COURSE: ADMIN PROFESSOR: ARRIOLA

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGESTS

US VS. PANLILIO
The orders (rules and regulations) of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant to a statute have the force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not a offense punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation. FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. It is alleged that the accused illegally and without being authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said carabaos exposed to rinderpest was still in effect, permitted and ordered said carabaous to be taken from the corral in which they were quarantined and drove them from one place to another. The accused contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 ISSUE: Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture? HELD: NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No. 1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, 2 of the Penal Code which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease among animals. HELD: NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power

VICTORIAS MILLING VS. SSS

When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. FACTS: The SSS issued Circular No. 22 which provides that, in computing the premiums due, all employers will include in the employee s remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay. Victorias Milling Compnay protested the circular as being contradictory to its previous Circular which expressly excluded overtime pay and bonus in the computation of premium contributions. Victorias questioned its validity for lack of authority on the part of the SSS to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the OG. SSS argues that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation, but a mere administrative interpretation in light of the amendments introduced by an amendatory law. Hence, there is no need for approval of the President and publication in the OG to be effective. ISSUE: Whether Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation? HELD: NO, Circular No. 22 is an administrative interpretation. There is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. In this case, Circular No. 22 was issued by the SSS, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term compensation. While prior to the amendment, bonuses and overtime pay were expressly exclude, such exemption was deleted by the amendatory law. Hence, it thus became necessary for the SSS to interpret the effect of such deletion through Circular No. 22.

PEOPLE VS. MACEREN

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. FACTS: The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC. ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?

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COURSE: ADMIN PROFESSOR: ARRIOLA

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS
If the rates prescribed by an administrative agency is in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers, prior notice and hearing is not essential to the validity of its issuance. FACTS: The Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report recommending an increase in school fees. DECS took note of the report and issued an Order authorizing a 15% to 20% increase as recommended. Petitioner sought for reconsideration on the ground that the increases were too high. Thereafter, the Order was modified reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%. Petitioner still protested the increases and filed a petition for prohibition, seeking to declare the questioned Department Order unconstitutional for it was issued without any legal basis and for violation of the due process clause for lack of due notice and hearing before issuance. ISSUE: Whether the Department Order is valid? HELD: YES. The power of the DECS, as granted by law, to regulate school fees include the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law. As to the issue of due process, there is no such violation. The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasijudicial in character. In this case, the Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for the school year 1987 to 1988. Hence, it applies to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country and the issuance of the department order is in the exercise of DECs quasi-legislative power. This being so, prior notice and hearing is not essential to the validity of its issuance.

ISSUE: Whether the respondents should first exhaust administrative remedies? HELD: YES. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. As correctly suggested by the respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings. In this case, the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on this controversy coming under its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene. The respondents have failed to satisfactorily establish that the extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies and immediate resort to the courts. In fact, Sunville has stopped its operations in compliance with the order of the DENR.

MORCOSO V. CA
As an exception to the general rule, administrative remedies need not be exhausted if the agency has no longer jurisdiction. FACTS: Respondent Tirol filed a complaint against Morcoso for recovery of possession of a fishpond situated in Ibajay, Aklan. She alleged that the said fishpond is part of the land she inherited from her father and that she entered into a lease agreement with Morcoso allowing him to lease a portion and develop it into a fishpond. Morcoso was later informed by the BFAR that the land Tirol leased to him is within the area of alienable and disposable public land, thus Morcoso applied for a fishpond permit. Morcoso refused to surrender possession of the fishpond. Morcoso assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court because of a pending administrative case before the BFAR regarding their conflicting claims. The trial court ruled in favor of Tirol. CA affirmed said decision. ISSUE: Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the case? HELD: YES. As an exception to the general rule, administrative remedies need not be exhausted if the agency has no longer jurisdiction. The doctrine requiring prior exhaustion of administrative remedies before recourse to courts is inapplicable because the fishpond in dispute is private and not public land. The plaintiffs have sufficiently established that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land in question under claim of ownership for a very long period of time. The fishpond not having been part of the public domain, the trial court correctly adjudged Tirol as the rightful owner thereof.

