PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES vs. GREGORIO PERFECTO EN BANC,G.R. No.

L-18463 October 4, 1922 Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippine Islands Defendant-Appellant: Gregorio Perfecto Ponente: Malcolm, J. Facts: On August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero discovered that records that pertain to testimonies given by witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared in his office. Then on September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto published an article that indirectly refers to the perpetrators of the crime as being members of the senate body. Mr. Perfecto wrote: The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery. On September 15,1920, the Senate adopted a resolution authorizing the Senate President to endorse to the Attorney-General for his study and corresponding action all the papers referring to the case of La Nacion and its editor Mr.Gregorio Perfecto. A case was filed in the Municipal Court and Court of First Instance of the City of Manila where Mr. Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty of violating of Spanish Penal Code 256. Issues: Whether or not the Spanish Penal Code 256 is still in force. Whether or not Spanish Penal Code 256 is abrogated or superseded by the Philippine Libel Law enacted by the Philippine Commission. Decision: The initial judgment was reversed and the defendant acquitted, as there was insufficient responsibility nor facts present in the part of the defendant to be found guilty or in violation neither of Article 256 nor of the Libel Law. Ratio Decidendi: Spanish Penal Code 256 is no longer in force, as it refers only to ministers or other persons under or related to the Spanish Crown. Furthermore during the change of sovereignty, Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was automatically abrogated by the Libel Law enacted by the Philippine Commission.

The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known rule of statutory construction is, that where the later statute clearly covers the old subjectmatter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 465.) Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. The gulf which separates this article from the spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which separates a monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the United States Macariola vs. Asuncion Case Digest Macariola v. Asuncion A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982 114 SCRA 77 FACTS: Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. 3010 for partition. Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R. Macariola. On June 8, 1863 respondent Judge rendered a decision, which became final for lack of an appeal. On October 16, 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on November 11, 1963. On March 6, 1965, a portion of lot 1184-E, one of the properties subject to partition under Civil Case No. 3010, was acquired by purchase by respondent Macariola and his wife, who were major stockholders of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc., Bernardita Macariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals with acts unbecoming of a judge. Macariola alleged that Asuncion violated , among others, Art. 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code and Article 14 of the Code of Commerce.

ISSUE: Whether or not the actuation of Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of property in a Civil Case previously handled by him an act unbecoming of a Judge HELD: Article 1491 , par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. The Supreme Court held that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. In the case at bar, when respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of litigation. Moreover at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondents order date October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long been final for there was no appeal from said orders. Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty , the political laws of the former sovereign , whether

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compatible or not with those of the new 4. That the respondent GSIS should give sovereign, are automatically abrogated, preference to the petitioner, a Filipino unless they are expressly re-enacted by corporation, over Renong Berhad, a affirmative act of the new sovereign. foreign corporation, in the sale of the outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. R:D GOVERNMENT SERVICE 1. From its very words the provision does INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) not require any legislation to put it in G.R. NO. 122156, 3 FEBRUARY 1997 operation. 267 SCRA 408 2. Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony 3. It is undeniable that in this case the BELLOSILLO, J. subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the FACTS: Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality The 30% - 51% shares of Manila Hotel deriving its authority from the State. Corporation owner of Manila Hotel a historical heritage, owned by GSIS 4. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the were sold by public bidding Filipino. It must be so if we are to give The two qualified bidders are Manila life and meaning to the Filipino First Prince Hotel (MPH) (petitioner) and Policy provision of the 1987 Renong Berhad (Malaysian group) Constitution MPH (petitioner) issued a managers check through Philtrust bank amounting to 33,000,000.00 to match MABANAG ET AL. VS. LOPEZ VITO ET AL. the bid of the Malaysian Group. GSIS (respondent) disregarded the EN BANC, G.R. No. L-1123 March 5, tendered amount to match the bid and 1947 that the sale of 51% of MHC may be Petitioners: Alejo Mabanag, Jose O. hastened. MHP (petitioner) filed a petition on Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto Serrano, J. Antonio Araneta, Antonio prohibition and mandamus. October, 1995, the court issued a Barredo, and Jose W. Diokno temporary restraining order enjoining Respondents: Secretary of Justice Ozaeta, respondents from perfecting Solicitor General Taada, and First consummating sales to the Malaysian Assistant Solicitor General Reyes Ponente: Tuason, J. firm. September, 1996, the instant case was Facts: accepted by the Court En Banc after it This is a petition for prohibition to was referred to it by first division. prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated ISSUES: Resolution of both houses proposing Whether or not the GSIS violated an amendment to the constitution of the Section 10 Par. 2 Article XII of the Philippines to be appended as an 1987 Constitution. ordinance thereto. Petitioners include 3 Senators and 8 Decision: Representatives. 1. That Sec. 10, Par. 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing The 3 Senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the provision and does not need first session of the Congress following implementing legislation to be carried elections, on account of alleged out. irregularities in their election, the 8 2. That the outstanding shares of the representatives had not been allowed to Manila Hotel Corporation are part of sit in the lower House except to take the national patrimony which part in the election of the speaker for contributes to the national economy. the same reason. 3. That GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to implement As a consequence, 3 Senators and 8 Representatives did not take part in the the stated provision under the passage of the resolution, nor their constitution. membership was reckoned with in the computation of the necessary vote

which is required in proposing an amendment to the constitution, if these members of congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary vote in either branch of the congress. The respondents deny that this Court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. Issues: Whether or not the Supreme Court can take jurisdiction on the issue at bar. Whether or not there have been irregularities in the passage of the resolution. Held: If ratification on an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in Section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification. There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even independent of any intervention by the Executive. If on the grounds expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary is needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry to the validity of the proposal then into that of the ratification. Moreover, as far as the journal is concerned, even if both journals and authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis that the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the 2 ways specified in Section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself in considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the

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journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as to give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and the due enactment thereof. The petition was dismissed without costs. Francisco vs. House of the Representatives GR no. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003 Ponente: Carpio Morales (J) FACTS: 1. Following Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. 1) Secs. 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) provide for the following: Section16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance. In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are

deemed initiated at the time of the filing on October 22, 2003 for being of such verified complaint or resolution insufficient in substance. To date, the of impeachment with the Secretary Committee Report to this effect has not General. yet been sent to the House in plenary in Section17. Bar Against Initiation Of accordance with the said Section 3(2) Impeachment Proceedings. Within a of Article XI of the Constitution. period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed 4. Four months and three weeks since the initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, filing on June 2, 2003 of the first no impeachment proceedings, as such, complaint or on October 23, 2003, a can be initiated against the same day after the House Committee on official. Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with 2. On July 22, 2002, the House of the Secretary General of the House by Representatives adopted a Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Resolution, sponsored by Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix Representative Felix William D. William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Fuentebella, which directed the Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Committee on Justice "to conduct an Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the investigation, in aid of legislation, on alleged results of the legislative inquiry the manner of disbursements and initiated by above-mentioned House expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Resolution. This second impeachment Supreme Court of the Judiciary complaint was accompanied by a Development Fund (JDF)." "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by 2) On June 2, 2003, former President at least one-third (1/3) of all the Joseph E. Estrada filed an Members of the House of impeachment complaint (first Representatives. impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. 5. Thus arose the instant petitions against and seven Associate Justices of the the House of Representatives, et. Supreme Court for "culpable al., most of which petitions contend violation of the Constitution, betrayal that the filing of the second of the public trust and other high impeachment complaint is crimes." The complaint was endorsed unconstitutional as it violates the by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, provision of paragraph 5 Section 3 of Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o Piang Dilangalen, and was referred impeachment proceedings shall be to the House Committee on Justice initiated against the same official more on August 5, 2003 in accordance than once within a period of one year. with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution, which provides for the ISSUES: following:. 1. Whether or not the filing of the A verified complaint for impeachment second impeachment complaint may be filed by any Member of the against Chief Justice Hilario G. House of Representatives or by any Davide, Jr. with the House of citizen upon a resolution of endorsement Representatives is by any Member thereof, which shall be constitutional. included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the 2. Whether the resolution thereof proper Committee within three session is a political question has days thereafter. The Committee, after resulted in a political crisis. hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Held: Members, shall submit its report to the 1. It is unconstitutional. The second House within sixty session days from impeachment complaint against Chief such referral, together with the Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred corresponding resolution. The resolution under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article shall be calendared for consideration by XI of the Constitution. Having the House within ten session days from concluded that the initiation takes place receipt thereof. by the act of filing of the impeachment 3. The House Committee on Justice ruled complaint and referral to the House on October 13, 2003 that the first Committee on Justice, the initial action impeachment complaint was "sufficient taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 in form," but voted to dismiss the same (5) of Article XI becomes clear.

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Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. 2. From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature. Decision: WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Merceditas Gutierrez, Petitioner vs House of Representatives, Committee on Justice, Respndents (GR No. 193459) Facts: Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and Felipe and Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello. Public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time. Resolution of September 7, 2010, found two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within ten days. Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court for injunctive reliefs. Respondent raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of selfexecuting, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. Ratio Decidendi: In case of doubt, the constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered selfexecuting, as contrary rule would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. CASE TITLE: AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner VS.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. NO. L-32717, November 26, 1970 FERNANDO, J. FACTS: On October 29, 1970, AmelitoMutuc, a candidate for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition at the same time prayed for a preliminary injunction against respondent COMELEC. He was informed by said Commission, that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner alleged that such Order by the respondent was violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech.

On the very next day of filing of said petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, a Resolution was adopted requiring respondent COMELEC to file an Answer not later than Issue: November 2, 1970 at the same time, Whether or not Assailed Resolutions of setting the case for hearing on November September 1 and 7, 2010 issued by public 3, 1970. respondent, The House of Representatives Committee on Justice are Respondent filed its answer, no denial unconstitutional. was made on the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification Ruling: for the prohibition was premised on a Supreme Court ruled that the assailed provision of the Constitutional Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and Convention Act, which made it unlawful September 7, 2010 of public respondent, for the candidates to purchase, produce, the House of Representatives Committee request or distribute sample ballots or on Justice, are not unconstitutional. electoral propaganda gadgets such as

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pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic foods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin. The case was argued on November 3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Atty. Romulo C. Felizmena arguing in behalf of the respondent. ISSUES: Whether or not the Order of prohibition imposed by the respondent COMELEC on the petitioner is an authority granted by the Constitutional Convention Act; Whether or not the prohibition made by respondent COMELEC in proposed using of jingles in petitioners mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers is violative of the petitioners Constitutional right to freedom of speech; Whether or not the respondent COMELEC exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law; DECISION: As set forth in a resolution dated November 3, 1970, respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited for enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order barring the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs. REASONS FOR THE DECISION: Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words "and the like."For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit the approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to.It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the

distribution of gadgets of the kind Cesar Climaco. The articles however was referred to as a means of inducement to despoiled efficaciously by the military. obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. A burst of gunfire ensued during the raid, as a result of the immediate retaliation of If the above provision of the the petitioners to deter the attack of the Constitutional Convention Act were to military, resulting from number of lend itself to the view that the use of the casualties. Parenthetically, the military taped jingle could be prohibited, then the arrested six male occupants, later challenge of unconstitutionality would be underwent finger-printing, paraffin difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal testing and photographing over their language, the Constitution prohibits an objection. abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this On December 21, 1984, the petitioners, preferred freedom calls all the more for the Alih family, filed a suit to the court in the utmost respect when what may be Zambaonga City Regional Trial Court; a curtailed is the dissemination of petition for prohibition with preliminary information to make more meaningful the injunction and restraining order, and equally vital right of suffrage. What subsequently, to recuperate the articles respondent Commission did, in effect, seized from them to preclude as to being was to impose censorship on petitioner, used as an evidence against them. an evil against which this constitutional right is directed. ISSUES: Whether or not the act of the military of "Lastly, as the branch of the executive search and seizure were constitutional as department although independent of defined and provided in Article VI, the President to which the Constitution Section 3 of the 1973 Philippine has given the 'exclusive charge' of the Constitution. 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' Whether or not the articles apprehended the power of decision of the Commission may preclude as an evidence against the is limited to purely 'administrative petitioners in any apparent imminent questions.'" It has been the constant proceedings. holding of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent RULING: Commission cannot exercise any The court so ordered that the search on authority in conflict with or outside of the November 25, 1984 of the respondents law, and there is no higher law than the led by Major General Castro on the petitioners premises was illegal and the Constitution. articles apprehended as a result thereof SUPREMACY OF THE are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, CONSTITUTION the seized articles shall remain in the Alih v. Castro, legal custody pending the outcome of the GR L-69401, criminal cases that may have been or may 23 June 1987, En Banc, Cruz [J] later be filed against the petitioner. PONENTE: CRUZ, J FACTS: On November 25, 1984, the Philippine marines operated an oppressive cruel form of domination by way of besiege on the premises of the petitioners, the Alih family, at Gov. Alvarez St., Zamboanga City. The Military operation carried out was of without a court order or a search warrant and warrant of arrest. The pursuit act of the military was on the basis of their superior order, on the ground that there were purported loose firearms, ammunition, and explosives, and that the Alih Family, the petitioners, was the key suspect on the assassination of Mayor REASONS FOR THE DECISION: The acts of the respondents were a violation of the Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be

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searched, and the persons or things to be It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing seized. asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter the and of the Article IV, Section 4(2). ports of a foreign state they become Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in subject to the local jurisdiction on all violation of this or the preceding section points in which the interests of the shall be inadmissible for any purpose in country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.) any proceeding. United States vs. H.N. Bull GR L-5270, Jan 15, 1910 ELLIOTT, J.: Facts: On the 2nd day of December 1908, a Norwegian streamer/vessel, known as the Standard, engaged in the transport of animals commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried six hundred and seventyseven (677) heads of cattles and carabaos, without proving suitable means for securing the said animals which resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others to have died while in transit. This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission. H.N. Bull however contended that no Philippine court has jurisdiction over the case. Issue: Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship while inside the territorial waters of the Philippines. Ruling: No court of the Philippines has jurisdiction over any crimes or offenses committed in a foreign ship on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but in the moment it entered into territorial waters, it automatically would be subject to the jurisdiction of the country. The offense, assuming that it originated in Formosa, which the Philippines would have no jurisdiction, continued until it reached Philippine territory which is already under jurisdiction of the Philippines. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. In view of the foregoing issue, the defendant is thereby foundguilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos,with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Reasons for the Decision: Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that

Roa Uy Tiong Co, a native of China, and his mother was Basilia Rodriguez, a native of this country. His parents were legally married in the Philippine Islands at the time of his birth. The father of the appellant went to China about the year 1895, and died there about 1900. Subsequent to the death of his father, in May, 1901, the appellant was sent to China by his mother for the sole purpose of studying (and always with the intention of returning) and returned to the Philippine Islands on the steamship Kaifong, arriving at the port of Cebu October 1, 1910, from Amoy, China, and sought admission to the Philippine Islands. At this time the appellant was a few days under 21 years and 3 months of age.

The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that After hearing the evidence the board of special inquiry found that the appellant When merchant vessels enter for the was a Chinese person and a subject of the purpose of trade, in would be obviously Emperor of China and not entitled to in convinient and dangerous to society land. and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the government to In view of the fact that the applicant for degradation if such individual merchants admission was born in lawful wedlock did not owe temporary and local On appeal to the Insular Collector of allegiance, and were not amendable to the Customs this decision was affirmed, and jurisdiction of the country. the Court of First Instance of Cebu in these habeas corpus proceedings The Supreme Court of the United States remanded the appellant to the Collector has said that the merchant vessels of one of Customs country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves Under the laws of the Philippine Islands, to the laws which govern the ports they children, while they remain under visit, so long as they remain; and this as parental authority, have the nationality of well in war as in peace, unless otherwise their parents. Therefore, the legitimate provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, children born in the Philippine Islands of 92 U. S., 520-525.) a subject of the Emperor of China are Chinese subjects and the same rule obtained during Spanish sovereignty Roa v. Collector of Customs Series of Conflicting SC Decisions re Issue: WON Roa is a citizen of the Philippines Citizenship October 30, 1912 Held: YES, The nationality of the Ponente: Justice Trent appellant having followed that of his mother, he was therefore a citizen of the Facts: This is an appeal from an order of the Philippine Islands on July 1, 1902, and Court of First Instance of Cebu never having expatriated himself, he still recommitting the appellant, Tranquilino remains a citizen of this country. Roa, to the custody of the Collector of We therefore conclude that the appellant Customs and declaring the Collector's is a citizen of the Philippine Islands and right to effect appellant's deportation to entitled to land. The judgment appealed China as being a subject of the Chinese from is reversed and the appellant is Empire and without right to enter and ordered released from custody, with costs reside in the Philippine Islands. There is de oficio. Ratio: no dispute as to the facts. Tranquilino Roa, was born in the town of His mother, before her marriage, was, as Luculan, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, we have said, a Spanish subject. on July 6, 1889. His father was Basilio Section 4 of the Philippine Bill provides:

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That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. On the death of her husband she ipso facto reacquired the nationality of the country of her birth, as she was then living in that country and had never left it. She was then the natural guardian of Tranquilino. Upon the dissolution of a marriage between a female citizen of the United States and a foreigner, she ipso facto reacquires American citizenship, if at that time she is residing in the United States. There is no statutory declaration on the question as to whether or not her minor children would follow that of their widowed mother. If the children were born in the United States, they would be citizens of that country. If they were born in the country of which their father (and their mother during coverture) was a citizen, then they would be a citizens of that country until the death of their father. But after his death, they being minors and their nationality would, as a logical consequence, follow that of their mother, she having changed their domicile and nationality by placing them within the jurisdiction of the United States. But, of course, such minor children, on reaching their majority, could elect, under the principle that expatriation is an inherent right of all people, the nationality of the country of "no principle has been more repeatedly announced by the judicial tribunals of the country, and more constantly acted upon, than that the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of the claimant of it." Quoted with approval in the case of Boyd vs. Thayer (143 U.S., 135) Valles v. COMELEC FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came

to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.

Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

ISSUE: CO KIM CHAM vs. Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH or a Filipino. and ARSENIO P. DIZON G.R. No. L-5 HELD: September 17, 1945 YES. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres FACTS: to the principle of jus sanguinis. Petition for mandamus in which Thereunder, a child follows the petitioner (Co Kim Cham) plead that the nationality or citizenship of the parents respondent judge of the lower court be regardless of the place of his/her birth, as ordered to continue the proceedings in opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which civil case No. 3012 of said court, which determines nationality or citizenship on were initiated under the regime of the sothe basis of place of birth. called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year occupation of these Islands. before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the The respondent judge refused to take Constitution of the Philippines were the cognizance of and continue the principal organic acts by which the proceedings in said case on the ground United States governed the country. that the proclamation issued by General These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, Douglas MacArthur had the effect of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of invalidating and nullifying all judicial Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones proceedings and judgments of the court Law. of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of of the Philippines established during the the Philippines who were Spanish Japanese military occupation, and that, subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided furthermore, the lower courts have no therein including their children are jurisdiction to take cognizance of and deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private continue judicial proceedings pending in respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, the courts of the defunct Republic of the was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Philippines in the absence of an enabling Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the law granting such authority. Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be During the Japanese occupation, no a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same substantial change was effected in the laws, which were the laws in force at the organization and jurisdiction of the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, different courts that functioned during the herein private respondent Rosalind Philippine Executive Commission, and in Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the the laws they administered and enforced. Philippines. ISSUES: The signing into law of the 1935 Whether or not under the rules of Philippine Constitution has established international law the judicial acts and the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for proceedings of the courts during a de the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, facto government are good and valid. xxx So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, Whether the proclamation issued by which confers citizenship by virtue of General Douglas MacArthur , in which blood relationship, was subsequently he declared that all laws, regulations and retained under the 1973 and 1987 processes of any of the government in the Constitutions. Thus, the herein private Philippines than that of the said respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Commonwealth are null and void and Filipino citizen, having been born to a without legal effect in the areas of the

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Philippines free of enemy occupation and control, has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts; and Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth, which are the same as those existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine Executive Commission and by the so-called Republic of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions pending in said courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth Government was restored. DECISION: It was adjudged and decreed that a writ of mandamus issue, directed to the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance and continue to final judgment the proceedings in Civil Case No. 3012. RATIO DECIDENDI: 1. YES. In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of a de facto government are valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that they effect during the continuance and control of said government remain good. All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and valid before and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into power of true and original sovereign. 2. NO. The proclamation has not invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the courts of justice during the Japanese regime, and this is impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37, which has the force of law, issued by the President of the Philippines on March 10, 1945, by virtue of the emergency legislative power vested in him by the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Said Executive order abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided "that all case which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court final decision." This provision impliedly recognizes that the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the

Japanese military occupation have not been invalidated by the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, because the said Order does not say or refer to cases which have been duly appealed to said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but to cases which had therefore, that is, up to March 10, 1945, been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals; and it is to be presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942, had been disposed of by the latter before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending on March 10, 1945, in the Court of Appeals were from judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance during the Japanese regime. 3.YES. If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy, may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, "Law once established continues until changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by change of sovereignty." COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. GUERRERO EN BANC, G.R. No. L-20942 September 22, 1967

name and style of Philippine Aviation Development. 61,048.19 liters of gasoline was actually used in aviation during the period from October 3, 1956 to May 31, 1957. The estate, as claimed, was entitled to the same rights and privileges as Filipino citizens operating public utilities including privileges in the matter of taxation. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disagreed. The matter was brought to the Court of Tax Appeals and ordered the petitioner to refund to the respondent the sum of P2,441.93. Court of Tax Appeals decision was reversed. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code allowing Filipinos a refund of 50 percentum of the specific tax paid on aviation oil, could be availed by citizens of the United States and all forms of business enterprises owned or controlled directly by them in view of the privilege under the Ordinance to operate public utilities in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines. DECISION: No. The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to it, to grant respondent Administrator the opportunity of proving whether the estate could claim the benefits of Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code, allowing refund to citizens of foreign countries on a showing of reciprocity. With costs.

RATIO DECIDENDII: To the extent that a refund is allowable, there is in reality a tax exemption. The rule applied with undeviating rigidity in the Philippines is that for a tax exemption to exist, it must be so categorically FACTS: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue declared in words that admit of no doubt. denied the claim for refund in the sum of No such language may be found in the P2,441.93 filed by the administrator of Ordinance. It furnishes no support, whether express or implied, to the claim the estate of Paul I. Gunn. of respondent Administrator for a refund. The deceased operated an air transportation business under the business

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From 1906 to 1966, it has been the constant and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. (Catholic Church vs Hastings and Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. vs Acting Commissioner of Customs) At the time when the Ordinance took effect in April 1947, the strict rule against the exemption was undisputed and indisputable. Such being the case, it would be a plain departure from the terms of the Ordinance to predicate a tax exemption where none was intended. (Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs Rodriguez 1938)

The Ordinance is designed for a limited period to allow what the Constitution prohibits; Americans may operate public utilities. (Martin vs Hunters Lessee Issue: (1816) I Wheat 304) (Cardozo, The Whether or not the Court may inquire Nature of Judicial Process (1921) 83) into the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation of Martial Law? Tax exemption is not to be presumed and that if granted, it is to be most strictly Held: construed. No such grant was apparent on The political or justiciable question the face of the Ordinance. No such grant controversy in this case has become moot could be implied from its history, much and purposeless as a consequence of the general referendum on 27-28 July 1973. less from its transitory character. PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., vs. HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE, G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974; En Banc, Makalintal (C.J.) Facts: On 21 September 1972, President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed the Proclamation No. 1081 thereby placing the country under Martial Law. Subsequently, on 22 September 1972, he issued the General Order No. 2, in the exercise of the powers he assumed by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081, ordering the Secretary of National Defense to arrest the persons named in the attached list as well as other persons who may have committed crimes and offenses in furtherance or on the occasion of or incident to or in connection with the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, as well as persons who have committed crimes against national security and the law of nations, crimes against the fundamental laws of the state, crimes against public order, crimes involving usurpation of authority, title, improper use of name, uniform and insignia, including persons guilty of crimes as public officers, as well as those persons

who may have violated any decree or order. Implementing General Order No. 2, respondent Secretary of National Defense, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, immediately effected the arrest of the petitioners without any warrant and without even any charges having been filed against them. Nine (9) petitions for writs of Habeas Corpus were accordingly filed before the Court by or in behalf of the arrested and detained individuals. In the case of Aquino, formal charges of murder, subversion and illegal possession of firearms were lodged against him with a Military Commission on 11 August 1973 and on 23 August 1973, he challenged the jurisdiction of the said Commission as well as his continued detention by virtue of those charges in a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in the Court (G.R. No. L-37364).

previously withdrawn by the respective petitioners. Reason for the Decision: Implicit in a state of Martial Law is the suspension of the said privilege with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival take precedence. On this particular point, the Honorable Court ruled that the proclamation of Martial Law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to, the Court is practically unanimous.

Planas vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-35925, 22 January 1973]; Second Division, Concepcion (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in separate opinions, 1 concurs as recapitulated, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 2 filed separate opinions Facts: On 16 March 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution 2, which was amended by Resolution 4 of said body, adopted on 17 June 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution 2, as amended, was implemented by RA 6132, approved on 24 August 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to said Convention was held on 10 November 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on 1 June 971. While the Convention was in session on 21 September 1972, the President issued Proclamation 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On 29 November 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, 30 November 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on 15 January 1973. Soon after, or on 7 December 1972, Charito Planas filed, with the Supreme

Reason for the Decision: In the aforesaid general referendum, majority of those who cast their ballots, including citizens between 15 and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the question as follows: "Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires, can continue in office beyond 1973. Do you want President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law?" The question was thereby removed from the area of presidential power under the Constitution and transferred to the seat of sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the nature of the exercise of that power by the President in the beginning whether or not purely political and therefore non-justiciable by this reason the Court precluded from applying its judicial yardstick to the act of the sovereign. Issue: Whether or not the writ of Habeas Corpus is automatically suspended upon the declaration of Martial Law. Held: The Honorable Court rendered the dismissal of all the petitions for Habeas Corpus, except those which have been

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Court, Case GR L-35925, against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for 15 January 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof." Substantially identical actions were filed. Meanwhile, or on 17 December 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until 7 January 1973, when General Order 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on 15 January 1973, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of 17 December 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution." In view of the events relative to the postponement of the plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on 22 January 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds there for, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on

Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases. In the afternoon of 12 January 1973, Vidal Tan, et. al. [GR L35948] filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than 15 January 1973." It was alleged in said motion, "that the President subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential Decree 86 organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public questions; and that thereafter it was later announced that 'the Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose [1] The New Society; [2] Reforms instituted under Martial Law; [3] The holding of a plebiscite on the proposed new Constitution and when (the tentative new date given following the postponement of the plebiscite from the original date of January 15 are February 19 and March 5); [4] The opening of the regular session slated on January 22 in accordance with the existing Constitution despite Martial Law." Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential Decree 73. Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73 purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the Executive, 1 but, also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases involving said issue. Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to submit to the People the Constitution proposed by the Convention. Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is unnecessary, for the time being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has

been postponed. In any event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later, the proper parties may then file such action as the circumstances may justify. Issue [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the people for ratification of specific proposals for amendment of the Constitution. Held [3]: The matter is one intimately and necessarily related to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President of the Philippines. This question has not been explicitly raised, however, in any of the cases under consideration, said cases having been filed before the issuance of such Proclamation, although the petitioners in L-35948 maintain that the issue on the referral of the Proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies may be deemed and was raised in their Supplemental Motion of January 15, 1973. At any rate, said question has not been adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases, and it would not be proper to resolve such a transcendental question without the most thorough discussion possible under the circumstances. In fairness to the petitioners in L-35948 and considering the surrounding circumstances, that instead of dismissing the case as moot and academic, said petitioners should be given a reasonable period of time within which to move in the premises. Held (totality): Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court, the result is this: (1) There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree 73. (2) On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and Concepcion, or 6 Members of the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic, whereas Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said Decree. (3) On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to incorporate therein the provisions contested by the petitioners in L-35948, Justice Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justice Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Concepcion have voted to uphold the authority of the Convention. (4) Justice

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Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had authority to continue in the performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio hold the same view. (5) On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the freedom essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra are of the opinion that that issue involves question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes contemplated. (6) On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed: [a] Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Concepcion are of the opinion that question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly raised before the Court, which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question. [b] Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1102 has been submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the "purported ratification of the Proposed Constitution based on the referendum among Citizens' Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution," but that such unfortunate drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant circumstances, the new Constitution is legally recognizable and should he recognized as legitimately in force." [c] Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect whatsoever. [d] Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether the Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and manageable standards," since the issue "poses a question of fact." (7) On the question whether or not these cases should be dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and

Esguerra voted in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions. Justices Fernando, Teehankee and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case No. L-35948 as to which they voted to grant to the petitioners therein a reasonable period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they wish to contest the legality of Presidential Proclamation 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period to the petitioners in said Case No. L-35948 for the purpose, but he believes, in effect, that the Court should go farther and decide on the merits everyone of the cases under consideration. Wherefore, all of the cases are dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void." Issue: Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable or political and therefore non- justiciable, question? Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (withsubstantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutoryprovisions? Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by thepeople? Are petitioners entitled to relief? Is the aforementioned Constitution in force? proposed

JAVELLANA vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY etal. GR L-36142, March 31, 1973 EN BANC, CONCEPTION (CJ): 6 concur, 4 dissenting

Held: 1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or Facts: political and thereforenon-justiciable, A Ratification Case: On January 20, 1973,three (3) days after question? the issuance of Proclamation No. 1102, JosueJavellana filed a case against the On the first issue involving the politicalExecutive Secretary and the Secretaries question doctrine Justices Makalintal, of National Defense, Justice and Finance, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee to restrain said respondents "and their and myself, or six (6) members of the subordinates or agents from Court, hold that the issue of the validity implementing any of the provisions of the of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a propose Constitution not found in the justiciable and non-political question. present Constitution" referring to that Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only of 1935. inferentially, in their discussion of the question. Justice Barredo The petition therein, filed by second JosueJavellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch a qualified and registered voter" and as "a as it is claimed there has been approval class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all by the people, the Court may inquire into citizens and voters similarly situated," the question of whether or not there has was amended on or about January 24, actually been such an approval, and, in 1973. Javellana alleged that the President the affirmative, the Court should keep (Marcos) had announced "the immediate hands-off out of respect to the people's implementation of the New Constitution, will, but, in negative, the Court may thru his Cabinet, respondents including," determine from both factual and legal and that the latter "are acting without, or angles whether or not Article XV of the in excess of jurisdiction in implementing 1935 Constitution been complied with." the said proposed Constitution" upon the Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or ground: "that the President, as three (3) members of the Court hold that Commander-in-Chief of the Armed the issue is political and "beyond the Forces of the Philippines, is without ambit of judicial inquiry." authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly(with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional andstatutory provisions?

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On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, especially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified." Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution." Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that

there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law." Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution." 4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, and therefore beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable." Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions. 5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force? On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third

question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force. ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.

Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-44640, 12 October 1976]; also Guzman vs. Comelec [GR L-44684], and Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-44714] En Banc, Martin (J): 1 concurs in result, 4 concur in separate opinions, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 2 filed separate opinions Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendumplebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991. On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the

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people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendumplebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the ReferendumPlebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming ReferendumPlebiscite of October 16.

Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of threefourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time Issue: Whether the President may call upon a when he shall initially convene the referendum for the amendment of the interim National Assembly, consistent Constitution. with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional

Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

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HIDALGO V. MARCOS GR L-47329, 9 DECEMBER 1977 80 SCRA 538 CASTRO, C.J. Facts: A referendum shall be conducted throughout the Philippines on the 17th day of December, 1977, on the following question: "DO YOU VOTE THAT PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS CONTINUE IN OFFICE AS INCUMBENT PRESIDENT AND BE PRIME MINISTER AFTER THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERIM BATASANG PAMBANSA AS PROVIDED FOR IN AMENDMENT NO. 3 OF THE 1976 AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION?" 2. Hidalgo petitioned the court to prohibit the President and COMELEC from proceeding with the said referendum. Issue: Whether or not the President can be forced to submit through a prohibition and/or mandamus by the Supreme Court as defined in Article X, Section 5 (1) of the 1973 Constitution: Section 5 (1). The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. Decision: Resolved not to give due course to the petition and to dismiss the same. Ratio Decidendi: 1. The President cannot be compelled by mandamus or otherwise to convene the interim National Assembly because, inter alia, this body was abrogated and supplanted by the interim Batasang Pambansa by virtue of the 1976 amendments to the Constitution, particularly Amendment No. I which partly provides- that There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly. an Interim Batasang Pambansa. 2. The 1976 amendments to The Constitution ratified by the people in the

October 16-17, 1976 referendumplebiscite and now form part of the Constitution, hence, the December 17, 1977 referendum, contrary to the petitioners posture, may not be said to be designed to effectuate their ratification. The holding of the coming referendum is an exercise authorized by one of those amendments, i.e., Amendment No. 7, which provides that a referendum may be called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any important matter whether of national or local interest. 3. No constitutional infirmity attaches to Presidential Decree No. 1229 because the referendum call for therein will not result in an amendment to the Constitution. The question, Do you vote that President Ferdinand E. Marcos continue in office as incumbent President and be Prime Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution to be submitted to the people in the December 17, 1977 referendum, is in neither the nature nor the form of an amendments It merely asks the people to either reaffirm or repudiate the confidence in the President which they had previously expressed. If the people vote yes, Amendment No. 3, which provides, inter alia, that The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the Nineteen Hundred and Thirty Five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution, will simply be reaffirmed and reinforced. If the people vote no, the President, as he has categorically announced, will in deference to the will of the people and exercising a public officers prerogative, resign. The cessation in office, for any reason, by the incumbent President will not result in an amendment to the Constitution, the provisions of which will remain unaltered.

proposing constitutional amendments goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. The three Resolutions were: 1) Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes 2) Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly; and 3) Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections. The three resolutions were approved by the InterimBatasangPambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981 which the date of plebiscite has been set on April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution. Issues: (1) Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is a fundamental law. (2) Whether or not the Interim BatasangPambansa has the power to propose amendments. (3) Whether or not the three-fourth votes is necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission. (4) Whether or not the three BatasangPambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments are valid.

Held: Yes, the Interim BatasangPambansa has the power and privilege to propose amendments. On January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. The existence of this power is indubitable as the applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. The Interim Batasang Occena vs. Comelec Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981 can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition It would be an indefensible proposition to proceedings against the validity of three assert that the three-fourth votes required BatasangPambansa Resolutions when it sits as a legislative body applies

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as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981, thus making them valid.

2. The purpose of Amendment No. 6 is that the Philippines be henceforth spared HELD: of martial law, unless manifest extreme Petitions are dismissed and prayer for situations should ever demand it. issuance of an injuction restraining respondents from holding the election 3. It would have been anachronistic to lift is denied, for the reason that there are martial law and still leave the law-making less than the required 10 votes to authority with the President (Prime declare BP 883 unconstitutional. Minister) alone. 4. The literal reference to "the President (Prime Minister)" in Amendment No. 6 was intended to make such reference descriptive of the person on whom is vested the totality of the executive power under the system of government established thereby. Gonzales vs COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967 Facts: On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of the Representatives passed resolutions No. 1, 2 and 3. These resolutions, respectively, proposed to increase the seats of the lower house from 120 to 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces according to the number of their inhabitants; to call a Constitutional Convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district; and to amend the Constitution (Section 16, Article VI) so they can be delegates themselves to the said Constitutional Convention. On June 17, 1967, the bill passed by Congress was approved by the president and it became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the constitution proposed in Resolutions no. 1 and 3 be submitted for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967. Two cases were filed against this act: one is by Ramon A. Gonzales, in L-28196, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He instituted the case as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers and voters similarly situated. The other one is filed by PHILCONSA, in L-28224, a corporation duly organizes and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non partisan organization with an objective of upholding the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts from whatever source. Issues: Whether or not Congress resolution to act as a constituent assembly violates the constitution? Whether or not Constitutional amendments can be submitted for ratification in a general election?

Philippine Bar Association vs COMELEC 140 SCRA 455 December 19, 1985 January 7, 1986 (Court noted that its act of dismissing the petitions had not been formally stated it its basic Resolution of December 19, 1985, dispositove portion inserted)

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI V. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF FACTS: FINANCE 11 petitions were filed for the prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 (Snap Elections special Facts: 1. The President, under Amendment No. national elections on February 7, 1986) 6 of the 1973 Constitution, has been for the offices of the President and granted with legislative power; and Vice President of the Philippines. 2. Petitioner argued that the President: Petitioners including Philippine Bar a. Did not retain his legislative power Association petitioned for issuance of after the lifting of Martial Law, and an injunction restraining respondent after the Constitution was amended (Comelec) from holding the election, on 7 April 1981, since the legislative stating that BP 883 is in conflict with power is vested in the Batasang the constitution, in a way that it still Pambansa; and allows the President to continue to hold b. Cannot exercise powers granted to office even after the calling of the the President-Minister of the special elections. provisional government established by the Transitory Provisions. Senator Pelaez submitted his argument that President Marcos letter of Issue: conditional resignation did not create Whether Amendment No. 6, as approved the actual vacancy required in Section in October 1976, considered repealed by 9, Article 7 of the Constitution. The omission by the amendment approved in letter states that the President is 1981. irrevocably vacating the position effective only when election is held and Held: after the winner is proclaimed and No. qualified as President by taking his 1. The legislative authority vested in the oath of office ten (10) days after his present interim Batasan by Amendment proclamation. No. 2 , is subject to the external concurrent legislative prerogative that ISSUE: Amendment No. 6 vests on the "President Whether or not BP 883 is (Prime Minister)." unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court stop and prohibit the holding of the elections.

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Held: Yes. Notwithstanding that the R.B.H. (Resolution of both Houses) Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of threefourths of all the members of the Senate and the house of representatives voting separately, said resolutions are considered null and void because Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto congressmen. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives proposeamendments or call a convention but may not avail both. No. Proposals for amendments to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification must be a special election, not a general election, in which officers of the national and local governments-such as the elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967, will be chosen. Special election will give people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said amendments.

DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, V. COMELEC DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS: Atty. Delfin is a founding member of the Movement for Peoples Initiative, a group citizen who desires to institutionalize people power, that claimed the following; 1. That he and the members of the movement intended to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution grants under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. 2. That the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. 3. That as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country, with assistance of municipal election registrars who shall verify the signatures affixed by the individual signatories. In this regard, on 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by

People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin amendments to the Constitution and have Petition) wherein Delfin asked the failed to provide sufficient standard for COMELEC for an order; subordinate legislation. 2. Parts of Resolution No. 2300 of 1 Fixing the time and dates for the COMELEC prescribing rules and signature gathering all over the country; regulations on the conduct of initiative or 2. Causing the necessary amendments to the Constitution are void. publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the The COMELEC cannot validly 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of promulgate rules and regulations to general and local circulation; implement the exercise of the right of the 3. Instructing Municipal Election people to directly propose amendments to Registrars in all Regions of the the Constitution through the system of Philippines, to assist Petitioners and initiative. It does not have that power volunteers, in establishing signing under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the stations at the time and on the dates COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) designated for the purpose. of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations The Petition further alleged that the referred to therein are those promulgated provisions sought to be amended are by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X law where subordinate legislation is of the Constitution. Attached to the authorized and which satisfies the petition is a copy of a "Petition for "completeness" and the "sufficient Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" standard" tests. embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the Empowering the COMELEC, an aforecited sections of the provisions administrative body exercising quasiconcerning term limits. judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of According to Delfin, the said Petition for legislative authority. However, in every Initiative will first be submitted to the case of permissible delegation, there must people, and after it is signed by at least be a showing that the delegation itself is twelve per cent of the total number of valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is registered voters in the country it will be complete in itself, setting forth therein the formally filed with the COMELEC. policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) On 18 December 1996, the petitioners fixes a standard the limits of which are herein Senator Miriam Defensor sufficiently determinate and determinable Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria to which the delegate must conform in Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil the performance of his functions. A action for prohibition. sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the ISSUE: Whether the petition for prohibition on circumstances under which the legislative the proposed amendment to the command is to be effected. Insofar as Constitution should be granted. initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both HELD: The petition was granted, and the requirements in subordinate legislation. COMELEC should be permanently The delegation of the power to the enjoined from entertaining or taking COMELEC is then invalid. cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly Lambino vs COMELEC enacted to provide for the implementation G.R. No. 174153 of the system. The Supreme Court further October 25, 2006 ordered the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin Petition. FACTS: On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a REASONS FOR THE DECISION: petition with the COMELEC to hold a 1. The R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate plebiscite that will ratify their initiative to cover the system of initiative on petition to change the 1987 Constitution

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under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative; 2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and HELD: 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose

amendments to the Constitution. This Group submitted to this Court a copy of a section states: signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution Memorandum on 11 October 2006. may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is of at least twelve per centum of the total Not Necessary number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be The present petition warrants dismissal represented by at least three per centum for failure to comply with the basic of the registered voters therein. x x x x requirements of Section 2, Article XVII (Emphasis supplied) of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a peoples initiative to amend The framers of the Constitution intended the Constitution. There is no need to that the draft of the proposed revisit this Courts ruling in Santiago constitutional amendment should be declaring RA 6735 incomplete, ready and shown to the people before inadequate or wanting in essential terms they sign such proposal. The framers and conditions to cover the system of plainly stated that before they sign there initiative to amend the Constitution. An is already a draft shown to them. The affirmation or reversal of Santiago will framers also envisioned that the people not change the outcome of the present should sign on the proposal itself because petition. Thus, this Court must decline to the proponents must prepare that revisit Santiago which effectively ruled proposal and pass it around for that RA 6735 does not comply with the signature. requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution. The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal Tolentino vs COMELEC on its face is a petition by the people. 41 SCRA 702 This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author FACTS: and thus sign the entire proposal. No The case is a petition for prohibition to agent or representative can sign on their restrain respondent Commission on behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a Elections "from undertaking to hold a petition, the proposal must be embodied plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at in a petition. which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" These essential elements are present only in Section 1 of Article V of the if the full text of the proposed Constitution of the Philippines to amendments is first shown to the people eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for who express their assent by signing such ratification by the people pursuant to complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an Organic Resolution No. 1 of the amendment is directly proposed by the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and people through initiative upon a petition the subsequent implementing only if the people sign on a petition that resolutions, by declaring said contains the full text of the proposed resolutions to be without the force and amendments. effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. There is no presumption that the The Constitutional Convention of 1971 proponents observed the constitutional came into being by virtue of two requirements in gathering the signatures. resolutions of the Congress of the The proponents bear the burden of Philippines approved in its capacity as proving that they complied with the a constituent assembly convened for constitutional requirements in gathering the purpose of calling a convention to the signatures that the petition propose amendments to the contained, or incorporated by attachment, Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and the full text of the proposed amendments. 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 The Lambino Group did not attach to respectively. their present petition with this Court a On September 28, 1971, Pres Diosdado copy of the paper that the people signed Macapagal, called upon respondent as their initiative petition. The Lambino COMELEC to help the Convention

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implement the above resolution. On September 30, 1971, Comelec responded and resolved to inform the Con-Con that it will held the plebescite under certain regulations. On October 7, 1971, plenary session approved a resolution calling a recess of the Convention from November 1-9, 1971 to permit the delegates to campaign of the said Organic Resolution No. 1. ISSUE: Whether it is in the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1? HELD: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory.

this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.

*** The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,". The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of

FRANCES ANN A. TEVES CONSTI1-C

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