P.O. Box 38741 Wellington M.C. 67 Hankey Street, Mt Cook, Wellington, New Zealand .

Ph : (04) 381 8750 Fax: (04) 381 8777

RESPONSE OF TE KOHANGA REO NATIONAL TRUST BOARD TO ECE TASKFORCE REPORT, AN AGENDA FOR AMAZING MOKOPUNA, 2011

20 December 2011

[To be published alongside Introduction to the Report if published by chapter]

PURPOSE OF TE KOHANGA REO NATIONAL TRUST BOARD'S RESPONSE TO THE ECE TASKFORCE REPORT

1.

Te Kohanga Reo National Trust Board ("the Trust Board"} represents 471 Kohanga Reo throughout New Zealand and 9,140 Mokopuna (as at 1 November 2011 ). In this document, we respond to comments made in the ECE Taskforce ("the Taskforce") Report, An Agenda for Amazing Mokopuna, 2011 ("the Report"), about Kohanga Reo and the Trust Board. The Trust was not consulted on the Report prior to its release for public comment on 1 June 2011 . This was despite assurances to the contrary and the inclusion of adverse comments and findings about the Trust Board and Kohanga Reo in the Report. In recognition of the unfair process adopted by the Taskforce, the Ministry of Education has agreed that our comments in response to the Report will always appear alongside the Report whenever it is published . The following statement should always be published in order to explain the need for the Trust Board's comments to appear alongside the Report:
Te Kohanga Reo National Trust Board's response to the ECE Taskforce Report appears as

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a separate addendum to the ECE Taskforce Report. Te Kohanga Reo National Trust Board
was not consulted in relation to the ECE Taskforce Report despite being an interested party and despite adverse statements being made about the Trust and Kohanga Reo in the Report. Te Kohanga Reo National Trust Board has therefore put this into its response and requested that its comments be read alongside the ECE Taskforce Report.

5.

The Trust Board is very aggrieved with the contents of the Report. It suggests that Kohanga Reo are of poor quality and that there are accountability issues relating to the Trust Board itself. The Taskforce also questions whether the Trust Board is a "key barrier" to the Kohanga Reo movement. The Trust Board has worked long and hard over the past three decades to ensure that the importance of the Kohanga Reo kaupapa for our people, our language and mokopuna is understood. However, the Report illustrates that there continues to be a lack of understanding regarding the nature and purpose of Kohanga Reo and their kaupapa.

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The Taskforce has failed to adequately inform itself through consultation or accessing relevant expertise. As a consequence, it was not in a position to make the findings and comments about Kohanga Reo and the Trust Board that it did. This is reflected in readily identifiable mistakes of fact and a lack of probative evidence to support its assertions. The statements made in the Report have caused unwarranted reputational damage to Kohanga Reo and the Trust Board and serve to undermine the sustainability of the Kohanga Reo movement. Kohanga Reo are nga taonga (treasures) in their own right and as kaitiaki (guardians), we are compelled to set the record straight.

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SUMMARY OF THE TRUST BOARD'S COMMENTS ON THE REPORT Structure of the Trust Board's response

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The specific concerns of the Trust Board are set out in detail below. For each chapter of the Report, the specific passages of the Report that the Trust Board does not agree with are quoted in full (in italics), followed by the Trust Board's comments. In each instance, the Trust Board provides an overall response to the Taskforce's findings in that chapter, followed by addressing the specific comments made in that chapter. However, our comments can be broadly summarised under the following headings: (a) (b) (c) (d) Failure of the Taskforce to adequately inform itself; Mistakes of fact and absence of context; Lack of probative evidence for key findings; and Consequences for the Kohanga Reo movement and the Trust Board .

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Failure of the Taskforce to adequately inform itself Lack of understanding and consideration of the nature and purpose of Kohanga Reo and their kaupapa

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The Kohanga Reo movement was started in 1982 as a whanau (family) development initiative, not an early childhood education (ECE) service, under the auspices of the Department of Maori Affairs. The movement was based on Mokopuna acquiring (not being taught), as early as possible, te Reo and tikanga Maori (Maori language and customs) and the passing down of cultural knowledge (usually from kaumatua (elders) to mokopuna (grandMokopuna)) in a whanau environment setting. The Kohanga Reo kaupapa is about mokopuna, tamariki (Mokopuna) and whanau working together or "mahi tahi". This extends from the learning environment, where everyone works together to learn from one another, through to whanau taking collective responsibility for managing and governing their Kohanga Reo. The dynamics are not unlike a marae. Unlike ECE, the focus of Kohanga Reo is not simply Mokopuna and qualified teachers, but about revitalising te Reo and tikanga Maori within the wider whanau context. Without consultation with Kohanga Reo, in 1990, Kohanga Reo was forced to assimilate within the ECE regulatory regime, despite the fact that it is not an ECE service and that this regime is inconsistent with the kaupapa.

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In treating Kohanga Reo as an ECE provider, the Taskforce considered Kohanga Reo against an ECE quality framework that does not fit the nature and purpose of Kohanga Reo and their kaupapa. For example, throughout the Report there is a focus on staff 1 who hold ECE qualifications as an indicator or driver of quality. But for Kohanga Reo, all of the whanau are responsible for learning . In particular, kaumatua play one of the fundamental roles in passing down knowledge to the Mokopuna, not ECE qualified staff. Although the Taskforce says that "[w]e unequivocally acknowledge the phenomenal achievements of Kohanga Reo in relation to whanau development and Maori language 2 revitalisation" , the Taskforce failed to evaluate Kohanga Reo against what quality means for Kohanga Reo (i.e., the very whanau development and Maori language revitalisation that the Taskforce claimed to acknowledge). The Report also goes on to make detrimental statements discussed below. Lack of recognition for the Trust Board's role as kaitiaki (guardian) of Kohanga Reo and their kaupapa, which are nga taonga

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The Trust Board is the umbrella organisation for Kohanga Reo and plays a special role as Kaitiaki in protecting the Kohanga Reo kaupapa. It represents 471 Kohanga Reo throughout Aotearoa and operates upon the mandate of Kohanga Reo whanau . In particular, its objects are to promote, support and encourage the Kohanga Reo kaupapa and to provide necessary financial, advisory and administrative assistance and support for Kohanga Reo whanau . The Taskforce failed to recognise the Trust Board's kaitiaki status, but nevertheless thought it appropriate to comment specifically on: (a) The governance role of the Trust Board . In particular, the Taskforce questioned the " ... national body leadership for Mokopuna who attend Kohanga Reo and whether the Trust Board is a key barrier or contributor to the original aspiration 3 of the movement" (emphasis added). That comment was of particular concern to the Trust Board given that the Taskforce does not appear to understand the original aspirations of the movement, which (as noted above) are not ECE. This comment was not put to the Trust Board before it was published. However, the ECE Taskforce thought it appropriate following the release of the Report to seek public comment about the Trust Board from the entire ECE sector in a 4 questionnaire released for consultation between 15 June and 8 August 2011 ; Previous reviews involving the Trust Board and whether such recommendations should be implemented. 5 For example, it suggested that the recommendations of the Gal len Report (2001) be revisited and where appropriate, implemented. 6 One of the recommendations of the Galien Report was for devolution of Kohanga

(b)

In particular, see Essay on Policy Design 1: Aiming for High-Quality Services, page 40 . The Taskforce notes at

page 49 that "For Maori students, the relationship between teacher and student is the most important thing ". However, Kohanga Reo have been hugely successful with whanau all playing an important role .
2

Page 57 of the Report. Page 146 of the Report. See ECE Taskforce Consultation Questionnaire, Part 6- Te Kohanga Reo National Trust: reporting and compliance

3
4

requirements (page 21) .

5
6

Page 145-146 of the Report. Recommendation 46, page 135 of the Report.

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7

Reo from the Trust Board to iwi to occur. Kohanga Reo whanau ; and (c)

However, devolution is a decision for

Alignment of the Trust Board 's reporting and compliance requirements with those 8 required in other ECE settings . Again, that failed to acknowledge the kaitiaki status of the Trust Board and an understanding of the kaupapa of Kohanga Reo. Requiring K6hanga Reo to meet ECE compliance requirements undermines the kaupapa of Kohanga Reo and seeks to further assimilate K6hanga Reo within the ECE framework.

Failure to adhere to Terms of Reference through Jack of consultation and relevant expertise

17.

The Trust Board considers that, in failing to properly inform itself, the Taskforce failed 9 to adhere to its Terms of Reference (set out at Appendix 1 of the Report). In particular, the Taskforce was requ ired to : (a) Undertake a full review of the value gained from the different types of government investment in early childhood education in New Zealand; and Consider the efficiency and effectiveness of Government's current early childhood education expenditure, and ways that this might be improved , particularly for Maori, Pasifika, and Mokopuna from low socio-economic 10 backgrounds.

(b)

18.

Further, the responsibility of Taskforce members was to " ... act in the interests of all 11 stakeholders including Mokopuna and parents". The Trust Board does not agree that Kohanga Reo should be defined as an ECE provider. However, we believe that the scope of the terms of reference required the Taskforce to undertake a full and robust review of the value gained from Kohanga Reo including its history and kaupapa and to act in the interests of Kohanga Reo and the Trust Board before making its findings. It did not do so. The Trust Board was the only national body singled out for criticism by the Taskforce. We were not consulted by the Taskforce or given the opportunity to comment on such critical and adverse findings. Had the Trust Board been given the opportunity to do so, it would have provided balanced comments and put necessary information before the Taskforce showing the criticisms lacked probative evidence. Having reviewed the Bibliography in the Report, we have not seen evidence that shows that the Taskforce accessed sufficient literature, expert advice or resources to inform itself about Kohanga Reo and the Trust Board to ensure its comments and findings 12 were accurate and robust.
Mistakes of fact and absence of context

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21 .

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As a consequence, some of the comments made in relation to the Trust Board are based on incorrect information or in the absence of wider context.

As noted at page 145 of the Report. Page 146 of the Report. From page 176 of the Report. Page 176 of the Report. Page 177 of the Report. From page 169 of the Report.

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10 11

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No replacement funding

23.

The Taskforce stated that the recommendation contained in the Galien Report that the Government agree a process to support future funding commitments previously met by the Property POtea scheme (established by the Trust Board to provide funding for computers, Maori language training, resource development, health and research) had 13 been actioned . While the Government disestablished the Property Putea scheme, it did not provide replacement funding .
Tripartite process

24.

The Taskforce said that the remaining recommendations of the Pricewaterhouse Coopers' castings review of the Trust Board were part of the Tripartite Review 14 process. One of the remaining recommendations as noted in the Report was:
.. .an examination of the funding and expenditure of the Trust, in light of the early childhood education sector, the Ministry's goals, the philosophies of the Trust and the Kohanga Reo movement and the wider socio-economic environment; to include a comparison with other parts of the early childhood education sector.
15

25. 26.

However, it was never agreed that this would form part of the Tripartite work process. The Tripartite parties consisted of the Trust Board, Te Puni Kokiri and the Ministry of Education, pursuant to a Tripartite Relationship Agreement 2001. Instigated by the Trust Board, a working group was established in 2008: the Funding Quality and Sustainability of Kohanga Reo Working Group, which appears to be the "Tripartite Review process" that the Taskforce refers to. The purpose of that Working Group was to support the quality and sustainability of Kohanga Reo by developing a three year agreement between the Trust Board and Ministry of Education and to develop options for and advise on (a) a plan to support current work by the Trust Board to ensure high quality provision by Kohanga Reo; (b) a joint sustainability plan; and (c) a review of Kohanga Reo funding .16 It was not intended to be a review of the Trust Board itself. In any event, that working group failed to furnish a final report in line with 17 its reporting timetable. The Taskforce also recommended that the current Tripartite Review be completed immediately.18 However, that finding failed to take into account the fact that since its inception, the Tripartite relationship had been dysfunctional and had failed to make any progress at all , despite numerous attempts by the Trust Board to re-establish that process. In fact, the Waitangi Tribunal itself recently said :
99 . .. we do note that the parties acknowledge that meetings have taken place pursuant to

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the Tripartite Agreement since 2008 and no progress has been made on establishing something as basic as an understanding of the Trust's kaupapa. This suggests that the Tripartite Relationship with the Crown is bordering on dysfunctional. ..

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14

Page 145 of the Report. Page 146 of the Report. Page 145-146 of the Report. Terms of Reference, Kohanga Reo Funding, Quality and Sustainability Working Group, page 1. See Terms of Reference, Deliverables, page 4. Recommendation 46 , page 135 of the Report ; page 146 of the Report.

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100. In our view such a process is unlikely to result in any effective remedy given the state of

h" . rea I t1ons 1ps. 19

Lack of probative evidence for key findings

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In its summary of recommendations, the Taskforce states that there is a need for :

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.. .an immediate focus on system quality and the effective use of government funds and effective use of government spending. This includes ...
o Strengthening quality measures for home-based services, education and care for

Mokopuna under two years of age, group sizes, and accountability measures for Kohanga Reo.
[Emphasis added]

30.

This finding resonates throughout the Report. The Trust Board has identified no evidential basis in the Report or the submissions to the Taskforce that mention Kohanga Reo for that finding. The Taskforce appears to rely on the number of supplementary Education Review Office (ERO) reviews received by Kohanga Reo, which it states is one indicator of poor quality.22 The Taskforce appears to have placed disproportionate weight on this indicator. The Trust Board has many concerns regarding the ERO process and whether many supplementary reviews received by Kohanga Reo were, in fact, 23 warranted. The Trust Board's concerns are set out in detail below. As stated above, the Taskforce did not take into consideration what quality means for Kohanga Reo, which is not an ECE service. Similarly, the Trust Board has not been able to pinpoint any foundation for the Taskforce's pejorative questioning of whether the Trust Board is a key barrier or contributor to the Kohanga Reo movement.
Consequences for the Kohanga Reo movement and the Trust Board

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Kohanga Reo and the Trust Board have suffered substantial and irreversible prejudice as a consequence of these failings of the Taskforce and the publication of the Report. In particular, the Report and subsequent comments made by Taskforce members have resulted in reputational damage that risks future enrolments at Kohanga Reo. This will, in turn, accelerate the decline in the number of Mokopuna acquiring fluency in te Reo Maori, since that is directly linked to the numbers participating in Kohanga Reo. In addition, the Trust Board is concerned that the Crown will implement reforms based on the Taskforce's ill -informed recommendations - further assimilating Kohanga Reo into the ECE framework and undermining their ability to operate according to their kaupapa and tikanga. The Crown has already taken actions and decisions, following the ECE Taskforce Report, to:

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Decision on an Application for Urgency of Deputy Chief Judge C L Fox, Presiding Officer, the Hon Sir Douglas Kidd

and Mr Kihi Ngatai , QSM , Wai 2336, #2.5.13, paras 99-100.

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Page 32 of the Report. See, for example, pages 36, 57 , 58, 82, 134, 146 and 148 of the Report. See Report, page 58 . See paragraphs 52-64 of the Trust Board's response for the problems with ERO reviews and Kohanga Reo .

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(a)

Focus on three issues (improving ECE services, ECE for Mokopuna under two and transition from ECE to school) arising out of the ECE Taskforce Report and establish an advisory group on each of those issues. Two of those advisory groups begin work next month ; Review the ECE curriculum , Te Whariki, as recommended by the ECE Taskforce; and Develop a new funding system , as recommended by the ECE Taskforce.

(b)

(c) 38.

We can only hope that our comments go some way towards correcting comments and errors made by the Taskforce and therefore prevent further damage being done to the taonga that are Kohanga Reo.

PART ONE: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION

Approach - Page 17

Alongside this process we also sought and received further ongoing comment and feedback from these submitters and many others; in particular, individuals and groups who preferred to communicate orally rather than in writing. We also undertook field visits to selected earlv childhood education services and met with various sector stakeholders. All of these sources of information and advice, along with the considerable breadth of knowledge and experience of our members, and many vigorous discussions, were vital in helping us answer many of our questions. We have been able to reach evidence-based conclusions about what kinds of improvements and changes are needed to redesign key aspects of early childhood education policy and services.
[Emphasis added]

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The Trust Board is an expert on Kohanga Reo, an interested party in the Report, and the Report contains adverse findings in relation to the Trust Board and Kohanga Reo. But the Taskforce did not seek comment and/or feedback from the Trust Board , even though the Trust Board was promised that it would be consulted. For the following reasons, we do not agree that the conclusions made in the Report about Kohanga Reo and the Trust Board are "evidence-based conclusions": (a) (b) The Trust Board and Kohanga Reo were not consulted; There is nothing in the Report to tell us whether the Taskforce consulted an adequate range of resources, including expert advice, so that it fully understood the Kohanga Reo kaupapa and role of the Trust Board. The Bibliography for the Report (Report, page 169) references little which would provide the Taskforce with detail in relation to the history, nature and purpose of Kohanga and its kaupapa or the quality of Kohanga Reo; and None of the submissions released to the Trust Board under the Official Information Act 1982 that mention Kohanga Reo contain any criticism of their quality or the accountability of the Trust Board. To the contrary, they suggest that Kohanga Reo should be better funded , or subject to more flexible regulatory requirements.

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(c)

Our Recommendations -Page 32 An immediate focus on system quality and the effective use of government spending. This includes: strengthening qualitv measures for home-based services, education and care for Mokopuna under two years of age, group sizes, and accountability
measures for Kohanga Reo

reduced tolerance for variability and under-performing services - intensive support followed by decisive action for services receiving supplementary EROreviews

The Rationale for Sequencing- Page 35 Phase one will focus on immediate quality improvements. These do not need to be costly to the Government. but we consider them to be urgent to safeguard Mokopuna's welfare and to ensure the sector is performing how it should. Important actions from this phase will also be the establishment of support mechanisms for Maori and Pasifika early childhood education
services. This phase will also include some immediate regulatory change.

Figure 7: The Change Process: phased recommendations- Page 36

Phase 1 Start Work, Focus on Immediate Quality Measures Work with Kohanga Reo

[Emphasis added]

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The Report suggests that phase one will focus on immediate quality improvements, which the Taskforce considers urgent to safeguard Mokopuna's welfare. It is clear from Figure 7 on page 36 of the Report that this is a reference to Kohanga Reo, as Kohanga Reo are the only institution referred to by name. Having regard to subsequent comments made in the Report about the high rate of supplementary ERO reviews for Kohanga Reo, it appears that the recommendation that there should be a "reduced tolerance for variability and under-performing services - intensive support followed by decisive action for services receiving supplementary ERO reviews" relates to Kohanga Reo. The Trust Board does not agree with this recommendation given its comments in relation to supplementary ERO reviews, as to which see paragraphs 52 to 64 below.

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PART TWO: MAKING CHANGE HAPPEN: ELEVEN ESSAYS IN POLICY DESIGN ESSAY ON POLICY DESIGN 1: AIMING FOR HIGH-QUALITY SERVICES

Abstract - Page 40

Long-term outcomes for Mokopuna can include attainment of higher levels of education, more employment opportunities and higher incomes, more stable relationships and reduced crime and welfare use. These benefits onlv result from participation in qualitv early childhood education. Experiencing poor-quality early childhood education can have negative effects on Mokopuna . Quality is a multi-faceted concept that describes those inputs that can cause positive outcomes. It is most likely to occur when early childhood education services connect families with staff who are adequately qualified and view themselves as professionals, and who work in settings enjoying good governance and management.
[Emphasis added]

Figure 2 - Domains of influence and outcomes of early childhood education - page 49 Culture Responsiveness to culture and variation in outcomes across ethnic groups

For Maori students, the relationship between teacher and student is the most important thing.
[Emphasis added]

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We do not agree that long-term outcomes for Mokopuna only result from participation in quality ECE. Kohanga Reo are not an ECE service, but have experienced wide success in developing whanau and mokopuna as a whole, together with revitalising the language and culture. This is what the movement was intended to do Throughout the Report, the Taskforce focuses on "quality ECE". It does not consider the nature and purpose of Kohanga Reo and its kaupapa and a suitable quality 25 framework for Kohanga Reo. The Report focuses on qualified teachers in considering what is a quality ECE service. 26 This focus reflects an entirely different world view and detracts from the nature and purpose of Kohanga Reo and their kaupapa. For example, collective responsibility, whanau development and the value of kaumatua. Kaumatua are experts as recognised repositories of cultural knowledge and do not require ECE qualifications.
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See pages 2-6, 40-42 and 55-58 for examples. Discussed above at paragraphs 11 to 16 and below at paragraphs 59 to 64. Pages 40-49 .

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ESSAY ON POLICY DESIGN 2: REPRIORITISING GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE

Some Kohanga Reo -Page 57 Te Kohanga Reo is the largest and oldest Maori immersion early childhood education institution in New Zealand. The first Kohanga Reo was established in 1982. Te Kohanga Reo is different to other Maori immersion earlv childhood education settings in that it has a significant national governance structure, called Te Kohanga Reo National Trust. Of the 472 te Reo Maori immersion services. 463 operate within Te Kohanga Reo National Trust. The ECE Taskforce wants to acknowledge the incredible contribution Te Kohanga Reo has made to Maori immersion early childhood education. The mission of Te Kohanga Reo National Trust is the protection of te Reo, nga tikanga me nga ahuatanga Maori by targeting the participation of mokopuna and whanau into the Kohanga Reo movement and its vision is to totally immerse Kohanga mokopuna in te Reo, nga tikanga me nga ahuatanga Maori. We unequivocally acknowledge the phenomenal achievements of Kohanga Reo in relation to whanau development and Maori language revitalisation. As we see it, there are also some realities that need to be urgently addressed - in particular the steady decline of Kohanga Reo enrolments and the disproportionate number of supplementary ERO reviews of Kohanga Reo. Figure 5 shows that Kohanga Reo enrolments have not increased as most other service types' enrolments have, but rather, have slightly declined.
[Emphasis added]

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It is incorrect to describe K6hanga Reo as the "largest and oldest Maori immersion early childhood education institution in New Zealand". When the K6hanga movement was established in 1982, it was established as a whanau development initiative, operating under the former Department of Maori Affairs, not an ECE service. In 1990, without consultation , all K6hanga Reo were brought within the ECE framework under the Ministry of Education, despite the fact that the nature and purpose of K6hanga Reo and their kaupapa are inconsistent with that framework. The description of the Trust Board as a "significant governance structure" fails to acknowledge the Trust Board's important role as kaitiaki of the K6hanga Reo kaupapa. The Taskforce says that of 472 te Reo Maori immersion services, 463 operate within the Trust Board. The Trust Board only represents K6hanga Reo, not te Reo Maori immersion services. It is also not clear what date those figures have been taken from. 27 Currently, the Trust Board has 471 K6hanga Reo chartered to it. The Taskforce raises concerns with the steady decline of numbers in K6hanga Reo. The Trust Board has raised those very concerns on many occasions over the course of a number of years. However, the Taskforce does not appear to have taken any steps to evaluate the reasons for that decline. It is not clear whether the Taskforce is implying that this may have something to do with the quality of K6hanga Reo and/or the Trust Board. The Trust Board has raised concerns that a major contributor for the decline is the kaupapa of K6hanga Reo not being adequately supported and being forced to

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Trust Board data as at 1 November 2011 .

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assimilate within the ECE framework. Kohanga Reo therefore have to meet requirements for ECE services rather than being allowed to operate on the basis of their own kaupapa. We also refer to our comments at paragraphs 11 to 16 above.

Page 58 One indicator of low-quality services is a supplementary review from ERO. Once ERO has undertaken a regular review of a service on its three-year cycle, it may choose to undertake a supplementary review, usually around a year later. A supplementary review is undertaken at the discretion of a National Manager in ERO. A supplementary review evaluates the extent and effectiveness of actions a service has taken towards addressing issues specified in a previous education review and/or any additional areas identified since that review. Supplementary reviews are therefore a possible indicator that a service is suffering from quality difficulties in one or more aspects of its operation. Kohanga Reo have an extremely high rate of supplementary reviews - over a third of all settings received them between 2007-2010. Figure 6 notes the percentage of different service tvpes with supplementary reviews. The dark blue line represents the overall average.

This is not intended to reflect badly on the Kohanga Reo movement as a whole. There are many reasons why whanau could struggle. Poor access to appropriate development or resources. lack of funding, and the availability of whanau members. kaumatua or kuia can all impact on a Kohanga Reo's operation. These are difficult situations, and they must change. But nonetheless, our primary concern has to be for the welfare of the mokopuna in these Kohanga Reo. Government must think seriously about the way it invests in Kohanga Reo. This is discussed further in Essay 4: Achieving Access for All Mokopuna. A dollar figure applied to 34% of Kohanga Reo is around $19m in 2009/2010.

Page 59 Provision of ECE Mokopuna under two years of age

Low-quality early childhood education is particularly harmful for under two-year-olds, and there can be long-term poor outcomes when they [sic[ exposed to poor quality which are costly to remediate Oower educational achievement and increased crime. for example). So a proportion of the $268m noted above could potentially be the poorest investment across the early childhood education portfolio.
[Emphasis added]

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The Trust Board does not agree with the Taskforce's comments in relation to the number of supplementary ERO reviews for Kohanga Reo being indicative of poor quality, as: (a) The Trust Board has reviewed all of the supplementary ERO reviews for Kohanga Reo from June 2007 to June 2010 and is concerned, for the reasons set out below, that the grounds upon which many Kohanga Reo were given supplementary reviews were unfounded and relate to a lack of understanding of the Kohanga Reo kaupapa and wider Maori concepts; and

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(b)

The use of ERO reviews cannot accurately measure the quality of K6hanga Reo as it is not an ECE service and ERO does not adequately understand the kaupapa of Kohanga Reo and what quality means for Kohanga Reo.

Supplementary ERO reviews for the period June 2007-2010

53.

During this period, there were a total of 169 ERO supplementary reviews conducted involving 137 Kohanga Reo, which means that a number of Kohanga Reo had more than one supplementary review during the period . The 169 supplementary reviews can be broken down into two types: 118 supplementary reviews reported regulatory noncompliance ("Compliance Reviews") and 51 supplementary reviews had recommendations only, i.e. they do not raise any issues of regulatory non-compliance ("Recommendations Only Reviews"). Accordingly, 30% of Kohanga Reo receiving supplementary reviews during the period received Recommendations Only Reviews. Nearly all Recommendations Only Reviews related to administration and governance (19%); human resources (0.5%); financial management (0.4%); curriculum, management and staffing (30%); and Te Korowai (41%) where the majority of these Te Korowai recommendations stated that 'the kohanga whanau work with their kaupapa kaimahi to address all areas for improvement identified in this report'. Kohanga Reo whanau treat this process as a means of self-review and often make suggestions themselves. For example, in a Supplementary review dated September 2010 (IDC09C043 onsite June 2010, Rohe 09) the ERO found that the Kohanga Reo had addressed all of the issues identified in 2009 and commented positively. However, whanau themselves identified professional development of staff and leadership as areas for improvement. ERO accordingly recommended that the whanau work with the kaupapa kaimahi to access professional development and set down another supplementary review to monitor progress within 24 months. The Trust Board considers that, in treating supplementary reviews as an indicator of poor quality, the Taskforce has served to undermine this self-review process. Some examples of misunderstanding the kaupapa of Kohanga Reo and the inadequacy of ERO reviews are set out below: (a) In a Supplementary Review dated September 2010 (ID02F064 onsite May 2010, Rohe 002) the Report states "6.3 further develop their strategic direction as a Kohanga Reo whanau", even though whanau have Te Ara TOapae, a strategic plan developed by the Kohanga whanau themselves alongside the Trust Board. Another recommendation is "6.4 improve self review practices in order to identify areas for ongoing development across the Kohanga", even though self review is 28 29 carried out each month at whanau hui and also through TOtohinga review.

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Whanau hui are regular formal monthly meetings which all whanau members are encouraged to attend and where

decisions are made on the management and operation of the Kohanga . At the hui, the Administrator/Secretary will provide previous minutes and the AdministratorfTreasurer will provide Financial Reports for previous months and/or forward-looking plans for whanau approval of budgets.
29

Kaiako/Kaiawhina will give a report on the activities of

mokopuna for the previous month and what they intend to do the following month . TOtohinga Review involves a review of the Charter between a Kohanga and the Trust Board, and a reaffirmation

of the whanau's commitment to the kaupapa . The norm is to review different parts of the TOtohinga (or charter) so

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(b)

Many of the "non-compliance" issues in Compliance Reviews relate to an inconsistency between the regulatory framework and the kaupapa of Kohanga Reo. For example, in relation to a marae-based Kohanga Reo that has been operating for 28 years, in a Supplementary Review (2007, 1001 E047, Rohe 01) non-compliance was cited due to "R32 ECC Regs 1998 - plan a range of activities that cater for the learning and developmental needs of Mokopuna" (page 23). Yet, in the same report it stated:
Mokopuna have a strong sense of belonging and identity and are secure in an environment that upholds the teachings of their ancestors. Mokopuna are able to identify landmarks that are of spiritual significance to the ... region through pepeha, waiata and whakapapa . Routines and tikanga for eating, toileting, sleeping and hand washing are well established and managed . Mokopuna are learning about positive social behaviour and enjoy the structured way in which routines flow. (Page 16)

(c)

Individual ERO reviewers seem unable to reconcile the purpose of the review with the kaupapa of Kohanga Reo. The Trust Board has attempted to work with ERO so that they understand the kaupapa of Kohanga Reo, but it is clear to the Trust Board that they are ill-equipped or often fail to have the expertise to determine the ''fitness" of Kohanga Reo. In this respect, we note that, based on the Trust Board's experience, very few ERO officers are fluent te Reo Maori speakers. The ERO has identified a number of "poor quality indicators" that unfairly implicate good practice at Kohanga Reo. For example, ERO states that "rote learning methods", "rigidly implemented routines" and "interactions that direct 30 and control Mokopuna" are all indicators of poor quality. Models of learning in Kohanga Reo that support the acquisition of te Reo Maori and the involvement of whanau frequently involve repetition and routine -language, history, waiata, for example.

(d)

58.

Had our reasonable expectation of consultation been met, we would have had the opportunity to avail the Taskforce of these details. However, we were not afforded that opportunity before the Report was published .
Quality of Kohanga Reo

59.

The use of ERO supplementary reviews is not a full and accurate measure of quality of Kohanga Reo. Over the years, the Trust Board has raised many concerns with the ERO process itself and ERO's inability to adequately assess and review Kohanga Reo upon its own quality criteria, rather than those of an ECE service. Specifically: (a) They do not take into account the unique and holistic approach taken by the Trust Board and Kohanga Reo; They generally focus on the implementation of the Ministry's ECE curriculum, Te Whariki;

(b)

that over a 1 or 2 year period , the whanau will have fully reviewed their TOtohinga.
30

The updated TOtohinga is

submitted to District Managers and is ultimately approved by the Trust Board at one of its bi-monthly meetings . Education Review Office, Quality in Early Childhood Services, 1 August 2010, at page 5.

15

(c)

The majority of the sector they deal with do not use te Reo Maori as the only language of instruction, as is the case for Kohanga Reo; and ERO does not have the expertise to adequately assess matters such as the use of te Reo and tikanga Maori within Kohanga Reo.

(d)

60.

The four broad criteria that the Trust Board uses for measuring the quality of Kohanga Reo are very different from an ECE framework, as follows: (a) (b) (c) (d) Total immersion in te Reo Maori and tikanga Maori; Management and decision-making by whanau ; Accountability to the Creator, mokopuna, Kohanga Reo and whanau; and Commitment to the health and well-being of mokopuna and whanau.

61 .

Had the Trust Board been consulted it could have advised the Taskforce in relation to a quality framework for Kohanga Reo. The Report infers that there are welfare concerns for mokopuna due to the high number of ERO supplementary reviews, and that there is a lack of quality or accountability in terms of the Trust Board . However, the Taskforce chose not to obtain the Trust Board's view on these issues, nor did they identify or address the fundamental issues the Trust Board has with the process for ERO reviews. Contrary to the Taskforce's comments, the welfare of mokopuna in Kohanga Reo is a primary concern of Kohanga Reo and the Trust Board, as set out above in relation to quality criteria for Kohanga Reo. The Report says that spending on poor-quality early childhood education is a bad 31 investment. Given the comments made by the Taskforce above, Kohanga Reo appear to be placed in that category. Again, that finding was made without consulting the Trust Board or obtaining a proper understanding of the issues faced by Kohanga Reo in relation to ERO reviews. The Trust Board is not suggesting that Kohanga Reo should not be subject to reviews, just that such reviews ought to be specific to the nature and purpose of Kohanga Reo and their kaupapa, not ECE Regulations developed within a different cultural framework.

62 .

63.

64.

31

Report at page 56, penultimate paragraph ; page 59 , second paragraph .

16

ESSAY ON POLICY DESIGN 4: ACHIEVING ACCESS FOR ALL MOKOPUNA

Recommendations - Page 82

19.

work is undertaken with Maori and Pasifika communities to determine ways to provide an over-arching governance and management support structure in Maori immersion early childhood education settings and Pasifika language settings.

65.

As above, Kohanga Reo are not "Maori immersion early childhood education settings". The Trust Board is kaitiaki for Kohanga Reo, and it is for Kohanga Reo whanau to determine the overarching governance and management support structure, not the Taskforce.

17

ESSAY ON POLICY DESIGN PERFORMANCE REPORTING

9:

IMPROVING

LICENSING

PROCESSES

AND

Abstract - Page 134 The current review of Te Kohanga Reo National Trust should be completed and earlier recommendations implemented. Recommendations - Page 134 46. the current Tripartite Review by Te Kohanga Reo National Trust, Te Puni Kokiri and the Ministry of Education is completed 47. the recommendations ofthe Gallen Report (2001) and the Pricewaterhouse Cooper's Report (2006) on Te Kohanga Reo National Trust are revisited, and where appropriate implemented 48. Te Kohanga Reo National Trust's reporting and compliance requirements become the same as those required of other earlv childhood education service
[Emphasis added]

66.

Contrary to what the Taskforce has noted above, the Tripartite process between the Ministry of Education, Te Puni Kokiri and the Trust Board did not include a review of the Trust Board itself and its governance. The Tripartite process was supposed to be about how the parties could together take measures to ensure the ongoing sustainability of Kohanga Reo and that Kohanga Reo received appropriate funding recognising the nature and purpose of Kohanga Reo and their kaupapa . The Taskforce is not a party to the Tripartite Relationship Agreement and the Trust Board does not understand why the Taskforce has chosen to comment on the Tripartite process. Very little eventuated from the Tripartite relationship, so the Trust Board cannot understand why the Taskforce suggested this mechanism. In any event, it is clear that the Taskforce did not obtain enough information to accurately report on the Tripartite Relationship Agreement. The Trust Board is not saying that it does not need to be subject to any accountability measures. Rather, it is saying that such measures should not be aligned to those of ECE services, as Kohanga Reo are not an ECE service. There can be no suggestion that the Trust Board does not account appropriately. It has never had a qualified audit report. The Ministry of Education even commissioned a castings review of the Trust Board, the Pricewaterhouse Coopers' review (see paragraphs 80 to 81 below). That review showed that the costs incurred by the Trust Board were reasonable and its record keeping processes robust. In fact, the one submission received by the Taskforce that mentions the accountability of Kohanga Reo 2 states thae

67.

68.

69.

32

Submission 30 to the ECE Taskforce dated 8 December 2010, released to the Trust Board under the Official Information Act 1982 on 9 November 2011 .

18

Nga Kohanga Reo have always had strict guidelines with their spending and have loads of paperwork before their funding is released why haven 't the MOE centres[?]

70.

The Trust Board, as kaitiaki of K6hanga Reo and kaupapa, is also accountable to K6hanga Reo whanau. The purpose of the Trust Board is to protect the K6hanga Reo kaupapa . Making the Trust Board's reporting and compliance requirements the same as those of other ECE services would undermine the role of the Trust Board as kaitiaki, whanau management, value of kaumatua and the kaupapa of K6hanga Reo.

71.

72 .

The Trust Board's comments in relation to implementing the recommendations of the Galien report and Pricewaterhouse Coopers' report are dealt with below alongside specific comments in the Report related to those issues.
Te Kohanga Reo- Page 145 As we have mentioned in Essay 4: Achieving Access for all Mokopuna we unequivocally acknowledge the phenomenal achievements of Kohanga Reo in relation to whanau development and Maori language revitalisation. Having said that, the disproportionate number of supplementary ERO reviews of Kohanga Reo suggest concerns must be addressed.
[Emphasis added]

73.

See the Trust Board 's comments above at paragraphs 46 to 56.

Te Kohanga Reo National Trust Reviews- page 145 The Gal/en report resulted from a working group set up by the Minister in 2001 in response to a request from the Trust for a direct relationship with the Crown. recommended: A tripartite relationship agreement be drawn up between the Trust, the Ministry of Education and Te Puni Kokiri, to enhance the Trust's current relationship with Government. That the Trust allow Kohanga Reo to receive capital funding through the Trust from the Ministry of Education's Discretionary Grants Scheme without incurring repayments by them to the Trust. and that the Government agrees to a process to support future funding commitments previously met by the Property Putea including. specificallv. funding for Te Arahiko. Maori Language Training. Resource Development and Research. Devolution of Kohanga from the Trust to iwi within five years . facilitated by the Ministry of Education and Te Puni Kokiri. Support for the Trust to redefine its future role was to include professional development, curriculum development, advocacy and professional leadership. The first two recommendations were actioned. but the third was not.
[Emphasis added]

The Working Group

74. 75.

The second recommendation of the Galien report was not actioned . From 1982-1989, there was no capital funding provided to K6hanga Reo until the Ministry of Education required "approved" buildings that were aligned to ECE requirements.

19

76.

The initial capital funding received by K6hanga Reo was termed "discretionary grants or loans" (1990) and this led to the establishment of the Property POtea scheme by the Trust Board. This scheme was mandated by K6hanga Reo nationally to generate funds for K6hanga Reo developments around computers, training, staffing, resources, health and whanau assistance where government funding was not available. The Government then disestablished the Property POtea scheme following the Galien report. On cessation of the scheme, the Trust Board had been led to believe that K6hanga Reo would have funding set aside to compensate what the Trust Board had lost through the disestablishment of the Property Putea scheme . The Trust Board received no additional monies to support the establishment of new K6hanga Reo. K6hanga Reo were then forced into the contestable round with all ECE providers and received no special consideration . The Trust Board has not received any funding for computers or resource development to date. Further, the Galien report's recommendation to devolve K6hanga Reo from the Trust Board to iwi within five years was not for the Taskforce to comment on. That issue is for K6hanga Reo whanau to decide and involves a discussion between Te K6hanga Reo whanau , lwi and The Trust Board 's mandate comes from the K6hanga Reo whanau throughout Aotearoa Since the Galien report, the Trust Board has revisited the devolution idea a number of times with K6hanga Reo whanau nationally. Under Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori are guaranteed the right to exercise tina rangatiratanga over taonga Maori, including K6hanga Reo. Accordingly, it is for K6hanga Reo whanau to determine whether K6hanga Reo should be devolved and, if so, the timeframe and process for any devolution. It is not a matter for the Taskforce to comment on .

77.

78.

79.

Page 145-146 In 2006, the Ministry of Education commissioned Pricewaterhouse Coopers to undertake a castings review of the Trust. The review found that the costs incurred by the Trust were reasonable when compared to similar organisations in the non-government organisation sector and the record keeping processes were reasonably robust. The recommendations of that review extended to the relationship between the Ministry, the Trust and Kohanga Reo, and suggested a facilitated forum to discuss the issues raised in the report. The suggested next steps were:

an examination of the funding and expenditure of the Trust. in the light of the earlv childhood education sector. the Ministrv's goals. the philosophies of the Trust and the Kohanga Reo movement and the wider socio-economic environment; to include a comparison with other parts of the earlv childhood education sector.

A Tripartite Review of funding, quality and sustainability of Kohanga Reo (by Te Kohanga Reo National Trust, Te Puni Kokiri and the Ministry of Education) was established in September 2008 and was to have completed its report by June 2009. However, recommendations are yet to be produced. We understand that the remaining recommendations of the Price waterhouse Coopers review are now part of this Tripartite Review process.
[Emphasis added]

20
80. The Trust Board notes that the Pricewaterhouse Coopers' review found that the Trust Board's costs were reasonable and robust. The review also found that the Trust Board was under-funded for the provision of front line operational support and advice to Kohanga Reo. This has not been adjusted in the past 14 years and the Trust Board continues to operate on the same level of resourcing that the Ministry set for it in 1997. As already noted above, the remaining recommendations of the Pricewaterhouse Coopers' review, i.e. a review of the Trust Board itself, was not part of the Tripartite Working Group process. That was never agreed between the Tripartite parties to be within the scope of the Tripartite work.

81.

Page 146 It appears that the te Kohanga Reo movement has, for some time, been viewed as too hot a political issue to touch. Added to this, any scrutiny of the institution is difficult because the Te Kohanga Reo National Trust strongly objects to what it views as any attempt to diminish its autonomy. However, while some Kohanga Reo are providing exceptional Maori immersion early childhood education, the issues outlined in Essay 2: Reprioritising Government Expenditure raise questions about consistent quality early childhood education provision, and national body leadership for all Mokopuna who attend Kohanga Reo, and whether the Trust is a key barrier or contributor to the original aspiration of the movement. Political sensitivities in any guise should never trump the safety and well-being of Mokopuna.

lack of progress in the area of ensuring quality early childhood education provision, targeted support and guidance from Kohanga Reo is of great concern to the ECE Taskforce. We discuss our view of the nature of quality in Essay 1: Aiming for High-Quality Services. We believe meaningful change is overdue and must be addressed. We need to do whatever it takes for all Mokopuna to have access to quality early childhood education in the form that is most appropriate for them and their community. That is their right. Therefore, we recommend the current Tripartite Review be completed immediatelv. and that the quality of initial teacher training should be added to the Tripartite Review. We a/so think that Te Kohanga Reo National Trust's reporting and compliance requirements should be aligned with those required in other early childhood education settings. We also believe that the recommendations of the Gallen Report (2001) and the

PricewaterhouseCoopers Report (2006) on Te Kohanga Reo National Trust should be revisited and where appropriate, implemented.
[Emphasis added]

82 .

The Trust Board and Kohanga whanau was alarmed to read the comments in the Report above, which are without foundation . The Taskforce did not attack any other organisation in such a direct matter yet it chose to target the Trust Board and Kohanga Reo without seeking the Trust Board's or K6hanga whanau views prior to publication . The Trust Board considers those findings and comments extremely inappropriate, for the following reasons: (a) The Taskforce suggests that the Trust Board is self-interested . The Trust Board refutes that implication. The Trust Board acts upon the mandate of K6hanga Reo whanau and, as long as it has the mandate of K6hanga whanau , it will continue to represent them to the best of its ability to protect the Kohanga Reo kaupapa. It is disappointing that the Taskforce chose to interpret the Trust

21

Board's role in the way that it did. Again, it conveys a lack of understanding about the role of the Trust Board, as kaitiaki; (b) The Taskforce questions consistent and quality ECE provision and national body leadership for Mokopuna attending Kohanga Reo. However, Kohanga Reo are not an ECE service nor should they strive to meet quality requirements of an ECE service, which undermines the nature and kaupapa of Kohanga Reo. The Trust Board is not "a key barrier" to the Kohanga Reo movement and after decades of working to promote the Kohanga Reo kaupapa, it was offended to see this suggestion published without any grounds to support it. Rather, the Trust Board has been instrumental in ensuring the survival of the Kohanga Reo kaupapa; Further, the Taskforce says that a lack of progress in targeted support and assistance for Kohanga Reo is of great concern. It fails to provide any detail about this or say whether it might be due to the fact that the Trust Board has been underfunded for the provision of front line operational staff and advice to Kohanga Reo, as found by the Pricewaterhouse Coopers' report. As part of its role, the Trust Board provides support and assistance to Kohanga Reo whanau, but was not consulted about this; As set out already above, the Tripartite Review was not about a review of the Trust Board . The Taskforce is not a party to the Tripartite Relationship Agreement and it was not its place to comment on that work or to suggest matters which should be added to that work; and Again, suggesting that the Trust Board's reporting and compliance requirements be aligned with ECE services fails to recognise the role of the Trust Board as kaitiaki and the nature and purpose of Kohanga Reo and their kaupapa .

(c)

(d)

(e)

83.

The recommendations of the Galien report and Pricewaterhouse Cooper's report have already been dealt with above.

Cost Considerations -page 148 Amending licensing categories and regular review of regulations can be met within the businessas-usual activities of the Ministrv of Education, as can completion of the review of Te Kohanga Reo National Trust.
[Emphasis added]

84.

This is incorrect. Again, the Tripartite did not include a review of the Trust Board and it is not the Taskforce's place to suggest otherwise. Completion of the Tripartite Working Group cannot be met within "business-as-usual activities of the Ministry of Education". The Tripartite Working Group did not result in any meaningful progress.

85.