SUNVILLE vs. JUDGE ABAD

The application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question by a court of justice. FACTS: Sunville was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA) authorizing it to exploit timber in Lison Valley, Zamboanga del Sur. Respondents filed a petition with the DENR to annul the said TLA due to some serious violations of its conditions and provisions of forestry laws, carried out by petitioner. They likewise filed a complaint for injunction in the RTC, based on the same causes of action. Sunville filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the court and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The motion was denied by Judge Abad of the RTC. The CA affirmed and held that the the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial intervention given the petitioners operations have caused heavy siltation in various rivers.

NFA VS. CA
The doctrine of administrative remedies is inapplicable where there is

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COURSE: ADMIN PROFESSOR: ARRIOLA

urgency or irreparable damage. FACTS: Earlier, the NFA conducted a public bidding to award security contracts for the protection of its facilities. Among those awarded were the private respondents. When David became the new Administrator of the NFA, he caused the review of all security contracts and created a Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC). When the time of the bidding came, some bids were disqualified for failure to comply with documentary requirements including those of Respondents. Respondents Lanting Security and Watchman Agency filed complaints with the RTC to restrain the Administrator from proceeding with the public bidding. During the pendency of the writ of preliminary injunction, David terminated the contracts of the security agencies and engaged the services of seven new agencies. Respondents filed another complaint to restrain the NFA from terminating their services. The lower court ruled in favor of Respondents. On appeal to the SC, the NFA contends that respondents did not exhaust administrative remedies and hence, their complaint is premature. ISSUE: Whether the Respondents should have first exhausted administrative remedies? HELD: NO. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to some limitations and exceptions. In the case at bar, respondents contracts were terminated in the midst of bidding preparations and their replacements hired barely five days after. An appeal to the NFA Board or Council of Trustees and the Secretary of Agriculture as mandated by the provisions of the Administrative Code was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The urgency of the situation which necessitated a recourse to the courts is justified.

had been joined and any of the following grounds were shown to exist: (1) When there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of; (2) When the evidence of culpability is strong; (3) When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or (4) When the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. (2) The regional trial court had no jurisdiction over the special civil action and gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case. If the Mayor thought that preventive suspension was unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought relief first from the Secretary DILG and not from the courts. Mayor Melgar's direct recourse to the courts without exhausting administrative remedies was premature.

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC VS. CA

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view . FACTS: Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED). It was also granted a coal operating contract in the so-called Giporlos Area. IEI was later advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the countrys coal supply-demand balance, the logical coal operator in the area would be Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC its rights in the area but later filed an action for rescission with damages against MMIC for failure of the latter to comply with its obligations. IEI prayed that the Energy Minister approve the return of the contract from MMIC to IEI. Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and MMIC. Trial Court ordered the rescission and declared the continued efficacy of the coal contract in favor of IEI and ordered the BED to issue its written affirmation of the contract and to give due course to IEIs application. CA reversed the decision and ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that under PD 1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks. ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply in this case? HELD: YES. It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined.

ESPIRITU vs. MELGAR AND JUDGE VIROLA

Absent any of the exceptions to the rule, the doctrine of administrative remedies cannot be disregarded. FACTS: Mayor Melgar allegedly attacked one Ramir Garing and had him arrested and detained in abuse of his position as Mayor in Oriental Mindoro. Ramir Garing filed a complaint and asked that Provincial Governor Espiritu to be placed under preventive suspension. After evaluating the complaint, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed Resolution No. 55 recommending that the Provincial Governor place the Mayor under preventive suspension pending investigation of the administrative complaint. This was based on reasonable grounds in the complaint corroborated by several witnesses. The Provincial Governor concurred. Mayor Melgar resorted to the RTC to issue a TRO on the Provincial Governor and alleged that the Provincial Governor committed GADLEJ. Judge Virola granted the TRO. The Governor appealed to the SC, citing that the judge committed GADLEJ in issuing the TRO. ISSUE: (1) Whether the Provincial Governor committed GADLEJ by placing the Mayor under preventive suspension? (2) Whether the Judge committed GADLEJ in issuing the TRO HELD: NO. There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive suspension is allowed so that the respondent may not hamper the normal course of the investigation through the use of his influence and authority over possible witnesses. As a general rule, the office or body that is invested with the power of removal or suspension should be the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause. The provincial governor of is authorized by law to preventively suspend the municipal mayor at anytime after the issues

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