TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY.

LINDA JIMENO
JUNTILLA vs. CAMORO G.R. No: L-45637 May 31, 1985 FACTS: The plaintiff, Juntanilla, was a passenger of the public utility jeepney bearing plate No. PUJ-71-7 on the course of the trip from Danao City to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by defendant Berfol Camoro. It was registered under the franchise of defendant Clemente Fontanar but was actually owned by defendant Fernando Banzon. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the vehicle. Upon landing on the ground, the plaintiff momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to his senses, he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. Aside from this, he suffered injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back. Because of his shock and injuries, he went back to Danao City but on the way, he discovered that his `Omega' wrist watch was lost. Upon his arrival in Danao City, he immediately entered the Danao City Hospital to attend to his injuries, and also requested his father-in-law to proceed immediately to the place of the accident and look for the watch. In spite of the efforts of his father-in-law, the wrist watch, which he bought for P852.70 (Exh. "B") could no longer be found. Juntilla filed Civil Case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu City , Branch I against Clemente Fontanar, Fernando Banzon and Berfol Camoro. the sum of P750.00 as reimbursement for the lost Omega wrist watch, the sum of P246.64 as unrealized salary of the plaintiff from his employer, the further sum of P100.00 for the doctor's fees and medicine, an additional sum of P300.00 for attorney's fees and the costs. Respondent filed an appeal before CFI of Cebu CFI Decision: Reversed the judgment; that the accident was due to fortuitous event; so the respondents were exonerated from liability. A tire blow-out, such as what happened in the case at bar, is an inevitable accident that exempts the carrier from liability, there being absence of a showing that there was misconduct or negligence on the part of the operator in the operation and maintenance of the vehicle involved. The fact that the right rear tire exploded, despite being brand new, constitutes a clear case of caso fortuito which can be a proper basis for exonerating the defendants from liability. ISSUE: Whether or not tire blow out in this case is a fortuitous event HELD: NO. It is not a fortuitous event. Hence, respondents are liable. In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. 1. The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. 2. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident. We agree with the observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. 3. There is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. The petitioner stated that there were three (3) passengers in the front seat and fourteen (14) passengers in the rear. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and

Respondents Contention: That the accident that caused losses to the petitioner was beyond the control of the respondents taking into account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and was only slightly used at the time it blew up. City Court Decision: In favor of the petitioner and against the respondents. Respondents are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

speeding at the time of the accident. Essential requisites of caso fortuito: (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.' In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. As to the issue of mechanical defects, who has the liability? The carrier has the liability. The injured party, namely the passenger, has the right of damages against the carrier and not the manufacturer. Why? Because the passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier. Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. It is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not an insurer of the safety of his passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. This is a case on contract of carriage. Remember that the diligence required to be observed by common carrier is extraordinary diligence. However, this was obviously not met by the common carrier. The contention of the respondents that if there were really injuries sustained by petitioner why was he treated in Danao instead of being treated in Mandaue City is UNTENABLE. City Court of Cebu found that the petitioner had a lacerated wound on his right palm aside from injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back, and that on his way back to Danao City, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost. These are findings of facts of the City Court of Cebu which we find no reason to disturb. NO DISSENTING OPINION. HERNANDEZ vs. COA G.R. No: 71871 November 6, 1989

FACTS: 1st phase (in the main office): Teodoro M . Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. As such, he went to the main office of the Authority in Manila on July 1, 1983, to encash two checks covering the wages of the employees and the operating expenses of the Project. He estimated that the money would be available by ten o'clock in the morning and that he would be back in Ternate by about two o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. For some reason, however, the processing of the checks was delayed and was completed only at three o'clock that afternoon. The petitioner decided nevertheless to encash them because the Project employees would be waiting for their pay the following day. He thought he had to do this for their benefit as otherwise they would have to wait until the following Tuesday at the earliest when the main office would reopen. And so, on that afternoon of July 1, 1983, he collected the cash value of the checks and left the main office with not an insubstantial amount of money in his hands. 2nd Phase (pauwi na siya): Typical man, nagisipg siya kung saan dadaan/didirecho pauwi. The petitioner had two choices, to wit: (1) return to Ternate, Cavite, that same afternoon and arrive there in the early evening; or (2) take the money with him to his house in Marilao, Bulacan, spend the night there, and leave for Ternate the following morning. He opted for the second, thinking it the safer one. And so, on that afternoon of July 1, 1983, at a little past three o'clock, he took a passenger jeep bound for his house in Bulacan. 3rd phase (unfortunate event ):

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

It was while the vehicle was along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue that two persons boarded with knives in hand and robbery in mind. One pointed his weapon at the petitioner's side while the other slit his pocket and forcibly took the money he was carrying. The two then jumped out of the jeep and ran. Hernandez, after the initial shock, immediately followed in desperate pursuit. He caught up with Virgilio Alvarez and overcame him after a scuffle. The petitioner sustained injuries in the lip, arms and knees. Alvarez was subsequently charged with robbery and pleaded guilty. But the hold-upper who escaped is still at large and the stolen money he took with him has not been recovered. The petitioner, invoking the foregoing facts, filed a request for relief from money accountability under Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code . This was even indorsed by the General manager and corporate officer of PTA. The Regional Director, National Capital Region, of the Commission on Audit, absolved Hernandez of negligence. However, the Commission on Audit, through then Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. denied the petitioner's request. Sabi niya, the loss is attributed to Fernandez negligence because had he brought the cash proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate, Cavite, immediately after encashment for safekeeping in his office, which is the normal procedure in the handling of public funds, the loss of said cash thru robbery could have been aborted. Petitioners Contention: 1. He decided to encash the checks in the afternoon of July 1, 1983, which was a Friday, out of concern for the employees of the Project, who were depending on him to make it possible for them to collect their pay the following day. July 2 and 3 being non-working days and July 4 being a holiday, they could receive such payment only on the following Tuesday unless he brought the encashed checks on that day, and took it to Ternate the following day. 2. The road to Marilao was nearer and safer (or so he reasonably thought) and there was less risk involved in his taking the money the following morning to Ternate rather than on that same afternoon of July 1. The drive to Ternate would take three hours, including a 30minute tricycle ride along the dark and lonely NaicTernate road; and as he would be starting after three o'clock in the afternoon, it was not likely that he would reach his destination before nightfall. The likelihood of robbery during the time in question was stronger in Ternate than in Marilao, so he should not be blamed if the robbery did occur while he was on the way to Marilao that afternoon. That was a fortuitous event that could not have reasonably been foreseen, especially on that busy highway. 4. He had not been remiss in protecting the money in his custody; in fact, he immediately pursued the hold-uppers and succeeded in catching one of them who was subsequently prosecuted and convicted. It might have been different if he had simply resigned himself to the robbery and allowed the culprits to go scot-free. BUT HE ACTED. HINABOL niya. Solicitor General Ordunez : petitioner was negligent. Successor Solicitor General Chavez: petitioner was NOT negligent. He said, assuming he was guilty of contributory negligence, he had made up for it with his efforts to retrieve the money and his capture of one of the robbers, who was eventually convicted. In effect, COA issued a memorandum which states: the petitioner should not have encashed the checks as the hour was already late and he knew he could not return to Ternate before nightfall. The memo concludes that in deciding to take the money with him to Marilao after imprudently withdrawing it from the main office, the petitioner was assuming a risk from which he cannot now be excused after the loss of the money as a result of the robbery to which it was unreasonably exposed. 3. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acts are so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's request for relief from accountability for the stolen money HELD: NO. This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions, something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although it could have happened, and did. For most of us, all we can rely on is a reasoned conjecture of what might happen, based on common sense and our own experiences, or our intuition, if you will, and without any mystic ability to peer into the future. So it was with the petitioner. It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court feels he should not be blamed for that. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and was one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. Disposition The petitioner is entitled to be relieved from

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

accountability for the money forcibly taken from him. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. (no dissenting opinion) GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs. CHATTO G.R. No: 87584 June 16, 1992 treatment (Exh. "E") She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3) months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or six (6) times. Defendants Contention: That the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. RTC Decision: In favor of injured parties, Chattos (mother and daughter). Court awarded actual damages (lost earrings 2.5K, money in lost wallet 1K, traspo fees 500, passport, and medications in hospital, atty fees 20K). Court also awarded moral damages (75K to mother, 10K to daughter) CA Decision: Affirmed decision of RTC. The errors assigned by the Gotesco are all without merit. ISSUE: Whether or not the collapse was due to force majeure. HELD: NO. FORCE MAJEURE WAS UNFOUNDED IN THIS CASE. ** Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the respondent Court impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that any of the

FACTS: In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie 'Mother Dear' at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked to the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. Per Medico Legal Certificateissued by Dr. Ernesto G. Brion, plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto suffered the following injuries: Physical injuries of contusions and abrasions. On the other hand, the findings on plaintiff Gloria are as follows: Physical injuries, lacerated wounds and abrasions. The CONCLUSIONS were that there were 1.Physical injuries noted on subject. 2.That under normal condition, in the absence of complication, said physical injuries will require medical attendance and/or incapacitate the subject for a period of from two to four weeks. Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July 1982 for further

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

causes denominated as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. His answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. "The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means." IMPLIED WARRANTY "Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant." That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner. IMPORTANT: Even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated asgross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure, for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence. WHAT IS FORCE MAJEURE? 'Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible; such as lightning, tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person. (BLACKSTONE definition) AFIALDA vs. HISOLE G.R. No: L-2075 November 29, 1049

FACTS: Loreto Afialda, Sps. Hisoles caretaker of their carabaos, was gored by one of the carabaos and consequently died. Margarita, Loretos sister, alleged that the mishap was due neither to Loretos fault nor to force majeure. She held the spouses liable based on article 1905 (The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it). Moreover, Margarita claimed that 1905 did not distinguish between damage caused to a stranger and damage caused to the caretaker. However, the spouses moved for the cases dismissal for lack of cause of action; the lower court granted the same. It also ruled that owner of an animal was answerable only for damages caused to a stranger and not to its caretaker. ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses are liable when the damage is caused to its caretaker. HELD: No. The animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. Simply, under article 1905 of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is not liable for injury caused by it to its caretaker. INELCO vs. CA

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

G.R. No: 53401 November 6, 1989 Dr. Briones was also presented contending that Isabel did not die because of electrocution, i.e. since there was no autopsy, the cause cannot be speculated; cyanosis could not have been found in the body because it only appears in live person. Finally, assuming arguendo Isabel was electrocuted, INELCO argued that Isabel was being negligent when she caused the installation of a burglar deterrent in her steel gate without the companys knowledge, and that this burglar deterrent was turned on which caused the charged electric current. CFI ruled in favor of INELCO, but the CA reversed the formers decision. ISSUE: (1)Whether or not the deceased died of electrocution; (2) Whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's death.

FACTS: When typhoon Genings rain and flood had receded, Isabel proceeded towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, which Isabel owned, to look after the merchandise that might had been damaged. She was followed by Aida, a salesgirl at the grocery, and Linda, ticket seller at the cinema. Isabel suddenly screamed Ay and quickly sank into the water. Aida and Linda saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water; the two girls asked for help from Ernesto, but the latter turned back shouting that the water was grounded. Ernesto told Antonio, Isabels son-in-law, on what had transpired. Antonio immediately requested the people of INELCO to cut off the electric current. The body was subsequently recovered about meters from an electric post. While these were happening, Engr. Juan of the National Power Corporation noticed fluctuations in the electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. Upon inspection, he saw electric lines hanging from the posts to the ground, yet he did not see any INELCO lineman within the vicinity; while he was at the intersection of Guerrero, the area where Isabel was allegedly electrocuted, he saw a 30 meter electric wire strung across the street. Engr. Juan later on learnt of Isabels mishap. Isabels body on the same day was examined by Dr. Castro. He found cyanotic which indicated death by electrocution. The doctor also found an electrically charged wound or a first degree burn. Suits ensued. INELCO claimed that Guerrero St. did not suffer from any defect that might constitute hazard to life and property. Abijero, furthermore, testified that he switched off the streets lights in said street, and that he did not see any broken wires near the vicinity.

HELD: 1. Yes. By a preponderance of evidence, private respondents were able to show that the deceased died of electrocution, e.g. burnt wounds, testimonies of Dr. Castro, Aida, and Linda. More so, the nature of the wounds can lead to no other conclusion than that they were burns, and there was nothing else in the street where the victim was wading through which could cause a burn except the dangling live wire of defendant company. The Court also ruled that the steel gates burglar deterrent argument by INELCO was not supported by evidence. SC relied on the witnesses testimonies and applied the principle of res gestae (trans: things done). Requisites of res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; (3) that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. Res gestae is an exception to the hearsay rule on the grounds of trustworthiness and necessity. "Trustworthiness" because the statements are made instinctively, and "necessity" because such natural and spontaneous utterances are more convincing than the testimony of the same person on the

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

stand. Therefore, the fact that Ernesto was not presented to testify does not make the testimony of Linda and Aida hearsay since the said declaration is part of the res gestae. While it may be true that, as petitioner argues, Ernesto was not an actual witness to the instant when the deceased sank into the waist-deep water, he acted upon the call of help of Aida and Linda with the knowledge of, and immediately after, the sinking of the deceased. In fact the startling event had not yet ceased when Ernesto entered the scene considering that the victim remained submerged. Under such a circumstance, it is undeniable that a state of mind characterized by nervous excitement had been triggered in Ernestos being as anybody under the same contingency could have experienced. As such, We cannot honestly exclude his shouts that the water was grounded from the res gestae just because he did not actually see the sinking of the deceased nor hear her scream "Ay." 2. Yes. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. Relying on Engr. Juans attestation, i.e. that there was no lineman at Guerrero St. and that INELCO office was closed, Court ruled that INELCO was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public, especially during after a calamity. Considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be. In addition, when an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of INELCO to produce an injury, INELCO is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for its own negligent conduct or omission. The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" (trans: to a willing person, injury is not done) relied upon by INELCO in order to absolve itself from liability finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril, or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property (eh kitang kita naman naten na kaya lang naman syang lumusong sa baha ay para i-check ang kanyang mga produkto. Kasalanan ba yun ni Isabel? Syempre hindi!). Other point: The exclusion of moral damages and attorney's fees awarded by the lower court was properly made by the respondent CA, the charge of malice and bad faith on the part of respondents in instituting this case being a mere product of wishful thinking and speculation. Award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith; there should be no penalty on the right to litigate. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (trans: loss without injury).

