A. Difference in Sex Silverio vs. Republic October 22, 2007 GR. No.

174689 FACTS: On November 26, 2002, Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name Rommel Jacinto to Mely and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of justice and equality. The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD: No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioners basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the petition. B. Some Form of Ceremony Martinez vs. Tan G.R. No. L-4904 February 5, 1909 FACTS: There was an evidence which is called an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same day, signed by the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states the presentation of the petition

above mentioned; that the persons who signed it where actually present in the office of the justice on the same day named; that they ratified under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in what they had there asked for. It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife. Following this is a certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of September, 1907, in which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of the peace in the presence of the witnesses on that day.

but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

COMPARE TO: Morigo vs. People G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004 Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were then boardmates for a lengthy period of time until they part ways and lost contact. After many years, Lucio was surprised to receive a card from Lucia, all the way from Singapore. They maintained constant communication and became sweethearts. They married each other at Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Bohol by merely signing a marriage contract by themselves and without solemnization. Thereafter, Lucia went back to Canada. She soon filed a petition for divorce with the Ontario Court and was granted. Lucio remarried with Maria Jececha Lumbago. Only afterwards did he file for a declaration of nullity before the trial court on the ground of the absence of a marriage ceremony in his first marriage. Notwithstanding, he was charged and

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte. HELD: Yes, the parties in this case were married. No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife. A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as void. the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once,

convicted of bigamy. In herein criminal case, trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio and ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, since in the civil case, the trial court ruled his first marriage void ab initio due to the want of marriage ceremony, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. However, CA affirmed the decision of trial court in his criminal case. Issue: Whether Held: Supreme Court granted his petition and is acquitted from bigamy. The requisites of bigamy are (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. In the instant case, Lucio and Lucia were not legally married because the first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, or not petitioner committed bigamy.

petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must be acquitted of the instant charge. 3. Prior Marriage

Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986 Facts: Karl Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with petitioner, Lilia, on the ground of the latters previous existing marriage. Lilia admitted the existence of prior marriage but she claimed that said marriage was null and void because she and her first husband were forced to enter the marital union. Issue: Whether or not Lilias first marriage is void Held: No. The presence of force only makes the marriage voidable. It is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has been made, it is clear that Lilia is still validly married to her first husband and her marriage to Karl is void.

Even if the marriage is void, judicial declaration of nullity is still needed especially for purposes of remarriage.

Also, SC ruled that a present spouse cannot remarry if there is no judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse no matter how long the latter spouse is absent.

Republic vs. Nolasco G. R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993 Facts:

Garcia vs. Recio G. R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 Facts:

Nolasco, a seaman,met Janet, a British subject, during one of his ship's port calls. The two got married in Antique and lived as husband and wife. Thereafter, Nolascoobtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents. While working overseas, he received a letter from his motherinforming that his wife had given birth to his son and that days after, his wife left. Nolasco then cut short his employmentcontract, went home and tried locating Janet but all his efforts fail. Thus, he filed this petition for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet. Issue: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead Held:

Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen. However, their marriage was dissolved and as a proof, they were issued a divorce decree by the Australian Family Court. Therafter, Recio became an Australian citizen and married Garcia, a Filipina. However, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondents former marriage only after their marriage. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Issue: Whether or not a divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage

No. SC ruled that Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a well-founded belief that she is dead.Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied.

Held: No. SC ruled that presentation of solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Mere submission of the copies of Divorce purportedly showing the dissolution of the marriage to the Filipino spouse cannot be taken as material and relevant enough to be given judicial notice of foreign laws by the Philippine courts as they must be alleged and proved in according with the rules of procedure and evidence.

Bobis v Bobis, GR 139509, July 31, 2000Facts: Isaganio Bobis married Maria Javier in 1985. During the subsistence of such marriage, he married Marbella Bobis and then subsequently married Julia Hernandez. Marbella Bobis charged him with bigamy. Sometime thereafter, he initiated a civil action for the declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. He filed motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case.Judge granted motion. Marbella filed motion for recon. and was Denied. Issue: WON the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a crim case for bigamy Held: NO

A prejudicial question is one which arises on a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. 2. 2 elements: a. the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action b. the resolution of such issue determines WON the criminal action may proceed 1. Landicho vs Relova: he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the 1stmarriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy and in such case, the crim case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. 2. here: resorted to civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating of delaying his crim prosecution 3. A decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the crim charge and thus is not a prejudicial question PETITION GRANTED. RTC orders reversed and set aside. Ordered to immediately proceed with crim case. Te vs. Choa, G.R. No. 126446, Nov. 29, 2000FACTS: Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her. On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta

1.

Santella an information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed by Choa. Arthur filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Choa.

ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former marriage. HELD: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void. In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.

ISSUE: whether or not Marriage annulment case had to be resolved first before criminal and administrative case be rendered judgment? Held: NO judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is ab initio was overturned. Family Code Art. 40 is the prevailing rule: the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. Mercado vs Tan, 337 SCRA 122FACTS: Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.

SSS vs. Jarque FACTS:Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon. More than 15 years, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead which was granted. Close to 13 years after his wifeAlice was declared presumptively dead Bailon contracted marriage with TeresitaJarque (respondent). Bailon, who was a member of theSocial Security System and a

retiree pensioner thereof, died. Respondent filed a claim for funeral benefits. Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), whoclaimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and thethird with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid for Bailons medical and funeral expenses; and all thedocuments submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious. SSS stopped the release of pension to respondent. ISSUE:Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Bailon to respondent is bigamous? HELD:It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, suchmarriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspringwill be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and respondents marriage prior to the formersdeath in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon. In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been voidab initiobut only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the firstwife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring thatthe

action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of anyconjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out in the testate or intestate proceedings of thedeceased spouse, as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding Morigo vs. People FACTS:LucioMorigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith. ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

HELD:Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed. Tenebro vs Court of Appeals Bigamy FACTS:Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy. ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Republic vs. Granada Facts: This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23 January 20091 and 3 April 20092 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent.

The husband of Yolanda Granada went to Taiwan and was never heard from him again. After 9 years, Yolanda filed to have her husband declared presumptively dead. The RTC granted her petition. Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied by RTC. Petitioner then appealed to the CA. CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that the decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executor upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal. Issues: Whether or not the decision of the RTC is immediately final and executor and not subject to ordinary appeal. Ruling: The SC affirmed the CA ruling. Article 41 of the Family Code provides: Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring supplied.) Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the Family Code. Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled "Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law." Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238 and 247, which provide: Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. xxx xxx xxx

Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads: ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.

Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory. Montanez vs Cipriano Facts: Petitioner filed a case of bigamy against respondent for marring the petitioners father while the respondent has a subsisting marriage. Respondent file a motion to dismiss alleging that the respondents first marriage had already been declared void ab initio. RTC denied the motion based on the ruling on Mercardo vs. Tan that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because the crime of bigamy has been consummated. Issues: Whether or not the subsequent declaration of the nullity of first marriage justifies the dismissal of the information for bigamy. Ruling: In Mercado v. Tan, 26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged. Abbas vs. Abbas In Syed Azhar Abbas vs. Gloria Goo Abbas, (G.R. No. 183896; January 30 2013), the Philippine Supreme Court confirmed that the absence of a marriage license is a ground for voiding a marriage. The failure to prove that a valid marriage license was issued to a couple shows that their marriage is void ab initio because a marriage license is one of the formal requisites of a valid marriage. In this case, Gloria failed to present the marriage license or a copy thereof before the Court. There were no documentary or testimonial evidence to support her claim that the marriage license was actually and validly secured. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar that their office had no record of the issuance of marriage license in their names adequately disproved her claim. The presumed validity of the marriage between the parties has been overcome. The Supreme Court voided Syed and Glorias marriage. The non-existence of the marriage license was proven by a certification from the Municipal Civil Registrar which should have issued the license in the first place. The civil registrar is public officer charged with the duty of maintaining a register book for marriage licenses and other relevant data and records relative to the

issuance thereof. Its certification has probative value compared to the failure of Gloria to present the actual marriage license before the Court. The High Court explained that Article 4 of the Family Code provides that a marriage is void ab initio in the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites under Articles 2 and 3 of the Code among which is a valid marriage license. 6. Physical Incapacity G.R. No. L-12790

Ruling Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR vs REY C. ALCAZAR, G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009 Facts:

August 31, 1960

JOEL JIMENEZ vs.REMEDIOS CAIZARES In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955, Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to Remedios Caizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist. Despite orders from the court, she refused to undergo physical examination. On 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. Issue Whether or not marriage may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband

Rey and Veronica was married to respondent on 11 October 2000. On 23 October 2000, Rey left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. They never coomunicated while Rey was abroad. When Rey returned to the Philippines

in 2002, he stayed in his parents house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro and he did not contact his spouse. Thus, Veronica is accusing Rey of physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines. There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent. Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not living with the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of their marriage or that these are incurable. The case was dismissed.

Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Respondents failure to communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after returning to the country, are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of marriage. 7. Psychological Incapacity

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT, Absence and failure to perform marital obligations is a ground for annulment of marriage based on PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED Ruling: No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner.

Santos v. CA 240 SCRA 20

FACTS: Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18 1988, Julia left for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not return to the country. In 1991, Leoul filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the dismissal. ISSUE: Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years constitute psychological incapacity? RULING: No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more than five years does not constitute psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) GRAVITY (b) JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITY Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. PETITION IS DENIED

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997 FACTS: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of defendants mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Ginas relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared

void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection. ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity. HELD: The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant nonfulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

Republic v. CA and Molina GR 108763, 13 February 1997 Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity the present recourse.

Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage. The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be

medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the SolicitorGeneral to appeal as counsels for the State. The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. Antonio vs. Reyes GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006 FACTS: Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a

petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and void. HELD: Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondents fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.

Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Te vs Te, GR No. 161793, Feb. 13, 2009 FACTS: Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. Around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place. Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. Rowena suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward, unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways. Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage. EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, the petitioner in this case, is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in

social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone. ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship. ISSUE: Whether or not based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void. HELD: BOTH INCAPACITATED PARTIES ARE PSYCHOLOGICALLY

Article 68 of the Family Code provides: obligations)

(essential

marital

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life. Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides: Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void. Azcueta vs RP G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009 FACTS: Petitioner Marieta Azcueta filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Art. 36 of the Family code. Petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo Azcueta was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked his mother for financial assistance. When they were married it was Rodolfo's mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who paid the monthly rental. Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her husband to find employment but to no avail. Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo was so dependent on his mother and that all his decisions and attitudes in life should be in conformity with those of his mother. Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas said that based on the information gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings. She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder were those whose response to ordinary way of life was

ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency on other people. She added that the root cause of this psychological problem was a cross-identification with the mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering that respondent's father was a seaman and always out of the house. She stated that this problem began during the early stages in his life but manifested only after the celebration of his marriage. According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also severe because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibilities expected of a married person. It was incurable because it started in early development and therefore deeply ingrained into his personality (requisites laid down on the Molina Case). ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations. HELD: PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED

Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfo's dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse is

psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36. Halili vs Halili G.R. No. 165424 Motion for reconsideration (June 9, 2009) FACTS: Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili (21 years old) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that he himself was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halil (19 years old). He claimed that he thought that the wedding performed at the City Hall of Manila was a "joke" and that the marriage certificate he signed was "fake." He also pointed out that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife and never consummated the marriage. After the wedding, they continued to live with their respective parents and never lived together but maintained the relationship nonetheless. A year after, the couple started bickering constantly. Petitioner stopped seeing respondent and went on dates with other women. It was at this time that he started receiving prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented, especially the testimony of the expert witness, was more than enough to conclude that he is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

HELD:

PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED

Petitioner is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, this Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis -- guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals. Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties. It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized that individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term. Particularly, personality disorders are "long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others." From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him

unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void. DIGNA A. NAJERA VS. EDUARDO NAJERA July 3,2009 FACTS: Petitioner Digna Najera filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains. Petitioner claimed that at the time of marriage, respondent Eduardo Najera was psychologically incapacitated to comply the essential marital obligations of the marriage. Respondent who now presently living in the United State filed his answer wherein he denied the allegations and petition and averred that petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very low morality, and guilty of infidelity. Petitioner presented as witness Cristina Gates, a psychologist who testified that she interviewed petitioner, but not respondent who was abroad. She opined that that the chances of curability of respondents psychological disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether the

established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable impulses. RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of the petitioner and respondent, but not annulment of marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able to proved respondent psychological incapacity. HELD: NO, The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."[24] The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.[25] In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."[26] What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates conclusion that respondent was psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable The court further ruled that, the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondents abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petition DENIED. Camacho-Reyes vs. Reyes , G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010 Facts: Petitioner and respondent were campus sweethearts. The formers love to the latter did not change even when she discovered that respondent was cutting classes and taking up marijuana. He did not even finish college. By the time they married each other, all living expenses were shouldered by respondents

