FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Article 26.

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 22 Van Dorn vs. Ronillo Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition. Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order. Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972. After the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines and their union begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975. The parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and subsequently, the petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. On June 8, 1983, private respondent filed a suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding. Issues: 1. What is the effect of the Nevada divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in The Philippines? 2. Is the petitioner still considered under the Philippine laws to be married to the respondent and subject to a wifes obligations under the Family Code? Held:
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1. Petitioner contends that respondent is stopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal/ property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment. 2. For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. 3. For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties. 4. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. Ruling: Petition is granted and respondent judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the complaint. Ratio Decidendi: An American granted absolute divorce with Filipina wife is cut off from marital and successional rights of the latter and the Filipina, although living abroad is still subject to the provisions governed in the Civil Code of the Philippines and therefore shall not be discriminated against in her own country. The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. Pilapil vs. Somera, et al. Facts: Imelda Manalysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After 3 and a half years of marriage, a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court. German law said that the court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.

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Two months later, private respondent filed adultery charges against former spouse before the City of Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. Issues: Whether or not the petitioner, after a valid divorce decree has been issued, still has the right to file adultery charges against former spouse? Held: Husband of petitioner had no legal standing to commence the adultery case since they are not married anymore at the time the charges of adultery were filed. The legal imposture that the German was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit cannot stand due to their divorce. Petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." Ruling: Questioned order denying petitioners motion to squash is set aside and another dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Temporary restriction order is hereby permanent. Ratio Decidendi: According to the law, in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Since the husband is divorced from the wife at the time of filing adultery charges, therefore he cannot legally file the complaint. Edgar San Luis vs. San Luis Facts: This case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, former governor of Laguna. During his lifetime, he contracted three marriages to the following: First, to Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942, six children, 21 years later, Virginia died. Five years later, he married Merry Lee Corwin, and their union produced one son. Three years later, Corwin filed a divorce before the family court of the First Circuit in Hawaii USA which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody. Lastly, he married respondent Felicidad San Luis in LA, California USA, but had no children with her. Felicisimo lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage, till December 18, 1992. Felicidad prays, although recognizing that the deceased has six legitimate children by first marriage and two legitimate children by second marriage, that the letters of administration of the properties amounting to P30,304,178 be issued to her. Two of the legitimate children of the deceased filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state cause of action.
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Improper venue because it should have been filed in Laguna, the place of residence of the deceased prior to his death and Failure to state cause of action because the petitioner is just a mistress because at the time of their marriage, deceased is still legally married to Merry Lee, her marriage to the deceased is void ab initio. Issues: 1. Whether or not the venue was properly laid? 2. Whether respondent has the legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration? Held: (1) Distinction of DOMICILE and RESIDENCE The term resides connoted ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. In statutes fixing the venue, the terms residence and domicile are synonymous and convey the same meaning as inhabitant Resides personal, actual or physics habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. Signifies physical presence in the place. For purposes of fixing venue under the rules of court, residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode which may not necessarily be his legal residence. Respondent was able to submit evidences of the proof of billing address of the deceased and was able to prove that he was residing in Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa. Therefore letters to administration were properly filed. (2) We first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry. Pursuant to Article 26(2): Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Therefore, the deceased had the capacity to remarry. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and deceased under the laws of USA. Respondent in this case would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry but fails to prove that her marriage to him w as validly performed under the laws of USA, then she may be considered as a co-owner by virtue of article 144 of the civil code which governs the property relations of parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage thus, property will be owned in equal shares. Ruling:
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Petition is denied. Case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Ratio Decidendi: Proving the validity of the divorce and capacity to remarry but failure to prove that marriage to a certain party was validly performed under the laws of foreign country, such party may be considered as a co-owner by virtue of article 144 of the Civil Code which governs the property relations of parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage thus, property will be owned in equal shares. Republic vs. Iyoy Facts: On December 16, 1961, Crasus and Fely were married in Bradford Memorial Church in Cebu City. They bore 5 children namely Crasus Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos. Crasus found out that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines to work in the U.S.A. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely was already married to an American and already bore a child because of the letters sent by Fely to their children. Fely was also already using the surname Micklus when she was given an invitation to the wedding of Crasus Jr. Thus a Complaint was filed against her on 1997 by Crasus saying that she had Psychological incapacity that was only shown after the wedding and that such incapacity should render their marriage null and void. RTC ruled that the marriage was void ab initio because of her psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties from the evidence presented by Crasus. The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines as represented by the Solicitor General, saw that the ruling of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence thus the case was brought up to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals using Article 26 said that RTC did not err in its decision to declare the marriage void ab initio. Issues: 1. Whether or not Fely was psychologically incapacitated? 2. Whether or not Court of Appeals committed an error using Article 26 in their decision? 3. Whether or not the solicitor general under Article 48 was authorized to intervene the said case? Held: 1. Fely was not psychologically incapacitated because in order to be considered under that category one must characterize the following guidelines as enumerated by Santos v. CA: Gravity the party must have grave or serious psychological incapacity that would render the party incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. Juridical Antecedence The party must have had the said incapacity before the said marriage even though it manifests only after the marriage. Incurability The party must have an incurable incapacity or if curable, the cure is way
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beyond the means of the party involved. At most Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy give Crasus only a ground for Legal Separation under Art 55 but not for declaration of Nullity of marriage under article 36. 2. CA erred in using Article 26 (2) as the basis for its decision. The said article was not applicable to the said case because of the following: By its plain and literal interpretation, it means that it is a marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino and the former divorcing the latter. At the time Fely filed for a divorce, which was in 1984, she was still a Filipino because as she admitted, she only got her US citizenship in 1988. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus. 3. The Solicitor General was authorized to intervene in behalf of the Republic. Pursuant to Article 48: In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Though it did not expressly mentioned the Solicitor General, it does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages because in EO 292, the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government, generally, he is tasked to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People of the Philippines once the case is brought before SC or CA. Ruling: The court granted the petition of Republic and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The marriage of Crasus and Fely was valid and subsisting. Ratio Decidendi: In cases of annulment or absolute nullity of marriage, the grounds for annulment on the basis of psychological incapacity must be sufficiently proved according to the guidelines above in Santos vs. CA. Republic vs. Obercido Facts: This case concerns the applicability of Par. 2, Art. 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S. Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva on May 24, 1981 and was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. Sometime in 1986, his wife went to the States and eventually was naturalized as an American citizen. In 2000, his wife filed a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley in the US.
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Petitioner filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not respondent can remarry under Paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code? Held: 1. The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. 2. Petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy). (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination (The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage). 3. Intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, the Court held that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. 4. For his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Ruling: The petition by the Republic of the Philippines is granted. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby set aside. No pronouncement as to costs. Ratio Decidendi: Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
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