RAMOS vs. PEPSI-COLA and BONIFACIO G.R. No: L-22533 February 9, 1967

FACTS: Car of Placido and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPSI had a collision. The car was driven by Augusto, son of Placido. PEPSIs tractor-truck was then driven by Andres. Placido and Agusto then sued PEPSI for damages in the CFI of Manila. CFI found Andres negligent; PEPSI was also made liable for failure to exercise due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Both were held solidarily liable. Upon appeal, CA sustained Andress liability, but absolved PEPSI for sufficiently exercising due diligence in the selection of its driver, Andres. The appellate court relied on Juans [personnel manager] testimony that Andres was subjected to theoretical and practical examination before hiring, and on the ruling of Campo v. Camarote whereby the Court pronounced that: In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family, he should have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he should have

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experiences and record of service. Augusto and Placido assailed the credibility of Juan, saying it was biased. or semi-trailers having a gross weight of more than 2,000 kg., AND which are not equipped with effective brakes on at least two opposite wheels of the rear axle. This is the condition set, wherein trailers without such brakes may be registered from year to year for operation, i.e. they should not be operated at any time at a speed in excess of 15 kilometers per hour in conjunction with a tractor-truck. But there was no finding by the Court of Appeals that the truck-trailer here did not have such brakes. In the absence of such fact, it is subpar. 4 (e), supra, that will apply. And petitioners admit that the truck-trailer was being driven at about 30 k.p.h. It is a fact that driver Bonifacio was not accompanied by a helper on the night of the collision since he was found to be driving alone. However, there is no finding that the tractor-truck did not have a rear-vision mirror. To be sure, the records disclose that Pat. Rodolfo Pahate, the traffic policeman who went to the collision scene, testified that he saw the tractor-truck there but he does not remember if it had any rear-vision mirror. This cannot prove lack of rear- vision mirror. And the cited provision is complied if either of the two alternatives, i.e., having a rear-vision mirror or a helper, is present. Stated otherwise, said provision is violated only where there is a positive finding that the tractor-truck did not have both rear-vision mirror and a helper for the driver. That is not the case here.

ISSUE: Whether or not PEPSI should be held liable (because Juan was not credible).

HELD: No. Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The Court has consistently respected the findings of the Court of Appeals, with some few exceptions, which do not obtain herein. Alternatively, no question is raised as to due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Appellants' other assignment of errors are likewise outside the purview of this Courts' reviewing power. Thus, the question of whether PEPSI-COLA violated the Revised Motor Vehicle Law and rules and regulations related thereto, not having been raised and argued in the Court of Appeals, cannot be ventilated herein for the first time. And the matter of whether or not PEPSI-COLA did acts to ratify the negligent act of its driver is a factual issue not proper herein

A motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against all damages caused by its driver. Article 2180 of our Civil Code is very explicit that the owner's responsibility shall cease once it proves that it has observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Neither could We apply the respondent superior principle. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his own negligence, not that of his employees. The former is made responsible for failing to properly and diligently select and supervise his erring employees. We do not - and have never - followed the respondent superior rule. METRO MANILA vs. CA

Resolution on Motion for Consideration Decision of the Court of Appeals should still be affirmed in toto. Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of M.V.O. Administrative Order No. 1, in that at the time of the collision the trailer-truck, which had a total weight of 30,000 kg., was (a) being driven at a speed of about 30 kph, or beyond the 15 kph limit set and (b) was not equipped with a rear-vision mirror nor provided with a helper for the driver. It will be noted that the 15 kph limit refers only to trailers

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

FACTS: At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28, 1979, plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney, then driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant Victorino Lamayo, bound for her work, where she then worked as a machine operator earning P16.25 a day. While the jeepney was travelling at a fast clip along DBP Avenue, Bicutan, Taguig, another fast moving vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC) bus driven by defendant Godofredo C. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila bound for its terminal at Bicutan. As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed; neither did they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision between them occurred, the passenger jeepney ramming the left side portion of the MMTC bus. The collision impact caused plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney and (she) was thrown out therefrom, falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical injuries. She was brought to the Medical City Hospital where she regained consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat, she was confined for twenty-four (24) days, and as a consequence, she was unable to work for three and one half months (31/2). A complaint for damages was filed by herein private respondent, who being then a minor was assisted by her parents, against all of therein named defendants following their refusal to pay the expenses incurred by the former as a result of the collision. Said defendants denied all the material allegations in the complaint and pointed an accusing finger at each other as being the party at fault. Further, herein petitioner MMTC, a government-owned corporation and one of the defendants in the court a quo, along with its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, contrarily averred in its answer with cross-claim and counterclaim that the MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful manner by driver Leonardo and that it was the passenger jeepney which was driven recklessly considering that it hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus, and that it was defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney and employer of driver Calebag, who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees and should thus be held solidarily liable for damages caused to the MMTC bus through the fault and negligence of its employees.Defendant Victorino Lamayo alleged that the damages suffered by therein plaintiff should be borne by defendants MMTC and its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, because the latter's negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the accident and that MMTC failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. Milagros Garbo testified that, as a training officer of MMTC, she was in charge of the selection of the company's bus drivers, conducting for this purpose a series of training programs and examinations. According to her, new applicants for job openings at MMTC are preliminarily required to submit certain documents such as National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearance, birth or residence certificate, ID pictures, certificate or diploma of highest educational attainment, professional driver's license, and work experience certification. Re-entry applicants, aside from the foregoing requirements, are additionally supposed to submit company clearance for shortages and damages and revenue performance for the preceding year. Upon satisfactory compliance with said requisites, applicants are recommended for and subjected to a Preliminary interview, followed by a record check to find out whether they are included in the list of undesirable employees given by other companies MMTC's Transport Supervisor, Christian Bautista, testified that it was his duty to monitor the daily operation of buses in the field, to countercheck the dispatcher on duty prior to the operation of the buses in the morning and to see to it that the bus crew follow written guidelines of the company, which include seeing to it that its employees are in proper uniform, briefed in traffic rules and regulations before the start of duty, fit to drive and, in general, follow other rules and regulations of the Bureau of Land Transportation as well as of the company. 9 RTC Ruling: Trial court, found both drivers of the colliding vehicles concurrently negligent for non-observance of appropriate traffic rules and regulations and for failure to take the usual precautions when approaching an intersection. As joint tortfeasors, both drivers, as well as defendant Lamayo, were held solidarily liable for damages sustained by plaintiff Custodio. Defendant MMTC, on the bases of the evidence presented was, however, absolved from liability for the accident on the ground that it was not only careful and diligent in choosing and screening applicants for job openings but was also strict and diligent in supervising its employees by seeing to it that its employees were in proper uniforms, briefed in traffic rules and regulations before the start of duty, and that it checked its employees to determine whether or not they were positive for alcohol and followed other rules and regulations and guidelines of the Bureau of Land Transportation and of the company. CA Ruling:

