Novelty,

coherence, and Mendeleevs periodic table

Abstract Predictivismistheviewthatsuccessfulpredictionsofnovelevidencecarrymoreconfirmationalweightthan accommodationsofalreadyknownevidence.Novelty,inthiscontext,hastraditionallybeenconceivedofas temporalnovelty.Howevertemporalpredictivismhasbeencriticizedforlackingarationale:whyshouldthe timeorderoftheoryandevidencematter?Instead,ithasbeenproposed,noveltyshouldbeconstruedinterms ofusenovelty,accordingtowhichevidenceisnovelifitwasnotusedintheconstructionofatheory.Onlyif evidenceisusenovelcanitfullysupportthetheoryentailingit.AsIpointoutinthispaper,thewritingsofthe mostinfluentialproponentofusenoveltycontainaweakerandastrongerversionofusenovelty.However bothversions,Iargue,areproblematic.WithregardtotheappraisalofMendeleevperiodictable,themost contentioushistoricalcaseinthepredictivismdebate,Iarguethattemporalpredictivismisindeedsupported, althoughinwaysnotpreviouslyappreciated.Onthebasisofthiscase,Iargueforaformofsocalled symptomaticpredictivismaccordingtowhichtemporallynovelpredictionscarrymoreconfirmationalweight onlyinsofarastheyrevealthecoherenceoffactsasidentifiedbythetheorytobereal. Keywords:novelprediction,usenovelty,coherence,DmitriMendeleev,periodictable

1 Introduction
Intuitionscanbestrongandneverthelessdeceptive.Thestatusofpredictionsintheoryassessmentappearsto confirmthis.Mostofussharetheintuitionthatatheoryssuccessfulpredictionofanunexpectedphysical effectshouldcountstronglyinfavourofthattheoryandinfactmoresothanthattheorysexplanationsor accommodationsofknownfacts.Itisalsosaidthatthereexistsaconfirmatoryasymmetrybetween predictionsandaccommodations,infavouroftheformer.Butwhatistherationaleforthatintuition?And whatisthehistoricalevidenceforthisintuition?AccordingtoWorrall(1985,2002,2005)theanswerstobothof thesequestionsisthereisnone.Worrallinsteadproposesthatinsciencetheoriesareassessedonthebasis ofthecriterionofusenovelty:evidenceisnovelnotonlywhenitisnovelinthetemporalsense,butalsoifit wasnotusedintheconstructionofthetheorythatentailsit.Theusenoveltycriterionismuchmore permissivethantemporalnovelty:evidencewhichdoesnotcountasnovelonthetemporalnoveltycriterion mayindeedcountasnovelontheusenoveltycriterion.Incontrasttothetemporalnoveltycriterion,says Worrall,theusenoveltycriterioncomesequippedwitharationale:evidencethatwasusedintheconstruction ofatheory,whichthatsametheoryentails,shouldnotcountinthattheorysfavoursincethetheorys

1/15

accommodationoftheevidencewasguaranteedbythewayinwhichthetheorywasconstructed.1Temporal predictivism,i.e.theviewthatphenomenadiscoveredafterthetheorypredictedthemcountmorethan phenomenathatwereknownatthetimethetheorywasproposed,Worrallpointsout,lacksarationale.Why shoulditmatterwhetherornotthetheoryortheevidencewhichthetheoryentailswasknownfirst? Besidescriticizingtemporalpredictivismforthelackofrationale,Worrallhasprovidedtwoindepth historicalstudies(onewithhiscollaboratorEricScerri)whereheseekstoshowthatthereisnohistorical evidencefortheviewthatscientistsvaluetemporallynovelpredictionsmorethantheexplanationofalready knownfacts.ThesecasesconcernFresnelswhitespotpredictionin1819(Worrall,1989)andMendeleevs predictionofnewchemicalelementsinthelatenineteenthcentury(Scerri&Worrall,2001)2.Thefirstcaseis uncontroversial.Worrallskillfullyandconvincinglyshowsthat,contrarytoallpriorexpectations,ourintuitions atleastinthiscasearemistaken.Poisson,amemberofthejuryassessingFresnelsworkfortheprestigious awardoftheFrenchAcademy,derivedanapparentabsurdconsequence,whichhadnotbeenrecognizedby Fresnelhimself:Fresnelstheorypredictedthatlightemanatingfromasmallholeshoneontoanopaquedisc wouldresultinasmallbrightspotatthecenterofthediscsshadow.ButWorrallfindsnoevidencewhatsoever inthelengthyreportsoftheAcademythatthisprimafacieimpressivepredictionhadanymoreimportforthe prizejudgesthanFresnelsexplanationofstraightedgediffractionpatternsthathadbeenknownfordecades beforeFresnelhadproposedhistheory.Ifanything,morepositiveemphasiswaslaiduponFresnels explanationthanonhissuccessfulpredictions3.TheassessmentofthestatusofMendeleevspredictionsof newchemicalelementsismuchmorecontroversial.Theclarificationofthiscontroversywillbeoneofthemain aimsofthispaper. ThisishowIproceed.InSection2,IcriticallydiscussbothaweakandastrongversionofWorralls accountofusenovelty,whichhiswritingscontainsidebyside,andwhichhasledtoconsiderableconfusionin theliterature.InSection3Iassessthehistoricalevidenceforandagainsttemporalpredictivismintheappraisal ofMendeleevsperiodictable.InSection4,IintroduceHitchcockandSobers(2004)conceptoflocal symptomaticpredictivism.WithregardtoMendeleevsperiodictableIthenargueforaspecificformof symptomaticpredictivism,accordingtowhichsuccessfulpredictionsareindicatorsforthetheoryhaving correctlyidentifiedacoherenceoffacts.Intheconclusionofthispaper(section5)Iproposethatalocal

Worrall(19891489)explicitlyreferstoPopper(1959)forhavingfirstarticulatedthisintuition.Theideathathypotheses shouldpassseveretestshasmorerecentlybeeninterpretedintermsoferrorstatistics(Mayo,1991). 2 SeealsovariouscasestudiesbythehistorianStephenBrush.Thereisfurthermoreasetofnonhistoricalexamplesthat hasbeencirculated,allininfavouroftemporalpredictivism(Lange,2001;Maher,1988;White,2003).Harker(2006) arguesconvincinglythattheseexamplesdonotbearonthepredictivismdebate,fortheirpersuasivenessdependsonthe beliefthatthepredictedeventsinquestionareunpredictableinprinciple(suchastheoutcomeofalottery).Ifgiven evidencethat,undercertaincircumstances(e.g.ariggedlottery,anunfaircoin),primafacieunpredictableeventshave indeedbeengenuinelypredicted,wearecertainlyboundtobeimpressed.Howeverpredictionsinsciencedonothave thatcharacter.Althoughcertainpredictionsmightbesurprising,theyaregenerallynotpredictionsofprimafacie unpredictableevents. 3 InfactFresnelstheorymadeanothersurprisingpredictionthatwasconfirmed.Itpredictedablackspotoftotal darknessatcertaindistancesbeyond(andinlineof)aholeinanopaquescreenonwhichlightisshone.

2/15

symptomaticpredictivismmightbethemostplausibletheoryofthestatusofpredictionsintheappraisal theoriesingeneral.

2 Weak and strong usenovelty

Worrallswritings(botholdandnew)containtwounappreciatedversionsoftheusenoveltycriterion.Inthe weakerversion,
Weak UN: Evidence e counts as novel with regard to a theory T entailing e, if e was not used in the constructionofT.EvidencethatisusenovelwithregardtoTsupportsT.

Inthisversion,inordertojudgewhetherornotagivenpieceofevidencesupportsthetheorythatentailsthis evidence,wehavetolookathowthetheorywasconstructed(Worrall1978,p.313).Inotherwords,Worrall believesthecontextofdiscoverytodirectlybearonthecontextofjustification.Furthermore,onWorralls view,itisamistaketotreatthedowngradingofadhocexplanationsandtheapparentupgradingofgenuine predictionsastwoseparatemethodologicalphenomena.Atroot,Worrallcontinues,theyarethesame phenomena(1989,p.148).Wecanthereforeformulateacriterionforwhatitisforatheorytobeadhoc, whichisimplicitinWorrallsWeakUN:

Weak ad hocness: a theory T entailing evidence e is ad hoc with respect to e, if e was used in the constructionofT.Thenelendsno(oronlylittle)supporttoT.

CalltheviewthatsubscribestoWeakUNandWeakadhocnessheuristicpredictivism.Heuristicpredictivism invitesallsortsofdamningobjections.First,asmanywritershavepointedout(Gardner,1982;Hudson,2007; Musgrave,1974),itishighlyimplausibletoassume,asheuristicpredictivismdoes,thatcontingentand potentiallyobscurefactsabouttheoryconstructionbyindividualsshouldinanywayinfluencethecommunitys assessmentofthetheoryinquestion.Canwereallyassumethatindividualsarenormallysufficiently transparentandhonestaboutthewayinwhichtheyconstructedtheirtheories,forthecommunitytobeable tomaketheirassessment?WorralldoesexplicitlyclaimthattobethecaseparticularlyinhisstudyofFresnels wavetheoryoflight(1989,p.154),butevenifhewererightinthisinstance,Idontthinkwecanassumethat onageneralbasis.ForWorrall'saccounttobeareasonableaccountoftheoryconfirmation,however,this wouldhavetobethecase.Otherwisethequestionofwhetheratheoryisconfirmedbytheevidenceornot regularlywouldbe"upintheair"inthepracticeofscience.Andgivenhowdifficultithasprovenevenfor philosophersandhistorianstodetermineunambiguously,insystematicresearch,whetherornotacertain pieceofevidencewasusedinatheory'sconstruction,itishardtoseethatscientists,whodonothavea systematicinterestinthisquestion,wouldregularlysucceedinansweringit.Second,heuristicpredictivismis incoherent.Worrallwantstosaythatthereisnoasymmetryintheconfirmationatheoryreceivesfromuse novelaccommodationsandpredictions.ForWorrall,usenovelaccommodatedandpredictedevidenceareon aparwithrespecttohowmuchtheysupportatheory.Itisthissymmetry,afterall,thatallowshimto accommodatethehistoricalevidencesurroundingtheappraisalofFresnelswavetheoryoflight,Einsteins theoryofgeneralrelativity,and(possibly)Mendeleevsperiodictable.ButitisquestionablewhetherWorrallis reallyentitledtothatsymmetry.Afterall,temporallynovelevidenceisbyfarthebestusenovelevidenceone

3/15

canget.Withtemporallynovelevidence,onecannotpossiblymanipulateatheoryentailingthatevidencesoas toaccommodatethatevidence.Incontrast,withevidenceethatwasalreadyknownatthetimethetheoryT entailedit,thereisalwaysthepossibilitythatewasusedintheconstructionofT.4Pairedwiththedifficultyof determiningequivocallywhetherornotknownevidencewasactuallyusedintheconstructionofatheoryor not(asdiscussedabove),temporallynovelevidence,evenontheheuristicaccount,isthebestevidenceone canget.Therefore,itseemsthatWorrallisnotentitledtopresumeaconfirmationalsymmetrybetween knowntobeusenovelandnotknowntobeusenovelevidence.5Thelatter,alsoonhisaccount,shouldcount morethantheformerintheappraisaloftheories.SoifWorrallhasshownthatthehistoricalrecord underminestemporalpredictivism,thatsamehistoricalrecordalsounderminesheuristicpredictivism. Worralliswellawareofatleastthefirstdifficultyofheuristicpredictivism.Indeed,hiswritingscontain astrongerversionoftheUNcriterion,whichanswerstothisfirstobjection(Worrall,2002,2005).
Strong UN: Evidence e counts as novel with regard to a theory T entailing e, if e was not needed in the construction of T, or, equivalently, there is no free parameter in T that would allow us to fix T in such a wayastoaccommodatee.EvidencethatisnovelwithregardtoTsupportsT.

Accordingly,
Strongadhocness:atheoryTentailingeisadhocwithrespecttoeifthereisafreeparameterinTthat needsto be fixed in order forT to entail e. A theory that is ad hoc with regard to e receives only little or nosupportfrome.

Thestrongerversioncircumventsthefirstproblemofheuristicpredictivism,sinceitnolongermattersatall whetherornotascientistconstructingatheoryactuallyusedacertainpieceofevidenceintheconstructionof thattheory:

[I]tisnopartoftheheuristicviewthatitshouldmatterwhatEinsteinwasworryingaboutatthetimehe producedhistheory,whatmattersisonlywhetherheneededtousesomeresultaboutMercuryinorder totiedownsomepartofhistheory.(Worrall,1985p.319) [T]here is no specific parameter within that theory that could have been fixed on the basis of [the Mercuryobservations]soastoproduceaspecifictheorythatentailedthoseobservations.(Worrall,2005 p.819)

Butifallweneedtoconsider,whenassessingtheevidentialsupportforatheory,iswhetherthattheorydoes ordoesnotcontainaparameterwhichcouldhavebeenfixedinordertoaccommodatecertainevidence,then thewayinwhichthetheorywasconstructedcannolongerbeofinterest.ContrarytoWorrallsweaker version,thecontextofdiscoveryandthecontextofjustificationnowcomeapart(e.g.Worrall,2005p.819). Giventhattheactualuseofapieceofevidenceintheconstructionofthetheoryisnolongerofinterestinthis strongerversion,thelabelheuristicpredictivismnolongerseemsappropriate.Itwouldthereforeperhaps

This,infact,istherationalethatdefendersoftemporalpredictivismoftengive(seee.g.Lipton,2004,1401). WithknowntobeusenovelevidenceIhererefertoevidencethatwasknowntobenotusedintheconstructionofa theory.

5

4/15

betterbereferredtoasakindofparameterfixingaccount.6Worrallsparameterfixingaccountnotonly addressesthefirstbutalsothesecondproblemofheuristicpredictivism.Whereasheuristicpredictivism additionallytothewantedasymmetrybetweenusenovelpredictionsandnonusenovelpredictionsimplies anunwantedconfirmatoryasymmetrybetweenusenovelaccommodationsandusenoveltemporal predictions(apparentlywithoutWorrallandothersbeingawareofit),theparameterfixingaccountdoesgive Worrallwhatheneeds.Ontheparameterfixingaccount,neitherinusenovelaccommodationsnorinuse noveltemporalpredictionscouldwehavepossiblyfixedtheparametersofthetheoryinsuchawayasto accommodatethedatainquestion:inneithercaseisthereaparameterinthetheorythatwouldallowustodo so.DespitetheprogressWorrallmakeswithhisparameterfixingaccountoverheuristicpredictivism(bothof whichhiswritingscontainsidebysidewithoutbeingproperlydistinguished),7however,eventheparameter fixingaccountfacesanumberofdifficulties.Beforediscussingthose,letusconsideranotherimportant amendmentWorrallmakestoStrongadhocness. ItisanimplicitmethodologicalimperativealsoofWorrallsStrongversionofusenoveltythatadhoc modificationsbeavoided.Sometimes,however,theadhocaccommodationofevidenceisacceptable.Thisis sowhentheadhocmodificationofatheoryresultsinindependentandsupportedpredictions(Worrall,2005 p.818).Schematically,WorralldistinguishesbetweenthegeneraltheoryTandthespecifictheoryTthat resultsfromTafterthefixingofparametersinTonthebasisofevidencee(satisfyingStrongadhocness).Now evidenceedoessupportthegeneraltheoryTunconditionallyifefollowsnaturallyfromT.Butinthiscase, thereisnoparameterinTthatneedstobefixedonthebasisofeforTtoentaile(cf.Worrall,2002,2005). TherewillthereforebenoT.Ontheotherhand,ifthereisafreeparameterpforevidenceeinT,therewillbe aspecificversionofTwithpbeingfixedonthebasisoftheevidencee.Butthen,Worrallhasit,esupportsT onlyconditionalonTalreadybeingaccepted.IfthereisindependentsupportforT,eisrightlyconsideredtobe evidentialsupportforT.Sincethereisnosuchindependentsupportforcreationism,theGossifiedversionof creationism,i.e.,creationismplustheideathatfossilsaretheplayfulwritingsbyGodinstone,shouldnot receiveanysupportfromthefossilrecord.Inanycase,whetherthereisindependentsupportforTornot, whenthereisafreeparameterinTthatneedstobefixedonthebasisofeinordertoproduceT,edoesnot supportT.WorrallalsosaysthatthesupportTreceivesfromedoesnotspillovertoT.Howeverthereisone importantexception.IfTmakesa(usenovel)predictione(notpredictedbyT),whichthengetsconfirmed,e willsupportT.Inotherwords,inthatcasethesupportTreceivesfromedoesspillovertoT.Nowrecallthat Twastheoutcomeoffixingafreeparameteronthebasisofevidencee,whichbyWorrallslightsprimafacie qualifiesasanadhocaccommodation.Althoughewasaccommodatedinanadhocfashion,andtherefore strictlyspeakingdoesnotsupportT,thisisrenderedmethodologicallykosherretrospectivelybythe independentsupportthatthefixingofparametersinTgenerated.Worrallillustratesthisschemewithan intuitiveexample.WhenAdamsandLeverrierusedthedataofUranustoadjusttheNewtoniantheorysothat itwouldentailtherightorbitforUranus(essentially,byadjustingtheassumptionaboutthenumberofplanets inoursolarsystem),thenewtheoreticalsystem(i.e.,Newtonstheoryplusadjustedauxiliaryofplanet
HitchcockandSober(2004)alsodevelopaparameterfixingaccount.Iwilldiscusstheiraccountinthenextsection. Indeed,thetwounacknowledgedversionsofWorrallsaccounthavecausedafairamountofconfusionintheliterature. Seee.g.theexchangebetweenBarnes(2005)andWorrall(2005).
7 6

5/15

number)generatedaprediction(theexistenceoftheplanetNeptune)whichwassubsequentlyconfirmed. Worrallconcludesthat,duetotheindependentsupportthatensued,theuseofthatdata[ofUranus]inthe constructionofthattheoreticalsystemcannotbeabadthing,althoughgoodbookkeepingrequiresusto saythatUranusdatadonotsupportNewtonstheory(Worrall,2002197).ConsiderWorrallsslightlymore complicatedexampleofFresnelswavetheoryoflight.Fresnelsgeneraltheoryoflightdescribesthe functionalrelationshipbetweenthevariablesofwavelength(W)andmeasurableslitandfringedistances(SF) inthetwoslitexperiment.ThegeneraltheorydoesnotspecifywhyaparticularWshouldbemeasuredgivena particularmonochromaticlightsource.AparticularlightsourcesW,however,canbedeterminedby performingtherelevanttwoslitexperimentandbyfixingSFaccordingly.Thetheoryresultingfromthis parameterfixingWorrall,again,referstoasthespecificwavetheory.AlthoughStrongadhocnessisthus satisfied,the(apparent?)adhocaccommodationofthedatafromamonochromaticlightsourcesuchas sodiumarcislegitimate,becauseinaccordwithWorrallsindependentsupportconditionthespecificwave theorygeneratespredictionsthatareindependentlysupported(e.g.fringeseparationsinother monochromaticlightexperiments).Thesupportthatthosedatalendtothespecifictheorydoesspilloverto thegeneraltheory.Butstill,inaccordwithWorrallsgoodbookkeeping,thedatathatwereusedtofixthe parameterWinthegeneralwavetheoryinordertogeneratethespecificwavetheorydonotlendanysupport tothegeneraltheory. TheaboveamendmentofWorrallsaccounthasprovokedcriticism.First,Barnes(2005)criticizes Worrallfortheideathattheevidencewhichneedstousedintheconstructionofatheoryshouldnotsupport thattheory.8Considerthefollowingexample.Inthestandardmodelinparticlephysicsmorethantwentyfree parametersneedtobefixedonthebasisofexperimentsforthetheorytobeempiricallyaccurate.Itwouldbe clearlyoddtosaythatevidencethatneededtobeusedtofixtheparametersofthestandardmodeldoesnot supportthestandardmodel(ormoreprecisely,thatthesupportthespecificversionofthemodelreceives fromthatevidencedoesnotspreadtothegeneralmodel).Ifthatwereso,thestandardmodelwouldhave rathermeagersupportindeed.Second,asBarnes(2005)andalsoHudson(2007)pointout,Worralls independentsupportconditiononacceptableadhocmovesisflawed.Forinstance,creationistswhopropose toviewaparticularfossilrecordastheplayfulwritingsbyGodinstone(referredtobyWorrallastheGosse dodge)willseetheirtheorybeingindependentlyconfirmedbyfurtherfindingsoffossilsaroundtheworld. But,ofcourse,thesupportthespecificcreationisttheory(i.e.,theGossifiedversion)wouldreceivefromsuch independentconfirmation,contraWorrall,shouldnotspreadtothegeneralcreationisttheory.Creationismis aspurioustheorywithorwithoutindependentsupportfortheGossifiedversion.9Another,perhapsslightly moreconvincingexampleisthefollowing.TheLorentzFitzgeraldcontractionhypothesis(LFC)isoneofthe primeexamplesforanadhochypothesis.LFCwasinvokedtoaccommodateindynamicaltermsthenull resultoftheMichelsonMorleysetherdriftexperiments(1887).Popper(1959)soughttodismissLFCasadhoc
Worrall(2005820)hasrejectedthiscritiqueduetoqualmswithspecificsofBarnessexample(parameterfixingin Fresnelstheory). 9 Worrall(2005),inresponsetoBarnes(2005),seemstoadmitthatmuchwhenheintroducestheadditionalrequirement thattherebelogicalconstraintsimposedbythegeneraltheory.Theseconstraints,presentinthewavetheoryoflight butnotincreationism,areintegralpartofanindependentpredictioncountinginfavourofthegeneraltheory(asinthe wavetheory)(822).AlthoughWorrallillustratestheselogicalconstraints,hefailstospellthemoutconceptually.
8

6/15

modificationforitsfailuretogenerateanyindependentlytestablepredictions(Poppersdemandswerethus weakerthanWorralls).ContraPopper,Grnbaum(1959)pointedoutthatLFCdidmakeindependent predictions.Itforinstancedid(falsely)predictanonzerodegreeofetherdrift.Althoughthispredictionwas notdetectablewiththeMichelsonMorleyexperiments,itshouldhavebeendetectableinavariationofthose experiments,namelythesocalledKennedyThorndykeexperiments(cf.e.g.Janssen,2002).Nowsupposethat theindependentpredictionbyLFChadbeenconfirmedinthoselatterexperiments.Then,accordingto Worrallsscheme,thatsuccessfulindependentpredictionwouldhavesupportedthetheorythatLFCwas supposedtosave,namelyLorentzethertheory.Butisitreasonabletoassumethat?Ithinknot.Lorentzs theoryplusLFCwasspurious,nomatterwhetherornotthatcombinationwascapableofgenerating independentsupport.WhatiswrongwiththeorieslikeLorentz,Isurmise,isnotsomuchtheirneedforusing certaindatatofixtheirparameters,butrathertheirlackofcoherence.Ishallspelloutthedetailsofthisviewin Section4ofthispaper.Butbeforedoingso,Ishalladdinsulttoinjurybyarguingthat,contrarytoScerriand Worrall(2001),temporalpredictivismisindeedsupportedbythehistoricalfactssurroundingtheappraisalof Mendeleevsperiodictable.

3 The appraisal of Mendeleevs periodic tablethe evidence

ThecontroversyaboutthestatusofMendeleevssuccessfulpredictionsofnewchemicalelementshas centeredaroundtwopiecesofevidence.ThefirstpieceregardstheawardoftheDavymedaltoMendeleev andthesecondpiececoncernsbibliometricdata(Brush,1996).Letusbrieflyconsidertheminturn. Maher(1988),Lipton(2004),andBarnes(2008)havecitedtheawardoftheDavymedaltoMendeleev in1882bytheRoyalSocietyasevidencefortemporalpredictivism.Bythetimethemedalwasawarded,two chemicalelements(galliumandscandium)hadbeendiscoveredinaperiodof15years,whichMendeleevhad predictedwhenfirstproposinghisperiodictable(1871).Maher,Lipton,andBarnesseemtotreatthefactthat theDavymedalwasnotawardedtoMendeleevbeforeanypredictedelementswerediscoveredasevidence forpredictionsplayingavitalroleintheappraisalofMendeleevstable.Yetthisallegedsupportfortemporal predictivismcanquicklybedismissed.AsScerriandWorrall(2001)pointout,thereisnomentionwhatsoever intheDavymedallaudationofMendeleevssuccessfulpredictionsofchemicalnewelements.Rather, emphasisisputonthemarvelousregularityinthepropertiesintwoseriesofalreadyknownelementsas revealedbyMendeleevsperiodictable.Furthermore,theDavymedalwasjointlyawardedtoLotharMeyerfor histableofchemicalelements,who,contrarytoMendeleev,didnotmakeanypredictionsaboutanynew elements. Thesecondpieceofevidencetemporalpredictivistsciteinsupportoftheirviewisthefactthat Mendeleevsperiodictablereceivedarealboostofcitationsintheperiodof18761885,i.e.,shortlyafterthe firstsuccessfuldiscoveryofoneofMendeleevspredictedchemicalelementsin1875(Barnes2008).Inthat periodthenumberofcitationsinfacttripledcomparedtothenumberofcitationsMendeleevsperiodictable receivedinthefirstfouryearsafteritspublication(andbeforetheconfirmationofoneofhispredictions). Couldtherebeanyclearerevidencefortemporalpredictivismthanthat?Butacloserlookatthebibliometric datashedssomedoubtonthis.Intheyearsinwhichgallium(1875),scandium(1879),andgermanium(1886)

7/15

werediscovered,therespectivecitationsofMendeleevsperiodictablewhichalsomentionedthenewly discoveredelementswere15outof27,13outof21,and7outof26,respectively.Obviouslyalargenumberof thoseauthorswhodiscussedMendeleevsperiodictable(infactthemajorityof53%)didnotrefertothe successfulpredictionsshortlyaftertherespectiveelementswerediscovered.WithScerriandWorrallonemay wonderthatitwouldbestrangeindeedforanauthorwhohadbeendrawntoMendeleevsschemeinlarge partbyitspredictivesuccesstomakenomentionofthatsuccessatall(p.433).Thus,theabovementioned evidencefortemporalpredictivisminthecaseofMendeleevssuccessfulpredictionofnewchemicalelements isatbestequivocal. Inadditiontothesetwopiecesofevidence,however,thereisfurtherhistoricalmaterialthatneedstobe consideredintheassessmentofthestatusofnovelpredictionsfortheacceptanceofMendeleevsperiodic table.ThismaterialconcernsMendeleevscontrapredictions.

3.1 Contrapredictions
Successfulcontrapredictions(atermcoinedbythehistorianStephenBrush)arepredictionsoftheoriesthat inducecorrectionstoempiricalresultsthatwerehithertoacceptedascorrect.InterestinglyMendeleevhimself highlightedcontrapredictionsasofutmostimportanceintheassessmentoftheperiodictable:
Where,then,liesthesecretofthespecialimportancewhichhassincebeenattachedtotheperiodiclaw, andhasraisedittothepositionofageneralisationwhichhasalreadygiventochemistryunexpectedaid, and which promises to be far more fruitful in the future and to impress upon several branches of chemical research a peculiar and original stamp? [] In the first place we have the circumstance that, as soon as the law made its appearance, it demanded a revision of many facts which were considered by chemistsasfullyestablishedbyexistingexperience.(1901p.475)

InMendeleevstime,theatomicweightofanelementwasdeterminedbytheproductofanelementsvalence anditsempiricallydeterminedequivalentweight10.Accordingly,thereweretwosortsofcontrapredictions Mendeleevmade:(i)predictionsthatdemandedchangestoanelementspresumedvalencyand(ii)predictions thatdemandedchangestoanelementspresumedequivalentweight.Mendeleevmadeseveral counterpredictionsofboth(i)and(ii),wherebymostproposedatomicweightchangesassociatedwith(i) turnedouttobecorrect,andmostproposedchangesassociatedwith(ii)incorrect(Smith,1976p.326ff.)11. TherewerethreeprinciplesonthebasisofwhichMendeleevmadehiscontrapredictions(andinfactalsohis novelpredictions):atomicweightorderingfromlowertohighervalues,familyresemblanceoftheelementsin aparticulargroupinthetable,andsingleoccupancyofplacesinthetable.Anydiscrepancyintheresultsthat theapplicationofeachofthoseprinciplesimplied,forMendeleev,pointedtothereassessmentofatomic weight,familyresemblance,orboth.Mendeleevneverwaspreparedtoviolatetheprincipleofatomicweight ordering,despitegenuineexceptionstoit.12Whereasbeforemid1869Mendeleevmostlyrepositioned
Anelementsequivalentweightisitsrelativeweightasdeterminedbytheproportionwithwhichitcombineswith hydrogen(andlateroxygen). 11 Withregardtotheplacingoftheelementsintheperiodictable,however,thepicturewasreversed(cf.Smith,1976p. 326ff.). 12 Theseexceptionsconcernsocalledpairreversals,i.e.casesinwhichanelementE1,onthebasisofitschemical properties,wouldbegroupedafteranotherelementE2,despiteE1havingalowerweightthanE2.Forinstance,
10

8/15

elementsinthetablewhileretainingtheweight,aftermid1869mostofhisrepositioninginvolvedachangein atomicweight(ibid.).LetusbrieflyconsiderthreeexamplesforMendeleevssuccessfulcontrapredictions. Mendeleevsperhapsboldestcontrapredictionconcernsuranium.Uraniumwasfirstisolatedin1841 andwasusuallyassumedtohaveanatomicweightof120andavalenceof2.Butwiththisweightoneofthe constraintsofMendeleevsperiodictable(continuousdecreaseofvalencefromgroupIVtogroupVII)would havebeenviolated,sinceuraniumwouldthenhavetobeplacedinbetweenthetetravalenttin(122)and trivalentantimony(118).Mendeleevproposedthattheatomicweightforuraniumbe240bydoublingits assumedvalence.InalatereditionofthePrinciplesofChemistryMendeleevwrotethaturaniumhasplayed aprominentroleintheconfirmationoftheperiodiclaw,becausewiththerecognitionofthislawachangein itsatomicweightwascalledfor,andwasprovedvalid.ForMendeleev,thisservedasconvincingevidenceof thegeneralityoftheperiodiclaw(citedinSmith,1976p.335,addedemphasis). Mendeleevalsosuggestedacorrectiontoberyllium,which,onthebasisofanumberofexperiments hadbeendeterminedtobetrivalentandaspossessinganatomicweightofabout13.514(cf.Scerri,2007p. 128).Again,accordingtoMendeleev(1901)thisweightbecamegenerallyadoptedandseemedtobewell established(p.484).However,therewasnoplaceinthesystemforanelementlikeberylliumhavingan atomicweightof13.5(ibid).Thechemicalpropertiesofberylliumwerejusttoodissimilartonitrogen(atomic weightof14)toplaceitnexttoit.InsteadMendeleevsurmisedthatberylliumwasbivalent,becauseitcould thenbeplacedinbetweenlithium(7)andboron(11)ingroupII.Afteradivergenceofopinion[which]lasted foryears(ibid.),Mendeleevwasvindicatedin1889. Ironicallythesuccessfulpredictionofgallium,thefirstdiscoveredelementtoconfirmanyof Mendeleevsnovelpredictions,isinfactapartialcontraprediction.In1875,apparentlywithoutbeingawareof Mendeleevsprediction,theFrenchchemistLecoqdeBoisbaudrandiscoveredgallium.Hedetermined galliumsdensityas4.7g/cm3.Mendeleev,however,hadpredictedasignificantlyhighervalue,namelyabout 6.0g/cm3.Onlyafterbecomingawareofthatcontraprediction,Boisbaudranrealizedthathisoriginal measurementshadbeencontaminatedwithmetallicsodium(whichheusedasareducingagentinthe isolationoffreegallium).Andindeed,Boisbaudrannowgainedadensityof5.935g/cm3,verymuchin agreementwithMendeleevscontraprediction.LaterMendeleevclaimedthatwithouttheperiodictable nothingwouldhavepointedtotheincorrectnessofthis[earlier]determination,nothingwouldhave promptedtheverificationofthedifficultyobtainedandseparatedgallium(1901,p.262).Thesuccessful predictionofgalliumbeingapartialcontraprediction(aboutsomeofthepropertiesofgallium)wouldbe particularlysignificantinsofarascontrapredictionsareconsideredtobeadifferentsortofbeastfromnovel predictions.Becausethen,contrarytothetemporalpredictivists,theboostincitationstoMendeleevsperiodic table(seeabove)mayinfactnotbeduetothesuccessfultemporalpredictionofgalliumbutratherduetothe
Mendeleevpredictedavalueof125fortelluriumratherthanthepreviouslyacceptedvalueof128sothatitcouldbe placedbeforeiodine(127).Andindeedchemiststriedtoverifythispredictionandexperimentallyredeterminedthe weightoftelluriumasapproximately124126,i.e.belowthevalueofiodine.Thesevalueswerehoweverlaterdeemed erroneous;iodineindeedcomesbeforetelluriumintheperiodictabledespiteitshigherweight.Thisapparentanomaly wouldultimatelybeeliminatedbychangingthemainorderingcriterionfromatomicweighttoatomicnumber.

9/15

successfulcontrapredictionofgalliumsproperties.Butarecontrapredictionsreallysignificantlydifferentfrom temporallynovelpredictions? Ibelieve(withBrush(1996),butcontraryScerri(2007))thatweshouldtreatcontrapredictionsasa particularformoftemporallynovelpredictions.Justlikeinstandardtemporallynovelpredictions,andcontrary toaccommodations,incontrapredictionsitisnotknownatthetimeaparticularpredictionisbeingmade whetherthecontrapredictionwillturnouttobecorrect.Contrapredictionsandtemporallynovelpredictions differofcourseinthatintheformerthereis,andinthelatterthereisnot,datarelevanttotheassessmentof theprediction.ButIdontthinkthatthisisasignificantdifference.Thisjudgmentisinfactsupportedby Mendeleevsownwritings.Withregardtothesuccessfulcontrapredictionoftheweightofberyllium Mendeleevnotedthathetookitasimportantinthehistoryoftheperiodiclawasthediscoveryofscandium (e.g.1901p.485).13IndeedMendeleev,whencommentingonthereasonsforthewidespreadacceptanceof theperiodictable,highlightedcontrapredictionsandtemporalpredictions(e.g.1901p.231).Assuming, reasonablyIthink,thatMendeleevwasnotdeludedaboutthereasonforthesuccessofhisscheme,itseems tobequiteclearthatpredictionsdidindeedenjoyaspecialstatusintheappraisalofMendeleevsperiodic tablecontrarytowhatScerriandWorrall(2001)claim.Thisisconsistentwithbibliometricdataconsidered above.14Buteventhoughtheappraisaloftheperiodictableindeedseemstosupporttemporalpredictivism, temporalpredictivismisstillatoddswiththefollowingfacts:(i)theabsenceofanymentionofMendeleevs successfulpredictionsintheDavymedallaudation,and(ii)theappraisalsofFresnelswavetheoryand Einsteinsgeneraltheoryofrelativity,fortheformerofwhichWorrall(1989)hasmadeagoodcasethat temporallynovelpredictionswerenotvaluedhigherthanaccommodationinthecommunityandforthelatter ofwhichBrush(1994)hasmadethesameclaim(seeIntroduction).Howarethesefactstobereconciled?Inthe remainderofthispaperIshalltrytodevelopananswerto(i).Apossibleanswerto(ii)willbesketchedatthe endofthisessay.

4 Localsymptomatic predictivism
HitchcockandSober(2004)introducevarioususefuldistinctions,whichIdliketointroducebeforemakingmy ownproposalabouttheroleandfunctionofsuccessfulpredictions.Firstofall,HitchcockandSoberdistinguish betweenaweakandastrongformoftemporalpredictivism.(ForthesakeofsimplicityIshallfromnowon refertotemporalpredictivismmerelyaspredictivism,andtotemporallynovelpredictionsmerelyas predictions).Accordingtothestrongformofpredictivism,predictionsare(forwhateverreason)intrinsically morevaluablethanaccommodations.Accordingtotheweakform,predictionsaremorevaluablethan accommodationsonlybecausetheyaresignsofanothertheoreticalpropertywhichmaynotbedirectly accessibletoscientists.Letmerefertothelatterformassymptomaticpredictivism.Anotherdistinction HitchcockandSoberintroduceisthedistinctionbetweenglobalandlocalpredictivism.Accordingtoglobal predictivism,predictionscountmorethanaccommodationsinallpossiblecontexts.Accordingtolocal predictivism,predictionscountmorethanaccommodationsonlyinparticularcontexts.
13 14

Contrapredictionsdonotonlyoccurinthecontextoftheperiodictable.SeeSchindler(2013). NotethatthosedatadonotcontainanyinformationonMendeleevscontrapredictions.

10/15

 InHitchcockandSoberslocalandsymptomaticpredictivism,predictionscan,butneednotbe,more valuablethanaccommodationsintheappraisaloftheories.Predictionsaremorevaluablethan accommodationsintheoryappraisal,ifitisnotobviouswhetherornotatheoryhasoverfittedthedata, wherebyanoverfitofthedataconsistsinthetheorysaccommodationofdataitshouldhavenot accommodated(becausethesedataarejustduetothenoiseintheexperiment).Overfitting,inturn,reduces thetheoryscapacitytoaccuratelypredictnewdata.Thus,successfulnovelpredictionscanserveasan indicatorforatheorynotbeingoverfitted.ThisiswhyHitchcockandSobersformofpredictivismis symptomatic.HitchcockandSoberspredictivismislocalbecauseatheoryspredictionsareonlyvaluablein contextsinwhichitisnotclearthatthetheorywasnotoverfitted.InthecaseofFresnel,HitchcockandSober hold,itwasclearthatthetheorywasnotoverfittedtothedataandthereforethewhitespotpredictionwas notneededforevaluatingFresnelstheoryasbeingagoodtheory(p.29). Primafacie,HitchockandSoberslocalandsymptomaticpredictivismappearstobeaplausibleaccount alsoofMendeleevsperiodictable.WhenMendeleevfirstproposedhisperiodictabletherewasarisk,asfor anyoneproposingaclassificationofchemicalelementsatthetime,thathehadoverfittedthedata,i.e.thathe hadaccommodatedempiricalinformationaboutchemicalelementsthatwaswrong.Itwasonlyafterhis successfultemporallynovelpredictionsandhissuccessfulcontrapredictionsthatthiswasshownnottobethe case.WhenitcomestothedetailsoftheapplicationofHitchockandSobersaccounttothecaseof Mendeleevsperiodictable,however,thingsstarttolooklesspretty. OnHitchcockandSobersaccounttherationaleforamodelbeingmorepredictiveofnewdatawhenitis lessoverfittedtothecurrentdatahastodowiththenumberofparametersofamodel.Thefewerparameters amodelpossesses,thelesslikelyitistobetieddowntoaparticulardataset.Thefewerparametersthemodel has,themoreflexibleitisinaccommodatingnewdatasetsthatshareacertaintrendwiththeprevious datasets,butdifferintheexactdistributionofdatapoints.Henceoverfittingisdirectlyrelatedtothenumber ofparameters:thefewerparameters,thesimplerthemodel,thelesslikelytheoverfit,andthemorelikelythe accommodationoffuturedata.ItisimportanttostressthattheparametersHitchcockandSoberaretalking aboutareempiricalparameters.15 ItisnoteasytoseehowthisstorybehindHitchcockandSoberslocalandsymptomaticpredictivism couldbeappliedtoMendeelevsperiodictable.TheonlyempiricalparametersthatMendeleevwasabletofix onthebasisoftheevidenceweretheslotsforthechemicalelementsintheperiodictable.Butthen,the numberofparametersseemstomakelittledifferencetowhetherornotMendeleevstableoverfittedthedata. HadMendeleevaccommodatedthefalsedata,histablewouldhavehadjustasmanyparametersasitactually didhavewithoutoverfittingthedata.PerhapsHitchcockandSobercoulddiscernothersortsofparametersin Mendeleevstableforwhichtheycouldmaketheircase.Butitisunclearwhatsortsofparametersthatcould be.Assumingthatalocalandsymptomaticformofpredictivismistherightkindoftheorytodescribe Mendeleevstable,itappearsthatanewrationaleforthisbrandofpredictivismisneeded.InthenextsectionI willtrytodevelopone.

IntheFresnelexample,theonlyparameterthatFresnelstheorycontainedwasthewavelengthofthelightusedin theexperiment(Hitchcock&Sober,2004p.29).

15

11/15

4.1 Coherence
Supposesomeoneproposesatheorythatstandsincontradictionwithsomeoftherelevantfacts.Whyshould yougivethattheoryanycreditletaloneadoptit?ThisquestionmustalsobeposedforMendeleevsperiodic table.Whywasittakenseriouslyratherthanbeingrejectedoutofhand?Afterall,ittoomadepredictionsin contradictionwithapparentlyestablishedfacts(seeSection3.1).Clearly,atheorythatstandsincontradiction withsomeoftheknownfactsmusthaveapropertythatmakesitsadoptionattractivedespiteitslackof empiricalfit.InthissectionIwanttoarguethatinthecaseofMendeleevstable,thispropertyconcernedits coherence. InordertobeablejudgewhetherMendeleevsperiodictablewasacoherentclassification,weneedto knowwhatitisforatheorytobecoherent.Thisisadifficultquestionanditisnotclearthatthereexistsa satisfactoryphilosophicalanswer.Usually,coherenceisdescribedasthepropertyofhowwellthingshang together.Ratherthantryingtogivenecessaryandsufficientconditionsforcoherence,Iwouldliketoillustrate thispropertywithtwoexamples16. ThefirstexampleconcernstheexplanationoftheMichelsonMorley(MM)aetherdriftnullresult.Two explanationswereinvokedtoexplaintheresult.Thefirstcamefromtheethertheory,whichwasamended withthenotoriousLorentzFitzGeraldcontractionhypothesis(LFC).ThesecondexplanationoftheMMresult wasofcourseEinsteinsspecialtheoryofrelativity.Whereasintheamendedaethertheorythereremaineda strictseparationofetherandmatter,Einsteinstheorywasabletoprovideacoherenttheory,inwhichthe lawsgoverningmatterandfieldsreceivedacommonjustificationintermsofMinkowskispacetime(cf.Janssen, 2002).ThesecondexampleconcernsthecontrastbetweentheCopernicanandthePtolemaicsystem.Although theadhocnessofthePtolemaicsystemisoftenassociatedwithitsuseofepicycles,thelattercannotaccount fortheadhocnonadhoccontrastbetweenthetwotheories.Copernicusnevercomplainedabouttheuseof epicyclesbythePtolemaistsandheinfactusedthedevicehimselfratherextensively(Kuhn,1957).However, Copernicusdidcomplainaboutotherdevices,suchastheequantpoint,whichviolatedCopernicussfirst principleofuniformcircularmotion.Perhapsmoreimportantly,Copernicusalsofamouslycompared Ptolemaicastronomytoincoherentsculpturing,becauseitconstructeditsmodelsonaplanetbyplanetbasis withoutanyconcernforhowthemodelsmightfittogether:itisasthoughanartistweretogatherthehands, feet,headandothermembersforhisimagesfromdiversemodels,eachpartexcellentlydrawn,butnotrelated toasinglebody,andsincetheyinnowaymatcheachother,theresultwouldbeamonsterratherthanaman (Copernicus,1992myemphasis).17

TherehavebeenrecentattemptstomakethenotionofcoherenceprecisewithintheframeworkofBayesianism (Bovens&Hartmann,2003).Accordingtothem,[c]oherenceisapropertyofaninformationsetthatboostsour confidencethatitscontentistrueceterisparibuswhenwereceiveinformationfromindependentandpartiallyreliable sources.However,notonlywoulditleadustoofarastraytograpplewiththedetailsoftheiraccount,butitalsonotclear thattheirframeworkcouldshedanyinterestinglightonthediscussionhere. 17 Itisinterestingtonoteaboutthesetwoexamplesthatatheoryslackofcoherenceandthescientificcommunitys judgmentaboutitbeingadhocseemtobecloselyrelated.

16

12/15

InanalogytotheseinformalillustrationsofthetheoreticalpropertyofcoherenceIwanttosuggestthat Mendeleevsclassificationwascoherentbecauseitconstitutedthefirstseriousattemptinhistorytorelateall elementsandtheirchemicalpropertiestoasingleorderingcriterion,namelytoatomicweights.Although previousattemptstoordertheelementsdididentifyperiodicities,theyneverwentasfarassubordinateall elementstotheatomicweightcriterion(cf.Smith,1976).Mendeleevsperiodictable,inhisownwords, proclaimsloudlythatthenatureoftheelementsdependsaboveallontheirmass(e.g.1901p.231). However,atthetimeMendeleevproposedhistableitwasnotclearwhetherhisinsistenceonacoherent orderingoftheelementswasnottoooptimistic.Afterall,hiscoherentclassificationwasatoddswithsome empiricalinformationaboutthechemicalelementsandpreviousclassificationattemptshadallfailedtocome upwithacoherentordering.OnlyaftersomeofMendeleevscontrapredictionsturnedouttobecorrect,did theconfidenceinthecorrectnessofMendeleevsschemereceiveaboost.Butagain,withouttheprior attractionofMendeleevsclassification,which,Isuggested,sprungfromitscoherence,Mendeleevsscheme mighthavebeenrejectedoutofhandratherthanleadingthewaytowardsthecorrectionofapparently establishedknowledge.Ithereforeconcludethat,whencoherenceisthedrivingforcebehindtheinitial adoptionofatheory18(despitecontraryevidence),successful(contra)predictionsareimportantindicatorsfor thecoherenceoffactsidentifiedbythetheorytobereal.Inotherwords,thestudyoftheappraisalof Mendeleevsperiodictablesuggestsaformofsymptomaticpredictivismaccordingtowhichsuccessful predictionscountmorethanaccommodationsintheappraisaloftheoriesiftheyrevealthecoherence identifiedbythetheoryasbeingreal. IntheformofsymptomaticpredictivismIpropose,scientistsgenerallysuspectcoherencetobeatruth conducivetheoreticalvirtue.Thisiswhycoherenttheoriesarenotrejectedoutofhandeveniftheystandin contradictionwithsomeoftheknownevidence(asdidMendeleevsperiodictable).Butofcourse,thereisno guaranteethatcoherenttheorieswillreallyturnouttobecorrect.Thisiswhysuccessfulcontrapredictionsare importantintheappraisaloftheories:theyconfirmthescientistssuspicionthatcoherencemightbeatruth conducivepropertyinthecaseathand. Itisinterestingtonotethatmyformofsymptomaticpredictivismisconsiderablyweakerthan HitchcockandSobersformofsymptomaticpredictivism.Contrarytotheirform,myformofsymptomatic predictivismdoesnotstipulateanecessaryconnectionbetweenatheoryspropertyofbeingcoherentandits capacitytoproducesuccessfulpredictions.Whetheratheoryproducessuccessfulpredictionswillsimply dependonwhetherornotthecoherenceoffactsidentifiedbythetheoryisreal. Onemaywonderaboutothersubtypesoftheformofsymptomaticpredictivismproposedhere.That is,onemightwonderwhethertheoreticalvirtuesthancoherence(e.g.simplicity,unifyingpower,fertility),may playasimilarroleascoherencedoesintheformofpredictivismproposedhere.Inprinciple,itwouldseem,
NotethatitisnotatallimplausibletotreatMendeleevsperiodictableasatheory,foritis(minimally)explanatoryofa certainsetoffacts.Themembershipinacertainchemicalgroup,asdelineatedbytheperiodictable,explainsthe apparentcoincidencethatcertainchemicalelementsthatdifferconsiderablyintheiratomicweightspossesssimilar chemicalproperties.Sincesuccessfulpredictionsweremadeonthebasisoftheperiodictable,theperiodictableclearly satisfiestwocentralcharacteristicsofwhatitisforsomethingtobeatheory.
18

