Challenges for American Intelligence

The Hon. Lee H. Hamilton

May 6, 2004

In the war on terrorism, many of our most important fights will not take place on
open battlefields; they will take place in the hidden world of intelligence. Thus it is
critical that the American people consider the daunting challenges facing our intelligence
agencies.

The United States cannot protect itself without good intelligence. The agencies of
our intelligence community played a key role in our victory in the Cold War, and they are
now the most important tools we have in preventing terrorist attacks. Quality intelligence
provides information and warning; disrupts terrorist activity; frames issues for
policymakers; and anticipates the consequences of U.S. policies.

The demands are huge and growing. For most of my years in Congress, the
paramount intelligence task was clear: counting missiles and evaluating the Soviet threat.
Today, policymakers want to know anything and everything, ranging from the actions
and intentions of every government, to the topic of conversation in a cave halfway around
the globe, to the health of foreign leaders, to the future of oil prices. But the fact is the
intelligence community cannot do everything and do it well. Policymakers must do a
much better job of setting clear priorities, and they must leave politics out of the process
of gathering and analyzing intelligence.

Just as it faces unprecedented demands, the intelligence community is

overwhelmed by its own unprecedented capabilities. Technology allows us to collect
millions and millions of bites of data every minute: conversations are recorded,
photographs taken, tips passed on, communications intercepted. In short, more raw data is
collected than we could ever use. The challenge is sifting through the mountains of data;
analyzing it; deciding what is important and what is trivial; coordinating agencies; and
getting the right information to the right person at the right time. This is appropriately
called "connecting the dots," but that is not so easy when you collect so many dots.

To succeed, we need to develop new capabilities. Part of this is getting people

who understand and can harness these technologies. But another part is developing
expertise in many areas, including linguistics. After all, what is the use in intercepting a
message if you can't read it or place it in context? This takes more than recruiting Arabic
speakers. In a world of globalized threats, we need people who understand certain
regions, cultures, and religions, and who can translate - and analyze - messages in a host
of languages: Farsi, Pashto, Urdu, Hindi, Dari, Kurdish, or Somali, to name a few. It will
take years to build up and maintain these kinds of skills.

We also need better "human intelligence": people on the ground who can detect
and alert us to terrorist plots, or people penetrating opaque countries like North Korea
and Iran. We should not have exaggerated expectations about what we can achieve -
we're not going to have a guy sitting next to Osama bin Laden in a cave. The good news
is we can develop espionage connections and capabilities for less than the price of a
satellite; the bad news is this capability only comes with time and great difficulty.

We should not do this alone. Al Qaeda is scattered in small cells around the
world; money and nuclear materials pass through global black markets; threats emerge
from unforeseen and dispersed conflicts. Since we cannot be everywhere at once, we
need to work with foreign intelligence services to gather information, evaluate threats,
and prevent attacks. Our knowledge and strength is multiplied when we can draw on the
capabilities and resources of friends.

Ultimately, the U.S. intelligence community cannot succeed without the support
of the American people. This will take more public understanding of the methods and the
mission, and less secrecy. When we over-classify information, people only learn about
intelligence in leaked newspaper stories, often about intelligence failures or
controversies. We do have to protect intelligence sources and methods. But the more
information we make public, the more people can understand the intelligence community,
and the importance and difficulty of its work.

The basic paradox is that intelligence fits awkwardly into a democracy, but it is
essential to protecting our democracy. The more light we can shine on this process, the
better positioned we will be to do the hard work of setting priorities, allocating resources,
and building capabilities to win the unseen battles of the war on terror.
 Challenges for Intelligence in American Democracy
International Spy Museum Exhibit Opening
The Hon. Lee H. Hamilton
May 5, 2004

Good evening. I am pleased to be with you to mark the opening of this exciting
new exhibit: "The Enemy Within: Terror in America, 1776 to Today."

Let me focus my remarks this evening on, 1) the importance of intelligence, and 2)
some of the key challenges for the intelligence community.

Importance of the Intelligence Community

First, a few words about the importance of intelligence to the United States
government and the American people.

