CHAPTER V

The Right to Association

Man by nature, is a social being. As a gregarious lot, the ordinary impulse to interact and form cliques and groups cannot be denied. It is therefore expected that our Constitution guarantee and promote every citizen right to association. The Constitution has the following provisions on the Right to Association, to wit
Article III, Section 4 No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Article III, Section 8 The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Also, the Civil Code provides liabilities to persons who shall violate the right to association. It is stated in Article 32 (12) Any public officer or employee, or any

private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: (12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law.
According to Justice Isagani Cruz,1 the right of association is deemed embraced in the right to expression. This is due to the fact that associations are oftentimes used by its members to express opinions. It must be noted though that the right to form associations has a built-in limitation that it must not be for purposes contrary to law. To illustrate the concept, it is best to discuss the case of Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union.2 Benjamin Victoriano, a member of the religious sect known as the Iglesia ni Cristo, had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc., 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union, which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision, which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.

On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to Paragraph (4) subsection (a) of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: x x x but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization. Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization, Victoriano presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the
1 2

Constitutional Law, 2000 ed., page 240. 59 SCRA 54.

Company asking the latter to separate Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The company terminated the employment of Victoriano. The issue in this case was whether or not, the law, which exempted INC members from being union members valid. The Supreme Court echoed this pronouncement:
Appellant Unions contention that Republic Act No. 8350 prohibits and bans the members of such religious sects that forbid affiliation of their members with labor union or from joining labor unions appears nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No. 3350; neither can the same be deduced by necessary implication there from. It is not surprising, therefore, that appellant, having thus misread the Act, committed the error of contending that said Act is obnoxious to the constitutional provision on freedom of association. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association. Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of Article IV of the constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the right to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a right, it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time. It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the right to join associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association. The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment of Republic Act No. 3350, provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: the employer is, however, not precluded from making an agreement with a labo r organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees. By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn. To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibi t affiliation of their members in any such labor organization. Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects, which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit

the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and sect to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining, and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.

The Supreme Court pronounced in the case that the right to join a union or organization includes the right to refrain from joining any union, for a right comprehends at least two broad notions which are liberty or freedom such as the absence of legal restraint whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and power whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. In what both the Constitution and the Labor Code have recognized and guaranteed to the employee is the right to join associations of his choice, The court declared that it would be incongruous to say that the law also imposes upon the employee the duty to join associations. The ruling in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union has been applied in a number of cases, including Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC3 which the Court held: x x x in holding that they are included in the bargaining unit for the rank and file employees of PIDI, the NLRC practically forced them to become members of PEO-FFW or to be subject to its sphere of influence, it being the certified bargaining agent for the subject bargaining unit. This violates, obstructs, impairs and impedes the service engineers and the sales representatives constitutional right to form unions or associations and to self-organization. Thus, it is the right of the worker to personally decide whether or not to join a labor union. The union, the management, the courts, and even the State cannot make the decision for the worker. In People vs. Ferrer,4 the issue was whether or not the Anti-Subversion Law which criminalized membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines impaired the citizens right to association. The High Court in this case ruled:
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association. In 1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was the overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China. More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth organizations such the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the New Peoples Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said: We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.

Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v NLRC, G.R. No. 88957, June 25, 1992 4 48 SCRA 382.

As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of the Philippines is an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government is intended not to provide the basis for a legislative finding of guilt of the members of the Party but rather to justify the proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are so fundamental that they are thought by some to occupy a preferred position in the hierarchy of constitutional values. Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise must be justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This is the reason why before enacting the statute in question Congress conducted careful investigations and then stated its findings in the preamble, thus: xxx xxx xxx x x x [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines although purportedly a political party, is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control; x x x [T]he continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines constitutes a clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines; x x x [I]n the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in scope but international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to cope with this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country. In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be open to question if, instead of making these findings in enacting the statute, Congress omitted to do so.

The case of In Re: Atty. Marcial Edillon,5 is interesting and must be discussed. Edillon was a lawyer who passed the Bar Examinations, by reason of which, he was admitted as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. As a member of the IBP, dues were collected which Edillon refused to pay. Hence, his name was stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. Questioning the action as an impairment of his right to association more particularly the right not to join the IBP, the Supreme Court has this to say:
The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the welldefined but unorganized and in-cohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state.

Furthermore, in the global context, freedom of association is included in a number of constitutions and human rights instruments such as the United States Bill of Rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, the European Convention on Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Labor Organization Conventions.
5

84 SCRA 554.

In Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, Students Right to Form Associations/Organizations, are expressed in the following sections
Section 9. Rights of Students in School. In addition to other rights, and subject to the limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following rights: xxx xxx xxx

7. The right to free expression of opinions and suggestions, and to effective channels of communication with appropriate academic and administrative bodies of the school or institution. 8. The right to form, establish, join and participate in organizations and societies recognized by the school to foster their intellectual, cultural, spiritual and physical growth and development, or to form, establish, join and maintain organizations and societies for purposes not contrary to law.

A cursory reading of the provisions gives us the idea that no school can prohibit the formation of associations and societies not contrary to law. Moreover, neither can the school compel its students to join associations or in most cases not to join them. This right is particularly of greater significance if associational objectives and activities are the preferred rights of individuals such as freedom of expression, right of assembly and petition, right to join political parties of their choice, and the free exercise of religious profession and worship, as the association itself enjoys the highest protection accorded to individuals.6 This is because association is an extension of individual freedom. It is a method of making more effective, or giving greater depth and scope to, the individuals needs, aspirations, and liberties. Hence, as a general principle, the right of individuals to associate or to refrain from association ought to be protected to the same extent, and for the same reasons, as individual liberty is protected.7 Nevertheless, in exercising the rights of students in school, students have duties and responsibilities to perform. In Section 15 (2) of BP 232, it states that every student shall uphold the academic integrity of the school, endeavor to achieve academic excellence and abide by the rules and regulations governing his academic responsibilities and moral integrity. Thus, while the students have the right to free expression of opinions and the right to association in organization not contrary to law, it should be emphasized that they have duty and responsibility to obey the rules and regulations of the school particularly governing moral integrity. However, there are certain situations when the right to association in a school environment can be curtailed. First, school rules and regulations may curtail the associational rights of students on campus only if the exercise presents the clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the school authorities have the right to prevent. In order for the school to take any action which restricts protected associational activities, the school bears the burden of proving that the school action serves a compelling, legitimate school interest (in particular, prevention of substantial disruption of educational activity) and that there is no other way of serving that interest which is less restrictive of students associational
Bernas, Fr. Joaquin G., Schools and the Right of Association Speech delivered before the Philippine Bar Association, March 20, 1991. 7 Ibid.
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activities, and in no event can the activity be restricted because of the contents of the groups message.8 Second, if the association is formed for the purpose of asserting an unpreferred right, it may be curtailed if the rule prohibiting it promotes the schools assertion of its own preferred right. Thus, labor unions, to the extent that they are associations formed for the protection of property, have been found inferior to the asserted religious right not to join a union. This ruling can be applied mutatis mutandis to the right of students to form associations contrary to the religious beliefs and teachings of the school. Hence, in a Catholic school, student cannot assert their freedom of association to justify the organization of a group that is contrary to the precepts, teachings and rules of the Catholic Church. Even if the student intends to form their own religious group or association, the same may not be allowed by the Catholic school. In this latter case, although the students are not only organizing in accordance with their freedom of association but also assertion of their right to religion, these freedoms cannot justify the existence in the campus of their group for the students are deemed to have waived their rights to the same when they decided to enroll in a school fully aware of the Catholic character thereof and therefore impliedly agreed to be bound by the Catholic schools rules and regulations pertaining to its own Catholic beliefs. Third, the school may prohibit associations harmful to the legitimate interests of the school and its students from operating and penalize students who persist in such memberships. Fourth, when the purpose of the organization is contrary to law or to the mission-vision statement of the school. Furthermore, while it is correct to say that every student can compel the school to recognize his/her right to association, it is incorrect to say that the right to association includes the right to compel the school for recognition of a student organization. Thus, the concept of recognition of a student association must be taken up. In addition, in Sec. 10(3), it is stated that school personnel have also the right to establish, join and maintain labor organizations and/or professional and self-regulating organizations of their choice to promote their welfare and defend their interests.

Recognized Student Associations

Attention is drawn again to Section 9(8) of BP 232
In addition to other rights x x x students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy: xxx xxx xxx

8. The right to form, establish, join and participate in organizations and societies RECOGNIZED by the school to foster their intellectual, cultural, spiritual and physical growth and development, or to form, establish, join and maintain organizations and societies for purposes not contrary to law.

Here the word organization is qualified by the word recognized. Recognition in this case implies the student organizations full compliance with school rules and regulations. Recognition carries the privileges of using the school name and the enjoyment of school
8

Weekstein, Paul; School Discipline and Student Right: An Advocate Manual, 1982 Revised Ed., page 82.

facilities. As such, schools can, and often do, require that student organizations, register as a condition of obtaining benefits which are not otherwise available to students individually or collectively school funds, office space, and regular meeting space. Thus, by registering, a group would not only have the same rights as other students to meet at an available, nondisruptive time and place. It would also be assured of the availability of such place on a regular basis.9 Moreover, as a recognized student organization, its activities, programs and projects are legally considered as officially sanctioned by the school administration and hence, are official or recognized school functions and/or activities. In effect, the school administration shall have special parental authority and responsibility and loco parentis over the minor students and the students of majority age respectively, who shall be involved in the said extra-curricular occasions.10 Finally, CHED Memorandum Order No. 97 requires all heads of private Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) to submit to the CHED a list of all fraternities/sororities and/or student organizations officially registered with their respective institutions and the corresponding members thereof. If the institutions have not extended official recognition to these organizations but the school heads do know of their illegal existence in their institutions, a similar list must also be submitted.

Fraternities and Sororities in Schools

The most frequently asked question on this topic is whether school administrators can prevent students from joining fraternities and sororities. In several cases, US courts have consistently ruled that a school may forbid fraternities because (1) they subvert the legitimate goals of the school and (2) students are constrained to submit to school regulations which promote discipline and school objectives. It cannot be argued that such a ban unconstitutionally interferes with the personal rights of students, their freedom of association, and their freedom of assembly. Fr. Bernas, commenting on this has said: (A student) cannot simply say, Keep me because I have the guaranteed right to form an association. He has the guaranteed right to associate with persons of like mind, but he cannot force himself on others who do not accept his values, especially if they are perverted ones. A recent case in the United States involves the suspension of a Yale University fraternity, Delta Keppa Epsilon for allegedly chanting phrases related to sex acts and other obscenities against women while marching across the campus. A summary of disciplinary actions was publicized by the school to prove that the school discouraged sexual harassment and said it wanted to ensure an educational environment free from harassment and intimidation.11

Sarmiento, Ulpiano III, Education Law and the Private Schools 2002 ed., page 506. Ibid. 11 Pelaez, Marina. 2011. Yale Suspends Delta Keppa Epsilon Fraternity After Sexist Chants. Time, 2011.
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