Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Some Games
The scal cli
If congress cannot agree on a dierent course of action, the Bush tax cuts expire for everybody on January 1st 2013 Democrats want tax cuts to expire, particularly on the wealthy (above $200k) Republicans want to maintain tax cuts for everybody Both sides have to agree on how to reform the taxes In August 2012 Senate democrats propose to let tax cuts expire above $200k On December 18th House republicans propose to let tax cuts expire above $1m On January 2nd Senate makes nal proposal to let tax cuts expire above $400k Faced with the choice to let tax cuts expire above $400k or for everybody, House agrees to proposal
Assuming that the low price is too low to cover for the risk, the insurance chooses the high price and the professor purchases the insurance only if he is sick If the insurance could oer dierent policies for professors with/without pre-existing conditions, it would oer a low price if the professor is healthy, and a high price if he is sick.
Crying it out
A two-year old girl wants to take her doll with herself into the bathtub Her father is concerned that the doll might fall apart either in the bathtub, or later in the dryer However, he is willing to concede if having her doll with her is very important to his daughter The girl can cry as long as she chooses to get her way The father can force his way as long as he is willing to The longer the girl cries, the more her father becomes convinced that having the doll is very important The longer the father holds out, the more the girl becomes convinced that the father will not concede this time
The Sex-Ratio
Why is there a roughly even number of men and women on the world? Darwin s theory of evolution by mutation and selection predicts that genetic traits that enhance the tness of an individuum will spread through the population Assume that the ratio of women to men there are ve men for each woman
w m
w m
= 0:2, so
Every woman has N = 12 kids, 2 daughters and 10 sons Every man has a chance of daughters and 2 sons
1 5
Note that women are much more productivethan men So, every woman will in expectation have 8 granddaughters and 40 grandsons She has 12 children, 2 daughters and 10 sons Each of the 2 daughters has 2 daughters and 10 sons for a total of 4 granddaughters and 20 grandsons
Each of the 10 sons has 0:4 daughters and 2 sons for a total of 4 granddaughters and 20 grandsons Consider a dominant mutation that leads to an equal number of 6 girls and 6 boys She still has 12 children, 6 daughters and 6 sons Each of the 6 daughters has 6 daughters and 6 sons Each of the 6 sons has 1:2 daughters and 1:2 sons Thus, the total number of grandchildren is 6 granddaughters and 43:2 grandsons ... Thus, after only two generations the mutation is leading to strictly more granddaughters and grandsons Eventually the mutation will spread over the entire population 6+6 1:2 = 36 + 7:2 = 43:2
Economic Applications
Game theory has pervasive implications in several areas of economics Industrial Organization: Price setting; Quantity setting; Product Choice; Entry into an Industry; Exit from an Industry Trade: Setting of Taris and Quotas Labor: Eort choice of worker; Promotion tournaments Public Finance: Tragedy of the commons Political Economy: Choice of optimal election platform
PrisonersDilemma
Two prisoners are charged of a serious crime. If they both C ooperate and do not confess, they will be released after one year of investigation. If they both D efect and confess, they will both be sent to prison for three years. If only one of them D efects but the other one C ooperates, the defector gets out of prison for free, while the cooperator receives a sentence of ve years. Every prisoner wants to mimize her own time in prison.
2 1 C D C 1, 1 0 , 5
4
D 5, 0 3, 3
In a variation of the PrisonersDilemma, prisoner 2 is scrupulous and prefers to cooperate with prisoner 1, as long as 1 cooperates as well. Thus the payo matrix is given by
2 1 C D
Think about for next class: Would you cooperate or defect in the prisonersdilemma? Would you cooperate or defect in the variation of the prisonersdilemma if you were prisoner 1? If you were prisoner 2?
C 1, 1 0 , 5
D 5, 2 3, 3
Fiscal Cliff
1
Accept
S
0
H
x 1 Accept
Reject
H
0
S
y Reject 1 Accept
S
0
S
x Reject
Prof.
Low
Blue Cross
High Medium
Prof.
Healthy
Low
no buy no buy no
Blue Cross
High Medium
Prof.
Healthy
Low
no buy no buy no
Crying it out
concede
concede
F
cry cry
concede
F
cry Hold out accept
F G
accept Hold out
G
accept
Hold out