M ay

T HE I NUIT OF GREENLAND IN RECENT

YEARS HAVE ACHIEVED UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS OF POLITICAL AUTONOMY IN THEIR OWN LOCAL AFFAIRS. HOW DID THEY DO IT, AND ARE THERE LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FOR THE I NUIT IN THE OF NUNAVUT ?

20 13

D ou g Cr aig

CANADIAN P ROVINCE

NUNAVUT SELF-RULE Lessons from Greenland

Research focus
size and both occupy the arctic regions; and both Greenland and Nunavut have moved towards varying degrees of self-governance in recent years. This paper will examine the feasibility and desirability in translating the Greenlandic experience to the context of Nunavut. First, the Greenlandic home-rule model will be examined. Then, the pros and cons of adopting this approach in Nunavut will be considered. Finally, it will be argued that while there may be some areas in which Nunavut can look to Greenland for inspiration, particularly in the areas of language and resource rights, significant benefits exist for Nunavut to remain fully embedded within a federal Canada. Development To begin, it is necessary to consider how Nunavut and Greenland compare:

Introduction Aboriginal self-government in Canadas far northern regions has advanced significantly in recent years, particularly after the creation of the Territory of Nunavut in 1999. The official separation of Nunavut from the Northwest Territories occurred following the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act (NLCA) and the subsequent Nunavut Act, and represented the first significant change to Canadas political boundaries since Newfoundland and Labrador joined Canada in 1949 (Henderson 2007, 3). Meaning our land in Inuktitut, the creation of Nunavut represented a significant recognition of Inuit land rights by the federal government, as well as the acknowledgement by the federal government that Canadas Inuit do have the right to self-govern within the framework of the Canadian Constitution. In spite of this, an ongoing question remains: how far should self-government extend to Canadas Inuit? This paper will look to the experience of Greenland, and ask whether the Greenlandic model of home-rule could or should be implemented as an institutional reform in Nunavut, Canada and to what extent. The comparison of Greenland with Nunavut was chosen because of significant similarities. They are both subnational units composed predominantly of Inuit people, the majority of whom speak the closely related Inuit dialects of Kalaallisut and Inuktitut, respectively; geographically they are similar in

Landsstyre and Landsting therefore make decisions without the interference of the Danish government, and together form the Greenland government located in Nuuk (rvik 1984, 936). In spite of a significant level of decision -making autonomy, Denmark remains a unitary state and the devolved Greenlandic legislature is still subordinate to the Danish Folketing, or national parliament of Denmark. The second category relates to matters which Copenhagen has the exclusive right to make decisions, but always with consultation of the Greenlandic government; this includes areas such as foreign relations, defense policies, and fiscal policy as related to the Danish krone Figure 1: Case Study Comparison which is currently in circulation in Greenland Nunavut Greenland (rvik 1984, 936). The third, and most controversial, section Type of polity Subnational unit; Subnational unit; territo- Similar of the home-rule agreement comprisautonomous country ry of Canada es issue-areas of joint concern which within Kingdom of Denmay be administered by either the mark Type of national govUnitary state Federal state Different Danish or Greenlandic governments, upon request by the Greenlandic government ernment. Nils rvik describes this as Constitutional monarchy Yes Yes Similar the cafeteria principle, in which Official Languages Kalaallisut (Western Inuktitut, French, EngDifferent Greenland can pick and choose if it Greenland Inuit dialect) lish wants to take over an issue-area and Population 57,713 (2013 est.) 34, 028 (2012) Similar transfer it to its regional jurisdiction. This means that an area of joint conGeographic location High arctic High arctic Similar cern automatically falls to CopenhaLand area 2,166,086 km2 2,038,722 km2 Similar gen to manage yet at any time Nuuk can choose to take over the authority Percentage Inuit (2011) 89% 84% Similar of certain policy areas. However, (Greenland 2013) (Nunavut 2012) the Greenlandic by doing so Nuuk then shoulders the Description of Reform: The Greenland Model Home Rule Act prepared by the joint Greenfull responsibility of financing the programme land-Danish Commission which set the legal in question and any related costs (rvik 1984, Inuit self-governance reform has been largely basis for Greenlands future status within the 936). This arrangement has allowed for sigsuccessful in Greenland, and the current status of constitutional framework of the Kingdom of nificant Greenlandic autonomy while at the Greenland is that of an autonomous country Denmark (Loukacheva 2007, 7). Following same time curbing complete separation due to within the Kingdom of Denmark. This status is a this act, Kalaallisut became the only official financial restraints, because Greenland is not recent victory for the Greenlandic people, and was language of Greenland which represented a currently fully capable of financing its own gained through a process of negotiation, comproshift towards Greendlandicization to reverse programs without Danish assistance. It was mise, referendums, and in some cases downright previous Danish policies (Auchet 2011, 961). agreed that the subsidization of Greenland by rejections of imposed Danish reforms and public In addition to complete language rights, the Denmark was to be reassessed on an annualpolicy. This process culminated in what is known act also granted the resident population of basis based on need, which left the door open today as the Greenland home-rule arrangement; Greenland fundamental rights to all natural for the potential for complete autonomy of a reform model which has granted unprecedented resources; renewable and non-renewable Greenland if its economy were to grow over autonomy to Greenland over its language rights, (rvik 1983, 76). time to the extent that it could fully fund itself resource rights, and local political institutions. (rvik 1983, 77). The Greenlandic Home Rule Act represented Home-rule as a concept refers to the power of a an arrangement to divide decision-making Arguments in Favor of Reform constituent subunit of a state to exercise signifipowers between Copenhagen and Nuuk, the cant administrative control over its own affairs, capital of Greenland, into three distinct cateHaving now considered the Greenlandic modand which entails a high degree of decentralizagories (rvik 1984, 935). Matters concerning el of the home-rule arrangement, let us now tion from the central government (Doubleday the internal regional and local affairs of turn to Nunavut to consider whether this mod2003, 299). To provide a context for this decenGreenland were determined to be the excluel can be adopted to meet local needs. tralization process in Greenland, beginning in sive responsibility of the Greenlandic 1953 there was an increasing Danisization of Landsstyre and Landsting, which correspond Up until the 1960s, Inuit participation in the Greenlandic society, during which time the central roughly to the Canadian equivalent of the administration of their own affairs in Canada Danish government enacted policies which faprovincial government and provincial legislawas minimal, mostly because the necessary vored the Danish minority in Greenland and enture, respectively (rvik 1984, 935). The administration required at the time was also

