Summary: People vs.

Vera (GR 45685, 16 November 1937) First Division, Laurel (J): 4 concur, 2 concur in result Facts: The People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al." (Criminal case 42649) of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila and GR 41200 of the Suprme Court. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case. The information in the said criminal case was filed with the CFI on 15 October 1931, HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the CFI, on 8 January 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of

origin for execution of the judgment. Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18 June 1937. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng "esinocentepordudaracional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by the Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation. On 3 July 1937, counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by

counsel on 13 July 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. On 6 August 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring allparties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on 14 August 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on 19 August 1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and the People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Supreme Court on 21 August 1937. Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and

Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case. Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. Equal Protection of Law People v Vera 65 PHIL 56 (1937) In criminal cases, the elements were laid down in Vera v. People: a. Accused is informed why he is proceeded against, and what charge he must answer. b. Judgment of conviction is based on evidence that is not tainted by falsity, and after the defendant was heard. If the prosecution produces the conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is guilty of depriving the accused of due process. Thus false testimony can be questioned by the accused regardless of the time that lapsed. c. Judgment according to law d. Tribunal with jurisdiction Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC 140 SCRA 455 January 7, 1986 FACTS: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the

President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation. The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest. ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional. The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election,

since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president. Romulo v Yniguez G.R. No. 71908 February 4, 1986 Patajo, J.:

Facts: 1. Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the Batasan in 1985, filed with the Batasan Resolution No. 644 and complaint calling for the impeachment of President Marcos. Said resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government. The Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further consideration and disapproved and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint attached. It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the archives. 2. On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the archives of Resolution No. 644 and the verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan. 3. Hence, this petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from enforcing Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings and mandamus to compel the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the archives and report out the resolution together with the verified complaint for the impeachment of the President of the Philippines. Petitioner contend that said provisions are unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of Article XI I of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with the mandatory amendatory process provided for under Article XVI of the Constitution, by empowering a smaller body to supplant and

overrule the complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisite 1/5 of all the members of the BatasanPambansa and that said questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at various stages by vesting the Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative belongs solely to BatasanPambansa as a collegiate body. 4. Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the Rules is unconstitutional because it imposes an unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose a condition not required by the Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII requires is the endorsement of at least one-fifth of all The members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings or for the impeachment trial to proceed. 5. Respondents Speaker and the Members of the Committee on Justice of the BatasanPambansa contend that that the petition should be dismissed because (1) it is a suit against the Batasan itself over which this Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises questions which are political in nature; (3) the Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the Constitution and even supposing without admitting that the Rules are invalid, their invalidity would not nullify the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment for the Batasan as a body sovereign within its own sphere has the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint even without the benefit of said Rules; and (4) the Court cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due course to the impeachment complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the court can interfere with the Batasans power of impeachment NO. 1. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in

the exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of this Court to review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body of the resolution and complaint for impeachment makes irrelevant under what authority the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government had acted. 2. Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment without revoking or rescinding the action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for recall (which of course it had no authority to do and, therefore, said Committee is in no position to comply with any order from the Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the Committee would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself. 3. The Court held that if it has no authority to control the Philippine Senate, then it does not have the authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, there will be the spectacle presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing.

4. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it. DUMLAO VS. COMELEC [95 SCRA 392; L-52245; 22 JAN 1980] Facts: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52 as

discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already received retirement benefits and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the same local elective office from which he has retired. Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal protection and due process rights. Held: No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification based on reasonable and real differentiations. In the present case, employees 65 years of age have been classified differently from younger employees. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the latter are not. Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials because there can be retirees who are even younger and a 65 year old retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official who is not a retiree. But there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run for office because there is the need for new blood to assume relevance. When an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work. WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansaBilang 52 is hereby declared valid.