60. REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO G.R. No.

154380 October 5, 2005 FACTS: In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myro Villanueva in Lam-an, Ozamis City. In 1986, Orbecido discovered that his wife had had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Orbecido learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and married an American. Orbecido filed with the Trial Court a petition for Authority to Remarry invoking Article 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code, the Court granted the petition. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought for reconsideration but it was denied by the Trial Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations of the respondent was proven as a fact according to the rules of evidence. HELD: Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of the afore cited evidence in his favor. ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

61. Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524 FACTS: Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabels Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabels father, Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina. The marriage of Isabels parents had previously been declared by the CFI as null and void.Federico anchors his opposition on this fact, alleging, based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federicos Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the decision declaring the marriage of Isabels parents null and void be upheld. Issue: In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive portion thereof, which should prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabels parents a case of a void or voidable marriage? Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child? Ruling: Petition dismissed. Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be declared null and void, the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged

natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article89 which provides that: Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.

62. SY vs CA [G.R. No. 142293. February 27, 2003] VICENTE SY, TRINIDAD PAULINO, 6BS TRUCKING CORPORATION, and SBT TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JAIME SAHOT, respondents. FACTS: Private respondent Jaime Sahot started working as a truck helper for petitioners family-owned trucking business named Vicente Sy Trucking. Throughout all the changes in names and for 36 years, private respondent continuously served the trucking business of petitioners. When Sahot was already 59 years old, he had been incurring absences as he was suffering from various ailments. Particularly causing him pain was his left thigh, which greatly affected the performance of his task as a driver. Sahot had filed a week-long leave sometime in May 1994. On May 27th, he was medically examined and treated for EOR, presleyopia, hypertensive retinopathy G II), HPM, UTI, Osteoarthritis and heart enlargement. On said grounds, Belen Paulino of the SBT Trucking Service management told him to file a formal request for extension of his leave. At the end of his week-long absence, Sahot applied for extension of his leave for the whole month of June, 1994. It was at this time when petitioners allegedly threatened to terminate his employment should he refuse to go back to work. They carried out their threat and dismissed him from work, effective June 30, 1994. He ended up sick, jobless and penniless.

On September 13, 1994, Sahot filed with the NLRC NCR Arbitration Branch, a complaint for illegal dismissal for recovery of separation pay against Vicente Sy and Trinidad Paulino-Sy, Belen Paulino, Vicente Sy Trucking, T. Paulino Trucking Service, 6Bs Trucking and SBT Trucking, herein petitioners. Petitioners, on their part, claimed that sometime prior to June 1, 1994, Sahot went on leave and was not able to report for work for almost seven days. On June 1, 1994, Sahot asked permission to extend his leave of absence until June 30, 1994. It appeared that from the expiration of his leave, private respondent never reported back to work nor did he file an extension of his leave. Instead, he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal against the trucking company and its owners. Petitioners add that due to Sahots refusal to work after the expiration of his authorized leave of absence, he should be deemed to have voluntarily resigned from his work. They contended that Sahot had all the time to extend his leave or at least inform petitioners of his health condition. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the company. It held that Sahot failed to return to work. However, upon appeal, the NLRC modified the LAs decision, ruling that Sahot did not abandon his job but his employment was terminated on account of his illness, pursuant to Article 284 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: Whether or not there was valid termination of employment due to his illness. HELD: The SC held that although illness can be a valid ground for terminating an employee, the dismissal was invalid. Article 284 of the Labor Code authorizes an employer to terminate an employee on the ground of

disease. However, in order to validly terminate employment on this ground, Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the Labor Code requires: Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal- Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health. The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employees illness and thus defeat the public policy in the protection of labor. In the case at bar, the employer clearly did not comply with the medical certificate requirement before Sahots dismissal was effected. Since the burden of proving the validity of the dismissal of the employee rests on the employer, the latter should likewise bear the burden of showing that the requisites for a valid dismissal due to a disease have been complied with. In the absence of the required certification by a competent public health authority, this Court has ruled against the validity of the employees dismissal. It is therefore i ncumbent upon the private respondents to prove by the quantum of evidence required by law that petitioner was not dismissed, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal; otherwise, the dismissal would be unjustified. This Court will not sanction a dismissal premised on mere conjectures and suspicions, the evidence must be substantial and not arbitrary and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant his separation from work. In addition, we must likewise determine if the procedural aspect of due process had been complied with by the employer. From the records, it clearly appears that procedural due process was not observed in the separation of private respondent by the management of the trucking company. The employer is required to furnish an employee with two written notices before the latter is dismissed: (1) the notice to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, which is the equivalent of a charge; and (2) the notice informing the employee of his dismissal, to be issued after the employee has been given reasonable opportunity to answer and to be heard on his defense. These, the petitioners failed to do, even only for record purposes. What management did was to threaten the employee with dismissal, then actually implement the threat when the occasion presented itself because of private respondents painful left thigh. All told, both the substantive and procedural aspects of due process were violated. Clearly, therefore, Sahots dismissal is tainted with invalidity. Petition is denied.