couraged young Inuit to leave Greenland and pursue higher education in Denmark (Auchet 2011, 960). Though accompanied by stable economic growth, this period resulted in a cultural shock and strong backlash from the Inuit majority (Auchet 2011, 960). A referendum was held in 1972 on entry into the European common market, and while 70% of Greenlanders rejected this policy move, it was pushed through by Copenhagen (Auchet 2011, 960). The growing Inuit frustration resulted in a pro-independence movement and a demand for greater autonomy. After a series of negotiations, formal semi-independence from Denmark was granted in 1979 after the signing of

minimal (Cairns 2000, 20). Previously, the federal government had administered the North in an almost continuing state of absence of mind, and the prevailing attitude of the federal government was that the Inuit were unable to make the right decisions for themselves (Cairns 2000, 20). From the central governments perspective, consent of the Inuit was not important, as can be seen in government relocation programs of the Inuit in the 1950s to strategic locations in the far north to secure Canadas sovereignty claims (Cairns 2000, 20). Over the course of the following decades the perspective of the federal government changed, as can be seen in the Royal Commission of Aboriginal Peoples report entitled Partners in Confederation of 1993 which recognized the inherent aboriginal right of self-governance in Canada (Cairns 2000, 32). It was at this time that the term First Nations first appeared, to clearly acknowledge the historical priority of these people within Canada (Cairns 2000, 32). As mentioned, the creation of Nunavut resulted from the initial signing on July 3, 1993 of the NLCA, which was the result of negotiations between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area, then part of the Northwest Territories, and the Crown representing the Government of Canada. The NLCA represented the largest comprehensive, constitutionally recognized land claims agreement in Canada, which guaranteed Inuit control of roughly 350,000 km2 of land in addition to 35,257 km2 of mineral rights; the remaining land in Nunavut was agreed upon to remain Crown land (Loukacheva 2007, 41). The NLCA set the groundwork for the eventual creation of the Territory of Nunavut in 1999, via the Nunavut Act which was a constitutional amendment carried out through the unilateral consent of the Canadian Parliament. Both acts set the groundwork for the governance system of the new territory in which public governance, rather than Inuit selfgovernance, was enacted (Loukacheva 2007, 39). In order for Nunavut to follow the home-rule

model of Greenland, this would mean reforming the decision-making powers of the territory and redefining the relationship of Iqaluit with Ottawa. There would need to be a new institutional framework necessary to determine the decision-making powers between the central and territorial government. This framework would need to clearly define what powers are solely under the jurisdiction of Iqaluit, such as all regional and local affairs of Nunavut; it would have to define what powers are solely under federal jurisdiction, such as military defense, fiscal policy, and international relations; and it would also need to include the cafeteria principle in which Iqaluit would be able to choose additional areas over which it would like jurisdiction as long as it could fully fund any related costs in these areas. Such an institutional reform of Nunavut would no doubt elevate the status of Nunavut domestically and abroad and could conceivably lead to further empowerment, a preservation of cultural integrity, and could also lend legitimacy to the right of the Nunavummiut people to further autonomy (Macklem 1995, 31). A strong advocate for enhanced Inuit autonomy in Nunavut is Natalia Loukacheva, who, upon considering the cases of both Greenland and Nunavut herself reaches the conclusion that the subnational governments of both should push for more rights. Loukacheva argues that any dialogue on Inuit selfgovernance, whether in Nunavut or Greenland, needs to incorporate Inuit perspectives on autonomy. The problem, as she sees it, is that traditionally there were no formalized indigenous concepts of sovereignty, land rights, or resource rights; which makes contemporary dialogue on self-governance difficult as the Inuit of today struggle to negotiate a political and legal system that is inherently foreign to them. Loukacheva goes on to argue that the Inuit right to autonomy should encompass not only control over local jurisdictions, but also the right to direct Inuit participation in international affairs which affect the Inuit homeland. In practice, this view advocates that Nunavut should continue to push for additional control over its own affairs, including the right of Iqaluit to conduct bilateral relations with other nations independent of any oversight from Ottawa. Other proponents of increased aboriginal selfrule in Canada recognize the argument of Canadian Inuit organizations that the right of self -government relates to the right of selfdetermination, which is an aboriginal right protected under Canadian common law (Moss 1995, 58). Many Canadian Inuit organizations

thus see constitutional amendments specifically recognizing self-government as extremely desirable and even crucial. One reason put forth as to why aboriginal groups in Canada should be entitled to exclusive jurisdiction over their lands is that of prior sovereignty; that is, the recognition that these groups exercised such jurisdiction prior to European contact, and therefore should be allowed to continue doing so (Macklem 1995, 13). In terms of economic autonomy, since its creation as a new territory Nunavut has yet to enter into any devolution negotiations with Ottawa, unlike the Yukon and Northwest Territories. This is in stark contrast to Greenland, which obtained full jurisdiction over its offshore mineral deposits; such as gold, zinc, lead, iron, and precious metals; and substantial untapped offshore oil and gas fields. The revenues from these resources currently flow directly into Greenlands treasury, unlike Nunavut, which does not retain this power (Speca 2012, 62). If Nunavut were to move in the same direction as Greenland and retain the majority of its resource revenues, it is conceivable that this would significantly decrease Nunavuts heavy reliance on financial assistance and transfer payments from the federal government, as is currently the case under the annual Territorial Formula Financing (TFF) program (Dyck 2011, 69). Arguments Against Reform John Amagoalik, commonly referred to as the father of Nunavut, explains that Nunavut is not purely Aboriginal self-government because, right from the beginning, we have proposed that Nunavut be a public government where everyone has the same rights and responsibilities (Loukacheva 2007, 39). This distinction is significant because it means that Inuit self-rule, at the exclusion of non-Inuit within the territory, is not how Nunavut operates. There is no preference of one group of people over another. While it is true that the process which led to the creation of Nunavut represented a broad increase in the local power of the Inuit, it simply reflected the system of public government found in other provinces and territories (Billson 2001). However, due to the obvious Inuit majority in Nunavut, this situation has been called public government with an Inuit face; a nuance that describes how de facto Inuit self-rule is achieved without explicitly labeling it as such (Loukacheva 2007, 39). If this arrangement seems to work, and public governance meets the needs of the Inuit in Nunavut, then what reason is there to push for further reforms for Inuit self-rule?

