AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.

versus JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS TO CANVASS THE VOTES FOR PRESIDENT & VICE PRESIDENT IN THE MAY 10 2004 ELECTIONS

protest, or abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioner Loren B. Legarda filed before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal a petition to annul the proclamation of Respodent Noli L. De Castro as the Vice-President of the Philippines. The protest filed by Legarda consisted of two aspects. The First Aspect covers the alleged erroneous, manipulated and/or falsified results of the election. While the Second pertains to the revision of the ballots of the precincts specified in the protest. The Second Aspect was earlier dismissed by the Supreme Court for the failure of Legarda to pay the required deposit for the expenses. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner clearly and convincingly proved the presence of manipulation or falsification of election results HELD:

Facts: By a petition for prohibition, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates in the May 10 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress on June 11 2004.

The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing. Petition DISMISSED. We are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and discharging her duties as such, which fact we can take judicial notice of, has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. The most relevant precedent on this issue is Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, a decision rendered by this Tribunal, which held that: The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiagos term if she would succeed in proving in the instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all-[too] crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery. It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the following grounds: (1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance; (2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof; (3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules; (4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and (5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible. Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a suppletory character, may likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer. After which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds. In sum, if an election protest may be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant. In the case at bar, protestants tenure in the Senate coincides with the term of the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010, that is the subject of her protest. On the matter of the alleged spurious ER copies, we agree with the protestee that the protestant had

Issue: Whether or not legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress supports Pimentels arguments against the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress after the adjournment of Congress.

Held: NO. Pimentels claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member.

Moreover, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee. Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned on 25 May 1992. Thereafter, on 22 June 1992, the Eight Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice President, respectively.

LOREN B. LEGARDA v. NOLI L. DE CASTRO P.E.T. Case No. 003, 18 January 2008, Presidential Electoral Tribunal, (Quisumbing, J. ) We are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and discharging her duties as such, which fact we can take judicial notice of, has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her

not adequately and convincingly rebutted the presumption that as public documents, the Congressretrieved ER copies, used for the proclamation of the protestee by the NBC, are authentic and duly executed in the regular course of official business. The evidence adduced by protestee to show that the supposed security features and markings in the Congress-retrieved ERs and the COMELEC/NAMFRELs copies are different, did not categorically establish that the Congress-retrieved ERs are fake and spurious. To overcome the presumption of regularity, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Absent such convincing evidence, the presumption must be upheld. In fact, the records show that even the witnesses presented by the protestant testified that they were able to discern security features and markings in the Congress-retrieved ERs. The records also show that witnesses were not made to examine all Congress-retrieved ERs in making observations relative to security features and markings, but only a sample set thereof was utilized, resulting in grave insufficiency in the evidence presented by protestant. As to the alleged break-in in Congress, which allegedly facilitated the switching of ERs, no conclusive evidence has been given. One of the protestants own witnesses, Atty. Artemio Adasa, Deputy General for Legislative Operations of the House of Representatives, categorically denied that a break-in and a switching of ERs had occurred in Congress. At any rate, as pointed out by protestee, even assuming arguendo that all the votes in the 497 precincts included in the pilot areas for the First Aspect with approximately 99,400 votes are considered in favor of protestant, still the protestant would not be able to overcome the lead of the protestee. The margin in favor of protestee adds up to a total of 881,722 votes, and it would take much more than a hundred thousand votes to overcome this lead. This is what the protestant had set out to do in her protest before the Tribunal, but unfortunately she failed to make out her case. In fact, Taraka and Balindong, the only two municipalities on which protestant anchors her arguments for the First Aspect, would only yield an additional 9,931 votes (4,912 votes for Taraka and 5,019 votes for Balindong), a mere fraction of the lead of protestee over protestant. To say that she could have shown that such fraudulent machination was replicated in several other municipalities of Lanao del Sur and other provinces, such as Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Lanao del Sur if she had enough time, is mere conjecture and can not be considered convincing by this Tribunal. It is the protestant herself who admits that she was able to adduce evidence only in Taraka and Balindong, for lack of time. But this Tribunal has been liberal in granting her plea for time extension. To say that the protestant had shown enough evidence to prove that the whole or even half (440,862) of the lead of the protestee over the protestant is spurious, would go against the grain of the evidence on hand. One cannot say that half a million votes were illegally obtained based on unclear evidence of cheating in less than ten thousand. The protestant has been afforded ample opportunity to adduce evidence in her behalf for the First Aspect of the protest but the evidence presented is simply insufficient to convince the Tribunal to render invalid all or even half of the 881,722 votes that protestee had over her in the last elections for Vice-President.

was able to participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes. ISSUE What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: *t+he President shall not be eligible for any re-election? RULING [The petition was DENIED DUE COURSE and thereby DISMISSED by the Supreme Court.] Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran [in the May 2010 elections]. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events. Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.

MACALNTAL VS COMELEC FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

Atty. Evillo C. Pormento v. Joseph Ejercito "Erap" Estrada and Comelec, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010 FACTS Private respondent Joseph Erap Ejercito Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He was however ousted *resigned according to the decision of the Supreme Court in Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001] from office and was not able to finish his term. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed Eraps candidacy and filed a petition for the latters disqualification, which was however denied by the COMELEC 2nd Division. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May 7, 2010. However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent

SSUES: A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution? B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article V of the Constitution that the winning candidates for

President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress? C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article X-A of the Constitution?

Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.

B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution? HELD: In resolving the issues, the application of the rules in Statutory Construction must be applied 1. All laws are presumed to be constitutional 2. The constitution must be construed as a whole 3. In case of doubt in the interpretation of the provision of the constitution, such meaning must be deduced from the discussions of the members of the constitutional commission. A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines? Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee voting process, to wit: SEC. 4. Coverage- all citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice president, senators and party-list representatives. Which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the assailed law which enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for president, vicepresident, senators and party-list representatives.

Section 18.5 of the same Act provides: SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. 18. 5 the canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 5. Disqualifications- The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act: a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws; b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign country; c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this subsection shall automatically acquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission may take cognizance of final judgments issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of judgments; d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies, consulates or Foreign Service establishments concerned, unless such competent authority subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or incompetent. As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the

SEC. 4 the returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. Such provision gives the Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for president and vice-president. It was held that this provision must be harmonized with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article V of the Constitution and should be taken to mean that COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and party-list representatives but not the President and Vice-President. The phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vicepresidency. Clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article V of the Constitution which provides that the returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the board of canvassers to Congress. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions." The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress. C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. SEC. 17. Voting by Mail. 17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions:

discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority.

Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo G.R. No. 183871 18 February 2010 PONENTE: Velasco, Jr., J. PARTIES: PETITIONERS: LOURDES RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO CARBONEL RESPONDENTS: PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, MAJ. DARWIN SY, JIMMY SANTANA, RUBEN ALFARO, CAPT. ANGELO CUARESMA, P/SUPT. EDGAR ROQUERO, ARSENIO GOMEZ, JONATHAN, and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari of CA decision PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: Supreme Court: Original Action for a Petition for the Writ of Amparo Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily heard the Original Action for Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a partial judgment which is the subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. FACTS: On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS) based in Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite. She was brought to and detained at the air base without charges. She was released a week after relentless interrogation, but only after she signed a statement that she would be a military asset. Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and grave misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, but nothing has happened. She likewise reported the threats and harassment incidents to the Dasmarinas municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their investigation. Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation which indicated that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes. Based on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo with the Supreme Court on 25 October 2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of petitioners and for the Ombudsman to immediately file information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes. The Supreme Court issued the desired writ and then referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for summary hearing and appropriate action. At the hearing conducted on 20 November 2007, the CA granted petitioners motion that the petition and writ be served on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma, and Jonathan. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case. On 31 July 2008, after due proceedings, the CA rendered its partial judgment, dismissing the petition with respect to Esperon, Razon, Roquero, Gomez, and Ombudsman. Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition. ANSWER: No. SUPREME COURT RULINGS: DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY and THE WRIT OF AMPARO Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms, means the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by

a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion for fraud;

b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and

c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other Foreign Service establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.

Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee . . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied) Such provision is unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article X-A mandating the independence of constitutional commissions. The phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee" in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, "only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee" found in the second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189. Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC. WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOD for being UNCONSTTUTONAL:

Estrada V Desierto Facts: In the trial of former President Estrada for plunder, he claimed presidential immunity from suit, since he was not convicted in the impeachment proceedings. Issue: WON Estrada is immune from suit. Ruling: Negative. The impeachment trial of Estrada was aborted by events which led to his loss of the presidency. Senate had already declared the trial in functus officio. If impeachment proceedings have become moot because of the resignation of the president, he can already be sued. From the ruling: What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used

subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility; foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal liability, whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators. There is no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine of Command Responsibility While there are several pending bills on command responsibility; there is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end [T]he right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones right by the government. And this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced: [The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. The remedy of amparo ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure Public Interest Center vs. ELMA June 30, 2006, Chico-Nazario *concurrent appointments, incompatible office N: CPM + TRO to declare null and void the concurrent appointments of ELMA as PCGG Chair and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel F: Elma was appointed as PCGG Chair Oct 1998. Later on he was appointed as CPLC (Jan 1999 during his term), but waived any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC. Supervening events: Theres actually no more controversy involved: In 2001, Elma was replaced by Sabio as PCGG. Nachura was then appointed as CPLC but pending resolution of the case, he was appointed SOLGEN. Arguments: Public Interest Center CLU vs. Exec Sec: Art IX-B, Sec 7, par2 and Art VII, Sec13 are violated by concurrent appointments CPLC and PCGG Chair are incompatible offices Arguments: Elma As interpreted in CLU vs. Exec Sec, the mentioned consti provisions dont cover other public officials

given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary. His appointment falls under the exceptions in Art IX-B, Sec7 The 2 positions are not incompatible NOTE: even if issue already moot, SC still took cognizance of the case because the case is capable of repetition, and to serve as a guide to the bench. whether the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under the prohibition against multiple offices imposed by Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution YES. The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People v. Green[13] - whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other. [I]ncompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two; x x x Where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other. The force of the word, in its application to this matter is, that from the nature and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other. x x x The offices must subordinate, one [over] the other, and they must, per se, have the right to interfere, one with the other, before they are incompatible at common law. x x x ***In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC. *note: Memorandum Order No. 152, issued on 9 July 2004 (provides that CPLC review Decision on investigation involving Cabinet Secretaries, agency heads, or Presidential appointees with the rank of Secretary conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)) whether such appointments violate the other constitutional provision regarding multiple offices, Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution NO if based on position. YES if based on primary functions test. the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions.