Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PSPA 235
June 4, 2009
PSPA 235
June 4, 2009
Two Perspectives
In the summer of 2008, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia were
embroiled in a regional conflict over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
South Ossetia in particular has traditionally aligned itself with Russia, despite the fact that the
international community (save Russia and Nicaragua) recognizes it as falling under Georgian
sovereignty. The conflict came to a head when conflicting reports of preemptive aggressive troop
movements by both sides surfaced. Though the subsequent conflict only lasted one week, the
damage to infrastructure and human life was extensive. Questions immediately arose regarding
respect for human rights by all participants. Particularly, attention was raised regarding
sovereignty. By researching the two main aggressors separately, an image has emerged that
shows mutual disrespect for and violation of international humanitarian law. Through the study
of the conflict, a clear picture can hopefully by painted of how best to identify and avoid human
2
Civilian Targeting, Illegal Weapons, and Forced Russian Citizenship
Neil Hilton
Much attention is placed upon Russia for its frequent disregard of human rights, both of
its own citizens and those of other nations it finds itself opposed to. This goes back generations,
before the Cold War between East and West, to common practices by tsarist rulers and other
despots. Russia is widely regarded as a harsh country, and the policies of its government are
often questioned for their legitimacy in the face of international agreements regarding the rights
of the individual. During the 2008 conflict with Georgia, this came into the international
Whenever there is armed conflict in the world, one of the primary concerns is what
when it is as intense as the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia. All authorities have a
moral obligation to protect the lives of innocents, be they their own citizens or not, simply on a
humanist level. Beyond that, though, there exists an incredible amount of legislation and
Convention, of which both Russia and Georgia are signatories, concerns the rights and treatment
of “protected persons,” or those who find themselves “in the hands of a Party or Occupying
Power of which they are not nationals.” 1 The basic premise of the Convention is that
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
1
"Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War." Office of the High
Commissioner of Human Rights. 12 Aug 1949. United Nations. 1 Jun 2009
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm>.
3
This commitment to the protection of civilians has been expounded upon in many subsequent
protocols and other documents of international humanitarian law, and is almost unanimously
regarded as a “natural law” that should apply universally. Though this right extends to citizens of
Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia/Abkhazia, evidence exists that implies that the Russian
Federation was responsible for extensive violations of this contract. Amnesty International, upon
reviewing evidence and taking eyewitness accounts, stated in an extensive report that the
organization is “consequently concerned that [Georgian] civilians and civilian objects may have
been directly attacked [by Russia] in violation of Article 51(3) of Protocol 1 to the Geneva
Conventions, or that they were hit in the course of indiscriminate attacks in violation of Article
51(4).”2 Extensive accounts tell of Russian aerial bombardment of public squares in towns that
did not have any Georgian troops or military objectives, or of fleeing convoys of civilian
For the most part, it appears that Russian troops on the ground conducted themselves in a
professional and orderly manner, and were not responsible for any extensive violations of human
rights of Georgian civilians. By contrast, the Russian-backed South Ossetian soldiers were
accused of widespread looting, pillaging, and attacks on civilians, often while Russians watched
on and failed to intervene. Amnesty International’s report is especially strongly worded regarding
…the Russian authorities singularly failed in their duty to prevent reprisals and
serious human rights abuses being carried out by South Ossetian forces and
militia units. In the “buffer zones”, Russia was bound by its obligations as an
occupying power as codified in the Fourth Geneva Convention. This means that it
was primarily responsible for the security and welfare of Georgian civilians in
those areas.3
2
Amnesty International. Civilians in the Line of Fire: The Georgia-Russia Conflict. London: Amnesty International
Publications, 2008. Pg 29.
4
Clearly, Russia’s failure to protect the civilians of Georgia, both from South Ossetian soldiers
and from aerial bombardment, is a grievous offence. Fortunately, a relatively small number
important to keep in mind that a single noncombatant killed, mistreated, or otherwise stripped of
Those civilians that were killed usually died through inappropriate use of weapon
systems that are unreliably targeted or otherwise indiscriminate in nature, which represents a
separate infraction against international law. During the conflict, Human Rights Watch spoke out
against Russia’s use of large, truck-mounted rockets in built-up areas. Holly Cartern, the Europe
and Central Asia director at HRW, stated that “these are all indiscriminate weapons when used in
populated areas, as they cannot be targeted against only military targets and therefore risk
causing unnecessary harm to civilians…They simply shouldn’t be used in areas where there are
civilians.”4
In the process of its frequent disregard for civilian life, the Russian military was
responsible for the use of several weapons systems that go against international treaties in all
circumstances, not just in civilian areas. The most notable of these systems are “cluster bombs.”
These weapons distribute smaller sub-explosives, which spread over a very wide area and
frequently fail to detonate immediately. However, they remain armed after their dispersal, and
have caused injuries and deaths a significant amount of time after wars in places like South
Lebanon, where the Israeli Defense Forces deployed them. In May 2008, an agreement was
signed in Dublin to ban the use of cluster munitions because of their unsystematic nature and the
3
Ibid. Pg 32.
4
"Georgia/Russia: Use of Rocket Systems Can Harm Civilians," 11 Aug 2008. Human Rights Watch. Web.1 Jun
2009. <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/08/11/georgiarussia-use-rocket-systems-can-harm-civilians>.
5
threat that they pose to civilians after hostilities have ended. Through Russia was not a signatory;
there exists great precedent against the use of indiscriminate weapons through other international
accords and conventions, which the nation has agreed to. Additionally, it has a responsibility to
However, Russia continues to deny using cluster munitions in Georgia, in the face of what
Human Rights Watch calls “overwhelming” evidence to the contrary. An article by that
organization expressed the belief that Russia’s “use of cluster munitions in populated areas was
despite widespread international outcries against landmines, Georgia’s government asserts that
Russian troops planted them at strategic points—namely railroad tracks and roads used by the
government to transport goods like crude oil. An anti-personnel mine was also claimed to be
responsible for a civilian death in the city of Gori, when a woman was killed by an explosion in
her garden.
The most enduring Russian abuse of human rights, however, extends beyond the civilian
casualties inflicted on the Georgian population or the weapons used to do so. More longstanding
is the annexation of ethnic Georgian populations into Ossetian territory. There have been several
well-documented cases of Russian forces extending a “buffer” outside of South Ossetia into
5
Amnesty International. Pg 17.
6
"Georgia: More Cluster Bomb Damage Than Reported," 4 Nov 2008. Human Rights Watch. Web.1 Jun 2009.
<http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/11/04/georgia-more-cluster-bomb-damage-reported>.
6
Georgia. Those unfortunate enough to live within this buffer area found themselves presented
with an extremely bleak choice—accept Russian citizenship, or leave. Anyone who remained but
attempted to resist the occupation of their village would be harshly punished. Russia’s strategy of
using citizenship as a tool is not new to the region. According to the UK Telegraph, “Passports
are a vital plank in Russia's strategy of securing a toehold in democratic Georgia. By issuing
citizenship to South Ossetians, Russia gained a pretext to invade in early August, claiming to be
defending its own from Georgian attacks.”7 They continued this policy after the short August
war, extending it to absorb ethnic Georgians as well as the Ossetians who may have a more
On the most basic and obvious level, this violates Article 15.2 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which states that “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.” Every individual is entitled to their
nationality, without interference from outside powers. The international system operates on a
clear and defined set of rules regarding national sovereignty, and citizenship is an important part
of this structure. A state is obligated to protect its constituents, and has no right to penetrate into
territory beyond their borders and essentially “steal” citizens. Furthermore, the tactics used by
the Russian authorities and troops to annex the land represented a separate rights abuse. In the
town of Akhalgori, more than 3,000 civilians fled their homes permanently when faced with such
an option. These citizens’ found themselves exiled from their ethnic and cultural homeland,
violating their basic right as guaranteed under Article 9 of the same document, which forbids
7
McElroy. Damien. "South Ossetian police tell Georgians to take a Russian passport, or leave their homes," UK
Telegraph 31 Aug 2008. 30 May 2009.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2651836/South-Ossetian-police-tell-Georgians-to-
take-a-Russian-passport-or-leave-their-homes.html>.