The Change Process- page 148

In phase one of our chanae orocess, we urge that all immediate concerns with quality are addressed. Therefore, reviewing the quality of early childhood education in the home-based part

22
of the sector that for under two-year aids, and accountability of the Te Kohanga Reo National Trust should begin as soon as practicable. This may result in regulatory change. We anticipate that parts of this change may create tension within the sector. Phase one should include the establishment of support mechanisms for Maori and Pasifika early childhood education services; support for any service receiving an ERO supplementary review; the completion of the Tripartite Review of Te Kohanga Reo National Trust; the revisiting of this review along with previous reviews and an alignment of Te Kohanga Reo National Trust's reporting and compliance requirements with those required of other earlv childhood education settings. Phase one should also include the design of a comprehensive Maori professional development and high qualitv advice and guidance programme, by both internal and external providers for Kohanga Reo. This process must also include evaluation of the quality of the advice and guidance provided.

86.

See the Trust Board's comments above.

23

APPENDIX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

Role and Scope - Page 176 The role of the Taskforce will be to:
a.

undertake a full review of the value gained from the different types of government investment in early childhood education in New Zealand. consider the efficiency and effectiveness of Government's current early childhood education expenditure, and ways that this might be improved, particularly for Maori, Pasifika, and Mokopuna from low socio-economic backgrounds

b.

87.

The Trust Board does provider. However, we Taskforce to undertake including its history and

not agree that Kohanga Reo should be defined as an ECE believe that the scope of the terms of reference required the a full and robust review of the value gained from Kohanga Reo kaupapa.

88.

As already mentioned above, the Report refers to Kohanga Reo as " ... the largest and oldest Maori immersion early childhood education institution in New Zealand . The first Kohanga Reo was established in 1982" (page 57). That does not adequately reflect the history and value of Kohanga Reo. At its peak, in 1993, there were 809 Kohanga Reo that chartered to the Trust for the Kohanga Reo kaupapa, with 14,514 mokopuna. There were 471 Kohanga Reo chartered to The Trust Board, with 9,364 mokopuna as at 1 June 2011 when the Taskforce report was released. In Wai 262, the Tribunal noted the decline in numbers of Kohanga Reo and Maori participation: 33
Two clear conclusions can be drawn from these figures. The first is that the revival of the Maori language can succeed through programmes of Maori language education for Mokopuna. The second is that by the turn of the millennium there was strong evidence that this strategy had stopped working.

89.

90.

Since Kohanga Reo was brought within the ECE regulatory framework, there has been a steady decline in both numbers of Kohanga and numbers of mokopuna . What started out as a development initiative by Maori people for Maori people has been Policies have been driven to conform to an early childhood education model. continually adopted which deny the kaupapa of Kohanga Reo and tino rangatiratanga. Kohanga Reo is not an ECE service. It is the revitalisation of Maori language, customs, culture within a cultural framework of whanau . There is no evidence in the Report demonstrating that the Taskforce understood and recognised the Kohanga Reo kaupapa. The Taskforce also failed to adequately describe or analyse:

91 .

92.
33

Taumata Tuatahi, at p 161.

24

(a) (b)

The disparity in funding for Kohanga Reo; The rationale for Kohanga Reo receiving a lower level of funding than other education providers referred to in the Report - the Trust Board notes in this regard that the inequity of funding for Kohanga Reo based on the distinction between "teacher-led" and "whanau-led" centres was raised in two individual 34 submissions; and The negative impact of the disparity in funding on Kohanga Reo and its kaupapa.

(c) 93.

The Taskforce also restated findings from the Galien report (2001) and the Pricewaterhouse Coopers' Review (2006). However, it did not undertake any analysis of the findings of those reports nor is there evidence that they undertook any review of the value that Kohanga Reo adds. An example of the Taskforce not undertaking a full review includes the weight that the Taskforce placed on the ERO supplementary reviews as an indication of poor quality of Kohanga Reo. The Taskforce does not appear to have given consideration, as a possible reason for supplementary reviews, to the finding of the Pricewaterhouse Coopers' review that the Trust Board was under-funded for the provision of front line operational support and advice to Kohanga Reo. The Taskforce also had a responsibility to review and analyse whether there were any other quality frameworks that could indicate the quality of services for Kohanga Reo. The Trust Board does not believe that Kohanga Reo should have its quality measured by a quality framework that was developed for early childhood centres. Rather, we believe that Kohanga Reo should have a recognised quality framework to measure quality and performance that reflects the kaupapa of Kohanga Reo. As identified at paragraph 59 - 64 above, the Trust Board could have provided information to the Taskforce about a quality framework. The Taskforce should have provided analysis on how quality at Kohanga Reo can be effectively measured. Instead, it relied on a process undertaken by ERO that gives no recognition to the kaupapa of Kohanga Reo.

94.

95.

96.

97.

Page 177 The Taskforce should consider how this system contributes to education success in schooling and later life. It should also be mindful of Government's objectives around education success for Maori and Pasifika learners, the status of Ka Hikatia - Managing for Success and the Pasifika Education Plan as key strategies for these populations, and the prime importance of provision which recognises language, culture and identity as key for increasing participation in early childhood education and improving learner outcomes.

98.

The Trust Board does not believe that the Taskforce could consider matters of language, culture and identity without first considering the Trust Board's position as kaitiaki of the Kohanga Reo kaupapa, the role of whanau in kohanga reo and the value of Kaumatua in fostering te Reo Maori as a living language. The Taskforce did not

34

Submission 260 to the ECE Taskforce dated 22 December 2010 and Submission 311 to the ECE Taskforce dated 30 January 2011 , released to the Trust Board under the Official Information Act 1982 on 9 November 2011 .

25
consider these matters. Nor did it consider the role of whanau development which is key to increasing educational success and participation by our people.

Process - Page 177 The Taskforce will meet to consider preparation of a report covering the areas above, to be made available in April 2011 . To support this goal, it may wish to: a. consider information about the current funding and policy settings for early childhood education in New Zealand b. consider current data on early childhood education in New Zealand, and national and international early childhood education research c. d. hear evidence from experts and interested parties. and conduct visits and fact-finding activities.

Responsibility of Members Members a. b. must act in the interests of all stakeholders including Mokopuna and parents should not represent any particular organisation or voice.

Members of the Taskforce will provide a breadth of perspectives ...

[Emphasis added]

99.

Given the findings and comments of the Taskforce, the Trust Board and Kohanga Reo were interested parties and stakeholders in the Report but were not consulted or given the opportunity to address the adverse comments made about Kohanga Reo and the Trust Board. The Taskforce could have taken steps to hear evidence from Kohanga Reo experts and the Trust Board, visit the Trust Board or conduct fact-finding activities, but chose not to do so.

Takuta TTmoti Karetu Co-Chairperson

Tina Olsen-Ratana Co-Chairperson

Te Kohanga National Trust Board

20 December 2011