its application in Nunavut, what lessons can be learned in terms of institutional reform? As is often the case, there are no obvious answers in black and white, but a compromise may be found in shades of grey. A nuanced perspective is therefore required; one in which striking a balance between the competing needs, interests, and capabilities of not only the Inuit within Nunavut, but of all Canadians, is the goal. This is echoed in Alan Cairns analysis of aboriginal self-governance in Canada. Cairns argues that our present discourse on aboriginal self-governance in Canada has a difficulty being both sensitive to our diversity [as Canadians] yet sympathetic and supAs mentioned previously, Nunavut relies heavily portive of a togetherness that is more than on the federal government for subsidization geographical (Cairns 2000, 6). While the through transfer payments to maintain its operatotal separation of Nunavut from Canada is not tions (Dyck 2011, 61). As it stands currently, preferable, neither is what Cairns calls Nunavut is in not economically self-sufficient, parallelism, in which aboriginal and nonwhich represents one reason why complete indeaboriginal communities coexist side-by-side pendence from Canada is not a realistic option for yet there is no cross-fertilization nor mutual Nunavut (Cairns 2000, 90). Not only the lack of sense of responsibility towards each other financial resources but also the small population (Cairns 2000, 6). Striking a middle ground of Nunavut poses a significant challenge to chasshould thus be the goal. This can be achieved ing the Greenland model. With a population of by supporting constitutional arrangements that less than 35,000 people Nunavut represents the foster a sense of common belonging, rather smallest subnational unit in Canada of any provthan separation, and using language such as ince or territory. The small populacitizen rather than treaty or tion poses a significant challenge nation, which have a distancing As long as the Inuit of to the required administrational effect; in order to allow for linkNunavut wish to remain requirements of implementing ages to flow between aboriginal part of a federal Canada, Greenlands home-rule model in and non-aboriginal communities there will always be a Nunavut. The small pool of human constitutionally recog(Cairns 2000, 92). Building muresources to draw from coupled tual responsibility and a shared nized place for them. with the lack of longstanding techsense of Canadian identity, therenical expertise in government administration posfore, is key. In addition, if public governance es significant challenges for Nunavut to pursue as it currently exists in Nunavut is effectively further self-rule (Billson, 2001). meeting the needs of the Inuit people, then perhaps a push towards the home-rule model In direct opposition to the normative assertion that of Greenland is not a necessity at this time. aboriginal people in Canada have the inherent right to self-rule, and thus special treatment, due It must also be recognized that Greenland and to the concept of prior residency; Tom Flanagan Nunavut are perhaps not perfectly analogous. derides this notion of what he calls aboriginal The simple fact that Denmark is a unitary state orthodoxy (Flanagan 2000, 4). He questions this and thus the Greenlandic government is suborso-called inherent right which he argues creates dinate to the central government in the Danish aboriginal communities within Canada that rely parliament is quite a significant difference. on the transfer of goods from other Canadians. This power difference may have fueled frusThus, Flanagan is clearly opposed to the current trations and separatist sentiment from Greensystem of transfer payments flowing from the land, which later led to the negotiations of the federal government to Nunavut. His thesis is that home-rule arrangement. In contrast, the aboriginal orthodoxy is unworkable, and actually federal nature of Canada allows for an equal harms those people it intends to help (Flanagan footing of the central government with the 2000, 4). provinces, in which there is no sense of hierarchy. The principle of equal division of power Final Analysis between the federal government and the provinces allows for regional decisions to be made After having considered the case of the Greenland and a relative sense of autonomy to exist. home-rule arrangement, and the pros and cons of Granted that while Nunavut is a territory and

currently does not have the same powers as other provinces, and is still under significant control of the federal government, it is conceivable that further devolution negotiations could lead to Nunavut being granted the powers enjoyed by other provinces, and thus allowing Nunavut to enjoy relative autonomy while remaining within the framework of a federal Canada. Perhaps Nunavut should not look to copy the Greenland model of homerule but rather develop its own model which adequately meets the needs of its Inuit population. Inspiration can be gained from the Greenlandic success story of negotiating further rights in the areas of language and control over resource revenues. In many ways, the question comes down to whether there is a mutual benefit for Nunavut to remain part of a federal Canada, or if there is more benefit for it to pursue its own destiny, apart from the of the rest of Canada. This echoes the similar dilemma facing Quebec and its historical push for separation from the Canadian state. In these debates, identity becomes a crucial factor. Do Quebecers feel Canadian? Do the Nunavummiut people feel Canadian? Is it possible to be both Inuit and Canadian at the same time? Are we stronger together, or apart? At the risk of introducing a personal bias into this analysis, it is suggested that it is our strengths, as well as our differences, which make us stronger as a nation and which contribute positively to the Canadian mosaic. This principle of multiculturalism, as defined in the Constitution Act of 1982, is a key pillar of Canadian heritage and a defining characteristic of Canadian values. As long as the Inuit of Nunavut wish to remain part of a federal Canada, and benefit from its strengths as a nation, there will always be a constitutionally recognized place for them.

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