LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLE: The cases should be determined on the merits in order to give the

parties full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicalities or procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. In fact, Section 6 of Rule 1 states that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of ensuring the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding (DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FAMILY FOODS MANUFACTURING CO. LTD. G.R. No. 180458, July 30, 2009, Third Division, Nachura, J.). Corollary to this, it is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial justice (MEDISERV, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010, First Division, Villarama, Jr., J.) Thus, in Republic vs. Jennifer Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008, 2nd Division, the Supreme Court agreed that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 (which requires the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the Petition shall be made parties to the proceedings) when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar. The High Court invoked Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it.

RELEVANT PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT ON THE RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE (RSP) ABSENCE OF DEFENDANT ON THE PRE-TRIAL: Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, if a sole defendant shall fail to appear in the preliminary conference, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule, that is, the court shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. However, "[t]his Rule (Sec. 7) shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action, who had pleaded a common defense, shall appear at the preliminary conference." xxxxxx The Court holds that the italized provision above does not apply in the case where petitioner is not a codefendant in the same case but actually sued in a separate case for ejectment. Therefore, petitioners failure to appear in the preliminary conference entitled respondent to the rendition of judgment by the trial court on the ejectment case filed against petitioner, in accordance with Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (SORIENTE vs. THE ESTATE OF ARSENIO E. CONCEPCION, G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009, Third Division, Peralta, J.). MOTION FOR EXTENSION NOT ALLOWED: By its express terms, the purpose of the RSP is to "achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination" of the cases they cover, among them, forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. To achieve this objective, the RSP expressly prohibit certain motions and pleadings that could cause delay, among them, a motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper. If the extension for the filing of these submissions cannot be allowed, we believe it illogical and incongruous to admit a pleading that is already filed late. Effectively, we would then allow indirectly what we prohibit to be done directly. It is for this reason that in Don Tino Realty Development Corporation v. Florentino,(G.R. No. 134222, September 10, 1999, 314 SCRA 197) albeit on the issue of late filing of an answer in a summary proceeding, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]o admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory measures, the very mischief that the rules seek to redress" (TERAA vs. DESAGUN, G.R. No. 152131, April 29, 2009, Second Division, Brion, J.). A POSITION PAPER IS NOT INDISPENSABLE FOR THE COURT TO RENDER A JUDGMENT: The failure of one party to submit his position paper does not bar at all the MTC from issuing a judgment on the ejectment complaint. A position paper is not indispensable to the courts authority to render judgment. xxxx In such a case, what would be extant in the record and the bases for the judgment would be the complaint, answer,

and the record of the preliminary conference (TERAA vs. DESAGUN, G.R. No. 152131, April 29, 2009, Second Division, Brion, J.).

Nature of the Rules of Procedure

The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the power of the Court to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation (SPOUSES ESPEJO vs. ITO, G.R. No. 176511, August 4, 2009, Third Division, Chico-Nazario, J.). Procedural rules may be relaxed for persuasive reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. More so, when to allow the assailed decision to go unchecked would set a precedent that will sanction a violation of substantive law (PHIL. ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, et al. vs. JOSEPH JUDE CARATES, Et al. G.R. No. 181274, June 23, 2010, Third Division, Villarama, Jr. J.). Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice (MOBILIA PRODUCTS, INC. vs. DEMECILLO, G.R. No. 170669, February 4, 2009, 2nd Division, Quisumbing, J.).

LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE:

In Padillo v. Court of Appeals, (422 Phil. 334 (2001), we had occasion to explain this principle, to wit: Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case,whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. As a general rule, a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that question is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing.( Id. at 351.) The concept of law of the case was further elucidated in the 1919 case of Zarate v. Director of Lands, (39 Phil. 747 (1919) to wit: A well-known legal principle is that when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, such declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal. The rule made by an appellate court, while it may be reversed in other cases, cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings in the same case. The "Law of the Case," as applied to a former decision of an appellate court, merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. Such a rule is "necessary to enable an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal." Again, the rule is necessary as a matter of policy to end litigation. "There would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to criticisms on their opinions, or speculate of chances from changes in its members." x x x. (Id. at 749.)

The law of the case doctrine applies in a situation where an appellate court has made a ruling on a question on appeal and thereafter remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings; the question settled by the appellate court becomes the law of the case at the lower court and in any subsequent appeal (Vios v. Pantangco, Jr., G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009, 578 SCRA 129, 143 cited in ELOISA L. TOLENTINO VS. ATTY. ROY M. LOYOLA ET AL., G.R. NO. 153809, JULY 27, 2011, EONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.).

APPEAL: APPLICATION OF THE FRESH PERIOD RULE (NEYPES DOCTRINE) As early as 2005, the Supreme Court categorically declared inNeypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633 that by virtue of its power to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the High Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 dayswithin which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the Court stated: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. xxxx Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. x x x x To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. With the advent of the "fresh period rule," parties who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that motion. The fresh period rule is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which states that the appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the above provision

supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order. xxxx The fresh period rule finally eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted from receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of notice of final order appealed from. Taking bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc., the Supreme Court set aside the denial of a notice of appeal which was purportedly filed five days late. With the fresh period rule, the 15-day period within which to file the notice of appeal was counted from notice of the denial of the therein petitioners motion for reconsideration. This was followed in Elbia v. Ceniza, wherein the Supreme Court applied the principle granting a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution. Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, it held that a party-litigant may now file his notice of appeal either within fifteen days from receipt of the original decision or within fifteen days from the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration. In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, the Supreme Court also applied the same principle of fresh period rule, expostulating that procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. The "fresh period rule" is irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner in which the appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or determined and, therefore, can be made applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity, without danger of violating anyone else rights. (SUMIRAN vs. DAMASO, G.R. No. 162518, August, 19, 2009, Third Division, Peralta, J.).

APPEALS: CAN THE FRESH PERIOD RULE (NEYPES DOCTRINE) BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES IT APPLY TO ALL CASES PENDING AT THE TIME OF ITS PASSAGE? YES. The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of promulgation of Neypeson September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, G.R. No. 173942, June 25, 2008,stating thus: The determinative issue is whether the fresh period rule announced in Neypescould retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure (emphasis supplied). Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. In Sumiran vs. Damaso, the Supreme Court stated that since this case was already pending in this Court at the time of promulgation of Neypes, then, ineluctably, the Court must also apply the ruling to the present case. Ergo, petitioner is entitled to a fresh period of 15 days counted from May 19, 2003, the date of petitioners receipt of the Order denying his motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision within which to file his notice of appeal. Therefore, when he filed said notice on May 29, 2003, or only ten (10) days after receipt of the Order denying his motion for reconsideration, his period to appeal had not yet lapsed(SUMIRAN vs. DAMASO, G.R. No. 162518, August, 19, 2009, Third Division, Peralta, J.).

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a particular act, in which case it is called amandatory injunction or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction. As a main action, injunction seeks to permanently enjoin the defendant through a final injunction issued by the court and contained in the judgment. Section 9, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides: SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction (emphasis supplied). Two (2) requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. Particularly, in actions involving realty, preliminary injunction will lie only after the plaintiff has fully established his title or right thereto by a proper action for the purpose. To authorize a temporary injunction, the complainant must make out at least a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief. Preliminary injunction will not issue to protect a right not inesse. These principles are equally relevant to actions seeking permanent injunction (PHIL. ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, et al. vs. JOSEPH JUDE CARATES, Et al. G.R. No. 181274, June 23, 2010, Third Division, Villarama, Jr. J.). An injunctive relief is not intended to determine a controverted right, but is calculated to prevent a further perpetration of wrong or the doing of any act whereby the right in controversy may be materially injured or endangered, until a full and deliberate investigation of the case is afforded to the party (GARCIA, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 185132, April 24, 2009, Third Division, Nachura, J.). Parenthetically, before a court grants injunctive relief, the following must be demonstrated: that complainant is entitled to the relief sought, the actual or threatened violation of complainants rights, theprobability of irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation as relief (Golding v. Balatbat, 36 Phil. 941 [1917]). Otherwise, there is no basis for the issuance of a writ of injunction.

In this connection, it is worthy to note that the applicant must show that it is entitled to the relief sought, and that acts are being undertaken in violation of the applicants rights. A preliminary injunction may be granted only where the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. While the existence of the right need not be conclusively established, it must be clear. The standard is even higher in the case of a preliminary mandatory injunction, which should only be granted x x x in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being acontinuing one; and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation x x x. In Power Sites and Signs, Inc. vs. United Neon, the Supreme Court stated that there is no "irreparable injury" as understood in law. Rather, the damages alleged by the petitioner, namely, "immense loss in profit and possible damage claims from clients" and the cost of the billboard which is "a considerable amount of money" is easily quantifiable, and certainly does not fall within the concept of irreparable damage or injury as described in Social Security Commission v. Bayona,115 Phil. 105, 110 (1962): Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy." An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement". An irreparable injury to authorize an injunctionconsists of a serious charge of, or is destructive to, the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which it has been held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof. (Emphasis supplied) Evidently, a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and irreparable injury, that is, injury that is actual, substantial, and demonstrable. Since any damage petitioner may suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by damages, a preliminary injunction is not warranted. As previously held in Golding v. Balatbat, 36 Phil. 941 (1917), the writ of injunction should never issue when an action for damages would adequately compensate the injuries caused. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ rests in the

probability of irreparable injury, the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of the multiplicity of suits, and where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused(POWER SITES AND SIGNS, INC. vs. UNITED NEON, G.R. No. 163406, November 24, 2009, Second Division, Del Castillo, J.).