13/15

suchotherformsmayverywellexist.Butofcoursetheywouldhavetobeshowntoexist,ataskwhichis beyondthisessay.19

5 Conclusion
WithregardtotheappraisalofMendeleevsperiodictableofchemicalelementsIarguedinthispaperfora formofsymptomatic(temporal)predictivismaccordingtowhichatheoryspredictionsareindicativeofthe coherenceoffactsbeingidentifiedbythetheorybeingreal.Thus,Mendeleevssuccessfulpredictionswere onlyofimportintheappraisalofMendeleevsperiodictableinsofartheyshowedthatMendeleevsideaof relatingallchemicalelementstothesingleorderingcriterionofatomicweightwasapproximatelycorrect.How theseconclusionsaretobereconciledwiththefactsabouttheappraisalofFresnelswavetheoryoflightand Einsteinsgeneraltheoryofrelativitywillhavetoawaitfurtherclarification.Butitmaybesuggestedtentatively thattherightgeneralviewofthestatusofpredictionsintheappraisaloftheoriesinscienceisalocal symptomaticpredictivism.Thatis,insomecontexts,scientistsapparentlydonotneedtoawaitatheorys successfulpredictionsinordertojudgethatthetheoryinquestionhasidentifiedareal(coherent)relationship. Perhapsthereisaslightasymmetrybetweencontrapredictionsandnovelpredictionsafterall:showingthat thetheoryscontradictionwiththefactswasonlyapparentmightbeamorepressingdemandindecidingthat therelationsidentifiedbyatheoryarelikelytoberealthancheckingwhetherthetheorymightpossiblybe contradictedbyfactsthathavenotbeengatheredyet. Acknowledgments IthankEricBarnes,HelgeKragh,andtwoanonymousrefereesforreadingdraftsofthispaperandforproviding inputthatallowedmetomakeanumberofimportantimprovements.Allremainingmistakesareofcourse mine.IalsothanktheparticipantsoftheworkshoponNovelPredictionsattheUniversityofDsseldorfin March2011forhelpfulcomments.IamgratefultotheZukunftskollegattheUniversityofKonstanzandthe GermanResearchFoundation(DFG)forfinanciallysupportingpartoftheresearchthatunderliesthispaper.

6 References
Barnes,E.C.(2005).OnMendeleev'spredictions:commentonScerriandWorrall.StudiesinHistoryand PhilosophyofSciencePartA,36(4),801812. Barnes,E.C.(2008).Theparadoxofpredictivism.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Bovens,L.,&Hartmann,S.(2003).Solvingtheriddleofcoherence.Mind,112(448),601633. Brush,S.G.(1994).DynamicsofTheoryChange:TheRoleofPredictions.PSA:ProceedingsoftheBiennial MeetingofthePhilosophyofScienceAssociation,133145. Brush,S.G.(1996).ThereceptionofMendeleev'speriodiclawinAmericaandBritain.Isis,87(4),595628. Copernicus,N.(1992).OntheRevolutions(translationandcommentarybyEdwardRosen).Baltimore:Johns HopkinsUniversityPress. Gardner,M.R.(1982).Predictingnovelfacts.BritishJournalforthePhilosophyofScience,115.
ButseeSchindler(2013).

19

14/15

Grnbaum,A.(1959).ThefalsifiabilityoftheLorentzFitzgeraldcontractionhypothesis.TheBritishjournalfor thephilosophyofscience,10(37),4850. Harker,D.(2006).Accommodationandprediction:Thecaseofthepersistenthead.TheBritishjournalforthe philosophyofscience,57(2),309321. Hitchcock,C.,&Sober,E.(2004).Predictionversusaccommodationandtheriskofoverfitting.TheBritish journalforthephilosophyofscience,55(1),134. Hudson,R.G.(2007).WhatsReallyatIssuewithNovelPredictions?Synthese,155(1),120. Janssen,M.(2002).Reconsideringascientificrevolution:ThecaseofEinsteinversusLorentz.Physicsin Perspective,4(4),421446. Kuhn,T.S.(1957).TheCopernicanrevolution:planetaryastronomyinthedevelopmentofwesternthought. Harvard:HarvardUniversityPress. Lange,M.(2001).Theapparentsuperiorityofpredictiontoaccommodationasasideeffect:areplytoMaher. TheBritishjournalforthephilosophyofscience,52(3),575588. Lipton,P.(2004).Inferencetothebestexplanation.London:Routledge. Maher,P.(1988).Prediction,accommodation,andthelogicofdiscovery.PaperpresentedatthePSA: ProceedingsoftheBiennialMeetingofthePhilosophyofScienceAssociation. Mayo,D.G.(1991).Novelevidenceandseveretests.Philosophyofscience,523552. Mendeleev,D.(1901).Theprinciplesofchemistry[tr.fromtheRussian(sixthedition)byGeorgeKamensky;ed. byA.J.Greenaway].NewYorkCollier. Musgrave,A.(1974).Logicalversushistoricaltheoriesofconfirmation.BritishJournalforthePhilosophyof Science,123. Popper,K.R.(1959).Thelogicofscientificdiscovery.London:Routledge. Scerri,E.R.(2007).Theperiodictable:itsstoryanditssignificance.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Scerri,E.R.,&Worrall,J.(2001).Predictionandtheperiodictable.StudiesinHistoryandPhilosophyofScience PartA,32(3),407452. Schindler,S.(2013).Theoryladenexperimentation.StudiesinHistoryandPhilosophyofSciencePartA,44(1), 89. Smith,J.R.(1976).PersistenceandPeriodicity:AStudyofMendelcev'sContributiontotheFoundationsof Chemistry.(Ph.D.),UniversityofLondon. White,R.(2003).Theepistemicadvantageofpredictionoveraccommodation.Mind,112(448),653683. Worrall,J.(1985).Scientificdiscoveryandtheoryconfirmation.Changeandprogressinmodernscience,301 331. Worrall,J.(1989).Fresnel,PoissonandtheWhiteSpot:TheRoleofSuccessfulPredictioninTheory acceptance:TheUsesofExperiment,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Worrall,J.(2002).Newevidenceforold.InP.Gardenfors(Ed.),IntheScopeofLogic,Methodologyand PhilosophyofScience(pp.191209).Dordrecht:Kluwer Worrall,J.(2005).Predictionandthe'periodiclaw':arejoindertoBarnes.StudiesinHistoryandPhilosophyof SciencePartA,36(4),817826.

15/15