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Standard Definitions
IEC 61508 Title: Standard for Functional Safety of Electrical / Electronic / Programmable Electronic Safety-Related System IEC 61508 was conceived to define and harmonize a method to reduce risks for human beings and/or reduce valuable loss for all industrial and non industrial environments. IEC 61511 Title: Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry IEC 61511 was developed as a Process Sector implementation of IEC 61508
Following the above standard is the minimum necessary condition to obtain plant safety. However this, alone, does not guarantee that the process will be safe. NOT implementing these safety standards will certainly lead to an UNSAFE process.
What is Safety?
Freedom from unacceptable risks
Risk Reduction
RRF = Frequency of accidents w ithout protection 1 = Frequency of tolerable accidents PFD avg
A.L.A.R.P.
Required SIFs are usually indicated in the P&ID (Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams) or in the PFD (Process Flow Diagram).
LC LV
Next process
Dike
Dike
Success P=0.99 P=0.1 Failure P=0.01 Yes P=1.0 Yes P=0.5 Yes P=0.5 No P=0 No P=0.5 No P=0.5
Example: A SIS is being installed to prevent a fire that will cost the company $1,000,000. The frequency prior to application of SIS has been calculated in one every 10 years. After SIS installation the expected frequency is one every 1000 years, and its annualized cost is approximately $66.000. Cost for nuisance trip is negligible, being F&G normally de-energized. What is the benefit-to-cost ratio for the F&G project? The Benefits/Costs relation will be:
1 1 1000000) - ( 1000000) = 99000 10 1000 Costs = (66000 + 0) = 66000 Benefits 99000 = = 1.5 Costs 66000 Benefits = (
A benefit-to-cost ratio of 1.5 means that for every $1 of investment the plant owner can expect $1.5 in return.
Layers of Protection
MTBF
MTTF is an indication of the average successful operating time of a device (system) before a failure in any mode.
MTBF: Mean Time Between Failures MTBF = MTTF + MTTR MTTF = MTBF - MTTR MTTR: Mean Time To Repair
Availability
Availability time (hrs) 1000 10000 100000 1000000 Repair time (Hrs) 10 10 10 10 Availability (%) 99 99,9 99,99 99,999
What does an availability of 99,99% for a specific component or system really stand for? That the component or system could stop working one time ..
.. every month with a repair time of 4.3 minutes. .. every year with a repair time of 53 minutes. .. every 10 years with a repair time of 8.8 hours.
MTBF =
RELIABILITY AVAILABILITY
MTTF
MTTR
Venn Diagram: Reliability-Unreliability; Availability-Unreliability and relations with MTTF and MTTR
= ----------------------------- = ------------
MTBF - Example
Instantaneous failure rate is commonly used as measure of reliability. Eg. 300 Isolators have been operating for 10 years. 3 failures have occurred. The average failure rate of the isolators is: Failure per unit time 3 = ------------------------------- = ----------------- = Quantity Exposed 300*10*8760 = 0.0000000115 per hour = 0.001 per year = 11,5 FIT (Failure per billion hours) = = 11,5 probabilities of failure in one billion hours. = 0.001 probability of failure per year MTBF = 1 / = 1000 years (for constant failure rate)
FIT
Failure In Time is the number of failures per one billion device hours.
Where: sd = Safe detected su = Safe undetected dd = Dangerous detected du = Dangerous undetected tot = safe + dangerous (MTBF = MTBFs + MTBFd) safe: spurious trip (nuisance trip) dangerous: safety trip
du 4 mA
dd/sd
Example for a 4-20 mA signal
DD +
DD
SD
DU +
SU
SD +
SU
= 1-
DD
DU
DU
SD
SU
Type A components are described as simple devices with well-known failure modes and a solid history of operation. Type B devices are complex components with potentially unknown failure modes, e.g. microprocessors, ASICs, etc.
System architectures
For redundant subsystems using electronic components, the value of ranges from 1% to 10 %. The second term of the equations is the PFDavg value contribution due to the factor, derived from the 1oo1 architecture.
Example: Example:
du 0.01 // yr; TI == 11 yr; == 0.05 du == 0.01 yr; TI yr; 0.05 For 1oo2 the is: 2 equation 1 1 For 1oo2 the equation is: (1 ) ( DU TI ) + 2 ( DU TI ) = 3
Considerations on Factor
Comparisons using different values of factor:
Considerations: The value 0.00003 is 166.6 times lower than 0.005. The value 0.000082 is 61 times lower than 0.005. The value 0.00028 is 17.8 times lower than 0.005. The value 0.000527 is 9.48 times lower than 0.005. Without factor the PFDavg, of 1oo2 architecture, is 166.6 times better than PFDavg value of 1oo1 architecture. With 1% factor the PFDavg, of 1oo2 architecture, is 61 times better than PFDavg value of 1oo1 architecture. With 5% factor the PFDavg, of 1oo2 architecture, is 17.8 times better than PFDavg value of 1oo1 architecture. With 10% factor the PFDavg, of 1oo2 architecture, is 9.48 time better than PFDavg value of 1oo1 architecture.
Where: RT = repair time in hours (conventionally 8 hours) T1 = T proof test, time between circuit functional tests (1-5-10 years)
dd = failure rate for detected dangerous failures du = failure rate for undetected dangerous failures
20%
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, recognized Standards, cover in detail these safety aspects.
Where: RT = repair time in hours (conventionally 8 hours) T1 = T proof test, time between circuit functional tests (1-5-10 years)
dd = failure rate for detected dangerous failures du = failure rate for undetected dangerous failures
SIF Example
Calculate values of MTBF, PFDavg, RRF for a possible SIL level of the following SIF. These values are given by the manufacturers:
Tx: Barrier: PLC: Supply: Valve: MTBF = 102 yrs; MTBF = 314 yrs; MTBF = 685 yrs; MTBF = 167 yrs; MTBF = 12 yrs; DU = 0,00080 / yr; DU = 0,00019 / yr; DU = 0,00001 / yr; DU = 0,00070 / yr; DU = 0,02183 / yr; DD = 0,0010 / yr; DD = 0,0014 / yr; DD = 0,0001 / yr; DD = 0,0000 / yr; DD = 0,0200 / yr; S = 0,00800 / yr S = 0,00159 / yr S = 0,00135 / yr S = 0,00530 / yr S = 0,00400 / yr
/ yr = 1/MTBF
MTBFs= 1/ S (yr)
S / yr
DD / yr
DU / yr
% of total PFDavg
RRF = 1/PFDav g
SFF
SIL Level
Tx Barrier D1014S
102
0.00980
125
0.00800
0.0010
0.00080
0.000400
3.40 %
2500
91.8 %
SIL 2
314
0.00318
629
0.00159
0.0014
0.00019
0.000095
0.81 %
10526
94.0 %
SIL 3
PLC
685
0.00146
741
0.00135
0.0001
0.00001
0.000005
0.04 %
200000
99.3 %
SIL 3
Valve
12
0.08333
24
0.04150
0.0200
0.02183
0.010915
92.87 %
92
73.8 %
SIL 2
Power Supply
167
0.00600
189
0.00530
0.0000
0.00070
0.000350
2.97 %
2857
88.3 %
SIL 3
Total (SIF)
10
0.1037 7
17
0.05774
0.0225
0.02353
0.011765
100 %
85
SIL 1
Tx
102
0.00980
125
0.00800
0.0010
0.00080
0.000400
8.98 %
2500
91.8 %
SIL 2
Barrier D1014S
314
0.00318
629
0.00159
0.0014
0.00019
0.000095
2.13 %
10526
94.0 %
SIL 3
685
0.00146
741
0.00135
0.0001
0.00001
0.000005
0.11 %
200000
99.3 %
SIL 3
36
0.02750
73
0.01370
0.0066
0.00720
0.003602
80.91 %
278
73.8 %
SIL 2
167
0.00600
189
0.00530
0.0000
0.00070
0.000350
7.86 %
2857
88.3 %
SIL 3
Total (SIF)
21
0.04794
33
0.02994
0.00910
0.00890
0.004452
100 %
225
SIL 2
92,87%
80,91%
7,86%
8,98%
2,13% 0,11%
SIL 1
SIL 2
Considering the same data used in the 1oo2 architecture as in the first example but introducing a factor of 5% (0.05) on redundant sub-systems.
Table 1oo2
Subsystem PFDavg 1oo1 RRF 1oo1 MTBFs 1oo1 PFDavg 1oo2[1] RRF 1oo2 MTBFs 1oo2 SFF SIL Level
Tx * Barrier D1014D *
0.000400
2500
125
0.00002019
49528
62.5
91.8 %
SIL 3
0.000095
10526
629
0.00000476
210051
314.4
94.0 %
SIL 4
PLC Valve
1 year T-Proof
200000 92 2857
741 24 189
741 12 94.3
Power Supply *
Total (SIF)
0.011765
85
17
0.00073528
1360
8.5
SIL 3
The Table highlights advantages of 1oo2 system architecture on 1oo1. Safety integrity level of the SIF has moved from SIL 1 to SIL 3 maintaining the same T-proof test time interval of 1 year.
Note 2:
Using such system configuration, the risk reduction factor is highly increased. If a SIL 2 level is required instead of SIL 3, it would be possible to extend the T-proof test time interval (TI).
System
Table 10a shows how the 1oo2 SIF would change for TI = 3, 5 &10 years.
Power Supply
Total (SIF)
0.011765
85
17
0.00120533
829
10
PLC Channel 1
The valves redundancy allows the SIF to reach SIL 2 level with a more than satisfactory RRF value.
Tx 1
IS Barrier Ch. 1
Input circuit
Output circuit
Final element
Final element _
The Table highlights advantages of 1oo2 system architecture of the final element. Safety integrity level of the SIF has moved from SIL 1 to a good SIL 2 maintaining the same T-proof test time interval of 1 year.
System
Table 10b shows how the 1oo2 Final Element SIF would change for TI = 3, 5 & 10 years.
Considering the same data used in the 2oo3 architecture as in the first example but introducing a factor of 5% (0.05) on redundant sub-systems.
Table 2oo3
The advantages of 2oo3 system architecture on 1oo1 are different then those obtained with a 1oo2. Safety integrity level of the SIF has in fact moved from SIL 1 to SIL 2 maintaining the same T-proof test time interval of 1 year. The very high value of RRF shows that SIL 2 can be easily maintained even with longer TI intervals.
Note 2:
Using such system configuration, the risk reduction factor is highly increased. If a SIL 2 level is required instead of SIL 3, it would be possible to extend the T-proof test time interval (TI).
System PFDavg 1oo2 0.00102414 0.00307242 0.0051207 0. 0102414 RRF 976 325 195 80 Max SIL Level SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 1
Table 10c shows how the 2oo3 SIF would change for TI = 3, 5 &10 years.
SIF MTBFS PFDavg Architecture (yr) 1oo1 1oo2 2oo3 17 8.5 55546 0.01176 5 0.00073 5 0.00102 4 RRF Max. SIL Level SIL 1 SIL 3 SIL 2
85 1360 976
Redundant Architecture Increase SIL level 2oo3 Architecture is primarily justified due to the MTBFs high value This means that production will almost never not be interrupted by spurious/nuisance trips 1oo2 Architecture is simpler, cost effective and with a slightly better RRF. But the MTBFs is very poor Choice is also to be made considering possible T-proof time
RRF 20 299 10 99
d for 10 years is = 0.00002 PFDavg for 10 years is 0.00001 for a single contact.
(PFDavg = d/2)
du per yr
0.000002 0.000002 0.000016 0.000006 0.000026
RRF
100.000 100.000 14.285 33.333 8333
Total SIF
PFDavg = DU
TI 2
when the effectiveness is not 100%, the PFDavg simplified equation is:
PFDavg = (Et DU
where: Et: SL:
TI SL ) + (1 - Et) DU 2 2
periodic testing effectiveness to reveal dangerous failures (e.g. 90%) system, or component, test proof interval with 99-100% effectiveness, or between two complete replacement of the device, or the lifetime of the system, or device, if it will never fully tested or replaced.
DU 12 )+ (1-Et)DU 2 2
DU 12 ) + (1- Et) DU 2 2
Example b:
PFDavg = (0,99 x 0,01 / 2) + (0,01 x 0,01 x 6) = 0,0056 RRF = 1 / PFDavg = 1 / 0,006 = 178 Note: after one year (or after each periodic test interval) SIL2 level is still maintained.
Example c:
PFDavg = (0,5 x 0,01 / 2) + (0,5 x 0,01 x 6) = 0,0325 RRF = 1 / PFDavg = 1 / 0,006 = 30 Note: after one year (or after each periodic test interval) SIL2 become SIL 1
Example c:
PFDavg = (0,5 x 0,01 / 2) + (0,5 x 0,01 x 1,5) = 0,01 RRF = 1 / PFDavg = 1 / 0,006 = 100 Note: after one year (or after each periodic test interval) SIL2 remain at its minimum level
TI PFDavg = DU 2
TI TD + 2 TI
PFDavg = DU
DU 12 ) + (1- Et) DU 2 2
PFDavg = DU
TI TD + 2 TI
PFDavg = (Et
DU TD SL )+ + (1- Et) DU 2 TI 2
The combination of both, effectiveness and test duration, brings to the following PFDavg equation for a 1oo1 architecture.
FALSE!
SIL integrity levels depend on the probability of failure which increases with time.
True or False?
TRUE!
Safety Manual is an integral document to the SIL rating of any component. It defines the assumption behind the certification and the conditions of the SIL rating as well as provide proper maintenance information.
True or False? Two products both claiming SIL 2 offer the same level of safety.
FALSE!
1) PFDavg
or RRF value of a SIL level ranges in a factor of 10. Example: SIL 2 means from RRF = 100 to 1000.
2) SIL ratings are time related. Example: SIL 2 rating for 10 yrs differs from SIL 2 for 1 yr.
TRUE!
Since some failures are undetected in operating conditions (dangerous undetected failures) Tests are required to restore the SIF in as-new condition (effectiveness 100%) Periodic Tests are essential for maintaining the SIL level.
True or False? T-Proof Time Interval are specified by the Plant Maintenance Personnel.
FALSE!
It is specified in the Hardware Specification and is decided by the manufacture and verified by the certification agency.
True or False? Component Type (A & B) are defined by the customer (User)..
FALSE!
The component class is defined by the Manufacturer.
TRUE!
Reducing time intervals between T-proof tests decreases the probability of failure (PFDavg) in time. Example: SIL 1 for 1 yr may become SIL 2 for 3 months.
True or False? PFDavg value of the SIF is the highest of all components PFDavg
FALSE!
The PFDavg value of the safety function (SIF) is the sum of PFDavg values of all its components (subsystems).
True or False?
SFF % and PFD both must match the SIF SIL Requirement .
TRUE!
The SFF value of each of the SIF component must be within the table A or B requirement to claim a given SIL level. The SIF total PFD must also match that of the required RRF
True or False?
FALSE!
Safety Impact Analysis must be performed for any hardware or software change in the plant!
TRUE!
Using a higher SIL level than necessary allows to reduce frequency of T-proof tests and has a lower incidence on the total PFDavg of the SIF. Example: SIL 3 for 1 yr could become SIL 2 for 10 yrs.
TRUE!
A safety function under maintenance is unavailable therefore the length of the repair time must be considered. The improvement obtained applying redundant architectures is temporarily lost.
FALSE!
Failures can be SAFE or DANGEROUS. The first lead to a spurious trip which does not harm, but induces a stopping of production. The second instead will render the safety function unavailable.
TRUE!
MTBF = MTTF + MTTR. For most applications, MTTR is negligible therefore MTBF MTTF. However in high demand applications, even a few hours of unavailability are critical and should be taken into account.
FALSE!
Redundant Architectures have different effects on SAFE and DANGEROUS failure rates. Example: 1oo2 improves dangerous failure rates but worsens safe failure rates. 2oo2 is the opposite
True or False? Safety Manual Provides for T-Proof test procedure but not the test effectiveness percentage.
FALSE!
Test Effectiveness (TE) must be specified along with the T-proof procedure and must be used in calculating recurring SIL level
True or False? SIL level and relating RRF are defined by HSE (Health Safety Executive)
TRUE!
A team composed of Management, Plant, Process, Instrument, Maintenance, Quality Engineers is responsible for determining RRF factor for each SIF
True or False? HSE Engineers have the responsibility to maintain the SIL level during plant life time
FALSE!
Maintenance Engineer are responsible to maintain the SIl level as mandated by initial calculations. For SIL 2 SIFs their work must be reviewed by a separate department. For SIL 3 or 4 SIFs by an external agency.
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