell, 417 U.S., at
588 -589. 13 More generally, an officer who happens to come across an individual's property in a public area
could seize it only if Fourth Amendment standards are satisfied - for example, if the items are evidence of a
crime or contraband. Cf. Payton v. New York, [506 U.S. 56, 69] 445 U.S., at 587 . We are also puzzled by the last
sentence of the excerpt, where the court announces that the "usual rules" of the Fourth Amendment are
inapplicable if the seizure is not the result of a search or any other investigative activity "precisely because
there is no invasion of privacy." For the plain-view cases clearly state that, notwithstanding the absence of any
interference with privacy, seizures of effects that are not authorized by a warrant are reasonable only because
there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity. The seizure of the weapons in Horton,
for example, occurred in the midst of a search, yet we emphasized that it did not "involve any invasion of
privacy." 496 U.S., at 133 . In short, our statement that such seizures must satisfy the Fourth Amendment and
will be deemed reasonable only if the item's incriminating character is "immediately apparent," id., at 136-137,
is at odds with the Court of Appeals' approach.
The Court of Appeals' effort is both interesting and creative, but, at bottom, it simply reasserts the earlier
thesis that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy, but not property. We remain unconvinced, and see no
justification for departing from our prior cases. In our view, the reason why an officer might enter a house or
effectuate a seizure is wholly irrelevant to the threshold question whether the Amendment applies. What
matters is the intrusion on the people's security from governmental interference. Therefore, the right against
unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if the seizure of the house was undertaken to collect
evidence, verify compliance with a housing regulation, effect an eviction by the police, or on a whim, for no
reason at all. As we have observed on more than one occasion, it would be "anomalous to say that the
individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is
suspected of criminal behavior." Camara 387 U.S., at 530 ; see also O'Connor, 480 U.S., at 715 ; T.L.O., 469
U.S., at 335 . [506 U.S. 56, 70]
The Court of Appeals also stated that, even if, contrary to its previous rulings, "there is some element or
tincture of a Fourth Amendment seizure, it cannot carry the day for the Soldals." 942 F.2d, at 1080. Relying on
our decision in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the court reasoned that it should look at the
"dominant character of the conduct challenged in a section 1983 case [to] determine the constitutional
standard under which it is evaluated." 942 F.2d, at 1080. Believing that the Soldals' claim was more akin to a
challenge against the deprivation of property without due process of law than against an unreasonable seizure,
the court concluded that they should not be allowed to bring their suit under the guise of the Fourth
Amendment.
But we see no basis for doling out constitutional protections in such fashion. Certain wrongs affect more than a
single right, and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution's commands. Where such
multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the habit of identifying, as a preliminary matter, the claim's
"dominant" character. Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517 (1984) (Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause). Graham
is not to the contrary. Its holding was that claims of excessive use of force should be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due
process test. We were guided by the fact that, in that case, both provisions targeted the same sort of
governmental conduct and, as a result, we chose the more "explicit textual source of constitutional protection"
over the "more generalized notion of `substantive due process.'" 490 U.S., at 394 -395. Surely, Graham does
not bar resort in this case to the Fourth Amendment's specific protection for "houses, papers, [506 U.S. 56, 71] and
effects," rather than the general protection of property in the Due Process Clause.
III
Respondents are fearful, as was the Court of Appeals, that applying the Fourth Amendment in this context
inevitably will carry it into territory unknown and unforeseen: routine repossessions, negligent actions of
public employees that interfere with individuals' right to enjoy their homes, and the like, thereby federalizing
areas of law traditionally the concern of the States. For several reasons, we think the risk is exaggerated. To
begin, our decision will have no impact on activities such as repossessions or attachments if they involve entry
into the home, intrusion on individuals' privacy, or interference with their liberty, because they would
implicate the Fourth Amendment even on the Court of Appeals' own terms. This was true of the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Specht, with which, as we previously noted, the Court of Appeals expressed agreement.
More significantly, "reasonableness is still the ultimate standard" under the Fourth Amendment, Camara,
supra, at 539, which means that numerous seizures of this type will survive constitutional scrutiny. As is true in
other circumstances, the reasonableness determination will reflect a "careful balancing of governmental and
private interests." T.L.O., supra, at 341. Assuming, for example, that the officers were acting pursuant to a
court order, as in Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516 (CA10 1987), or Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 , (1972),
and, as often would be the case, a showing of unreasonableness on these facts would be a laborious task
indeed. Cf. Simms v. Slacum, 3 Cranch 300, 301 (1806). Hence, while there is no guarantee against the filing
of frivolous suits, had the ejection in this case properly awaited the state court's judgment, it is quite unlikely
that the federal court would have been bothered with a 1983 action alleging a Fourth Amendment violation.
[506 U.S. 56, 72]
Moreover, we doubt that the police will often choose to further an enterprise knowing that it is contrary to the
law, or proceed to seize property in the absence of objectively reasonable grounds for doing so. In short, our
reaffirmance of Fourth Amendment principles today should not foment a wave of new litigation in the federal
courts.
IV
The complaint here alleges that respondents, acting under color of state law, dispossessed the Soldals of their
trailer home by physically tearing it from its foundation and towing it to another lot. Taking these allegations as
true, this was no "garden variety" landlord-tenant or commercial dispute. The facts alleged suffice to constitute
a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, for they plainly implicate the interests protected by
that provision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, accordingly, reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Footnotes
[1] Jones' statement was prompted by a district attorney's advice that no criminal charges could be brought
because, under Illinois law, a criminal action cannot be used to determine the right of possession. See
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, 9-101 et seq. (1991); People v. Evans, 163 Ill.App. 3d 561, 114 Ill.Dec. 662, 516 N.E.2d
817 (1st Dist. 1987).
[2] The Soldals ultimately were evicted per court order in December 1987.
[3] Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides that:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State ...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
[4] The court reiterated the panel's conclusion that a conspiracy must be assumed on the state of the record
and, therefore, that the case must be treated in its current posture "as if the deputy sheriffs themselves seized
the trailer, disconnected it from the utilities, and towed it away." 942 F.2d 1073, 1075 (CA7 1991) (en banc).
[5] The court noted that, in light of the existence of adequate judicial remedies under state law, a claim for
deprivation of property without due process of law was unlikely to succeed. Id., at 1075-1076. See Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). In any event, the Soldals did not claim a violation of their procedural rights. As
noted, the Seventh Circuit also held that respondents had not violated the Soldals' substantive due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners assert that this was error, but, in view of our disposition of
the case, we need not address the question at this time.
[6] Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Soldals were required to establish that the respondents, acting under color of
state law, deprived them of a constitutional right, in this instance, their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
freedom from unreasonable seizures by the State. See Monroe v. Pape, [506 U.S. 56, 61] 365 U.S. 167, 184
(1961). Respondents request that we affirm on the ground that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that there
was sufficient state action to support a 1983 action. The alleged injury to the Soldals, it is urged, was inflicted
by private parties for whom the county is not responsible. Although respondents did not cross-petition, they
are entitled to ask us to affirm on that ground if such action would not enlarge the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in their favor. The Court of Appeals found that, because the police prevented Soldal from using
reasonable force to protect his home from private action that the officers knew was illegal, there was sufficient
evidence of conspiracy between the private parties and the officers to foreclose summary judgment for
respondents. We are not inclined to review that holding. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152
-161 (1970).
[7] In holding that the Fourth Amendment's reach extends to property as such, we are mindful that the
Amendment does not protect possessory interests in all kinds of property. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 176 -177 (1984). This case, however, concerns a house, which the Amendment's language
explicitly includes, as it does a person's effects.
[8] Place also found that to detain luggage for 90 minutes was an unreasonable deprivation of the individual's
"liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary," which also is protected by the Fourth Amendment. 462 U.S.,
at 708 -710.
[9] When "operational necessities" exist, seizures can be justified on less than probable cause. 480 U.S., at 327
. That in no way affects our analysis, for even then it is clear that the Fourth Amendment applies. Ibid; see also
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 , at 703 (1983).
[10] Of course, if the police officers' presence in the home itself entailed a violation of the Fourth Amendment,
no amount of probable cause to believe that an item in plain view constitutes incriminating evidence will
justify its seizure. Horton, 496 U.S., at 136 -137.
[11] It is true that Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (1856), cast some
doubt on the applicability of the Amendment to noncriminal encounters such as this. Id., 18 How. at 285. But
cases since that time have shed a different light, making clear that Fourth Amendment guarantees are triggered
by governmental searches and seizures "without regard to the use to which [houses, papers, and effects] are
applied." Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967). Murray's Lessee's broad
statement that the Fourth Amendment "has no reference to civil proceedings for the recovery of debt"
arguably only meant that the warrant requirement did not apply, as was suggested in G.M. Leasing Corp. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 (1977). Whatever its proper reading, we reaffirm today our basic
understanding that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures fully applies in the civil context.
[12] This was the view expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d
1516 (1987), remanded on unrelated grounds, 853 F.2d 805 (1988) (en banc), with which the Seventh Circuit
expressly agreed. 942 F.2d, at 1076.
[13] The officers in these cases were engaged in law enforcement, and were looking for something that was
found and seized. In this broad sense, the seizures were the result of "searches," but not in the Fourth
Amendment sense. That the Court of Appeals might have been suggesting that the plain-view cases are
explainable because they almost always occur in the course of law enforcement activities receives some
support from the penultimate sentence of the quoted passage, where the court states that the word "seizure"
might lose its usual meaning "when it stands apart from a search or any other investigative activity." Id., at
1079 (emphasis added). And, in the following paragraph, it observes that, "[o]utside of the law enforcement
area, the Fourth Amendment retains its force as a protection against searches, because they invade privacy.
That is why we decline to confine the amendment to the law enforcement setting." Id., at 1079-1080. Even if
the court meant that seizures of property in the course of law enforcement activities, whether civil or criminal,
implicate interests safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment, but that pure property interests are unprotected in
the non-law-enforcement setting, we are not in accord, as indicated in the body of this opinion. [506 U.S. 56, 73]

Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402

From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.comTo: chansen@washoecounty.usSubject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice CourtDate: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 09:10:14 -0700
Dear Civil Supervisor Hansen
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
Dear Sparks Justice Court,
I called and received permission to file this by fax...I am indigent and request a fee waiver, and failing that, an opportunity to cure any filing fee deficiency.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.comTo: sheriffweb@washoecounty.us; lstuchell@washoecounty.us; kstancil@washoecounty.us; chansen@washoecounty.us; milllerr@reno.gov
Subject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice CourtDate: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 07:58:36 -0700
Dear Sparks Justice Court, WCSO, RPD, and Reno Justice Court.I have received (though not personally served) what appears to be an eviction notice (5 day unlawful
detainer?) for rentals located at 1680 Sky Mountain Drive, Reno, 89523, but the notice indicates that I must file a Tenant's Answer with the Sparks Justice Court.Am I mistaken
in viewing this matter to be outside the jurisdiction of the Sparks Justice Court, and rather, a matter to be handled in Reno Justice Court?Given Sparks Justice Court is open 5
days a week (closes at noon on Fridays) and Reno Justice Court has 4 judicial days a week, the deadline for filing a special appearance (to contest jurisdiction) and or a Tenant's
Answer of Affidavit is difficult to measure.I spoke with a Reno Police Department who identified himself as Sargent Miller last week and he indicated the WCSO planned to
come effectuate an eviction on this date, June 26, 2012. I believe that would be premature, as Nevada Landlord Tenant law provides for filing a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit by
noon after the fifth full day (judicial days) and Fridays in Sparks Justice Court are not full days in that sense, and regardless, Sparks Justice Court, I believe, is not the
appropriate forum where, as here, the situs is located in Reno (Ward 1-nap?)Sincerely,Zach CoughlinPO BOX 3961Reno, NV 89505tel 775 338 8118fax 949 667 7403
Civil Division
630 Greenbrae DriveSparks, Nevada 89431(775)353.7603 Phone(775)352.3004 FaxCivil Department SupervisorChris Hansenchansen@washoecounty.usThe Civil Division
of Sparks Justice Court is made up of three major functions:CivilCivil Complaints for damages in excess of $5000 or if a suit involves a breach of contract, punitive damages, an
action to obtain possession of property, a writ of restitution, or other like actions, legal counsel is suggested for these types of actions.EvictionsAn act or process of legally
dispossessing a person of land or rental property.Small ClaimsAn action filed in order to obtain a monetary judgment. Claims must not exceed $5000. A small claims action
may be filed with the Sparks Justice Court if one of the following applies to the defendant:
1. They reside within the boundaries of the Sparks Township;
2. They are employed within the boundaries of the Sparks Township; and/or,
3. They do business within the boundaries of the Sparks Township.
Back to messages
request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Attachment
8/06/12
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net, drakej@reno.gov, kadlicj@reno.gov
Zach Coughlin
Sent: Mon 8/06/12 3:54 PM
Attachments:
7 attachments
20120605_101458 admitting dwayne tried to lift door up 6 5 12.mp4 (498.1 KB) , 20120605_101513 Northwind manager handy man attacks from
golf cart 6 5 12.mp4 (3.1 MB) , northwind v coughjlin combined for rjc judges chamers vacate summary eviction motion affidavit, amended motion and
proposed order.pdf (130.9 KB) , supplement to tenants motion to dismiss northwind in sparks justice court.pdf (98.3 KB) , 6 8 12 fax to northwind with
page numbers.pdf (50.7 KB) , northwind fax 6 4 12 habitability retaliation etc.pdf (45.8 KB) , emails to weavera@reno.gov.pdf (32.5 KB)
Dear Mr. Loomis and City Attorney Kadlic and Deputy City Attorney Drake, I am writing to request that you file some motion to alter, amend, reconsider, set aside, or modify
my bail in the case stemming from my JUly 3, 2012 arrest for distrubing the peace, failure to provide proof of insurance, and failure to secure a load. I am writing to request that
you file a pre trial motion (Motion to Dismiss, request for a pre trial motion and bail motion, and motion to supress police report based upon the DTP arrest occuring for alleged
conduct outside the officer's presence). If you will not file these motion (and please provide me a draft of such motions for my review prior to filing them as well as prior to
making any communication on my behalf to either the RMC or the City of Reno Prosecutor), please provide me a written indication of your rationale for so refusing, and then
please file a Motion to Withdrawal as soon as practicable. I ask this respectfully. The police showed up to the hearing, yet I was not noticed of that fact in advance, or of the
hearing itself. Further, Judge Gardner explicilty indicated he was basing his decision to raise the bail based upon "public safety" and "concern for the defendant's safety", which
are impermissible rationale for so increasin one's bail.
NRS
178.498
. Many courts use a bail schedule to determine the amount, but note the
initial amount can be increased if good cause is shown.
NRS 178.499. Additionally, in
determining the amount of bail, the judge should look at the following factors
(NRS
178.498)
:
The factors listed in NRS 178.4853.

Bail can not be excessive.
U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. It should be limited to a

NRS 178.484
. The Court should take care in imposing any restrictions on a defendants constitutional rights (i.e.,
of the alleged crime. Section 11 of
NRS 178.484 describes the document that must

My bail hearing contained what seems to be an impermissible coercive attempt to condition my release or the possibility thereof upon my providing
confidential medical records (Lake's Crossing etc) to the Reno Municipal Court, even where the same judge presiding over the bail hearing found me
competent enough to face a criminal trepass trial less than two weeks before teh bail hearing in 11 CR 26405.

The friend of mine who posted my bail, Jared Swanson, has a serious form of cancer and a one year old baby. I request a reduction of the bail for
his benefit and for the proof of insurance charge to be dismissed, as (and I am trying to avoid this in any way I can), if I am rearrested, such a proof
of insurance charge may present another basis for imposing an unduly burdensome bail upon me, as it did on July 5th, 2012 where, despite my
having produced a legible pdf copy of my proof of insurance card on my large screened zoomable smart phone, Officers Weaver and Dye still charged
me with that violation, and the bail was subsequently increase. Further, none of the events or accusations forming the basis of the distrubing the
police charge occurred in the officer's presence, and the police report contains no indication whatsoever that the arrest was made based upon NRS
171.1771. I provided Officer Weaver my driver's license prior to the arrest. I did not

either issue a citation or arrest and detain the person.
NRS 171.1771 states that a person can be arrested if

Additionally, I am requesting that you file a Motion to Dismiss the Disturbing the Peace charge based upon a lack of evidence and or
insufficiency of pleading in that the allegations do not amount to a prima facie case of a DTP violation. Further, please subpoena and
or collect the Protection Order application filed by Milan Krebs on July 5th, 2012, and interview Krebs as to why he mentions
Coughlin often carrying around a large knife in a menacing manner in that protection order application, yet completely failed to
mention that in his July 3rd, 2012 police report. Additionally, please determine why Kreb's TPO appliication has a different style of
handwriting on the caption compared to the descriptive sections, indicating someone pushed the filing of the TPO on Krebs, perhaps
his employer, Northwind Apartments or the RPD, which has in the days preceding the arrest threatend to arrest Coughlin for criminal
trespass if he returned to any part of the premises of Northwind Apartments, in consideration of Coughlin's eviction from unit 29,
despite the fact Coughlin still had a valid right to go to his other two rentals, units 45 and 71, in addition to the fact that Northwinds
essentially withdrew or rescinded its June 28th, 2012 eviction of Coughlin by posting an Amended 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice on
unit 29 on June 28th, 2012 shortly after Coughlin pointed out to Northwinds and Nevada Courts Services that the July 14th, 2012 5
Day notice was not "personally served" (NCS's R. Wray lied about effecting personal service, as he could not possibly have verified
someone of "suitable age and discretion" was within the windowless room with a metal door closed and locked and where no Wray
admits that he received no verbal response from the unit or anyone therein upon his knocking on the door and or attempting to break
into the unit, please see Soldal v. Cook County in that regard, a US S. Ct case) and therefore Coughlin would have had until at least
noon on July 28th, 2012 to file a Tenant's Answer, whereas the eviction/lockout/arrest of June 28th, 2012 took place two hours
before noon at 10 am).

Additionally, RPD Officer Weaver had previously attempted to break into one of my rentals at Northwind at a time when he lacked a
warrant and or an exigent rationale for doing so, much less an eviction Order. I just want this case to be dismissed and to try to
move on in life, and difuse the tensions incident to this case.

I did not disturb the peace at Northwinds as alleged, nor did I make the threats Kreb's accuses me of or stalk him or follow him in a
threatening manner at any time. Additionaly, I never broke into nor did I ever attempt to break into Krebs' truck, and in fact, I filed a
police report in June 2012 reporting extortionate threats by another maintenance man at Northwinds ("Luke" is his name, I believe)
and Northwind's Manage Dwayne Jakob, wherein they threatened to make such a spurious allegation, but subsuquently refrained from
doign so when it apparently occurred to them that I may have excuplatory video evidence disproving such an allegation as well as
capturing their baseless and extortionate threats and accusations. Additionally, please subpoene the police reports I filed with the
RPD and any emails I sent to any officers (including Weaver, Barnes, Sargent MIiller, LIeutenant Brown) and any reports of or
recording of phone conversations I had with any of those RPD personnel. Further, please see the attached june 26th, 2012 email to
the RPD, WCSO, RJC, Sparks Justice Court and others pointing out the insufficiency of the 5 day Notice drafted and posted by non-
lawyers Nevada Court Services, in that under NRS 40.253 it listed the wrong forum for the tenant to file a Tenant's Answer, and under
the Aiken decision of the Nevada Supreme Court and NRCP 60(b)(4), any lockout order stemming therefrom is void for lack of
jurisdiction.

(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for
another alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense
is committed;...
Krebs did not immediately arrest me under NRS 171.136(2)(d), nor was the DTP arrest for an offense alleged to have occurred in the
officer's presence.

the attached videos are of the incident on June 5th, 2012, not from July 3rd, 2012, but they support my contentions and the
relevancy of subpoening the police incident reports and other documentation should this case not be dismissed, nolle prosequi, de
minimis, etc....

I will forward to you my emails to the RPD et all from June 26th, and July 2nd, 2012. I realize their tone was not a smart one to take
or appropriate and am only sending them in hopes of having this matter dismissed. I do not have any interest in pursuing anything
like Wheeler v Cross 344 Fed Apps 420 (2008) .

Sincerely,

Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
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The nature and circumstances of the offense charged

The defendants financial ability to post bail

The defendants character; and

The factors listed in NRS 178.4853.

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