T2 B2 10-14-03 Hearing - Intelligence Background 2 of 3 FDR - Tab 5 - Draft Staff Document - Intelligence Community Reform Proposal 909

Draft Staff Document
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Intelligence Community Reform Proposal
A. Introduction and Overview
The following sections outline problems in the intelligence community and

remedies proposed in the accompanying legislative reform package. Some of the
problems have been recognized for many years. Others have been revealed only recently
by such events as September 11th and the mistaken estimates of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction capabilities. The reform proposal also is intended to address the rise of
homeland security intelligence requirements. As we approach the third anniversary of
September 11th, while the Defense Department by bulk and variety remains by far the
largest consumer of intelligence, homeland security intelligence support requirements are
growing substantially, and the consumer base for national intelligence in the Department
of Homeland Security, national and local law enforcement, and emergency response
communities could in time rival that of the military. These new consumers need a seat at
the table, they need the concerted attention of the DCI, and they need strong support from
the national collection and analysis agencies, including those within the Defense
Department. The DCI must devote more time and attention to helping the Department of
Homeland Security, the FBI, and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center to master the art
of intelligence collection and analysis as rapidly as possible.
The reform proposal needs to be evaluated in its totality, since most individual
elements are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The reform proposal's major
elements include establishing a Director of National Intelligence who would not also
serve as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; "dual-hatting" the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence as the senior Deputy Director of National Intelligence;
restricting the role of several of the intelligence agency directors to "organizing, training,
and equipping" their agencies, as the Goldwater-Nichols Act did for the chiefs of staff of
the military services; in another parallel to Goldwater-Nichols, creating a Deputy Director
of National Intelligence for Operations in charge of a large joint tasking organization,
with a senior deputy from a Defense Department combatant command; establishing an
Senior Advisor for Homeland Security; requiring personnel rotations as a condition for
promotion, modeled after the Goldwater-Nichols Act personnel reforms; creating other
joint organizations and processes to provide the DNI improved capabilities to monitor the
expenditure of funds, reprogram funds, and oversee major procurements within the
intelligence agencies; mandating a single, streamlined security clearance process for all
intelligence community personnel, and decisively shifting authority for classifying
information and deciding who gets access to information from the agencies that collect
intelligence to the DNI, to facilitate information sharing; and directing that the DNI, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security jointly apply modern
information technology and business practices to network the intelligence community and
its customers, including state and local officials who are essential to homeland security,
to fully share information, and to vastly improve the community's agility and efficiency. "1
The proposed legislation also would require the President to establish policy regarding

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the use of advanced "data mining" tools on government and private-sector databases to
ensure that American citizens' privacy is protected as the government works to better
protect the country from terrorism. More detailed explanations of selected reform
initiatives follow this overview and introduction.
DC1Authorities and Relationship to the Secretary of Defense
The National Security Act of 1947 as originally enacted intended the DCI to be a
coordinator and arbiter of intelligence produced by the cabinet departments and to
provide independent assessments to the President. Over time, the DCI has accumulated
considerably more authority and more responsibility for managing the intelligence
organizations established within the cabinet departments and under the authority of
cabinet secretaries. Under any circumstances, such an inelegant management
arrangement - shared executive power and dual reporting chains - presents daunting
problems. These challenges are especially acute in the case of the Defense Department.
Most of the resources that the DCI relies upon to produce intelligence products that are
considered to have national-level significance are the same as those that the Secretary of
Defense needs to prepare for and to conduct military operations. As a former Director of
the NRO observes, if the national foreign intelligence community did not exist, the
Secretary of Defense would immediately create almost all of it.
A unique and complex power-sharing arrangement has grown up on an ad hoc basis

between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. By executive order and statute, the DCI is
assigned tasking authority over national intelligence, and is responsible for producing
assessments for the President and National Security Council. The DCI has the authority
to build the budget for national intelligence and to transfer and reprogram funds. The
Secretary of Defense, by executive order and statute, is the President's executive agent for
signals intelligence, executes appropriated funds for most of the intelligence budget, and
has the predominant role in selecting the directors of NSA, NRO, NGA, and DIA. In
addition, NSA, NGA, and DIA are designated as combat support agencies under the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, which among other things means that they are subject to periodic
inspection by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to assess their readiness to support combat
operations.
In the last several decades, there have been many proposals and attempts to strengthen
the ability of the DCI to manage the intelligence community. Usually, reform advocates
have proposed to increase the authority of the DCI by shifting authority from the
Secretary of Defense. However, these proposals typically run into problems because the
reality is that both officials have legitimate claims to authority over the same intelligence /
resources.
What is interesting is that the senior leadership in the Defense Department sincerely
believes that the Defense Department is severely disadvantaged with respect to
intelligence matters, at the mercy of the DCI, while the perception of the DCI and his
staff is that they have a hard time controlling the defense intelligence agencies and that

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the Defense Department too often holds sway in conflicts between the DCI and the
Secretary of Defense. Can both be right? To an extent, yes: sometimes one side prevails,
and sometimes the other, in serious disputes. But it is also the case that with two
"bosses", the intelligence agencies often either escape control or are subjected to
competing direction. The two opposing staffs in many instances and in various areas
negate or neutralize one another, and the agencies are adept at playing one against the
other to maintain their autonomy. Having two bosses, in other words, sometimes can
mean having none. One example that illustrates this phenomenon: neither the DCI's staff
nor that of the Secretary of Defense has access to budget execution data from the defense
intelligence agencies. The DoD Comptroller has been barred from year-of-excecution
inspections, and the agencies will not report such data to the Community Management
Staff either.
It is of course preferable to have clean lines of authority, and many have argued that
the DCI cannot effectively manage national intelligence without having full control over
the intelligence community, but there are reasons why Congress and the President have
shared power between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense, and politically it is unlikely
that the balance of power between them can be changed in any event. Shared power and
mutual dependence is a reality, and the staffs of both officials must accept that and learn
to make the best of it. In fact, there are ways to encourage the DCI and the Secretary and
their staffs to cooperate rather than confront one another, and through cooperation both
officials can increase their real power over the intelligence agencies. That is to say, the
relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense need not be a "zero-sum
game," where any accretion of power by one can only come at the expense of the other.
The Roman Republic for centuries governed through two Consuls who could either veto
one another or work together to get something accomplished. Likewise, the Goldwater-
Nichols Act has succeeded in taming the intense rivalry of the military services. It ought
to be possible, too, to create a culture of "jointness" between the DCI and the Secretary of
Defense - indeed between the DCI and all the cabinet secretaries involved in national
intelligence.
The proposed legislation would not significantly alter the relationship or distribution
of power between the intelligence community director and the Secretary of Defense, but
would clarify the respective authorities and significantly enhance the DNI's ability to
manage the intelligence community and make it more effective. In the spirit of
Goldwater-Nichols, the proposed legislation would create several joint organizations and
processes that would give both the DNI and the Secretary of Defense, for the first time,
full insight and control over defense intelligence agency expenditures and acquisition
programs. The proposed legislation also would "dual hat" the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence as the DNI's senior Deputy Director, which will ensure that DoD
interests are fully respected within the intelligence community, assist the DNI in
enforcing decisions, and help to ensure that national and tactical DoD intelligence
programs and capabilities are properly coordinated. In a close parallel to Goldwater-
Nichols, as described below in this section, the authority of the DNI (and indirectly the
Secretary of Defense) would also be significantly enhanced by creating a joint tasking

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organization, and restricting the responsibilities of the directors of the main intelligence
collection agencies to organizing, training, and equipping SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMINT
personnel and systems; like the military service chiefs under Goldwater-Nichols, these
agency directors would play no role in directing the actual operations of collection and
analysis.
Director of National Intelligence
The DCI has been a poor community manager partly because of authority limitations,
partly because of a consistent failure to exercise authority already conferred by executive
order and statute, and partly because the CIA dominates the DCFs time, attention, and -
some assert - favor. The intelligence community does not regard the DCI as an
impartial and engaged leader. The DCI should be separated from day-to-day management
of the CIA and become a full-time manager of the entire intelligence community -
especially in light of the new demands for homeland security and the need to grow
expertise in intelligence collection and analysis in the FBI and DHS. The proposed
legislation would effect this separation by establishing a Director of National Intelligence
and a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The legislation would abolish the
position of Deputy Director for Community Management, since the intent is for the DNI
to perform this job full time. •
hi the past, the DCI has opposed establishing a Director of National Intelligence
separated from the CIA because of severe doubt that the office would have enough power
to effectively control the community. Without full and exclusive control over the main
organizations and agencies in the community, it is argued, a DNI would be powerless if
set adrift from the CIA, since the CIA provides the DCI with a strong institutional power
base. To ensure that a DNI could be an effective community manager, it is usually
claimed that the DNI would have to be given full line-management authority over all
major intelligence agencies, especially including the authority for executing appropriated
funds. In effect, what is advocated is the creation of a "department of intelligence" in all
but name, even if the intelligence agencies and organizations were to be formally left
inside existing cabinet departments. These arguments, and this model, were rejected in
crafting this legislative proposal. A DNI can be an effective community manager using
basically existing DCI authorities - for tasking, building budgets, transferring funds, and
providing substantive intelligence to the President - if they are productively applied, if
other reforms are implemented and if better partnerships are forged with various cabinet
secretaries, especially the Secretary of Defense.
Moreover, there are substantive reasons to stop short of consolidating line-

management authority under a DNI. Competitive analysis has always been a valued
feature of U.S. intelligence, hi essence, competitive analysis usually means the clash
among departmental analysis organizations and the CIA - the differing views of State,
DoD, Energy, CIA, and so forth. Creating an actual or virtual "Department of
Intelligence" could jeopardize this arrangement; even if the present decentralized
structure of analysis were to be maintained, over time in the name of efficiency pressure

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could arise to consolidate analysis (as proposed in the Boren-McCurdy legislation of

1992). The goal should be to enhance the DNI's ability to coordinate and integrate
operations, focus the community on priorities, share information better, nurture the skills
needed for the new homeland security mission, and so on - but not affect the support that
cabinet secretaries need and expect from their intelligence organizations, and not dilute
competitive analysis.
Information Sharing and Information technology
The problems we face demand a shift from the restraining principle of "need to
know" to aggressive adherence to the principle of "need to share." As investigations of
September 11th show, the intelligence community has problems sharing information
within and across organizations, and leaves a wealth of potentially valuable information
"on the cutting room floor" as analysts and reporters within collection agencies screen
masses of raw data to produce finished assessments. The intelligence community's most
basic databases are inaccessible to many analysts both inside and outside the agencies that
collected the data. Information is power, and intelligence organizations tend to hoard it to
protect their interests. Exploiting all available intelligence data and sharing information
across agencies is also difficult because the technology for doing it is new and the
policies and procedures that need to be implemented to enable it run counter to
longstanding practice. These obstacles must be overcome.
The proposed legislation would require changes in policy governing classification and
access to information, imposition of uniform personnel security clearances, and shifting
responsibility for protecting U.S. persons' privacy from agency directors to the DNI.
These changes will remove major barriers to information sharing and collaboration. The
proposed legislation also includes a series of initiatives to create a networked intelligence
community that shares and exploits all useful information; rather than moving boxes
around on organizational charts, the legislation proposes a "virtual reorganization," ^
exploiting to the fullest America's information technology and the associated novel
business practices, while maintaining competitive analysis.
Penetrating and Assessing Hard Targets
The Intelligence Community has not been very successful in penetrating "hard
targets," including the leadership of rogue nations, terrorist groups, weapons of mass
destruction proliferation activities, and other transnational threats. NSA's challenges can
perhaps be met by acquisition management reforms, more aggressive targeting, and by
taking more operational risks. CIA's HUMINT challenge is less tractable, but greater
emphasis on language and cultural training, exploiting the cultural and ethnic diversity of
American society, tailoring tradecraft for operations against non-traditional targets, and
aggressively applying advanced technology in partnership with other organizations could
help. Sec. would create a joint tasking organization that would enable horizontal
integration and cross-cueing across the intelligence disciplines. Other solutions have
been and will be pursued through the normal oversight process.

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Analysis Reforms
The flaws in pre-war analysis of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs include
an unwillingness to take seriously the dissenting views of organizations outside of CIA,
and a failure to appreciate the importance of being aware of, and conveying to consumers,
the assumptions and methodology used in assessments, and the limits of hard knowledge.
There is a clear need to re-emphasize standards for conducting and presenting
assessments. The proposed legislation would establish such standards and mandate a ,
permanent "red team," modeled after Israeli practice. '
Community Personnel Assignments
A problem that is related to the DCFs infirmities as the manager of the intelligence
community is the weakness of the DCI's staff. This staff does not reflect the intelligence
community in make up and commands little authority and respect within the intelligence
community. Similar and equally serious problems in the Defense Department's Joint
Staff, and staff serving the unified commanders, defense agencies, and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, were solved by mandating joint duty tours as a condition for
promotion, which has succeeded in inculcating a joint culture and in vastly improving the
quality of uniformed personnel serving in joint assignments. The intelligence community
needs the same remedy. The proposed legislation would require tours in other agencies
or community positions as a condition of promotion, establishes joint intelligence
specialties, and reserves billets for personnel in those specialties. Also in keeping with
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the DNI would review and appeal promotion lists of all
personnel to ensure equal promotion rates for personnel who have served in joint /
assignments.
Joint Tasking of Collection and Analysis
The DCI, by executive order and statute, has tasking authority over the intelligence
community, but the exercise of this vital authority is very weak and dispersed; collection
and analysis operations are dominated by the separate agencies and splintered further
within them. Despite the individual efforts of the Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence for Collection to focus collection on the most important problems and to
integrate tasking across the intelligence agencies, we still approach intelligence problems
with three independent collection and analysis strategies - one for signals intelligence, /
one for human intelligence, and one for imagery. The military learned from long and
bitter experience that ground, air, and naval forces must be combined and integrated
under a unified command. Since this basic principle, reflected in the Goldwater-Nichols
Act, took effect in the Defense Department, U.S. military performance has been the envy
of the world. To achieve cross-service integration and unity of command, the Goldwater-
Nichols Act barred the military service chiefs unequivocally from any role in
commanding operational forces, restricting them to the mission of organizing, training,
and equipping forces for the combatant commands. The major collection agencies - CIA,

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NSA, and NGA - are analogous to the military services prior to Goldwater-Nichols.
Their operations are not integrated under a joint, unified tasking apparatus, and the clout
of the agency directors consistently presents a challenge to the authority of the DCI and
the senior staff of the Secretary of Defense.
For the war on terrorism, combating proliferation, and future combat operations, there
is an urgent need for integrated collection strategies and operations - in military parlance,
for "task organized" operations that combine HUMINT, imagery, and signals intelligence
operations to achieve specific objectives. The Defense Department refers to this concept
as intelligence "campaign planning." The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act almost
overnight transformed U.S. military capabilities. After a string of embarrassing,
demoralizing failures and Pyrrhic victories, the U.S. military became an irresistible force
in Panama, Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom - at no
cost, from unifying command and integrating forces. Since the DCI confronts
independent "stovepipes" at least as formidable, on a relative scale, as the military
services posed to the Secretary of Defense and the unified commanders, establishing unity
of command and integrated operations in the intelligence community might pay similar
spectacular dividends.
The proposed legislation would achieve these goals by creating a joint tasking
structure under a Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Operations, and would
restrict the Directors of CIA, NSA, and NGA to organizing, training, and equipping
HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT resources. These agencies' operations would be
managed through senior operations officers within each agency, who would be analogous
to military component commanders under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. These changes,
too, will foster a culture of "jointness" and integration within the intelligence community,
and make the intelligence agencies more dependent on, and responsive to, the DNI. The
legislative proposal does not recommend a similar restriction on the heads of other
intelligence organizations to the role of organizing, training, and equipping, but extending
the concept might be necessary in the future.
The proposed legislation would require that a senior military officer from a combatant
command also serve as a senior deputy to the Deputy Director for Operations to integrate
national and DoD intelligence capabilities and ensure effective support for military
operations. This officer would replace the Associate Director of Central Intelligence for
Military Support within the CIA.
Domestic Intelligence Collection and Analysis
The legislative proposal would not alter the current structure for domestic
intelligence collection and analysis within the FBI, TTIC, and DHS, but does recommend
changes to the oversight and tasking of these activities under the proposed Director of
National Intelligence. It is critical to define the policy and procedures governing how the
intelligence community tasks the FBI to collect and report on terrorism. Under this
proposal, the Director of National Intelligence would define policy and procedures related

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to tasking terrorism collection domestically, and for information sharing with state and
local law enforcement. The proposal would create a new Senior Advisor for Homeland
Security, reporting to the Director, who would help to define domestic intelligence needs
and represent the needs of all homeland security customers to the intelligence community.
When the DNI selects the Senior Advisor for Homeland Security, consideration should be
given to current and former senior executives within the Department of Homeland
Security or the FBI.
The proposed joint tasking organization would be responsible for the direction of
the FBI's domestic intelligence collection activities, and for guiding the tasking of the
domestic intelligence analysis operations of the FBI, DHS, and TTIC.
These proposals, along with other measures described in other sections, are
intended to ensure that the DNI takes responsibility for the maturation of domestic
intelligence, that domestic and foreign intelligence are integrated, that the DNI plays an
active role in overseeing domestic intelligence collection tasking to ensure protection of
civil liberties, and that the needs and interests of homeland security are represented at
senior levels of the intelligence community.
Fixed Term of Service for New CIA Director
It has often been proposed that the DCI should serve a fixed, extended term that
does not match up with the four-year presidential election cycle to help insulate the
intelligence process from political pressure - modeled after the treatment of the Director
of the FBI. The conclusion reached here is that it would be a mistake to distance the head
of the intelligence community from the President. Unlike the FBI Director, it really
matters whether the President trusts and listens to the DCI. FBI Directors have a well- /
defined job that cannot be circumvented and cannot be ignored.
However, it might be possible to gain the benefits of the FBI Director model
without sacrificing the advantages of being selected by the President. Since the proposed
legislation would effect a separation of the job of CIA Director and the head of the
intelligence community, it is possible to insulate the CIA Director while having the DNI
serve at the pleasure of the President. The CIA is the only all-source analysis
organization that is not under the purview of a cabinet secretary. Sec. would fix the
tenure of the Director of the CIA at 10 years.
Separating the CIA from the DNI and fixing the term of service of the Agency's
Director raises issues of accountability and control. This consideration reinforces the
importance of the joint tasking organization proposed in this legislation. This
organization, under the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Operations, would
direct the collection and analysis at CIA and would have visibility into CIA's
implementation of this direction.

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Intelligence Community Reform Proposal
B. "Dual-Hatting" the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
The legislative proposal would "dual hat" the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence as the Deputy Director of National Intelligence. In this capacity, the DDNI
would be the second-ranking official in the intelligence community and would perform
the duties of the DNI in the absence of the DNI. With the creation of this joint office, the
authorities of the DNI could be augmented by the authorities of the Secretary of Defense,
providing nearly complete, unified control over the defense intelligence agencies. This
joint office also would provide a powerful means to integrate across the national and
defense intelligence communities. The Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, and the combatant commands would be assured that the intelligence community
would protect the interests of the Defense Department. In terms of DoD's homeland
security mission, the DDNI would provide a mechanism to coordinate between DoD,
DHS, and the law enforcement community. The DNI, likewise, would be assured that
DoD would better understand national intelligence community needs and the needs of
national-level policymakers for support.
This change would eliminate the ability of agency heads to avoid unwanted /
direction by playing DoD against the intelligence community leadership (and vice versa). '
It also should help to eliminate competing guidance to the intelligence agencies. With this
dual assignment, common functions within the USD(I) and the DNI's staffs should be
considered for consolidation and integration. It should help to eliminate complaints that
the DNI lacks power over the defense intelligence agencies. It should help to reduce the
sharpness of conflicts between the staffs of the DNI and the USD(I) in the Pentagon, and
increase the degree of cooperation. It should, above all perhaps, help to ensure that the
other reforms proposed in the legislation work effectively and are enforced - the joint
tasking organization, joint acquisition oversight, joint budget execution oversight,
common personnel security practices, joint information network development, centralized
control over information classification and access policy, and the requirements for
community tours for promotion.
Advocates on both sides of the DCI-DoD divide will tend to see in this proposal
ways for their side, alternately, to triumph and to be trumped. The point, however, is to
blunt the impulse to make these calculations. At the same time, realistically, the proposal
will not eliminate conflicts ~ nor will it solve all problems even when the arrangement is
working as well as possible. That is why it is but one of many reform proposals reflected
in the legislation.
C. Joint Comptroller organization
The proposed legislation would establish a joint Secretary of Defense/DNI

organization as an adjunct to the existing DoD Comptroller's office. The DNI would
provide staff to this organization as would the Secretary of Defense. The DNI and the

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Secretary would jointly appoint the head of this joint office, who would report to the
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). The office would use thefinancialcontrol /
authority of the Secretary of Defense to gain access to any financial information relating
to the National Foreign Intelligence Program executed by the Secretary of Defense. In
addition, under arrangements mutually determined by the DNI and the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary's authority and processes to withhold funding and transfer funding
could in principle be used at the request of the DNI; indeed, the dual-hatted
DDNI/USD(I) ought to be able to exercise the authorities of the Secretary of Defense
directly in this area as well as almost any other. The proposal would not shift budget
execution authority from the Secretary of Defense to the Director of National Intelligence.
The intention, rather, is to devise a mechanism whereby the DNI, with the concurrence of
the Secretary of Defense, could gain access to the Secretary of Defense's authorities in
cooperation with the Secretary's staff. This innovation would directly benefit the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in supporting the Secretary of Defense, as well as
the DNI. Also, Sec. 103 would codify the authority to reprogram funds that is conferred
on the DCI by Executive Order 12333. With respect to reprogrammings that involve a
transfer of funds across departments, consistent with sec. of the National Security Act,
the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of the Department providing the source of funds
may object, hi each case, an appeal may be lodged to the President.
Currently, as various current and former OSD and CMS officials confirm, neither
the DCI nor the staff of the Secretary of Defense get access to detailed budget execution
information from the defense intelligence agencies. It is not clear how this remarkable
arrangement evolved, but logic suggests that each staff neutralized the other and the
agencies cultivated autonomy in the ensuing void, hi any event, this situation must be
changed to ensure that the proposed DNI and the Secretary of Defense can exercise their
assigned authorities. The joint organization recommended here, rather than taking power
or authority away from either the DCI or the Secretary of Defense, would actually
increase the real authority of both officials — provided that their staffs can cooperate.
For the first time, under the proposal recommended here, the DNI's and
Secretary's senior staff would have routine access to budget execution information from
the national intelligence agencies in the Defense Department, without which
comprehensive management and real control is illusory. No doubt there will be /
disagreements between the DNI's and Secretary's staffs at times about what to do with
this information, which will have to be refereed at higher levels of authority, but at least
both staffs will be operating on the basis of real data and an understanding of the facts.
Without insight into the execution of the budget, the reprogramming and transfer powers
of the DNI are empty, because taking money from an organization requires knowledge
about where funds are excess to need and can be withdrawn and applied to higher
priorities. And the Secretary of Defense cannot responsibly manage the overall execution
of appropriated funds without access to all financial information.
Sec. 103 would require that all other non-DoD NFIP organizations provide the
DNI complete access to budget execution data, in a form and on a schedule established by
Draft Staff Document 10

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the Director.
Sec. 101 also would establish a Deputy Director of National Intelligence for
Resources (DDNI/R) who would report to the proposed DNI. At the direction of the
DNI, the DDNI/R would propose reprogrammings and transfers to the DNI based on
budget execution information provided by the Joint Comptroller Office and the non-DOD
NFIP organizations.
These proposed reforms are essential. Current and former officials indicate that,
under the current system, the DDCI/CM has all but given up on exercising the DCFs
authorities to transfer funds to meet unexpected, higher priority requirements - even
though on paper these authorities appear to be impressive. Experienced officials have
indicated that, without access to budget execution data, the DDCI/CM usually cannot
discover situations where funds are excess to need, or cannot make a persuasive case to /
present to senior DoD officials or to officials from other departments. Similarly, senior
DoD officials typically reject requests from the DCFs senior staff to reprogram funds, at
times based solely on the opposition of the affected agency director without an
independent understanding of the actual budget situation. These reports are consistent //
with the fact that very few reprogramming requests for National Foreign Intelligence
Program funds are submitted to Congress compared to Joint Military Intelligence
Program funds, Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities funds, or the DoD budget
overall.
D. Access to Information: Need to Share versus Need to Know
hi the intelligence community, information is the coin of the realm. Here,

information really is power. Protecting sources and methods, and protecting the privacy
of U.S. persons, remain indispensable, but the agencies to some extent use these
imperatives to further their parochial interests in sustaining their control over the flow of
information. In the new security environment, sharing information is paramount, but this
imperative runs headlong into the agencies' monopoly over the intelligence data in their
possession - who gets access, how access is provided, conditions on the further use of the
information, the level of classification, and so forth.
This conflict of interest must be broken. As former NSA Director Admiral Mike
McConnell puts it, we must shift from a culture of "need to know" to a culture of "need
to share." Instead of employees being punished for sharing information outside their
group or organization, they should be reproached when they fail to share. "Ownership"
of information must be shifted from the agencies and organizations that collect
information to the analysts who use the data to create intelligence products and
consumers.
Accordingly, this legislative proposal would prohibit the delegation of

classification and distribution authority from the DNI to agency directors or their
subordinates. The DNI would be required by law to establish a joint process, independent

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of the agencies, to make decisions about how all intelligence information is to be

classified, stored, accessed and disseminated and how sources and methods are to be
protected. Analytic organizations and the heads of consuming agencies and departments
can trigger a formal re-evaluation of access policies by request to the DNI.
Today, CIA analysts working on national intelligence estimates for the President
of the United States do not get access to information about sources of human intelligence.
As the current Director of the Directorate of Intelligence (DDI) at the CIA stated in a
recent report, CIA analysts preparing assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
programs did not realize that what they thought were multiple sources reporting on a
topic were really only one source, and that other sources would have been judged less
credible or reliable than they in fact were had analysts been informed of the source's
access and credibility. A former DDI recently noted that some years ago there was a
regular process for analysts to assess the credibility and reliability of Directorate of
Operations assets; it was his opinion that the practice, halted because of DO objections,
was perceived as a threat not to the protection of sources but to the authority of the DO.
The DCI recently agreed to grant greater access once again to DI analysts to human
source information, but his action corrected only one part of one access problem. For
example, why would the DCI limit access to source information only to CIA analysts?
The Defense Department's Joint Intelligence Task Force for Counter-Terrorism (JITF-
CT), set up after the Cole bombing to protect U.S. military forces from terrorist attack,
still cannot persuade the CIA to give its analysts electronic access to CIA's database of
HUMINT reports. Until very recently, JITF-CT also was denied access to NSA's most
basic SIGINT databases. These limitations persisted even after September 11th
investigations established conclusively that extremely important information about some /
of the hijackers lay dormant in these databases. ^
A similar set of problems thwarts access to signals intelligence. The NSA

Director currently bears responsibility for protecting the privacy of U.S. persons whose
communications are inadvertently intercepted. NSA maintains elaborate protections, both
technical and procedural, to sustain privacy and prevent abuse in accordance with statute
and executive order. NSA personnel must be trained in the law, policy, and procedures
for protecting U.S. persons' privacy as a condition for access to "raw" SIGINT and to
databases containing information on U.S. persons. NSA employees from the Director
down take these responsibilities very seriously. As currently managed, however, these
privacy protections needlessly prevent critical information sharing, electronic
collaboration, and joint operations with non-NS A personnel and organizations simply
because the latter are not under the NSA Director's direct control. NSA insists that only
NSA personnel can access certain databases and types of information because since only
the NSA Director has the responsibility for privacy protection, personnel who do not
report to the Director cannot be given access to databases containing information on U.S.
persons.
Congress over the last two years has tried to deal with this problem by mandating
that intelligence community personnel outside of NSA who need to have access to NSA

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data and databases be given the same training as NSA personnel regarding privacy
protection, hi other instances, proposed joint operations have been physically housed at
NSA as a way to meet the NSA Director's requirements for accountability. But these
initiatives have proven to be half-measures at best. All-source analysts need to be able to
"mine" NSA databases on their own, when they need to; they must not be hobbled by
having to use an NSA employee as an agent and filter simply because they do not happen
to be employed by the Agency. The solution is to make the DNI responsible for
enforcing statute, executive order, and policy regarding protections for U.S. persons, not
the Director of NSA or other agencies, as recommended in sec. 101.
Putting the DNI in charge of all information access decisions should enable,
finally, to open on data mining operations across the intelligence agencies' databases, and
on full electronic collaboration within "communities of interest" and other joint
organizations and operations, while putting in place uniform policy, procedures, and
practices to maintain compliance with the law and protection of privacy.
E. Separation of DNI from CIA
As noted in the Introduction and Overview of this report, the proposed legislation
would create a Director of National Intelligence who would not also serve as the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency. As described briefly in that section, this reform is
crucial because the CIA has dominated the DCI's perspective and management attention.
DCI's spend very little time on intelligence community issues and problems in agencies
apart from the CIA. This lack of attention undermines the authority of the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management, since it has been
demonstrated time and again that resistance will be successful. Compounding this
problem is the pronounced reluctance of DCI's to overrule the CIA in community
matters, which engenders cynicism and recalcitrance in the other intelligence agencies.
Necessary reforms of CIA and the community as a whole, including those that the DCI
himself has proposed, will remain difficult to achieve if the DCI's relationship to the CIA
is not altered. It also will be difficult to transform the FBI, and nurture sophisticated
intelligence collection and analysis capabilities in the FBI and DHS without hard work
and attention from the DCI.
It has been argued that separating the DCI from a powerful institutional base like
CIA without providing full executive authority ~ and especially budget execution
authority — to a DNI would make the DNI a paper tiger. Certainly, sitting on the throne
in Langley adds heft to the DCI, but it also constrains him, and perhaps constitutes as
much an irresistible crutch as an effective bureaucratic club. More important, there are
other paths to power. A DNI separated from the CIA will be forced to make full use of
the very considerable but under-utilized powers conferred by executive order and statute
on the DCI (e.g., building budgets, tasking authority). In addition, as proposed in this
legislation, the power of the principal agency directors with whom the DNI must grapple
would be reduced by limiting their role to organizing, training, and equipping their
agencies. And the DNI's power would be substantially enhanced by creating a robust

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tasking organization and the several joint organizations in partnership with the Secretary
of Defense; by requiring the DNI to exercise centralized control over the personnel
security process and decisions on access to information; and by enhancing the
competence and "joint" perspective of staff serving the DNI. Above all, the DNI and the
Secretary of Defense will be able to wield as much authority as necessary over the
defense intelligence agencies if they can forge a partnership based on a conscious
understanding that they cannot escape or overcome their mutual dependence — any more
than the President or Congress can govern without cooperating with each other.
For a long time after the establishment of the CIA and the office of the DCI, it
made sense to tie the DCI tightly to CIA and give CIA very much a primary status, since
originally the DCI was to be a coordinator of departmental intelligence, not a strong
manager over departmental intelligence organizations, hi order to give independent
assessments for the President and National Security Council, the DCI had to rely on the
CIA and the CIA had to be a "full-service" agency, with its hand in every type of
collection and analysis. Over time, however, the DCI has been expected to act as more of
a manager of intelligence than a coordinator, and has steadily gained authority over
national intelligence agencies and departmental intelligence production -- even if it was
not always exercised fully. As a result of this continuing evolution, the DCI should no
longer be so dependent on the CIA and should not confer such favor on the CIA, to the
detriment of other organizations.
F. Acquisition Authority and Oversight
Under Title 10, the military departments' and defense agencies' acquisition
programs are under the direction and authority of senior acquisition executives, who in
turn are to report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. The Service Chiefs,
Service Secretaries, and defense agency directors are not in the chain of command when it
comes to managing acquisition programs. Yet, the directors of the defense intelligence
agencies have operated as though they had been delegated acquisition management
authority by the Secretary of Defense, and all parties have essentially ignored the law.
The DCI has almost no authority under the law or executive order to manage acquisition
programs executed by the defense intelligence agencies. DoD has considerable expertise,
and well-established procedures and machinery, firmly based in law and practice, but the
expertise and processes are under the purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. The resources and expertise resident under the •
USD(AT&L) have not been applied to the acquisition activities of the defense
intelligence agencies. The OSD staff responsible for intelligence oversight for the
Secretary of Defense have little expertise in acquisition management and oversight,
traditionally have not conducted effective oversight, and have not attempted to exploit the
capabilities resident in USD(AT&L) - presumably because of internal DoD bureaucratic
rivalries, and resistance from the affected agencies and the DCI's staff.
The Senate Armed Services Committee in the National Defense Authorization

Act for Fiscal year 2004 sponsored legislation that forces NSA acquisition programs to be

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managed in accordance with Title 10. The Act makes clear that NSA's senior acquisition
executive reports to the USD(AT&L), who is the milestone approval authority. The
SASC took this action out of frustration with years of poor performance by NSA on its
modernization programs.
Under this legislative proposal, the SASC precedent would be extended to all the
defense intelligence agencies, except the NRO, but with some modifications. Currently,
the DCI's staff has pretensions to become a force in acquisition oversight. The DCI a few
years ago created the position of Intelligence Community Senior Acquisition Executive,
for example. But this office is understaffed and has largely been ineffective. Under this
proposal, the DNI and the Secretary of Defense would create a joint acquisition oversight
organization as an adjunct to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition. The Secretary of Defense and the DNI would jointly determine acquisition
management and oversight rules and procedures that are tailored to the unique needs of
national intelligence, and that take advantage of the DCI's existing special acquisition
authorities. Each defense intelligence agency would be required to have a professionally
certified senior acquisition executive that would report to the joint acquisition office
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), and not to the agency
directors. The Director of the Joint Acquisition Office would be the milestone approval
authority for defense intelligence agency acquisition programs. In the case of CIA
programs, the Senior DNI-appointed official within the joint DNI-Secretary of Defense
organization would be the milestone approval authority, hi the case of the NRO, the
Secretary of Defense has already decided to elevate the Director of the NRO, dual-hatted
as the Under Secretary of the Air Force, as the Milestone Approval Authority for all DoD
space programs, not the USD(AT&L). Especially since the NRO has the sole mission of
managing complex acquisition programs, this exceptional arrangement is acceptable.
These reforms would help to ensure that acquisition management within the NFIP
is brought up to professional standards and placed under the control of community
leadership. These changes also preserve the existing (but basically only theoretical)
authorities of the DCI and the Secretary of Defense, but enhance the real power of both to
manage the intelligence community. As in other areas, in the past rivalry prevented
effective management and oversight by either the DCI or the Secretary of Defense. With
the proposed changes, cooperation will replace rivalry, and lead to strong management
within their respective spheres of responsibility.
G. Personnel Management and the Vitality of the Community Management Staff
The Community Management Staff (CMS) and its predecessor have been
relatively weak organizations, in part because of neglect by the DCI, in part because of
personnel weakness, and in part because of resistance from the agencies, starting with
CIA. However, a strong and competent CMS is as important to the intelligence
community as OSD staff is to the Defense Department, or the Joint Staff is to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It took decades for the OSD staff to mature to the point
where it could hold its own against the staffs of the military services; we cannot afford to

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wait as long to fortify CMS.
The essence of the proposed legislation for personnel management is to promote a

community or "joint" perspective and culture by requiring tours of duty in community
positions outside of one's home agency or department as a condition for senior
promotion. The legislation is modeled closely on the highly successful Goldwater-
Nichols Act reforms. The purposes of the provisions are to increase the quality of the
staff assigned to support the DNI and other community-wide organizations and activities,
to reduce the parochialism of the workforce of the separate agencies and departments, and
to enhance cooperation between the various intelligence agencies and organizations. The
legislation is also intended to reduce the predominance of CIA personnel in community
assignments.
A capable, impartial community staff will be vital to successful DNI community

management. By requiring tours in community positions as prerequisites for promotion,
the Community Management Staff, like joint-duty billets in the Defense Department, will
attract the best and brightest from the various intelligence agencies and organizations.
The CMS will become more competent and respected, and the agencies from which they
come will also become less parochial as senior officers return from community
assignments. Certain senior positions within the intelligence community will require an
officer who has completed two joint assignments, hi general, these positions are the most
senior analytic and collection operations positions across the intelligence community.
The DNI will review all promotion recommendations to ensure that personnel who serve
in joint assignments receive the same consideration for promotion as other personnel.
Promotion to the senior executive service will require completion of a joint intelligence
assignment.
An additional step that DoD could take that would complement the reforms
mandated in the current proposal would be to make service in intelligence community
positions military joint duty assignments, and to make intelligence community service a
joint specialty under Goldwater-Nichols.
The role of military officers is especially important in the joint tasking

organization mandated in sec. 102. This organization would function like a combatant
command J-3, controlling all operations of the intelligence community. That is, it would
direct the tasking of collection and of exploitation, analysis, and dissemination. This
organization should be staffed with highly qualified and experienced personnel from
across the intelligence community, and should include substantial numbers of military
officers to ensure that the community is always prepared to provide whatever support the
combatant commanders require.
H. Joint Tasking Organization
This section describes the proposal to create a joint tasking organization under a
new Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Operations, to assign a senior military

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officer from a combatant command as the Assistant Director of National Intelligence for
Defense (ADNI/D).
In the mid-1990s, Congress created the positions of Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence for Community Management, and three Assistant Deputy Directors for
Collection, Production, and Administration. This reform measure has proven to be
valuable, as far as it went, but experience has shown that stronger and integrated /
management is necessary.
The DCI by statute and executive order has tasking authority, and all tasking is
done in the name of the DCI. However, his tools and organizational support for
executing these responsibilities are austere and primitive. The incumbent ADCI for
Collection has been an extremely effective and tireless advocate for focusing collection
and analysis on the highest priority and most important intelligence requirements, but his
resources and authority are too limited to make a decisive impact. There is no institution
behind his efforts; if he were to be removed from office tomorrow, every initiative he has
undertaken would likely dissolve. One official, with a tiny staff, and with little more than
moral authority, cannot fulfill the broad and complex requirement to levy tasking
direction across the intelligence community, especially when, as now, it is necessary to
orchestrate multi-agency, multi-discipline, and multi-system tasking. The authority to task
the intelligence community is an immensely powerful tool available to the DCI that has
never been even remotely fully exploited. Tasking authority provides the basis for the
DCI to control the substantive operations of the intelligence community, hi addition to
representing a neglected avenue to power, there is a compelling need for the DNI to use
this authority to orchestrate the various instruments of intelligence collection and
analysis.
It is axiomatic in the military that integrated operations and combined arms under
unified command are keys to success. Armor needs infantry for protection, and vice
versa, both need artillery to suppress defenses, and all need protection from aircraft.
Likewise, the operations of air, ground, and naval forces must be coordinated. This basic
precept, driven home by the spectacular American military successes after the enactment
of Goldwater-Nichols, has yet to be embedded in the routine operations of the
intelligence community, hi tackling intelligence problems and challenges, fundamentally,
we pursue three separate strategies - one for signals intelligence, one for imagery, and
one for HUMINT - just as we used to pursue separate ground, air, and naval campaigns.
Furthermore, collection tasking today is largely separate from managing the

exploitation, analysis, and dissemination of what has been collected. The pace and scope
of modern intelligence operations demands that timelines be collapsed, that authorities
have end-to-end insight into the production cycle to ensure that critical products are
completed and delivered, and that widely distributed production resources can be
efficiently allocated. It need hardly be said that tasking collection means little unless it is
accompanied by tasking for exploitation, analysis, and dissemination, and unless
authorities and consumers have visibility into the process. Furthermore, whereas in the

