ESSAY #1 Sec. 18.

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to question the deployment. Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."37 In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."38 Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case. The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the Presidents exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power has reached its distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v. Baker70 and Montenegro v. Castaneda71 to the volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia,72 Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,73 and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.74 The tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining "political questions," particularly those questions "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government."75Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison in declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in the conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional sufficiency. From the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks and balances, "under which the President is supreme, x x x only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora80 -- a recent case most pertinent to these cases at bar -echoed a principle similar to Lansang. While the Court considered the Presidents "calling-out" power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that "this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. This ruling is mainly a result of the Courts reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.81 It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty. Whether or not the case will prosper Will depend whether there is enough factual basis to support the presidents call upon the Philippine Marines to combat criminality, said criminality falling under lawless violence, rebellion or invasion "it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings

#2 republic of the Philippines vs court of appeals, Henrico uvero et al Background: Interpreting the effect of moratorium law on a monetary obligation, this Court in a recent case said: The law on debt moratorium does not condone debts or the payments of obligations. It merely suspends collection and payment. The right to such suspension may be invoked by the debtor; but he may also waive or renounce it. (Araneta vs. Marta Cui Vda. de Sanson, 47 Off. Gaz., 2849; Phil. 142.) Two views on the effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality Orthodox- an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is a total nullity Modern view. The second or modern view is less stringent. Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. The court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding the law, but the decision affects the parties only and there is no judgment against the statute. The opinion or reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar cases, but it does not strike the statute from the statute books; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute. The parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound Issue: whether or not the unconstitutionality of the Moratorium law suspended the prescription period. If suspended: period does not prescribe and defendant therefore is liable to pay

If not suspended: since the moratorium law did not exist the period for recovery has already elapsed therefore defendant is no longer liable to pay complainant. Jurisprudence: same facts in Manila Motors co v Flores the court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff ruling that Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil., 68) may be construed to mean that at the time of the decision the Moratorium law could no longer be validly applied because of the prevailing circumstances. At any rate, although the general rule is that an unconstitutional statute confers no right, creates no office, affords no protection and justifies no acts performed under it. (11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.) there are several instances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation (cf. notes in Cooleys Constitutional Limitations 8th ed., p. 383 and Notes 53 A. L. R., 273) or qualified its effects since the actual existence of a statute prior to such declaration is an operative fact, and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored (Chicot County vs. Baster, 308 U. S., 371) and a realistic approach is eroding the general doctrine #3 a.) whether Mr. X may be compelled to testify and if yes, what sanction may be imposed on him Requisites of legislative inquiry: Must be in aid of legislation b.) conduct must be strictly in conformity with the rules of procedure that must have been published in advance for the information and protection of the witnesses. If both are satisfied: Failure of refusal to attend a legitimate legislative investigation or contumacy of the witness may be punished as legislative contempt. The punishment that may be meted out includes imprisonment. In Arnault v Nazareno the incarceration lasted until such time as the witness decided to answer certain relavant questions put to him in connection with the investigation of a government transaction. The old rule, as illustrated In Lopez v de los reyes, was imprisonment could only last for the duration of the session when the contempt was committed. b.) whether or no DMN sec can claim executive privilege. what is executive privilege? In simplest terms, it is the power of the President to withhold certain types of information from the courts, the Congress and ultimately the public. The types of information include those which are of a nature that disclosure would subvert military or diplomatic objectives, or information about the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law, or information about internal deliberations comprising the process by which government decisions are reached. Of these types of information perhaps the trickiest ones are those about internal deliberations leading to a government decision. But the decision itself, once reached, unless it is about confidential military or diplomatic matters, can become a matter of public concern. Certainly, for instance, if a decision reached is criminal, it cannot be privileged. Put differently, our Court has said that a claim of privilege may be valid or not ?depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is claimed. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.? From this the Court has concluded that it is not for one claiming executive privilege ?to unilaterally determine that respondents? duly-issued subpoena should be totally disregarded. One must also see executive privilege vis--vis the power of Congress to use compulsory process. ?While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to

legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. . . . Only one executive official may be exempted from this power?the President. nother point which the Court has emphasized in Ermita is that a claim of privilege must be stated with sufficient particularity to enable Congress or the court to determine its legitimacy. ?Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected.? The lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from disclosure impossible. However, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect (Fr. Bernas) Traditional grounds. one of the recognized limitations on executive privilege is that it must only be invoked for the most compelling reasons such as the need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets.