G.R. No. L-45674 EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B. BERNARDINO, petitioners, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: On February 6, 1966 complainant Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, who was then the Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital, filed a case for intriguing against honor allegedly committed on December 26, 1965 against Dr. Emiliano Francisco and Atty. Harry Bernardino with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. On May 3, 1966, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information in the former Court of First Instance of Rizal accusing Francisco and Bernardino of the crime of grave oral defamation. On October 8, 1966 the information upon order of the court, was amended by adding the particular statements uttered by each accused allegedly constituting the crime of slander. Issue: Whether or not the crime of simple slander found by the Court of Appeals to be the offense committed by the petitioners has prescribed. Held: The court held that and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription "shall commence to run again when such p terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted", thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint or information is filed must have power to acquit or convict the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal not otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate without

conviction or acquittal if the court should discharge the accused because no prima facie case has been shown.

G.R. No. L-17905

January 27, 1923

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN MORAN, FRUCTUOSO CANSINO, and HILARIO ODA, defendants-appellants.

Facts: On March 31, 1922, the decision of this court in the present case, affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, was published, but the term of imprisonment by the said court upon the accused, for a violation of the Election Law, defined and punished in section 2639 of the Administrative Code, was increased to six months from which judgment the present appeal was taken by the accused. The accused, after asking for a reconsideration of the said decision and a rehearing and pending the resolution on the said petition, filed a special motion on May 2d of this year, alleging that the crime complained of had prescribed under the provision of section 71 of Act No. 3030, enacted by the Legislature on March 9, 1922, and praying that they be absolved from the complaint. Upon this motion the Attorney-General was heard, having filed an answer and a supplemental answer, with the corresponding arguments, opposing the same, as well as the accused who filed their reply thereto and supplementary replies, both parties stating at length the reasons and legal grounds for their respective contentions. Issue: Whether or not the prescription provided in section 71 of Act No. 3030 refers only to that Act and not to any other, for said section 71 Held: It is enough to take into consideration the fact that Act No. 3030, is, as its title indicates, amendatory to several sections and parts of sections of chapter 18 of the Administrative Code, known as the Election Law, and of chapter 65 on penalties for the violation of various administrative laws, among them, those of the Election Law itself, included in said chapter 18 of the Administrative Code, in order to understand that when the Legislature used the words "This Act," that is, Act No. 3030, it referred, necessarily, to the Election Law included in various sections and provisions of the aforesaid two chapters of the above-mentioned Code, that is, the Election Law prior to Act No. 3030, under which the herein accused were convicted. One needs but examine one by one all the sections of said Act No. 3030, each of which declares the sense in which each of the sections included in said chapters in amended, in order to convince himself that said Act No. 3030 is similar to the law that preceded it, with the amendments and some additions thereto. If the

Legislature had passed and enacted a new Election Law different from that contained in the above-mentioned chapters of the Administrative Code, then it may be said that the phrase "This Act" can in no way refer to the prior Election Law. Furthermore, if the offenses resulting from the violations of the Election Law, the provisions of which are contained in the aforesaid chapters of the Administrative Code, are the same offenses provided for in Act No. 3030, though with some modifications in the details as to some of them and with increase in the penalty, it cannot be denied that when the Legislature used the words "This Act" in section 71 of Act No. 3030, wherein it is provided that said offenses shall prescribe one year after their commission, it necessarily referred to offenses resulting from the violations of the former Election Law, as amended by said Act No. 3030. Besides, one of the objects of this Act, as its title indicates, is to make more effective the provisions and the purposes of the former Law contained in the Administrative Code; so that Act No. 3030 rather than being an integral part of the former election law is in conjunction with the latter the only Election Law in force; and any other interpretation to the contrary of the phrase "This Act" cannot, in our opinion, be accepted as good logic and in accordance with the principles of sound reasoning.

Prescription of Criminal Offense G.R. No. L-22366 October 7, 1924

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EUSTAQUIO JOSON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Facts: This is a criminal action. The complaint charges that the defendants violated the Election Law. The complaint was dismissed upon motion of the defendants. The Attorney-General appealed for the Government. The complaint was presented in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay on the 28th day of April, 1923. It charged that the defendants had violated the provisions of section 60 of Act No. 3030. That during the period between the first to the sixth of June, 1922, but specially on the 6th of June aforesaid, early in the morning and during said 6th day of June, and on the occasion of the general elections which were being held on said day in the municipalities of Virac and Bato, Province of Albay, Philippine Islands, the above-named accused, conspiring for the purpose, did wilfully and intentionally write, prepare and cause to be written, distributed, published, divulged and posted in different public places within the municipalities of Virac and Bato several posters and bills reading as follows: "Seores Electores: Guiromdoma nindo an magna casaquitan na tinitios ta. Barato an bandala huli que Vera: mahal an bagas huli qui Pedro Martinez," which in English means: (Voters, bear in mind our sufferings, hemp is cheap, due to Vera, and rice is dear, due to Martinez), and is calculated to belittle and defeat Jose O. Vera, Provincial Governor and candidate for reelection, and Pedro Martinez, Representative for the Second District and also candidate of reelection, with reference to Administrative Order No. 13 of the Bureau of Agriculture, which the defendants have persistently and publicly been attributing to Governor Vera, as author of the measure, and to the raising of the price of rice by the Fifth Philippine Legislature in its last period of sessions which the same defendants have been

attributing publicly to Representative Martinez, without in one or the other case stating their names or that of any other person, with their domicile or residence, at the bottom of said bills. And all the above criminal acts were committed by the accused, within their conspiracy and in pursuance and furtherance of a general plan of election campaign in all the municipalities of the subprovince of Catanduanes. Issue: Whether or not the action is barred by prescription. Held: In the absence of a definition in Act No. 3030 or any other acts of the Legislature, defining what shall constitute the commencement of a criminal action, we are inclined to follow the provisions of section 46 of Act No. 190, and to hold that the word "action" as used in section 46 applies to both criminal and civil actions. In accordance therefore with that section, we are forced to decide that the filing of the complaint in the present action on the 28th day of April, 1923, had the effect of interrupting the running of the prescriptive period mentioned in section 71 of Act No. 3030, and that the actual arrest of the defendants was not necessary to interrupt the running of the period of prescription or limitation. Moreover, it may be added that when the defendants voluntarily appeared after the complaint was presented against them and gave bonds for their appearance at any time they may be called, no arrest is necessary. Voluntary appearance relieves the necessity of an actual arrest.