63. REPUBLIC VS. CA 236 SCRA 257 FACTS: Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by a City Court Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. They decided to live together when Castro discovered she was pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted

to put in order he marital status before leaving for the U.S. She then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila. Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage. The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged nonissuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.

ISSUE: Is the marriage valid? Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"? HELD: At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by the local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" - a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas as initially unknown to the parents of the former.

64. Cario vs Cario Susan Nicdao Cario vs. Susan Yee Cario GR No. 132529

FACTS: SPO4 Santiago Cario married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance. On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, Nicdao was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemni zed without the required marriage license. ISSUES: Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void; Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.

HELD: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void . Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property.

65. SALITA V MAGTOLIS 233 SCRA 100 JUNE 13, 1994 FACTS: Erwin Espinosa (32) and Joselita Salita (22) were married on January 25, 1986. Separated in1988 and Erwin sued for annulment on the basis of psychological incapacity also moved for bill of particulars ISSUE: Whether bill of particulars submitted by Erwin is of sufficient definiteness to enable petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading HELD: YES. SC held that the bill of particulars filed by Erwin is sufficient to state a cause of action. Private respondent already alleged that petitioner is unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession (upon his time and efforts). To demand more detail would be asking for information on evidentiary facts.SC sees no need to define or limit the scope of Art. 36 of the Family Code since the actual issue is with the sufficiency of the bill of particulars. AFFIRMED CA DECISION.

66. Santos vs. Ca G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995 FACTS: Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18 1988, Julia left for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not return to the country. In 1991, Leoul filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the dismissal. ISSUE: Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years constitute psychological incapacity?

RULING: No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more than five years does not constitute psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) GRAVITY (b) JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITY Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. PETITION IS DENIED

67. REPUBLIC VS. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425 FACTS: On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her. In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the investigating prosecutors manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to

perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal. ISSUE: Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice? HELD: Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code. Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.

68. REPUBLIC V. MOLINA FACTS: Roridel & Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church. They had a son, Andre Molina. A year after the marriage, Reynaldo started manifesting signs of immaturity and irresponsibility: (1) spent more time with his friends (2) depended on his parents for aid & assistance (3) not honest with the finances (4) relieved of his job making Roridel the breadwinner of the family. Roridel went to live with his parents and afterwards, Reynaldo abandoned her and the child. Roridel filed a case for the declaration of nullity of their marriage by virtue of her husbands psychological incapacity. Reynaldo claims that Roridels strange behavior, refusal to perform marital duties & failure to run the household & handle finances caused their quarrels. Roridel on the other hand claims that her husband is immature, irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, chronic liar & infidel. He now lives with a mistress with whom he has a child. ISSUE: WON Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated? HELD: NO. Marriage is valid. RATIO: 1. They seem to have a difficulty or outright refusal or neglect in performing their obligations. Theyre not incapable of doing them. 2. Failure of their expectations is not tantamount to psychological incapacity. 3. Guidelines for Art. 36

a. Burden of proof to show nullity of marriage: plaintiff. Presumption of existence of marriage over its dissolution & nullity. b. Root cause of incapacity should be: medically/clinically defined, alleged in complaint, proven by experts, clearly explained in decision. c. Existing at time of celebration of marriage. d. Medically/clinically permanent or incurable, whether absolute or relative. Incapacity directly related to assumption of marital obligations, doesnt include incapacit y in profession, etc. e. Grave to render them incapable. Not mere refusal, neglect or difficulty or ill will. f. Essential obligations outlined in FC Art. 68-71 and 220, 221, 225. State non-compliance in petition with evidence, include in decision. g. Consider National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines interpretations. Not binding should be given respect since this law originated from Canon law. Harmonize civil law w/religious faith. h. Prosecuting attorney/fiscal and Sol. Gen. will appear as counsels for the state. They should submit certification within 15 days from submission of case for resolution.

69. Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004 FACTS: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child. Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation. HELD: The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to b e due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would

have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshios illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.

70. Tuason vs. CA GR No. 116607 Facts: In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria L. Tuason filed with the RTC branch 149 of Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio Tuason. In her complaint, Maria alleged that she and Emilio were married on June 3, 1972 and as a result begot two children and at the time of the marriage Emilio Tuason was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligation which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights between them. Maria also alleged that Emilio is a drug user and a womanizer that in 1984 he left the conjugal hoome and cohabitated with three women in succession. After he left the conjugal dwelling he gave minimal support to the family and even refused to pay for the tuition of his children compelling Maria to accept donations and dole-outs from her family and friends. Emilio likewise became spendrift and abused his administration of the conjugal partnership. Issues: 1. whether or not Maria's claim that Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage and becomes manifest only after their marriage is a valid ground for nullity of their marriage 2. whether or not Emilio Tuason's claim that he was deprived of due process is correct. Held 1. Yes. Emilio Tuason failed to present witnesses or evidences that would prove his innocense that led to the court's decision to declare their marriage void under Art. 36 of the Family Code nasedon the evidences presented by Maria Tuason 2. No because his failure to inform or to notify the courtabout his confinement or medical treatment therefrom is negligence which is not excusable that led the court to deny his petition.

71. Sin vs. Sin GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001 FACTS: Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florences petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him. ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of the State in the proceedings. HELD: Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification

briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.

72. Pacete vs Carriaga 231 SCRA 321 FACTS: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita. HELD: The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

73. Perez v CA G.R. No. 112329. January 28, 2000 J. Ynares-Santiago Facts: Primitivo B. Perez had been insured with the BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation for P20,000.00. Sometime in October 1987, an agent of the insurance corporation, visited Perez in Quezon and convinced him to apply for additional insurance coverage of P50,000.00. Virginia A. Perez, Primitivos wife, paid P2,075.00 to the agent. The receipt issued indicated the amount received was a "deposit." Unfortunately, the agent lost the application form accomplished by Perez and he asked the latter to fill up another application form. The agent sent the application for additional insurance of Perez to the Quezon office. Such was supposed to forwarded to the Manila office. Perez drowned. His application papers for the additional insurance of P50,000.00 were still with the Quezon. It was only after some time that the papers were brought to Manila. Without knowing that Perez died, BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation approved the application and issued the corresponding policy for the P50,000.00. Petitioner Virginia Perez went to Manila to claim the benefits under the insurance policies of the deceased. She was paid P40,000.00 under the first insurance policy for P20,000.00 but the insurance company refused to pay the claim under the additional policy coverage of P50,000.00, the proceeds of which amount to P150,000.00. The insurance company maintained that the insurance for P50,000.00 had not been perfected at the time of the death of Primitivo Perez. Consequently, the insurance company refunded the amount paid. BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation filed a complaint against Virginia Perez seeking the rescission and declaration of nullity of the insurance contract in question. Petitioner Virginia A. Perez, on the other hand, averred that the deceased had fulfilled all his prestations under the contract and all the elements of a valid contract are present. On October 25, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner ordering respondent to pay 150,000 pesos. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the trial court saying that the insurance contract for P50,000.00 could not have been perfected since at the time that the policy was issued, Primitivo was already dead. Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by respondent court, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on the ground that there was a consummated contract of insurance between the deceased and BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation. Issue: WON the widow can receive the proceeds of the 2nd insurance policy Held: No. Petition dismissed. Ratio: Perezs application was subject to the acceptance of private respondent BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation. The perfection of the contract of insurance between the deceased and respondent corporation was further conditioned with the following requisites stated in the application form: "there shall be no contract of insurance unless and until a policy is issued on this application and that the said policy shall not take effect until the premium has been paid and the policy delivered to and accepted by me/us in person while I/We, am/are in good health." BF Lifeman didnt give its assent when it merely received the application form and all the requisite supporting papers of the applicant. This happens only when it gives a policy. It is not disputed, however, that when Primitivo died on November 25, 1987, his application papers for additional insurance coverage were still with the branch office of respondent corporation in Quezon. Consequently, there was absolutely no way the acceptance of the application could have been communicated to the applicant for the latter to accept inasmuch as the applicant at the time was already dead. Petitioner insists that the condition imposed by BF that a policy must have been delivered to and accepted by the proposed insured in good health is potestative, being dependent upon the will of the corporation and is therefore void. The court didnt agree. A potestative condition depends upon the exclusive will of one of the parties and is considered void. The Civil Code states: When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void. The following conditions were imposed by the respondent company for the perfection of the contract of insurance: a policy must have been issued, the premiums paid, and the policy must have been delivered to and accepted by the applicant while he is in good health.

The third condition isnt potestative, because the health of the applicant at the time of the delivery of the policy is beyond the control or will of the insurance company. Rather, the condition is a suspensive one whereby the acquisition of rights depends upon the happening of an event which constitutes the condition. In this case, the suspensive condition was the policy must have been delivered and accepted by the applicant while he is in good health. There was non-fulfillment of the condition, because the applicant was already dead at the time the policy was issued. As stated above, a contract of insurance, like other contracts, must be assented to by both parties either in person or by their agents. So long as an application for insurance has not been either accepted or rejected, it is merely an offer or proposal to make a contract. The contract, to be binding from the date of application, must have been a completed contract. The insurance company wasnt negligent because delay in acting on the application does not constitute acceptance even after payment. The corporation may not be penalized for the delay in the processing of the application papers due to the fact that process in a week wasnt the usual timeframe in fixing the application. Delay could not be deemed unreasonable so as to constitute gross negligence.

74. SOMOSA-RAMOS vs. VAMENTAGR No. L-34132, July 29, 1972 FACTS: Petitioner Lucy Somosa- Ramos, filed an action for legal separation based on the ground of concubinage on the part of respondent Clemen Ramos. She also sought for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of her paraphernal and exclusive property. The hearing on the motion was opposed by respondent Ramos alleging that if the motion for preliminary injunction were heard, the prospect of reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim. Respondent judge Vamonte thereafter granted the motion of respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit HELD: NO. The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. . That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court."

There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him.

75. BITANGCOR vs TAN FACTS: In two consolidated cases of Bitangcor vs.Tan and Peredo vs.Tan against successful 1971 Bar examinee Rodolfo M. Tan, it was held that therein respondent "had fallen short of the requisite morality for admission to the Bar" for violating the honor of two women. Tan had sexual relations with both complainants without marriage and had sired a daughter by complainant Bitangcor. ISSUE: whether or not the respondent Rodolfo Tan be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath RESOLUTION: It cannot be denied that respondent's conduct left much to be desired, He had committed a transgression, if not against the law, against the high moral standard requisite for membership in the bar. He had proven false to his word. What is worse, he did sully her honor. This on the one side. On the other hand, eighteen years had gone by from the time of the 1956 examinations. He was a successful bar candidate but because of this lapse from moral propriety, he had not been allowed to take the lawyer's oath (Justice E. Fernando IV). The court believes that the long wait has rehabilitated him and taught him that failure to live up to the requisite moral standard is not to be taken lightly. The resolution of february 29, 1972 is set aside, and respondent rodolfo m. Tan is allowed to take the lawyers oath.

76. CHI MING TSOI V. CA FACTS: Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were married on May 22, 1988. According to Gina, since the time of their marriage, they never had a sexual intercourse. They underwent medical examinations. She was found healthy & normal. Chi Ming underwent medication which was confidential. She claims that her husbands a homosexual who married her to maintain his residency status and to prove that he is really a man. Chi Ming claims that it is Gina who refuses to have sexual intercourse. Gina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Chi Mings psychological incapacity. New medical examination proved that Chi Ming is capable of having sexual intercourse. Lower court & CA declared Alfonso as psychologically incapacitated to discharge essential marital obligations due to his reluctance or unwillingness to consummate marriage. ISSUE: WON Chi Ming is psychologically incapable? HELD: Yes. Granted. Marriage void. RATIO: No intercourse since marriage. Chi Ming should have discussed the problem with his wife if she indeed refused to have sexual intercourse with him. Or he could have resorted to the court if she still resisted. 1. Senseless & protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. 2. Procreation is one of the essential marital obligations and constant non-fulfillment of such will destroy marriage. 3. Filipinas are modest, Leni would have not subjected herself to such public scrutiny if she was just making this up. Chi Mings reluctance & unwillingness to perform sexual acts with a wife he claims he loves dearly, proves that this is a hopeless situation & of his serious personality disorder. Grave enough

77. Ilusorio vs. Bildner GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000 FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City. In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued. HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral. Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy. The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.

78. ARTURO PELAYO VS. MARCELO LAURON FACTS: On November 23, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician, filed a complaint against Marcelo and Juana Abella. He alleged that on October 13, 1906 at night, Pelayo was called to the house of the defendants to assist their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child. Unfortunately, the daughter-in-law died as a consequence of said childbirth. Thus, the defendant refuses to pay. The defendants argue that their daughter-inlaw lived with her husband independently and in a separate house without any relation, that her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous event. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants should be held liable for the fees demanded by the plaintiff upon rendering medical assistance to the defendants daughter-in-law.

RULING: No. The Court held that the rendering of medical assistance is one of the obligations to which spouses are bound by mutual support, expressly determined by law and readily demanded. Therefore, there was no obligation on the part of the in-laws but rather on the part of the husband who is not a party. Thus, decision affirmed.

79. SERRANO VS. SOLOMON FACTS: Solomon executed a Deed of Donation prior to his marriage to Feliciano. The deed stated that if his marriage is childless and if Feliciano predeceases him, half of his properties will belong to his siblings and the other half to the person who reared his wife(Serrano). Feliciano predeceased Solomon ISSUE: whether or not the donation is considered donation propter nuptias HELD: Solomons donation cannot be considered donation propter nuptias. Marriage was not the only condition for the donation since other conditions were imposed. Even if it was in consideration of the marriage, it was not in favor of one or both of thespouses but in favor of a third person.