Good intelligence is essential to our national security. A superpower like the United
States simply cannot survive without it.

As a heavy consumer of intelligence and an observer of the intelligence community

for decades, I hold the men and women of our intelligence agencies in high regard.

They are highly talented people. They are dedicated to their work and their country.
They are called upon to do a difficult, and sometimes dangerous, job with the knowledge
that good work rarely receives outside recognition.

The work of the intelligence community played a key role in our victory in the
Cold War. And on September 11, 2001, we all learned that the mission for the intelligence
community is as vital and urgent as it has ever been.

Intelligence is the most important tool that we have in preventing terrorist attacks -
at home and abroad. Better intelligence is everybody's favorite solution to preventing
terrorism. And intelligence is also a crucial component of our work to curb weapons
proliferation. The stakes could not be higher.

Policymakers simply must be able to trust that they have the best possible
intelligence as they deal with these new threats. Good intelligence does not guarantee good
policy, but poor intelligence can ensure bad policy.

If a policymaker has quality intelligence, issues are framed; decisions are clearer;
and consequences can be anticipated.

Challenges for the Intelligence Community

Let me now go over some of the difficulties and challenges for the intelligence
community.
 Growing Demands: The demands on our intelligence agencies are huge and
growing.

For most of the time that I was in the Congress, the demands on the intelligence
community were fairly clear: counting and evaluating Soviet missiles. We asked the
intelligence community for other information, but this task dominated the agenda.

I don't mean to diminish the enormity of that task. But since the priority was so
straightforward, the work of the intelligence community was more easily directed.
Personnel and resources could focus on the task, develop expertise and technologies, and
achieve fixed goals. It was a different, and for its problems, a simpler day.

Now, policymakers demand anything and everything of the intelligence

community. They want to know:

~ the actions and intentions of every government and leader in the world;

~ the identity of every group that means us harm;

— what happens when OPEC leaders get together;

~ which world leader has the flu;

~ what is being said in a cave halfway around the globe;

-- the anticipated results of this or that election.

The list goes on and on. The demand for intelligence is just insatiable among
policymakers, and there is an increasing reliance on intelligence for military operations.

Thus the intelligence community has become more demand-driven, and the tasking
is coming from more and more consumers. Just as every senior corporate executive wants
his own economist, every federal agency and every military service wants an independent
intelligence capability.

The fact is the intelligence community cannot do everything at once and do it all
well. Responsibility is on the consumers to set, in some orderly manner, the priorities.
They do not do a very good job of that, finding it easier and less demanding to ask for
intelligence on everything.

Intelligence officials must contribute to this process of prioritizing. They need to

say what is feasible and what the trade-offs are.

Politicizing Intelligence: In this process, it is important that intelligence is not

politicized.
 Twenty years ago, I said in a speech: ".. .the needs of policy should not determine
the conclusions of analysis. Intelligence should drive policy; not vice versa." That was true
then, that is true now.

In my experience, Presidents and Administrations tend to get the intelligence they

want. After all, they appoint leading officials who set priorities.

But collection and analysis must be separated - to the maximum extent possible -
from policy formation and politics. Policymakers should not use intelligence as a tool to
make a policy look good - they should use intelligence to make good policy.

Growing Data: Another difficulty is data - mountains of it. Just as the intelligence
community faces unprecedented demands, technology permits us to collect unprecedented
amounts of raw data.

We collect literally millions and millions of bites of data every minute.

Conversations are recorded; photographs are taken; a tip is passed on; communications are
intercepted.

We collect far more raw intelligence data than our analysts could ever synthesize or
policymakers use. The challenge is sifting through the huge amounts of information,
analyzing it, deciding what is important and what is trivial, coordinating different agencies,
and getting the right information to the right person at the right time.

This is a task of exceeding difficulty. It takes systems analysis and management to

an extraordinary degree. As we have heard a lot since 9/11 - the challenge is connecting
the dots. That is not so easy when you collect so many dots.

Technology is wonderful. But technology is not a cure-all. The success of the

intelligence community depends upon its ability to harness these awesome technologies, to
control them, and to ensure they don't overwhelm us.

Developing Capabilities: A related challenge is developing new capabilities. It

takes a slew of capabilities for our agencies to succeed in their many missions.

One area that has received much attention is languages. What is the use in
intercepting a message if you can't read it?

In the past, we needed people who spoke Russian, a smattering of East European
languages, Chinese, or Korean.

Now the challenges are far more diffuse, hi a globalizing world with global threats,
we need to understand what a lot more people are saying. This is not merely a matter of
finding people who speak Arabic. We need to be able to understand a whole host of
difficult languages: Farsi, Urdu, Pashto, Hindi, Dari, Kurdish, or Somali, just to name a
few. And we need people who can translate - and analyze - messages in those languages.

We also need people with highly specific technical skills. Sometimes it seems that
technology is developing faster than we can keep up with it.

I don't know about you, but I understand some of these technologies about as well
as I understand Farsi.

We need people who have a good understanding of:

~ network security;

~ wireless technologies;

— nanotechnology;

— biometrics;

~ data mining.

The list goes on and on. No one should expect a quick process here. This cannot
happen overnight. It takes years to build up and maintain these skills - whether you are
talking about languages or computers or simply knowledge about certain parts of the
world.

We need training within the community. It takes people traveling to and living in
foreign countries. And it takes people getting accustomed to new tools and new tasks.

We also need to develop better understanding of foreign cultures and religions - as

well as languages and technologies - within our institutions of higher learning.

And we need more attention paid to open-source information: newspapers,

periodicals, academic studies, satellite television, radio programs, Internet web sties,
books, pamphlets, and religious tracts that can alert us to broad patterns developing around
the world.

Often the rest of the world is very open in expressing their feelings and intentions
towards us. If we pay close attention to what they are saying, we can take better care of our
security and our interests.

Developing HUMINT: Another thing that people around this town always talk
about is getting better human intelligence, or HUMINT. Many talk of it as the "silver
bullet." But as important as it can be, it is not a silver bullet.
 A well-known critic from several years back said the U.S. spy system, "is a self-
serving sham carried out by careerist bureaucrats who have managed to deceive several
generations of American policymakers and the public about the necessity and value of their
work."

He went on to say that agencies collect, "entirely too much useless information at
too great risk in too many friendly countries," and do a "very poor job in getting good
political intelligence through espionage."

Those comments were made by Aldrich Ames after his conviction. Ames is a
betrayer of his nation, directly responsible for the deaths of many people. We do need
better HUMINT - to catch traitors like Ames.

One can't help but be struck by how much these statements have echoed over the
years. Improving our human intelligence is now only more urgent in an age of terrorism.

Technology alone will not make us more secure. We need to put people on the
ground who can detect and alert us to terrorist plots. We need to penetrate stateless terrorist
networks and dispersed cells. And we need to penetrate opaque countries like North Korea
and Iran.

I do not have exaggerated expectations of what HUMINT can achieve - especially

in dealing with terrorist cells. I don't expect that we'll have a guy sitting next to Osama bin
Laden. But I think we would all like to improvements in human intelligence.

The good news is that HUMINT is cheap in comparison with technical collection
systems. The bad news is that HUMINT is very hard to develop.

Cooperation with Foreign Governments: Just as important as developing our

own capabilities is developing our relationships with foreign intelligence services.

- Al Qaeda is scattered around the globe, working in small cells in more than
eighty countries;

— Material that could be used to make nuclear weapons passes through complex
global black markets;

~ Future threats emerge from unforeseen conflicts and remote parts of the world.

Our intelligence community cannot be everywhere at once. We need help - to

gather information, evaluate threats, and prevent attacks.

Already cooperation has been essential in rooting out al Qaeda in countries as

diverse as Pakistan, Germany, Yemen and the Philippines.
 The new world coming is increasingly global. So, too, are the new threats. We must
continue to strengthen relationships with foreign intelligence agencies to meet this
challenge.

Openness and Understanding

I have run through just a few of the many challenges before the intelligence
community. I'll not go into some of the other issues of management, coordination and the
like. Many of these issues are currently under consideration by the 9/11 Commission, and I
wouldn't want to make premature judgments.

But let me talk a little bit about something that is extremely important to the future
of the intelligence community: openness and public understanding.

Classification: There is much skepticism, even cynicism, about the intelligence

community among the American people. Part of this is due to over-classification of
information.

Some estimates of the number of classified documents reach into the trillions.
Needlessly stamping information "secret" breeds a lack of regard for material that is
properly classified and overloads our capacity to protect truly sensitive information.

When everything is classified, then nothing is classified. We must find a way to

reduce the amount of information being classified. The amount of classified information is
overwhelming us. If we classified only what is valuable, we could focus our resources to
protect that information.

Over-classification also breeds cynicism amongst the American people. For

instance, when a few paragraphs were redacted from the Congressional Joint Inquiry into
9/11, there was great speculation about what was in those paragraphs - particularly
concerning one foreign country. To some, it seemed sinister. To others, it was downright
amusing. To all, it was frustrating.

Now don't misunderstand me. We have to protect our sources and methods. The
intelligence community deals with the most sensitive matters in the United States
government; seeks information people don't want to give us; carries out clandestine
operations; and protects the lives of a lot of people who carry out missions. It must inform
policymakers with discretion. These are awesome responsibilities.

But sometimes we are our own worst enemy on this issue. Our attitude seems to be:
"when in doubt, classify." We shoot ourselves in the foot by keeping so much information
secret - it only feeds public suspicion.

The more information we can make public, the more people can understand
complex issues, and appreciate the process, management, and work of the intelligence
community.
 Educating the Public: Finally, let me say how valuable I think the International
Spy Museum is.

The American people should have more vehicles to learn about the work of the
intelligence community. Many of you, I trust, share that opinion. Sometimes it seems that
the only place where people can learn about the work of the intelligence community is in
leaked newspaper stories.

Many recent events - from 9/11 to the run-up to the Iraq war - have raised peoples'
awareness and doubts. Questions will surely reverberate around this town for some time to
come. But questions should reverberate beyond the halls of Washington.

The American people need to think and learn more about intelligence. In an age of
terrorism, we may not win our most important fights on the battlefield - many will take
place in the secret world of bank accounts, infiltration, information intercepts, and analysis.

The America people need to recognize that all the satellites, spies, and analysts in
the world cannot convert assessments into smoking guns, or stop every individual that
means us harm. Intelligence is not a cure-all. It is an important tool that can help us take
action.

The American people need to consider how that affects how our nation makes
decisions about war and peace, and actions both overt and covert.

There is a lot that the American people can learn from the exhibit that is opening
here today. They can learn about the long history of domestic threats to our security, and
how our government has responded to those threats.

And they can better understand and reflect upon the complex and difficult choices
ahead:

~ How should we collect and analyze intelligence within our borders?

~ How should we organize our intelligence agencies to combat terrorism and other
threats?

-- How should we protect civil liberties in an age of terrorism?

-- How can we track terrorist funding in the vast world of national and international
finance?

~ How can we keep our transportation sector running smoothly while protecting
ourselves?
 ~ How can we maintain legitimate immigration and commerce while protecting
ourselves?

Director Tenet referred recently in a speech to, "the unclear, the unknown, and the
deliberately hidden" world of intelligence.

The Spy Museum plays an important role in shining a bit of light on that unclear,
unknown, and deliberately hidden world. And as the museum demonstrates - and our
children and grandchildren can attest - learning about that world can also be a lot of fun.

With that light comes better understanding. And with understanding comes more
trust and support for the intelligence community, as it carries out its very difficult and very
essential 21st century tasks.

Conclusion

Because it does rely so much on secrecy, intelligence fits awkwardly into a

representative democracy.

But intelligence is essential to the safety and security of our representative

democracy, and public understanding is essential to the success of the intelligence
community's mission.

Through the good work of the Spy Museum and other institutions like it, we can
help make intelligence fit a little better into our American democracy.
 Supporting Democracy in Indonesia
Lee H. Hamilton and George P. Shultz

The development of strong, prosperous, and democratic states in the Islamic

world is now a vital U.S. interest. Accordingly, much planning has gone into an initiative
for reform in the Middle East. Support for a strengthened Indonesian democracy should
also be a core U.S. objective.

This year, Indonesia is holding its most ambitious parliamentary and presidential
elections since the end of the Suharto era in 1998. Voters all over the archipelago are
casting direct votes for representatives and - in July - for president. These efforts should
be applauded. But democracies depend on more than elections; the rule of law, a dynamic
civil society, minority rights, and a market economy are key components of stable
democratic government. The challenge for Indonesia is accelerating reforms in these
areas. In particular, corruption and an ineffective judicial system have left many
Indonesians skeptical of post-Suharto democracy while turning off some foreign
investors.

There is, of course, a security dimension to these issues. This traditionally

moderate Muslim nation is home to several violent fundamentalist groups, most notably
the al Qaeda-affiliated Jemaah Islamiyah, which has been tied to terrorist bombings in
Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia. Popular disaffection with government and
poor economic conditions can leave the door open for terrorist groups adept at exploiting
local grievances and hardships. In a nation of over 17,000 islands, there is danger that a
jihadist group could gain the kind of territorial foothold that enables terrorist
indoctrination, training, and planning.

The United States has been increasingly concerned with this threat.
Understandably since the October 2002 Bali bombings, counter-terrorism has been the
focus of U.S. policy toward Indonesia. But the U.S. agenda in Indonesia can be
broadened beyond sharing intelligence and making arrests. Simply put, the U.S. should
accelerate efforts to support the long-term growth, stability, and democracy that
undermine the terrorists.

First, the U.S. can bolster its commitment to Indonesian education. President
Bush put us on the right track with a pledge of $ 157 million over six years, but this
commendable beginning could go farther. Education initiatives counter those who teach
hatred and brighten prospects for the 20 percent of Indonesian children who receive no
schooling. Further assistance in areas like teacher training, school supplies, and
educational exchange can help Indonesia develop its own alternatives to those who
exploit gaps in education to promote jihadist indoctrination.

Vigorous public diplomacy is also needed in a country where distrust of the U.S.
has become the norm. This should include an explanation of American policies and
values that engages Indonesians in a dialogue rather than simply pushing a message
through advertisements and brochures. Another necessary element is the kind of support
for civil society that the U.S. has employed in so many countries - efforts that include
cultural centers, NGOs, academia, the media, and the private sector. This support could
improve bilateral relations while helping Indonesians develop the vitality of their own
democracy.

The U.S. should also move toward greater cooperation with Indonesia's police
and military. For the judicial system to improve, the capacity of Indonesia's police to
enforce the law must be enhanced, and that can be aided by support from the U.S. and
other countries. Similarly, ties with the Indonesian military will be necessary - both
operationally and from the standpoint of educating them on the relationship between
military and civil control. This is controversial ground; accountability and human rights
must be part of the equation. But ultimately the U.S. and Indonesians will gain more from
engagement than estrangement on these issues.

We are not seeking to impose an American agenda. The vast majority of

Indonesians have demonstrated a willingness to embrace political, judicial, and economic
reforms, although they are wary of the U.S. Indeed, progress on reforms will lead to
much-needed foreign investment in this resource-rich country that could improve the
standard of living for many Indonesians. Meanwhile, by helping Indonesia, the U.S. can
help democracy gain a foothold in the world's largest Muslim country while undercutting
efforts of terrorists.

There is great promise and potential peril in Indonesia: promise for a thriving
democracy in an important Islamic country; peril arising from the regional erosion of
state control that enables terrorism. A sustained and comprehensive U.S. policy of
engagement and encouragement of democracy can help ensure that Indonesia's elections
are part of a broader democratic success story - one that someday may be looked back
upon as a watershed for the Islamic world.

Lee Hamilton, a former Chair of the U.S. House Committee on International Relations, is now
President of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. George Shultz, a former
U.S. Secretary of State, is a Distinguished Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
Both were co-chairs of the recent National Committee on U.S.-Indonesian Relations.
 The United States and the Islamic World
The Hon. Lee H. Hamilton
April 22,2004

The pace of events in the war on terrorism often overtakes our ability to evaluate
them. Nearly every day there is a crisis. That is why it is critical to take a step back and
look at a broader challenge: the volatile relationship between the U.S. and the diverse and
complex Islamic world.

The U.S. is currently fighting an extremist ideology that exploits deprivation in

parts of the Islamic world by channeling it into violent anger. Al Qaeda and affiliated
terrorist groups carry this banner. Where economic and political conditions are most dire,
they offer empowerment to the powerless. Where the U.S. is particularly unpopular, they
fuse that unpopularity to their radical jihad.

The challenge for the U.S. goes beyond rooting out terrorists with military force.
We must also ensure that new terrorists are not being produced faster than we are
capturing or killing them. In short, we have to defeat an ideology, not merely a group of
people. To do that, we must elevate our relations with the vast majority of the world's
Muslims who crave peace.

Unfortunately, current signs indicate deep tension. Surveys show wide mistrust
and antipathy towards the U.S. across the Islamic world. The core of this negative feeling
is a basic disconnect: majorities approve of values like freedom and democracy, but they
don't think the U.S. supports those values. Instead, they see the U.S. as self-interested
and hypocritical, propping up repressive regimes and pursuing access to cheap oil. In the
war of ideas, many share the same policy grievances as Osama bin Laden, even if they
abhor his methods.

How can we reverse this trend? First, we must explain ourselves better by making
public diplomacy a central component of our foreign policy. Just as in the Cold War, we
need to defend our ideals abroad vigorously by building cultural centers and universities,
sponsoring exchanges, creating broadcast outlets, teaching English, and translating and
disseminating books. Our aim should be to explain our policies and values, while
encouraging civil society abroad.

This must be more than an advertising campaign. It must be a real effort to extend
dialogue beyond governments, including the private sector, media, academia, non-
governmental organizations, and efforts to enhance our own knowledge of certain
languages and regions. If we don't act aggressively to define ourselves in the Islamic
world, the extremists will gladly do it for us.

To succeed, our message must be backed up by our policies, and our interests
gradually align with our values. The U.S. should no longer unflinchingly support an
authoritarian status quo, particularly in the Middle East. We should seek out, encourage,
listen to, and work with emerging democratic reformers, and sustain policies supporting
economic development, educational opportunity, incremental political reforms, and the
rule of law. This will take time, resources and skillful diplomacy. But the more people are
capable of finding a job, an education, or a vehicle for political participation, the less
likely they are to join or sympathize with terrorists.

We must also engage in an Israeli-Palestinian peace process. No other issue

polarizes relations between the U.S. and the Islamic world as much as this one. Our
steadfast support of Israel should be accompanied by active pursuit of a peaceful two-
state resolution. Sustained U.S. engagement can help ensure Israeli security, improve the
lives of the Palestinians, and raise U.S. standing in the world. It will not solve all our
problems; but it will make our problems far more solvable.

Ultimately, ideological and political conflicts within Islam must be settled within
Islam through the constructive efforts of moderate Muslims. What the U.S. can do is
reach out to the overwhelming number of Muslims who resent their political and
economic situations, and make it clear that we want them to achieve a better life. This
will not be easy. Islam stretches across countries with diverse populations and concerns -
from Morocco to Malaysia, from southern Africa to central Russia. To reach these many
corners, America's foreign policy agenda must go beyond the war on terrorism to
envision and support a peaceful evolution towards democracy and modernity.

In the Cold War, we defeated Communism by aligning ourselves with the

aspirations of the majority of people beyond the iron curtain. So, too, must we now be
aligned with and respectful of the aspirations of peaceful Muslims. For if we don't want
to be fighting the war on terrorism three generations from now, we need to start creating
friends faster than enemies.
 A Sustainable Peace for Afghanistan
March 11,2004
The Hon. Lee H. Hamilton

Building peace and stability in Afghanistan sometimes gets lost in the shuffle of
American foreign policy concerns. But much remains to be done in a country that is at the
vital core of the war on terrorism, and a reversion to sustained violence and anarchy could
undo the good accomplished in the last two and half years.

Notable progress has been made. The Taliban is no longer in power and al Qaeda
has been denied its most important sanctuary. International cooperation has been strong,
with a clear U.N. mandate and a NATO-led peacekeeping force (ISAF). A central
government has been established in Kabul, with a democratic Constitution, new currency,
and new army. Most Afghans enjoy greater freedoms, women and girls are emerging from
subjugation, and 3 million children have returned to school. For the first time in many
years, Afghans have reason to hope.

But further progress faces daunting challenges. Taliban and al Qaeda fighters have
proven resilient in the southeast, and warlords control much of the country beyond Kabul.
Crime is rampant, the drug trade has ballooned, and arms and landmines litter the
countryside. Even the most hardened aid workers refuse to operate in many regions, and
some warn that Afghanistan teeters on the brink of chaos.

To stem this myriad of threats, the U.S. and its allies must redouble security efforts.
ISAF should be enlarged, and expand operations throughout the country. U.S. forces
fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda should also have a mandate to assist in peacekeeping.
And international diplomacy should dissuade persistent meddling in Afghanistan's internal
affairs by neighboring governments. Otherwise, allied forces and the Afghan government
will face continued threats from porous borders, and huge swaths of lawless and violent
territory.

U.S. forces and ISAF should also assist a U.N. program to demobilize hundreds of
thousands of militiamen. A country cannot come together if it is awash in weaponry from
twenty-five years of war, some of which was supplied by the U.S. in the 1980s. We should
challenge warlords who prefer private armies to national reconstruction, and explore
incentives for those who give up their weapons. Local autonomy under a federalist system
should be encouraged; armed factionalism must not.

The security situation complicates an already tenuous political transformation.

President Hamid Karzai's government is struggling to wrest control over tax collection and
governance from warlords, and must overcome longstanding tribal and ethnic rivalries. It
is not clear that Afghanistan is ready for national elections scheduled for this summer, and
it may be years, if not decades, before the country can develop functioning democratic
institutions.
 To strengthen the Afghan government against warlords and lawlessness, U.S. and
allied forces should accelerate training of the Afghan National Army and police force. In
doing so, we must be sensitive to Afghanistan's tribal and ethnic divisions. Currently, the
Tajik minority controls much of the Defense Ministry, generating misgivings among the
Pashtun majority that bolsters warlords. We should work with the Afghan government to
build bridges among factions that have been at odds with each other, integrate recruits
from across the country, and move with deliberation towards national elections.

Finally, the international community must steer Afghanistan towards sustainable

physical and economic reconstruction. Afghanistan's devastated economy still struggles
under the weight of the drug-trade, persistent drought, war-ravaged infrastructure, and
millions of returning refugees. A pressing need is finding alternatives for Afghans with
nowhere to turn but the cultivation of poppies. International aid and investment will thus
be critical to rebuilding basic infrastructure and some form of market economy. So far, less
than a quarter of $4.5 billion pledged by international donors two years ago has been
delivered, and the needs remain overwhelming.

Afghanistan had a similar moment of promise and tumult after the Soviet Union
withdrew from a decade-long war in 1989. Unfortunately, the international community did
not follow through, and the resulting vacuum was filled by the Taliban and Osama bin
Laden. As Afghanistan implements its Constitution and moves towards elections, the U.S.
must step forward and provide greater leadership; our own security has been and remains
linked to Afghanistan's. We repeat the mistake of neglect at our peril.

When the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, we took on unique responsibility for its future.
We owe it to this war-ravaged nation - and to our own security - to sustain our
involvement, and to encourage Afghans to choose the forces of national integration over
the forces of disintegration.
 Balancing U.S. Interests in Pakistan
The Hon. Lee H. Hamilton
October 27,2003

Recently, a colonel in the U.S. Army told me, in blunt terms, our urgent priority
in dealing with Pakistan and its President, Pervez Musharraf: "We have got to support
Musharraf. If he goes, we're in big trouble."

Indeed, it is hard to overstate the importance of Pakistan, and President

Musharraf, to the United States. Within Pakistan's borders are scores of al Qaeda
terrorists, Taliban fighters, and - many believe - Osama bin Laden. Pakistan possesses
nuclear weapons, and has come frighteningly close to war with nuclear-armed India over
the disputed territory of Kashmir. Meanwhile, an ideological battle rages between anti-
American Islamic fundamentalists, the Pakistani military, and more moderate mainstream
political forces, and there have been attempts on President Musharraf s life. Picture an
Islamic fundamentalist government armed with nuclear weapons and harboring Osama
bin Laden and you see why the colonel is concerned. It is our worst nightmare.

Within this cauldron of activity, President Musharraf, to his credit, has supported
the war on terror. Since 9/11, he has ended Pakistani support for the Taliban; facilitated
our war effort in Afghanistan; and turned over critical intelligence and more than 500
suspected al Qaeda terrorists to the U.S., including key leadership figures. To bolster
Musharraf and sustain this cooperation, we have granted Pakistan nearly $2 billion in aid,
and President Bush has pledged $3 billion more over the next five years, calling
Musharraf "a courageous leader and friend of the United States." While there are strong
reasons for this support, there is also cause for concern on three key issues: terrorism,
proliferation, and democracy.

On terrorism, Musharraf has repeatedly said that he will close terrorist offices and
stop terrorists from crossing the Pakistani border into Kashmir. But his record does not
match his rhetoric. Cross-border attacks persist, fueling tensions with India. Terrorist
groups that are shut down often reappear with new offices and new names, and arrested
terrorists are often promptly released. The stakes could not be higher - a major terrorist
attack on an Indian target could launch a war with the potential to go nuclear and kill
millions. Indeed, terror in Kashmir could prove to be more destructive than anywhere
else in the world.

Musharraf s commitment to cracking down on the Taliban has also been

questioned. American military commanders complain that Pakistan does not adequately
seal its Afghan border, permitting Taliban fighters to take refuge in Pakistan's ethnic
Pashtun areas before returning to Afghanistan to strike at American and Afghan
government forces. While Musharraf s control over this rugged and tribal border region
is not complete, it does seem that Pakistan's cooperation has not been absolute.

On proliferation, Musharraf has repeatedly said that Pakistan does not barter with
its nuclear technology. But it has been widely reported that North Korea obtained
enriched uranium technology from Pakistan in exchange for missile technology, and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said that Pakistani companies provided
critical support to Iran's nuclear program.

Finally, Pakistani democracy has suffered under Musharraf, who took power in a
coup. In April of 2002, he held a referendum on his rule that most observers believe was
fraudulent. In August of 2002, he rewrote the constitution to grant himself extensive
powers, including the ability to dissolve the national assembly. And while he did hold
parliamentary elections in October of 2002, these were regarded as badly flawed and
restricted.

The situation in Pakistan goes to the heart of the complexity and nuances of
American foreign policy. How does the U.S. balance this myriad of interests in Pakistan?
Does the war on terror force us to compromise our principles and forge alliances with
troubling leaders?

The answer is we must protect and balance our interests, but also act on behalf of
our values. Too often in the Islamic world, America has supported troubling rulers who
keep the lid on the cauldron without addressing the systemic problems that ultimately
cause the cauldron to boil over. Right or wrong, this causes Muslims to associate
American policies with support for oppressive regimes and their own lack of freedom. It
is not yet clear if Mushurraf is prepared to implement his stated long-term vision of a
democratic Pakistan divorced from terror, or if he is simply another self-interested
military dictator. Time - and U.S. policy - will tell, and the results will be critical to our
relations with the world's Muslims.

We should support Musharraf. But we should also prod him in the right direction.
Aid should be conditional, not a blank check. And America's message to the Islamic
world should be clear: we stand against the exportation of dangerous weaponry and
terror, and we stand for democracy and human rights.