parents, and they were living with the respondents parents. When their first child was born, financial difficulties started to come in. To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. Petitioner was a single-income earner, and the business ventures of the respondent all floundered. The couple became so estranged from each other that the respondent remained unconcerned and inattentive, not only to the petitioner but also to their children. To make things worse, petitioner was able to confirm that respondent was having an extramarital affair. Issue:Whether or not the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. Ruling: Yes, there existed psychological incapacity. The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was nullified. Psychological incapacity was shown by respondents 1.) sporadic financial support; 2.) extra-marital affairs; 3.) substance abuse; and 4.) failed business attempts. The high court found that the marriage between the parties from its inception had this congenital infirmity which pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support as mandated by Article 68 of the Family Code. Such finding was anchored by the unanimous findings of three psychology experts: petitioner manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband,

while the respondent manifested strong sense of Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. The Supreme Court further ruled that such psychological incapacity, as stated by psychology experts, is permanent, incurable, and stable over time, and mere recommendation of one psychology expert that the incapacity is curable does not automatically imply curability. Therefore, the case has the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability the three requirements of nullifying marriage based on psychological incapacity.

Issue: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to prove psychological incapacity under Art.36 of the Family Code. Held:NO Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability of Catalinas psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, with its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. Petition GRANTED. Mendoza v. Republic G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012 Facts: Petitioner Arabelle Mendoza and her husband Dominic Mendoza met sometime in 1989. They had been neighbours since then. After a month of courtship, they had been intimately together that petitioner became pregnant with their daughter. They got married in a civil rites sometime June 1991, while petitioner was on her eighth month of pregnancy. Thereafter, their relationship went south. Petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband, as exemplified by his emotional immaturity, sexual infidelity, deceitfulness, and irresponsibility and failure to give support to her and her child. Her husband is also alleged to have misdealings with other people at work and with other people as shown by several cases filed against her husband.

Republic v CA, G.R. No. 159594, November 12, 2012 Facts: Eduardo De-Quintos Jr. filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage citing Catalinas psychological incapacity to comply with marital obligations. To prove psychological incapacity he presented the results of the neuropsychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle Reyes, a psychiatrist. The latter opined that Catalina exhibited treats of Borderline Personality Disorder, that was no longer treatable. That Catalinas disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapable to meet her marital obligations. The RTC granted the petition, and it was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not emotional immaturity, sexual infidelity and irresponsibility amounts to psychological incapacity to warrant the nullity of their marriage Held: No. The medical report failed to show that his actions indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, sexual infidelity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share or to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity, was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that was incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity, if true, is but a ground only for legal separation.

manifest through her sexual infidelity and abandonment of their home. RTC granted his petition. CA reversed the RTC, but on appeal CA granted the prayer of Cesar Issue: whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesars marriage based on the sexual infidelity and abandonment of Lolita as would constitute her psychological incapacity. Held: No. Infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage. Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations. No evidence on record exists to support Cesars allegation that Lolitas infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness. We have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations"; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CESAR ENCELAN G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013 Facts: On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita. The former went to Saudi Arabia went to work. Cesar later found out that Lolita was having an illicit affair and that the Lolita allegedly abandoned their home together with their children to live with her paramour. Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas psychological incapacity which was

D. Consent a. Insanity PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANICETO BULAGAO G.R. No. 184757 October 5, 2011

psychologist that accused-appellant had the same mental or psychological condition at the time of the said incidents. Even assuming that accusedappellant was of such mental state at the time of the incidents, the psychologist testified that accused-appellant had the capacity to discern right from wrong. Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial court that he was suffering from mental retardation. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Besides, this Court observes that neither the acts of the accused-appellant proven before the court, nor his answers in his testimony, show a complete deprivation of intelligence or free will. Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.