80. SOLIS V. BARROSO FACTS: Spouses Lambino and Barroso made a donation propter nuptias (land) in favor of their son Alejo and his fiance Fortunata. One of the conditions is that in case of death of one of the donees, would revert to the donors, while surviving donee keeps the other half. Lambino and Alejo died, Barroso reclaimed lands. ISSUE: whether or not the donation propter nuptias was valid HELD : The donation propter nuptias by the spouses were made in a private, not public, instrument. It is not valid and does not confer any rights. In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the obligation. The marriage in a donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation.

81. HEIRS OF SEGUNDA MANINGDING V. CA | HEIRS OF BUAZON- ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION While prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. FACTS: This case involved 2 parcels of land: a riceland and sugarland in Pangasinan. The heirs of Segunda claim that they own the disputed lands together with the Buazons. The Buazons aver that: 1. Their father, Roque Buazon, acquired the land by virtue of a deed of donation propter nuptias. 2. Segunda Maningding, Maria Maningding, Juan Maningding and Roque Bauzon co-owned the lands as heirs of Ramon Roque. Roque Buazon allegedly repudiated the co-ownership of the sugarland in 1965 and repudiated it to himself and later on, Juan and Maria Maningding renounced and quitclaimed their shares in the Riceland in favor of R. Buazon.

3. Subsequently, Roque Bauzon transferred the riceland to his son Luis Bauzon and the sugarland to his daughter Eriberta Bauzon (the respondents in this case), both transactions being evidenced by deeds of sale. On 31 July 1979 Segunda Maningding died. Her heirs allegedly discovered the transfers made by Roque Bauzon in favor of his children only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition of the properties as well as the accounting of the produce but were unsuccessful. The trial court awarded both parcels to Segunda Maningding and Roque Bauzon as co-owners in equal shares after finding that Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding had already executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation. It rejected the deed of donation for failure to prove its due execution and authenticity and nullified the deed of sale by Roque Buazon to his children. It concluded that Roque Bauzon could not have validly conveyed both parcels as one-half (1/2) of each parcel rightfully belonged to Segunda Maningding and her heirs. The CA reversed the ruling, declaring the donation and sales valid. Later on, the court reversed itself by declaring the donation void for failure to comply with the necessary requirements. However, it ruled that the properties belonged to Roque Bauzon by virtue of acquisitive prescription. ISSUE: Whether or not Roque Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription RULING: Yes. While prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in the concept of owner by virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The possession was public as it was Roque Bauzon who personally tilled and cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were manifest and visible to all. These acts were made more pronounced and public considering that the parcels of land are located in a municipality wherein ownership and possession are particularly and normally known to the community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he was never ousted therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His possession was uninterrupted and in good faith because of his well-founded belief that the donation propter nuptias was properly executed and the grantors were legally allowed to convey their respective shares in his favor. He likewise appropriated to himself the whole produce of the parcels of land to the exclusion of all others. As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the property from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who were never given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which reason they demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their shares. Unfortunately they slept on their rights and allowed almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse before attempting to assert their right. Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their inaction. Note: The donation propter nuptias was effected as early as 21 April 1926. It was only in 1986 when the heirs of Segunda Maningding demanded partition of the properties and conveyance of the produce. Sixty (60) years have already elapsed. Even granting that Roque Bauzon possessed the properties only upon the death of his father in 1948, more than thirty (30) years have already passed. In either case, acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of Roque Bauzon.
83. IMPERIAL VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Petitioner Eloy Imperial purchased a parcel of land from his father Leoncio Imperial. Although the transaction was denominated as a sale, both admit that it was adonation. Subsequently, Leoncio filed an action for the annulment of the supposed deed of sale but a compromise agreement was then made by both parties. When Leoncio died, his adopted son, Victor, substituted him in the Compromise agreement. When Victor also died, his heirs (herein private respondents) filed an action for annulment of the donation on the ground that the conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner Eloy impaired the legitime of Victor, their natural brother and predecessors-in-interest. Petitioner Imperial raises the defense that the donation did not impair Victors legitime and that the action of respondents has already prescribed. Issue: Was the donation made by Leoncio Imperial in favor of petitioner Eloy Imperial inofficious and should be reduced? Held: No. Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of title. In the recent case of Vizconde vs. CA, we declared that what is brought to collation is not the donated property itself, but the value of the property at the time it was donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir of the donee.

84. SANTOS VS. ALANA FACTS: Rolando Santos, petitioner, and Constancia Santos-Alana, respondent, are half-blood siblings both asserting their claim over a lot registered in the name of their father, Gregorio Santos. He died intestate in 1986. During his lifetime, specifically in 1978 Gregorio donated the lot to Rolando which the latter accepted. The deed of donation was annotated on Gregorio's title. In 1981, Gregorio again sold the lot also to Ronaldo as per a Deed of Absolute Sale. In that same year, by virtue of the annotated deed of donation, the title under Gregorio's name was cancelled and a new one was issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila in Rolando's name. In 1991, respondent Constancia filed a complaint for partition and reconveyance against R. She alleged that during his lifetime, G denied having sold the lot to R; that she learned of the donation in 1978; and that the donation is inofficious as she was deprived of her legitime. In his answer, R countered that G's suit is barred by prescription considering that she is aware that he has been in possession of the lot as owner for more than ten (10) years; and that the lot was sold to him by his father, hence, C can no longer claim her legitime. The trial court found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was not signed by the parties nor was it registered in the Registry of Deeds. Thus, it is not a valid contract. What is valid is the deed of donation as it was duly executed by the parties and registered. The trial court then held that since G did not own any other property, the donation to R is inofficious because it impaired C's legitime.