7
over three months after the war ended, that there were still 20,000 ethnic Georgians who could
not return to their homes in South Ossetia due to Russian or Ossetian gangs and soldiers
continuing to operate in the region.8 Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention likewise
guarantees that persons “evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities
in the area in question have ceased.” Clearly, this is not the case. In many cases, their children
will be a displaced generation without a real homeland. They contribute to the growing number
of refugees worldwide that continually drain international aid efforts and require constant
attention to ensure that the situation doesn’t spiral further out of control and become even more
serious.
For those who stay and become Russian, there are further impacts as well. Article 22 of
the UDHR guarantees each individual the “realization of…[the] social and cultural rights
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.” Rather than self-
determination allowing these ethnic Georgians to maintain their heritage, they are forced into
another society. Russia is creating a patchwork of forced residents that are coerced into
allegiance to a nation that is not their own. One casualty of this process is the culture of those
people who are press-ganged into a new national identity. They and their children have unwilling
Georgians are deprived of this basic humanizing right, they are instead viewed as objects that
give the Russians legitimacy in their claims to Ossetia’s territory, or that should be forced from
their lands as refugees. They become a strategic interest for a geopolitical move that many
8
"Georgia/Russia conflict: Counting the cost of war: Return, security and truth still a long way off." Press Releases.
18 Nov 2008. Amnesty International. 30 May 2009 <http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/>.
8
consider to be imperialist, as Russia and NATO compete to exert influence over contested
Overall, it is clear that the Russian government and military was responsible for extensive
breaches of human rights during the short conflict of August 2008. Of course, they were not the
year after the war ended, there is little to no accountability on either side for actions taken during
the war. The conflict still continues, as a Russian-backed parliament was elected in South Ossetia
this week.9 Likely, this region will see more violence over the status of breakaway territories like
South Ossetia, and human rights abuses against civilians and soldiers alike will continue. One
can only hope that increased scrutiny from the international community in the wake of the last
9
Barry, Ellen. “South Ossetians Elect Parliament." New York Times 31 May 2009.
9
Disk 2: Georgian Violations and Restriction of Nationality
It’s easy to blame Russia; they’re the bad guys. This is how it was for the latter half of the
20th century and that’s how the beginning of the 21st seems to be going. At the very least, this
Western perception of the once “evil empire” as the silent iron fist waiting to strike out and
reassert the power politics of old still holds true if one were to watch any daily media concerning
Russia. This was no more true than during the Georgia-Russia conflict in the summer of 2008,
when Western media outlets were happy to jump on Russia as an aggressive, invading neighbor
to Georgia’s pro-Western, innocent democracy. If one news source is to be believed, the conflict
was “about Russia, resurgent and nationalistic, pushing its way back into the Caucasus and
chasing others out, and reversing the losses Russia feels it has suffered since the end of the cold
war.”10 To be sure, as Mr. Hilton so eloquently laid out, Russia has had and, during the 2008
conflict, did perpetrate human rights violations. But one must be careful not to get trapped into
the politics of the situation, the lingering Cold War mentalities of Us v. Them, and dissect the
conflict in South Ossetia through the clearest looking glass we can find: that of basic human
rights.
On August 7th, 2008, in the dying hours of the summer afternoon Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili declared an “immediate and total” ceasefire with Russian backed South
Ossetian militias as well as with Russian itself. However by 11:00 P.M. that same evening
Georgian artillery was observed as being fully engaged in bombardment of the South Ossetian
capital of Tskhinvali, as well as the strategic heights around the city. The city was still inhabited
10
"Russia and Georgia: A Scripted War." The Economist 14 Aug 2008 Web.30 May 2009.
<http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11920992>.
10
by thousands of civilians who were now caught in what can only be described as “indiscriminant
shelling.”11 As Amnesty International noted in their report on the conflict, “much of the
destruction in Tskhinvali was caused by GRADLAR MLRS (GRAD) launched rockets, which
are known to be difficult to direct with any great precision.”12 Based on eyewitness reports, the
nature of the munitions used and the evidence of scattered destruction in densely populated
civilian areas strongly suggested that Georgian forces committed indiscriminate attacks in its
assault on Tskhinvali on the night of 7 August, causing deaths and injuries among South Ossetian
civilians and considerable damage to civilian objects. In later stages of the conflict it was widely
reported that Georgian shelling included “cluster munitions” such that fragment into “smaller,
exploding shrapnel bomblets” whose trajectory is guesswork at best.13 As pointed out by Mr.
Hilton previous, such international legislation, and binding legislation at that, does indeed exist
for there to be a concerted effort to curb this kind of wholesale and haphazard breach of human
rights. Addressing what appears to be a joint effort by many in the international community to
maintain a legalized status of such munitions, arms researcher and humanitarian Bonnie
Docherty observes that, “a comprehensive prohibition is the only real solution. So-called
responsible use of cluster munitions is a myth, and nations should resist efforts to weaken the
ban.”14 Georgian use of cluster munitions falls in direct conflict on the prohibition on
11
Amnesty International. Civilians in the Line of Fire: The Georgia-Russia Conflict. London: Amnesty International
Publications, 2008. Pg 27.
12
Ibid. Pg 26.
13
Human Rights Watch. A Dying Practice: Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008. New
York: Human Rights Watch Publications, 2009. Pg. 12
14
"Cluster Bomb Ban Treaty Approved." BBC News 28 May 2008 Web.1 Jun 2009.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7423714.stm>.
11
Geneva Conventions.15 According to the group Handicap International, 98 percent of cluster-
bomb victims are civilians, and 27 percent are children.16 Georgian military action in the 2008
conflict, especially the initial instigation of hostilities followed by haphazard disregard for the
humanitarian law. In its January report of the conflict the New York-city based Human Rights
Watch put it in far more simple terms, noting that Georgian forces used "indiscriminate and
disproportionate…force during their August 2008 war that violated international humanitarian
law.”17
There have been conflicting reports on Georgian ground forces’ treatment of ethnic
Ossetians during the build up to and execution of hostilities. Amnesty interviews maintain that
Georgian forces were professional and respectful of the rights of those noncombatants in the
conflict zone, both in regards to detainment and personal property rights.18 Human Rights Watch,
on the other hand, paints a different picture of Georgian troops in South Ossetia, stating that, “in
some villages, the Georgian offensive seemed to have been carried out with little regard to the
safety of civilians,” going on to note that, “Human Rights Watch researchers learned that as the
Georgian infantry entered the village they were spraying the gates and fences of homes with
bullets, demanding that the militias surrender. Hundreds of bullet holes were clearly visible on
15
Article 51 of the GC bans attacks which are “ of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian
objects without distinction” as well as “…may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated”.
16
"Times Topics: Cluster Munitions." The New York Times 03 Jun 2009 Web.3 Jun 2009.
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/cluster_munitions/index.html>.
17
Human Rights Watch. Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict Over
South Ossetia. New York: Human Rights Watch Publications, 2009. Pg 41.
18
Amnesty International. Civilians in the Line of Fire: The Georgia-Russia Conflict. Pg 25.
12
fences and gates.”19 Unfortunately, with two conflicting reports by two reputable sources, it
becomes increasingly hard to draw a clear picture of the conflict as it unfolded in this sense.
However, of those reports authenticated it does not seem that civilian endangerment was an
institutionalized tactic of the Georgian ground forces, occurring rather as isolated incidents.
While looking at the nature of the hostilities as they played out in the summer of 2008 is
indeed necessary for there to be transparency and accountability, a look at the issues at the root
The mountainous region of South Ossetia split off from Georgian government control in
the 1991-1992 war that killed more than 1,000 people, displaced tens of thousands and resulted
in the region's de facto independence. South Ossetian leaders are seeking eventually to join with
their brethren across the border in the Russian republic of North Ossetia, while at the same time
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili stated that he “is determined to peacefully reassert the
country's sovereignty and reintegrate the two separatist areas.”20 Various reports, mostly from
South Ossetian sources, place support for Ossetian independence at about 90% of the
population.21 Certainly, these issues bring up a myriad of questions, not the least of which can be
addressed in the context of human rights, especially with regard to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The UNHR says, in nothing short of clear and measured language, that,
“everyone has the right to a nationality”22 as well as “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
19
Human Rights Watch. Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict Over
South Ossetia. Pg. 59-60
20
Ruff, Abdul. "Abkhazia and South Ossetia Independence: Russia-Georgia Tensions." Global Politician 14 May
2008 Web.30 May 2009. <http://www.globalpolitician.com/24748-georgia-russia-abakhazia-ossetia>.
21
Ibid.
22
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Article 15.1
13
nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.”23 But how and in what context has
Georgia perpetrated such violations based on these inalienable rights? The question is as
ambiguous in its implications as it is in its asking. While the document guarantees the right to a
nationality, it addresses neither the circumstances of nationality nor the implications of changing
the nationality. Yes, Georgia does extend the right of nationality as Georgian citizens to the
people of South Ossetia, but given the fact that these people are neither ethnically or culturally
Georgian24 it should be noted that they do not want to be citizens of Georgia. The UDHR does
provide for the change of nationality, as highlighted above, and indeed, as the BBC reports, “to
Georgia's deep annoyance, most South Ossetians have Russian passports and the Russian rouble
[sic] is commonly used in trade,”25 but this does not bring the true issue to bear: self-
society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and
international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State,
of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development
of his personality,”26 however, by being denied the recognition by Georgia as South Ossetians in
national and cultural terms the government in Tbilisi is in violation of these rights. To be clear,
this is not a case of a non-native ethnic minority group with a separatist agenda seeking regional
autonomy, but rather a native, ethnically homogenous nation asserting its right to national
23
Ibid. Article 15.2
24
United States. CIA. The World Factbook - Georgia. CIA, 2009. Web.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html>.
25
"Regions and Territories: South Ossetia." BBC News 13 May 2009 Web.25 May 2009.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/3797729.stm>.
26
UDHR. Article 22.
14
recognition and determination,27 a right protect by Article 22 of the UDHR. Georgian actions,
such as those displayed during the 2008 August war suggest a violation of the UDHR and basic
human rights not only in the letter but also in the spirit of the document.
This is not an isolated issue, as cases of “grey-nationality” can be found from Chechnya
in Russia to Kurdistan in Turkey and Iraq. It is, however, an issue that needs to be addressed, and
doing so within the framework of human rights and the Universal Declaration can work to bring
about a better understanding of the matter, and hopefully can be used to avoid future conflicts
27
"Regions and Territories: South Ossetia." BBC News 13 May 2009.
15
Conclusions
Examining evidence against both sides shows remarkably similar conduct throughout the
course of the conflict. Both Russia and Georgia can and should be held responsible for using
indiscriminate weapons systems over urban areas that needlessly threatened and took civilian
lives, in addition to causing widespread damage to civilian infrastructure. Both sides are
confirmed to have used cluster munitions that are widely regarded as violating international
statutes on humanitarian uses of weapons. On the whole, both Russian and Georgian troops acted
in accordance with laws regarding just conduct in war, especially regarding civilian populations.
Isolated incidents did occur, especially at the hands of disorganized South Ossetian militias, but
there is no evidence of institutional directives to do so, and no reason to believe that this was an
intentional tactic on the part of their Russian supporters. Rights regarding national self-
determination were violated by both sides, though evidence points to a more widespread and
pervasive violation at the hands of the government in Tbilisi. Finally, evidence points to initial
With these violations in mind, the authors reaffirm their support of all international
humanitarian laws regarding the use of indiscriminate weapons, warfare in urban and heavily-
populated areas, and greater international discourse on what are perceived as “sub-national”
groups that may see themselves as independent people. More cooperation is needed by the
international community to create binding legislation and agreements that prevent such abuses
from happening in the future. Finally, all nations should reaffirm the supremacy and legitimacy
of the Geneva Conventions and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and be held accountable
16