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past collection was often the limiting factor in the intelligence production cycle, today the
opposite situation is increasingly encountered: in many instances, the volume of
information is swamping the available analytic resources; the key decisions today are as
likely to revolve around what information should be selected for processing, exploitation,
and dissemination than around what should be collected.
Intelligence challenges today require, and technology allows, real-time, dynamic

tasking of collection, analysis, and dissemination within the intelligence disciplines and
also between them. Signals intelligence information can be used immediately to task
imagery collection, resulting in precise geo-positioning of hostile targets. In addition,
national systems can be used to tip or cue tactical systems, and vice versa. The Defense
Department's combatant commanders are coming to expect that such capabilities will be
routinely available and will become ever-more sophisticated and powerful. CIA case
officers on the ground in the war on terrorism, likewise, expect and demand this type of
support and the ability to report in real-time.
More classic national intelligence tasks also require horizontally integrated

capabilities. Preparations for a future nuclear test, for example, might in the future first
be detected by an Air Force space-based moving target detection radar that picks up the
movement of trucks up a remote mountain road. A national intelligence satellite or
perhaps an unmanned drone could then be immediately tasked to identify the moving
vehicles and to observe the area for an extended time. Similarly, SIGINT, moving target
detection radar, and optical imagery could be utilized together to detect, identify, and
track Chinese mobile missiles facing Taiwan. As the DCI's Transformational Space-Air
Planning Study concluded in 2003, the possibilities are almost unlimited, and the payoff
is very high, from the horizontal integration of intelligence systems, organizations,
processes, and disciplines.
In short, both strategic intelligence and intelligence that supports combat

operations and operations against terrorists and other transnational threats would benefit
enormously from what the Defense Department has recently termed intelligence
"campaign planning." An intelligence campaign involves the methodical, step-by-step
planning for employing intelligence capabilities in an integrated way against specific
objectives to achieve specific results. Such "campaigns" can be regionally based,
topically based, or both. They would involve the close cooperation of all intelligence
disciplines, collectors and analysts, and customers. This type of focused operation is not
possible today.
Another hugely important and accelerating trend is for analysts and consumers to
take the initiative to reach into the intelligence production process at many points to draw
out information of immediate value. Analysts and other consumers demand access to
many forms and types of data before that data is put into a so-called finished product - or
is left on the cutting room floor. Analysts and consumers require the tools and the
networks necessary to access information and the experts who are working with or on that
information when required. The structure and operation of the joint tasking system must

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accommodate these initiatives.
Controlling the work of the intelligence community from above, and ensuring that
analysts and consumers can access the data they need from below, require a horizontally
integrated community that is networked to its customers. Both NGA and NSA are trying
to develop modern collection and workflow management systems that will allow dynamic
tasking, provide insight into the status of the enterprise, and enable analysts and
consumers to track the progress of their requests for support. Likewise, the DCI has
sponsored a program to develop an information system (called 1C MAP) to provide
transparency into tasking across the intelligence community, including HUMINT
operations. None of these development efforts is mature, but they are the building blocks
for an integrated, joint tasking capability. It is essential that NSA, NGA, and DoD's
collection tasking and workflow management programs ensure that the systems they are
building for managing collection and exploitation are able to operate seamlessly with
each other and with those developed for the joint tasking authority to enable rapid tipping
and cueing and other joint operations. The capability to operate the intelligence
community, in whole or part, as a unified enterprise is essential for supporting military
operations, CIA personnel on the ground, and any other intelligence activity where
timing, timeliness, and coordination are crucial.
Somehow, too, the intelligence community must find methods to tap the potential
of soldiers, police officers, and case officers on the ground as information sources. The
Chief of Army Intelligence has adopted the phrase "every soldier a sensor" to express the
Army's appreciation of the value of all potential sources of human intelligence, and the
Army's commitment to finding ways to take advantage of this resource. Likewise, police
officers on the streets of America could provide vital information for counter-terrorism.
In addition to tapping into tactical HUMINT sources, the national intelligence community
must be able to receive data from the large number of Defense Department collection
systems - satellites, aircraft, and ships - and to know ahead of time how they are going to
be tasked. The Defense Department has committed to ensuring that its assets will be able
to provide data to the national intelligence community. The intelligence community, for
its part, must develop the ability to ensure that it is able to ingest, analyze and disseminate
that data.
Creating an effective joint tasking structure is directly analogous to the

empowerment of joint commanders by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Goldwater-Nichols
made unity of command a reality by fully subordinating for the first time the army, navy,
and air force component commands to the joint combatant commanders. The operations
of the U.S. SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT systems and organizations must likewise be
effectively controlled and integrated by a competent, unified, joint tasking organization.
The proposed legislation would create a joint tasking organization under the direction of a
new office of Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Operations, and would restrict
the Directors of CIA, NSA, and NGA to organizing, training, and equipping HUMINT,
SIGINT, and IMINT resources, paralleling the role of the military chiefs of staff under the
Goldwater-Nichols Act. These agencies' operations would be managed through senior

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operations officers within each agency, who would receive tasking and direction from the
Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Operations. These changes, too, would foster
a culture of "jointness" and greater integration within the intelligence community.
This proposal to create a unified tasking organization and process is fully

consistent with the tasking authority already conferred on the DCI by statute and
executive order. The proposal does not alter the current relationship between the DCI,
the Secretary of Defense, or other cabinet secretaries. The tasking structure itself should
be thoroughly joint, with personnel drawn from across the intelligence community, and
must include skilled military personnel to ensure professional support to combatant
commanders.
The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Operations would establish

tasking processes for routine and priority requirements as well as contingency tasking for
crisis support. Analysis and collection operations would routinely be conducted within
the national agencies and departmental intelligence units under the daily direction and
management of each organization's operations director (in the case of NSA, CIA, and
NGA) or through the head of the organization (for the other organizations in the
intelligence community). The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Operations
would also have the authority to establish joint task forces, "communities of interest,"
new community centers, or analytic teams, to address crisis support, hard targets, or any
other intelligence issue that would benefit from a more integrated collection and analysis
structure. As outlined elsewhere in this document, these teams or task forces could be
virtual organizations with electronic connectivity and need not be collocated.
The agency operations officers are to be selected by the DNI based on

nominations from the Directors of the Agencies. Sec. 102 does not attempt to define
precisely the boundary between the joint tasking organization's responsibilities for
directing the operations of the national intelligence collection and analysis organizations,
on the one hand, and those of the organizations themselves, on the other. It is essential to
preserve and rely upon the expertise, esprit, and detailed knowledge resident in the
individual intelligence agencies and organizations, just as the Goldwater-Nichols Act
reforms preserved the vibrancy of the military services. At the same time, it is equally
important for the DDNI for Operations to truly direct the intelligence enterprise and to
have visibility into the execution of taskings.
Sec. 102 would require that the ADNI/D be a senior military officer from a
combatant command. The only logical choice at present would be an officer from
STRATCOM, to which the most recent Unified Command Plan (UCP Change 2)
assigned the mission of global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
coordination. This officer's primary mission would be to promote and improve
coordination and mutual support between the operations of national intelligence systems
and the joint and tactical ISR capabilities that STRATCOM is now responsible for.
STRATCOM has the responsibility for working with the combatant commanders to
adjudicate requirements for reconnaissance support from so-called "low density-high

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demand" aircraft, submarines, ships, and so forth. STRATCOM also has the mission of
planning intelligence campaigns in support of military missions. In addition,
STRATCOM operates current and future satellite systems - for radar surveillance,
missile launch detection, weather forecasting, and communications. Integrating these
operations with the operations of national intelligence systems will provide significant
mutual benefit. Overall, it is clear that coordination in peacetime and especially in
wartime with the proposed DNI national tasking organization is an inescapable
requirement.
The senior STRATCOM officer to be assigned as ADNI/D under this proposed

legislation should have a support staff composed of a mix of STRATCOM military
personnel and personnel assigned by the DNI to ensure complete coordination of tasking
in peacetime and crisis and integrated to the maximum extent possible with the staff
responsible for tasking national intelligence. The staffs responsible for tasking national
intelligence and joint/tactical ISR would not have to be collocated, but they must be able
to work together seamlessly. With the assignment of this senior officer to the joint
tasking organization, the position of ADCI for military support within the CIA would be
redundant and therefore abolished.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence strongly supports the concept of
"horizontal integration" across the intelligence community as described in this report.
The Defense Department has learned from combat experience and through analysis that
integrating sensor tasking and analysis pays enormous dividends. DoD is pressing
forward to achieve the coordinated operation of NSA, NGA, and DIA, as well as the rest
of the intelligence community. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the defense
intelligence agencies are designated as combat support agencies, which as noted
previously subjects them to reviews by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to ascertain their
readiness to support the combatant commands. To the extent that horizontally integrated
operations across these agencies, guided by a joint tasking apparatus, develops as a key
element of their future performance, the combat support readiness of these agencies must
be evaluated in a new context. The DNI, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs are urged to jointly develop mechanisms to verify the combat support readiness of
horizontally integrated organizations and processes.
The collection of tactical HUMINT is critically important to the war on terrorism.

This tactical HUMINT is routinely collected to support the force protection mission.
Traditionally this HUMINT has been essential to deployed forces, but of less interest to
strategic intelligence analysis. The war on terrorism changes this dramatically. Terrorists
conducting surveillance of military installations overseas could use the same modus
operandi against critical infrastructure installations within the U.S. State and local law
enforcement should be notified to be on the alert for particular behavior that military
HUMINT collectors have reported and vice versa. The ADNI/D can serve as a channel to
communicate with DoD's tactical HUMINT collectors without interfering with their
support to military commanders. Likewise, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence
for Operations must have mechanisms to communicate information and intelligence

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needs to state and local law enforcement, and to those elements of DHS that are not part
of the intelligence community but need intelligence support and in turn can provide
important intelligence information gleaned from their normal operations.
I. Personnel Security
Personnel security practices have changed very little since the advent of the Cold
War, with the system somewhat oblivious of the changing needs of the intelligence
community or of the advance of technology. The security services of the various agencies
share a culture of resistance to change and of risk avoidance. The larger bureaucracies of
which they are part also use security practices as a means of controlling information and
protecting turf. Together, these forces and interests have stymied past efforts to
modernize and standardize security practices.
The DCI is already responsible for regulating the process for granting clearance
for sensitive compartmented information (SCI). The DCI issues directives (DCIDs)
governing SCI clearances, but the DCIDs are implemented separately by all the major
organizations within the intelligence community. Each organization — NRO, NSA, NGA,
DIA, all the military services, State, DoE, DHS, FBI - writes its own directives
"interpreting" the DCI's Directive, with the predictable results. The DCI has established
a Security Center to assess what can be done to narrow the differences across the
community that limit reciprocity and create delays in personnel transfers. This initiative,
while positive, is based on consensus and persuasion. A more decisive process - and
break with the past - is required for the rapid progress our current situation demands.
Responsibility for interpreting DCIDs for SCI security clearances, just as for
protecting sources and methods and determining access to information, should no longer
be left to the individual agencies. Today, more than ever before, we must be able to
rapidly move personnel from one organization to another, to move information between
individuals and organizations on demand, to create electronic "communities of interest"
and task forces with experts from across the intelligence community at will, and move
contractors from one contract to another without incurring costly and needless delays
associated with the lack of security clearance reciprocity. Once and for all, we must
establish a common clearance process for government and industry personnel for granting
access to sensitive compartmented information.
This legislative proposal would require the DNI to establish a single process and a
single set of standards and criteria for granting access to SCI material, and to ensure that
they are implemented consistently. In addition to abolishing all agency-unique rites of
passage, the DNI must speed up the process and reduce the costs of granting clearances.
The nation cannot afford the current security clearance system that is taking over 400
days on average to issue a clearance to contractor personnel. The current system is
costing the nation billions of unproductive labor dollars. The intelligence community
cannot spend counter-terrorism funds because of the lack of cleared personnel. The
Department of Homeland Security is waiting one to two years to clear personnel for its

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nascent Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection organization. The issue of

who at the state and local level receives clearances has yet to be addressed.
Current policies and perceptions for granting clearances to individuals who have
relationships with foreign nationals must also be reassessed. Each national intelligence
agency has partnerships with foreign intelligence entities under which we provide access
to U.S. collection to leverage the analytic capabilities of that partner. In some cases we
have insight into how clearances are granted in these partner countries, but in others we
really have no idea what level of trust should be accorded the personnel in partner
countries. Yet, there must be a documented "compelling need" to clear a U.S. citizen
who has a relationship with a foreign national, no matter what country the foreign
national conies from. The agencies are reluctant to provide clearances to U.S. citizens
who have family living in foreign countries. Many of these U.S. citizens have native
language skills and a deep cultural understanding that are critical for a more effective
intelligence community. If there are truly insurmountable issues with clearing U.S.
citizens because of their or their family's relatively recent arrival in the United States, we
ought to end our foreign partnerships, and end the practice of relying heavily on
information from foreign intelligence services.
Much of the labor-intensive and time-consuming field work mandated for

clearances is obsolete today given what can be done electronically and given the mobility
of most Americans. Sec. 101 would require the DNI to establish a process that completes
processing and adjudication within 90 days. The Director of National Intelligence must
rationally assess the need for field investigations and the advantages of contract
investigators and adjudicators. The Director of National Intelligence must speed up the
processing of issue-free cases, complete the implementation of the Office of Personnel
Management's e-Clearance initiative, and move to a risk management approach. The
security focus should shift to "keeping individuals clean" (risk management) vice
focusing on individuals' past (risk avoidance).
J. Virtual Reorganization and Information Technology
The intelligence community lags far behind industry standards in the application
of information technology to improve the effectiveness of its personnel and organizations.
An end-to-end redesign of systems and procedures is needed to realize the goal of a
networked community that can find and recognize important data, digest it, and make it
available to consumers when and in the form they need it. Applying modem information
technology and the business practices associated with that technology will do much to
break down the "stovepiped" intelligence agencies, promote information sharing across
organizations, streamline bureaucracies, and speed up the intelligence production process
- all without moving any boxes around on an organizational chart.
Industry has taken advantage of new networking technology to empower its

workforce by ceding initiative to lower levels, promoting peer-to-peer collaboration
across organizational boundaries, and eliminating layers of middle management. These

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are changes that would also benefit the intelligence community. Together with policy
changes on data access, personnel security, and analyst-to-analyst collaboration, a
networked community with modern computer tools could provide higher quality
products, faster, and in greater quantity.
Case officers still file reports as it would have been done a fifty years ago.
HUMINT reporting and SIGINT data must instead be "tagged" and stored in properly
structured databases to enable advanced data mining and retrieval, which is key to
connecting fragments of information into a coherent picture. Technology exists also to
enable old databases to be tagged and structured. Today, databases of unevaluated
SIGINT and HUMINT data is not directly available to most analysts and consumers.
Instead, raw information is first evaluated and filtered by reports officers before it is
available for all-source analysis. However competent and well-meaning, this first-tier
filtering inevitably leaves behind information that might be valuable - indeed critical - to
some analyst or consumer in ways that the reports officer could never foresee or be
expected to appreciate. The left-behind nugget may not even be needed for years, past the
time when the analyst who first screened the information has moved to another job.
Analysts must be able to access all potentially relevant databases and must have tools to
enable them to discover and retrieve what they need. This is not possible today and
would not be permitted even if it were possible. This situation must be changed if we are
ever to hope to foil the next September 11th. As noted elsewhere, policy about access to
the basic intelligence databases of CIA, NSA, and NGA must be made by the DNI, not
the agencies that happen to collect the data. Need-to-know considerations must be
balanced by need-to-share imperatives. The need to protect sources and methods must be
balanced against the need for analysts to be able to assess the credibility of sources. The
proposed legislation would require the DNI to correct these problems.
Analysts need modern tools on their desktops to access databases and to "mine"
them. They need tools to help them digest the masses of data now available and to
comprehend what it means. This area has been seriously underfunded, but true to form,
the money that is available is managed separately by each agency, resulting in rampant
duplication and little interoperability. The proposed legislation would require the DNI to
establish a single, integrated program to serve all agencies to achieve a critical mass of
investment and to ensure that all-source analysts at different agencies can work together.
A critical need is for analysts and their customers to be able to collaborate

electronically — to share information, and to interact dynamically as a group. Despite
pressure from Congress, the DCI, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for years, it
is still not possible to do this fully within any agency, and the ability to collaborate from
one intelligence agency to the next is even more limited, while there are no capabilities to
collaborate with the homeland security community, combatant commands, and other
consumers. The legislation holds the DNI and Secretary of Defense responsible for
ensuring that electronic collaboration finally becomes a reality -- years and years after the
DCI described the goal as one of his strategic priorities.

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Networking the intelligence community effectively requires large communications

capacity and a management mechanism to design and enforce an architecture and
standards for interoperability. The intelligence community and the Defense Department
each possess huge communications capacity that was not used by the intelligence
agencies for years because of policy disputes. These policy problems are apparently
finally being resolved, but management issues have yet to be decided. The Defense
Department's Chief Information Officer has a comprehensive enterprise architecture for
DoD, a vision and plan. The intelligence community Chief Information Officer is
developing an architecture for sharing information within the intelligence community (see
below), but has not designed a comprehensive network architecture for the community.
The intelligence agencies generally do not have solid enterprise architectures of their
own, and there is no community architecture for them to build to.
The Defense Department has developed a true enterprise architecture through the
Global Information Grid (GIG) program. The same cannot be said of the intelligence
agencies, individually or considered as a community. NGA is at least pursuing an
enterprise architecture, however, through the GEOSCOUT program. NSA has been
trying for years to develop an architecture under the Trailblazer program, but its prospects
are uncertain at best. The intelligence agencies do not comply with OMB's mandate to
relate budget requests for information technology to an enterprise architecture —
presumably because they are unable to do so. Instead, the intelligence community puts
forward to OMB the Intelligence Community System for Information Sharing (ICSIS)
program, developed by the community CIO, and claims that ICSIS is an enterprise
architecture for the entire intelligence community; in reality, ICSIS is just a set of
capabilities that would be applied to an architecture. Each of the intelligence agencies
must develop a modern enterprise architecture; each of these individual architectures
must be part of a community-wide architecture; and this community-wide architecture
must work seamlessly with DoD's GIG. If this is not achieved, it will be impossible to
realize the DCI's Strategic Intent, the horizontal integration vision, the required level of
information sharing, and many other critical intelligence, military, and homeland security
goals.
The emphasis on creating a network that can disseminate national

intelligence information out to tactical military echelons, state and local law enforcement,
and other widespread homeland security officials, must not overshadow the need for the
network to also be able to report up from those same tactical levels to national-level
analytic organizations. As noted elsewhere in this report, soldiers and tactical HUMINT
personnel on the ground abroad, and local police officers, could well collect information
vital in the war on terrorism. Means must be established to capture tactically and locally
collected information and make it accessible to intelligence community analysts.
Likewise, the network must be able to deliver to NSA, NGA, CIA, and DIA data
collected by DoD space-, air-, and sea-based platforms, and their tasking must be
transparent to the DDNI/O.
The proposed legislation also would require the President to develop policy and

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guidelines for the development and use of advanced "data mining" tools to be used to
discover and correlate information held in government and private sector databases.
Credible investigations after September 11th show that it would have been possible to find
Al Mihdhar and Al Hazmi, and discover connections to many if not indeed all of the
other 17 hijackers, after those two terrorists had been "watch listed" in August 2001 if the
intelligence and law enforcement communities had possessed the right tools and if it had
been possible to access all the pertinent databases held by the government and private
sector. Certainly, "connecting the dots" before a future catastrophic terrorist attack could
well depend on correlating fragments of information to be found in the most disparate
places. A persuasive case has been made by experts from many disciplines and across the
political spectrum that it is possible to protect the privacy of U.S. citizens when
developing and using this advanced computer technology.
Today, however, approaching three years after September 11 4 , a stalemate exists

in this arena that truly represents the worst of all worlds. The hardline legal view within
the administration is that additional policy and guidelines to regulate government access
to "publicly held" databases are not only unnecessary but would unduly restrict the
President's authority in a time of war, especially if Congress enacted them into law. hi
defending this view, proponents point out that the Supreme Court has in the past ruled
that citizens have no "expectation of privacy" regarding information held by third parties,
and conclude that the government has the right under the Constitution to conduct data
mining operations at will. Advocates of this position appear to hold sway within the
administration, since there has been no attempt to develop policy and guidelines in this
area
On the other side, opponents of data mining are equally determined to prevent any
use of this technology, under any circumstances. This group, too, for its own reasons also
strongly opposes any attempt to develop policy and guidelines to safeguard privacy
during data mining operations because any step down what they see as a slippery slope
leads inexorably to Big Brother. Thus far, these opponents of data mining have won the
day in public battles over the Total Information Awareness program; both chambers of
Congress voted by very wide margins across the political spectrum to prohibit the
operational use of the program's technology. However, other ambitious data mining
programs exist that either have not come to the attention of opponents or have found
other means to survive.
What we have, then, is the tragic situation where a marriage of strange bedfellows
has stymied the development of sensible government policy and at the same time held
back the development and application of tools that could potentially save the lives of
many American citizens. It is past time that this absurd and dangerous situation be
remedied. The President should establish a credible and transparent policy process that
will persuade the American people -- and their elected representatives -- that data-mining
can and will be conducted in ways that they will find acceptable. If the President,
conversely, believes that no restrictions are called for on data mining operations, he needs
to forthrightly say so and persuade Congress and the American people that their fears are

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misplaced.
4/27/2004 4:46 PM

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T2 B2 10-14-03 Hearing - Intelligence Background 2 of 3 FDR - Tab 5 - Draft Staff Document - Intelligence Community Reform Proposal 909

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Draft Staff Document

Intelligence Community Reform Proposal

A. Introduction and Overview

The following sections outline problems in the intelligence community and

Draft Staff Document

DC1Authorities and Relationship to the Secretary of Defense

A unique and complex power-sharing arrangement has grown up on an ad hoc basis

Draft Staff Document

Draft Staff Document

Director of National Intelligence

Moreover, there are substantive reasons to stop short of consolidating line-

Draft Staff Document

could arise to consolidate analysis (as proposed in the Boren-McCurdy legislation of

Information Sharing and Information technology

Penetrating and Assessing Hard Targets

Draft Staff Document

Community Personnel Assignments

Joint Tasking of Collection and Analysis

Draft Staff Document

Domestic Intelligence Collection and Analysis

Draft Staff Document

Fixed Term of Service for New CIA Director

Draft Staff Document

Intelligence Community Reform Proposal

B. "Dual-Hatting" the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

C. Joint Comptroller organization

The proposed legislation would establish a joint Secretary of Defense/DNI

Draft Staff Document

Draft Staff Document 10

D. Access to Information: Need to Share versus Need to Know

hi the intelligence community, information is the coin of the realm. Here,

Accordingly, this legislative proposal would prohibit the delegation of

Draft Staff Document 11

of the agencies, to make decisions about how all intelligence information is to be

A similar set of problems thwarts access to signals intelligence. The NSA

Draft Staff Document 12

E. Separation of DNI from CIA

Draft Staff Document 13

F. Acquisition Authority and Oversight

The Senate Armed Services Committee in the National Defense Authorization

Draft Staff Document 14

G. Personnel Management and the Vitality of the Community Management Staff

Draft Staff Document 15

wait as long to fortify CMS.

The essence of the proposed legislation for personnel management is to promote a

A capable, impartial community staff will be vital to successful DNI community

The role of military officers is especially important in the joint tasking

H. Joint Tasking Organization

Draft Staff Document 16

In the mid-1990s, Congress created the positions of Deputy Director of Central

Furthermore, collection tasking today is largely separate from managing the

Draft Staff Document 17

Intelligence challenges today require, and technology allows, real-time, dynamic

More classic national intelligence tasks also require horizontally integrated

In short, both strategic intelligence and intelligence that supports combat

Draft Staff Document 18

accommodate these initiatives.

Creating an effective joint tasking structure is directly analogous to the

Draft Staff Document 19

This proposal to create a unified tasking organization and process is fully

The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Operations would establish

The agency operations officers are to be selected by the DNI based on