Facts: Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape in committed on June 17 and June 29 of 2000 against a 14 year old child who was adopted by Accused-appellants parents. Accused interposes as one of his defenses is his alleged insanity at the time he committed the alleged rape against the victim. Yolanda Palma, a clinical psychologist, conducted a mental examination on accused-appellant on September 12, 2002, and found that accused-appellant was suffering from mental retardation as he had an IQ of below 50. After the prosecution presented its evidence, defense also presented the victim whereby during the presentation of evidence the victim recanted her story. She alleged that she was just angry at the Accused prompting her to make-up her alleged complaint. Issue: Whether or not the insanity is a valid defense in the crime of rape Held: No. As regards the defense of accused-appellant that he was suffering from mental retardation, the RTC noted that the psychological examination of accused-appellant was conducted more than a couple of years after the dates of the complained of incidents. There was no showing from the findings of the

b. Fraud Anaya vs Palaroan G.R. No. L.27930 26 November 1970 Facts: Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Defendant Palaroan filed an action for annulment of marriage on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting Anayas counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Palaroan divulged to her that several months prior to the marriage, he had premarital relationship with close relative of his. Anaya alleged that failure to divulge that affair constituted fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not that this concealment of pre-marital relationship is a ground for annulment? HELD: The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and its further excluded by the last paragraph that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to x x chastity shall be a ground for an action to annul marriage. ORLANDO VILLANUEVA VS CA G.R. No. 132955 27 October 2006 FACTS: On April 1998, petitioner married Lilia before RTC Judge in Puerto Princesa. Thereafter, on November 1992 petitioner filed to annul the marriage. He alleged that he was under the threat of violence and duress when he married his wife. Also, he further alleged that he was defrauded by claiming that she was pregnant, hence, he married her but he pointed out that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar? HELD: The Court ruled that petitioner allegation of fear was not concretely established. He was a Security Guard who is well abreast of self-defense and that the threat he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Further, fraud cannot be a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. The lapse of time before the petitioner initiated an action negates his allegation. Manuel G. Almelor vs C.A. G.R. No. 179620 Facts: 26 August 2008

Petitioner was married to Leonida Trinidad on 29 January 1989 and out of cohabitation, they had three children. After 11 years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition to annul their marriage on the ground that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated alleged among others was his homosexuality. RTC granted the petition not on the ground of Art. 36, but Art. 45. CA affirmed in toto. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not homosexuality per se is a ground to annul a marriage? HELD: No. A marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality. It was not proven that petitioner was homosexual at the onset of marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.

c. Duress Villanueva vs CA, 505 Scra 564 FACTS: Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia CanalitaVillanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant

prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. ISSUE: whether or not the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent HELD: The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orlys allegation of fear was not concretely established. He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and well grounded reason for fear to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and a half years to file an action which brings merit to Lilias contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage. Aranes vs Occiano, 380 SCRA 402 Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing the

marriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) Commodore Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, among others. Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioners right, upon Orobias death, to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which required the respondent to comment on the complaint. Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did. He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as due to her own fault and negligence. Issue: Whether or not respondents guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction. Ruling: Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme Court held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage license, is

void, and that subsequent issuance of such license cannot render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Navarro v. Domagtoy S.C. A.M. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996 FACTS: Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law. It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has

jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void. HELD: The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. F. Marriage License Sy vs. CA, G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000 Facts: Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner filed an action for legal separation against private respondent, on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more than

one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 13 dated December 4, 1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent. On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 16 dated December 9, 1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony. Held: Yes. It appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial. These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona. Alcantara vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, Aug. 28, 2007

Facts: A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They got married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage. Held: No. SC held that the marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. Clearly, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In the present case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number and a certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Nial vs. Bayadog, G.R. 133778, Mar. 14, 2000 Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the

marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. Issue: Whether or not Pepito and respondent are exempted from securing marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Held: No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years. In the present case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even

where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife". Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

DE CASTRO vs DE CASTRO Facts: In lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. Issue: WON the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid? Held: Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio. REPUBLIC vs DAYOT Facts: In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. Issue: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. Held: We answer in the affirmative. Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly

but reasonably construed. They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their

marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house. ABBAS vs ABBAS Facts: Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. Issue: whether or not a marriage license was issued. Held: It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her

representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value. SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held: The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.

IV. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ANNULMENT OR DECLARATION OF NULLITY

Lolita D. Enrico vs. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007 FACTS: The heirs of Spouses of Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed before the RTC a complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Eulogio Medinaceli to herein petitioner on the ground that their marriage was entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license is not applicable under the circumstances where Eulogio and petitioner was married for more than three months only after the death of Trinidad. They raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible. Petitioner contended that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC ruled that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the grounds raised by respondents are valid.

HELD: The Supreme Court granted the petition. The marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The marriage was celebrated in 2004. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. However, the compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse.

of respondent Teifilo Carlos II making him the successor even as a collateral heir to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow, there being no other compulsory heir. Respondent moved for a summary judgment, The RTC declared the marriage between the spouses as null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the RTC was reversed. ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage may be filed by herein petitioner for lack of the requisite marriage license. HELD: The petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration in May 1962. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgmemt in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. The interest must be material. The burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Juan de Dios Carlos vs Felicidad Sandoval G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008 FACTS: Petitioner and his deceased brother Teofilo inherited 6 parcels of land from their parents who died intestate. Parcels 1, 2 and 3 were registered in the name of Teofilo. Parcel 4 was registered in the name of petitioner, In 1992, Teofilo died intestate survived by herein respondents Felicidad and their son Teofilo Carlos II, the only compulsory heirs. Upon Teofilos death, Parcels 5 and 6 were registered in the name of respondents. In August 1995, respondent filed a cause of action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Teofilo and Felicidad in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural or adoptive father

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the RTC in regard to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad and the late Teofilo Carlos. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action.

is simply misplaced. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother. HELD:

Isidro Ablaza vs. Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner filed in the RTC of Masbate a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage contracted between his late brother Cresenciano and his wife Leonila. The petitioner alleged that the marriage had been celebrated in December 1949 without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only in January 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that Cresenciano died without any issue thereby he being the surviving brother is entitled to one half of the real properties acquired by his brother, before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of marriage of the spouses at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. The RTC dismissed the petition stating that the petitioner is not the proper party to file the action, not being a party to the marriage contracted between the spouses and that his contention that he is considered a real party in interest, as he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,

The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. The validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of a marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. The applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of celebration of the marriage in 1949. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of the nullity of the marriage had absolutely no application to the petitioner. The old and new Civil Code contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of his brother that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required a marriage license for their validity. The Supreme Court ruled that both the RTC and CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. The decision of the CA was reversed and set aside. The records of the case were returned to the RTC for further proceedings.

Danilo Aurelio vs. Vida Aurelio FACTS: Petitioner (Danilo) and respondent (Vida) are husband and wife with two children. Vida filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of Psychological Incapacity ( PI ) existing prior and at the time of their marriage manifested by both of them. The following were alleged as manifestations of their PI: For Vida: That she suffers from Passive Aggressive ( Negativistic ) Personality Disorder. Her feelings change very quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. For Danilo: That he suffers from Historic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features depicted under the following: a. b. c. d. consistent jealousy or distrust; refusal to assist in the maintenance of family; refusal to foot household bills; arrogant;

e. insensitive to feelings of wife; f. humiliates wife in front of their children ISSUE: WON the petition is sufficient in form and substance inorder to annul the marriage based on Psychological Incapacity RULING: Yes. The abovementioned personality disorders are depiction of PI. There was compliance of the MOLINA Doctrine. Hence, the petition is granted. REPUBLIC vs. CA FACTS: Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalinas hysterectomy following her second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage,citing Catalinas psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After conducting an investigation, the public prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between Eduardo and Catalina. Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time

gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.7Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on Catalina, Dr. Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes administered thefollowing tests, namely:- Purdue Non Verbal Test, Draw-A-Person Test, House-Tree-Person Test, Sacks Sentence Completion Test, and Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test (see Exhibit B, Exhibit Folder, p. 5). Decision G.R. No. 159594 3found that Catalinas disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations. Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her Answer/Manifestation, whereby she admitted her psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without Eduardos consent and flirting with different men. She insisted that she had only one live-in partner; and that she would not give up her share in the conjugal residence because she intended to live there or to receive her share should the residence be sold. ISSUE: WON the marriage can be annulled based on psychological incapacity. WON Borderline Personality is considered PI inorder to nullify a marriage. RULING:

Petitioner failed to establish PI of the wife for lack of compliance of sufficiently explaining thegravity, root cause and incurability of Catalinas PI. Moreover, the result of neuro-psychological evaluation by the physician , Dr. Reyes was vague as to the gravity, root cause and incurability of PI. Rule requires that there be an IN-DEPTH assessment of parties by the psychologists. Mere theory and opinion of the psychologists without identifying clearly the facts upon which this theory was applied is not enough to warrant a finding of PI. In the instant case,Dr. Reyes, had only ONE ONTERVIEW with the wife which defeat the need for a IN-DEPTH and OBJECTIVE Assessment. The decision of the Supreme Court can be summed up as follows: 1. PI must be Psychological Illness; 2. Findings of Borderline Personality was not corroborated by evidence presented; 3. Evidence showed that there was mere IMMATURITY but not PI. To constitute as OPI, such must be a manifestation of disordered personality that made the spouse unable to perform the essential obligations of husband and wife; 4. Mere difficulty , refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligation is differentfrom Incapacity; 5. No PI in the following instances: a. irreconcilable differences; b. sexual infidelity/ perversion; c. emotional immaturity;

d. abandonment of conjugal home ( as in the instant case ) e. In order that letter ( b) be considered as PI, it must be shown that it is manifestation of disordered personality hence cant comply with essential obliation of marriage . WHEREFORE, petition denied.

The totality of evidence was not enough to corroborate the psychiatrists opinion. The petition was filed because of the wifes harbored ill-feelings against the husband. The guideline under MOLINA Doctrine was not sufficiently followed in the instant case. Emotional Immaturity and irresponsibility cant be equated with psychological Incapacity. *MOLINA Doctrine is reproduced for our guidelines:

Mendoza vs. Rep FACTS: Petition for annulment of marriage was filed. The allegations of the petition were as follows: a. That the husband is immature, deceitful, lacks remorse for dishonesty, inability to share his earnings, inability to feel remorse of his misbehaviors, sexual infidelity and criminal offenses.

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable

ISSUE: WON the alleged manifestations of PI warrant nullification of their marriage. RULING: No.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 17 G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20. 18 Supra note 15. Decision G.R. No. 159594 8 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.19The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse.

FACTS: SaludArca married Alfredo Javier on November 19, 1937. He then left for the US and eventually filed an action for divorce against Salud before Circuit Court of Mobile County in Alabama and successfully obtained a decree of divorce dated April 9, 1941. ISSUE/S: Whether or Not the decree of foreign divorce binds our jurisdiction? HELD: No. The above pronouncement is in keeping with International Law which prohibits the extension of a foreign judgment or the law affecting the same, if is contrary to the law or fundamental policy of the state of the forum(Phils). Tenchavez vs Escano 15 SCRA 355 FACTS: Vicente Escano married Pastor Tenchavez on February 24, 1948. In the end they separated. Escano left for the US to study and while she was there, she filed a complaint for Divorce in Nevada USA. On October 21, 1950 a decree of divorce was issued. ISSUE/S: Whether or not a decree of divorce applies in our country? HELD:

V. FOREIGN MARRIAGES AND FOREIGN DIVORCES Arca vs Javier 31 July 1954

No. The foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction. Van Dorn vs Romillo 139 SCRA 139 FACTS: Petitioner Van Dorn is a Filipino citizen married to Richard Upton, a US citizen in Hongkong. They got divorced in Nevada in 1982. Richard Upton filed a civil case in the Philippines to manage their conjugal property. ISSUE/S: Whether or not foreign divorce has binding effect in the Phils and their conjugal property. HELD: Yes a divorce validly obtained abroad involving a foreign nationals, the court having acquired jurisdiction over the subject, has the effect of validity in our country when the same is valid according to the national law of the alien. Being a US citizen ,Upton is estopped to deny the consequences of the decree of divorce of which he is party.

Somera vs. Pilapil 174 SCRA 663

FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen and Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national were married at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They had a child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling. After about three and a half years of marriage, conjugal disharmony eventuated, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. Pilapil then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to Pilapil. On June 27, 1986, Geiling filed 2 complaints for adultery alleging that while still married to Pilapil, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, one of which was assigned to Hon. Somera as the presiding judge.

ISSUE: Whether or not Geilings adultery charges against Pilapil will prosper considering that they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued. On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to who will be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in VanDorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner herself answered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying that she was no longer a Filipino citizen. The trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and the Padlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita. Private respondent, Blandina was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: FACTS: Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorced in San Francisco on July 23, 1954. Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Blandina Dandan, the respondent therewith. They were blessed with six children. Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo despite of the foreign divorce she obtained. HELD: The Supreme Court held that, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to

HELD: The Supreme Court held that, in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that Geiling is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, Geiling is no longer the husband of Pilapil and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case.

Quita vs. CA 300 SCRA 406

their national law. Fe D. Quita was no longer a Filipino citizen, she was an American citizen when she obtained divorce in the USA so she is no longer considered as the surviving spouse of Arturo and can no longer inherit from him. Llorente vs. CA 345 SCRA 592 FACTS: Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate, but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition for probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorentes estate. The trial court granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Paula Llorente can still validly inherit from

Lorenzo Llorente as a surviving spouse despite of the divorce decree the latter obtained against the former. HELD: Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the Civil Code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce. The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

GRACE GARCIA, aka GRACE GARCIA-RECIO petitioner vs.REDERICK A. RECIO respondent G.R. 138322 October 2, 2001 Facts: Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) was married to Editha Samson, (Australian), in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia (Filipina) in Cabanatuan City. But since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with Editha Samson. Issue: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy. Held: Partly meritorious. The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either: (1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be: (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

Republic vs. Orbecido G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 Facts: Orbecido was married to Lady Myros. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter. Lady Myros left for US bringing along their son. A

few years later, Orbecido learned that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen, obtained a divorce degree and got married to another man. Thereafter, Orbecido filed this petition granting him the authority to remarry. Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry Held: Yes. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. Art. 26, par 2 of the Family Codestates that where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine law. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.

man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. ISSUE: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree. HELD:

Corpus v Sto Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another

Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED. The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC.In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Llave vs Republic FACTS:Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice -initially under the Islamiclaws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by anRTC Judge at Malabang, Lanaodel Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano's civil statuswas indicated as 'divorced.'Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano's wife, and uponhis death, his widow, On November 23, 1994, private respondents

HajaPutriZorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son AdibAhmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano's legitimate childrenwith Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage betweenEstrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged,inter alia, that Sen. Tamano marriedZorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he marriedEstrellita in 1993.Summons was then served on Estrellita. She then asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to fileher answer, and again, another 15 days, both of which the court granted. Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss where she declared thatSen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred inthe latter's disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano. Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to takecognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Lawsof the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under theexclusive jurisdiction of shari'a courts. The trial court denied Estrellita's motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity. Thus, Estrellita filed acertiorari petition with the SC questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss.The SC referred the petition to the CA. During the pendency of the petition before the CA, the RTC continued to try the case since there can beno default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellitawas allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties pres ented their evidence. When it waEstrellita's turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose were postponed mostly at her instanceuntil the

trial court, suspended the proceedings in view of the CA's temporary restraining order enjoining it fromhearing the case.Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita. She then elevated the appellatecourt's judgment to the Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari.Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for decision, reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she hasnot yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of GR. No. 126603.

one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous marriages. SC finds the CA Decision correctly rendered. VIII. WHEN THERE IS DELIVERY OF PRESUMTPIVE LEGITIMES Dino vs. Dino

ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous and Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellitas marriage declared void ab initio? HELD:Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita's marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the mairiage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as

Facts: Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court granted the petition. However, the decision states that the DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Issues: The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Ruling: The Court has ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relation of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court. For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: 1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies. We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides: Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of

the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties. The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are: Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was contracted. Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community

of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership. In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. G.R. No. 189207 June 15, 2011

ERIC U. YU, Petitioner vs. HONORABLE JUDGE AGNES REYESCARPIO Facts This is a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage between spouses Eric U. Yu and Caroline T. Yu with the Branch 163. RTC, Pasig City.. On September 12, 2006, private respondent moved to submit the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage for resolution of the court, considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property relations were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage. On September 28, 2006, petitioner opposed private respondents Motion, claiming that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage cannot be resolved without the presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property relations.. Petitioner, therefore, averred that the incident on nullity of marriage, on the one hand, and the incidents on custody, support, and property relations, on the other, should both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. On May 21, 2008, the respondent filed an Omnibus Motion that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage be resolved ahead of the incidents on custody, support, and property relations, and not simultaneously. Meanwhile, the petitioner opposed it and moved that the property relations of the spouses be resolved simultaneously. Issue:

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the Respondent Judge in submitting the main issue of nullity of marriage for resolution ahead of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations. Ruling: The Court finds it more prudent to rule first on the petitioners petition and respondents counter-petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of each others psychological incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court eventually finds that the parties respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties psychological incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to comply with Article (sic) 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the petition. The Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on the subject

incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioners assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.