Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Commission Sensitive
Law Enforcement Sensitive
10/21/03
I. How did AI-Qaeda as an institution (as opposed to the hijackers) raise and
move funds to support itself? What were Al-Qaeda's expenditures?
II. Prior to 9/11, what did the U.S. do to identify and stop the raising and
movement of money in support of terrorist groups?
A. What did the USG do to gather and analyze intelligence on the raising and
movement of money in support of terrorist groups?
a. CIA
i. Description and assessment of the CIA structure involved in
terrorism generally and terrorist financing specifically
(a) Non-CTC efforts
(0 9/11 Closed by Statute
(ii)
b. General description and assessment of the State Department's role in
gathering and analyzing financial intelligence related to terrorist groups
i. Structure of State for gathering and analyzing intelligence
generally
(a) Analysis by INK
• Pre-9/11 seems that limited analysis on top of distributed intell|9/n closed by statute |
• receives and disseminates intell
• ask: how prepare briefings, summaries
(b) Other efforts
(i) Foreign trips/meetings
• seem fairly high-level; not sure much intell gained
(ij) | 9/11 Closed by S t a t u t e |
• appears that posts wd visit locations; more to verify HQ info than to gather?
• but lots of errors from HQ so perhaps both functions
(iii) Multilateral/regional efforts
B. What did the USG do to disrupt the raising and movement of money in
support of terrorist groups?
1.
• State objected to draft EO, treasury secretary w/ broad discretion, rdos-7439, rdos-7436
(b) Description of how designations occur (including chain of
command, information flows, funding)
(i) | 9/11 Closed by S t a t u t e |
1. What were US efforts to garner international support for efforts to block and
freeze assets
a. Description of the general international attitude regarding counter-terrorist
financing
i. Support of multilateral institutions for blocking and freezing
(a) UN actions against Taliban UNSCR 1267 Oct. 99
• unanimously adopted, Malaysia reversed initial 'no' vote, 10/15/99, rdos-5730, rdos-
6665
• loopholes in UNSCR 1333, 4.12.01, rdos-5721
• US requested countries to comply w/ sanctions before take effect, 10/26/99, rdos-6659
(b) Other examples of support
• early Egypt efforts, rdos-4332 O
• SA stripped UBL of citizenship, froze assets, 4/8/94
• UK proposed G-8 project based initiative dealing w/ Saudi-based NGOs, 2/24/00
(RDOS 03005171)
• UAE offered to assist, 9/14/98 (RDOS -6364)
• G-8 mtg. considerable disciissinn of TF, 3/8/99, Fr draft convention, rdos-5156
,| 9/11 closed by statute |Qerm jegjs> 3/2Q/98, rdos-5746
• arab CT convention, 4/22/98, rdos-6541
• draft OAU convention, 3/26/99, rdos-6705
• summary of EU CTF efforts, 6/7/99, rdos-6681
• UN adopted US/R resolution imposing new sanctions on Taliban, Ch/Malaysia
abstained, France approved of time limits, 12/20/00, rdos-5263
(c) USG response to independent foreign efforts
(i) Did they overlap USG efforts
(ii) Were they seen as effective
(iii) Interaction with private sectors
• US-UK. 2/10/98, rdos-6222
ii. Foreign entities' views of the terrorism problem and the utility of
blocking and freezing
3
• SA mission budget, one line abt CTF, good overall description, US-SA, rdos-6402
9/11 Classified Information
' US-GCC senior level consultations, US presents UBL strategy, 8/7/00, rdos-5726
US amb mtg w/ EGIS, outlines strategy incldg going after $, 3/27/96, rdos-6430
3.
9/11 Classified Information
• re: US AML, US looking for ways to improve, little effect on fundraising by T orgs,
3/16/98, rdos-5145
• R discussing draft AML law w/ Europe, draft to Duma, 4/7/99, rdos-5727
• Canadian working on CTF legis, 6/4/99, rdos-6682
• EU legal regimes, no specific TF legis, 5/3/99, rdos-6686
• Italy regime, 10/4/01, rdos-5253
• AML reports, 99-01, rdos-4329B, C, D
I 9/11 Classified Information I
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Commission Sensitive ~ Law Enforcement Sensitive
Commission Sensitive — Law Enforcement Sensitive
10/21/03
iii. FIUs
iv. Private sector sophistication
b. Description and assessment of USG efforts to improve these abilities
i. Assessments
ii. Training
iii. Funding
iv. Role of various agencies (coordination, etc.)
• embassy Cairo proposed 5 yr training program, no mention CTF, rdos-6513
• Cairo notes that ML not big in Egypt, no laws against, 9/24/98, rdos-6512
• US trying to internationalize training efforts, include G-8 in FSAT visits, 3/18/02 (rdos-
5845)
III. Based on what we know about the 9/11 conspiracy, were there any key
opportunities to detect them as a result of their financial transactions? What
other lessons can be drawn from these financial transactions?
• criminality
• KYC
• hawala/charity oversight
• wire transfers
• zakat and relnp bw charities and banks
IV. What has al-Qaeda done since 9/11 to continue to support terrorist
operations and move money?
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Commission Sensitive — Law Enforcement Sensitive
Commission Sensitive -- Law Enforcement Sensitive
10/21/03
V. What are we currently doing, and have these efforts eliminated the
deficiencies present before 9/11?
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Commission Sensitive -- Law Enforcement Sensitive
Commission Sensitive -- Law Enforcement Sensitive
10/21/03
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Commission Sensitive -- Law Enforcement Sensitive
Commission Sensitive -- Law Enforcement Sensitive
10/21/03
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Commission Sensitive ~ Law Enforcement Sensitive