ISSUES: I. Was the donation inofficious?

II. Is the action barred by prescription? HELD: I. Whether the donation is inofficious. YES. It bears reiterating that under Article 752 of the Civil Code, the donation is inofficoius if it exceeds this limitation no person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may give or receive by will. In Imperial vs. Court of Appeals, we held that inofficiousness may arise only upon the death of the donor as the value of donation may then be contrasted with the net value of the estate of the donor deceased. At this point, we emphasize that as found by the trial court, G did not sell the lot to R. He donated it. The trial court also found that the donation is inofficious as it impairs C's legitime; that at the time of G's death, he left no property other than the lot now in controversy he donated to R; and that the deceased made no reservation for the legitime of C, his daughter and compulsory heir. Pursuant to Article 752 earlier cited, G could not donate more than he may give by will. Clearly, by donating the entire lot to R, we agree with both lower courts that G's donation is inofficious as it deprives C of her legitime, which, under Article 888 of the Civil Code, consists of one-half (1/2) of the hereditary estate of the father and the mother. Since the parents of both parties are already dead, they will inherit the entire lot, each being entitled to one-half (1/2) thereof. II. Whether C's suit is barred by prescription. NO. In Imperial vs. Court of Appeals, we held that donations, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime (as in this case), are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason, we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs. From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? In Mateo vs. Lagua, involving the reduction, for inofficiousness, of a donation propter nuptias, we held that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined. Here, G died in 1986. Consequently, C had until 1996 within which to file the action. Records show that she filed her suit in 1992, well within the prescriptive period.

85. BITANGCOR vs TAN FACTS: In two consolidated cases of Bitangcor vs.Tan and Peredo vs.Tan against successful 1971 Bar examinee Rodolfo M. Tan, it was held that therein respondent "had fallen short of the requisite morality for admission to the Bar" for violating the honor of two women. Tan had sexual relations with both complainants without marriage and had sired a daughter by complainant Bitangcor. ISSUE: whether or not the respondent Rodolfo Tan be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath RESOLUTION: It cannot be denied that respondent's conduct left much to be desired, He had committed a transgression, if not against the law, against the high moral standard requisite for membership in the bar. He had

proven false to his word. What is worse, he did sully her honor. This on the one side. On the other hand, eighteen years had gone by from the time of the 1956 examinations. He was a successful bar candidate but because of this lapse from moral propriety, he had not been allowed to take the lawyer's oath (Justice E. Fernando IV). The court believes that the long wait has rehabilitated him and taught him that failure to live up to the requisite moral standard is not to be taken lightly. The resolution of february 29, 1972 is set aside, and respondent rodolfo m. Tan is allowed to take the lawyers oath.

86. Abalos vs. Macatangay Facts: Arturo and Esther Abalos are husband and wife. They own a parcel of land in Makati. On June 2, 1988, Arturo, armed with a purported Special Power of Attorney, executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in favor of Galicano in which Arturo acknowledged he received a P5k check from Galicano as earnest money to be deducted from the purchase price and that Arturo binds himself to sell the land to Galicano within 30 days from receipt of the P5k. The purchase price agreed upon was P1.3 M. The P5k check was dishonored due to insufficiency. Apparently, Esther and Arturo have a rocky relationship. Esther executed a SPA in favor of her sister and that she is selling her share in the conjugal property to Galicano. It was alleged that that the RMOA is not valid for Esthers signature was not affixed thereto. And that Esther never executed a SPA in favor of Arturo. Galicano informed the couple that he has prepared a check to cover the remainder of the amount that needs to be paid for the land. He demanded that the land be delivered to him. But the spouses failed to deliver the land. Galicano sued the spouses. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contract of sale between Arturo and Galicano. Whether or not the subsequent agreement between Galicano and Esther is binding and that it cured the defect of the earlier contract between Arturo and Galicano. HELD: No. No matter how the RMOA is looked upon, the same cannot be valid. At best, the agreement between Arturo and Galicano is a mere grant of privilege to purchase to Galicano. The promise to sell is not binding to Arturo for there was actually no consideration distinct from the price. Be it noted that the parties considered the P5k as an earnest money to be deducted from the purchase price. Taking arguendo that it was a bilateral promise to buy and sell, the same is still not binding for Galicano failed to render a payment of legal tender. A check is not a legal tender. Taking arguendo that the P5k was an earnest money which supposedly perfected a contract of sale, the RMOA is still not valid for Esthers signature was not affixed. The property is conjugal and under the Family Code, the spouses consents are required. Further, the earnest money here is not actually the earnest money contemplated under Article 1482 under the Civil Code. The subsequent agreement between Esther and Galicano did not ratify the earlier transaction between Arturo and Galicano. A void contract can never be ratified.

87. HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO, G.R. No. 153802 March 11, 2005

FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife. Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[ Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises. Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said documents null and void and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages. The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for damages and attorneys fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition

ISSUE: 1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE. 2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY. HELD: the petition is denied.

1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part: ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . . In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . . In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter. The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondents consent. 2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . . Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.

88. VILLANUEVA- MIJARES ET. AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS April 12, 2000 FACTS: Felipe Villanueva left a 15,336-square-meter parcel of land in Kalibo, Capiz to his eight children: Simplicio, Benito, Leon, Eustaquio, Camila, Fausta and Pedro. In 1952, Pedro declared under his name 1/6 portion of the property (1,905 sq. m.). He held the remaining properties in trust for his co-heirs who demanded the subdivision of the property but to no avail. After Leons death in 1972, private respondents discovered that the shares of Simplicio, Nicolasa, Fausta and Maria Baltazar had been purchased by Leon through a deed of sale dated August 25, 1946 but registered only in 1971. In July 1970, Leon also sold and partitioned the property in favor of petitioners, his children, who thereafter secured separate and independent titles over their respective pro- indiviso shares. Private respondents, who are also descendants of Felipe, filed an action for partition with annulment of documents and/or reconveyance and damages against petitioners. They contended that Leon fraudulently obtained the sale in his favor through machinations and false pretenses. The RTC declared that private respondents action had been barred by res judicata and that petitioners are the legal owners of the property in question in accordance with the individual titles issued to them. ISSUE: Whether or not laches apply against the minors property that was held in trust. RULING: No. At the time of the signing of the Deed of Sale of August 26,1948, private respondents Procerfina, Prosperedad, Ramon and Rosa were minors. They could not be faulted for their failure to file a case to recover their inheritance from their uncle Leon, since up to the age of majority, they believed and considered Leon their co-heir administrator. It was only in 1975, not in 1948, that they became aware of the actionable betrayal by their uncle. Upon learning of their uncles actions, they filed for recovery. Hence, the doctrine of stale demands formulated in Tijam cannot be applied here. They did not sleep on their rights, contrary to petitioners assertion. Furthermore, when Felipe Villanueva died, an implied trust was created by operation of law between Felipes children and Leon, their uncle, as far as the 1/6 share of Felipe. Leons fraudulent titling of Felipes 1/6 share was a betrayal of that implied trust

89. Valdez Jr. v. CA 489 SCRA 369

FACTS: The case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio and Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella before the MTC of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs are the registered owners of a residential lot at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which they acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. by virtue of Sales Contract. It is alleged also that defendants, without any color of title, occupied the said lot by building their house in the

said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession thereof; that they were asked several times to peacefully surrender the premises to the plaintiffs but the defendants refused and likewise did not want to amicably settle before the Barangay. On the other hand, the defendants claim that petitioners failed to state grounds for unlawful detainer (prior physical possession of the property or that they were the lessors thereof). In the alternative, private respondents claimed ownership over the land on the ground that they had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as attested by an ocular inspection report from the DENR. MTC: ruled in favor of the plaintiffs RTC: affirmed MTC CA: reversed RTC and said that plaintiffs failed to allege prior material possession which is mandatory in forcible entry nor was their tolerance on the part of the owner to make out a case for unlawful detainer

ISSUES: whether petitioners have made a clear case of unlawful detainer/ whether MTC had jurisdiction

HELD/RATIO: NO. The case was actually one for forcible entry and not unlawful detainer. MTC had no jurisdiction. Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them, their mother. Clearly, defendants entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledg e of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. Petition denied and CA decision affirmed.

90. Manacop vs. CA GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992 FACTS: Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioners corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment. HELD: The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment. The petition was dismissed by SC.

92. Liyao vs. Liyao GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002 FACTS: William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she and the deceased were legally married but living separately for more than 10 years and that they cohabited from 1965 until the death of the deceased. On the other hand, one of the children of the deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were legally married and that her parents were not separated legally or in fact. ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the deceased. HELD: Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law. Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

93. Herrera vs Alba Facts: In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in order for the latter to recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera denied Armis allegations. In the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid )DNA testing to establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba. However, Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing has not yet garnered widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be admissible in court; and that the said test is unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-incrimination. ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct.