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

Court of Appeals modified the trial court's decision by holding MMTC solidarily liable with the other defendants for the damages awarded by the trial court because of their concurrent negligence, concluding that while there is no hard and fast rule as to what constitutes sufficient evidence to prove that an employer has exercised the due diligence required of it in the selection and supervision of its employees, based on the quantum of evidence adduced the said appellate court was not disposed to say that MMTC had exercised the diligence required of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver, Godofredo Leonardo. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the oral testimonies of witnesses even without the presentation documentary evidence, prove that driver Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and clearance requirements and had undergone all trainings, tests and examinations preparatory to actual employment, and that said positive testimonies spell out the rigid procedure for screening of job applicants and the supervision of its employees in the field 2. Whether or not petitioner exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees HELD: 1. While there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence, or even subject evidence for that matter, inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony. It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law. The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment. It is entirely within each of the parties discretion, consonant with the theory of the case it or he seeks to advance and subject to such procedural strategy followed thereby, to present all available evidence at its or his disposal in the manner which may be deemed necessary and beneficial to prove its or his position, provided only that the same shall measure up to the quantum of evidence required by law. In making proof in its or his case, it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence be formally entered. Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observed by petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances in the case at bar has not been clearly established. It is not felt by the Court that there is enough evidence on record as would overturn the presumption of negligence, and for failure to submit all evidence within its control, assuming the putative existence thereof, petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and indifference. 2. In any event, we do not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a good father of a family, which for an employer doctrinally translates into its observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees but which mandate, to use an oft-quoted phrase, is more often honored in the breach than in the observance. Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's procedure for screening job applicants and supervising its employees in the field, through the testimonies of Milagros Garbo, as its training officer, and Christian Bautista, as its transport supervisor, both of whom naturally and expectedly testified for MMTC. Their statements strike us as both presumptuous and in the nature of petitio principii, couched in generalities and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their verity. The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Article 2176 and 2177, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code provisions on quasi-delicts as all the elements thereof are present, to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (2) fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond, and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by plaintiff. It is to be noted that petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo under Article 2180. Article 2180 applicable only where there is an employer-employee relationship, although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in business or industry. Employer is liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks. But, it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. The diligence of a good father of a family required to be observed by employers to prevent damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees in order to protect the public. With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the defendant driver and of an employer-employee relation between him and his co-defendant MMTC in this instance, the case in undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180. When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of employees, the employer is likewise responsible for damages, the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employer's own negligence. Due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. Finally, we believe that respondent court acted in the exercise of sound discretion when it affirmed the trial court's award, without requiring the payment of interest thereon as an item of damages just because of delay in the determination thereof, especially since private respondent did not specifically pray therefor in her complaint. Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides that in quasidelicts, interest as a part of the damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court, and not as a matter of right. Additional Issue: Prefatorily, private respondent questions the timeliness of the filing of the petition at bar in view of the procedural stricture that the timely perfection of an appeal is both a mandatory and jurisdictional requirement. This is a legitimate concern on the part of private respondent and presents an opportune occasion to once again clarify this point as there appears to be some confusion in the application of the rules and interpretative rulings regarding the computation of reglementary periods at this stage of the proceedings. The records of this case reveal that the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, dated October 31, 1991, was received by MMTC on November 18, 1991 16 and it seasonably filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof on November 28, 1991. 17 Said motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court in its resolution dated February 17, 1992, which in turn was received by MMTC on March 9, 1992. 18 Therefore, it had, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, fifteen (15) days therefrom or up to March 24, 1992 within which to file its petition, for review on certiorari. Anticipating, however, that it may not be able to file said petition before the lapse of the reglementary period therefor, MMTC filed a motion on March 19, 1992 for an extension of thirty (30) days to file the present petition, with proof of service of copies thereof to respondent court and the adverse parties. The Court granted said motion, with the extended period to be counted from the expiration of the reglementary period. 19 Consequently, private respondent had thirty (30) days from March 24, 1992 within which to file its petition, or up to April 23, 1992, and the eventual filing of said petition on April 14, 1992 was well within the period granted by the Court. We digress to reiterate, in view of erroneous submissions that we continue to receive, that in the case of a petition for review on certiorari from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which has long since been clarified in Lacsamana vs. The Hon. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 20 allows the same to be filed "within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the same time to the corresponding docket fee." In other words, in the event a motion for reconsideration is filed and denied, the period of fifteen (15) days begins to run all over again from notice of the denial resolution. Otherwise put, if a motion for reconsideration is filed, the reglementary period within which to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court is reckoned from the date the party who intends to appeal received the order denying

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

the motion for reconsideration. 21 Furthermore, a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review may be filed with this Court within said reglementary period, paying at the same time the corresponding docket fee. KRAMER vs. CA from the said date. Respondent's Contention: The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, 3 the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. RTC Ruling: The trial court observed that in ascertaining negligence relating to a maritime collision, there is a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such collision, and that the Board of Marine Inquiry was constituted pursuant to the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations, which took effect on January 1, 1975 by virtue of Letter of Instruction No. 208 issued on August 12, 1974 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, precisely to answer the need. The trial court went on to say that the four-year prescriptive period provided in Article 1146 of the Civil Code should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained. CA Ruling: In a Decision dated November 27, 1987, 7 and clarified in a Resolution dated January 12, 1988, 8 the Court of Appeals granted the Petition filed by the private respondent and ordered the trial court to dismiss the Complaint. The pertinent portions of the Decision of the appellate court are as follows It is clear that the cause of action of private respondent (the herein petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer) accrued from the occurrence of the mishap because that is the precise time when damages were inflicted upon and sustained by the aggrieved party and from which relief from the court is presently sought. Private respondents should have immediately instituted a complaint for damages based on a quasi-delict within four years from the said marine incident because its cause of action had already definitely ripened at the onset of the collision. For this reason, he (sic) could cite the negligence on the part of the personnel of the petitioner to exercise due care and lack of (sic) diligence to prevent the collision that resulted in the total loss of their x x x boat. We can only extend scant consideration to respondent

FACTS: The F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned byTrans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was due to the negligence of the employees of Trans-Asia. The Kramers instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City. Trans-Asia filed a motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasidelict like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period.

Petitioners Contention: The maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve. The running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

judge's reasoning that in view of the nature of the marine collision that allegedly involves highly technical aspects, the running of the prescriptive period should only commence from the finality of the investigation conducted by the Marine Board of Inquiry and the decision of the Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, who has original jurisdiction over the mishap. For one, while it is true that the findings and recommendation of the Board and the decision of the Commandant may be helpful to the court in ascertaining which of the parties are at fault, still the former (court) is not bound by said findings and decision. Indeed, the same findings and decision could be entirely or partially admitted, modified, amended, or disregarded by the court according to its lights and judicial discretion. For another, if the accrual of a cause of action will be made to depend on the action to be taken by certain government agencies, then necessarily, the tolling of the prescriptive period would hinge upon the discretion of such agencies. Said alternative it is easy to foresee would be fraught with hazards. Their investigations might be delayed and lag and then witnesses in the meantime might not be available or disappear, or certain documents may no longer be available or might be mislaid. ... ISSUE: Whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by presciption HELD: YES Under A1146 CC, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, this Court held: The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises. It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of 2 vessels the 4 year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel. Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30, 1 985, was beyond the 4 year prescriptive period. Disposition petition is dismissed. ALLIED BANKING vs. CA NATURE : Petition seeking the reversal of the decision of CA in "Joselito Z. Yujuico vs. Hon. Domingo D. Panis, RTC Judge of Manila and Allied Banking Corp.,"1 and the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision. FACTS : Mar 25, 1977 - Respondent Yujuico, a ranking officer in General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) and a member of the family owning control of the said bank, obtained a loan from the said institution in the amount of 500K. Private respondent issued a promissory note in favor of GENBANK. March 25, 1977 the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued a resolution forbidding GENBANK from doing business in the Phil. It was followed by another resolution ordering the liquidation of GENBANK. In the Memorandum of Agreement between Allied Banking Corp (Allied) and Amulfo Aurellano as liquidator of GENBANK, Allied acquired all the assets and assumed the liabilityies of GENBANK, including the receivable due from Yujuico. Yujuico failed to comply with his obligation prompting Allied to file a complaint for the collection of a sum of money before the CFI Manila (now RTC). First case: CA affirmed RTC decision in a special proceeding finding that the liquidation of GENBANK was made in bad faith. This decision declared as null and void the liquidation of GENBANK. It

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

was then that Yujuico filed the third party complaint to transfer liability for the default imputed against him by the petitioner to the proposed third-party1 defendants because of their tortious acts which prevented him from performing his obligations. Second and current proceeding (1987) Yujuico filed a motion to admit Ammended/Supplemental Answer and a Third Party Complaint to impead the Central Bank and Aurellano as third-party defendants. The complaint alleged that by reason of the tortuous interference by the CB with the affairs of GENBANK, he was prevented from performing his obligation such that he should not be held liable thereon. RTC Judge Mintu denied the third-party complaint but admitted the amended/supplemental answer. The case was re-raffled where presiding Judge Panis reiterated the order made by Judge Mintu. Both parties filed for motions of partial reconsideration, which were both denied. CA, in a petition for certiorari questioning the denied motions, rendered a decision nullifying the RTC order. The RTC judge was found to be in grave abuse of discretion and was ordered to admit the third-party complaint. Petitioner claims that the cause of action alleged in the third-party complaint has already prescribed. Being founded on what was termed as "tortious interference," petitioner asserts that under the CC on quasi-delict" the action against thirdparty defendants should have been filed within four (4) years from the date the cause of action accrued. On the theory that the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1977, the date when the Monetary Board ordered GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines, petitioner maintains that the claim should have been filed at the latest on March 25, 1981. On the other hand, private respondent relies on the "Doctrine of Relations" or "Relations Back Doctrine" to support his claim that the cause of action as against the proposed third-party defendant accrued only on December 12,1986 when the decision in CA (first case)became final and executory. It is contended that while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17,1987, it must be deemed to have been instituted on February 7, 1979 when the complaint in the case was filed. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not there was ground to admit the third-party complaint 2. Whether or not the cause of action under the third-party complaint prescribed HELD: 1. YES
1

The first instance is allowable and should be allowed if it will help in clarifying in a single proceeding the multifarious issues involved arising from a single transaction. After going through the records of this case, this Court finds that the third-party plaintiffs claim is premised not only on what was alleged as the tortious interference by the third-party defendants with the affairs of GENBANK. More importantly, attention should have been focused on the fact that this allegation is wedded to a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 03642 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Special Proceedings No. 107812. 8 We quote the pertinent portion of the affirmed decision, to wit: Based on the foregoing facts, the Court finds the liquidation of GBTC as embodied in Annex "A" and Annex "B" of the petition, which merely adopted the bid of the Lucio Tan group as the liquidation plan of GBTC as plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and therefore the same must be annulled and set aside. ... 9 (Italics supplied). This decision, which declared as null and void the liquidation of GENBANK, prompted private respondent herein to file a third-party complaint against the Central Bank and Arnulfo Aurellano on the theory that he has a right to proceed against them in respect of ALLIED's claim. In the words of private respondent, he "[s]eeks to transfer liability for the default imputed against him by the petitioner to the proposed third-party defendants because of their tortious acts which prevented him from performing his obligations. 10 Thus, if at the outset the issue appeared to be a simple maker's liability on a promissory note, it became complex by the rendition of the aforestated decision. The judgment of the CA in its first decision is the substantive basis of private respondent's proposed third-party complaint. There is merit in private respondent's position that if held liable on the promissory note, they are seeking, by means of the third-party complaint, to transfer unto the third-party defendants liability on the note by reason of the illegal liquidation of GENBANK which was the basis for the assignment of the promissory note. If there was any confusion at all on the ground/s alleged in the third-party complaint, it was the claim of third-party plaintiff for other damages in addition to any amount which he may be called upon to pay under the original complaint. While these allegations in the proposed third-party complaint may cause delay in the disposition of the main suit, it cannot be outrightly asserted that it would not serve any purpose.

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

The tests to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a thirdparty claim is "in respect of plaintiff 's claim" are: (a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is based, or whether the third-party's claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected with the plaintiffs claim; (b) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although the thirdparty defendant's liability arises out of another transaction; or (c) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defense which the third-party plaintiff has, or may have against plaintiffs claim. (Capayas v CFI Albay) The claim of third-party plaintiff, private respondent herein, can be accommodated under tests (a) and (b) abovementioned. 2. YES The action for damages instituted by private respondent arising from the quasidelict or alleged "tortious interference" should be filed within four 4 years from the day the cause of action accrued. It is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party when the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned. (Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Admistration) While the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as above discussed, since the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17, 1987, consequently, the action has prescribed. The third party complaint should not be admitted. Disposition: Petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner are hereby reversed and set aside and declared null and void, and another judgment is hereby rendered sustaining the orders of the RTC denying the admission of the third party complaint BATACLAN vs. MEDINA G.R. No: L-10126 Ocotber 22, 1957 Shortly after midnight, bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner, defendant Mariano Medina, under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, seated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated on the left side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said that they could not get out of the bus. There, is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approached the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire. That same day, the charred bodies of the four doomed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified, specially that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs, plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and

FACTS:

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter court endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint. of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the witnesses, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and detected even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above- reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the burning of the bus was its overturning.

HELD: Yes. Proximate cause is 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking

FERNANDO vs. CA G.R. No: 92087 May 8, 1992

FACTS: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. On November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and he signed the purchase order. However, before such date, specifically on

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. One body, that of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there. The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned that the five victims entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. In fact, the septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports, put the cause of death of all five victims as `asphyxia' caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst, swelled in hemorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, was sulfide gas produced from the waste matter inside the septic tank." The trial court dismissed the case filed by the petitioners against Davao City. The Court of Appeals on the other hand reversed the decision of the RTC. It ordered the grant of damages to petitioners by Davao City. Both parties filed for motion for reconsideration. The CA reversed its decision and it dismissed the case filed by the petitioners. the claimant did not in any way contribute to the negligence of the defendant. However, where the resulting injury was the product of the negligence of both parties, there exists a difficulty to discern which acts shall be considered the proximate cause of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. Petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing to clean a septic tank for the period of 19 years resulting in an accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the laborers. They contend that such failure was compounded by the fact that there was no warning sign of the existing danger and no efforts exerted by the public respondent to neutralize or render harmless the effects of the toxic gas. They submit that the public respondent's gross negligence was the proximate cause of the fatal incident. While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon. The public respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. It is likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet for their personal necessities but have remained unscathed. The absence of any accident was due to the public respondent's compliance with the sanitary and plumbing specifications in constructing the toilet and the septic tank. Hence, the toxic gas from the waste matter could not have leaked out because the septic tank was air-tight. The only indication that the septic tank in the case at bar was full and needed emptying was when water came out from it. Yet, even when the septic tank was full, there was no report of any casualty of gas poisoning despite the presence of people living near it or passing on top of it or using the public toilet for their personal necessities. Petitioners made a lot of fuss over the lack of any ventilation pipe in the toilet to emphasize the negligence of the

ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of victims was due to the negligence of Davao City and as such, the latter should be held liable.

HELD: No. To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant's negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred (Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186). Proof of such relation of cause and effect is not an arduous one if

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

city government and presented witnesses to attest on this lack. However, this strategy backfired on their faces. Their witnesses were not expert witnesses. On the other hand, Engineer Demetrio Alindada of the city government testified and demonstrated by drawings how the safety requirements like emission of gases in the construction of both toilet and septic tank have been complied with. He stated that the ventilation pipe need not be constructed outside the building as it could also be embodied in the hollow blocks as is usually done in residential buildings. The petitioners submitted no competent evidence to corroborate their oral testimonies or rebut the testimony given by Engr. Alindada. It would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from the public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. The fatal accident in this case would not have happened but for the victims' negligence. The market master knew that work on the septic tank was still forthcoming. It must be remembered that the bidding had just been conducted. Although the winning bidder was already known, the award to him was still to be made by the Committee on Awards. Upon the other hand, the accident which befell the victims who are not in any way connected with the winning bidder happened before the award could be given. Considering that there was yet no award and order to commence work on the septic tank, the duty of the market master or his security guards to supervise the work could not have started. Also, the victims could not have been seen working in the area because the septic tank was hidden by a garbage storage which is more or less ten (10) meters away from the comfort room itself. The surreptitious way in which the victims did their job without clearance from the market master or any of the security guards goes against their good faith. Even their relatives or family members did not know of their plan to clean the septic tank. URBANO vs. PEOPLE G.R. No: 72964 January 7, 1988 FACTS: Petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier. Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine. An amicable settlement was entered into by Javier and Urbano. At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. A criminal case was filed against Urbano for Homicide. The trial court found him guilty. IAC affirmed the trial courts decision. He filed for a motion for new trial/reconsideration but was denied.

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. ISSUE: Whether or not the wound caused by Urbano is the proximate cause of the death of Javier. Whether or not the wound is just a remote cause. HELD: No and yes. The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus. However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. Proximate cause 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died. If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have seen more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.' PHOENIX vs. IAC

FACTS: In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at about 1:30 a.m. private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel and awarded damages in favor of the former. Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court in CA-G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages. The award for damages was reduced. We agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States but we are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments have any validity for our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited." note: Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still

ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident?

HELD:

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the Petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequent manner which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. Private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts. Industrial Corporation P11,419.50. for P20,927.00 and Vicente Tui, for

To cover the face value of the checks, plaintiff, on October 10, 1979, requested PCIB Money Shop's manager Mike Potenciano to effect the withdrawal of P32,000.00 from his savings account therein and have it deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank. Roberto Santos was requested to make the deposit. In depositing in the name of FLORENCIO REYES, he inquired from the teller the current account number of Florencio Reyes to complete the deposit slip he was accomplishing. He was informed that it was "815" and so this was the same current account number he placed on the deposit slip below the depositor's name FLORENCIO REYES. Nothing that the account number coincided with the name Florencio, Efren Alagasi, then Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, thought it was for Florencio Amador who owned the listed account number. He, thus, posted the deposted in the latter's account not noticing that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES. On October 11, 1979, the October 10, check in favor of Winner Industrial Corporation was presented for payment. Since the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated that his account had only a balance of P4,078.43, it was dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for next clearing. On October 15, 1979, the October 10, 1979 check was redeposited but was again dishonored. Likewise, the October 12, 1979 check in favor of Vicente Tui when presented for payment on that same date met the same fate but was advised to try the next clearing. Two days after the October 10 check was again dishonored, the payee returned the same to Florencio Reyes and demanded a cash payment of its face value which he did if only to save his name. The October 12, 1979 check was redeposited on October 18, 1979, but again dishonored for the reason that the check was drawn against insufficient fund. Furious over the incident, he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate verification of his account. Upon verification, the bank noticed the error. The P32,000.00 deposit posted in the account of Florencio Amador was immediately transferred to the account of Reyes upon being cleared by Florencio Amador that he did not effect a deposit in the amount of P32,000.00. The transfer having been effected, the bank

PILIPINAS BANK vs. CA FACTS: As payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes, Florencio Reyes issued postdated checks to Winner

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

then honored the October 12, 1979, check. Trial Court rendered a decision and ordered the petitioner to pay the private respondent for damages. The petitioner then subsequently appealed adn on of the contention is that the Respondent Court of Appeals erred on a matter of law, in not applying the first sentence of Article 2179, New Civil Code, in view of its own finding that respondent Reyes' own representative committed the mistake in writing down the correct account number. through the full name, is the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip. He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption, which was proven to be erroneous, and proceeded with clear certainty, considering the amount involved and the repercussions it would create on the totality of the person notable of which is the credit standing of the person involved should a mistake happen. The checks issued by the plaintiff in the course of his business were dishonored by the bank because the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated a balance insufficient to cover the face value of checks. QUEZON CITY vs. DACARA ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the injury to Reyes? FACTS: Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of '87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth. Indemnification was sought from the city government which however, yielded negative results. Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara ,for and in behalf of his minor son, Jr., filed a Complaint for damages against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, as defendants, before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 101, Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-233. FULGENCIO prayed that the amount of not less than P20,000.00 actual or compensatory damages, P150,000.00 moral damages, P30,000.00 exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 attorney's fees and costs of the suit be awarded to him. In an Answer defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a moun[d] of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident on February 28, 1988 at 1:00 A.M. In short, defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely because of the latter's negligence and failure to exercise due care. The RTC ruled in favor of the complainant (Dacarra) since he evidence proffered by the complainant was found to be

HELD: For Article 2179 of the Civil Code to apply, it must be established that private respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. The concept of proximate cause is well defined in our corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been forseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence." In the case at bench, the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name *Applying the test, the bank employee is, on that basis, deemed to have failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee posted the cash deposit in the account of Florencio Amador from his assumption that the name Florencio appearing on the ledger without, however, going

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

sufficient proof of the negligence of herein petitioners. It is under Article 2189 of the Civil Code. Petitioners appealed to the CA and maintained that they had observed due diligence and care in installing preventive warning devices, and that it was in fact the plaintiff who had failed to exercise prudence by driving too fast to avoid the diggings. Moreover, the lower court allegedly erred in using Article 2189 of the Civil Code, which supposedly applied only to liability for the death or injuries suffered by a person, not for damage to property. accident was aptly discussed in the lower court's finding, which we quote: "Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28, 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive. "Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman which for clarity is quoted again, none was found at the scene of the accident. The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just and equitable. Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts' findings, which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly point to petitioners' negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondent's car. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion. No moral damages: there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code. ell-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded -- whether in a civil 33 or a criminal case34 -- in the absence of proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,

CA Ruling: The CA agreed with the RTC's finding that negligence was the proximate cause of the damage respondent. Noting the failure of petitioners to present support their contention that precautionary measures been observed. petitioners' suffered by evidence to had indeed

ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident? HELD: Maintaining that they were not negligent, petitioners insist that they placed all the necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of a roadside construction. They argue that the driver (Fulgencio Dacara Jr.) of respondent's car was overspeeding, and that his own negligence was therefore the sole cause of the incident. Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise.15 Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.

That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

social humiliation, or similar injury.35 The award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. Award of exemplary damages: Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence.40 Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences of their carelessness, and that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of others. 41 The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property. Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case. A finding of gross negligence can be discerned from the Decisions of both the CA and the trial court. We quote from the RTC Decision: "Sad to state that the City Government through its instrumentalities have failed to show the modicum of responsibility, much less, care expected of them by the constituents of this City. It is even more deplorable that it was a case of a street digging in a side street which caused the accident in the so-called 'premier city.'" The CA reiterated the finding of the trial court that petitioners' negligence was clear, considering that there was no warning device whatsoever at the excavation site. The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any adverse consequence of their failure to install even a single warning device at the area under renovation. Considering further that the street was dimly lit, 44 the need for adequate precautionary measures was even greater. By carrying on the road diggings without any warning or barricade, petitioners demonstrated a wanton disregard for public safety. Indeed, the February 28, 1988 incident was bound to happen due to their gross negligence. It is clear that under the circumstances, there is sufficient factual basis for a finding of gross negligence on their part. GABETO vs. ARANETA FACTS: Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata (kalesa) near Plaza Gay, in Iloilo, going to a cockpit. When the driver had turned his horse and started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into the street, and laying his hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, one Julio Pagnaya, replied that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta, and that he had taken up the two passengers as the first who had offered employment. Pagnaya then pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing, however, to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out, which he did, in order to find the bridle. The horse was then pulled over to near the curb and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle. The horse, being free from the control of the bit, became disturbed and moved forward, in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Pagnaya over. After going a few years further the side of the carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street. Meanwhile, one of the passengers, Ilano, had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the sidewalk; but the other, Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died. Consolacion Gabeto, the wofe of Proceso, instituted a claim of damages against Araneta. CFI ruled in her favor and ordered the Araneta to pay the amount of P3,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not Araneta's action is the proximate cause of

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

the damage done to Gayetano. FACTS: M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7am. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port (MIP). Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority (PPA) to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth 4. Gavino stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. Then, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel also sustained damage. PPA filed before the RTC a complaint for a sum of money against FESC, Capt. Senen C. Gavino and the MPA praying that the defendants therein be held jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff actual and exemplary damages plus costs of suit. RTC ordered the defendants therein jointly and severally to pay the PPA the amount of P1,053,300.00 representing actual damages and the costs of suit. CA affirmed except that if found no employer-employee relationship existing between herein private respondents MPA and Capt. Gavino. It ruled that the liability of MPA is anchored, not on Article 2180, but on the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, 7 and accordingly modified said decision by holding MPA, along with its co-defendants therein, still solidarily

HELD: No. The SC reversed the decision of the CFI. Araneta was absolved from the complaint. The stopping of the rig by Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. Pagnaya testifies to one fact which, if it were fully accredited, would possibly put a different complexion on the case; for he says that when the horse was pulled over to the curb, the defendant, by way of emphasizing his verbal denunciation of Pagnaya, gesticulated with one of his arms and incidentally brought his hand down on the horse's nose. This, according to Pagnaya, is what made the horse run away. There is no other witness who testifies to this; and it is noteworthy that Ilano does not mention it. A decided preponderance of the evidence in our opinion is against it. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. Pagnaya had a natural interest in refuting this fact, as well as in exculpating himself in other respects; and we are of the opinion that the several witnesses who testified for the defendant gave a more credible account of the affair than the witnesses for the plaintiff. According to the witnesses for the defendant, it was Pagnaya who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit it come out of the horse's mouth; and they say that Pagnaya, after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go away.

FAR EAST SHIPPING vs. CA

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

liable to PPA but entitled MPA to reimbursement from Capt. Gavino for such amount of the adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of the amount equivalent to seventy-five percent (75%) of its prescribed reserve fund. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are liable for the damage sustained.

Petioner's Contention: Since the MV PAVLODAR was under compulsory pilotage at the time of the incident, it was the compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino, who was in command and had complete control in the navigation and docking of the vessel. It is the pilot who supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation of a ship and his orders must be obeyed in all respects connected with her navigation. Consequently, he was solely responsible for the damage caused upon the pier apron, and not the owners of the vessel. It claims that the master of the boat did not commit any act of negligence when he failed to countermand or overrule the orders of the pilot because he did not see any justifiable reason to do so. In other words, the master cannot be faulted for relying absolutely on the competence of the compulsory pilot. If the master does not observe that a compulsory pilot is incompetent or physically incapacitated, the master is justified in relying on the pilot.

HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the CA. The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85. In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same regulation in this wise:

Respondent's Contention: PPA, in its comment, predictably in full agreement with the ruling of respondent court on the solidary liability of FESC, MPA and Capt. Gavino, stresses the concurrent negligence of Capt. Gavino, the harbor pilot, and Capt. Viktor Kabankov, shipmaster of MV Pavlodar, as the basis of their solidary liability for damages sustained by PPA. It posits that the vessel was being piloted by Capt. Gavino with Capt. Kabankov beside him all the while, as the former took over the helm of MV Pavlodar when it rammed and damaged the apron of the pier of Berth No. 4. Their concurrent negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision between the vessel and the pier Capt. Gavino, for his negligence in the conduct of docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel; and Capt. Kabankov, for failing to countermand the orders of the harbor pilot and to take over and steer the vessel himself in the face of imminent danger, as well as for merely relying on Capt. Gavino during the berthing procedure.

Sec. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage.

The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on beard. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master.

Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

or its pilots shall be determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. waters for which he is licensed, such as a particular harbor or river.

Gavino's Negligence: Gavino was not sure if the anchor was dropped on time thereby causing the incident. As pilot, Gavino should have seen to it that the order was carried out, and he could have done this in a number of ways, one of which was to inspect the bow of the vessel where the anchor mechanism was installed. Further, Gavino's reaction was even (haphazard) because instead of arresting fully the momentum of the vessel with the help of the tugboats, Gavino ordered merely "half-astern". It took Gavino another minute to order a "full-astern". By then, it was too late. The vessel's momentum could no longer be arrested and, barely a minute thereafter, the bow of the vessel hit the apron of the pier. Patently, Gavino miscalculated. He failed to react and undertake adequate measures to arrest fully the momentum of the vessel after the anchor failed to claw to the seabed. When he reacted, the same was even (haphazard). Gavino failed to reckon the bulk of the vessel, its size and its cargo. He erroneously believed that only one (1) anchor would suffice and even when the anchor failed to claw into the seabed or against a hard object in the seabed, Gavino failed to order the other anchor dropped immediately.

There is a presumption of fault against a moving vessel that strikes a stationary object such as a dock or navigational aid. The moving vessel must show that it was without fault or that the collision was occasioned by the fault of the stationary object or was the result of inevitable accident. Such vessel must exhaust every reasonable possibility which the circumstances admit and show that in each, they did all that reasonable care required. In the absence of sufficient proof in rebuttal, the presumption of fault attaches to a moving vessel which collides with a fixed object and makes a prima facie case of fault against the vessel. A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. In a broad sense, the term "pilot" includes both (1) those whose duty it is to guide vessels into or out of ports, or in particular waters and (2) those entrusted with the navigation of vessels on the high seas. Under English and American authorities, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. The pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the navigation even in localities where pilotage is compulsory. In this case, Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar into Berth 4. Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. A pilot should have a thorough knowledge of general and local regulations and physical conditions affecting the vessel in his charge and the

Capt. Kabankov's Negligence: He was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver. Kavankov refused to act even as Gavino failed to act. Even as Gavino gave mere "half-astern" order, Kavankov supinely stood by. The vessel was already about twenty (20) meters away from the pier when Gavino gave the "full-astern" order. Even then, Kavankov did nothing to prevent the vessel from hitting the pier simply because he relied on the competence and plan of Gavino. While the "full-astern'' maneuver momentarily arrested the momentum of the vessel, it was, by then, too late. All along,

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

Kavankov stood supinely beside Gavino, doing nothing but relay the commands of Gavino. Inscrutably, then, Kavankov was negligent. Under normal circumstances, the abovementioned facts would have caused the master of a vessel to take charge of the situation and see to the maneuvering of the vessel himself. Instead, Capt. Kavankov chose to rely blindly upon his pilot, who by this time was proven ill-equipped to cope with the situation. In sum, where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master being required to permit him to navigate it, if the master observes that the pilot is incompetent or physically incapable, then it is the dury of the master to refuse to permit the pilot to act. But if no such reasons are present, then the master is justified in relying upon the pilot, but not blindly. Under the circumstances of this case, if a situation arose where the master, exercising that reasonable vigilance which the master of a ship should observe that the pilot was so navigating the vessel that she was going into danger, and there was in the exercise of reasonable care and vigilance an opportunity for the master to intervene so as to save the ship from danger, the master should have acted accordingly. The master of a vessel must exercise a degree of vigilance commensurate with the circumstances. vessel, or other property, resulting from acts of a member of an association in the actual performance of his duty for a greater amount than seventy-five per centum (75%) of its prescribed reserve fund; it being understood that if the association is held liable for an amount greater than the amount above-stated, the excess shall be paid by the personal funds of the member concerned.

There being no employer-employee relationship, clearly Article 2180 of the Civil Code is inapplicable since there is no vicarious liability of an employer to speak of. Art. 1207 of the Civil Code provides that there is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. Plainly, Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, which as an implementing rule has the force and effect of law, can validly provide for solidary liability. " Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 may be a mere rule and regulation issued by an administrative agency pursuant to a delegated authority to fix "the details" in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Nonetheless, said administrative order, which adds to the procedural or enforcing provisions of substantive law, is legally binding and receives the same statutory force upon going into effect. In that sense, it has equal, not lower, statutory force and effect as a regular statute passed by the legislature."

MPA's liability: MPA is jointly and solidarily liable with its member pilot. Capt. Gavino, in the absence of employer-employee relationship and in applying Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, as basis for the adjudged solidary liability of MPA and Capt. Gavino. PAR. XXVII. In all pilotage districts where pilotage is compulsory, there shall be created and maintained by the pilots or pilots' association, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, a reserve fund equal to P1,000.00 for each pilot thereof for the purpose of paying claims for damages to vessels or property caused through acts or omissions of its members while rendered in compulsory pilotage service. In Manila, the reserve fund shall be P2,000.00 for each pilot. PAR. XXVIII. A pilots' association shall not be liable under these regulations for damage to any

SABIDO vs. CUSTODIO

FACTS: In Barrio Halang, Laguna, two trucks, one driven by Nicasio Mudales and belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company (LTB), and the other (6x6 truck) driven by Aser Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve. Agripino Custodio a passenger of LTB bus, who was

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO

hanging on the left side as truck was full of passengers was sideswiped by the track driven by Aser Lagunda. As a result, Agripino Custodio was injured and died. It was found that the LTB bus with full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding downward a slope, whereas the 6x6 truck was climbing up with no cargoes or passengers on board but for three helpers, owner Sabido and driver Lagunda. Petitioners' truck was running at a considerable speed, despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right side of the road, said truck was driven on its middle portion and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite direction as to sideswipe a passenger riding on its running board. The CFI and the CA concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. and its driver Nicasio Mudales, had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable. Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the running board of the bus while the same was still 5 or seven 7 meters away from the truck driven by him. Indeed, the distance between the two (2) vehicles was such that he could have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck were not running at a great speed.

Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact, the negligence of the first two (2) would not have produced this result without the negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners' negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear chance. Petitioners contend that they should not be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver, because the latter's liability arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the former springs from a quasi delict. The rule is, however, that: According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor ... . (38 Am. Jur. 946, 947.)

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for the death of Custodio.

HELD: The carrier and its driver were clearly guilty of negligence for having allowed Agripino Custodio to ride on the running board of the bus, in violation of Section 42 of Act No. 3992, and that this negligence was the proximate cause of Agripino's death. It should be noted, however, that the lower court had, likewise, found the petitioners guilty of contributory negligence, which was as much a proximate cause of the accident as the carrier's negligence, for petitioners' truck was running at a considerable speed, despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right side of the road, said truck was driven on its middle portion and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite direction as to sideswipe a passenger riding on its running board. Further, the CA gave weight to the testimony of petitioner

TORTS CASE DIGESTS 3C ATTY. LINDA JIMENO