HELD: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court, the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no question as to the acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002). In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the other hand, as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme Court provides, which is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines: In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by courts before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test inquires: Whether the theory or technique can be tested, Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review, Whether the rate of error is acceptable, Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity inclusion can be had, the DNA test result must state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is the biological father. However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a 100% ) does not immediately result in the DNA test result being admitted as an overwhelming evidence. It does not automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case Herrera, is the biological father of the child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable evidence which can be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with. What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the biological father? Then the evidence is merely corroborative. Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the right against selfincrimination. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. There is no testimonial compulsion in the getting of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-incrimination.

94. Tecson Vs. Comelec 424 SCRA 277 G.R. No. 161434

Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent. Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen. Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.

95. Macadangdang vs CA GR No. 38287, October 23, 1981 FACTS: Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They started a buy and sell business and sarisari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect on the legal separation. HELD: The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated.

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse. Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.

96. Republic Vs Court of Appeals and Castro Case Digest Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Castro G.R. No. 103047 September 12, 1994 Facts: Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by a City Court Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. They decided to live together when Castro discovered she was pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in order he marital status before leaving for the U.S. She then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila. Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage. The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged nonissuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed. Issue: Is the marriage valid? Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"? HELD: At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage license shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by the local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" - a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas as initially unknown to the parents of the former

97. ILANO v. CA G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994

NOCON, J. FACTS: Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata. Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again. Later, he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate and with his promise of marriage, they eloped. While they were living at Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning. During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods CA REVERSED RTC judgment declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S. ILANO as the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child. ISSUE: W/N MERCEDITAS S. ILANO is the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child. HELD: Petition is DENIED. CA affirmed. Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments. Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was conceived, she is a spurious child. Rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of his parents but because under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would be incompatible with the stability of the civil status of person, the permanence of which affects public interest. Even when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the revocation of such act will not revoke the recognition itself. To be sure, to establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not, however, mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues (De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Merceditas is not appellee's daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid embarrassment. It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had long beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who claims to be a total stranger to be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter's signatures and handwriting. The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the relationship between Leoncia and appellee, their living together as circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and documentary evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed by his belated denials. Any other evidence or proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph.

This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiatio As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious child of petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent court took into account the following: The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having been born on December 30, 1963, was about 9 years old at the time and was already of school age spending about P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school expenses alone, while defendant was earning about P10,000.00 a month. She is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period of 12 years, 4 months and 14 days, which is hereby fixed at P800.00 a month for the 1st 3 years; and considering the declining value of the peso as well as her needs as she grows older, at a graduated increase of P1,000.00 a month for the next 3 years; P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding 3 years; and P1,500.00 a month for the last 3 years, 4 months and 14 days until she attained the age of majority. This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney's fees is appropriate under Article 2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court deems it just and equitable under the given facts and circumstances that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

98. Acebedo vs. Arquero Facts: On June 1, 1994,Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brookes Point, Palawan for immorality. Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC Brookes Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brookes Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the letter-complaint was the girls Baptismal Certificate reflecting the names of respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents Respondent claimed that the immorality charge by the petitioner was just a mere harassment and a product of complainants hatred and jealousy. By respondents own admission however, he had an illicit relationship with the petitioners wife for 8-9 months. The reason for having this illicit relationship was explained by the respondent that the petitioner and his wife had a kasunduan in writing and duly notarized. The Kasunduan indicated that they would sever their marriage ties and allow themselves to live with other possible partner and that no one would go to court to institute any action against the other. Issue: Whether or not the Kasunduan is enough ground to sever the marriage tie. Ruling: SC ruled that respondents justification fails, being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Art 1 of the family code provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature and consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. It is an institution of public order and policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by stipulation of the parties. Respondent is suspended for 6 months

100. Cang vs Court of Appeals Facts: Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married, begot three children. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair. Anna Marie subsequently filed a petition for legal separation which was granted. They had an agreement for support of the children and that Anna Marie can enter into agreements without the written consent of Herbert. Petitioner left for the US. Meanwhile, the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie filed for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang children. Upon learning of the

adoption, Herbert went back to the Philippines to contest it, but the petition for adoption was granted by the court. Issue: Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? Held: Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads: Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (2)the parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality. Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrange mental one, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.

101. Cervantes vs Fajardo Facts: The minor was born to respondents Conrado Fajardoand Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely two (2)weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon. The adoptive parents received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. Subsequently, the respondents took the child. Issue: Can respondents take back their child? Held: In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion. It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her. Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall

be exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

102. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION GARCIAHONORATO B. CATINDIG, Petitioner G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

OF

STEPHANIE

NATHY

ASTORGA

Facts: On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to 'Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname ' Garcia be changed to 'Catindig, his surname. Finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner's legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. Issue: Whether or not, an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? Held: Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother's surname 'GARCIA as her middle name. Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption.