Is there any influence of religion (i.e. Hinduism) in shaping Indian foreign policy-making or its discourse in the past or today?

P.K. Gautam replies: A good question. The questioner must also link this with the reply of Ashok K. Behuria of IDSA at http://idsa.in/askanexpert?page=8 to the question on possible impact of Indias religious demographic profile on its foreign policy. India is a secular, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious nation. Now if Hindus are a majority religion, it does not mean there is a Hindu culture of foreign policy. An atheist can be a Hindu and vice versa. Buddhism and Jainism are atheistic religions. Even before the birth of the three Abrahamic rooted religions, during and after the consolidation of Mauryan Empire in the 4th century BCE, books on statecraft, such as Arthashastra by Kautilya, were influencing the foreign policy making in India. Western authors loosely mention that this was Hindu policy, whereas Emperor Chandragupta Maurya died as a Jain. His son Bindusara was a Hindu and grandson Emperor Ashoka became a Buddhist. In theory, foreign policy is built up of four Upayas (approaches): Sama- Dana- Bheda - Danda, meaning conciliation, gifts, rupture and force. Application of foreign policy consists of six Gunasor policies: (i) Sandhi, making a treaty containing conditions or terms, that is, the policy of peace (ii) Vigraha, the policy of hostility (iii) Asana, the policy of remaining quiet (and not planning to march on an expedition) (iv) Yana, marching on an expedition (v) Samsraya,seeking shelter with another king, and (vi) Dvaidhibhava, the double policy of Sandhi with one king and Vigrah with another at the same time. Similarly, conquest is of three types: Dharmavijay (just war), Lobbhavijay (war of greed) and Asuravijay (conquest like a demon). Yudh or war is also of three kinds (i) Prakash-yudh, open fight in place and time indicated (ii) Kuta-yudh, concealed fighting involving use of tactics in battlefield, and (iii) Tusnim-yudh or silent fighting. Based on these traditions, with realties of todays world, Indias foreign policy is influenced by its extant ancient traditions and indigenous knowledge. Statecraft is a-religious. National interest, like in any other countrys foreign policy, remains the key driver of Indias foreign policy as well. How fruitful it has been for India not to align with any major powers historically? What should be the future course when it comes to dealing with the present major powers of the world? If by nonalignment we mean not being a formal member of a military alliance, then India has remained nonaligned since independence, and it is likely to remain nonaligned for the foreseeable future. However, if nonalignment means not even having a military or security understanding with another country directed against a third country, then India was obviously NOT nonaligned between August 1971 and August 1991 when the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship was operational. The advantage of nonalignment lies in not getting entangled in other people's wars and consequently focusing on one's own internal affairs. However, the practice of such a policy is possible only under two conditions. One, the country in question enjoys 'splendid isolation' in terms of its geographical location (like the United States, for example, which is separated from Eurasia by two oceans). Two,

the country in question has no adversaries/rivals, particularly adversaries who are more powerful. If it does, then whether it likes it or not, it will have to either align or at least come to a defence/security understanding with another country with which it shares common concerns about its adversary. So long as Pakistan was India's only adversary, which is until the 1962 India-China War, India could afford to remain nonaligned because it had the ability to tackle the challenges posed by Pakistan on its own. However, once the China challenge emerged and India found itself unable to deal with Chinese power on its own, India leaned towards the Soviet Union to serve as a balancer. Multialignment proved impossible for India given US-China rapprochement and the larger combination of the China-Pakistan-United States that appeared on the scene with the beginning of the 1970s. In its own view, India was technically not a member of the Warsaw Pact and hence was 'nonaligned' in the superpower Cold War; but this proposition was not fully accepted by the US and its allies. The larger point to note here is that given China's emergence as Asia's largest economy with Asia's largest military machine and defence expenditure, India simply does not have the ability to deal with the challenges that China has begun to pose. It therefore needs allies and friends with which if not to align but at least coordinate defence and security policy. Nonalignment is therefore a suboptimal policy option for India in the coming years. Why are the international organisations not taking effective steps to curb terrorist activities in the Sahel region? Many countries in the Sahel region lack the capacity to tackle issues facing them owing to fragile state structures, and pressing political and socio-economic concerns. Regional problems, such as organised crime; trafficking of arms, humans and weapons; and, proliferation of terrorist networks are cross-border in nature, necessitating strong inter-state interaction. Regional cooperation, however, has been fragmented due to economic and political incapacities, and in some cases, outstanding bilateral contentions. Efforts to deal with these problems at the national level have proved to be inadequate due to their trans-national nature and porous borders between countries in the region. International organisations have worked on combating transnational threats, such as terrorism for over a decade. The African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the United Nations, and the European Union (EU) have all formulated approaches to support security in the region. Most recently, the EU launched a civilian mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel) to assist in improving the capacities of the Nigerian security forces, and eventually those of Mali and Mauritania - the other frontline states - in combating terrorism and organised crime, improving national control over territories, and in facilitating development in the region. The United States has also played a prominent role in strengthening regional counter-terrorism capabilities. Though multilateral frameworks may be the best way to address a trans-national issue, such as terrorism in Sahel, there are many challenges to it as well.

As mentioned earlier, regional cooperation is lacking since not all Sahelian governments can agree on the best way to tackle these issues. There is also resistance to a regional approach to countering terrorism because of the perception that it could encroach on their sovereignty. Governments in the region have also been sensitive to international intervention, particularly Western-backed, since it is seen as detracting from more pressing local development priorities. Given recent events in the region, particularly in the Western Sahel, international assistance may be critical to addressing these threats. Why should India be concerned about the evolving situation in Maldives? India should be concerned as Maldives has come under the control of forces that may not be as friendly as the previous regime was. Though the new president has paid visit to India, it has been noticed that there are voices trying to undermine the interests of Indian companies, like the GMR. It is feared that this could only be the beginning. India should also be concerned about the rising power of Islamists in the country. They are not only supporting the present government but are also gaining in influence within the country. The political flux in Maldives will also encourage other external forces, like China and Pakistan, to strengthen their hold in the country. How internet-based social media could be a threat to security, and what can be done about it? Internet based social media is per se not a threat to security. It follows in a long line of technological innovations that have enhanced human interaction, enabling both the conveying of information, news and opinion at a rapid pace, as well as widening and deepening the democratic discourse. Like any other advancement in technology, its use comes with challenges, making it a double edged sword, in this case, for those involved with safeguarding public security. They are concerned by its potential for disrupting public order, either involuntarily through the unchecked spread of rumours, or deliberately through the propagation of misinformation with the intent of creating enmity between groups. A combination of the two was witnessed recently and has led to calls for regulating social media. However, the nature of the medium is such that it has raised valid questions as to whether such regulation is possible without infringing on the fundamental rights of the citizen relating to freedom of speech and privacy. Even as that debates continues, there are many other steps that the government can take to get in front of the problem. In the first instance, the authorities can use the same medium to provide correct information and nip rumours in the bud. Existing technologies and laws provide sufficient leeway to the authorities to effectively monitor internet traffic, including social media, in real-time, but are under-utilised for a variety of reasons, largely to do with coordination. In fact, along the matrix of cyber security challenges, social media pales in comparison to other challenges, such as securing critical infrastructure and countering cyber espionage, which are much more pressing and can have greater negative consequences. What strategy did US follow to check migration from Mexico? Can it be of relevance to India in terms of preventing illegal migration?

For the United States, illegal migration from its southern land borders, especially from Mexico, has been a major border management challenge since the 1960s. However, the inflow of Mexicans assumed overwhelming proportions in the 1980s, compelling the Reagan administration to enact the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), making it illegal for employers to hire unauthorised immigrants. This Act did not prove effective as the trend of illegal migration continued in subsequent years. During the 1990s, under the National Strategy Plan formulated in 1994, several operations, such as Operation Hold-the-Line (El Paso 1994), Operation Gatekeeper (San Diego, 1994),Operation Safeguard (Nogales, Arizona 1994), and Operation Rio Grande (South Texas, 1997) to prevent the entry of illegal migrants from Mexico were conducted with some success. Currently, under the National Border Patrol Strategy of 2005, the United States Border Patrol (USBP), which is responsible for guarding the US borders, deploys personnel, tactical infrastructure and technology to prevent illegal migration. At present, of the total border patrol agents deployed along the countrys international borders, 80 per cent are deployed along its southern borders to watch the line and interdict any unathorised entry in the United States. Besides, forward operating bases and check posts have been constructed for conducting and coordinating patrols along the border. Physical obstacles such as fences and vehicle barriers (permanent and temporary) have also been constructed to impede the illegal entry of people and vehicles. To date, nearly 650 miles of fencing, including 299 miles of vehicle barriers and 350 miles of pedestrian fence, have been erected along the USMexico border. To improve detection, floodlights are being installed, while roads are being laid for better mobility of patrol agents. Various electronic surveillance devices, such as remote video surveillance systems, sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, mobile night vision scopes, radars, etc are deployed as force multipliers. The US strategy to prevent the inflow of migrants has achieved mixed results. The massive deployment of personnel and resources has indeed resulted in large scale arrests of persons trying to illegally cross into the United States. While apprehension figures since 2006 of illegal migrants from Mexico show a declining trend, indicating that fewer people are trying to cross the US-Mexico border, the fact remains that the number of illegal migrants in the United States grew from 3.5 million in 1990 to 10.8 million in 2009, of which 6.7 million were from Mexico. India too has employed a similar strategy to guard its borders against illegal migration. It has deployed border forces and installed electronic devices to guard the borders. India has also erected fences along its borders with Bangladesh and Pakistan to prevent illegal migration. Like the United States, India has to an extent been successful in preventing large-scale illegal migration. A decline in the number of illegal migrants apprehended by the Border Security Force over the years bears a testimony to this fact. Has Mauritius offered the lease of Agalega Islands to the Indian Navy? What does it mean for India?

There is apparently some confusion on this issue. News papers had reported that the Islands were offered during the visit of Dr. Arvin Boolell, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and International Trade of the Republic of Mauritius to India during July 4-7, 2012. However, a press statement by the Mauritian High Commission had stated: In the several interviews given by Minister A. Boolell to the written press, never was the issue of Agalega raised either on a stand-alone basis or as part of a trade-off for the DTA (Double Taxation Avoidance) issue. The issue was also never discussed with the Indian authorities. At no point in time did the Minister refer to any deal as mentioned in an article entitled Mauritius offers India 2 Islands in effort to preserve tax treaty in todays edition of The Times of India. The said article is erroneous, misleading, false and malicious. There is also no mention of the offer on the website of the Ministry of External Affairs. As per newspaper reports, the issue of handing over of the Islands in 2006 had met with stiff political resistance. The Island offer has been connected with three issues Firstly, to avoid cancellation of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement; secondly, development as a tourist resort; and thirdly, as a strategic military base. In the first issue, Mauritius has apparently more to gain, and in the second issue both nations could gain. The third issue would require deft political and diplomatic manoeuvring and India is unlikely to set up a military base for its own use. However, development of a military base for joint operations could be considered. How far is Pakistan Army radicalised? What are its implications for India? Religious radicalisation has two profiles. First is the society at large which may not actively pursue the radical agenda, but empathises with it and willingly or under duress supports it. The other profile comprises people who want to actively further the radical agenda by forcing their diktat on others through terror, inducement, or persuasion. This would apply to the growth of Islamic radicalism in Pakistani society at large also. And what ails a society, ails the nations armed forces also, as the latter springs from the former. Pakistan Army emerged from the erstwhile British Indian Army and retained its structures and ethos. Very few changes, that too cosmetic in nature, were made in the structure and functioning of the Pakistan Army in independent Pakistan. However, things began to change after General Zia-ul Haq initiated his Islamisation policies (out of as much his personal beliefs as his political strategy to deal with Zulfiqar Ali Bhuttos p olitical legacy). Pakistan Army, up to this point of time comprised of Muslim soldiers and officers who naturally revered, or at least had sympathy for Islam and Islamic causes, but did not want it to interfere with their professional duties and functioning. However, Zias Islamisation policies brought in a new breed of officers and men who wanted to pursue an active Islamic agenda in military matters. Not only proselytization activities of the Deobandi/Wahabi dispensation were allowed in the barracks, even active personnel were allowed to go for activities such as Tabligh. A new breed of military thinkers and strategicians also emerged who began to propound a merger of social jihadism with military plans. The name of Brigadier S. K Malik is foremost among such military scholars. His treatise, The Quranic Concepts of War, propounded the inevitability of a conflict between Dar-ul Islam (the world of Islam) and Dar-ul Harb (the world of non-believers) in which not just Islamic armed forces but even

the society had to join in and use terror to such an extant that the enemy lost the will to fight even before the actual conflict started. This doctrine led to the creation of non-state armed surrogates by the Pakistan Army/ISI likeSipah-eSahaba Pakistan (SSP to quell the Shiite opposition to Zia-ul Haqs pro-Sunni Islamisation measures), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (to cow-down Christians and other minorities). It also led to creation of various Kashmir/India centric armed groups beginning with Hizb-ul Mujahideen and going on to Lashkar-e- Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. Anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan further strengthened this breed of officers and soldiers in Pakistan Army. When General Musharraf tried to pull back the clock, it is these elements who struck back. There have been reports of some units of Pakistani armed forces, particularly in the frontier forces, having refused to conduct operations against the Islamic fighters belonging to Tehriq-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani General Headquarters (GHQ) using predominantly Shiite Northern Light Infantry (NLI) for taking on TTP in Swat and other areas of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan Army is not fighting the TTP just to preserve the state; it is fighting to ensure its own survival also. The TTP does not want to rest content just with sustaining an Islamic Republic of Pakistan with its British or Western oriented structures and ethos, it wants to replace them, including the military traditions and practices, with structures and ethos that conform to the Quran and the Sunnah as per its understanding of Islam. There are indications that the number of those who support this agenda is constantly increasing and moving upwards in Pakistans armed forces. The attempts on Musharrafs life, the Mehran atta ck last year and the most recent attack on PAF Minhas, all of whom had strong links with men in uniform, suggest that the virus of Islamic radicalism has travelled far in Pakistans military establishment a fact that has been acknowledged by the top brass also from time to time. While most of the top generals may have remained immune to this virus, the same can not be said either of the middle level officers, and most certainly not, for the lower ranks. Japan-China stand-off over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands The dispute between Japan and China over the barren rocky islands known as Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea owes its origins to the unfinished business of the Second World War. At the end of the war, the United States dispossessed Japan of most of its overseas island territories such as Taiwan, but curiously left untouched the territorial issue of some of the smaller islands. A reading of US intentions at that time would indicate that Japanese sovereignty would continue only over the four main Japanese islands, with the others being assigned to erstwhile owners. But US intentions were never given practical shape. At the end of the war, the Soviet Union marched in and captured the four northern islands in the Kuriles chain north of Hokkaido, the northern most main Japanese island. Left unclear and untouched were the Senkaku/Diaoyu group of islets that often submerge at high tide. What is different now is the rising tide of nationalism in both Japan and China. Both vociferously lay claim to the islets and the hidden message is the sense of rivalry, strategic concern and future prospects. The present phase of the dispute erupted in April 2012 when the Mayor of Tokyo, facing a difficult political outcome, decided to up the ante by pledging to buy the islands. He thereby hoped to refurbish his nationalist credentials. The feelings and attitude of the Japanese people towards

China began to change sometime from 2010 onwards when they realised that China had eclipsed Japan to become the world's second-largest economy. Confident of its newly acquired status, China also began to adopt a more hard line approach to maritime disputes. This became evident when Japan arrested a Chinese fishing boat and its crew near the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, but was forced to back down and release them when China threatened to cut the export to Japan of rare earthsa vital mineral in the manufacture of hi-tech items. On a strategic level, concerns about China's rising military and economic power have prompted Japan to broaden its foreign policy options by engaging other Asia-Pacific countries and even India, while strengthening its own defence capabilities and stepping up security co-operation with the US. In forums such as ASEAN, Japan has tried to encourage other countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei to move in tandem to oppose Chinese claims in the South China Sea. On the other hand, Chinese nationalists see such Japanese moves as willingness to second US efforts to contain China's rise and expand US presence and influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan is seen as the fulcrum or the pivot on which the US hopes to reorient its policy of engaging once again with the region. China has also not taken kindly to Japanese efforts to bolster the anti-China sentiments of some ASEAN countries. Japan fully supports their intentions of dealing with China collectively rather than on an individual basis as China desires. And China is watching very carefully the evolving IndoJapanese strategic relationship. The rise of nationalism in both Japan and China and the sovereignty issue over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea is a highly explosive mix, perhaps even more so than the South China Sea island and territorial disputes. Chinese nationalists often link present Japanese policies with atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers during the Japanese invasion of China in the Second World War. This is because the Chinese psyche is easily aroused and anti-Japanese feelings, though dormant, are never too far below the surface. Thus incidents surrounding these islands easily revive historical wounds, stir national pride and restrict diplomatic space for an equitable solution. On 16 August 2012 the Chinese newspaper Global Times, an affiliate of the Peoples Dai ly, even went to the extent of publishing a photograph of a demonstrator on the disputed islands proudly holding the KMT Taiwanese flag! It would have been unthinkable and blasphemous just a few years ago. It is obvious that neither China nor Japan desire a large-scale conflict, since both have nothing substantial to gain from such a conflict. Nevertheless, there is deepening pessimism on both sides over the prospects of a peaceful settlement to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, primarily because of the harsh public sentiments that it has unleashed in both countries. Both governments are aware of the deep strategic mistrust that exists between the two countries. What is also adding fuel to this mistrust is the current domestic political turmoil in both countries. While the Japanese leadership is facing a fragmented and shifting political landscape, the Chinese leadership is in the midst of a once in a decade delicate power transfer. Neither country at this stage can be seen to be soft, for it would adversely affect their political prospects. It is for this reason that both prefer to let the dispute simmer for the present, for it suits their respective political purposes. If Prime Minister Noda calls for early elections in Japan and manages to retain power against all odds and the Chinese leadership manages to successfully conclude their 18th Party Congress, there might be some hope that this

dispute can be safely put aside. To find a resolution of the dispute at the present juncture when feelings are running high on both sides is indeed very problematical. Dont Shoot the Messenger: The Un-Social Strategy When the Jasmine revolution swept up the Arab spring, detractors around the world said democratic nations would be safe. The new media revolution would only help democracies engage further. This belief has held strong. Yet, those in the corridors of power, here in India, have felt increasingly uncomfortable. This is unchartered territory. The government finds itself in a new information battlefield with no contingency plan. The manipulation of the social media in allegedly spurring the mass exodus of north east Indians from all over the country, fearing retaliation in the aftermath of the Assam violence, has only confirmed its worst fears. The government reaction has been typicalcensorship and crackdown. But naturally, the backlash to the decision has been equally loud, spurring a nationwide debate on internet freedom and government control. It is almost a sense of deja vu! The last time we saw television studio discussions this animated and newspaper editorials this frantic was during the peak of the India Against Corruption movement spearheaded by a septuagenarian Gandhian Anna Hazare. Social media in combination with television coverage gave the movement an unprecedented momentum that had the establishment completely taken by surprise. The impulsive reaction then too was an immediate crackdown on social media websites. The only difference was that then the millions out on the street were protesting misgovernance, today they are fleeing for their safety. Here are two examples: one that pledges to test the true strength of our democracy and the other that exposes the helplessness of the establishment to guarantee and assure its citizens safety against hate crimes. In both cases, what is obvious is the manipulation of the messenger. Clearly, the establishment has been sitting this game out. With no tools at its disposal, or specialists aware of the advances in the new communication genre, the government is simply overwhelmed. The glare of 24x7 news coverage hastens reaction time resulting in predictable statements threatening crackdown and censorship. In fact, some television journalists believe that it was relentless pressure from social media followers of various networks that actually propelled sustained television coverage of the Assam violence.1The new media impact is clearly here to stay. In response to this, according to the most recent reports from Guwahati, the government has banned 250 websites, which, it alleges, fuelled the communal fears.2 The Indian government has also stated that it possesses evidence against a Pakistan-based hardline group that is alleged to have been involved in doctoring images and spreading them across Facebook, Twitter, You Tube and other such websites to incite people and create panic among people from the north east living across India.3 The Prime Ministers Office has asked Twitter to remove all fake account handles floated in the name of the Prime Minister.4 While Twitter relented partially, Google and Facebook have responded to government pressure by citing legal tangles and redirecting requests to Uncle Sam.5 The US government, incidentally, urged India a few days ago to maintain internet freedom amid reports of a crackdown.6

This episode, which has started the controversy on social media and regulation, begs many questions to be answered. First, can the authorities truly blame social media alone for the ramifications of the violence in Assam to the hate crimes in Pune, protests in Mumbai and the exodus from Bangalore? Second, if rumours alone could trigger mass exodus, there also looms the larger question of integration and identity of citizens from the north east with the rest of India. As a nation we have failed to assure them of their safety. Finally, violence in Assam still continues despite government clampdowns on social media. So, are we really missing the wood for the trees? If one were to leave the politics aside and look at the bigger picture, India and its governance machinery have stood exposed to a massive cyber security challenge and put themselves in an awkward position both domestically and internationally. Experts on cyber security admit that even reports on cyber security that provide policy recommendations to the government have often overlooked the aspect of dealing with social media. But can we afford to do this any longer? According to a survey analysis on social media usage in India, of the TRAI listed 121 million internet users 46 million are monthly active Facebook users (which has made India dethrone Indonesia from the second spot of most frequent Facebook usage).7 Twitter has a total user base of more than 14 million in India, which is also the sixth largest country in terms of personal accounts.8 This by no means is a small number. It also reflects the changing patterns of communication among urban India. This is an audience that the government needs to reach out to. While appreciating the effort taken by the government and various departments to engage with the new media phenomenon, one but has to ask in the face of these staggering numbers, is hosting twitter handles and facebook account links on government pages enough? Routine schedules of meetings and press releases aside, do the authorities engage and exploit the potential of the new media to their advantage? Most importantly is a there a method to this madness? Perhaps there is, but the problem lies herein. We have never heard it out and aloud. Or at least that is the perception. The messages dont seem to get through the clutter. The problem seems to stem from the organisational culture and mindset, which has still not embraced the phenomenon that is the new media revolution. So every time there is a problem that stems up in the space, the establishments impulsive reaction is to shut down. Journalists reporting on the ground in Assam confirm that there has still been no effort from either the state government or the centre in using the social media and other forms of communication to counter the rumour mongers creating havoc in the state. All the efforts have been concentrated on clamping down on websites with offensive content. This approach is necessary, but reactive. Could authorities have invested in a plan to communicate assurances of protection and safety to the people in the affected areas? The Prime Ministers speech in both houses of Parliament may no t have been heard by a villager in a relief camp in Assam. For the government, the internet has always been a tool for better governance and its application has been technical, with issues of e-governance handled by technocrats. Not much thought has been given to the aspect of content and here lies its biggest shortcoming. 9 Now having come under

strident criticism, the Centre has fine tuned its cyber strategy by setting up a dedicated panel to screen websites. *and+ deciding against a blanket ban of Twitter handles it has sought to set up a panel to screen every URL or website that intelligence and technical agencies believe should be blocked.10 However, in the interim, the passing of orders and their subsequent retraction, amplified by clumsy press releases, has resulted in the government clearly losing the perception battle.11 Yet, many believe that pushing the bureaucracy to develop a proactive approach to communicating with the people and simultaneously developing a system to regulate social media content is also beset with systemic problems. The issue is two pronged social media monitoring and media engagement. The NTRO (National Technical Research Organisation), the apex intelligence body under the National Security Advisor, still does not have an official mandate of a monitoring agency. Ironically, it has only 50 people to handle media monitoring for the entire nation.12 On the other hand, if one required authorities to engage and counter propaganda, the most common refrain is the predicament of the fear of the Official Secrets Act that hovers above like the sword of Damocles. Larger issues of governance stuck in the paradigm of the colonial era mindset stand in the way of efforts to counter offensive propaganda and project a robust image of the country, says Josy Joseph, Senior Journalist with the Times of India.13 Censorship and crackdown can only be interim solutions. We need to look at alternative models that dont normatively take away the idea of India as a healthy democracy and draw negative comparisons with China. The immediate need is to communicate strategically and not shoot the messenger. What is India's agenda for attending the NAM Summit Meeting in Tehran despite the fact that the US doesn't approve it? There is no agenda for Indias attendance other than the fact that it is a founder member of the Non Aligned Movement, which notwithstanding the end of the Cold War, continues to have relevance as a forum for expression of views and exchange of ideas within the developing world. It also provides a significant voice as a consolidated voting bloc in the UN General Assembly and other international forums on aspects that are of concern to the developing world. Whet her the USA approves of Indias attendance or not is irrelevant, as the USA cannot presume to dictate Indias foreign policy. In fact, it is important to note in this context that even the Secretary General of the United Nations cannot avoid attending the NAM Summit just because it is being held in Teheran. The Government of Indias decision to attend at the highest level is well taken. It will not only provide an opportunity on the side-lines for the Indian Prime Minister to meet and make contact with newly elected heads of government of many countries like Egypt and others, but also provide an opportunity to engage with the Iranian leadership both in the bilateral and multi-lateral context. What are the Chinese and US interests in Myanmar, and what are its implications for India? Udai Bhanu Singh replies: Both China and the US are conscious of their economic and strategic stakes in Myanmar. However, it was China that seized the opportunity (especially after 1988) to exercise

influence in Myanmar at a time when the US ostracised the military regime for neglecting human rights and democracy. The US followed a two-pronged approach of sanctions and non-engagement till the visit in November 2011 of the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. China utilised the economic and strategic opportunity in Myanmar:

To develop its backward Yunnan province by exploiting Myanmars natural resources, sending its surplus population across the border and advancing its business interests. To access energy from off-shore Arakan region laying a dual pipeline starting from Kyaukphyu. To provide access to landlocked parts of its territory to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar by means of road, rail and river connectivity.

The US belatedly realised for following reasons that it too had interests in Myanmar:

The rise of China and its growing influence in Myanmar accompanied by increased assertiveness in the South China Sea and multilateral bodies. Negative impact on the US business interests.

For India, Myanmar is important due to following reasons:

A key component of its neighbourhood and Look East Policy. Critical to the comprehensive development of its North-eastern region, and for curbing insurgency. As a source of energy. Growing Chinese influence and its implications for the Indian Ocean and other non-traditional security issues.

The Inadequacies of the UN Arms Register It was certain that the shortcomings of the UN Register of Conventional Arms would resurface in the run up to the failed Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). This is because the deficiency lay in the type of weapon systems contained in this register and not so much in the spirit of the Treaty. Initiated in 1991, The Arms Register was emerging as the principal database that would contain the declarations of the member states, the signatories to the Treaty. It was conceived on the principle that a voluntary disclosure about weapons holding and acquisitions would go a long way in promoting transparency, and thus build confidence and trust among the members. But rhetoric apart, there is no escaping the perception that the ingredients of this register were initially seen only through a partisan prism, essentially as a strategic step against the weapons suppliers of the erstwhile Warsaw Pact countries. A scholarly view, put forward in 1995 ascribed the fructification of the register to the United Nations (UN) Security Council after the first Gulf War, i.e., Operation Desert Storm.1 The widespread belief in the powerful US-led camp was that something must be done to prevent the sort of destabilizing build up in conventional weapons that had taken place in Iraq in the 1980s.2 The effort was essentially aimed at stemming the flow of weapons from the freshly emerged state of Russia from the erstwhile USSR.

At the very outset, the register was never in sync with the conflicts which afflicted the world when the document was being designed. Several invidious logics seem to have been injected into the document during the formative periods and in the course of which the nominations focused only on big weapons of pure military relevance. A voluntary declaration scheme was accordingly devised for the member states as per which they could inform the UN about their military holdings. Eventually, in the years to come, they evolved into broad generic groups, namely, battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers. The practice was that a group of selected government experts would periodically examine the weapon systems in the laid-down framework of weapons of military relevance and advise the UN Secretary General as to what should go in the register. The UN apparently had abdicated its wisdom to a set of warriors who would advise at the bidding of their masters, sitting in far-flung capitals wearing several strategic interest garbs. But whilst these machinations were unfolding in the portals of the Security Council, the minions had shut their eyes to the globally pervasive phenomenon of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) unleashing mayhem in the 1980s throughout most of the world. The continents of Africa, Asia, the Americas, and even Europe, were engulfed. Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Central America (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala), Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan), and Southern Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka), all faced this peril. All but three of the 49 conflicts since 1990 relied on SALW as the only instruments of war; it was only the 1991 Gulf War that was dominated by heavy weapons. Memories are short but the events in Somalia, undivided Sudan and Afghanistan remind us of the infamous actions of the gun-running super powers. A civil war had become inevitable in the Somali society when the government fell in 1991180,000 Somalis were armed with enough ammunition left over from stock-piling to last another 20 years.3 The UN peace keepers had to contend with rival gangs battling each other with assault rifles, rocket propelled grenades and mortars. In neighbouring (former) Sudan, according to a UN estimate, over 500,000 people died in civil wars between 1983 and 1989.4 The tragedy of the Afghan War (197989) was the power play between the outside powers at its worst, in the course of which a US-led coalition pushed SALW worth over US$ 6 billion into the country.5 In 1990, as many as 16 armed conflicts had claimed 2,632,000 lives.6 People died in warsmostly civil and intra-state wars where SALW were employed. Despite these inhuman innovations in the phenomenon of armed conflict, it took the UN over a decade (in 2006) to recognise the signs and accept the fact that the SALW needed to be included in the UN arms register. The context thus had changed and, mercifully, we were acknowledging that the nature of warfare has undergone a metamorphosis and new variants of weapons systems were acquiring a far potent military significance. From the concept of counter-state wars we had descended to wars against society, especially in fledgling nations. To these, the whole concept of the UN Register appeared as a charade foisted by western powers. This was perhaps the primary reason for a substantial drop in the reports being sent to the UN register. It took civil society advocacy groups several years of persuasion and unrelenting pressure to have SALW included in the register. This hypothesis was seemingly proven when it was discovered that as a sequel to the introduction of the SALW in the register, the

reports from Africa improved significantly. It was a strategic shift in the military lexicon. These affected nations had much to do with the inclusion of the SALW in the register. This was but one small step in recognizing the appropriate types of weapons which ought to be included in order to make the document holistic and purposeful. The architects of the register, however, were still not able to visualize this adequately. They were truly caught up in the straitjacketed paradigm of military relevance when they glossed over the application of Land Mines and, especially, Anti Personnel Land Mines. Whilst the august body serving the ends of the Register design was not ready to emerge from battle fatigues, their own brethren from the Committee of Disarmament spearheaded the 1997 Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and their destruction. It was being promoted as an international agreement that would ban anti personnel landmines. We now know it as the Ottawa Convention or the Mine Ban Treaty. This syndrome continues to be the strangest paradox till today: it would not allow a weapons system to be listed in the register which was otherwise proposed to be banned by a treaty. The current situation is that the Mines Ban Treaty has not attracted the members of the UN Security Council and it is not being seen as a weapon of military relevance. There is a deep belief that for the Treaty to be robust and meaningful, it must be ensured that the weapon systems which will matter in the future are reflected in the very design of the instrument. This would point to threats and situations which the member states are aware of. If the endeavour is to build a consensus, then the Treaty must remain free from biases and prejudices of the past; at the same time, it should acknowledge that armed conflict is not inevitable. It can be avoided. Iran factor in Indias Afghan Policy As the date of withdrawal of foreign combat troops from Afghanistan draws nearer, New Delhi is determined to play a larger role in the conflict-prone country, in spite of reports of expanding Taliban influence. While some analysts are emphasising the threat of Taliban and cautioning India to lessen its engagement in Afghanistan, unlike in the 1990s, India is no longer considering withdrawal as an option. Moreover, because of continued American presence and long-term assured international engagement in reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, it would be difficult for the Taliban to repeat their performance of the 1990s. At the moment, a confident India is moving ahead with its plans to provide necessary training to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in order to make them combat-competent. Ensuring smooth security transition is the key to larger political stability of Afghanistan. Indias Afghan policy is driven by the twin themes of stability and development. A stable Afghanistan is less likely to act as a sanctuary for terror, and pose security threats to the countries in the neighbourhood. In addition, India has other geo-political interests; Afghanistan can provide it with the crucial link (via Iran) to central Asia. Thus Indian investment is aimed at providing critical developmental support and generating goodwill which can be converted into political capital to boost its staying power in Afghanistan.

India has pledged $2 billion worth of aid to Afghanistan. Some projects have already been implemented and some are in the pipeline. India has now proposed community based development projects worth $100 million which it plans to undertake in all the 34 provinces of Afghanistan. These projects would be implemented in the following sectors: agriculture, health, education and rural development. It will be used to provide vocational training, sanitation and drinking water facilities. The number of scholarships for the Afghan students has been raised from a total of 650 to 1000 students per year. India is also planning to allocate an additional $120 million for Salma dam project to meet the escalation cost caused by delay in project implementation. This dam could not be completed as per schedule in 2010 due to worsening security situation in the area resulting from frequent gun-battles between the Taliban and the project security personnel. This project is vital as it will generate 52 MW of power and irrigate 40,000 hectares of farm-land touching the lives of ordinary Afghans. In this context, to ensure its long-term engagement with Afghanistan, it is imperative for India to work on its relations with Iran which provides vital connectivity with Afghanistan through Chabahar, to sustain Indias presence there. Recently, Pakistan allowed Afghanistan to receive 1 00,000 tonnes of wheat from India out of its total pledged amount of 250,000 tonnes. This trade consignment is part of the trade and transit Agreement signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan and under this arrangement Afghanistan is allowed to import wheat from India through the Karachi port. However, Pakistan is not willing to allow India overland transit through its territory. After a long wait (and several meetings), Ahmedinijad government has finally approved $100 million Indian investment in Chabahar port. This has been pending for long due to political reasons. Indias relations with Iran have been strained due to Indias vote in the IAEA. Moreover, because of international sanctions, India is presently facing problems to pay Iran for its oil. There is an argument that by building roads and transportation links India would be able to pay Iran through other means. Notwithstanding US pressure, it is in the strategic interests of India to invest in the Chabahar port as an alternative link with central Asia. As per some media reports, India wants Afghanistan to be part of this link project and sign a trilateral Agreement on the sidelines of Non Alignment Summit which is going to be held in Tehran on August 30-31, 2012. Kabul has so far been noncommittal about this proposal fearing US reprisal. However, in January this year India assured Iran that it would build the missing part of the road and rail links to connect Iran to Afghanistan and beyond. Lately, some Afghan scholars are proposing an India-IranAfghanistan trilateral on the lines of several multilateral arrangements that Kabul has forged with its neighbours. There were also reports that the foreign ministers of these three countries had met in New York in 2010 and discussed the possibilities of initiating such a mechanism. But no progress could be made because of US pressures. There is no reason why India should not be cooperating with Iran to make its presence in Afghanistan sustainable. Since India is aspiring for a larger role in Afghanistan as envisaged in the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the two countries, any strategy to have an expanded presence in Kabul would require close cooperation with Iran for better access to Afghan territory through

Chabahar. In spite of US pressure, Afghanistan has maintained its links with Teheran. It has recently admitted that it did receive regular cash aid from Tehran. If US wants India to play a larger role in Afghanistan beyond 2014, and coordinate its efforts with the international community to stabilize Afghanistan, it should take a pragmatic look at Indias engagement with Iran. The US knows quite well that Pakistan has refused to provide land transit to India to trade with, or even send essential items to Afghanistan. Keeping in mind the distance and time factor to send goods to Afghanistan through Iran, India had to convert wheat into fortified biscuits to prevent it from rotting during transportation. Even India had to move five mega transformers for Salma dam project by air. Thus Iran remains crucial for Indias engagement with Afghanistan and central Asia. India is part of many multilateral initiatives on Afghanistan. Recently, India also held Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan to encourage private sector investment there. A seven-member Indian consortium, led by the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL), has won the bid for three iron ore mines with estimated reserves of 1.8 billion tonne at Hajigok in 2011. It is also interested in bidding for some copper mines in Afghanistan. To transport these mined minerals from Afghanistan Iran provides the only alternative route given Islamabads intransigence to allow India transit and trade. Thus, there are compelling reasons for India to collaborate closely with Teheran to make its Afghan policy successful. In fact, from a pragmatic point of view, India, US and Iran have a convergence of interest in Afghanistan and they should work together to stabilise Afghanistan. However, rather than coordinating their policies towards Afghanistan, US and Iran are engaged in a meaningless confrontation in Afghanistan. Iran wants the US to leave Afghanistan, while the US wants Iran to stay away from the internal conflict in Afghanistan. In this context, India has limited options; it has to work with the US to stabilise and rebuild Afghanistan and simultaneously, it has to have friendly relationship with Iran to access Afghanistan through its territory in order to sustain its links with Afghanistan. India has its security interests at stake in Afghanistan and would not like the return of a regressive regime in Afghanistan; therefore, it needs to stay engaged in Afghan beyond the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. Since India-US relationship has matured in the meanwhile, Indias strategic relationship with Iran s hould not hurt the US too much. Even if it does, since India has no other alternative, it should not hesitate to pursue a policy independent of US priorities. How can India justify its intervention in Bangladesh in 1971 when India was following a noninterventionist policy? We give below one account on the justification of the 1971 war and creation of Bangladesh. The trouble began when the Pakistani Army on March 25, 1971, in complete disregard of the mandate of 1970 general election, launched a brutal crackdown on the civilians in East Pakistan which subsequently led to an insurgency. From March/April 1971, refugees started pouring into India and a situation was reached where it was not economically possible for India to continue to host

about 10 million of them. Handling refugees and facing the ire of Washington which openly supported Pakistan, India was in a very precarious position. India had deep apprehensions concerning a long- drawn guerrilla war in East Pakistan with even pro- Chinese influence at a later date if it got protracted. India negotiated the friendship treaty with the then Soviet Union in August and undertook an extensive diplomatic-cum-political campaign to impress upon individual countries on the realities of the situation. The regional stability also was getting worst. Thus, it was in India national interest to get over the problem on grounds of humanitarian intervention. Pakistan launched an attack on the Western sector on December 3, 1971. Based on the legitimacy of self-defence, India undertook military action. While holding out in the Western sector, the Indian armed forces conducted combined operations with the freedom fighters or the Mukti Bahini and in a quick and decisive way ended the campaign in two weeks time with the surrender of Pakistans military in Bangladesh. The war also had the support of the people of India as there was a moral outrage and public sympathy in civil society including that of the French philosopher Andr Malraux and Sen MacBride of Ireland. Employing excellent diplomatic skills and negotiation strategy, India overcame a number of hurdles in the politics of the UN system during all stages. After the surrender of Pakistani troops, India did not allow UNs role to be thrust upon it. India favoured only direct negotiations between itself, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It needs to be remembered that India never took undue advantage of over 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war including civilians who were repatriated unilaterally after the Simla Agreement of 1972. According to the Indian tradition, the war was a dharmavijay (just war). In other words, it was jus ad bellum (the justice of resort to war) and its conduct jus in bello (the justice of the conduct of war). However historical memory should not lead to an unending bitterness. Issues such as war crimes and trial of guilty members of the Pakistan Army are still pending in Bangladesh. Justice also is due in view of continued ill treatment of innocent Biharis in Bangladesh who may have not sided with the Pakistan Army. Some Pakistanis due to one-sided perceptions may still carry a grudge and wish for revenge against India. Time has come for India not to rejoice crudely over its military success but now to seek better relations. That war was 41 years ago and violent conflict is unlikely to resolve issues in the present age. What could be the geo-political implications if Iran goes nuclear? If Iran goes nuclear, depending on whether one is a nuclear optimist or pessimist, it could lead either to a more stable Middle East/West Asia or be a cause of greater instabilities. Proponents of the former view include international relations theorists like Kenneth Waltz. Countries of the region of course hold quite a different view. Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries contend that a nuclear Iran would be emboldened to undertake de-stabilising activities with greater impunity. These could range from increased support for organizations, such as the Hezbollah and Hamas, to contemplating offensive actions like missile attacks or naval brinkmanship for instance.

Accordingly, these countries are fortifying themselves with missile defence assets, procuring sophisticated military assets, among other measures. The GCC countries like Saudi Arabia are also on record stating that they will most definitely explore the possibility of obtaining the nuclear option themselves if Iran goes nuclear. US officials like Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Strategic Command chief Gen. Robert Kehler have hinted at the possibility of bestowing extended nuclear deterrence on their allies in the region. What are the actual reasons for ethnic violence in Myanmar? What active role could India play in it? Ethnic conflict is one of Myanmars biggest challenges. It makes the task of n ational reconciliation tougher. Myanmar is a multi-ethnic country composed of seven ethnically designated states and regions (with Bamar or Burman majority) referred to in the colonial period as Frontier Burma and Ministerial Burma. The Burmans (mostly Buddhist), who are 68 per cent of the total population, form the majority. The other ethnic groups are the Shans, the Karens, the Rakhines, the Kachins, Chins, Was, Palaungs, the Nagas, etc. The British effectively put the country on a path of separate economic and political development when it divided it into Ministerial Burma (dominated by the Burmans and directly governed) and Outer Burma (dominated by the minorities and allowed a measure of autonomy). The British policy of preferring minorities in their recruitment to the army and civil administration saw a reaction in the post-independence period of military rule. The 2008 Constitution provided for six Self-Administered Zone/Division: Naga, Danu, Pa-O, Pa Laung, Kokang and Wa respectively. Following the 2010 general elections, demands for a second Panglong Conference were raised. However, the statelessness of Rohingya Muslims contributed to the violence and refugee flow seen in the recent past. India, on its part, desires stability in its neighbourhood and especially because of the common ethnic population on either side of the India-Myanmar border. India seeks to contribute to ethnic peace in Myanmar through improved economic condition, greater connectivity, emphasis on community based development with emphasis on health and education sector. In all this besides the government, the private sector and NGOs are required to be important stakeholders. How India views the coming of Muslim Brotherhood into power? Would it give rise to Islamic extremism? Ever since the popular protests against the regime of Hosni Mubarak started in Egypt, India has expressed its support for the will of the people of Egypt. Now India is ready to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood in power in Cairo and has shown no hesitation in doing so. After the elections, India welcomed the verdict of the people of Egypt and congratulated its leader Mohamed Morsi. Indias External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna visited Cairo in March 2012 and chaired the sixth India-Egypt joint commission meeting. He met the top leadership of the country including the Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi. During Krishnas visit, India and Egypt signed four documents on cooperation in the field of environment protection, cultural exchange, agriculture and standardisation. Both the countries have also identified areas, such as, trade & economic

cooperation, science & technology, culture and information technology, to further strengthen their cooperation. It would be too early to predict the rise in Islamic extremism with the coming of Muslim Brotherhood to power. It is expected that Muslim Brotherhood will practice moderation and rather conduct itself as a responsible political party than an underground Islamist organisation. The party has promised to build a modern democratic state and is under pressure to satisfy both the conservative elements and the secular-minded sections of the Egyptian society. A lot depends upon the direction in which the party and the leadership would like to take the revolution. What are China's interests in Syria? Syria is an important country for China in the West Asian region. While the region has been dominated by the USA, other powers like China and Russia have been vying for influence among the countries in the region. The recent conflict in Syria and Chinas use of veto on the resolutions against the Assad regime has brought to fore the Chinese actions and interests in the country. For China, Syria is a strategic ally in the troubled region and in recent times both the countries have attempted to strengthen their relationship. China enjoys good relationship with Iran as well and at times has tried to take advantage of Irans close ties with Syria in strengthening its foothold in the region. Thus, strategically, Chinas relationship with regimes like Iran and Syria challenges the traditional American dominance in the region. It also makes clear the Chinese intention of playing a role in the troubled region, though the Chinese leaders shy away of making such statements in public. During the vote on the Syrian issue in the UN Security Council, China was opposed to the use of force for regime change and had demanded a peaceful settlement of the conflict through dialogue and consultation, which shows that they have stakes involved with the current regime. On the economic front, China is an important trading partner of Syria. The bilateral trade is heavily in favour of China. In 2011, Chinas exports to Syria totalled US$ 2.4 billion, while imports from Syria stood at US$ 26 million. China also has stakes in Syrias oil industry with the state -owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signing huge deals for exploration and developmental activities in the country. Furthermore, China intends to use Syria, given its geographical proximity with the EU, Africa and other West Asian countries, as a trading hub for its products. How should India deal between the official one-China stance and the unofficial recognition to Tibet? What factors should be considered? Indias one-China stance and unofficial recognition of Tibet are two different issues. In my opinion, they should not at all be linked together. The one -China stance is a political and diplomatic issue, used generally in the context of Chinas Taiwan problem. But in the context of rising complexity in the Sino-Indian relations over the boundary and the Tibet issue, the one-China stance could be an ideal handle for building pressure on China if India decides to take a bold step in order to counter the Chinese stance in the bordering regions over various issues. In fact, Indias official

recognition of Tibet as an integral part of China should seriously be revisited, considering that China has not taken a clear and public political stance about Jammu and Kashmir bei ng an integral part of India. In my view, India must bring China around to take a clear and decisive public stance on three issues: Jammu and Kashmir, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. Though China has taken an open stance once in a while in recognising Sikkim as a part of India, there is no guarantee that China will not revisit its stance on Sikkim in future. Beijings recent posture over Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh has also been problematic. If China does not take an open and public stance on these three issues vital for India in consonance with Indias unambiguously stated positions, then India must seriously revise its Tibet policy, and de-recognise Tibet as an integral part of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). This also becomes more relevant when bordering issues like water dispute, Chinese construction work in the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) and the problem in handling the Tibetan refugees effectively have emerged as new additions to the existing border complexity between the two countries. I believe that India should consider two immediate factors. First, building diplomatic pressure on China to take a clear public stance on issues vital to India and its territorial integrity; second, a clear message should be conveyed to China that it needs to appreciate Indias democratic values with regard to the Tibetan refugees and the Dalai Lama. Under no circumstances should India henceforth take a public stance recognising Tibet as an integral part of China, unless China clarifies its positi on publicly and clearly on Arunachal Pradesh at least. This is important when there is a leadership transition taking place in China in 2012-13. Besides, it is high time that India seriously utilised the presence, services and the human resource of the 100,000 odd Tibetan refugees who have been living within its territory for decades. Why do Indian fisherman often run into problems with the Sri Lankan authorities in the Indian Ocean? What are the causal factors? Both Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen have been fishing into Palk Bay area for centuries. Problem emerged only after a maritime agreement was signed by India and Sri Lanka in 1974. In fact, initially the 1974 border agreement did not affect fishing on either sides of the border. In 1976, through an exchange of letter, both India and Sri Lanka agreed to stop fishing in each others waters. However, the agreement could not stop the fishermen from fishing in these waters, as fishermen know no boundary. They go wherever they can get maximum number of catch. They, knowingly or unknowingly, often violate the International Maritime Boundary Lines in search of a good catch, at times at great personal risk. Both India and Sri Lankan fishermen have been known for entering into each others waters. However, cases of arrest of Sri Lankan fishermen by Indian authorities are comparatively less since they mostly fish in the high seas by using multi-day crafts. On the other hand, due to the dearth of multi-day fishing capability, Indian fishermen cannot shift their fishing effort from the Palk Bay area to the offshore areas of the Indian waters or way beyond the continental shelf. Therefore, Indian fishermen have no other option but to fish into the Sri Lankan waters. While for the Sri Lankan

authorities protecting their maritime boundary is important, for the Indian fishermen the priority is of securing their livelihood. It is noteworthy that despite the signing of maritime boundary agreements, fishermen communities of both the countries continued their fishing in the Palk Bay area peacefully until the Eelam war broke out in 1983. Nonetheless, after the end of War in 2009, the Sri Lankan fishermen have been raising their objection to Indian fishermen fishing in their waters. According to an estimate, more than 500 trawlers from Tamil Nadu cross the International Maritime Boundary Line and fish in the Sri Lankan side of the Palk Bay, threatening the livelihoods of the fishermen in the north of Sri Lanka, who have just commenced fishing after the end of war in 2009. Thus, the main problem with Indian fishermen is that a large number of them are dependent on fishing in Sri Lankan waters, which is prohibited by the 1976 Maritime Boundary Agreement. Also, a large number of Indian fishermen are dependent on trawling which is banned in Sri Lanka. What is the geo-political significance of the Indian Ocean? The geo-political significance of the Indian Ocean stems from the fact that it is a centre piece in the wider Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The combination of economic growth and slowdown, military expansion, increasing demand for natural resources, demographics combined with the geo-political situation, increased presence of nuclear capable actors and variances in regional structures of governance, highlights the geo-political significance of this area. Major points that merit attention are:

The Indian Ocean is third largest water body of the world that has vital sea lanes of communication crisscrossing it and which feeds Asias largest economies. Around 80 per cent of the worlds seaborne oil trade passes through the choke points of this ocean and therefore it literally connects the east to the west. The varying system of governance in the area determines the outline of the regional security architecture. The relations between nations both intra and extra regional shapes the complex matrix that define the overall architecture. Changes in political thought processes and any alteration in relations could alter the security scenario of the region. There has been a gradual to an accelerated expansion of maritime forces and their capabilities in the region. The growing presence of extra regional powers and nuclear capable nations has further altered the existing security framework. This is affecting the existing military balance and the impending imbalance could create a new architecture that could affect the prevailing security scenario. The economic upsurge of some nations and stagnation/slowdown of others is throwing up challenges that could affect the regional and international markets. The lack of intra-regional trade as compared to the extra-regional trade has limited the relations between nations in the region. Added to it is the growing competition and race for exploiting available natural resources, which could bring in new challenges to the region in times to come. What are the prominent reasons for violence in Assam? What are its long-term solutions?

After a brief lull last week, violence has returned to the Bodo Territorial Areas Districts (BTAD) in Assam. On August 6 and 7, four more people were found dead and two injured in Kokrajhar and Chirang districts raising the figures of the number of people killed to 78. The BTAD districts, namely, Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baksa, and Udalguri, remain tense with nearly 400,000 people displaced and at present taking shelter in the 300 or more relief camps across these districts. The violence that has disrupted life in the BTAD areas over the past few weeks started on July 19 and July 20. On July 19, two student leaders belonging to the All Assam Minority Students Union (AAMSU) and the All Bodoland Minority Students Union (ABMSU) were shot at in Kokrajhar district. This allegedly led to a retaliatory attack by the minority community, killing four former members of the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT). This in turn led to an escalation of violence in the BTAD areas and the nearby Dhubri district. While complex, the causes of the present round of violence can be deciphered. First, the political empowerment of minority communities in the BTAD areas in recent years has resulted in growing unease among the Bodo community. In May 2012, the Bodo Territorial Council (BTC) Chief, Hagrama Mohilary, had accused the minority representative in the BTC, Kalilur Rehman of the Congress, of instigating the minority community against the Bodos. What further led to tensions between the two communities was the demand by the ABMSU and ASMSU for dissolution of the Bodo-dominated BTC for its alleged involvement in Bodo-Muslim tensions. Second, these political tensions have been further compounded by the perception in Bodo areas that illegal migration from Bangladesh is relegating the Bodos to a minority status in their own land. The Bodos at present constitute 29 per cent of the population, followed by the Rajbonshis (15 per cent), Bengalis immigrants (12 to 13 per cent), and Santhals (6 per cent). Third, the perception of massive illegal migration has generated a fear psychosis among the Bodo community that their ancestral lands will be illegally taken away by the migrants. The lack of any reliable data on the number of people coming in from Bangladesh into Assam aggravates this situation. Fourth, the inclusion of illegal migrant names in the voters list is viewed as a deliberate ploy by some outside force to empower an outside group vis--vis the Bodos, so that the latter lose their sense of distinct indigenous identity. This has created a siege mentality among them. Fifth, the existence of armed groups like the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (anti-talk faction), the Bisra Commando Force representing the Santhals, etc., further contributes to a situation of violence. What is occurring in the BTAD areas is not new. Similar violence had occurred in the past. In 1993, the first large scale massacre occurred when 50 migrants were killed in Kokrajhar and Bongaigaon districts. In 1994, 100 migrants were killed in similar violence in the Bodo areas. In 1996, another minority community in the Bodo areas, the Santhals, were targeted by Bodos leading to the death of 200 people and displacement of thousands. In 2008, in an exact replica of the present violence, Bodos-minority community violence killed 100 people and displaced nearly 200,000.

The state response to the present violence has been lacklustre at best. There were telling signs since April-May 2012 that the BTAD areas were tense and violence between the two communities could erupt. Hence, the first step that the Assam state government should have taken is to increase the police presence in these districts. Also, these areas are designated Disturbed Areas where the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 as amended in 1972 has been imposed. This meant that the army is already stationed in the nearby Rangiya and Goalpara districts. Under the circumstances, the army should have been alerted much earlier by the state government so that the necessary permissions required to send troops to conflict areas were obtained from Delhi in time. What happened instead was that since no prior request was made by the state government, the army had to wait until the Ministry of Defence issued orders to respond to the crisis. This issue of procedural delays also brings into stark focus the aspect of civil-military relations in conflict areas and the need for decentralization of command and control. For the near future, the BTAD areas will be prone to violence given the long drawn out political complexities there. In 1987, the Bodos under the NDFB, originally named the Bodo Security Force, demanded the creation of a separate Bodoland state outside of Assam. While the Bodoland Accord of 1993 managed to persuade the BLT to give up violence and join politics, the NDFB is not involved in peace talks with the Centre despite its chief, Ranjan Daimary, being handed over by Bangladesh to India in 2010. Thus, the group continues to be fully armed. Also, the general perception in Assam and in the Bodo areas in particular that their land is being horded by illegal Bangladesh migrants who one day will become the political rulers does not help mitigate the situation. The lack of state government mechanisms to control illegal immigration as well as failure to release official data on the exact numbers of migrants exacerbates the issue. Given that migration from Bangladesh will continue because of the economic opportunities available in Assam for such unskilled labour, the only way out is to issue work visas to keep track of the people coming in. Also, the core reason for the violence is insecurity over land. According to the Bodo Accord, no outsider can settle in Bodo

lands. But this provision has not been implemented in letter and spirit. Moreover, community records on landholdings are weak and not written down. Hence, a Bodo whose land has been taken by an outsider has no papers to claim ownership of his/her land. The need of the hour therefore is to activate a clean and transparent record keeping of land by the state so that violence based on the fear of outsiders forcibly taking away the most precious commodity, land, is effectively averted. What is the relative importance of Sudan and South Sudan to India? How does the conflict there affect Indias interest in the region? Over the years, India has developed close ties with Sudan and in recent years warmed up to the Government of South Sudan as well. The Sudanese cherish the support extended by the Indian Government on various occasions in the past. For e.g. Indias Election Commission had helped organise Sudans first general elections in the late 1950s and Indian engineers had played a major role in setting up the countrys sugar industry and railways. Similarly India was one of the first countries to open a consulate in South Sudan and accord recognition to the Government of South Sudan after its independence on 9 July 2011. At present, Indias investment in the two Sudans is over $3 billion. In the last decade, Indias investments have been mainly in the energy sector. In 2003, Indias ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) had invested $750 million to acquire 25 per cent equity held by the Talisman group in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). GNPOC is a consortium that also includes the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Malaysias Petronas and Sudans Sudapet. It had also invested in other energy assets in block 5A and 5B. Most of these assets are located in South Sudan. Therefore, it is natural that conflict and instability in the region will have an adverse impact on India. In the last six months, the relations between Sudan and South Sudan have worsened with armed conflict breaking out intermittently. Unfortunately, the countries have still not resolved their outstanding disputes on three crucial issues - energy, boundary demarcation, and citizenship. India along with the rest of the world should take urgent steps towards pushing the leaders of both the countries to peacefully negotiate and resolve the pending disputes. How and from where do the Naxalites procure their weapons? The Naxalites procure weapons from different sources and by different methods. There are numerous reports that link Naxalites to a number of militant and criminal groups throughout South Asia. These groups have interacted with Maoists from Nepal, insurgent groups of Indias Northeast, ISI-backed Islamists from Bangladesh and criminals from Myanmar. Weapons flow among these groups without much check. The details of Naxalites sources of weaponry are as follows: 1. Initially, the Naxalites collected weapons from the local people. These were old vintage type muzzle loader guns and locally made shotguns used for killing animals and hunting. Some of them also used bows and arrows. Their main weapon used to be their human strength, that is, their large numbers. Later they started looting arms and ammunition from the local police outposts in the Naxalite infested areas. After gaining confidence, they stared raiding the armoury and ambushing the

police and security force patrol parties to loot/snatch their arms, ammunition and equipments, like bullet proof jackets, night vision devices, communication sets, etc. 2. The Naxalites also obtained weapons by bribing or coercing members of the security forces to sell or give their firearms and the ammunition along with their equipment. 3. Naxalites also have their own local arms factories. The manufacturing of arms demonstrate a wide range of craftsmanship, right from assembling makeshift weapons from discarded parts to more advanced forging process. These factories also produce homemade mortar rounds and components for improvised explosive devices. As reported, they even have laboratory to test the improvised explosive devices, land mines, claymore mines and other sophisticated explosives/ammunition. 4. It was initially the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that had provided the Naxalites the training in the handling of weapons, mines and grenades at a camp near Bastar in Chattisgarh State. Later when the LTTE fighters fled Sri Lanka after their 2009 defeat, it is suspected that a few Tamil fighters began providing training of all types to the Naxalites in exchange for safe haven. 5. The Nepalese Maoists have not only exchanged training and weapons with the Naxalites, but also their strategic planning. 6. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) has helped Indian Maoists to procure weapons and ammunition through Myanmar and Bangladesh. 7. There is a relationship between the ULFA and Naxalites to smuggle drugs through Bangladesh border in exchange of weapons and ammunition. 8. There is no shortage of explosives with the Naxalites. They are able to procure the same from the mining contractors operating in the Naxalite -controlled areas, including fertilizer distributors and mining companies that maintain stocks of explosives, blasting caps and detonators. 9. The Naxalites have also procured foreign weapons, ammunition and explosives from external militant and criminal groups operating within and outside of India. Such shipments are traded for smuggling services or purchased with funds from banditry, extortion or revolutionary taxes. Purchasing weapons from the outside is very expensive. According to an article published in 2009 by India Daily News, Naxalite expenditure reports seized by police showed that, over a six-month period, one zone command spent more than three-quarters of the units budget on weapons. Such evidence suggests that their effort to procure weapons from outside have certain limitations; obtaining them locally is far cheaper and can be done by virtually any Naxalite fighter. The Naxalite arsenal is thus vast and diverse, consisting of arms and ammunition manufactured in China, Pakistan and India. How many weapons are held by the Naxalites is anybodys guess. Is the government reluctant to deal with the issue of illegal immigration from Bangladesh? Illegal immigration is not getting the attention it should for various reasons. First and foremost, our country is having a coalition government which is always struggling for its survival. As the security

impact of the illegal immigration is of silent nature and seen only over a period of time, it is not getting the attention it deserves. Moreover, the issue gets immediately communalised because most migrants coming from Bangladesh are Muslims. Hence, the government does not want to touch this issue. What is at stake for India in the South China Sea? What has been India's stand in that conflict so far? Indias stakes in the South China Sea can be viewed as economic and diplomatic. Both these aspects impinge on Indias Look East Policy. The economic factor is driven by the presence of energy resources and trade that plies between India and the nations in the region. The energy factor is significant given the reported energy potential of the region. Diplomatically India would like to be seen as a responsible growing power that advocates healthy relations between nations, thereby ensuring a secure regional architecture wherein nations settle their differences amicably. In standing with this approach, India has adopted a neutral stance, and has requested nations to sort out their differences peacefully. India has further requested the nations to establish a code of conduct that would ensure freedom of navigation and access to resources. On May 10, 2012, the MEA, while responding to a media query on recent developments in the South China Sea, had stated: We have been following with concern recent developments involving China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. Maintenance of peace and security in the region is of vital interest to the international community. India urges both countries to exercise restraint and resolve the issue diplomatically according to principles of international law. Therefore, India continues to engage nations of the region that is in standing with its Look East Policy. An example is the recent deployment of four naval ships i n the region and the conduct of exercises with the navies of South Korea, Japan and even China. What is the significance of Indian participation in international military exercises? What are the advantages of our participation? In the domain of international relations, military diplomacy has, in recent years, emerged as a major tool to further diplomatic interests of nations. Participation in international level military exercises is an indication of the highest level of trust and confidence between the member nations. It is a key confidence building measure (CBM) and an indication of the faith reposed by India on another nation or a group of member nations. On the operational side, military exercises enable militaries to understand each others drills and procedures, overcome language barriers, and facilitate familiarisation with equipment capabilities. It also facilitates understanding and familiarisation with new technologies that other countries may be utilising and enables on-the-job training of each others crews. This is particularly useful in the event of joint operations whether in war or in operations other than war (OOTW) - humanitarian aid, disaster relief, anti-piracy, etc when nations come together for a common cause. A fine example was the aid assistance provided by a host of nations during the tsunami in South East Asia where a

massive land, air and sea rescue effort was successfully executed to provide relief to the affected countries. Perhaps, the most important advantage of joint military exercises is strategic signalling. A joint exercise with one or more nations serves the purpose of signalling to a third country of the influence we have in the region and a demonstration of our resolve to further our diplomatic objectives. On the intangible side, military exercises promote brotherhood and camaraderie between soldiers and militaries. Besides goodwill, it is a tool for projection of a nations soft power culture, language, customs, beliefs, food habits and lifestyle. Soldiers all over the world have almost similar rank and organisational structures, which helps establish a unique spirit of bonding and friendship between their communities irrespective of the country of origin. What are the various concerns of a nation engaged in a water treaty with another nation? Kindly respond with a special reference to India and its neighbours? A riparian treaty is entered into to allay the following fears/concerns: 1. Water sharing: For a lower riparian country, the share of water that it gets from the upper riparian is of great concern. Water is largely linked to agriculture and hence water security is also food security. Fears and apprehensions always remain. If the lower riparian is economically and militarily weaker than its upper riparian, it will seek a treaty or water sharing arrangement and the involvement of a third party to ensure the treaty's effectiveness, for example the Indus Water Treaty. But, if the lower riparian is relatively powerful in the basin then it can dictate terms, like Egypt in the Nile basin. Some powerful upper riparian countries like China do not have any water treaty with its lower riparian and deliberately chose not to have any sharing arrangement except for some MoUs. 2. Sharing of hydrological data: This is a big concern given the impact of climate change. Lower riparian would like to be informed on the changing profile of the rivers in the upper reaches. Such information helps them to be prepared for eventual flood disaster, etc. Withholding information is a tool of coercion and upper riparian can exploit its hydrological position to harm the lower riparian. 3. The general principles of water sharing as captured by the above two concerns are: principle of limited sovereignty over water resources and the principle of 'no significant harm'. What are the different measures taken by the Indian Government to combat piracy in the Indian Ocean? How can piracy be eradicated from the Indian Ocean Region? The measures taken by the Indian Government can be viewed at three levels. Firstly, operationally via kinetic means, by deploying naval ships with armed helicopters to patrol the piracy prone areas. Secondly, in the international arena, by participating in the various multilateral fora that have been set up to combat piracy, and thirdly, internally by taking steps to arrest and prosecute pirates and strengthen the fight against piracy via a piracy bill.

Operationally, the Indian Navy commenced anti piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden from October 2008. Indian Naval ships operate independently and are not part of the multinational forces that operate in the area. In order to achieve a high degree of cooperation with other maritime forces, India is an active participant of various cooperative mechanisms like Shared Awareness and De confliction (SHADE) that have been established to facilitate sharing of information. In addition, India, Japan and China (all three nations operate independently) have agreed to coordinate patrols thereby ensuring an effective and optimum use of the combined maritime assets to escort ships, especially in the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor established for use by all merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden. The Director General Shipping has launched a web-based registration service where merchant ships can register with DG Shipping in order to avail of the escort facility provided by Indian Naval ships in the Gulf of Aden. Due to the spread of piracy in the Indian Ocean, Indian Naval and Coast Guard ships have also been deployed in piracy prone areas nearer the Indian coast. As a result, around 1000 plus ships of various nationalities have been escorted and around 40 piracy attacks prevented by Indian forces deployed in these areas. At the international level, India continues to take up the issue of piracy and its attendant ramifications at various fora and advocates steps to be adopted by the international community. Internally, India arrests and prosecutes pirates as per the laws of the land, a weak point as of now as there is no specific penal code that addresses the issue of piracy. In arresting and prosecuting pirates, India is one of the few nations that do so. In order to strengthen the fight against piracy, a piracy bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha during the 15th session in April 2012. The bill post enactment should, amongst other aspects, give the required boost to the legal system to prosecute pirates. Piracy can be eradicated by addressing the root causes, an aspect well recognised by the international community. The root cause of piracy in the Indian Ocean lies on land i.e., the instability in Somalia. Addressing this issue requires an international understanding and sustained effort. What is Gujral Doctrine? I. K. Gujral served as India's Minister of External Affairs in the cabinets of V.P. Singh (5 December 1989-10 December 1990) and H. D. Devegowda (1 June 1996-21 April 1997. He went on to become Prime Minister in April 1997 and retained the foreign ministry (21 April 1997-18 March 1998). During his tenure as foreign minister, he adopted accommodative policy vis--vis Indias neighbours. Gujrals policy of non-reciprocal accommodation led to the signing of a 30 year treaty between India and Bangladesh on December 12, 1996. In fact, the 1977 treaty on water sharing between India and Bangladesh (after extensions in 1982 and 1985) had lapsed in 1988 and negotiations could not succeed because of inflexibility on both sides. He even ensured Bhutanese consent for digging of a canal from a Bhutanese river to augment the flow of water to Ganga and showed his willingness to revise the controversial Mahakali treaty with Nepal which was received well in Nepal. In his famous Chatham House speech in London in September 1996, Gujral outlined his approach towards the neighbours and stated:

"The United Front Governments neighbourhood policy now stands on five basic principles: First, with the neighbours like Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity but gives all that it can in good faith and trust. Secondly, no South Asian country will allow its territory to be used against the interest of another country of the region. Thirdly, none will interfere in the internal affairs of another. Fourthly, all South Asian countries must respect each others territorial integrity and sovereignty. And finally, they will settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations. These five principles, scrupulously observed, will, I am sure, recast South Asias regional relationship, including the tormented relationship betwe en India and Pakistan, in a friendly, cooperative mould." Gujral reiterated these five principles later in another speech at Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS), Colombo in January 1997. Such policy of accommodation was called Gujral doctrine by noted Indian journalist Bhabani Sen Gupta in his article, India in the Twenty First Century, *International Affairs, Vol. 73, Issue 2, 1997, pp. 308-309]. Interestingly, Pakistan did not feature in the list of countries Gujral identified in his speech for non-reciprocal treatment. A perceptive analyst of south Asian politics, A. G. Noorani, held such measures as cosmetic and deceptive and argued that Gujral doctrine excluded Pakistan and was thus not a wholehearted effort to generate trust with all the neighbours. Some other analysts held that Gujral was unable to bring about any change primarily because of his inability to convert the foreign policy bureaucracy firmly wedded to the principles of security, national interests and major power status at the global level, to the basic art of friendliness. It was also alleged that the foreign office was more comfortable with the language of hegemonic power than Gujrals language of friendship and dtente. Interestingly, however, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government (1998-2004) led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and and the United Progressive Alliance government (2004 - till date) led by Manmohan Singh have continued with Gujrals foreign policy which laid emphasis on the need to have a peaceful, stable and constructive environment in Indias neighbourhood which is being regarded as vital for the goals of accelerated development for India and the region. What is the concept of Comprehensive National Power (CPN), and where does India stand in terms of CPN ranking? There are many definitions of Comprehensive National Power (CNP). As per one of the more acceptable definitions, CNP is "comprehensive capability of a country to pursue its strategic objectives by taking the necessary actions internationally". It can also be defined as "degree of ability to mobilize and utilize strategic resources of a country to realize national objectives." It provides an intrinsic analytical tool for identifying gaps and boundaries of national power and extrinsically balances interests in the international relations loop. Although there are different factors considered by different people to measure CNP, the most commonly accepted factors are: economy; military strength; internal cohesion; governance; human capital; science & technology; knowledge and information; geography and natural resources; foreign policy and diplomacy; and, national will and leadership. All these factors are consequential in denoting the power of a nation state in the present environment.

One of the first studies for measuring Comprehensive Index of Power was attempted by an American named Ray Cline in 1977. Subsequently it was modified by the Chinese think tanks, like China Academy of Social Sciences and Academy of Military Sciences. In India, the NSCS has also been publishing National Security Index from time to time. The respective positions of various countries in all these studies vary. Therefore, it is not possible to state exactly the position of India in CNP index. However, it is commonly agreed that India is presently behind USA, China, Russia, Japan and Germany but has the potential to improve its position by overtaking the last three in about a decade or so. It will of course depend on taking adequate measures to fill the gaps and make course correction in policy implementation. Could water be a source of future conflict in South & South-East Asia? What could be its ramifications for India? Water can be a source of dispute both 'within' countries as well as 'between' countries. Dispute cannot be the same as conflict and conflict cannot be the same as war. Water tensions will exist but water war is unlikely. South Asia has large river systems. Prominent are the Indus River in the west and the Ganga-Brahamaputra-Meghna in the east. With population pressures and the need to achieve developmental goals, disputes and grievances arise over the use of and control over the rivers. Structures like dams and barrages create upper-lower riparian tensions that have the potential to lead to conflict. Numerous bilateral treaties exist but are also often hostage to the prevailing political animosity. Resource nationalism will increasingly dominate the hydrological contours of South Asia and will largely define regional politics. Many of the existing riparian treaties will come under pressure over the sharing and harnessing of river waters. Indias riparian relation with its neighbours will become progressively testing with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal continuously raising concerns over regulating and sharing of river waters. While South Asia remains a difficult region with high suspicion and mistrust, remarkably water sharing is far more formatted with institutional mechanisms than any other issue. What probably would be required in the future is a political consensus based on interdisciplinary knowledge involving different stakeholders on how to share the benefits of the rivers. That's the challenge. Is it necessary for India to supply 500MW of electricity to Pakistan when India itself is facing acute power shortage? Similar questions can be asked about Indian aid/assistance of $2billion to Afghanistan or $1 billion credit line to Bangladesh, when many parts of India are languishing in poverty and disease. Foreign policy of a country is run on pragmatic principles. A nation has to make certain tangible sacrifices in return for intangible gains. As a rising power with a growing economy, India has to maintain its image of being a benevolent, accommodating and peace loving country, mindful of the needs and aspirations of its relatively smaller neighbours. A stable and peaceful neighbourhood is imperative for sustained growth of Indian economy and regional development. While India has managed to

establish a better line of communication with most of its South Asian neighbours and has significantly improved its relationship with them, Pakistan has been a major challenge for Indian diplomacy. Plagued by internal security challenges and afflicted with a pathological obsession with India, Pakistan has chosen to divert the attention of the local jihadi elements towards India over the years, and sought to build a negative bond of unity through hatred of India. In this context, deeper and continuous engagement with Pakistan is, therefore, an alternative India can hardly ignore. Other options of benign neglect and coercive diplomacy have proved futile in the past. Knowing fully well that the real masters crafting Pakistan's India policy have a vested interest in generating anti-India sentiments though active propagation of senseless fear of India in Pakistan, India needs to act in a manner that would endear it to the people of Pakistan. It is felt by many analysts in India that it is perhaps better to adopt a people-centric approach vis--vis Pakistan and hope that things would improve someday when people and not the army would decide Pakistan's India policy. In this context, we must take note that the offer of 500w of electricity was received well in Pakistan and there was a sense of surprise and exasperation in some quarters as to how and why India made such a generous offer. While it may take a long time before India actually delivers electricity to Pakistan (because of the technical issues of transmission, supply and fee structure, etc.), a good beginning has been made to alter perceptions about India in Pakistan. The intangible gains from such an offer in the shape of gradual change in mindset can unleash the locked potential of India-Pakistan economic cooperation and lead to prosperity in both these countries and the region as well. Can't Asif Ali Zardari's visit to Dargah Ajmer Sharif rightly be termed as 'Shrine Diplomacy? A direct answer to the question would be an emphatic 'No', because he did not plan to undertake the Shrine to build bridges with India. Zardari's primary purpose was to pay a visit to the dargah in his personal capacity. Given his position as the President of Pakistan, his meeting with the Indian Prime Minister must have been factored in, however, while contemplating such a visit. Such visits assume significance when they lead to unexpected political outcomes. In this case, even if Zardari's visit was a personal one, it did have some balming effect on Indo-Pak relations and reinforced the process of dialogue that was recovering from the shocks of both Mumbai attacks and the unnecessary diplomatic assault from the then Pakistani foreign minister in July 2010. The resumed dialogue process gathered some pace after the visit, though it had already started gathering momentum since the November 2011 announcement of (working towards) granting of MFN status to India by end 2012. It would be incorrect to say that he undertook the shrine visit to cement ties with India. Is NAM still significant for India? This question will draw different answers depending upon the perception of the person who wishes to respond. But before trying to answer it from Indias perspective, it may be useful to analyse whether the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that evolved under the shadow of the Cold War standoff, has continued relevance in the context of the prevailing global geo-strategic environment. With the end of the confrontation between the so-called capitalist driven ideology of the Western world led by the USA, and the socialist ideology of the Soviet-led bloc during the Cold War period; the

absorption by the newly emerged East European countries, and countries like China and Russia, of much of the ideology of market driven economies; and the disintegration of many of the Cold War structures, the very concept of non-alignment becomes questionable. Not that the concept was nonquestionable even in the days when it was relevant; in as much as, many of the participant countries were fully aligned with the socialist bloc. The sad fact is that many of the countries that were at the forefront of the movement in its early days soon drifted into one or the other camps, and remain there, or as in the case of Yugoslavia, disintegrated into separate entities. To that extent, the concept of non-alignment is hardly relevant any longer. However it still provides a useful forum for the developing countries to meet, discuss and evolve common positions on some of the problems faced by them, as also in dealing with situations emerging from actions initiated by the developed countries through a consensus of their own. From Indias perspective therefore, it would appear that while it has little or no significance as an ideology, it continues to have significance in providing a forum for a group that represents nations whose voice needs to be heard in the evolving global scenario. What will be the significance of the proposed international north south corridor for India? India, Iran and Russia signed the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) agreement on September 12, 2000. The agreement provides for the transit of goods through Iran and the Caspian Sea to Russia and Northern Europe. This agreement has been ratified by all the three signatories and has been in force since May 16, 2002. The INSTC is an important gateway for India to Central Asia. The potential of this corridor is manifold, with India, Myanmar and Thailand also getting linked by road. This will boost trade between Europe and South East Asia as well. As compared to the route through Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea that is currently used, the INSTC is much shorter and cost-effective. It is 40 per cent shorter and 30 per cent cheaper. From Indias point of view, the North -South Corridor not only helps India bypass Pakistan and yet reach out to Central Asia but also enables it to transport goods at a cheaper cost to the European markets. At present there are many missing links in this route. Member countries are working to address the problem areas to make full use of the corridor. How can India play an effective role in Nepal's sabilisation? The prolonged political crisis in Nepal has been a matter of great concern for India. Any upheaval in Nepal has a spill over impact on India. India faces two serious problems vis--vis the ongoing political impasse in Nepal. Some political forces think that India can and should play a major role in settling the problems in Nepal, whereas others question the legitimacy of Indias role. In recent years, the anti-India feeling in Nepal has seen a phenomenal rise. In the present context, where there is lack of trust among the political parties in Nepal, India has to be careful about playing its part in resolving the current crisis.

India had earlier played a major role in the signing of the 12-point agreement between the Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists in 2005. At that time, there was a consensus among the political parties on fighting the common enemy, the King. But the political equation in Nepal this time around is completely different. There is no common enemy and at the same time there is no consensus on several key issues pertaining to the political future of Nepal. At this juncture, what India can best do is to help build a consensus among the political parties to agree on taking the process of constitutionmaking to its logical end. Any attempt to support or favor any political constituency by India, would create even more anti-India sentiments in Nepal. Why the British handed over Hong Kong to China in 1997? What were the terms and conditions? Hong Kong was acquired by Britain in three stages after defeating China in the Opium War. The first was Hong Kong Island, which was ceded to the Great Britain in perpetuity by the Treaty of Nanking on August 29, 1842. The Kowloon Peninsula was leased to Britain by the Convention of Peking in 1860, and the new territories on a 99 year lease under the Second Convention of Peking in 1898. China regarded these treaties as unequal, imposed on China under the duress of gun -boat diplomacy. As the 99-year treaty was to expire on July 1, 1997, both Britain and China started negotiations in early 1980s. The historic joint declaration on the future of Hong Kong was signed on December 19, 1984 between Premier Zhao Ziyang and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Under the joint declaration, an innovative one country, two systems was devised, under which Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty while retaining its political and economic system. The tenets of the joint declaration were later elucidated in the Basic Law, under which the present Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is governed. Is Israel a natural ally of India? India and Israel are strategic partners rather than natural allies, though the former term is conspicuously absent in official pronouncements, especially that of India. The term one hears more often is that of valuable partner. Strategic complementarities bring the two countries together. These include Israels world-class arms industry dependent on exports for maintaining its commercial and technological edge, Israeli expertise in such niche technology areas like radars and UAVs and India's requirements for such surveillance technology. Indias defence modernisation needs coupled with short-comings in its domestic defence industrial base (inability to develop AWACS for instance led it to source Israeli Phalcons), as well as Israels willingness to supply sophisticated equipments, are equally pertinent. People-to-people contacts are no doubt robust, as evident in growing numbers of tourists visiting either country. Historically, there have been no significant instances of anti-Semitism in India. Some of the threats both the countries face are similar in nature (Islamic extremism), though from different sources. Despite such similarities, however, some significant structural and policy differences do exist. While Israel is a Jewish democratic state, India is a secular democratic republic. Both countries have significant policy differences over issues like the Palestinians and the Iranian nuclear imbroglio.

What could be the implications of India becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council? To understand what the implications could be, it is necessary to first look at why India wants to become a permanent member of the Council. An expansion in Council membership would, according to India, reflect the contemporary realities (and not the world realities of the pre -Cold War era when the UN came into being), make the system more democratic and also enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the Council in dealing with glob al issues. Indias inclusion as a permanent member would also be an acknowledgement of its growing importance in global governance. If India does become a permanent member, naturally it would join the P5 club and enjoy veto rights. Those opposed to the expansion of the Security Council argue that if the number of member states who have the power to veto any resolution increases, the impending possibility of a prolonged deadlock over global issues that would require immediate attention also increases. This would in turn impinge on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Council in maintaining global peace and security, the very reason that India envisions an expanded Council. There is also an apprehension among the international community that if countries like India, Germany become permanent members to the exclusion of other nations, such a reform would not make the system any more democratic than what it is today. Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that the current Council structure is not conducive for maintaining global peace and security. It remains to be seen how the Security Council can be reformed to make it more efficient and effective and at the same time reflect the realities of today. Will there be any impact of the Rohingya conflict on north-east India? The Rohingya conflict is one of the longest conflicts between the majority Buddhist Burmese and the minority Muslims in Myanmar. It has led to the displacement of large number of people across the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, especially from the Rakhine state. The tragic aspect of this issue is that about 800,000 Rohingyas in Myanmar are stateless people. They are not recognised as an ethnic indigenous minority or citizens of Myanmar. Bangladesh, which has a 271 km long border with Myanmar, houses nearly 300,000 Rohingya refugees, especially in Cox Bazar. Many of these refugees are without jobs and could fall prey to radical ideologies. They may join the Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islam (HuJI) which has been accused of carrying out bomb blasts in Assam. Another aspect could be the fear of a major spill over of the conflict into Indias north-east in terms of refugee flow from across the porous Bangladesh-India border. The north-east is a region plagued by armed ethnic conflicts based on issues of land and identity. Further inroads by a refugee population could exacerbate the situation in the north-east. Why should India provide grant and loans to Bangladesh while it remains silent on the issue of illegal infiltration and anti-India activities carried out from its soil? India's decision to provide grant and loan is going to benefit both India and Bangladesh. These grants and loans are for building roads and other communication networks that would facilitate transit to

the north-eastern parts of India. Transit through Bangladesh has been a long standing request from India. Under Awami League regime, action against anti-India activities has been taken. Some insurgent leaders have been arrested and handed over to India. Both the countries are working out mechanisms to address the issue of illegal migration as it includes illegal trafficking of women and children. Illegal migration affects Indias security and economic and social stability. In the absence of any mechanism to address this, the two governments agreed for joint border patrol which started last year in July. Apart from this, the BSF needs to be more vigilant to prevent unauthorised migration. What are the possible strategic and military implications of deep sea mining by China in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)? The strategic and military implications are enormous as they would permit a larger legitimate presence of the Chinese in the region. Economically, deep sea mining in the IOR would require a conduit for storage and transportation of the products mined as close to the mining area as possible. This would require setting up of infrastructure designed to cater for storage and transportation that could be established in a nation or nations close to the region. This infrastructure could be set up by China either as a bilateral or multilateral enterprise and could add to the strengthening of strategic ties between China and the concerned nations. Militarily, China would be in a legitimate position to increase its military presence specifically naval for ensuring security of the area from a variety of existing threats like terrorism and piracy. In order to sustain a military presence, it would have to rely on ports in friendly nations for re-supply and refueling purposes. This offers the chance of increased military-to-military cooperation with nations in the area. Overall, the implications of deep sea mining in the IOR could accord China the opportunity to increase its foot print in the region. What efforts India is making towards cyber security? Wouldn't indigenisation of telecom equipments help? The government has been contemplating various steps to strengthen cyber security within the country. These include the delegation of responsibilities of securing cyber space to various agencies that have the capability to undertake these responsibilities and dialoguing with various stake holders including the private sector which owns much of the cyber infrastructure. That said, administrative and technical measures form only part of the solution. Many of the current threats require a response in the form of user education; the general population has to be apprised of basic cyber security measures, and law enforcement and judicial professionals also have to be updated to deal with cyber issues. Much of this is happening, but at different speeds, since policy making and responsibilities are spread across different ministries. Moreover, areas such as law and order are the domain of the states. A nodal agency on cyber security has been suggested to have a holistic approach to cyber security as against the fragmented approach that currently prevails

As far as the indigenisation of telecom equipment is concerned, many countries are considering similar steps. This is the case because telecom and data networks are the arteries that connect the various critical infrastructures. However, the dispersion of technical know-how and manufacturing capabilities across the world, and cost considerations, and the lack of an eco-system in telecom component manufacturing within the country, just to name a few factors, are the challenges to operationalising such a policy. Many of these issues are addressed in the IDSA Task Force Report on Cyber security available here Why Myanmar in recent years has become a key strategic partner for India, although during 80s and 90s India was very aloof about it? It is perhaps not apt to say that India had been aloof about Myanmar in the 1980s and 1990s. India has been finessing its policy vis--vis this geo-strategically significant ASEAN country. Our common experience of struggle against colonialism was carried over into the post-independence period as well. Then, as the realpolitik requirements of statecraft hit us, the sentimentalism of the freedom struggle era was shed (around 1993) in preference for a more pragmatic approach of dealing with the regime in power. Even then it must not be construed as an abandonment of India's principles (which include faith in democracy). However, whatever political system Myanmar obtains is entirely a matter of choice of its own people. As the transition to democracy began, India too came out in support of the process in Myanmar because it considers it a key strategic neighbour. What are the safety measures that are taken to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants in India? Such measures include physical protection of plants and radioactive material as well as adopting and executing global standards in the running of these plants. The latter includes incorporating design features to ensure safety of the plants during normal operations as well as to effectively tide over the ill-effects of possible natural events like floods, tsunamis among other disasters. These could include situating back-up generators at a greater height (especially pertinent in the aftermath of Fukushima) or increasing the height of protective walls or in-built design features to ensure cool running of the plants among other efforts. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), established in 1983, is responsible for regulating the functioning of all nuclear power plants in India. To make functioning of the plants more independent, the government in 2011 has put into motion the required measures to establish the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA), which will subsume the work of the AERB. In recent times, the complementarities and mutually reinforcing nature of safety and security measures at nuclear power plants and of materials is being emphasised (two of S trilogy, the other being safeguards). India appreciates this fact and is a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, entered into force in 1987, as well as its 2005 Amendment which was ratified by India in 2007. India also supports the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

It is said that the UN Security Council should be expanded to reflect the contemporary realities. What are these 'contemporary realities'? There has always been a desire for a normative system among the states to conduct international affairs in a manner that promotes co-existence. The system is achieved bilaterally or collectively reflecting the contemporary realities which, more or less, means the contemporary power and influence hierarchy of the states in the international system. The UN, which we have, is a product or a reflection of the power hierarchy of the world after the Second World War. The UN has a Security Council and a General Assembly. The former comprises of the P5 (victorious allied powers) and 10 other non-permanent members, and the latter contains all the member states. The Security Council, especially the P5 (US, Russian Federation, China, U.K. and France), countries with veto power in the council, take important decisions related to the maintenance of peace and security in the world. The power of veto tacitly given to them by the principle of great power consensus has been institutionalised in the UN Charter as they emerged as the most powerful military and moral authority after the Second World War. Initially, the P5 were the only countries that had the military and economic power to enforce any order in the international system just after the Great War. Both the realists and the idealists for their own reasons supported the constitution of the United Nations in the current form as they had seen the failure of the League of Nations because of lack of US support. Both agree on the point that an international organisation should have the powerful countries in the core decision-making and executive organs as only their participation and support can enforce any order in the international system. After the Great War, the axis powers (Japan, Germany, and Italy) were destroyed and most of the Asian, African and Latin American states were colonies of the victorious powers or some other European countries. So, the primacy of allied and other powers in the United Nations system was in tandem with the contemporary realities. The world has seen changes and many new states have emerged since the end of the Second World War. They vie for a more just and democratic world order. They feel that the United Nations should reflect the following contemporary realities which is structured on the basis of the post -Second World War realities:

The aspirations for a multilateral world the rise of other major economic and military powers India, Brazil, Japan, Germany, South Africa and others. The democratic aspirations of the peoplethe UN needs to be more democratic. Rise of regionalismeach region wants its representation in the system. The constitution and composition of the Council has been changed twice in the past to adjust with the contemporary realties of the times. The Council was expanded from 11 to 15 members in 1965 and the Peoples Republic of China was recognised as successor to the Republic of China in 1971. What is strategic depth? What does it mean? If possible, please give some examples. The concept of Strategic Depth emerges from the realm of military operations and it usually denotes the distance between enemy forces and the main centres of gravity of a country. These centres could be military frontlines, bases, or industrial and commercial hubs. For a military professional, the greater the distance that has to be traversed by enemy forces to reach these bases, the better are

the chances of a successful defensive operation. This is primarily because it gives the defender more time and space to organise the defence and stretches the enemys logistical chain. The best examples emerge from the French and German invasions of Russia/Soviet Union. Russian strategy traded space for time and even followed a scorched earth policy. They also relocated key industries to the hinterland. In short, Russia had the luxury of space and had greater strategic depth. In more contemporary times, some in Pakistan have justified meddling in Afghanistan so that they can attain strategic depth in case of a war with India. This, however, logically means that the Pakistani military will desert its people and the country and operate out of Afghanistan to fight India. Rightfully so then this idea has been ridiculed by many Pakistani analysts. Why has Pakistan army been playing a central role in Pakistan's domestic and foreign policy? Politics abhors vacuum and the leadership vacuum (Jinnah famously said 'what is the Muslim league except me and my stenographer) as well as the political leaderships vacuity in Pakistan soon after independence left the army as the only coherent and cohesive force in the country that could fill this vacuum. An underdeveloped political culture meant that the political leadership looked towards the army, which was one reason why the army chief Ayub Khan was also made defence minister. The military bureaucratic establishment negotiated with the Americans and this set the stage for the army's central role in foreign policy making in the years to come. Alongside were social and cultural factors - feudalism and a fascination with the military - that facilitated the central role for the army. Also contributing to the importance of the army was the circumstances in which Pakistan came into being and the consequent hostility with India and the fear that India wanted to undo partition. This gave rise to a national security state in which the army naturally acquired a central role. The inability of the political class to either set the rules of the game (much less play by any rules) or to come up with a constitution paved the way for the military to take over power. It is widely accepted now that the martial law that was declared in Lahore to contain the anti-Ahmediya riots in 1953 allowed the army to taste the blood of usurping political power. How is the relationship between India and North Korea and what are the implications of change of North Korean leadership for India? There has been continuity in relations between India and North Korea, irrespective of change in leaderships. Peace and stability in the Korean peninsula has always been a matter of abiding interest to India. It may be recalled that a special session of Indian Parliament was convened on July 31, 1950 to discuss the Korean crisis. Drawing the attention of the House, the then President Dr. Rajendra Prasad had noted that Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru has appealed to the Russian Prime Minister Joseph Stalin and to the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson that the authorities of these two great countries should use their influence to localise the armed struggle in Korea, and break the dead lock in the UN Security Council over the admission of the Peoples Republic of China, so that the present international tension might be eased and way is opened up for the resolution of the Korean problem by discussion in the Security Council.

India was appointed as Chairman of the 9-member UN commission to hold elections in Korea in 1954. After the Korean war of 1950-53, India had played an important role as the chairman of the NNRC (Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission). Consular relations with DPRK were set up on March 1, 1962 and full diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on December 10, 1973. Relations between India and the DPRK have been generally characterised by friendship, cooperation and understanding. India has been extending humanitarian assistance to the DPRK, which has suffered from food shortages during the last few years as a result of natural calamities. The DPRK authorities have expressed their gratitude for Indias humanitarian assistance to them from time to time. Is Siachen deal with Pakistan in Indias interest? It is argued by peaceniks on either side that the Indian militarys presence in the Siachen region at the cost of nearly Rs. 3000 crores per annum is too costly and unaffordable from the point of view of the debate on development-versus-defence. The alternative is demilitarisation with a bilateral agreement not to reoccupy the heights at any cost and eventual delimitation or demarcation. Demilitarisation is much easier than demarcation, which will take long and protracted negotiations. The basic issue of lack of trust which is coming in the way of resolution of Siachen will not be addressed by withdrawal and may not lead to delimitation. Moreover, with the geo-strategic importance of Siachen increasing at the moment because of the expanding footprints of China in the Gilgit-Baltistan, any resolution of the issue emphasising on demilitarisation of the region will hurt Indias strategic interests. Demilitarisation will mean vacating the military posts from Saltoro which gives Indian army an advantage at the moment. Even if Pakistan were to recognise Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), the strategic costs of withdrawal will be much heavier for India than for Pakistan. Indian military is distinctly unprepared for such an eventuality. At a time, when Pakistan is finding it difficult to maintain its forces in the Siachen sector, from a realist perspective, it hardly makes sense for India to make these strategic concessions. Defence analysts in India believe that the cost is not unaffordable while the experience gained by Indian troops in high altitude warfare is invaluable. In view of the above, any argument for resolution of Siachen issue with Pakistan, leading to complete withdrawal of Indian military from the Siachen heights, will have to be carefully analysed. How safe is the Indian coastline? What steps has the Government taken recently to improve the security of our coastlines? Indias coastline continues to remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks as well as to smuggling of drugs, arms and explosives. However, the situation is not so bleak. Thanks to the various measures undertaken by the government, the countrys coastal security situation is fast improving. Some of the measures initiated by the central government are:

The Indian Navy has been entrusted with the overall responsibility of coastal and maritime security; the Coast Guard given the additional responsibility of patrolling the territorial waters

The Navy and Coast Guard are being provided with additional manpower as well as suitable assets for coastal security 73 Coastal Police Stations have been established under Coastal Security Scheme Phase I; additional 131 Coastal Police Stations will be set up under Phase II Coastal Police Stations have being provided with trained manpower and interceptor boats to patrol the coastal waters Four Joint Operation Centers (JOCs) have been set up for coordination and intelligence sharing among various agencies involved in coastal security 46 static radars are in the process of being installed to provide complete coverage of the entire coast off the mainland and island territories, All vessels (merchant ships and fishing boats) above 20 meters are required to install Automatic Identification System (AIS) devices, and to track and monitor these vessels 84 AIS Stations are being set up along the coastline. All fishing boats are being registered under a uniform registration system All the coastal villagers are being provided with identity cards. It is important to emphasise that given the nature of the problem, Indias coa stline cannot be made foolproof; it can at best be managed efficiently so that the consequences of any untoward incident are minimised to the extent possible. How has India's counter-terrorism strategy changed post 26/11? India has been fighting terrorism in all its manifestations for a number of decades. However, over a period of time, the focus has shifted from home grown insurgents to terrorists sponsored, abetted and financed by Pakistan. This shift in the source of terror is also reflected in the country's strategy. From a stage wherein, insurgent leaders joined the mainstream and became Chief Ministers of States like Mizoram, to the LeT, the nature of threat has completely transformed. While this reality was evident before 26/11, however, it became all the more apparent thereafter, and forced policy makers to take more resolute and stringent steps to counter the threat. Amongst the specific steps, at the legal level, the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) was strengthened, reinforced and equipped to handle terrorism in all its manifestations. The limitation of inadequate security forces were addressed by opening NSG hubs at places other than Manesar in order to ensure faster and more effective reaction to crisis situations. Intelligence gathering, sharing and dissemination became a priority and the NATGRID was established, which is in the process of formalization. A Multi Agency Centre was established which is likely to evolve into the NCTC, thereby honing the inter-agency capability to fight terrorism. At the diplomatic level as well, India has pushed for international recognition of terrorism in all its forms and a number of UN Resolutions have been passed to provide a cohesive effort against terrorism. Yet another initiative has been the targeting of terrorism finance, which has received an impetus with both the UAPA and Anti Money Laundering legislations becoming more effective. A long-term step has also been to address the alienation of certain sections of the population through better integration, concessions, and targeting of hardline propaganda machinery, both from within and outside the country.

What could be the reasons for the unproductive functioning of SAARC while other regional associations like ASEAN and SCO have led to effective cooperation? First, I dont agree that the SAARC has been unproductive for a number of reasons. Any analysis of the SAARC should take into consideration the bitter partition that the Sub-continent witnessed and the accompanied mistrust and suspicion that made normal state-to-state relations a complicated affair. The relevance of the SAARC should be seen in the following manner: (a) It provides a platform for the regional countries to meet and discuss issues confronting the region. (b) The smaller countries of the region can play a visible role by setting regional agenda in spite of 'big India's' presence. (c) It has helped in expanding areas of cooperation that require collective regional effort, including certain non-traditional issues like terrorism, drug smuggling, etc. (e) Meeting of leaders on the sidelines of the SAARC summits have often helped in ironing out bilateral differences. The ASEAN countries did not have contested ideologies, such as the one based on two-nation theory. The countries comprising ASEAN came together to defend themselves from the communist threat. Such external threat was absent in the case of SAARC. Rather, India was considered as a threat by some member countries. Thus, SAARC and ASEAN cannot be compared. Similarly, SCO is relatively a new organisation established in 2001. I dont think SCO has been effective in terms of forging a common policy on Afghanistan. There is contestation between China and Russia as the latter feels that China is expanding its influence over Central Asia which is its legitimate sphere of influence. Though the forum speaks of countering terrorism; it is yet to have any comprehensive policy to deal with the post-withdrawal situation in Afghanistan. What can India do to secure its interests in Arctic? The Arctic has heated up in many different ways. The immediate reason seems to be the heated political discussion on 'who' shall extract the oil when the ice thins and possibly disappears? 'How' will the new marine delimitation lines be drawn? 'Who' will control the new sea passage? The big question (which is quickly dismissed by the Arctic 5) is 'who' owns the Arctic? There is no Indian interest so to speak. At best it can articulate a view point on international resource governance and responsible environmental management. This voice can be expressed through various platforms none more significant than the UN Security Council. However, India should ensure that it is not left out from the expanded observer status in the Arctic Council. There is pressure from China and Brazil to expand the non-Arctic observer status to which India has also joined in. It will be a big image blow if China gets it but India does not. There are six non-Arctic countries who sit in as observers: France, Germany, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, and the UK. The Arctic Council members include the Arctic 5 (Canada, Denmark via Greenland, Norway, Russia and the US) plus 3 (Finland, Iceland and Sweden). What is the difference between natural ally and strategic partner? Natural allies are normally 'birds of the same feather', while strategic partners are often strange bedfellows. Natural allies (think of America and Britain during the Second World War) share common political and cultural valuesthey may believe in democracy or authoritarianism; they may uphold liberal capitalism or socialism or state corporatism; they may share common historical and

cultural traditions; their societal values may be more or less similar; they may practice the same religion; and so on. Strategic partners (think of America and the Soviet Union during the Second World War) may share none of these similarities. Notwithstanding this difference, what makes two countries either natural allies or strategic partners is the common security challenge that they both face at a particular juncture in history and more importantly their decision to come together and pool their resources to deal with this challenge (think of America, Britain and the Soviet Union coming together to deal with the Fascist challenge during the Second World War). Has IBSA become redundant now that South Africa has acceded to the BRICS group? IBSA will continue to be relevant despite South Africas accession to the BRICS group. We must remember that the IBSA dialogue forum brings together three large democratic countries from different continents - Asia, Africa and South America. In comparison to BRICS, the IBSA has managed to develop a framework of multi-sectoral cooperation. Various working groups set up under the rubric of the IBSA dialogue forum has taken diverse initiatives towards South-South cooperation. Further, IBSA countries have been successful in coordinating positions at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on issues of global concern. This was quite evident by the visit of IBSA representatives to Syria and the coordination of positions in this context by the three countries at the UNSC. In the case of BRICS, the fact that it is a more diverse grouping composed of democracies as well as autocracies with differing geopolitical interests, limits the possibilities of synchronizing positions. Is the projection of popular alienation of Kashmiri people from India a perception or reality? There is some sense of alienation from the rest of the country among sections of people in the Kashmir Valley. There are several separatist groups in the Valley who have a varying degree of influence on the people. Therefore, in some areas of the Valley, their call for a boycott of the Assembly elections of 2008 had resulted in very low voter turn out. However, it would be incorrect to state that all sections of people are alienated to this extent and in this manner. The high voter turn out in the panchayat elections of 2011 in the Kashmir Valley indicates the willingness of the people to participate in democratic processes. Moreover, people are actively participating in the several development initiatives taken by the government. More recently, there has been some writing on the various meanings of azadi; so the nature and extent of alienation needs to be assessed in the light of these various meanings. The government (State and Union) has also undertaken several initiatives to enable greater interaction between people in the Valley and those in the rest of the country. What could be the implications of the proposed US-China consultations on South Asia for India? Are we seeing formation of G-2?

US-China consultations on South Asia are on for quite some time. The fourth round is coming up later this year. They are discussing all issues including India-Pakistan relations. There have been even indirect offers to mediate if it was agreeable to both the parties. However, there is no cause for concerns as far as India is concerned. Both China and the US understand that all outstanding issues between India and Pakistan should be resolved bilaterally and at the most they would play the role of facilitators. Both the countries have on different occasions asked Pakistan in the past to join India in a dialogue rather than seek their mediation in the event of any crisis. As far as other issues in South Asia are concerned, there is, one believes, a tacit recognition of the preeminent strategic position of India, which is duly backed by a realisation that any attempt either to hurt the strategic interests of India or change the power equations would be counter-productive; it would upset the regional power balance and threaten regional peace. Moreover, for China, the American attempt to undertake a regular dialogue on South Asia will both comfort China for the importance it receives from the US, and help China moderate its approach towards South Asia. There is disquiet at certain levels in India about the growing Chinese footprints in the neighbouring countries especially because of the temptation of these countries to use China as a balancer against India, wrongly perceived as a hegemon. However, in view of the shift in India-US relations in the recent years, US-China dialogue can be used as a forum to transmit Indian concerns to China regularly. On the whole, India should keep a close eye on the discussions in the forum, establish a healthy line of communication with both the countries, and communicate its concerns in a free, frank and uninhibited manner. What has been Sri Lankas position on the Kashmir issue? Has Sri Lanka been supportive of India in various international fora on the Kashmir issue or against Pakistani aggression? Immediately after India voted in support of the US sponsored resolution on Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on 22 March 2012, Sri Lanka cautioned India that this particular resolution could provide precedence for similar resolutions against India on Kashmir. This might have led the questioner to raise this issue. However, Sri Lanka has not so far taken any adverse position on Kashmir, and has rather maintained neutrality over the issue. As a smaller country, it had in the 1950s and 60s sought to project its soft power and had offered to mediate between India and China. Even in the late 1990s, there were moves by Pakistan to encourage Sri Lanka as a mediator and the then president had even indirectly offered to help the process, if there was a need for the same. However, Sri Lanka has largely respected India's reservations about any third party mediating between India and Pakistan. It has also taken a neutral posture on the issue in international fora. In

view of the growing contacts between Sri Lanka, and India's traditional rivals-- Pakistan and China, it is being speculated that Sri Lanka may change its position on Kashmir in future. However, Sri Lanka is well aware that any such step would damage India-Sri Lanka relations and any Indian counter measure would be disastrous for the Island country. Against this backdrop, whether it would take any position against Indian interests on the Kashmir issue in international fora remains to be seen. What are the strategic and security implications of 'string of pearls' for India? The string of pearls theory is often seen as a Chinese attempt to encircle India. However, there are a few imperatives that require to be seen in a holistic manner. The Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) could be seen stemming mainly from their interest in advancing their economic engagement and ensuring safety of their maritime trade, especially oil, as the Indian Ocean is the conduit for Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) flowing from east to west and vice versa. Therefore, in order to establish a presence and ensure protection of their investments and interests in the region, China is engaging IOR nations as it is doing the world over. Whether the string of pearls is a threat to Indias interests, especially to what extent, is a debatable issue. Although a matter of concern, it should be viewed in the backdrop of Indias existing standing as a stabilising factor in the security dynamics of the region. Chinas engagement of nations in the Indian Ocean region, namely Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Maldives and most recently Seychelles is based mainly on infrastructure development and enhancement of diplomatic ties thereby availing of the facilities available for extending what is called the string of pearls theory. Recent political events in Myanmar and the US engagement could however dilute the Chinese influence there. However, the strategic and security implications of Chinese engagements in the IOR are tremendous and require to be viewed through multiple prisms ranging from the diplomatic, economic, good will and trust to military balancing. The military balancing aspect is not considered an area of immediate concern and would be driven by the Chinese capability to maintain a sustained military, especially naval, presence in the region. Although Chinas actions are within the ambit of international law and relations, a fact acknowledged by the Indian defence minister, India should look at a policy that would ensure that its relations and investments with the nations in terms of goodwill and trust earned, defence diplomacy and economics are not reduced by the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. How important is the role of soft power in international relations? Soft power is a desirable trait in international relations but is of limited utility in times of war. And, if the organising principle of international relations is the state of anarchy between nations, then soft power reveals to be not that powerful after all. At the same time, soft power does have a certain diplomatic appeal - it helps to win friends and convince people. Also in the field of public diplomacy, soft power is pretty useful in shaping perceptions. Hence, for instance, India's soft power is the Bollywood film industry which is popular in large parts of Asia and Africa.

With huge potential reserves of hydrocarbon and minerals in the Arctic region, is the balance of power again tilting westwards? The international system is essentially about maintaining peace through balancing power. The balance of power is almost indispensable in diplomacy and one of the greatest exponents of this has been Russia. With reference to the Arctic, where the melting of the ice is opening the seas to vast resources and fisheries as well as shorter navigational routes, great power politics is potentially high. Competition and contestation over future stewardship and exploitation of the resources in the Arctic may well lead to stand-offs and military expansion, a throw-back to the Cold War period. Russia, therefore, is a critical player and a counterweight to any balance of power tilting westwards. In fact a resurgent Russia will find the Arctic region a perfect ground to proclaim its power status. It must be remembered that the Arctic is territorial proprietorship of the 5 nations called A5 (US, Canada, Russia, Norway and Denmark). Unlike Antarctica, which is governed by the 1959 Treaty that bans territorial claims, the Arctic region is sectorial. The odd country out in the A5 is Russia. The other 4 are NATO members with long standing Western liberal democracies and thus a natural ally. Yet Russia seems to be in a position to balance the unfavourable equation. It has greater cooperation with Norway, with which it shares border, over fishing and hydroelectricity. With Canada it cooperates on ice breakers. Oddly it is the US which seems to be maintaining a strategic silence in the A5 grouping. Why has India failed to tackle the problem of Naxalism despite so many policies in place? The reason lies in the governments inability to properly implement policies on the ground. Some of the key inhibiting factors in this regard are: a) Terrain: The areas where the Naxals operate are thickly forested, hilly, remote, and have limited roads and tracks. There are no proper detailed maps available as some of these areas have not been surveyed properly. b) Location of villages: The villages are located in remote areas separated by thick jungles. There are no good roads or tracks connecting these villages, with the result that there is lack of communication. Generally the local people move on foot. To approach these people living in such remote areas from the district/tehsil headquarters takes considerable time. A determined government machinery is the only device to approach the people in the region. c) Poverty: Most of the people live in extreme economic conditions as there are hardly any employment avenues available. Therefore, they are easily motivated and lured to join the Naxalite organisations. d) No Presence of Government Machinery: There is no presence of state government in these remote areas with the result neither these poor people are aware about the policies of the government and their benefits, nor the government has shown any interest to know about the needs

of these tribal people. This has been taken advantage of by the Naxals to endear themselves to the local people. e) Deployment of Security Forces: There is no presence of police in some of these remote areas. Even if it is there, they are not effective. The Central Forces i.e. BSF, CRPF and the ITBP are thinly deployed as compared to the requirement. Moreover, the area has been heavily mined by the Naxals and therefore the security forces have not been able to dominate these areas. f) Lack of Proper Training: To operate against the Naxals, no proper training was imparted to the security forces at the time of their induction, and therefore, they initially suffered heavy causalities. Besides this, the central armed forces also do not enjoy special powers like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in these states. In addition, the fear of human rights violations has made the security forces adopt a defensive posture. g) No Development: The affected areas have been neglected by the state governments. These areas remain economically deprived and backward as the local government never tried to approach or communicate with the common people. Now several efforts are being made, but the development progress has been very slow. h) Political Attitude: The most important aspect is the political attitude of the state governments when it comes to implementing the programmes and taking necessary effective measures to deal with the Naxalite problem. While Andhra Pradesh has largely succeeded in controlling the situation, other States have failed to view and acknowledge the prevailing situation in the correct prospective. The Naxalites are well entrenched and are spreading their wings to larger areas. Their movement has so far been well planned and organised. Pro-Naxal activists have been placed at all strategically important locations to counter government plans. These activists not only agitate against government policies but also effectively resist the implementation of developmental policies. To neutralise the Naxalite movement, constant, determined and well- coordinated efforts are required on all fronts. There is an urgent need to ensure that the policies and programmes of the government reach the people. However, all this would take time may be a minimum of five to six years. What is the difference between Maoism and Naxalism? Naxalism originated as a rebellion against lack of development and poverty at the local level in the rural parts of eastern India. The term Naxal derives its name from a village called Naxalbari in the State of West Bengal where the movement had its origin. The Naxals are considered far left radical communists who support Maoist political ideology. Their origin can be traced to the split that took place in the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in 1967. It led to the formation of Communist Party of India (Marxist and Leninist). Initially the movement had its centre in West Bengal. Thereafter, it spread into less developed areas of rural central and eastern India, such as, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha and Andhra Pradesh through the activities of underground groups like the Communist Party of India (Maoist).

Maoism originated in China as a form of Communist theory derived from the teachings of the Chinese political leader Mao Zedong. It was widely applied as the political and military guiding ideology of the Communist Party of China till 1977-78. It emphasised the advancement of peoples social and economic life by establishing a classless society through armed revolution. It was rooted in the anti-imperialist struggle and supported armed revolution in order to achieve political transformation. Naxalism is actually based on the principles of Maoism to achieve a similar transformation in India. What is the meaning of geo-economics and geo-strategy? What one means by strategic engagement? Geo-economics is the study of how economics functions in an international environment. It is basically an academic study of the global move of capital, market and labour. The concept of geoeconomics thereby interacts with the geographic and demographic aspects of states and consequently influences their own policy with regard to international trade and commerce. Geoeconomics also provides us with a list of economic powers; the states with the greatest economic strengths, and how that influences the structure of power. For example, the US as the top economy followed by China as the second largest economy, and how the distribution of economic power informs their politics, etc. Geo-strategy is the practical world of policy-making amongst states at the international level. It basically informs states to chart out a strategic course of which policies to undertake in order to improve ones own position in the international order. This could include policies to become the worlds pre-eminent power, or to become an economic power or a regional actor. The geographic location of a country plays a critical role in the formulation of geo-strategy. Strategic partnership is a partnership between two states in order to support/forward/craft particular goals in the international order. A strategic partnership enables two states to have a common vision towards a particular foreign policy goal. For example, the US and India have a strategic partnership between them. This strategic partnership brings the two countries together on global issues like safeguard of the global commons, the fight against piracy, non-proliferation, high technology cooperation, etc. The strategic partnership framework also offers the guidelines for future policy making on issues of common interest. Why Japan provides her maximum Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to India? First of all let us understand what the Official Development Assistance (ODA) is. It is a low-interest and a long-term loan offered by Japan to developing nations including India. Japan claims that it is a tool to maintain good relations with other countries. To begin with, Japan extended large amount of soft loans to Southeast Asian and East Asian countries including its erstwhile colonies to achieve twin purposes: gaining their goodwill and maintaining presence in their market through Japanese-funded projects. However, the fact that it is driven by Japans entr epreneurial interest cannot be negated as ODA was mostly a tied aid under which the recipient countries had to buy technical equipments for

Japanese funded projects from the Japanese companies. Later, post-1990s, Japan left the option open for the recipient countries to buy technical equipments through open biddings. India was one of the first countries to receive Japanese ODA loan in 1958. In 2007, India became the largest recipient of Japanese ODA loan when Japan had to cut the ODA loan to China owing to peoples demand. Japans ODA Charter stipulates that the country will halt its ODA loan to countries that violate human rights, do not promote democracy, invest hugely in defence, or are involved in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Major portion of Japanese loan to India goes to infrastructure development projects. Japan wants to lower its presence in China in view of growing tension between the two countries over disputed territories in the East China Sea. Also, studies suggest that China will become an ageing society in the next 20 to 30 years (if it does not ease its one-child policy), and in that scenario the consumption of Japanese manufacturing products will decrease. So they want to shift their productions to India which still has a large youth population and a growing middle class. But since the infrastructure in India remains poor, they believe that it will hamper the flow of their goods from one corner of India to another. This explains why Japan has been extending loans for infrastructure development projects in India, including road and railway corridors. Japan also wants to make India its export hub to reach out to the West Asian economies and to minimize the shipping costs. Is China a threat to the Indian Navy or does India has the advantage by being able to control China's sea lines of communication? Threat perceptions are normally based on capabilities and perceived intentions in an area of common interest. The same would apply in the case of China in the Indian Ocean, which apparently appears to be the theme of the question. Chinas entry into the Indian Ocean is presently based on economic engagements and ensuring safety of their maritime trade, especially oil, that traverses the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs). In order to ensure security of these interests, the presence of the PLAN is normative. To be perceived as a threat, a Navy must have the ability of firstly presence in adequate numbers and secondly sustained supportable operations. The first aspect requires a good mix of combat ability in all three dimensions air, surface and sub surface. The Chinese Navy has a big disadvantage in the air dimension, primarily the lack of ship based air cover, and the land based maritime reconnaissance capability due to the distance involved. An aircraft carrier could provide this air cover but it would be restricted in time and space. The second aspect of sustenance of operations would be driven by the number of bases available for resupply and maintenance. Air operations and support from friendly foreign bases is a possibility but nations permitting this type of support would weigh the pros and cons in terms of international pressure, and the aspect of neutrality in the event of a conflict. India on the other hand has the advantage over China in the Indian Ocean as the proximity of bases and operations over distances in the region are part of its normal operating philosophy, thereby permitting it to be present in adequate numbers. Therefore, presently, the Chinese Navy is not considered a cogent threat.

The aspects covered above permits India to monitor the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean so as to ensure a secure maritime environment. As India believes in and supports the aspect of freedom of navigation in the seas, it would under normal circumstances not like to be viewed as an impediment in another nations maritime trade. However, in the event of a conflict, it would have the advantage of monitoring and interdicting Chinese trade traversing the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean. What are the important factors that pushed Italy to sign a long-term strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan? The phrase long-term strategic partnership is tautological. Though liberally used today in international parleys and joint declarations, the term strategic partnership is however meant to be comprehensive, all-encompassing and long-term. It is suppose to have a pre-defined road map, timeframe, with well-articulated objectives. Italy has had a long Afghan connection. Not only the deposed Afghan King Zahir Shah spent almost three decades in exile there, Italy also hosts an influential Afghan expat community. Italy, being an important member of the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF], has around 4,000 soldiers posted in Afghanistan and is the lead nation of the Regional Command West [RC- W] of the ISAF, which is headquartered in Herat. Like the US, Germany, the UK, etc., Italy also has a Special Envoy for the Af-Pak region to coordinate its national and multilateral efforts. The current incumbent is Francesco Tal. Italian troops too have suffered casualties in Afghanistan. Being an EU/NATO member, signing a strategic partnership with Afghanistan is not unprecedented for Italy. Other European countries too have signed partnership agreements with Afghanistan. Recently, on May 16, Germany and Afghanistan signed a bilateral agreement in Berlin, by which the former has assured long-term military assistance to the latter. As it is evident from the recent developments like the NATO Summit in Chicago, the Western forces engaged in Afghanistan are in a withdrawal mode. However, at the same time, the contributing nations of the ISAF want to maintain close contacts with Afghanistan and assist in re-building the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF]. Most crucial factor, which has definitely influenced Italy, is the imminent fall-out of the impending withdrawal of the ISAF from Afghanistan. For Europe, it means a wave of Afghan refugees at its doorstep. A fresh wave of Afghan refugees may be inevitable given the fear of a Taliban takeover of Kabul and subsequent reprisal against the supporters of the current government and civilian population in a post-withdrawal scenario. Long-term factors are rise in drug trafficking from Afghanistan, terrorism, and more importantly, the operational connections of young Islamic radicals in Europe with the extremist forces with terror potential active in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region. Is the lease of the Russian Nerpa class submarine, with its non-combat clause, justified? Should India have gone for either a Borie or Typhoon class?

To understand the rationale behind the leasing of the Russian Nerpa class submarine (renamed INS Chakra), a look at the time line of Indias nuclear submarine programme and some treaties like Non Proliferation and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is essential. India had earlier leased and operated a Charlie class Russian nuclear submarine from 1988 to 1992 for training its personnel on nuclear powered submarines. This submarine was also called INS Chakra. Construction of the Nerpa class submarine commenced in 1993 and it was scheduled for delivery in 2007 on lease to India. However, various reports indicate that issues related to equipment and an accident at sea resulted in the delay. The Typhoon class submarines have been in service since 1981 and are due to be decommissioned (removed from service) reportedly due to restrictions imposed on Russia by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. However, as per reports, no such decision to remove from service has been made and the submarines would remain with the Russian Navy. Given this situation, taking the Typhoon class on lease would not have been beneficial to India. The Typhoon class is scheduled to be replaced by the Borei class. Construction of the Borei class began in 1996. By that time, in all probability, the deal between India and Russia for the Nerpa would have been concluded. It is surmised that no matter which submarine India would have taken on lease, the non combat clause would have been applied. As per reports, the Russian submarine (Nerpa) can carry strategic weapons but they are not being transferred to India because of the MTCR. Out of the 10 tubes, four are blank, while six are open. The MTCR prevents the transfer of missiles above the range of 50 nautical miles, and Russia has never flouted the MTCR. The four blanked-out tubes are for bigger weapons with a wider diameter. Apart from the international treaties the cost factor of acquiring, maintaining and operating a nuclear powered submarine is also a consideration. Admiral Arun Prakash, India former Chief of Naval Staff, had remarked, The problems with acquiring a foreign nuclear submarine on lease are obvious: the current sources are limited (until the Nuclear Suppliers Group looks more benignly at us), it will carry a conventional weapon load, and it will come at a huge cost. Therefore, the taking on lease of the Nerpa class submarine by India is mainly to gain expertise and experience before India develops its indigenous nuclear powered submarines. In this respect, the deal for the Nerpa, given the circumstances and time line mentioned above, could be considered optimal. How the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean region is detrimental to Indias interests? The Indian Ocean is the conduit for Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) flowing from east to west and vice versa. Therefore, the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean Region could be seen stemming mainly from their interest in advancing their economic engagements and ensuring safety of their maritime trade, especially oil. Chinas engagement of Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and most recently Seychelles is based mainly on infrastructure development and enhancement of diplomatic ties, thereby availing of the facilities

available for extending what could be called its Look West Policy. Recent political events in Myanmar and the US engagement could however dilute the Chinese influence there. However, the implications of Chinese engagements in the IOR are tremendous and require to be viewed through multiple prisms ranging from the strategic to economic to military balancing. The military balancing aspect is not considered an area of immediate concern and would be driven by the Chinese capability to maintain a sustained military, especially naval, presence in the region. Whether the Chinese presence is detrimental to Indias interests, especially to what extent, is a debatable issue. Although a matter of concern, it should be viewed in the backdrop of Indias current standing as a stabilising factor in the security dynamics of the region. Although Chinas actions are within the ambit of international law and relations, a fact acknowledged by the Indian defence minster, India should look at a policy that would ensure that its relations and investments with the nations in terms of goodwill and trust earned, its defence diplomacy and economics, are not reduced by the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. What steps India has taken to counter Chinese initiatives in Nepal? To my understanding, India has never instituted or designed its policy towards Nepal to counter Chinese initiatives. While Beijings policy towards Nepal has largely been based on anti -Indian proposition, India has always preferred to see Nepal as a traditional South Asian neighbour, and has preferred to maintain a healthy relation at both political and non-political levels. India must boost its economic and commercial interests in Nepal, and must rise to negate Chinas endeavor before Beijing utterly dominates Nepalese market and resources. Besides, India should never undermine the strategic location of Nepal that is vital to its national security, as it is closely bordered to both China and Tibet. Indias thrust should be similar to that of the Chinese strategy - maintain good political contacts while pushing the economic and commercial interests ahead. In recent times, China has shown a keen interest in the politics of an unstable Nepal. What are Chinas objectives in Nepal? China sees Nepal as a strategic location for its geo-political objectives in South Asia. In Chinese strategic perception, Nepal would be better utilized by regional powers like India if China doesnt maintain or institute a strong relationship with Nepal. Besides, the Chinese experts believe that Nepal is crucial from Beijings security perspective because of the frequent protest movements and vulnerable conditions in Tibet. In Chinese calculation, having good relations with Nepal will help it to curb Tibetan movements and keep a vigilant eye on the Tibetan protests and activities. While the Tibet factor remains primary security issue for China in Nepal, possibility for greater trade and commercial contacts with Nepal has also been the principal objectives in Chinas recent policy towards Nepal. Trade has continued to expand between China and Nepal over the years, but importantly, China has also inked vital hydro power plant projects with Nepal. For example, China has recently signed a $1.6 billion agreement to develop the hydro power plant in Nepal, which is of almost 760-megawatt, known as West Seti project. This is vital from Indias perspective as India used to be the principal country in Nepals hydro power and water projects till

recently. In short, the Chinese policy towards Nepal consists of both political and economic objectives, targeted at larger South Asian politics and goals. In return, Nepal has equally shown greater support and affiliation with China in the broader South Asian politics. This is clearly evidenced in Nepals open support for Chinas application for observer status in SAARC previously. More recently, Nepal has also not openly opposed the prospect of China becoming a full member in SAARC. India must take these issues seriously, as Nepal is a neighbouring South Asian country, and India shares larger security and political interests with Nepal. Is there any sign of Bhutan possibly titling towards China for economic reasons? If yes, then what should be India's strategy towards Bhutan? Bhutan has adopted a very cautious, guarded and pragmatic foreign policy towards China. Given the strong India - Bhutan relations, which is built on the foundation of trust and mutual benefit, it is unlikely that Bhutan will tilt towards China. There are three other reasons which will discourage Bhutan's tilt towards China. First, Bhutan's industrial belt is in the South and geographically trade facilitation becomes more convenient with India. Second, Bhutan- China boundary dispute has not been resolved as yet. I do not see both countries having an economic relationship with an unresolved boundary dispute in the back burner. Third, for establishing ties with China, Bhutan will have to reverse its policy of not having any diplomatic relations with P-5 countries. That would mean having diplomatic relations with the United States of America too. Having said this, I am not negating the possibility of the China factor. Domestic pressure is building up in Bhutan to resolve the boundary dispute with China. With Bhutan now encouraging the private sector to come up, there will be some circles in Bhutan, who will see business in engaging with China. Today, the Indo- Bhutan relations have become all encompassing, cross cutting various sections of society. India, therefore, has to be more sensitive and responsive in its engagement with Bhutan. India also needs to factor in the change taking place in Bhutanese society and politics. Why did India decide to withdraw from ACU? How will the new agreement with Iran solve the problem? In December 2010, the RBI decided to stop using the Asian Clearing Union (ACU) to pay Iran for its crude - under US pressure. The ACU, which was established at the initiative of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP) and in operation since 1974, is a currency mechanism set up to help countries economise on their forex reserves by allowing them to conduct bilateral barter trade and make payments using the Asian Monetary Units (currency units indexed to the US dollar and the euro that allowed countries to hold surpluses and deficits outside their formal foreign exchange reserves). Washington and its Western allies had been pressuring India not to use the ACU to pay Iran on the grounds that this mechanism was too opaque, thereby making it difficult to ascertain whether the money flowing into Iran's coffers was not being used for the country's nuclear programme. Under pressure from the US Treasury, the Indian government withdrew from the ACU facility. A RBI circular

on December 27, 2010 noted that all eligible current account transactions including trade transactions with Iran should be settled in any permitted currency outside the ACU mechanism. In order to pay Iran, India first turned to a complex mechanism using the Hamburg-based EuropaischIranische Handels Bank (EIH) via the German Central Bank and the State Bank of India between February to April 2011 as the procedure did not violate UNSC or EU sanctions. However, pressure on German Chancellor Angela Merkel from the US increased and in April 2011 this route was also closed by Germany. India then made an arrangement with Turkey's Halkbank, 75 per cent of which was owned by the Turkish government, which had refused to abide by US and EU sanctions. But Halkbank too was put under tremendous pressure to close this payment avenue as well. India, unlike China, does not have the wherewithal to conduct barter trade with Iran, given the huge imbalance in their bilateral trade. After weeks of negotiations, both countries agreed in February 2012 that India would pay 45 per cent of its oil bill in rupees which would be held in the Kolkatabased UCO bank (which has minimum, if any, exposure to the US market) and IDBI bank and paid out to two Iranian private banks, Bank Parsian and Karafarin Bank. The rest of the oil bill will be sorted out in time. To further facilitate this mechanism, India had also agreed to waive a withholding tax of 40 per cent of net income, i.e., while making payments to Iranian crude oil suppliers, Indian refiners will not have to deduct taxes. Moreover, to correct the trade imbalance, India and Iran are trying to substantially increase Indian export basket to Iran. In March, an Indian trade delegation went to Iran for this purpose, but came back largely disappointed. Indian traders had hoped to export wheat, rice, tea, pharmaceuticals, iron and steel. Early this month, a 56-member Iranian team also visited India to look at options to boost trade. While statements, such as potential bilateral trade reaching $24-25 billion, are making the rounds, nothing concrete has come out of the discussions, barring a few small deals in Indian export of soy meal and animal feed to Iran. Hence, while the rupee trade has allowed India to pay Iran some $7 billion for earlier oil, India will have to either boost exports to Iran to continue buying oil from Iran or cut its oil imports from the country. What does India stand to gain if the membership of SCO is granted? Given the increasing role and significance of the SCO in the Eurasian region and beyond, India is likely to benefit more in the long-term by joining the organisation rather than by staying out of it. For long India has been seen as a mute spectator and fence sitter in terms of its foreign policy towards Western and Central Asia. As India seeks to expand its role in regional and global affairs, it cannot remain insulated from the developments in its extended neighbourhood. Today, Indias growing economy and its scientific and technological advancement are perceived as being beneficial for the region. First and foremost, the full membership of the SCO will provide India greater visibility in the affairs of the Eurasian region which is strategically important for India. Secondly, it will enable India, as an

integral part of the Eurasian security grouping, to neutralise centrifugal forces arising from religious extremism and terrorism in the region. In addition, it will help India in managing much more effectively the negative impact of a Talibanised Afghanistan, especially in the post-2014 scenario. Thirdly, it will provide India with a forum where it can constructively engage both China and Pakistan in a regional context and project Indias security interests in the turbulent regional swathe including West Asia. More importantly, cooperation in three critical areas energy, building trade and transportation links, and dealing with traditional and non-traditional security threats can be facilitated through the SCO mechanism. What security implications do you see by the presence of PLA or the Chinese army in the Pakistan occupied Kashmir? In recent past, there has been extensive reportage on the possible presence of PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) soldiers in Gilgit Baltistan region of PoK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir). In October 2011, Chief of the Indian Army, General V.K. Singh, also endorsed this possibility by stating there could be 3000-4000 PLA soldiers in this region. In August 2010, an article by Selig Harrison published in the New York Times signaled similar possibility. Since PoK, and Gilgit Baltistan in particular, are largely inaccessible to the outside world, it is rather difficult to know the extent and nature of Chinese presence in Gilgit Baltistan. There are multiple security implications arising from Chinese activities in PoK. China in the past has deliberately tried to punctuate Kashmir as disputed by issuing stapled visas to people from J&K (Jammu and Kashmir) and obstructing an Indian army official posted in J&K to be part of a defence delegation visiting China. That it has willingly offered its assistance in infrastructure development in PoK and possibly has stationed PLA soldiers there, shows the duality in Chinese standards. In view of the strong bonhomie between China and Pakistan, the Chinese presence in Gilgit Baltistan close to the LoC could act to Indias detriment in times of war and other contingencies. In the broader context of Indias encirclement by China in the south Asian region, this kind of presence is disturbing since PoK is a territory which legally belongs to India. The need, therefore, is to ensure that the issue of Chinese presence in PoK figures predominantly in future bilateral exchanges between India and China. What is the difference between insurgency and terrorism? Insurgents, by and large, target the security forces and the state apparatus. They work to mobilise the people, acquire popular support and eventually overthrow the government. Insurgents, in Mao Tse-tungs famous formulation, are the fish and the people are the water in which these fish swim. In contrast, the common people are the targets of terrorist violence today, although this was not the case when terrorism first emerged in the modern era. When terrorism came to be first employed as a strategy in the late 19th century, the targets were symbols of political authority kings, emperors, viceroys, political leaders, government officials, etc. Further, these attacks were intended to serve as propaganda by deed, meaning advertisement for the cause. And these attacks were carried out only as the final resort and mainly against autocratic rulers and governments. In contrast, there are no

innocents is the motto of contemporary terrorists who moreover target democracies in the first resort. And, unlike 19th century terrorists who proudly proclaimed that they are indeed terrorists, terrorists today cloak themselves in the garb of freedom fighters and holy warriors. Be that as it may, both insurgents and terrorists engage in violence in order to attain certain political or increasingly politico-religious objectives-national liberation and independence, establishing a communist system of government or an Islamic form of government, restoration of the Caliphate, etc. Isn't illegal immigration from Bangladesh a serious security threat to India? How can it be checked? Illegal migration from Bangladesh is a serious threat to security of India. It can be checked only if central and state governments decide to act in tandem. At present there is little political will. Also, there is less focus on the issue because its impact is seen in the long-term. Moreover, the illegal migrants are now spread all over India. As a result, they no more provoke the kind of agitation that was seen earlier in states like Assam. Mangesh Sawant asked: Was it not a strategic mistake on India's part to recognise Tibet as an integral part of China? Prashant Kumar Singh replies: Any answer to this query will always depend on individual reading and perception of the history. If one is convinced that the presence of the Dalai Lama has done more harm than good to India, and that India could have bought long-lasting friendship and friction-free relationship with China by unequivocally endorsing Chinese claims over Tibet which in turn would have forestalled the emergence of Sino-Pak axis, one can conclude that it was a strategic mistake on the part of India not to have immediately recognised Tibet as an integral part of China. However, if one reasons that the friction-free relationship between these two Asian giants is Utopian thinking and a strategic context is bound to be there in their relationship, with Tibet being just one dimension; and that maintaining Tibet as a buffer, though condemned as an imperial legacy, was a prudent strategy to follow, then one would argue that India did not play its Tibet card well in the 1950s. That India pursued an imperial strategy in Tibet in the 1950s has been basically a Chinese insinuation. The criticism that not recognising Tibet as an integral part of China was a strategic mistake on the part of India is academic acceptance of this Chinese position only. However, the strategy of creating buffers moves beyond ideological contexts. The USSR pursued this strategy vis--vis the West, and the USSR and the PRC even vis--vis each other. And also, China did treat Tibet as a strategic backyard (or buffer) for the core Han China against the countries lying west of Tibet. Otherwise, China's medieval claims on Tibet are irrelevant in the modern times. Therefore, if at all India was pursuing a policy of retaining and maintaining a buffer in Tibet, this policy was not non-kosher for

China. China was also doing exactly the same in Tibet. In the final outcome, what made a difference was who played this policy more deftly. Furthermore, the semantics apart, India has never challenged Chinese authority over Tibet. In fact, India did a rare favour to China by surrendering its extra-territorial rights on Tibet which it had inherited from the British. Moreover, the Tibet problem is between Tibetans and China, not between India and China. India has not done anything to aggravate this problem in the last 50 years. But unfortunately, Chinas insecurity vis--vis Tibet is often transmitted on to its relations with India. The Maoist China was a revolutionary state having strong ideological motivations. It aligned with the USSR and declared hostility towards the US in ideological fervour, discarding American overtures between the 1949 Communist takeover of China and the Korean War. Even before 1949, America had actually stayed away from becoming a party against the communists in the Chinese Civil War. China made the North Korea attack the South Korea because of ideology. Finally, it broke from the alliance with the Soviet Union in its ideological quest for the leadership of the socialist world. In fact, the Maoist China entered into many confrontations with external powers and many a times descended into domestic chaos because of ideology. In this light, asserting that Tibet was the only reason behind the Sino-Indian confrontation is probably incorrect. China's desire to assert superiority of its political system over democratic India and to project itself as the only leader of Asia were probably far more responsible reasons behind Chinese aggression on India in 1962, though India had its own share of strategic and diplomatic mistakes. Therefore, the suggestion that even more unequivocal support to China on Tibet issue would have made a genuine difference to the SinoIndian relations does not carry much conviction. However, a valid criticism of India's Tibet policy in the 1950s is that it became a hotchpotch of idealism and realism. Neither idealism nor realism got a full play in this policy. The diagnosis about Chinese presence in Tibet was quite realist but the prescriptions followed were somewhat idealist, which could not withstand the heat of the events as they unfolded in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Turan Nishant: What kind of security threats does a radicalised south Punjab in Pakistan poses to the border states of India? P.K. Upadhyay replies: Rising religious radicalism in Pakistan is a cause for major concern to India. For one it is not a phenomenon with purely internal security and stability implications for Pakistan. It is trans-national in its approach and character, and seeks to reach out to the Muslim communities and societies outside Pakistan as well. This could adversely affect sections of the Indian Muslims. It could accentuate sectarian differences among the Indian Muslims, destroy notions of religious pluralism and could make various sects more orthodox, doctrinaire and militant in pursuit of their wish to impose their interpretation of the faith. India's bordering areas, especially those across south Punjab of Pakistan, which cannot be totally insulated given the dictates of geography, would be the first recipients of this virus, adding to India's already considerable headache in managing border areas.

Besides, increasing sectarian tensions and growing radicalisation could weaken the state apparatuses and even cause a breakdown in the law and order situation in Pakistan. This could make many people leave their home and hearths and seek refuge in India. How will India deal with that situation? Would it allow them easy entry into the country's bordering areas in Indian Punjab and Rajasthan with its concomitant security and social implications, or would it stop them in the no-man's land and force them to live in appalling conditions and face international opprobrium for that? It is about time that the government does its homework and be ready with possible solutions. Shubhda Chaudhary: What is the difference between norms and principles in international regime theory? Namrata Goswami replies: In International Regime Theory, regime has been defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles signify beliefs of causation and fact; norms are standards of behaviour based on rights and obligations. Hence, for instance, principles are those that signify a certain belief system leading to a particular outcome. For example, in China, the principle belief that economic power leads to overall national strength. Norms are used to guide state action based on history, values, rights and certain political obligations. Manish Sawankar asked: Is Agni V an ICBM? A. Vinod Kumar replies: Since the tested range of the Agni V cannot be independently verified, only DRDO's claims could be taken into account. Nonetheless, DRDO declares the system to have around 5000 km range, which is normally identified as an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM). There is no single globally accepted international definition for ICBM ranges, which vary from 5500 km by some groups to anything above 7000 km by others. The literal meaning reflects a capability of the system being able to travel from one continent to another farther one, if one is to trace the origins of ICBM technology and its initial application in the US-Soviet missile competition during the Cold War. In our case, if the intended target is China, then the need for intercontinental coverage doesn't arise as Beijing would be roughly within 4000 km from Delhi. Shubhda Chaudhary asked: What are the implications of accepting the US-sponsored sanctions against Iran by India? S. Samuel C. Rajiv replies: It is not mandatory on the part of India to follow the US-sponsored sanctions against Iran given that these are unilateral measures primarily applicable to the US companies or companies that do/intend to do business with the US-based companies. These sanctions have certain requirements like prohibiting an investment exceeding $20 million in a year in Irans petro-chemical industry, restrictions on loans that can be provided by the US financial institutions ($10 million over a 12-month period), among others. The above are part of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) of January 2010. The Obama administration further tightened such measures by targeting Irans Central Bank in December 2011, making it difficult for others to carry out business transactions with Tehran.

India has been negatively affected by these unilateral measures, and has had to find alternative mechanisms to pay for Iranian crude. The percentage of Iranian oil though has been declining relative to the overall imports. Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee during his recent visit to the US remarked that India was buying 14 million tonnes of Iranian oil, as against total imports of 170 million tonnes (for a little over 8 per cent). The US 2012 National Defence Authorisation Act urges countries to cut their imports from Iran significantly. President Obama recently gave 11 nations (10 European and Japan) exemption from US sanctions which could be effective from July 2012 after making the consideration that they have reduced their imports significantly. While India has not a pplied for such exemption, it could still meet the criterion by not paying in hard currency for the crude it buys, sourcing its requirements from others like Saudi Arabia (which is to supply 32 million tonnes in 2012-13, which is 5 million tonnes more than the previous year) among other pertinent steps. Blessy asked: How the US factor and the US-Iran relations affect the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline? M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi replies: The US-Iranian standoff over the latters nuclear programme has implications for the IPI gas pipeline project. US has been opposed to the IPI project in view of continuing sanctions on Iran. It has objected to Pakistan going ahead with $7.5 billion gas pipeline deal. The US Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Blake, had told Pakistan back in April 2010 that it is not the right time to have such transactions with Tehran. US has also tried to convince India to not to join IPI and instead look for alternative sources to fulfill its energy demands. US has supported and encouraged the TAPI gas pipeline project as an alternative to the IPI pipeline. However, the US opposition is not the only factor delaying the IPI project. Differences over issues pertaining to pricing mechanism, security guarantees, and transit fees, etc. have also been impinging on the IPI project. Ajai Vir asked: What is the difference between Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security? Which one should have higher priority? S. Samuel C. Rajiv replies: Nuclear Safety primarily refers to the measures taken to ensure the wellbeing of power reactors and other civilian uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear Security on the other hand refers to measures taken to prevent the misuse of nuclear/radiological materials/weapons including physical protection of sources, among others. Both have the common purpose of ensuring that the negative effects of nuclear materials/technologies on society and environment are prevented. Both should have equal priority depending on the nature of the threat, technologies being used, among other pertinent factors. Issues of nuclear safety came into prominence after the Chernobyl meltdown. Organisations like World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) were formed to help ensure uniform standards in civilian nuclear plant operations, improved safety procedures, among others. Issues of nuclear security came into prominence in the aftermath of 9/11. Events like the Nuclear Security Summit

have sought to focus attention on these aspects. The IAEAs Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) is another prominent initiative, in which India is a significant partner. Ajai Vir asked - How do you view the nuclear stance of Iran and North Korea? Is it similar in the context of geopolitics? S. Samuel C. Rajiv replies: Iran and North Korea have presented significant challenges to the international non-proliferation regime. Both countries face difficult regional security situations. However, there are differences in the two cases which make their respective nuclear stances also different. Iran is a regional power in its own right a huge country (Robert Kaplan calls Iran the greater Middle Easts universal joint), significant population, massive natural resources, among other strengths. The only claim to fame for North Korea is its dubious nuclear status. While Iran is a theocracy with democratic elections, the other is an authoritarian state based on a personality cult. As regards their interactions with the non-proliferation regime, North Korea is no longer part of the NPT, while Iran had threatened in the past that it will quit the treaty if pushed to the wall. However, all of Irans declared nuclear activities continue to come under NPT/IAEA safeguards. While Iran has not followed through on IAEA/UNSC resolutions since September 2005 urging it to stop its uranium enrichment activities among other requirements, North Korea has indulged in a series of nuclear and missile brinkmanship and has been unpredictable in its nuclear stance. Harsha AH asked: What is the significance of Central Asian countries for India? Meena Singh Roy replies: Today, the importance of Central Asia for India is not merely civilisational and historical; it goes much beyond this. Central Asia serves as a land bridge between Asia and Europe, and is rich in natural resources. It is thus geopolitically axial and economically offers whole range of opportunities. Both India and Central Asian Republics (CARs) share many commonalities and perceptions on various regional and world issues. There is enormous scope for pragmatic and profitable engagement between the two. The importance of CARs also lies in ensuring peace and stability in the region. However, Indias major limitation in this strategically important region is geographic non-accessibility. India does not share border with the CARs. Why do some countries favour nuclear energy, while others do not? Reshmi Kazi replies: Some countries favour nuclear energy due to following reasons:

Nuclear energy is a viable, clean and green gas free solution to the ever increasing demand for electricity; It is one of the economically most attractive sources of energy; Its sustainability can be assured for a long period of time; Though the capital and operational cost is high but in the long run the fuel cost is low;

Even if the uranium cost from which nuclear fuel is to be produced rises, it will not affect the cost of nuclear energy; Nuclear fuels can be stored for a long period in a compact space; and Nuclear fuel can be transported easily If other countries do not favour nuclear energy, it is because of following reasons:

There are huge capital and operational costs involved; Nuclear energy generation involves several risks including those of a reactor accident, nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; Opponents believe that there are other alternative sources of renewable energy like wind power and solar energy which are developing fast; Nuclear power poses many threats to people and the environment including health risks and environmental damage from uranium mining and processing and transport; and There also exists the unsolved problem of radioactive nuclear waste Anurag Chaturvedi asked: Does India's religious demographic profile play any role, vital or trivial, in framing its foreign policy, especially towards Muslim states? Ashok Kumar Behuria replies: India is known for its diversity. It is regarded as an ethnic, cultural, religious and racial melting pot. Its ethnic and linguistic overlaps with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka do influence its policies towards these two countries. It is natural that India's foreign policy, especially in so far its relations with its neighbours are concerned, will be influenced by its demography to a significant extent. Keeping in mind the percentage of Muslims in India (about 12-13 per cent), and the historical legacies of trade and commerce with the Muslim world, as well as the scars of partition on communal lines, it would be natural to expect that the 'Muslim' factor would play its due role in the making of India's foreign policy, especially towards the Muslim world. This explains India's bid for membership in the Organisation of the Islamic Countries (OIC) and delicate handling of its relationship with the West Asian and North African countries. India's disinclination to send troops to Afghanistan, despite its improving relationship with the US, is also partly ascribed to the government's sensitivities to the feelings of the Muslims at the domestic level. Nevertheless, while these demographic factors are significant, one should not exaggerate the importance of demography on foreign policy making, because the prime drivers of such policy are national interests, as defined through a dynamic assessment of national aspirations and needs through a perpetually evolving democratic consensus. Munesh Chandra asked: What is the difference between geo-politics and geo-strategy? Krishnendra Meena replies:

Geopolitics - Geopolitics is the analysis of the interaction between, on the one hand, geographical settings and perspectives and, on the other, political processes. The settings are composed of geographical features and patterns and the multilayered regions that they form. The political processes include forces that operate at the international level and those on the domestic scene that influence international behaviour. Both geographical settings and political processes are dynamic, each influences and is influenced by the other (Cohen 2003:12) This definition in general also covers the idea of critical geopolitics with the inclusion of domestic factors as influential in international politics. However, it needs to be understood that within the critical geopolitical strand, geopolitics is understood to be a plurality rather than a singula rity, which implies that there could be multiple geopolitical visions of a particular event or phenomenon of international importance and consequently multiple interpretations. Geostrategy - Geostrategy is the geographic direction of a states foreign poli cy. More precisely, geostrategy describes where a state concentrates its efforts by projecting military power and directing diplomatic activity. The underlying assumption is that states have limited resources and are unable, even if they are willing, to conduct an all-out foreign policy. Instead they must focus politically and militarily on specific areas of the world. Geostrategy describes the foreign-policy thrust of a state and does not deal with motivations or decision-making processes. The geostrategy of a state, therefore, is not necessarily motivated by geographic or geopolitical factors. A state may project power to a location because of ideological reasons, interest groups, or simply the whim of its leader. Rajat Dubey asked: What is the position of Bangladesh government on the construction of Tipaimukh Dam? What is the Indian response to it? Anand Kumar replies: The previous BNP-led government in Bangladesh was opposed to the construction of Tipaimukh Dam. The present Sheikh Hasina government is currently in discussion with the Indian government over the construction of this dam. As a result, its stand so far is not clear. India, on the other hand, is not opposed to the construction of this dam which is run-of-the-river project. Hence, no water will be diverted and construction of this dam would not harm Bangladeshi interest. Anakha asked: What are the major security/geo-strategic challenges in South Asia, and what implications it has had on India's security environment? Smruti S. Pattanaik replies: Major security and geo-strategic challenges in South Asia can be attributed to fragile democratic structures, weak and unstable governments, growing radicalisation, uncertainty in Afghanistan, and increasing Chinese influence in South Asian region which traditionally is considered as Indias periphery. India shares border with each of the countries in South Asia except Afghanistan. Fragile democratic structures and erosion of democratic institutions pave way for extra constitutional intervention (military intervention) and political instability. Ability of the governments to deal with

governance issue remains limited. Ungoverned spaces are exploited by non-state actors to challenge the state. The resultant political instability does not remain confined to the boundaries of nationstates and its spill over effect is often felt in India. Ethnic overlaps, porous border and shared ethnocultural linkages often make conflicts in the region transnational in character. Growing radicalisation has emerged as a major challenge in south Asia. Almost all the countries are afflicted with the problem of religious radicalisation. For instance, growing radicalisation in Pakistan not only has implications for Pakistans own stability, but also for India and Afghanistan. Some of the militant groups have been able to engage in terrorist attacks against India and Afghanistan through trans-national networks and linkages many a times sponsored and facilitated by state actors. Similarly the problem of radicalisation in Bangladesh threatens its societal and political fabric with serious implications for India. Nexus between the fundamentalist, criminal elements and state actors was apparent in the Chittagong arms haul case where ten truck loads of arms was unloaded for insurgent groups operating in Indias north-east. In Sri Lanka, the rise of ultra-nationalism has made resolution of ethnic conflict extremely difficult. The assertion of rights by various ethnic groups and demand for federal representation in Nepal has made the peace process complicated. In Afghanistan, the post-2014 situation remains uncertain. The strengthening of Taliban as a political force would have consequences beyond the region. India has major economic investments in Afghanistan and remains concern about the rise of Taliban. Growing Chinese influence in the region is another major concern for India. In many cases, Indias neighbours have tried to play the China card to blunt Indias regional pre -eminence. China-Pakistan nexus remains a major stumbling bloc for South Asian peace. Unresolved border problem with China also adds to Indias anxiety. All these factors impinge on Indias overall security environment. Ajai Vir asked: The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) recently announced its decision to evolve into a confederation. What will be the implications for India (if any)? Prasanta K. Pradhan replies: The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is seriously debating the proposal made by Saudi King Abdullah to transform itself into a confederation. According to the reports available in the public domain, the proposed Gulf confederation will have a unified foreign, defence and security policy for all the six member countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE), while at the same time remaining independent and sovereign. It also proposes to have a single foreign affairs ministry and one common embassy for all the countries. Consequently, all the countries of the world too will have one common embassy for member-states of the Gulf confederation. Similarly, there is also proposal for establishing a unified military leadership and upgrading of the current Peninsula Shield Force. There obviously remain certain hurdles in the way of GCC becoming a confederation. But if this proposal is agreed upon by all the members and they decide to go ahead with it, then India, like other countries of the world, too would have to prepare itself to deal with a single entity in the Gulf region in political, economic and defence arenas. At present, it is difficult to foresee the positive or negative consequences of the proposed confederation for India as it is yet to take any concrete shape.

Ganesh Pol asked: Well coordinated terror attacks in Iraq show substantial al Qaeda presence in the region. Has the nine year old US-led global war against terror in Iraq failed? Prasanta K. Pradhan replies: Al Qaeda started its activities in Iraq after the American invasion in 2003. Throughout these years, al Qaeda has given a tough fight to the American as well as the Iraqi national forces in charge of the security. Though the US has withdrawn its forces from the country, it has not officially declared the war against terror in Iraq as over. Al Qaeda is far from being extinct in Iraq. It has lost many of its cadres and often looked weak, but has still managed to sustain itself and has undertaken terrorist attacks at frequent intervals. Thus, if one judges the success or failure of the war against terror in Iraq on the basis of sustenance of al Qaeda, and its ability to undertake high impact attacks, then clearly, the US-led war has not been successful so far. But one must understand that war against terror in Iraq is only part of a bigger geo-political canvas and it would take a long time for this war to end. Rajat Dubey asked: What is the approach and contribution of India towards fighting humanitarian crisis in Somalia? Ruchita Beri replies: India recognises Somalia as a neighbour across the Indian Ocean and is in favour of an early resolution of the humanitarian crisis in the country. Towards this end, it supports all the initiatives led by the United Nations (UN) for return of peace and stability in Somalia. India also recognises that the piracy in the Gulf of Aden is rooted in the instability in Somalia. In terms of efforts towards conflict resolution, India in the past has been involved in the UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia. During 1993-94, a large group of Indian peacekeepers, led by Brigadier M. P. Bhagat, had participated in the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II. At the last India Africa Forum Summit, held in Addis Ababa in April 2011, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a contribution of $2 million towards augmentation of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Moreover, the Indian Navy has been involved in anti-piracy patrolling in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. In recent years, India has provided developmental and humanitarian assistance to Somalia. India has extended assistance to Somalia in capacity building through human resource development, and has recently increased the number of scholarships to the country. Somalia is also among the partner countries of Pan-African e-network project, a joint initiative of India and the African Union. This project aims at connecting 10,000 African students in 54 countries across the continent with Indian universities. At the same time, the Pan-African e-network would provide for tele-medicine services through consultations of African medical practitioners with their counter parts in India. In addition, in September 2011, India announced a contribution of US$ 8 million towards humanitarian assistance for countries in the Horn of Africa region (Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti) to be distributed through the UN World Food Programme. Blessy asked: What factors affect Indias energy security requirements? How do these factors affect Indias national security?

Shebonti Ray Dadwal replies 1. India is dependent on fossil fuels to meet its growing demand, in which it is deficient. Despite the effort to enhance domestic production, dependence on imported resources continues to increase. Hence, India needs assured access to imported energy supplies. Therefore, energy diplomacy is important to gain access to not only supplies, but also overseas assets, for which strong bilateral relations are required to gain preferential access to both. Moreover, gas is still a largely regional market; hence, gaining access to gas supplies will also depend on the attractiveness of the Indian market and relations with supplier countries. 2. Since renewable energy resources is a growing market, both for energy security as well as climate change considerations, access to new energy related technologies is important. The R&D investment in India remains modest at best, if not poor. At the same time, India needs to negotiate with developed countries with requisite cutting edge technology to gain access to the same at affordable prices. 3. India needs to create an attractive investment climate to woo foreign companies in the energy sector across the board. With the current subsidy regime that is prevailing, many companies/countries are wary or unwilling to invest in the energy sector. Hence, sensible pricing policies that can promote economic partnership with countries that have energy resources and technologies are required. 4. Without adequate and affordable energy supply, as well as a good delivery system to ensure that modern forms of energy are accessible to undeveloped areas, India's economic growth will not be sustained and/or will remain skewed. This can lead to instability in the poorer and less developed parts of the country. Areas that are most affected by political instability today are the ones that are largely under-developed. 5. If India wants to be counted as an emerging economy with global influence, it will have to ensure that its economic growth is sustained. One of the main components of economic growth is energy security, without which the infrastructure will remain stunted. Rajat Dubey asked: Do you think India has succeeded in bringing peace to the northeast in the last few years? What should be Indias future strategy? Pushpita Das replies: Yes, there is no doubt that today the Northeast is more peaceful than before. The violence levels in the last few years have come down considerably. In fact, the number of violent incidents has steadily come down since 2008. Till November 2011, the region as a whole witnessed 537 violent incidents as compared to 1561 incidents in 2008, 1297 in 2009, and 773 in 2010. Correspondingly, the number of security forces and civilians killed has also reduced drastically from 466 in 2008 to 61 in 2011 (till October). The prevalence of relative peace in the region is mainly because most insurgent groups, such as the ULFA, National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB- anti-talk faction), Dima Halam Daogah- Joel

(DHD-J), United National Liberation Front (UNLF), and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), have been rendered ineffective with the arrest of their top leaders. These arrests also eventually forced these rebel groups to announce ceasefires and initiate talks with the government. In few instances, these talks have resulted in the signing of memorandum of settlements between the government and the insurgent groups. In the future, the government should continue to engage the insurgent groups in dialogue as well as encourage other groups to shun violence and come to the negotiating table. Simultaneously, it should take steps to address genuine grievances of various ethnic groups residing in the region so as to prevent potential ethnic clashes. In recent months, reports abound that the Maoist have been making inroads in the region by forging ties with insurgent groups. The government should be mindful of this emerging trend and enhance the capacity of the police force to effectively deal with the left wing extremism in the region. Most importantly, the government should improve governance and expedite developmental activities in the Northeast. Which all are the international laws/conventions that govern wars? Which institutions enforce them? Namrata Goswami replies: The international laws/conventions that govern wars at present are the four Geneva Conventions, and its three additional protocols. The Geneva Conventions of 1949, which revised the Xth Hague Conventions of 1907, are primarily aimed at protecting the victims of wars as they were conceptualised in the aftermath of the Second World War. The Conventions seek to protect the sick and the wounded, shipwrecked members of the armed forces, prisoners of wars (PoWs), and civilians caught in a war zone. While the Conventions consist of 417 articles to deal with these issues, there is no provision that deals with the conduct of war in the original four. The drafting of the Conventions were heavily influenced by the German concentration camps and the Japanese treatment of PoWs. The two additional protocols of 1978 however deal with the conduct of war, and provide provisions to even deal with internal armed rebellions. Protocol I sets limits on methods and means of attack, especially conventional weapons that led to limitless and indiscriminate destruction of life. The international bodies that debate on these Conventions and the protocols are the United Nations, the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. As far as international law is concerned, the weakness lies in the lack of a permanent implementing body. While cases can be tried in the International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice, the implementation of judgments would then depend on a particular state. Since not all countries are members of these courts, most notably the US, their military personnel cannot be tried in these courts. Shubhda Chaudhary asked : What is Indias position on the Syrian crisis and how has the uprising in Syria affected the relationship between the two countries? Prasanta Kumar Pradhan replies: India has expressed its concern about the deteriorating situation in Syria. India acknowledges Syria as an important country in the region and believes that any protracted internal conflict will have its impact not only on the internal peace but on the regional

stability as well. India wants the Syrian crisis to end in a peaceful manner ensuring the human rights of the people. India has called for a peaceful and inclusive political process to address the grievances of all sections of Syrian society. Also, India opposes any kind of external intervention in Syria to end the conflict as societies cannot be reordered from outside. Thus, India supports a nonmilitary solution to the conflict and is of the view that the threat of use of force would be detrimental to the territorial integrity and political independence of the country. Despite the ongoing tension in the region, India is trying to maintain good relationship with Syria. It is too early to gauge the negative impact of the conflict on the India-Syria relationship as the situation is still unfolding; and India remains hopeful of a peaceful resolution of the conflict. India has had good ties with the current regime. President Pratibha Patil had visited the country in November 2010, just before the protests began in the Arab world. Both the countries can focus on further developing bilateral relationship after the present turmoil is over. Preetam asked: What are the achievements of SAFTA and its future prospects? Smruti S. Pattanaik replies: SAFTA was ratified in 2006. Under SAFTA, trade concessions are offered to two categories of countries the LDCs and non-LDCs. It provides unilateral concession on 4,536 tariff lines to the five LDC countries of South Asia. India has now announced zero tariffs to the LDC countries. The tariff reduction is contained in article 7 of SAFTA. For smooth implementation, SAFTA has established a committee of experts to review its progress. They help the SAARC ministerial council consisting of Commerce Ministers who periodically review the working of SAFTA. The seventh meeting was held in February this year. This meeting reviewed the revised sensitive list in phase two where each country is required to bring down the sensitive list to adhere to zero tariffs within the timeframe envisaged by SAFTA. SAFTA has trade facilitation measures contained in Article 8. Trade within the region is increasing and in August last year the intra regional trade was US$ 1.3 billion. SAFTA process would get a boost with increased connectivity within the region and establishment of multi-modal transport network that will facilitate free trade. Shijith Kumar asked : Why nuclear liability rules ultra vires? Reshmi Kazi replies: In the given context, rule 24 of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Rules, 2011, prescribes the time limit of 5 years to resort to the option of right of recourse. However, the contradiction appears when the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act 2010 mentions no such time limit. To that extent, the rule is ultra vires to the Act and thereby invalid. Rule 24 stipulates limits in two ways:

with regard to the amount for which suppliers can be held liable by way of recourse, and the number of years for which such liability can be imposed.

Rule 24 does this by imposing limits on the option of recourse to a position which is clearly permitted by Section 17(a) of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act. It thus seeks to bypass both Section 17(b) and any effect Section 46 (under which a victim of a nuclear accident could bring a liability claim against the operator under Tort Law and include the supplier also as co-defendant) may have on supplier liability, rather than directly limit these provisions. At the same time, a rule is a subsidiary legislation to the corresponding Act. Thus, it is imperative that the rule must be in tandem with the Act. Abhishek M Chuaudhari asked: Are surgical strikes against terrorist camps across LoC recommendable? Does India have such real time actionable intelligence? Anit Mukherjee replies: Surgical strikes across the LoC could mean use of one of the two options - air strikes or raid by Special Forces. Both options, however, are problematic - from a diplomatic and military perspective. First, surgical strikes would be viewed by the neighboring country as an attack on its sovereignty and may lead to a military response. It is not clear how the violence would then be maintained to lower levels given the danger of possible escalation. Second, such strikes would under most of the circumstances not be viewed favorably by the international community, and may lead to diplomatic isolation. However, much depends on the circumstances and the nature and impact of the triggering event. Even if, for the sake of an argument, one were to assume that there are justifiable grounds for exercising such an option (say a horrific terrorist attack that can be traced back to elements across the border), major problems pertaining intelligence and targets remain. As rightly suggested, the 'real time actionable intelligence' is very difficult as terror camps can consist of nothing more than rudimentary tents in jungles. Hence its difficult without constant surveillance and/or Humint to obtain the precise coordinates to conduct such strikes. It is not known whether India has such capabilities. Finally, India and Pakistan are trying once again to give talks a chance with the expectation that the Islamist terrorist groups are forever shut down. Of course, its not entirely known whether this will happen. In sum, while no option should be taken off the table in statecraft, surgical strikes under current conditions appear to be a remote possibility. How projects like Trans-Asian highway and railway networks would help in ending the isolation of North-East India? During the colonial period, the Northeast region was connected to the Indian mainland and rest of the world through undivided Bengal. All transportation lines at that point of time were routed through that province. Thus, the Assam, Garo, Khasi and Lushai Hills; and Tripura and Cachar, were connected with Bengal. The far eastern side of the Northeast was connected to Myanmar by a road running from Assam and through Imphal to Tamu. Partition of the Indian Subcontinent, however, disrupted the colonial pattern of transportation. It not only cut the region off from the rest of India, but also led to increased transportation costs and dislocation of traditional markets. The entire Northeast, thereafter, became landlocked.

Faced with the twin challenges of integrating the Northeast and assuring its economic growth, India accorded priority to the construction of roads both within the region as well as across the borders. Projects like the Asian Highway and Trilateral Highways when completed will connect the Northeast with South Asian countries like Bangladesh, as well as with the Southeast Asian countries. Improved connectivity would then open up the Northeast for greater trade and investment, provide access to ports in Bangladesh and Myanmar, markets for its products, as well as enhanced people-to-people contact. This would ensure better socio-economic integration of this region with India and rest of the world; thus, bringing prosperity to the Northeast. Moreover, trans-border connectivity would also facilitate India in realizing its goal of economically linking up with East and Southeast Asia through its Look East Policy. Rakesh Neelakandan asked: What are the strategic implications for India if Western forces leave Afghanistan? Vishal Chandra replies: Western forces are not going to completely withdraw from Afghanistan by 2014. Although both the US and the NATO may announce the end of combat mission and withdraw much of their conventional forces by 2014-15, they are likely to maintain some military presence even as they move into a more supportive role. The US Administration has alluded to the possibility of maintaining a strong presence of Special Forces, and continued special operations against militant/insurgent groups, in years beyond 2014. The nature and level of future Western engagement in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region would, however, depend on the strategic partnership agreement currently being negotiated by Washington and Kabul. NATO is likely to remain involved in training and funding the Afghan army and police for years beyond 2014. In the long run, much would depend on how effective the training and mentoring process of the Afghan army and police is; and on the level of international aid and support for the development of institutions and critical infrastructure in Afghanistan. As of now, the prospect of Taliban and other Pakistan-backed Afghan militant groups taking over Kabul or simply overrunning the country seems remote. Despite growing uncertainty over the Western mission, it is still early to be commenting on the likely situation in the region or the implications for India in the next few years. One would have to wait and see how the US deals with Pakistan as Western forces draw down, and how politics within Afghanistan evolves in the run up to the next presidential and parliamentary elections due in 2014-15. Sandeep Madkar asked: What is the strategic and military significance of Siachen glacier for India? P.K. Gautam replies: Siachen glacier is a part of India. The State of Jammu and Kashmir has two illegal encroachments. One is of that of Aksai Chin by the PRC together with part of Shaksgam region handed over by Pakistan to the PRC in 1963, and the other is the well known Pakistani Occupied Kashmir and Northern Areas. Ensuring territorial integrity is a duty of a sovereign state. Thus, to thwart the Pakistani designs to occupy the undemarcated region, India troops had to occupy the heights and passes in 1984. Although the terrain is extremely difficult and not an avenue of approach for armies to march in and invade a country, the region has ideational strategic significance based on cartography and historical reasoning. Since 2003, though the firings have stopped by either side

based on peace agreement, troops still need to man the region. If the region is not held then it can be occupied by an adversary and later it will become very difficult to dislodge them. This is its military significance. Till trust is built up, no withdrawal seems in sight. Another complication is unwarranted entry of the PLA in the garb of road builders, and the administration in the Northern Areas and the POK. Uday asked: Can it be said that the situation in Indias neighbourhood today is far more stable than ever before, especially in view of recent developments in Myanmar, Bangladesh, etc? Ashok Kumar Behuria replies: The countries in India's neighbourhood are in the process of adapting to the competitive reflexes of democracy. True, there have been political turmoils/unrests in Nepal, Pakistan, Maldives and Bangladesh, but the silver lining in the cloud is that their commitment to stick to the democratic system remains quite firm. There are grave challenges that each of these countries will have to overcome-- in Nepal, the slow process of consensus building; in Pakistan-- various institutions engaged in an insidious struggle for power and exploring their limits; in Sri Lanka-majoritarian arrogance trumping the spirit of democracy; in Bangladesh-- the extreme bipolarity in politics asserting itself, and in Maldives-- the early pangs of a difficult transition to democracy. In this situation, India's pragmatic neighbourhood policy with an emphasis on economic cooperation, connectivity and dialogue has created an ambience for positive change in the region. Its bilateral arrangements/agreements with Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh have provided an impetus for growth and prosperity. The ongoing process of dialogue between India and Pakistan has already resulted in Pakistan agreeing to accord MFN status to India. The shift in American policy towards Myanmar, in the wake of the Myanmarese government's decision to usher in democracy in the Junta controlled state, has proved that India's policy of engagement in the past was wise and effective. Overall, the neighborhood may not be as stable as one would have wished it to be, but India's creative approach is likely to contribute to regional prosperity and stability. A lot would, however, depend on the way the domestic political dynamics, in each of the countries in the region, unfold in the days to come. Can or should India acquire parts of Kashmir which are under Chinese and Pakistani control, either diplomatically or forcefully? Priyanka Singh replies: The entire Jammu & Kashmir is an integral part of India by virtue of the Instrument of Accession signed in 1947. Hence, India certainly should claim parts of the state which are under the illegal control of Pakistan and China. Aggression or use of force is not a rational approach and overall it does not fit within Indias traditional policy framework. To regain the lost territory by force, therefore, does not appear to be a prudent choice for India. Diplomatic channels are more viable and are likely to bear favourable results in the long-term provided they are pursued rigorously and on a consistent basis. In this regard, India needs to be forthcoming about its claim on parts of Kashmir under Pakistani and Chinese occupation. There is also a need to ensure that Indias claim on the lost sub regions of Kashmir (under Pakistan and China) are taken up appropriately in its

dealings with both Pakistan and China. India needs to duly strengthen its case on the lost parts of Jammu and Kashmir based on the legality of the Instrument of Accession. Ganesh Pol asked: Can you explain the 'red lines' drawn by India as talks with the Taliban, led and owned by Afghanistan, are initiated? Vishal Chandra replies: It is for the elected government of Afghanistan to draw the red lines or lay down terms and conditions for negotiating with the Taliban. The Afghan Government has stated that the Taliban must accept the Afghan Constitution, renounce violence and sever all ties with al Qaeda and other terrorist organisations. These three pre-conditions for an Afghan-led peace and reintegration programme were endorsed during the International Conference on Afghanistan held in London in January 2010. The Conference was attended by more than 70 countries (including India) and international organisations. Hans Raj Singh aked: What is the importance of Myanmar for India? Udai Bhanu Singh replies: Myanmars importance lies in its geo-strategic location at the tri-junction of east, south-east and south Asia. It is the only south-east Asian country with which India has a land border which accounts for its significance in the development of Indias northeast and in the context of Indias Look East Policy. Added to this is the China factor, need for stability in the Indian Ocean, and its potential as a proximate source of energy. Besides, Indias democratic credentials (for a country in transition), and historical and cultural ties (for a nation which reveres Buddhism), makes Myanmar an apt avenue for the exercise of Indias soft power. Ajai Vir asked: Is it a coincidence that Pakistan has changed its stance on Kashmir when China has a working infrastructure in the region, or is there a link? Priyanka Singh replies: I do not think there is a link between the two. This year on February 5 during the so-called Kashmir solidarity day, the Prime Minister of Pakistan Yusuf Raza Gilani stated that his country could not afford war on Kashmir. The statement, no doubt, is important and unprecedented but cannot be taken at the face of it. For us to discern that it somehow signals a significant policy shift on the part of Pakistan is both premature and impractical. At least India is not looking out for such reassurances. Rather, to hear, if Pakistan would stop proxy tactics of harbouring/supporting militant groups targeting Indias security, would have been much more assuring. Pakistan is too absorbed in managing its worsening internal security situation and is preoccupied balancing out equations with the US and China. It, therefore, is a foregone conclusion that it cannot easily think of opening up a new front on its eastern border in near future. Hence, what Gilani posited was literally correct but I dont think it implies much on Pakistans obsession with the Kashmir issue. Chinas extensive involvement in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) is a reality and it is possible that external factors such as this may lead to some kind of change in Pakistans approach towards PoK. In case such a shift occurs, it would be interesting to note how things pan out in the region.

Sairam asked: In what way political unrest in Maldives affects Indias security? Anand Kumar replies: The Maldivian archipelago is quite close to the southern tip of India. Hence, any instability in the Island nation is likely to impact directly on Indias security. Pakistan -based terror groups have been eying Maldivian islands to set their bases. One prominent group in this regard is Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Countries inimical to Indias interest have also been trying to get a foothold in Maldives. Prominent among them are China and Pakistan. The instability in Maldives could be used by them to strengthen their position vis--vis India in the Island nation. Sairam asked: Why do states like Bangladesh and Myanmar support insurgency in India? Anand Kumar replies: There is considerable change in the policy followed by both Bangladesh and Myanmar in supporting insurgency in northeast India. Bangladesh started supporting insurgency after 1975 when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of the country, was killed in a coup on 15 August 1975. After his killing, right wing forces asserted themselves in Bangladesh. After a series of coups and counter coups, General Zia ur Rahman came to power. He reversed the policies followed by Mujib. He started following a policy that was hostile to India. One of the offshoots of his policy was the revival of support to northeast insurgents that was earlier taking place during the Pakistan rule. However, after coming to power in January 2009, Sheikh Hasina reversed this policy and is taking action against Indian insurgents groups who have been using Bangladeshi territory. As far as Myanmar is concerned, some misunderstanding was created in the Indo-Myanmarese relations after 1962. This prompted Myanmar to allow Indian insurgents to use its territory. Moreover, Indias border with Myanmar is densely forested which is used by insurgents sometime without the knowledge of Myanmarese authorities. However, in recent times, Myanmar government has taken several steps against Indian insurgent groups. Nishant Turan asked: What is the "strategic significance" of Pakistan for India in the 21st century? Sushant Sareen replies: The strategic significance depends on the state of relations between the two countries. If Pakistan is a friendly country, then it is not only a buffer between India and Central Asia and West Asia but also a bridge between India and these areas. If Pakistan remains a hostile country, then it threatens India's security and stability, insidiously as well as openly. As a hostile country, it acts as a barrier and obstacle to everything India is aspiring for. Take for instance, India's quest for a UNSC seat. Pakistan is one of the most virulent opponents of India's claims. Pakistan also becomes a threat when it functions in conjunction and as a client of countries like China to catch India in a pincer. The export of Islamic terrorism and radical Islamist ideology is a very big destabilising factor in India. India's dilemma is that while it finds a hostile Pakistan a big drag and danger, there is no certainty that if Pakistan was to cease to exist, India's strategic outlook would improve dramatically. Ashish asked: What is the impact of Indias emerging ties with Bangladesh and Myanmar on Chinese influence in north-east India?

Namrata Goswami replies: One of the main impacts of Indias growing ties with Bangladesh is the easing of tensions with regard to demarcation of the border, especially in states like Tripura and Assam. Most importantly, states in the northeast want to increase connectivity by using the Chittagong port, which opens up a quicker access to the sea for them. India and Bangladesh have also collaborated on closing down northeast insurgent camps in Bangladesh, especially with regard to the ULFA. With Myanmar, India has developed a broad relationship of economic connectivity, trade, and political openness. Myanmar is also passing through political reform with Aung San Suu Kyi taking part in democratic elections. Democracy in Myanmar will further broaden its ability to be inclusive with regard to its ethnic minorities, who mostly live in the India-Myanmar border area. This in turn will strengthen existing India-Myanmar cooperation in fighting insurgencies in the region. That said, growing ties with Bangladesh and Myanmar, while strengthening connectivity of Indias northeast to the outside world, do not directly impact on Chinas influence in the northeast, which is culturally minimal, to say the least. Most of the ethnic groups that migrated to the northeast from Yunnan in China are neither Han nor do they seek any great historical connection with the Chinese empire. Hence, given Chinas limited influence, both politically and socially, Indias growing relationship with Bangladesh and Myanmar are significant by themselves and not as a counter to Chinese influence in the region. Vibha asked: What is the influence of China's growth on north-east India and the Indian Ocean region? Namrata Goswami replies: The influence of Chinas growth on northeast India can be two -folds. The first is one in which the people of the northeast could get inspired by the Chinese economic growth model, especially in its south western province of Yunnan, and emulate such a globalising model. Already, the chief ministers of the region are ardent supporters of the Look East policy which aims to create land and rail connectivity between Indias northeast, Myanmar, and Yunnan in China. This could foster economic connectivity and bring in prosperity to the northeast. The other influence is more security related. Chinas claim on Arunachal Pradesh and its water diversion plans on the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet are creating a public perception in the northeast that China is a threat to India. Hence, while Chinas influence with regard to economic connectivity could be positive, its territorial claim and water diversion plans are negative influences. Similar is the case with the Indian Ocean. China views the Indian Ocean, especially the Malacca Strait, as the lifeline for its energy supplies and exports, which is critical to maintaining its internal growth. It wants to collaborate with other Indian Ocean countries to ensure the safety of these lanes. However, China is an authoritarian regime with a closed political system. Hence, its military modernisation, acquisition of an aircraft carrier and assertive claims on the South China Sea is creating an atmosphere of militarisation of international waters. The Chinese influence is thus highly securitised. Sandeep Madkar asked : How the US factor is affecting India-Iran relations? Can India have good relations with both of them simultaneously? Meena Singh Roy replies: Yes, the US-Iran relations are impacting on the India-Iran relations indirectly. Even if the US-EU bilateral sanctions against Iran are not mandatory for India to follow,

they do impact on India's relations with Iran. Because of the US sanctions on Iran's oil and financial sectors, India is finding it difficult to make the payments for the crude oil which it buys from Iran. Moreover, the private sector, which has higher stakes in doing business with the US, is gradually pulling out of Iran as they don't want to be black-listed in the US. Under these circumstances, it would be really difficult for India to balance its policy with respect to Iran and the US. What is the role of Indian Navy in identifying, assessing and controlling non-traditional threats in the Indian Ocean? S.S. Parmar replies: The Indian Navy has a prominent role to play in addressing non-traditional threats. This task is done in tandem with other agencies like the Indian Coast Guard, maritime wing of police, governments of states with coastlines and intelligence agencies to name a few. Nontraditional threats can be broadly divided into two areas those like maritime terrorism and piracy that require to be addressed by kinetic means, and those like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), search and rescue (SAR), pollution control, etc., that require to be addressed by benign means. Although pollution control is under the ambit of the Coast Guard, the Indian Navy provides the required assistance that is sought. The Indian Navy has mechanisms in place to assess, indentify and address these issues. These include identifying strong points and strengthening weak points so as to better manage situations both developing and developed. This involves deploying assets that would aid in combating the threats that arise from such non-traditional threats. Issues like terrorism and piracy that require application of force are addressed by patrolling areas identified as the most vulnerable with suitable assets in tandem with other agencies. For example, along the coast the Indian Navy has identified suitable places and established detachments that work with other agencies to assess the situation and patrol designated areas. Ships and aircraft also patrol the maritime zones of friendly nations on their request to combat terrorism and piracy. In addition, ships with embarked armed helicopters have been deployed in the Gulf of Aden since 2008 to combat piracy as part of the ongoing international effort. The benign role is assumed and assets deployed so that assistance is rendered both internally and externally in a fast and humane manner. The deployment of assets during the 2004 tsunami is a classic case in which relief was provided within 24 hours to the states on the east coast of India and Sri Lanka and within 72 hours to affected nations like Indonesia and Maldives. Unlike the threats emanating from terrorism and piracy that could be assessed based on intelligence inputs, disasters do not come with any warning and therefore the Indian Navy is always ready at short notice to deploy its assets as and when ordered. Harry asked: How the Indian Air Force could have been better utilized to support the ground troops during Operation Vijay? Anit Mukherjee replies: The war in Kargil was unprecedented on several levels. That the Pakistani army would attempt such an audacious but strategically inept operation was not envisaged by any

Indian political, intelligence or military official. As a result, the war and its geographical location came as a complete surprise. Perhaps, due to that, both the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force had never planned, trained or equipped themselves to fight the war that they did. The unique terrain and the extreme altitude also presented formidable challenges. Despite that, the Indian Air Force (IAF) performed ably as its pilot went in harms way and some paid the ultimate sacrifice. Thus, there were significant problems in Army-Air Force operations during this war. To begin with, though the three services in India follow the coordination model of jointness, they lack interoperability. In simple words, the IAF lacked the capability to communicate with ground troops. As a result, the strike missions flown were pre-planned with fixed time-over-targets (ToTs). Both the Air Force and the Army had not practiced or trained with hand held laser designators. Surprisingly, till date their drills are based on Ground Liaison Officers and Air Control Team (ACT) with tentacles that require dedicated and scarce Air Force officers to enable robust cooperation. This is a concept inherited from the World War Two era as most modern militaries have taken advantage of advanced communications equipment to practice better interoperability. The employment of Air Force helicopters in an attack role has been the subject of a controversy due to the shooting down of a Mi-8. Air Force officials contend that the Army was wrong to request for helicopters while some in the Army maintain that the Air Force was reluctant to engage in offensive operations. Overall, the war in Kargil presented unique challenges and junior officers and men in both the Army and the Air Force performed admirably. There were disagreements between senior officials, some of it perhaps unavoidable, that vitiated working relations to some extent. Unfortunately, however, joint lessons learnt were never commissioned by either the Chiefs of Staff Committee or the Ministry of Defence, as a result we know very little about the joint conduct of operations. To put it in a more direct manner, the answer to your question will only be known when the operational documents of both services are studied or the participants interviewed. That unfortunately, while still possible, has not happened. Harsha asked: What are the implications of Afghanistan-India treaty, especially in terms of India training Afghan security personal, for the relationship between the two countries, and what are its effects on Pakistan? Vishal Chandra replies: First and foremost, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of India have signed an Agreement on Strategic Partnership and not a Treaty. Secondly, it is reflective of the aspirations of the two sovereign states to further build on their ties in keeping with their mutual interests. The Agreement essentially suggests that the two friendly neighbouring countries wish to further institutionalise and consolidate their cooperation in various sectors critical to the future of Afghanistan. It simply reiterates Indias commitment as a development partner of the Afghan people, even as uncertainty over the future of Afghanistan grows. The Agreement is, thus, in continuation of Indias effort since 2001 to help build Afghan capacities so that Afghans c an take control of their own affairs. The timing of the agreement, however, assumes significance as it comes

at a time when Afghanistan is passing through a crucial phase of transition whereby the Western forces are handing over the security responsibilities to their Afghan counterparts. The point pertaining to India assisting in the training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) has to be seen as part of Indias overall effort to build Afghan capacities. The document is by no means military-centric and does not refer to any bilateral security arrangement or treaty. A clear distinction must be made here between deployment of troops for military operations and providing assistance in building up the capacities of an army or police. These are entirely two different things and should not be confused or mixed up with each other. India has time and again made it clear that it has no intention of deploying its military on Afghan soil. Perhaps, India, along with several other countries, would be contributing towards building up the Afghan military, most likely by training Afghan military officials at its own institutions in India, who in turn would be expected to train and mentor the Afghan forces. Several Asian countries too are assisting in rebuilding the capacities of the Afghan military. It is for Afghanistan to decide as to how it intends to deal with its internal and external challenges. Indian aid and assistance is in accordance with the wishes of the Afghan government and people. Rajat Debey asked : Considering the complexities of procedure and conflicting interests, what kind of reforms in the UN Security Council can be expected in the near future? Keerthi Sampath Kumar replies: Any kind of UN Security Council reform in the near future, i.e., before the end of Indias term as a non-permanent member in the Council, is unlikely. With each group in the UN proposing their own set of demands that are not complementary to one another; be it the G4 or the African group or the Uniting for Consensus group, hopes of compromise on the structural reforms of the Council remain narrow. Deep divisions among countries on all the five tracks of Intergovernmental negotiation on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council continue to prevent agreement on any permanent reform. With members reinstating their well-known positions on reforms, the fact unfortunately remains that there have been no developments in the recent past. Further, any change in the structure of the Security Council will require UN Charter amendments which will in turn necessitate vote from two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly, including all the P5 members. Consensus among the P5 on the addition of any new permanent member is currently absent and will be close to impossible to achieve in the immediate future. Nonetheless, all roadblocks aside, there is growing optimism at least among the Indian delegation in New York to achieve progress while India is in the Council. Though India is well-aware of the obstacles in achieving Council reforms, India wants to leave no stone unturned before its term gets over in 2013. Geraldine asked : What does strategic relationship between two nations mean? Does it me an only military ties or more than that?

Ali Ahmed replies: A 'strategic relationship', as the term suggests, involves a shared understanding between the two or more states involved on the nature of threats in the environment and the place of their collective power in helping mitigate the threats. This does not amount to an alliance, meaning a deeper relationship in which the states are treaty bound to come to each others assistance in case of materialisation of a threat against any member state. In a strategic relationship, the states involved, that could number two or more, discuss the role of power through periodic bilateral (multilateral as the case may be) confabulations at a high, ministerial and bureaucraticmilitary official, level. The ambit of these talks can be quite broad, to include technology, strategic perspectives, state of and progress in the relationship, future directions of international affairs and the relations in particular, etc. It need not be restricted to the military sphere and could include civilian areas, such as nuclear technology, space, agriculture, etc. The relationship has material and physical dimensions in that there may exist a buyer-seller relationship between the states in terms of armaments and high technology, military training, exchange between subject matter experts, assistance to the position of the other in global forums to an extent, etc. The relationship is usually forged through a written document that brings out the demands on and expectations of all sides. Usually this may not have any hidden clauses, but there would be confidential exchanges and areas of such high end cooperation such as in the intelligence field and technology. The across the board relationship, its strength and depth make for a strategic relationship or partnership. Clearly, it amounts to more than military ties. There are mutual benefits in that the strategic or relative power (political, diplomatic and military) position of both stands to increase by maintaining the relationship. The relationship is not usually directed at any other adversary state or group of states, but the fact that it exists helps the participating states in respect of increasing their bargaining position in respect of that state. Rakesh Neelakandan asked : What should India do to secure its interests in the Arctic? Uttam Kumar Sinha replies: The Arctic region is estimated to hold over 40 per cent of global reserves of oil and gas. Ice melting due to global warming will open up areas for exploring and extracting resources. The race for resource, as history has shown, leads to geopolitical competition and contest. The Chinese, quickly sensing the enormous resource potential in the region, have started articulating a commons position, that is, no nation has sovereignty over the Arctic and that the resource are for all to exploit and use. The Arctic Council compromising five littoral states Norway, US, Canada, Denmark and Russia would not like outside intervention and would clearly like to monopolise the resources. While the Arctic might seem not to be in Indias strategic radar, it, however, does present an opportunity to articulate a view of ecological protection that is contrary to resource scramble. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 freezing territorial claims and allowing for only research and scientific activities is a good guidepost and India should articulate this in various forums. Amit Kushwaha asked: Is employment of UAVs / UCAVs instead of manned aircrafts a better option for combating insurgency and terrorism in India? Vivek Chadha replies: India follows the principle of minimum force during combating insurgency and terrorism. With this as the backdrop, the employment of aircraft for offensive roles is ruled out given

the possibility of collateral damage and escalation involved. It is only helicopters which are used for logistics (supply) and casualty evacuation in our context, and at times for movement of forces to ensure better mobility and flexibility. Therefore, while UAVs and UCAVs may not have a direct replacement role vis--vis aircraft, however, they can certainly be used for surveillance and tracking purposes. This would help conduct clinical and hard intelligence based operations which are in the spirit of India's counter-insurgency doctrine. Their employment for precision and guided strikes is not relevant in the Indian context, as it is against the very ethos of minimum force - a fundamental principle followed scrupulously. Hans Raj Singh asked: Why the people of Manipur want AFSPA to be repealed? Which section of AFSPA does Irom Sharmila wants to be repealed? Namrata Goswami replies: The people of Manipur want the AFSPA repealed because they view it as repressive law which denies them their fundamental rights. According to the AFSPA, a person can be arrested without warrant on mere suspicion, without evidence, that he or she is supporting insurgencies. This has created a militarized political space, which curtails civil liberties, in their viewpoint. I do not think Irom Sharmila is fasting for the repeal of one particular section of the AFSPA. She wants the act in its entirety to be repealed. Hans Raj Singh asked: What is the basic reason of insurgency in northeast India? How the problem can be tackled efficiently? Namrata Goswami replies: There are four basic reasons for insurgencies in the Northeast. First, there was a historical absence of pre-British and British colonial polices to integrate the hill areas of then Assam to the rest of British India. Hence, the absence of historical linkages has created a space for later day feelings of cultural and political differences amongst ethnic communities with the rest of India. Second, most of the ethnic communities view the use of force as more effective than non violent dissent in getting New Delhi's attention which is physically so far away. Third, the continuous lack of economic opportunities creates incentives for unemployed youths to join armed movements where they earn a salary. Fourth, existence of external help from Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar has perpetuated the insurgencies. Problem can be tackled by use of efficient policing since absence of law enforcement has led to increase in armed violence. Effective policing should be supported by good governance, civil and political rights. The use of dialogue and negotiations is the only solution to these armed conflicts. Muzaffar Hussain asked: Why is India not opening up trade through Ladakh area? Is their any security threat involved? Joe Thomas Karackattu replies: Ladakh has historically been a vital link between Tibet, Xinjiang and Central Asia. The connection between Leh and the towns of Yarkand, Kashgar and Khotan are well noted. This connection with Xinjiang was so active that there are people of Yarkandi descent whove

settled in Ladakh over time. Exports of textiles, tea, spices and oils and import of bullion, silk and carpets was the main economic activity. Tibet was largely dependent on Ladakh for supplies of essential goods (food grains, saffron, shawls, etc). The annual turnover of Ladakhs t rade with Tibet during the Dogra rule is noted to run into several lakhs of rupees, only to be disrupted in 1950, and ultimately coming to a standstill in 1959. The decision to open up trade is conditional on both India and China pursuing a broader vision of regional development. There is the outstanding issue of Aksai Chin, which India considers as part of Ladakh. Apart from the settlement of political issues, the region needs an all-weather road network to Leh. The viable connections that could result in revival of economic activity for Ladakh include Demchok in southeastern Ladakh on the Indian side connecting to Tashigang in Tibet. There is also the Nubra Valley of Ladakh region which could be used for smooth conduct of Kailash and Mansarovar yatras (also tourism and employment generation for locals in Ladakh). India can gain reliable access to inner Asia, and even China has much to gain in terms of development of its relatively poorer western regions if these issues are pursued in an overall cooperative framework as opposed to a zero-sum game. The G-4 has sought reform in the ''working methods'' of UNSC. Is this merely a diplomatic term for veto power or does it signifies more? Satish Nambiar replies: On various occasions in 2011, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, India availed of opportunities to articulate its uncompromising position on UNSC reforms. In that context, at the UNSCs Open Debate on Working Methods of the Security Cou ncil, India placed on the table propositions for reform of the working methods of the Council which would require a comprehensive reform in the membership of the Council with expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories. In this debate, India put forward recommendations to deal with the archaic system that impact on the legitimacy and credibility of the Council and its effective functioning. Among other issues, India questioned the monopoly of the P5 members in drafting resolutions and underscored the need to make it more democratic and credible. All these efforts are part of India's case for a reformed Council that would accommodate around 25 members, with six new members in the permanent category to include two seats from Africa, two from Asia, one from Latin America and the Caribbean, and one from Europe. That the non-permanent seats should be expanded from 10 to 14 or 15 members with the addition of one new non-permanent seat each for Asia, East Europe, the Latin American and Caribbean Group, and one or two non-permanent seats for the African states. India is also striving for Council reforms in terms of a veto restraint agreement whereby the permanent members would limit the usage of veto power and abstain from using it under certain circumstances. Ajai Vir asked: What are sanctions? Can every country impose them the way USA has done against Iran? Why does India support only UNSC backed sanctions? Satish Nambiar replies: Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council is authorised to take enforcement measures for maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. Such measures may range from economic and/or other sanctions not involving the use of armed force to

international military action. The use of mandatory sanctions is intended to apply pressure on a State or entity to comply with the objectives set by the Security Council without resorting to the use of force. Sanctions thus offer the Security Council an important instrument to enforce its decisions. The range of sanctions include comprehensive economic and trade sanctions and/or more targeted measures, such as arms embargoes, travel bans, financial, or diplomatic restrictions. Unilateral sanctions have meaning only when imposed by a powerful country like the USA that can manipulate the levers of international power like diplomacy, commerce, trade, banking, transportation, etc., and is able to influence other countries to join the process. India has consistently taken the stand that any action of such a nature against a member state must have international approval, namely that of the UN Security Council. Rajat Dubey asked: What will be the short and long term effect of Arab turmoil and growing confrontation with Turkey on the strategic position of Israel? Rumel Dahiya replies: Although Israel did not have many friends to count upon in the region, it was in a reasonably comfortable situation till 2009 in view of friendly relations with Turkey, stable relations with Egypt and Jordan, and fissures among the Palestinians and a weak Syria to contend with. Even other Arab countries were less hostile towards Israel than before. However, the "street" in the countries neighbouring Israel continued to be by and large hostile towards it. Deterioration of relations with Turkey weakened Israel's position in the region since Turkey was gaining in strength and influence. Israel still felt confident of its security because of its military strength and unstinted support of the US. The Arab Spring or Arab Turmoil has disturbed the geo-political balance in the region. Egypt has now come under the sway of the conservative forces. It is expected that the new dispensation in Egypt will be less accommodating of Israel's security and diplomatic concerns despite the fact that it will need external (read US) financial assistance to be able to improve economic condition of the masses. The Egyptian military's salience in decision-making is bound to come down over time and Egypt's policy towards Israel will be dictated more and more by the popular perception at home. However, an armed conflict between the two countries is not expected in short to medium term due to asymmetry of power between the two countries. The Iran factor, unless Israel decides to undertake strikes on Iranian nuclear installations, will work to its advantage. Israel may be hoping for fragmentation of Syria on ethnic lines following a civil war, but the outcome may be different and Muslim Brotherhood may assume power upon the fall of the current regime. This will not be a welcome development for Israel. Turkey's ambitions of gaining a leadership role in the region have met with some headwinds in past months and it will remain embroiled in diplomatic stand off with some EU countries and will have to make difficult choices with regard to Syria. It will also be in a difficult situation if Israel decides on striking Iranian nuclear facilities to slow down and disrupt its march towards nuclear weaponisation. Given the asymmetry of military power and the fact that its neighbours will be busy trying to establish internal security, it is felt that in the short-term Israel does not face any military threat or serious diplomatic pressure. However, if the Palestinian factions genuinely unite and once the conservative governments in countries surrounding Israel become stable, there will be serious diplomatic pressures on Israel. It

will still be militarily powerful enough to deal with any threat and new gas finds off its coast in Eastern Mediterranean will help its economy, yet its diplomatic isolation is expected to grow. Subconventional threats are also likely to grow and hard response will invite universal condemnation. Though Israel can meet the threats that it may face, it is likely to come under growing pressure to resolve the Palestinian problem. Sushant Awasthi asked: Is the policy of Non-Alignment introduced by Pt. Nehru still relevant, and how far is it justifying? S. Kalyanaraman replies: Non-alignment is not an optimum foreign policy for India in the emerging international environment. The policy was premised on certain factors that are no longer applicable. The first of these was the clear distinction that existed at that time between the West and the Rest, with the West dominating and attempting to perpetuate its dominance over the Rest, while for their part the Rest sought to become independent, assert their independence and stave off neoimperialist tendencies. A corollary to this was the sense of solidarity that the leaders and peoples of the Rest had for each other in their struggle for independence and later in their attempts to stave off Western dominance. Hence, Asian solidarity, pan-Asianism, Afro-Asian solidarity, Third World solidarity, the Non-Aligned Movement, the call for a New International Economic Order, and so on and so forth. Complicating this dynamic was a second factor -- the Cold War ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the camps led by America and the Soviet Union, a rivalry between two of the products (liberalism and communism) of the Age of European Enlightenment. The foreign policy of non-alignment and the domestic pursuit of a mixed economy model were meant to enable India avoid entanglement and navigate between these two powerful ideological currents and the manifestations of their military power and rivalry around the world. Thirdly, Indias condition in the late 1940s and early 1950s was that of a much weaker, less stabler, and a just partitioned country, which, moreover, had enormous internal challenges before it; people even doubted whether it will survive for long. This too necessitated avoiding external conflicts and fully focusing on managing the domestic challenges. None of this of course meant that India was able to practice non-alignment in its purest form especially in the latter part of the Cold War. Notions of solidarity and peace were trumped by the imperatives of national security caused by Pakistan's congenital distrust of India and Chinas sense of being the greater Asian power. While the challenge from a relatively weak Pakistan was easily dealt with, with the capabilities that India was able to muster without much difficulty; India had to lean upon the Soviet Union to deal with the greater challenge posed by China through the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, during the Cold War, non-alignment was not viewed or practised as a religious dictum, even though it had a become a mantram chanted to cast a veil over Indias practice of the muchreviled balance of power politics. Today, of course, things are much different. The rise of the Rest has meant that the West is in retreat. The West is no longer the fulcrum of the international economy, nor is it the main theatre of geopolitical rivalry. These distinctions now go to Asia or to be more precise the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific region. Even though India continues to face enormous domestic challenges, the fact remains that it has made considerable progress over the last six decades to emerge as a trillion dollar

economy with one of the fastest rates of economic growth and projected to emerge as one of the top three economies of the world by mid-century. Indian notions of solidarity among Asian, AfroAsian and Third World states are now leavened with a greater appreciation of national and geopolitical rivalries as well as of ongoing changes in the worlds and Asias balance of power. Unlike the 1940s and 1950s when India was a rather weak player whose weight was insignificant to make an impact on the global balance of power, today it is an important weight in the Asian balance of power. Indeed, Indias foreign policy is now aimed at fostering a stable balance of power in Asia and in ensuring that the continent does not become a unipolar space dominated by China in particular. If India were to pursue a foreign policy of non-alignment, then that will only hasten the emergence of Asia as a geopolitical space dominated by a single power in front of whom India will have to kowtow. How many people in India can envisage such a prospect with equanimity? Hans Raj Singh asked: What are the major problems on the Indo-Nepal border and how they can be resolved? Nihar Nayak replies: India-Nepal border is unique. It is an open and the most peaceful border in Asia. The present arrangement supports the sustenance of livelihood and cultural linkages of millions of people in the region. However, this asset is turning into a liability due to extra-regional countries design to destabilise the relationship between India and Nepal. One country is consistently instigating certain sections in Nepal by saying that open border has been responsible for the underdevelopment in Nepal. Therefore, it should be closed. Its design is to close the border to check the inflow of anti-national elements from India. Another country takes advantage of the open border and wants to destabilise India by using the Nepal territory. For example, terrorist outfits like LeT, Indian Mujahideen and some insurgent groups from North Eastern part of India have been using the open border to provide logistical support (supply of trained cadres, fake Indian currency, and terror finance by using Nepalese banks, dispersal of small arms and explosives and narcotics) to their clandestine operations in India. Apart from that, there are frequent reports of misuse of open border by local criminal gangs, smuggling of subsidised consumer goods and allegations of encroachment of territory. People living in the border region of both the countries are involved in these activities. Remedies Since 98 per cent of the border is demarcated by the joint survey, both the countries should resolve the border disputes by singing on the survey report. That will avoid border encroachment disputes. Second, since both the countries are affected due to the misuse of open border by internal and external forces, the responsibility of border management and regulation depends on both. Although India has taken certain measures, like deployment of additional SSB personnel (presently 45,000, Nepal only 4,500), construction of integrated border check posts and capacity building programmes for the SSB, similar responses are required from Nepal.

Last but not the least, meetings pertaining to joint border management mechanism should be organised regularly for effective border management, coordination, and to avoid any kind of misunderstanding between both the countries. Rajat Dubey asked: What could be a feasible solution for the political and humanitarian crisis in Somalia, and how should the world respond to it? Ruchita Beri replies: Since the collapse of Said Barres regime in 1991, anarchy, insidious clan conflicts and political fragmentation seem to characterise Somalia. The recently released Failed State Index, published by the journal Foreign Policy, places Somalia at the top of the list. There have been number of initiatives to resolve the Somali crisis. The most notable attempt was that of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) that brought the warring factions to come to an agreement on a Transitional National Charter in 2003, followed by inauguration of the TFG in Kenya. The TFG however was opposed by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that in 2006 controlled the entire South and Central Somalia. The TFG managed to get rid of the ICU with help from Ethiopian armed forces and the United States of America. However the TFGs attempt to control the reg ion was challenged by Mogadishu-based militia Al Shabaab. In 2008, after an agreement with the moderate Islamists, their leader, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, was elected as the president of Somalia in 2009. However, despite the presence of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops, the conflict continues to rage in south and central Somalia. It will be prudent to mention that Somalia at present comprise of three fragmented political entities: First is Somaliland that lies in the north and is comparatively stable. However, it is not recognised as an independent state by the international community. Second is Puntland, a breakaway territory that has been in news as the hub of pirate activity. Third is South and Central Somalia, where the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) rule is limited to Mogadishu while the rest of the countryside is largely under the control of Al Shabaab. There are number of challenges towards the road to peace in Somalia. Internally, the TFG is faced with multiple problems, including shortage of resources and lack of effective coordination. The international community has helped train the Transitional Federal Armed Forces; however, desertions are very high due to factors, such as, the lack of clear command and control structures and delays in payment of salaries, etc. At the same time, the lasting peace in Somalia will not be possible without recognising the concerns of external powers such as Ethiopia that fears the establishment of an unfriendly regime in the country. The continuing rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the region (with reports of each country supporting rival groups) compounds the problem. The final option that remains with the international community and the TFG is to open peace talks with members of Al Shabaab group. Amol Shinde asked: Is Myanmar's democratisation in India's favour vis--vis China ? Udai Bhanu Singh replies: The democratic transition underway in Myanmar is a happy augury for India, the worlds largest democracy. Yet, India does not advocate the export of democracy. Besides, a democratic movement which is indigenous (but is open to fresh ideas from outside) has greater chances of success. The initial attempt at democracy in 1988 (and the 1990 elections

thereafter) did not fructify as it was suppressed. As the West imposed sanctions (taking the high moral ground), China seized the opportunity to make inroads into the country with heavy economic and military aid and investment. A new era dawned in Myanmar with the new 2008 Constitution, the November 2010 elections, and the new parliament, which holds the prospect of reconciliation among the three stakeholders in Myanmar: the military, the political parties and the ethnic groups. Myanmars democratisation will help the country break out of economic isolation. Second, military assistance would help wean it away from Chinas clasp. Democratisation in Myanmar would r estore the balance in its polity and help address the issue of developmental neglect in minority dominated border provinces (adjoining both Indias northeast and China). Internal stability in Myanmar (with improved inter -ethnic relations) would render greater autonomy to the country in its external relations (evidenced in the suspension of China-led Myitsone dam project recently). While it appears unlikely that Chinas other mega-projects (such as Kyaukphyu port development and the dual pipeline and railway line starting from the same port) would be adversely affected, it will introduce alternative players into the fray. As the ASEAN members (and the world community) take note of Chinas assertion in the South China Sea and Chinas access to the Indian Ocean, a growing interest in Myanmars democratisation process is a welcome development. Neeraj Kapoor asked: How the insurgency in Kashmir is different from the Maoist insurgency or the insurgency in Assam? G.K. Pillai replies: The insurgency in Kashmir is different primarily because it arises from differing perceptions with Pakistan and the people of Kashmir valley on the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union at the time of independence and the special status accorded to the State through Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. The insurgency in J&K has been actively assisted by the Government of Pakistan and the two countries have fought in 1948, 1965, 1971, and in the Kargil sector on this issue. It has been the official policy of the Government of Pakistan to bleed India through a thousand cuts in order to weaken its resolve that J&K is an integral part of India. Pakistan has, therefore, not lost any opportunity to exploit any discontent in J&K. There are reportedly 22 camps in Pak occupied Kashmir where militants are being trained to be infiltrated across the LOC to attack security forces and vital installations in the State. The Maoist insurgency originates from apparent discontent over agrarian reforms and exploitation of the local population, especially tribals; and now has the stated objective of the overthrow of the Indian State and parliamentary democracy. It has got its support by exploiting local grievances against the local government to organise an armed liberation struggle against the Indian State. It draws inspiration from Mao Tse Tungs Communist movement. It is not limited to any one state since the Maoists do not believe in parliamentary democracy and is currently spread in parts of at least 9 States in India. Maoists have been reported to have got training from the LTTE and are actively seeking cooperation from insurgent groups in the North East, especially the PLA. In Assam, there are a number of insurgent groups which are active. United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) Paresh Barua faction seeks a sovereign Assam and has its origins in the fear that continuous

migration of persons from erstwhile East Pakistan and now Bangladesh will alter the demographic character of the State of Assam to the detriment of its indigenous people. Who are the indigenous people of Assam still remains to be resolved. The BODO insurgent movement also called for an independent BODO State as these tribals felt that they would be discriminated if they stayed within the State of Assam. Then there are a number of other militant groups based on tribal identity and geographical contiguity who have taken up arms to fight for their tribal identity which they feel is not getting due recognition and support within the State of Assam. Both the ULFA and BODO groups have received training and arms from Pakistan. Shijith Kumar asked: After a decade of negotiations, why the Doha Round has not succeeded? Jagannath P. Panda replies: The Doha round of talks has not been primarily successful because of the invariable differences between the developed and developing countries on the WTO settings, and about the rules and regulations of the IMF and World Bank. The developing countries mostly argue that the current rules and regulations in most of the global financial bodies are more in favour of the developed or industrialised countries. Also, the developed countries are not forthcoming when it comes to trade concessions for the developing countries or the rising economies. They conduct their business dealings as usual through customary ways i.e., by subsidising their agricultural sectors and setting the market conditions that suits their needs, without caring much about developing countries needs. On the contrary, the developed countries/blocs like the US and the EU have been of the view that the developing economies have failed to agree and converge with the developed countries demands for near zero-tariffs in important sectors, like agriculture and services. These fundamental differences in the Doha Round of talks have increased the divide between the developed and the developing countries. Most of the talks in Doha so far have pressurised the developing countries to open their markets further, overlooking the need for bringing transparency to the rules and regulations in the global financial bodies, like the WTO, IMF and the World Bank. Though it seems that the main reason behind the failure of the Doha Rounds are systemic problems, linked to rule and regulations of the global financial bodies; but the process of discussion has been politicised gradually among the two mainstream blocs- developed and developing countries. Further, there seems to be a lack of coherent strategy among the developing countries to form a credible union which would help put more pressure on the Western or developed powers to bring transparency and make amendments in the rules in the WTO, IMF and the World Bank. Blessy asked: Is the Integrated Energy Policy of India sufficient to meet its energy demand? Shebonti Ray Dadwal replies: This is a strange question. The Integrated Energy Policy (IEP) of 2006 was intended to provide a road map for a holistic and long-term approach to India's energy policy -as opposed to the hitherto ad hocism that pervaded energy planning and strategy. Till the IEP, India had no overarching energy policy as such, and ministries were looking at various aspects of energy -oil and gas, coal, power, renewable energy, etc., as separate and distinct from one another, and sometimes were even at odds with each other. The IEP was the first attempt to look at energy policy in a holistic manner. Whether it succeeded is doubtful. Like the recommendations made by earlier committees, the recommendations of the IEP have remained just that without few if any of them

being put into practice. One of the main problems that have been identified as a barrier to enhancing energy security is the pricing policy and system of subsidies that are provided in several areas of the energy sector - oil, power, water, renewable energy, coal, etc. This deters investment from the private sector, both domestic and foreign, and denies access to state-of-the-art technology. It also leads to pricing discrepancy and black marketeering, as well as losses to PSUs across the board. It certainly does not add to energy security; on the contrary, it contributes to energy insecurity. More specifically, some of the recommendations of the IEP have been criticised as being unrealistic and given to populism. So, in short, while the IEP was a noteworthy attempt at looking at energy security in a holistic manner, it has not really added to India's energy security. How far has India been successful in meeting its energy requirements by improving its relationship with the Gulf countries? Shebonti Ray Dadwal replies: First, India has always placed relations with the Gulf countries at a premium due to its dependence on oil sourced from this region as well as religious and other factors, such as presence of five million Indians living and working in the GCC countries. Second, of late, as part of its energy security strategy, India is following a policy of energy source diversification and is widening its source base to African and other energy-rich countries. However, the Gulf is and will remain its, as well as the world's, largest source of oil and gas. Third, the Gulf countries too are placing more importance on relations with Asian countries, notably China and India, as important future markets for the energy. It is noteworthy that the Asian countries are overtaking the Western countries as the largest consumers of energy. At a time when India and other Asian countries are looking for substituting a portion of their Iranian oil imports, Saudi Arabia is the only country that can provide extra barrels as it is the only Gulf country with spare capacity. It has recently signed a strategic partnership agreement with India with energy as a major area of focus. Therefore, India's rising economic profile as well as its growing energy market would be more a cause for Gulf countries to strengthen their relations with India than India seeking to improve relations with these countries. Shijith Kumar asked: What is the nature and trend of the nuclear diplomacy post-Fukushima? A. Vinod Kumar replies: Presume the questioner refers to the global diplomatic efforts to redress concerns on nuclear safety and issues pertaining to the growth of nuclear energy, post-Fukushima. One could recall that the immediate fallout of the Fukushima incident was the apprehensions over the nuclear safety amid natural calamities and accidents, and a consequent impact in some countries pursuing nuclear energy. While a few countries like Germany and Sweden, which were contemplating a revival of nuclear energy, decided to discard those plans; in countries like India, where a surge of nuclear energy was being anticipated, a wave of protests have emerged against nuclear expansion. Similarly, in Japan, various groups have been pressuring the government to shut down nuclear plants. Japans response to these protests intrinsically explains the global diplomacy on nuclear energy expansion and safety issues. While working on local protests, Japan has continued to back its

companies in getting contracts to build new plants in countries like Indonesia and Turkey, besides keeping a solid eye on burgeoning nuclear energy markets like India. The same could apply to most countries with major economic growth trajectories which would need sustainable sources of electricity and clean fuel. Even countries like Germany, which is the European economic powerhouse, are expected to fall back on nuclear energy to meet their industrial needs. While Fukushima disaster is attributed to a flawed coolant pumping system, the incident has prompted the IAEA to further enhance global safety templates at nuclear plants. Countries like India have undertaken a review of the safety standards of existing facilities and are preparing enhanced standards of safety for new facilities to match up to the expected natural and man-made disasters. Rajat Dubey asked: India has been equivocating in its approach towards the Arab turmoil. As Islamist parties gain power, what will be its impact on Indias position in West Asia in times to come? Ashok Kumar Behuria replies: What might seem as equivocation is in fact a measured policy vis--vis the developments in the Arab world. Indian statements are cautious and people-oriented. India has reasons to be circumspect in light of the uncertain political environment and therefore it has perhaps resisted the temptation to join party with forces taking on the incumbent regimes, even if they seem to be in the driver's seat. India's abiding concern for religious radicalism may have conditioned this thinking as well. Islamic parties coming to power in these societies should not be seen as boding disaster for India. The Islamist forces in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and elsewhere are likely to be as nationalistic in their outlook as the regimes they displaced. Therefore, they are likely to retain their diplomatic links with India with as much fervour, if not more, as their predecessors. India must not allow its anxiety vis-vis the fundamentalists to affect its diplomatic dealings with these countries. In case, the Islamist forces show any reluctance, which is most unlikely, in strengthening their relationship with India - a rising economy with substantial Muslim population, and with decades of fruitful bilateral relationship - India must bide for time and push for better diplomatic relationship rather than push itself hurriedly into isolation. It must also coordinate its diplomacy with other important players in international politics. Anil asked: Why India does not support democratic movements in China, Tibet, Pakistan, etc? Isnt it in Indias long-term interest? S. Kalyanaraman replies: India's establishment as a liberal democracy was the third great moment in the history of liberalism, the first two being the American and French Revolutions. There is no doubt that India favours democracy taking root among its neighbours as well as the spread of democracy throughout the world. However, India does not believe in imposing democracy on any country at the tip of a bayonet. Instead, it prefers to serve as an example that other countries can emulate for their own benefit. India's past experience in promoting greater democracy within the sub-continent clearly demonstrates the limits of what can be achieved. India helped in the liberation of Bangladesh and its

establishment as a democratic state; but democracy there was soon overthrown. Indeed, the latest attempt at a coup in Bangladesh partly stems from forces that do not favour better or closer IndiaBangladesh relations. Similarly, through the 1980s, India attempted to convince Sri Lanka of the imperative of evolving a federal democratic polity (as opposed to Sri Lanka's preference for a unitary polity) that would address the grievances of its minority Tamils in particular, but failed to move Colombo. Even today, Sri Lanka refuses to see the merits of the Indian democratic model and is seeking to evolve a 'Sri Lankan' model in the wake of its 'victory' over the LTTE. The limits of what India can achieve in this regard are even starker when it comes to countries that are adversaries or rivals. Overtly promoting democracy and democratic movements especially in countries that are adversaries or rivals is not a prudent policy for two main reasons. Firstly, the very fact of extending such support will delegitimse or help to delegitimise these movements because of perceived support from the Indian adversary/rival; thus, detracting from the long-term goal of enabling these countries to become democracies. Secondly, a policy of overtly promoting democratic movements in countries that are adversaries or rivals will simply add another point of conflict to an already troubled relationship and further vitiate bilateral relations, something that needs to be avoided especially when India's principal focus continues to be on internal socio-political-economic development. Neeraj Kapoor asked: The Arab Spring has churned the world, including democratic, communist and capitalist countries. What has been the overall impact of the Arab Spring at the wider international level? Satish Nambiar replies: The overall impact of the Arab Spring has not been uniform. While it has been generally warmly welcomed in the developed world comprising established democracies and free-market economies, and in most developing countries that have evolved into democracies, the response has varied from the muted to the subdued in countries under communist rule and under autocratic regimes. Whereas the former see this as a manifestation of the assertion of the will of the people towards greater personal freedom and an exercise of the rights and privileges of the people, the latter are concerned about the impact the movement can have within their own societies that have long been subjected to rigid control over civil liberties. They perceive the movement as a threat to their survival as the sole dispensers of the well being of their people. The more significant impact that merits close monitoring is on the monarchies that are ruling Saudi Arabia and many of the Gulf states with significant Shia populations that are awakening to their destinies, propelled as they are by what has transpired in a country like Iraq. There is of course another dimension to the development. While the assertion of the will of the people, personal freedom and civil liberties is welcome, the outcome of the elections that have followed, have some disturbing connotations. In almost all instances, parties with established radical Islamist inclinations appear to have secured the majority of the votes. Should this trend be benign, there is no need for alarm. But if this becomes the trigger for the more extremist policies that encourage activities like those undertaken by the Al Qaeda and associated movements, the international community will need to evolve policies to deal with the problem. That is the challenge.

Udhayan C C asked: Why are Indian foreign policy makers always apologetic in their approach towards China? Joe Thomas Karackattu replies: Posing a generic question on the issue of Indian foreign policy makers being always apologetic in their approach to China is problem atic. Firstly, this is not a scientific conclusion. Unlike pure sciences, foreign policy is largely interpretive. We must understand that India and China are equals in a Westphalian setting, that both have their respective optics to view outstanding issues and that both need to use reason more than reaction while shaping the future of bilateral (and multilateral) ties. There are positive changes all around us. It is to the success of the top leadership in both countries that the India-China LAC remains, arguably, the most peaceful of all inter-state boundaries. Both countries have upgraded the level of engagement on the border issue. Pt Jawaharlal Nehru and Premier Zhou Enlai had agreed to have mid-level bureaucrats mediate border talks, but Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Premier Wen Jiabao reached an understanding in 2010 to have foreign ministers of the two countries deal with the vexed problem. In other areas as well, the progress should not be missed. Last year, the Annual Defence Dialogue (ADD) between the two countries took off after nearly two years. The progress on trade and economics is known well (as are the associated problem areas). Unfortunately, speculative commentary from some sections of the media and strategic community on either side would almost have us believe that the two countries are in preparation for war because that is what lies ahead. 2011 was the Year of China-India Exchange. However, except for official visits by two state chief ministers from India, and the formal youth exchange programme, and a couple of provincial trade delegations from China, and the ADD, the interaction at the level of societies remained cosmetic. Of the total international arrivals in India, roughly 2 per cent are Chinese (both tourists and business persons). Cultural exposure to Chinese programming content (CCTV English) does not exist. Most Indians have exposure to Chinese culture through Hollywood or Hong Kong movies, but rarely come into contact with mainland cultural content directly. Thus, even our imagery of each other is relayed largely via a third medium. You would therefore appreciate that it would take many more years for India and China to transform societal preferences by more engagement. Only then will there be fewer instances for the possibility of spurious inferences. However, try and visualize a scenario where population demographics, viz. the young structure of the Indian population, makes it suitable for Indians to find jobs in the other growth engine in Asia, i.e. China over the next two decades (similar to the out-migration that happened from India to the Gulf economies, Europe and America). Vice-versa, visualize a scenario for China where it needs to look to India to mitigate the imbalances of its export dependence on the West and the deficiency of consumption within. There are plentiful avenues that will have logic of their own to pull the countries towards a more cooperative direction. Indian policy makers have confidently highlighted areas where China has not shown sensitivity to our concerns, and India would continue to do so. Till then, there would be recurring problems over

allocation and recognition of sovereignty, Tibet, China-Pakistan relations, India-US relations, energy, and maritime competition in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. The challenge is to build trust so as to overcome these hurdles. Ajai Vir asked: Given the fact that the US support leverages India's position at the UNSC, can our foreign policy be termed as truly independent? Cherian Samuel replies: While there are compelling arguments both for and against the proposition, the empirical evidence, and this is something the United States cites repeatedly, lies in the voting record of India at the United Nations. A perusal of this shows that India has voted against resolutions supported by the United States more often than not. The voting record in the Security Council is more nuanced since many of the resolutions are brought to the floor only after a consensus has been reached among the members. In most cases, draft resolutions are voted out so they do not become a part of the official record. In the year since India became a non-permanent member of the UNSC, of the 67 resolutions that have been brought before the UNSC, it has abstained just once. 64 out of the 67 have been passed unanimously. India was joined in abstaining on Resolution 1973 (authorising the use of a no-fly-zone over Libya) by China, Russia, Brazil, and Germany. While it is a coincidence that the so-called BRIC countries are together at the same time in the Security Council, they have merged as a formidable bloc, resisting US and Western pressures. Therefore, it would be incorrect to say that the United States has successfully leveraged Indias position in the UN Security Council to its advantage. Hans Raj Singh asked: What is the impact of Arab uprisings on India, politically and economically? Prasanta K. Pradhan replies: The uprisings in the Arab world do not seem to have any direct political impact on India as India does not play a proactive political role in the region; rather, it poses a challenge for Indias foreign policy. India is opposed to any kind of intervention in the affairs of other states and believes that the problems should be resolved taking into account peoples aspirations. Thus, India abstained from voting in the United Nations Security Council over draft resolutions on Syria and Libya. However, with huge stakes involved in the region political, economic and security the Arab uprisings are a test case for Indias policies and approach towards the region. Economically, the Arab uprisings have led to a sharp increase in oil prices as oil production and supply were affected by the protests. The oil prices increased from around US$ 89 per barrel in December 2010, when the protests started, to over US$ 120 per barrel in May 2011. This can be attributed as one of the reasons for the rising oil prices in India. The impact of the uprisings on trade and investment has not yet been properly ascertained. But it has been reported that a number of Indian companies who have invested in several projects in the region, particularly in North Africa, are concerned about their investments and the future security environment in the affected countries. Also, there may be some marginal fall in remittances as number of Indian workers from Libya and Egypt have come back home.

Juliee Sharma asked: Are there specific provisions in India for compensating to the victims of victim-activated IEDs? Ali Ahmed replies: Indian civilians and soldiers have been victims of IED attacks as part of proxy war, terror attacks and in insurgency hit areas. Such attacks result in fatalities and long-term injuries. The material damage, though sometimes considerable, pales in comparison to the human toll. Not only lives but long-term livelihoods of families are sometimes disrupted. Compensation, therefore, requires being not only as immediate relief but also to enable recouping over a longer time period. While monetary compensation is resorted to, measures such as employment to next of kin are also taken as warranted. The state governments usually take on the onus for compensation. For example, in J&K, the MHA Annual Report of 2010-11 (p. 9) informs that a one-time cash compensation of Rs. 5 lakh is provided to the next-of-kin of civilians killed in militancy-related incidents in lieu of compassionate appointment under SRO-43. This would include IED attacks. For this, Rs. 100 crore was released to the State Government from Security Related Expenditure (Relief & Rehabilitation). As informed by the State Government, an expenditure of Rs. 96.16 crore has been incurred so far. As for the soldiers who are victims of IED action, they are treated as battle casualties. Juliee Sharma asked: What is India's policy and strategy to tackle the threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices? Ali Ahmed replies: Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) pose a threat of two kinds: first is from terrorism targeting population, and second is IEDs aimed at causing casualties among soldiers. The two forms of IED employment by terrorists/insurgents require distinct and overlapping measures. Indias policy to tackle the threat posed by IEDs aims, firstly, at prevention. This at the political level involves mitigation of persisting conflict situations. This has both internal political and diplomatic dimensions. At the strategic level, it implies intelligence and public information. Next, since IEDs are employed in proxy war, increase in their use would imply escalation in the level of confrontation. This can be deterred through diplomatic and conventional means. At the tactical level, it means taking due precaution such as surveillance through electronic means and keeping tabs on explosive material from falling into wrong hands. The second element of policy is defensive. These include proper sanitisation of areas under threat through, for instance, road opening drills in counter insurgency areas, and appropriate reaction by quick reaction teams. An example at this level is the periodic IED information bulletin document in Northern Command for speedy dissemination of lessons learnt. Third are mitigation measures to reduce casualties by timely evacuation, collecting evidence for follow up and prosecution, etc. Lastly, offensive actions to trace and destroy IED making factories, busting terror cells, etc., may be employed. These could be both military and intelligence operations. As far as the strategy against IEDs goes, it is situation specific and guided by the overall policy and counter terror/insurgency doctrine. Since conflict theatres in which IEDs are employed have their unique context and intricacies, strategy is dynamically individuated. There is cross learning from experiences elsewhere, including from abroad. The manner the latter is done is through appropriate doctrine, sensitisation and training.

As per the latest strategic review, US treat India as an ally and China as a threat. Will that reduce the aggressiveness of China towards India? Rukmani Gupta replies: The latest strategic guidance document for the United States D epartment of Defense highlights the US' global priorities in the field of defence and identifies Asia-Pacific and the Middle East as the two most important regions for the US policy in future. In the context of American rebalancing in Asia, the US' commitment to investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India is mentioned. China's rapid military modernisation and a concomitant lack of transparency in its strategic intentions, as well as its use of asymmetrical means to counter American power projection capabilities, are seen as challenges. Since the Indo-US nuclear deal of 2005, many in China believe that the US is actively cultivating ties with India with a view to balance China's rise in Asia. The identification of India as an important element in future US strategy, as suggested in the strategic guidance document, is likely to heighten Chinese threat perceptions vis--vis India. It is by no means certain that increased wariness would entail conciliatory posturing towards India. Harsha AH asked: Even though Iran was willing to accept the payment for Indias oil imports in the Indian currency, why did India declined from doing so? Shebonti Ray Dadwal replies: According to reports, Iran is willing to accept payments in rupee for the crude it sells to India but the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is opposing the idea. Iran's central bank had expressed their vote of confidence in the rupee during their meeting with RBI executives, where they said that they were ready to operate through a State Bank of India (SBI) branch in Mumbai where state oil firms can make rupee payments. But RBI is against this arrangement on the ground of high trade imbalance between the two countries. Iran imports goods from India worth only $1 billion against the huge amount New Delhi pays for its oil. Also, many Indian banks do business with the US and are wary of coming under the US sanctions. However, recently it appears that some smaller Indian national banks are being used to make payments to Iran, such as the UCO, Union Bank, etc. In mid-January 2012, a finance ministry team from India will be in Tehran for talks to resolve the payment issue, where some innovative ideas on how barter trade can be conducted on the lines of China-Iran and Iran-South Korea trade may be discussed. Buddhika asked: Can India alone deal with the non-traditional threats coming from the Indian Ocean? S.S. Parmar replies: The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean and has an area of 73,556,000 sq km including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. This vast area is home to many littorals and Island nations. Therefore, any activity in this ocean is subject to a plethora of issues stretching from strategic interests both intra and extra regional, national jurisdiction of maritime zones, varying national laws dictated by types of governance and economics, to capabilities and capacities of nations to address both traditional and non traditional threats that affect the existing security scenario.

Non-traditional threats, such as piracy, terrorism, drugs and arms trade, and natural disasters, are trans- border issues that affect most of the nations that are either located in the region, or use the Indian Ocean as transit for their maritime trade, or have a presence for their strategic interests. The vast expanse of the area, number of nations involved, the magnitude of laws and the capacities and capabilities of nations make it a difficult task for one nation to deal with non-traditional threats. This is the reason why nations engage each other via bilateral and multilateral dialogues and understandings. India, on its part, engages nations in the Indian Ocean so that a comprehensive framework, optimally utilising national assets to counter the non-traditional threats, can be established. Ajai Vir asked: The recent visit of the Japanese prime minister to India was viewed as part of ongoing efforts for containment of China. In principle, why should any country need to contain another? R.N. Das replies: It is true that Indias relations with Japan have undergone a significant transformation in recent years, with the signing of India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership in December 2006. In October last year, the two countries signed the joint document, Vision for India Japan Strategic and Global Partnership in Next Decade. The India -Japan-US trilateral took place in the US in December. All these, however, should not mean to suggest a containment strategy, though there has been such a perception in some sections of the strategic community both in India and elsewhere. Prime Minister Mammohan Singh, time and again, has asserted that the India-Japan strategic and secureity cooperation is not aimed at any third country, least of all China. India has neither the inclination, nor the capability or for that matter any need to contain China. The two countries are carefully engaging each other to overcome the trust deficit. For example, in spite of the spat over ONGC Videshs foray into the South China Sea, the postponement of the talks between the special representatives, and the latest episode of alleged ill-treatment meted out to the Indian diplomat in Shanghai, the two countries have handled the issues very deftly. Prime Minister Singhs recent statement in Bhubaneswar that China is well ahead of India in terms of research and development in the field of science and technology, and External Affairs Minister Krishnas appreciation for Beijings handling of the issue of Indian traders held captive in Yiwu near Shanghai by the local authorities, clearly suggests that India is serious about engaging China. There should not be any zero-sum game between the two countries. Harry asked: What is the importance of C4I2 in modern wars? Mandip Singh replies: C4I2 systems stand for Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence and Interoperability. C4I2 systems provide a tactical commander with the state-of-theart equipment to exercise control and manoeuvre his forces. C4I2 systems are designed to cater to the three critical needs of a commander on the battlefield - latest and updated intelligence, decision aids, and the capability to transmit these decisions to the forces under command.

The basic ingredients are:

Command - a person who is responsible for conduct of the mission. Control resources placed under the control of the commander. Communications means to transmit decisions, e.g., radio, secure communication transmission networks, VSAT, satellite transponders, etc. Computing use of data, audio and video, with a host of automation equipment like LAN, WAN, photocopiers, fax , telephones, teleprinters, etc. Intelligence-gathering of real time information by satellites, air or ground sensors, integrated observation aids, radars, etc. Interoperability use of a common medium between users, e.g., optical fibre, common bandwidth, etc. The basic challenges to an effective and efficient C4I2 network is survivability, reliability, robustness and cost effectiveness. Its areas of interface or information exchange in the military domain are: joint operations, joint planning, integrated logistics, joint intelligence and joint training. In a strategic context, a robust and reliable C4I2 system provides a credible deterrence in the event of a nuclear war. This is ensured by positive control of nuclear assets, by providing adequate time for assessment and decision-making, use of discriminate retaliation measures and enhanced capability to manage crisis situations. Udhayan C C asked: What is wrong if India enters into a regional security pact with US, Japan and Australia? Shamshad Ahmad Khan replies: There is no problem if India enters into any strategic agreement with these countries. In fact India has signed various strategic partnership agreements with major democracies of the world including the US, Japan and Australia. However, these agreements are bilateral and not multilateral. Forging a multilateral security arrangement or pact is not on the agenda of Indian policy planners as they think that the countries outside this regional security arrangement might feel that such an arrangement may be aimed against them. This may lead to a security dilemma and will have negative implications for the regional security scenario. Gaurav asked: Should India leverage the tensions in Pakistan-US relations to widen the rift, or should it adhere to principles of non-interference in the bilateral relations of its neighbours? Priyanka Singh replies: Before we get down to weighing whether India could take advantage of the current rift between US and Pakistan, it is imperative to examine whether India actually has the leverage to do so. As far as Pakistan and the larger issue of terrorism are concerned, India recently met with a degree of disappointment. USAs reluctance and delay to allow Indian investigation agencies access David Headly and failure to persuade Pakistan to handover Mumbai perpetrators to India have shown certain limitations inherent in India-US relations. Much has been talked about de-

hyphation of India and Pakistan by US but the fact remains, Pakistan is crucial to India-US relations and so are US-Pakistan relations to India. US Pakistan relations have become discordant as US has taken a more strident stand on Pakistans duplicitous role in the fight against the Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Meanwhile, India has been closely observing the developments across its western border. India probably realizes that its stand against Pakistan abetting terrorism and using it as a state policy stands vindicated. All these years India has been constantly raising the issue with US, but without much impact. The best approach for India (which is being practiced currently) is to wait and watch. For now, India needs to insulate its borders with Pakistan and simultaneously secure its interests in Afghanistan which face constant threat from Pakistans ISI. Digressing from its traditional policy of non interference would not give any added strategic dividends to India presently. Hence, as events unfold in the region India should just keep a careful watch on them so that it could act in a timely manner and effectively, if needed. Harsha AH asked: Is the Concept of Balance of Power still relevant in contemporary international politics? Anit Mukherjee replies: One helpful manner of thinking of international politics is to relate it with human nature. In other words states behave similar to people and both are driven by the same passions. For Thucydides, the ancient Greek historian, state behavior was driven by "fear, honour and interest." One could argue that the same passions drive us. If this is true then in an anarchic state, where international politics is conducted, it is unlikely that concepts like "balance of power" will ever be irrelevant. So, yes, the concept of balance of power is still relevant in contemporary international politics. One can only imagine this no longer being so in case of a world, federal government which, at this moment or for the foreseeable future, appears highly unlikely. The concept of balance of power stems from the fear among smaller powers of the rise of a larger rival power. In this fear is the key, for if the two powers enjoy friendly relations then there would be no need to "balance" the larger power. Moreover balance of power consists of external and internal balancing. In the former, the state looks for external alliances as deterrence and in the latter it builds up its own strength again for deterrence. In sum this concept, like most other concepts that drive international politics, is not going away anytime soon. Rajesh Kumar Sharma asked: What is the role of the infantry in capability enhancement of the armed forces? Vivek Chadha replies: Capability enhancement of the armed forces in todays battlefield milieu is representative of a synergised and cohesive approach to the process. Therefore, the armed forces as an entity are not merely the sum of the capability of its constituents, but the integrated culmination of their ability to function in unison. This implies that every constituent of the forces, which very much includes the infantry, would be an integral part of the process of capability enhancement.

In Indias context, the role of infantry is further highlighted by virtue of infantry centric responsibilities in a number of spheres of operations like counter insurgency and counter terrorism. The specific aim of enhancing this capability has been initiated through a number of initiatives. A highly trained, equipped and networked soldier as visualised in the Futuristic Infantry Soldier as a System (FINSAS) programme currently underway for the army is one amongst the many initiatives in this context. The initiative visualises a highly networked soldier, with better weaponry and communication facilities. It also aims to make him more agile, mobile and lethal. The enhancement of educational levels for intake, emphasis on further improving this capability while in service and providing opportunities to imbibe technology in an increasingly automated environment are some other initiatives in this regard. The recent experiences of the US forces, both in Iraq and Afghanistan have also proved that shock and awe may be important, however, an army finally needs boots on ground to achieve desired objectives. It was also demonstrated in Libya that the ability to force victory is finally achieved through the infantry, which needs to capture and occupy ground to force a favourable decision. Therefore, the role of Infantry in any form of capability enhancement will remain critical. However, as mentioned earlier this will be in concert with other constituents of the force. Neeraj Kapoor asked: Keeping in mind that the naxals are Indians with guns and naxalism is a result of government apathy, what should be the right strategy against Naxalism? Kishalay Bhattacharjee replies: Naxalism, to begin with is not only the result of government apathy; that is just one approach to understanding Naxalism. Naxalism or Left Wing Extremism in India is an ideological war as much as an armed insurgency. Therefore it is imperative to counter the ideology that helps mobilise their support. The apathy feeds into this extremism. Therefore it is essential to address the apathy as well. But most importantly the authorities must be seized of the gravity of the Maoist problem. Maoists haven't struck in the cities yet and that could be one reason for the Government to have not responded to it immediately. Development must be all round and not concentrated only in Maoist dominated areas. Police reforms must be implemented immediately. The state and the centre must agree on the threat perception and follow a clear policy which is currently absent. The Government must choke funding of these organisations. Tactical negotiations must follow arrests of leaders to allow them to participate in the democratic process as proof that change is possible. Crucially, there has to be a genuine will to address the grievances of the people which in turn feed into these movements. China's foreign policy is becoming more assertive. Is this assertiveness of China seen as a threat by ASEAN countries? Rahul Mishra replies: Chinas foreign policy has traditionally been considered hawkish, which is evident from Chinas long-standing territorial disputes with its neighbours, and the wars it fought in the past. It was only after the end of the Cold War that China started projecting its benign image. The recent Chinese moves on the Spratly and Paracel islands disputes have however tarnished this image.

Within the ASEAN member countries, there are varying perceptions and responses to Chinas assertive behaviour. For instance, while countries like Indonesia and Singapore tread a cautious approach in dealing with China by keeping the US on their side. Malaysia, Laos and Myanmar are to a great extent positive about China and its rise. This goes in contrast to the Philippines and Vietnam, which have no intention to strike a compromise deal with China on the South China issue. As an institution, ASEAN considers engaging China through multilateral forums as its best strategy. China is also considered a partner country, which has helped ASEAN come out of a number of crises in the past. However, one cannot deny the fact that it was the Southeast Asian threat perception of China, which led to formation of ASEAN in 1967. The same persists even today, though manifestations are different. Therefore, what is apparent at the national level, gets transformed when the constituent countries of ASEAN come together as a unit on a matter of concern; thus resulting in ASEANs balanced approach towards China. Sandya asked: What is Indias perception regarding maritime security in the Indian Ocean? S. S. Parmar replies: Indias perception of maritime security stems from the Freedom to use the Seas. This is an important aspect that is the focus of any maritime nations outlook. There are some issues that require to be viewed and assessed when correlating maritime security to the Indian Ocean Region as they form the basis of Indias perception.

The IOR is a region of diverse economies and systems of governance. One third of the worlds populace resides here in a quarter of the worlds land mass. It consists of 56 littoral and landbound nations. It accounts for 65% of strategic raw material reserves, 31% gas and more than half of the world's oil exports. The region is the largest producer of rubber, tea, spices, and jute. Some other important minerals found are manganese, cobalt, tungsten, coal and iron ore. This region has seen the maximum number of conflicts post the cold war and is considered the hub of global terrorism. Piracy, gun running, human and drug trafficking are issues that are also affecting the maritime security environment. Around 70% of the worlds natural disasters occur in the IOR. The region has the presence of extra regional powers. Therefore the perception of India vis--vis the IOR is based on ensuring a safe and stable maritime environment that will firstly ensure security of Indias national integrity and sovereignty; secondly, protection of our national interests; thirdly, ensure safe passage of maritime trade both national and international; fourthly, ensure cooperation amongst nations to combat and reduce the impact of non-traditional threats like terrorism, piracy and natural disasters.

These aspects require certain mechanisms that exist in the form of engagement with Indias maritime neighbours. India also engages the extra regional maritime players who have a stake in the IOR. This has led to bilateral and multilateral understandings at the diplomatic, economic and military levels that cover the issues highlighted above. Udhayan C C asked: India had a border with Afghanistan which is now with PoK. Why cant we reclaim it by force? Priyanka Singh replies: The Wakhan Corridor in the Badakhshan province separates Afghanistan from Gilgit Baltistan in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK).The corridor is approximately140 miles long and between 10-40 miles wide. Besides PoK, it shares border with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan, China, Tajiskistan and is thus of immense strategic value. The strategic significance of PoK cannot be denied in the present context and it is absolutely justified that India should reclaim PoK, but probably not by force. Indias stance on PoK has not been very forthcoming in the past so many years. Compulsions at the international level coupled with a rather defensive approach at the domestic level have meant that claims over PoK have not been adequately highlighted as part of the overall Kashmir issue. Hence, before we start thinking in terms of reclaiming our territory by force, a lot needs to be done on the policy front. We need to reshape and strengthen our policy on PoK which supports our legitimate claim on PoK. There is need to create awareness regarding Indias claim over PoK, not only at the international level, but also to a certain extent at the domestic level. Resorting to use of force without exploring all other possibilities would be unwarranted. More importantly, Indias claim on PoK should not be confined solely to strategic interests in Afghanistan. True, PoK will give India unfettered access to Afghanistan and more importantly to Central Asian markets. However, the strategic dimension should be preceded by the legal claim, which is that PoK is an integral part of India currently under illegal occupation of Pakistan. Syed Waseem Pasha asked: In the Indian context, how can human intelligence and technical intelligence be used in combating terrorism? Amit Kumar replies: Human Intelligence or HUMINT, refers to intelligence gathering by means of interpersonal contact with its emphasis on human beings, as opposed to the more technical intelligence gathering involving SIGINT (Signals intelligence), IMINT (Imagery Intelligence) and MASINT (Measurement and signature intelligence). Together these can play a very important role in combating terrorism. Terrorist activities in India are carried out by modules that consist of local youth, often supported by external actors. HUMINT is crucial in gathering information about these modules. However, since these are largely loosely structured organizations, there is scope for the police to sneak into their set up. Through increased use of police, particularly beat-level policing, police can gather enough information about these outfits. Thus, unlike NIA or other agencies that take actions once an incident has occurred, HUMINT can prevent the very happening of the same. The beat constable, who knows

every household in his limited area of responsibility, should be the pivot of the entire police system, which is at the forefront of fighting the menace of terrorism. So we must strengthen beat policing to overcome our serious inability in the sphere of intelligence gathering and then take suitable measures to augment intelligence sharing. Since our police are still not technically qualified, HUMINT becomes more crucial to them as compared to the military, which is technically more qualified and can take adequate care of threats emanating from across the borders using TECHINT for its purposes. Also, technical intelligence will prove more useful for the military and paramilitary than the police. So through a combined use of these two intelligence mechanisms, we can be more effective in countering terrorism. Vasudev asked: Is staffing relevant in present day war scenario? Ali Ahmed replies: Military staffs have been around as long as military leaders have. The function of military staff is to support the commander in planning and executing the mission of the force, interacting vertically and horizontally and monitoring the situation on behalf of the commander. Current day conflict would continue to require this function to be discharged and therefore military staffs are here to stay. However, the way they are configured currently and the manner in which they discharge their responsibilities is influenced by technology induced changes. The revolution in military affairs and the military technological revolutions, alongside developments outside of the military in communications and IT/IT enabled services, call for a reappraisal of discharge of the staff function. Netcentric warfare and innovative management practices necessitate change from traditional organisational structures, procedures and processes. This no doubt commands attention within the military. Middle piece officers are trained in the staff function at the Defence Services Staff College. This would be the node within the services to conceptualise the necessary steps to improve practices, along with the training and doctrine related agencies in respective services such as the Army's Army Training Command. For instance, a self-critical look can be taken for delayering, streamlining and pruning, particularly of top heavy headquarters. This is reportedly underway with the Transformation initiative being test bedded in terms of integrating logisitics. This being a significant area in the staff domain, the outcome bears watching. Aniket Bhujbal asked: Will India beat China in a war? R N Das replies: The question seems irrelevant particularly at a time when both India and China are engaged in trust-building measures. China has already made some positive overtures, like issuing proper visas, unlike the earlier stapled visas, to Indian journalists from Jammu and Kashmir who attended the BRICS Summit in Sanya, China, last April. It is also reported that defence exchanges between India and China, which was suspended earlier owing to the stapled visa issue, is going to be resumed soon. There is also the provision for a hotline telephone connection between the Prime Ministers of the two countries. Bilateral trade between the two has also crossed 60 billion US dollars, creating mutual inter-dependence. In spite of all this, there is no letup in Indias defence preparedness to face any kind of threat to its territorial integrity and security from any quarter, including China. Let the defence preparedness be the concern of the Defence and Security Agencies. It serves no purpose to create a paranoia about China, which is Indias migh ty and important neigbour.

Sree Kumaran asked: Why should foreign officials of donor agencies allowed to freely mix up with private sector when this is not allowed in other countries? Namrata Goswami replies: India is a democracy encouraging free movement of people, ideas, thought and exchanges. Hence, when there are foreign donors collaborating with the Indian private sector on particular developmental projects, there is no curtailment in their ability to interact and share ideas and review the progress of particular projects. There are clear advantages to this kind of approach. First, it enables better management of projects based on a symbiotic understanding between donor expectations and the private sectors' capabilities and motivations. Second, it enables frank and fruitful interaction with regard to limitations. Third, it showcases the freedom and openness of Indian democracy. Fourth, it ensures that goals are met within the specific time period. Sree Kumaran asked: Why J&K cannot be treated as any other State in the country by withdrawig the special status amending the Constitution? Arpita Anant replies: There is no denying that historically, the state has a claim to a special status. At the time of Independence, the National Conference, which was the torchbearer for integration of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with India, also advocated for a special status i.e. autonomy within the Union of India. Given the circumstances at that juncture, a special status was granted vide Article 370 of the Constitution. It was then elaborated on by the Constitution Application to Jammu and Kashmir Order 1950; and further reiterated in the Delhi Agreement of 1952. However, due to a combination of domestic and international developments, as Sheikh Abdullah moved away from a commitment to integration with special status, Nehru moved away from the commitment to autonomy. What followed were several years of a perceived erosion of autonomy. When the National Conference contested elections in 1996, it included the restoration of autonomy in its manifesto. More recently, the Peoples Democratic Party too has articulated its own version of autonomy as part of its formula of self-rule. Given the history, and the fact that the idea of autonomy is central to the political discourse of two important, and what are called mainstream parties of the state, it will not be possible to simply amend the Constitution to withdraw the special status at this juncture. Raviteja asked: Is it right time to move out of Afghanistan in this crucial time for the US? Vishal Chandra: It is more about the US priorities at various levels as defined by the current administration. After the elimination of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden by the American commandoes in Pakistan, it remains to be seen as to how the US deals with the Pakistani establishment in times to come. The prospect of the US further expanding its operations within

Pakistan cannot be ruled out even if the NATO starts withdrawing its forces later this year. In my personal opinion, the US is not going to withdraw lock, stock and barrel from the AfghanistanPakistan region. Even the process of withdrawal of forces will be a long-drawn affair taking at least four to five years. The pace of American withdrawal will depend also on the ground situation in Afghanistan; threat perceptions among the Western countries; and the preparedness of the Afghan National Security Forces. Raviteja asked: Was India getting enough recognition for her efforts in Afghanistan? Vishal Chandra replies: Yes, the Indian contribution to Afghan reconstruction has been appreciated and recognised by the Afghan people. India has been the only regional country carrying out development projects based on local community participation across the country. Indian projects are not confined to a particular region or to a relatively peaceful province in Afghanistan. They are not driven by commercial interests either. It would not have been possible for India to complete several of its projects thus far without the goodwill of the Afghan people and support from the Afghan government. Even in most adverse of circumstances and despite several constraints, India continues to assist in rebuilding Afghan capacities. In fact, Indian projects are a model when it comes to carrying out reconstruction activity in an in-conflict situation. It would be unfortunate if the situation deteriorates to a point where it may not be possible for India sustain its presence in Afghanistan. Is LTTE really finished from Sri Lanka and there is any chance for them to regroup? Gulbin Sultana replies: With the killing of Prabhakaran and most of the other key leaders, Sri Lankan armed forces eliminated the LTTE in May 2009. Kumaran Patmanathan was arrested in Thailand and brought back to Sri Lanka. He is in Government custody and was given the charge of looking after the developmental projects of the North-East. At the end of the war 12000 (according to some sources 11696) LTTE combatants were in Government custody. According to some estimates, 7000 were rehabilitated and reintegrated into the society. 4100 are yet to be reintegrated into the society as of April 2011. They are undergoing special training in 9 Rehabilitation Centres in the North. Chances of the LTTE regrouping are remote for the following reasons: Firstly, the Sri Lankan Government has taken strict military measures to prevent any kind of regrouping of the LTTE. It continues with the Emergency laws and Prevention of Terrorism Act. High Security Zones in the former war zones are also not yet dismantled. The ex-combatants who have already been reintegrated are being constantly monitored by the Government. Secondly, many of the ex-combatants who were forced to join the LTTE do not want to regroup again and are looking forward towards a normal life. However, the LTTE sympathizers are still there in foreign countries. They have formed a TransNational Government of Tamil Eelam. But it is not a united force and at present in the absence of a charismatic leader is largely rudderless.

Changes in the dynamics of global and regional security perception should also be taken into consideration while analyzing the possibility of re-emergence of the LTTE. Unlike the 1980s, it will not be possible for the LTTE to find a safe haven in the neighbouring countries. Thus, the possibilities of the LTTE regrouping in the near future appear remote. However, given the way the Sri Lankan Government is handling the Tamil issue, it seems it has not learnt from past mistakes. Its level of distrust towards the Tamils is still very much the same. So, it will not be surprising if there is a future uprising in Sri Lanka in the next few decades. Abdul Rahman asked: Is Nuclear Revolution a benefit or harm? Sasikumar Shanmugasundaram replies: The meaning of nuclear revolution has clearly impressed the security studies community while the judgement of its utility has not. Bernard Brodies (1946) first analysis of nuclear revolution still remains an oft quoted phrase: Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on i ts chief purpose must be to avert them. Brodies analysis was refined and perfected by scholars like Michael Mandelbaum, Thomas Schelling, Robert Jervis, Kenneth Waltz, and Stephen Van Evera, among others. Nuclear revolution as the result of mutual vulnerability therefore still remains an impressive theoretical logic. However, like any debate on the social adaptation to technology, the evaluation of the effects of nuclear revolution is strongly debated both among scholars and policy makers. Therefore, the benefit or harm of nuclear revolution has to be contextualized. Scholars of defensive realist camp believe that nuclear revolution is a benefit because it creates a degree of security and precludes self-defeating expansionist policies. Proponents of offensive realism would, however, argue that nuclear revolution cannot stop a states incentive to accumulate power. Constructivists would contend that the success or failure of nuclear revolution depends on the social context through which it is interpreted. And finally critical theorists/ post-modernists would argue that the meaning of nuclear revolution depends on complex power relations in world politics. Moving from the ivory tower to the ground, multitudes of opinion still remain. The United States would contend that the risk of nuclear confrontation (between States) has reduced but the risk of nuclear attack (by terrorists) has increased. Therefore, capitalizing the effects of nuclear revolution against responsible nuclear weapons states and simultaneously augmenting conventional forces against terrorists or rogue states has been its security policy. North Korea, on the other hand, would continue to advertise confidence on its own nuclear deterrent, engaging with, although not explicating, the ideas of nuclear revolution. For India the benefits of nuclear revolution vis-a-vis China is very different from the complexities it generates vis-a-vis Pakistan. For Israel, China or Pakistan, even a robust nuclear arsenal cannot reduce the security competition with their adversaries. The question whether nuclear revolution is a benefit or harm therefore has to be contextualized. Future transformation of the nuclear era might enable more patterns of evaluation of the question which annihilation would obviously confirm. Vikas Kalyani asked: Can you explain the initiatives taken by India towards enhancing her maritime interests?

S. S. Parmar replies: Maritime interests of a nation are extensive and cover a vast ambit. They broadly include protection of national integrity ranging from military intervention, anti-terrorism and anti-piracy actions; economic growth through trade and commerce; exploitation of the sea resources under the nations jurisdiction and maintaining the ecological balance. India has been taking initiatives towards enhancing her maritime interests by engaging neighbours and other international players at various fora so as to ensure a stable regional security environment. These fora are at political, diplomatic and military levels. The main thrust is to work out common grounds to tackle maritime terrorism and piracy as well as ensuring freedom of navigation on the high seas especially in the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs). The Indian Navy and Coast Guard are responsible for ensuring that the nation maintains the freedom to utilise the seas for its national purposes and therefore safeguard Indias National Interests at all times. Both of these services have ongoing plans to induct ships, aircraft and develop infrastructure to support this responsibility. Economic growth in the maritime arena is being enhanced by developing port infrastructure, rail and road connectivity and ship building capabilities. There is an equal impetus given towards harnessing the resources from the sea, mainly oil and gas. Fishing, however, remains a weak area and could be developed so as to put India in the top slot of fishing nations. Rajesh Singh asked: How did the structure of the world change after the cold war? Anit Mukherjee replies: The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the end of the bipolar rivalry between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, which had characterized world politics since the end of WWII. Besides the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, it resulted in freedom for many Eastern European countries from their communist parties and led to a wave of democratization there. Moreover it created a number of new countries in Eastern Europe and in Central Asia . It more or less ended the experiment with communism that began with the Bolshevik revolution. Finally, it led to changes in almost all regional settings in the world. For instance, the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan led to global inattention that ultimately led to the Taliban regime. This democratic triumph also led to global economic growth at unprecedented levels. Finally it also created instability, for instance in the Balkans and in parts of Asia, e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh. Ravi Ranjan asked: What is meant by Geopolitics of a region? Anit Mukherjee replies: Geopolitics, as defined by Robert Blackwill, is understood to mean the art and practice of the application of power by nations in the international domain. 1 This word is believed to have originated from Rudolf Kjelln, a Swedish political scientist at the beginning of the 20th century.2 In simple words, however, geopolitics would include how nations behave with each other in their quest to protect their national interests and to expand their influence/power. Geopolitics of a region would thus mean how the states within the region interact with each other through different instruments of the state including politics, diplomacy, military power, economic relations, etc. For instance, the geopolitics of East Asia would include understanding how the ASEAN countries engage with each other- building alliances and friendships among themselves and with other powers in the region including China , India , US, Australia , etc.

1. 1.See Robert Blackwill, The Geopolitical consequences of world economic recession - a caution, RAND Occasional Paper, p. 1, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf 2. 2.Ibid.

Nidhi asked: What are conventional and non conventional threats to maritime security and how maritime security can be precisely defined? S. S. Parmar replies: Maritime Security is a subset of national security and therefore nations would view it in direct correlation to their national interests. Therefore, the definition could vary from nation to nation and a generic definition would be more appropriate. Maritime Security is a term that encompasses the aspects and issues arising from the oceans surrounding the nation that impinge on its national interests. The division of conventional and non-conventional threats again varies from nation to nation. Conventional threats traditionally would be the military threats faced by a nation from another nation that impinge on its sovereign integrity, trade, maritime area under its jurisdiction as per international law in which the various laws, both international and national, apply. Non-conventional threats would cover a host of other aspects. The major ones being terrorism, piracy, natural disasters, drug trafficking, smuggling, illegal immigrants, changes in the climate and ecology to name a few. Neeraj Kapoor asked: Is there any solution possible for naxalism as what has happened in Sri Lanka with LTTE? Nihar Nayak replies: To begin with, it is essential to identify the basic differences and similarities between the two movements. The first and foremost difference is the LTTE was fighting for a sovereign and separate State. It was an ethnic conflict. On the other hand, the Naxalite/Maoists/LWE in India is fighting for equality, social justice and dignity of marginalized people, tribal rights and good governance. Second, while the LTTE was identified as a terrorist organization, this is not the case with Maoists. They have very limited trans-boundary activities. However, there are incidents of Maoists targeting civilians. These occasional incidents can not be compared with the LTTE. The Maoist movement has been thriving because of their nexus with political leaders. That was not the case with LTTE. Finally, in terms of lethality, till date, the Maoists use firearms looted from police and other security agencies. On the other hand, LTTE has been one of the dreaded organisations in the world with military might -Army/Navy and Air force and it was fighting and operating like a Rogue state. LTTE was responsible for killing of top political leaders, including former PM of India, Rajiv Gandhi. However, they have some basic similarities like political goal, indoctrination and training programmes, guerilla tactics, mobilization of front organizations, formation of military wings, etc. Considering these basic differences between these organisations/movements, only military or police action is not a viable solution to the Maoist problem. Military action could suppress the movement.

However, that may not bring a permanent solution to the problem. Earlier, on two occasions (1970s and 2002-03 in Andhra Pradesh), police actions were taken against the Maoists. Interestingly, the movement revived with more vigour. There are also strong possibilities of collateral damage if military action is taken against the Maoists. Adopting the LTTE or Sri Lankan model against the Maoists in India is not advisable. Rather, this problem can be tackled through both development and police action (only in high conflict zones) depending on the local situation. There is also a need of strong political will to resolve the menace by taking appropriate action against the nexus between Maoists and some political leaders. Dinesh asked: Given the present situation what should be India's foreign policy towards Iraq? Sonia Roy replies: India and Iraq have always emphasised on their traditionally close political ties, especially since the 1970s. India and Iraq never had any hostility towards each other. The US-led invasion in 2003 and subsequent violence forced India to recall its ambassador in 2004. In March 2011, with improving internal situation following the 2010 elections, India has decided to resend its envoy to Baghdad. But at the same time, India opposed the US-led invasion. Since 2003, India has contributed US$10 million towards the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), apart from providing training to Iraqi officials under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme. In addition it has committed US$20 million under the United Nations framework for assistance to the Iraqi people. The goodwill aid to Iraqi reconstruction, while refraining from interfering in its internal affairs, would be a good gesture of Indias friendly approach towards Iraq. Since 2003, bilateral visits between the two countries have been rather limited. Iraqi Minister of Oil, Hussein Al Sharistani visited India in 2007 while the Iraqi Minister of Industry and Minerals Fauzi Franso Hariri came in 2010. There have been no reciprocal political visits to Iraq. India should look into improving political relations with Iraq and resume bilateral visits towards this end. Iraq is the third largest supplier of crude to India after Saudi Arabia and Iran and is slated to be world's biggest oil supplier by 2015. The re-construction opportunities are immensely beneficial for Indian companies. Also, the Indian government should tune its foreign policy, with emphasis on its historical ties to counter balance, or at least make a dent in Chinas fast growing economic relations and the resultant influence in Iraq. With the stagnation of the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, it is in Indias interest to ensure unhindered energy supply from Iraq, and making it a strategic friend in the region. Sonia Roy is pursuing research at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Neeraj Kapoor asked: Why India doesn't pressurise China to take back AKSAI-CHIN region occupied by them in LADAKH? R. N. Das replies: This question raises the larger issue of settlement of border dispute between the two countries. There have been sincere efforts to resolve the border issue, and so far there have been 14 rounds of border talks to solve the long-pending border dispute. The special representatives

of both the countries have been appointed by the two countries to examine the entire gamut of border dispute so as to find an amicable settlement of the border dispute. Besides, agreements have also been signed between the two countries in this regard, for example, the agreement signed in 1993, affirms the view that the India-China boundary question shall be resolved through peaceful and friendly consultation, and that neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means. Yet another important highlight of the agreement was that it stipulated pending and ultimate solution of the boundary question between the two countries, the two sided shall strictly observe the line of actual control between the two sides, and that no activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control. Clause 7 of the 2005 agre ement on Political parameters and guidelines for the settlement of the India-China boundary question stipulated that in reaching a boundary settlement; the two sides shall safeguard the due interests of their settled population in the border areas. Thus the question has to take into account the entire border dispute into consideration. Maneesh Aggarwal asked: What will be the effect of Unrest in Middle East over Chinese investments in that region and over Indian interests? Prasanta K. Pradhan replies: Chinese investments in the West Asian and North African (WANA) region would certainly be hampered because of the continuing protests. China is also worried like any other countries who have invested in the region as the situation is undoubtedly discouraging for the investments. China is a major investor in the region where its companies have invested in big petroleum and construction projects. But, the protests have forced them to temporarily cease their operations in some places. For instance, China has evacuated over 35,000 of its nationals working in various projects in Libya and has decided to halt all its investments activities in the country. It has also decided not to make new investments until the situation stabilises. Similarly, China has investments of over US$ 600 million in Egypt, and there are more than a thousand Chinese companies operating in the country. There were reports that the Chinese companies faced some difficulties in their operation during the protests in Egypt. But as the political instability in the region subsides, the investment scenario should improve. Thus, the present obstruction is temporary in nature and it would gather momentum as the protests settle down. India is heavily dependent on the Gulf region for energy supplies. Any major political crisis in the region would disrupt the oil production and supplies thus leading to an increase in oil prices. It would be more serious if disruption in the oil supply were to take place in the strategically important Strait of Hormuz. Apart from oil, India shares huge non-oil trade relations with these countries. Indias nonoil trade with the WANA region amounted to $120.75 billion in 2009-10. The total non-oil trade with the six GCC countries alone amounts to $84 billion. Any prolonged political crisis would certainly hinder trade between India and the region. Similarly, it would also be detrimental to the interest of Indian companies which have invested in the region. The safety and security of the five million strong Diaspora in the Gulf would be a major challenge for India. Problems would aggravate in the event of a need to evacuate nationals. Given the current state of affairs in Iraq, what should be India's policy towards its relations with Iraq?

Prasanta K. Pradhan replies: Iraq continues to be in a state of fluidity as it is facing regular security challenges with terrorist incidents taking place frequently. India had called back its Ambassador from Baghdad in the wake of American invasion in 2003 but continued to support the reconstruction of the country. As the situation has started improving slowly and the parliamentary elections were held successfully in March 2010, India has decided to resend its envoy to Baghdad. Thus, in the current situation India should continue with the reconstruction efforts in post war Iraq. India has already committed $20 million for assistance to Iraq under the auspices of the UN and another $10 million towards the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) apart from providing training to Iraqi officials under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, providing scholarships and so on. As Iraq is slowly moving towards peace and stability, India should also take more steps to strengthen its ties with Baghdad. In this regard, announcing a new envoy is step in the right direction. Since 2003, high level bilateral visits between the two countries have remained limited. Iraqi Minister of Oil, Hussein Al Sharistani visited India in 2007 and Iraqi Minister of Industry and Minerals Fauzi Franso Hariri visited India in February 2010; while there have been no high level visits from India. It is time for India to look forward in this direction and resume bilateral visits as the situation improves. Similarly, India should look towards putting back on track the bilateral trade between the two countries which was hindered in the aftermath of 2003. In 2010, India imported 15 million tons of crude from Iraq. It would be in Indias interest to continue to ensure unhindered energy supply from Iraq. Thus, Indias policy should aim at restoring the old ties with Iraq which were disrupted due to external intervention and the internal instability. Vikas Kalyani asked: With oil crisis arising, what should India do to reverse the energy crisis & become self sustained in energy requirements & fulfillment? Shebonti Ray Dadwal replies: Apart from the fact that an oil "crisis" is unlikely, the fact remains that prices, and not supply will become the main issue of concern. If we are talking about the oil market per se, India can do little in terms of increasing supply given its limited reserves and growing demand, and it will have to keep importing the same. Apart from diversifying oil import sources from the Middle East region and looking at tying up long term deals with other countries (Africa, Latin America, Russia) to take advantage of preferential pricing in the short term, as well as investing in foreign oil blocks/equity, India should do the following for the medium to long term: 1. Reduce demand by initiating better demand management. 2. Implement recommendations on subsidies on oil pricing to reflect the real price of oil, which in turn can reduce demand. 3. Introduce strict norms for auto industry (which is the largest consumer of oil), in terms of energy efficient technology. 4. Improve and encourage mass transport as against private vehicles. 5. Invest more in R&D to hasten the transition to third generation cellulosic biofuels.

Rajesh Singh asked: In your view is Kazakhstan closer to China or Russia? Meena Singh Roy replies: Kazakhstan follows a "multivector" foreign policy and in recent years its relations with China have been growing. The China-Kazakh partnership is termed "strategic". Kazakhstan remains China's major political and economic partner in the post Soviet era. It is important to China not only because of its energy resources but also with regard to the Uighur question which is an important domestic concern for China. However, in my view despite these growing links with China, Russia remains closer for Kazakhstan. Rajesh Singh asked: Has Kazakhstan been any type of relationship with China before Soviet disintegration? Meena Singh Roy replies: Prior to 1990 relations between two countries were impeded by the generally bad state of Sino-Soviet relations. None of the republics could engage with any foreign country unless it was tacitly approved by Moscow. According to the oral epics of Central Asian people, particularly in case of Kazakh and Kyrgyz, traditionally the Middle Kingdom is presented as the historical enemy of the people of the Steppe and an opponent of Islam's eastward expansion. The diplomatic relations between Kazakhstan and China started only after Kazakhstan's independence. Kumar Gaurav Sonkar asked: Why China is issuing "staple visa" to the citizens of Arunachal Pradesh as well as of Kashmir? Prashant Kr Singh replies: Recently, China has appeared to be revising its three-decade old policy of formal neutrality on the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. In 1960s and 70s, China had supported Kashmirs so-called right to self-determination and armed-rebellion against India. It had even supported Pakistan in its war against India in 1965 and 1971, though this support never crossed verbal limits. However in 1980s, it changed its policy due to combination of factors. It declared that the Kashmir issue was a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan and that they should settle it through peaceful diplomatic methods. Since then, China had followed this policy of formal neutrality on the Kashmir issue, though it continued to intensify its military (including nuclear) cooperation with Pakistan during this period. But now it seems that China wants to revise its policy on Kashmir. In the last few years, China has started issuing loose leaf stapled visas instead of properly stamped ones to the Indian citizens of Jammu and Kashmir.(J&K) Last year, it had denied visa to a General from the Indian Army who was commanding in that region. This implies that China does not recognise Indias sovereignty over J&K. However, China has not made any formal statement to this effect. It has simply conveyed that giving properly stamped visas to the Indian citizens of J&K would amount to Chinese recognition to India's authority on Laddakh which China claims as its own. But China is very subtly asserting disputed status of Kashmir by such actions. It has been observed that in international politics, when a state does not recognize another st ates authority over some territory, it does not issue a proper visa to the residents of that territory. By giving stapled visa to those residents, it registers its protest over the existing status of their citizenship. China has followed the same practice in case of Indian citizens of Arunachal Pradesh which it considers part of its territory.

Bharath Kumar asked: Considering the fact our bridge fell off during CWG without EQ (and Bhopal), I am curious about the safety of nuclear facilities? All good? A. Vinod Kumar replies: It is natural to be curious and concerned about safety of our civil nuclear energy facilities, in the light of the Japanese tragedy. I will also not call it unfair to compare it with the mishaps during the CWG constructions and the Bhopal tragedy. For such events reflect the national culture in constructing and maintaining national assets and how much of commitment and accountability is followed on their establishment. Hence, the worries on nuclear energy facilities are genuine and need to be addressed by the government before we plunge into our contribution to the nuclear energy renaissance. Yet, despite all what we need to be worried about, our nuclear energy infrastructure has been amazingly robust, reliable and durable. A reason why this could be affirmatively claimed is the environment in which the nuclear energy infrastructure came up. The questioner might recall that for most part of our nuclear energy development years, we were at the receiving end of technology control regimes, like the NSG. While proliferation concerns were cited as reason why we were kept outside, besides the fact that we didnt sign the NPT, another inherent element was the questions regarding our ability to safely run the nuclear infrastructure. This was more of a western prejudice on most third world countries. Hence, even when we developed an indigenous nuclear energy infrastructure like Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR), the DAE stressed that we adhere to the best practices and standards of safety. And that culture has been followed as a sacrosanct value ever since. A case in example is the Tsunami onslaught on Kalpakkam in December 2004. Unlike in Fukushima where the power units to run the coolant systems were perilously close to sea, and hence vulnerable to tidal surges, our power units in Kalpakkam are reportedly secured at a height of 15 meters, sufficiently away from the sea. Not many might recall that a whole housing colony for Kalpakkam employees were wiped out by the Tsunami, but yet our reactor and the power units were intact thanks to such measures. Hence, even while we conceive ourselves as a corrupt nation without accountability on national assets and infrastructure, this is one example to show how we might be more progressive then even many western countries on safety and security. Of course, the Bhopal tragedy might have been an eye-opener which our planners took seriously while planning other national assets. That tragedy also very well reflects in our Nuclear Liability Bill in which, much to chagrin of western suppliers, we have made long-term provisions to make even the suppliers accountable to any mishaps in nuclear facilities. Akash asked: Why the revolution in Middle East is called as Jasmine Revolution? What is its impact on India? Sonia Roy replies: The association of Jasmine with the Tunisian Revolution, is media-termed, and a debated concept in Tunisia. One explanation is that Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the second president who had came to in 1987, preferred the term Jasmine Revolution to describe his bloodless coup. This revolution ended with him fleeing the country in January 2011. Another explanation is that is it

named after Tunisias national flower, the Jasmine. The overthrow of President Ben Ali was described within the Tunisian tradition of naming regime change after plants. And a third explanation is that the street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi, who lit himself up and started a chain reaction of political riots in Tunisia, sold incense (jasmine). Strategically speaking, India has by and large remained unaffected by the whole situation in the Middle East. It has adopted the usual wait and watch attitude, and continuing re lations with these states. India has been careful in its diplomacy in not trying to promote democracy but at the same time supporting the aspirations of the people. There is a large Indian expatriate community in West Asia, especially in the Persian Gulf region and is estimated at 5to 5.5 million. Their safety and well-being are vital for India. In the economic arena, Indian industries have suffered from the general unrest in the region and there are indications of slump in economic activities. The spiralling oil prices and fears over supply disruptions are intrinsically linked to the political stability of the West Asian region. Sonia Roy is pursuing research at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Email: soniaroy03@gmail.com Arnab Dasgupta asked: Why Pakistan does not face the same situation in the POK as India does in J&K? Is it only religion that protects it or something else? Priyanka Singh replies: First of all, it is incorrect to assume there are no problems for Pakistan in the PoK (AJK and Gilgit Baltistan). There is simmering unrest in the PoK and a great deal of discontent amongst the people against Pakistan. There are nationalist groups who are demanding independence from Pakistans control over the region. Due to Pakistans deliberate strategy of not allowing these groups to flourish and denying them the right of expression, the leaders of such groups are forced to flee their homeland and operate from outside PoK, majority of them being based in Europe and US. The region has been kept under closed wraps largely beyond the reach of media attention. After the earthquake of 2005 when international relief poured in PoK, the ground realities including the existence of militant training camps were taken note of by the outside world. However, the nature of problems which India faces in J&K is quite different from that of PoK. The biggest of all is the cross border militancy in J&K unleashed by Pakistan for more than two decades. Pakistans role in promoting terrorism against India lies at the core of the problems which the GOI faces in J&K. Popular sentiments resulting from governance issues have at times been tapped and manipulated by Pakistan to sponsor terrorism in J&K. Ethnicity and culture rather than religion bears upon the state of affairs in PoK. The demographic composition of the region has been tampered by Pakistan to reduce the majority of shias into a minority. Sectarian clashes between the people have led to violent incidents thus serving Pakistans purpose behind divisive politics. This has led to further disaffection in PoK gravely hurting the sensitivities of people on culture and origin.

India provides fair democratic processes in J&K which allow dissidence, debate and discourse. In the absence of basic rights and liberties, the possibility of street protests and demonstrations in PoK are far fetched. The political processes in PoK are farce- designed merely to strengthen Pakistans unlawful control on the region. J. Singh asked: Who is more dangerous for India Islamic Terrorism, Hindu Terrorism or Naxal? S. Kalyanraman replies: Naxals pose the more serious challenge to India today because they seem to enjoy a measure of popular support particuarly among the tribal people. Naxals have gained popular support among the tribals because they have taken up the tribal cause and tribal discontent -- tribal peoples in India's heartland feel that they have not adequately benefited from the mineral wealth being extracted from their "land"; and that they have been generally neglected by the government which has not been providing them with governanance and civic amenities; etc. Popular support has enabled Naxals to expand their armed cadre, given them the advantage of operating more freely in tribal-dominated areas and to gather adequate intelligence about the movements of the security forces. If the Naxals manage to consolidate their presence and entrench themselves in these areas, then it will be natural for them to seek to expand the areas under their influence. While it may be too early to say whether the Naxals will be able to expand thus, what can be said with greater assurance is that a Naxal consolidation in tribal areas will prolong the insurgency, militarise the people of the area, and generally hold back the region's and the country's progress. In contrast, neither militant Islamists nor Hindu radicals enjoy any degree of popular support within India, which makes them that much less dangerous. But this is not to discount that they pose a serious security challenge given that they mainly target innocenet civilians in places of worship, markets, suburban trains, hotels, etc. Here, the threat from militant Islamists is more dangerous than that posed by Hindu radicals because militant Islamists are much better organised and trained and linked, going back to the Afghan jihad of the 1980s. India faces a terrorist threat not only from Indian militant Islamists but also from Pakistani militant Islamists. In addition, linkages exist between Indian and Pakistani militant Islamists on one hand and criminal networks like the D-Company on the other. And all these actors have links with the Pakistani Establishment -- Dawood and his lieutenants are based in Karachi and are under Pakistan's protection, the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other anti-India groups continue to enjoy protection in Pakistan, and Indian Islamists receive training in Pakistan and their travel is facilitated by Indian criminal networks. In contrast, Hindu radicals are new to this game, and, under the present circumstances, it appears unlikely that there will be state support or international support for the organisation of a group or groups committed to waging a holy war of any sort. Nor do these groups appear to enjoy any popular support. Raviteja asked: After collapse of USSR in general and after 2000 in particular India moved towards US. Is India moved away from its NAM ideology? Smita Purushottam replies: Once the old ideological divisions had evaporated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, non-alignment itself lost its earlier meaning. Since non-alignment meant that India

refused to participate in the ideologically driven global contest for power blocks and influence between the Soviet and Western blocks, India did not have much of a choice once the contest ended! In this End of History moment, the only relevant elements of continuity were the positions the developing world continued to maintain on important international issues of equity, transfer of resources and also any neo-imperialist ventures mounted by some of the advanced countries, which India continued to oppose. Even in todays shifting geopolitical scenario, India insists that it wishes to preserve strategic autonomy and foreign policy independence and thus refuses to align with any country or power, so in a sense India has not moved away from its NAM ideological moorings. What can be India's contribution towards fighting the global terrorism based on the experience gained so far? Rumel Dahiya replies: The most important contribution that India can make in fighting terrorism globally is propagating the right conceptual framework. Delinking terrorism from religion, terrorism being bad and unacceptable under any pretext like 'root cause', defeating terrorism without putting people to hardship are the ideas that would resonate across the globe. Defeating terrorism at home through synergised efforts of all agencies of the government and cooperation of the people will send the right message to all the countries affected by terrorism. Besides setting an example of how to eliminate terrorism, India could and should cooperate with other countries through information sharing about terror networks, their financing, arms trafficking and cross-border linkages etc. However, it is not advisable to get directly involved in fighting terrorism on foreign soil. Venkat asked: As we are moving close with USA, how are we going to balance our friendship with Russia too. What is India's future foreign policy on this? Smita Purushottam replies: Indias relations with the United States and with Russia do not represent a Kierkegaardian choice, i.e., India is not being forced to choose between one or the other. The United States and Russia are rapidly improving bilateral relations, as can be seen from recent developments - for example the NATO-Russia Council meeting in which both sides agreed that they no longer constituted a threat to each other, and when the U.S. ratified the new START Treaty while leaving Russias superiority in tactical nuclear weapons intact. A leaked Russian foreign ministry policy document which people believe is genuine - clearly delineated that improving ties with the West is a priority for Russia, which seeks to modernize and upgrade its technology and economy in partnership with the West. Therefore there is no contradiction for India, which has excellent relations with both countries, and accordingly, no need for balancing. The only area where closer Indo-US relations could affect Russia is in the field of defence purchases. India needs to modernize its armed forces and equip them with the latest and best defence technologies available in the world so that it can meet modern day challenges. Recent encouraging statements from the United States which have indicated lifting of restrictions on high technology exports to India and also that India could participate in the joint strike fighter programme are huge

departures from the traditional American stand and could make America a very attractive partner. Meanwhile, India also has to weigh the record in terms of its tried and tested cooperation with Russia. Russia has always been a steady and assured supplier in times of war and crisis and any decision that the government takes will obviously take all these elements into consideration. Moreover, India and Russia are taking steps to rejuvenate technological cooperation in their defence partnership. Elements of cooperation and competition will have to be handled maturely by all sides while India will have to take decisions based on its long term national interest. Vilas Naik asked: Why is fundamentalism and extremism growing in all parts of the world? Rumel Dahiya replies: Let us first understand what is fundamentalism? In the context of monotheism fundamentalism is the type of religious behaviour that takes a central religious text and places in such a holy, sacred place that it becomes considered infallible and from Godrather than from man . Fundamentalists take the tenets of their religion so seriously that earthly evidence will not dissuade them from their religious views, and morality itself pales in comparison to what they think God's will is. Fundamentalism is often seen as violent, intolerant, stubbornly backwards, sometimes inhuman, godly and sectarian. These traits arise because the 'fundamentals' of a religion are held to be those morals, behaviours and beliefs held by the earliest followers, hence, fundamentalist ideas tend to clash with modern society and modern morality. The link here (http://www.vexen.co.uk/religion/fundamentalism.html) will explain some of the reasons for rising trend of fundamentalism and extremism. However, it is mainly a leftist view and may not be universally acceptable. To my mind this phenomenon is neither new nor confined to one religion. Its shades are found in all religions and at various times. Primarily it is the result of intra-religion exercise of social and political power. Some people are of the opinion that fundamentalism will ultimately fail. For a brief discussion seehttp://haystackcommentary.wordpress.com/2009/11/10/why-fundamentalism-will-fail/. However, it is a powerful narrative and likely to sustain itself despite ebbs and flow in its practice. Vilas Naik asked: Does Rule of Law exist in Indian India? Rumel Dahiya replies: In legal terms there are three theoretical concepts of Rule of Law viz; Rule according to law; rule under law; or rule according to a higher law (meaning law based on universal principle of fairness, justice and equality). The rule of law requires the government to exercise its power in accordance with well-established and clearly written rules, regulations, and legal principles. This implies that there must be laws that govern and regulate legal, social and economic behaviour of individuals and are equally applicable to all irrespective of their social standing, political clout or material condition. The laws must be framed in an unambiguous terms and notified for every citizen to know about and understand them. In this respect, Indian laws are fairly comprehensive and modern. The problem is in implementation. The rule of law also requires the government to exercise its authority under the law. This requirement is sometimes explained with the phrase "no one is above the law." It is here that India measures poorly. In theory the laws are universally applicable. In practice, however, some people escape the provisions of law. They are more equal than others in this respect. The role of regulatory

law enforcement agencies leave much to be desired. Occasional judicial activism and civil society pressure result in cases being taken up but slow judicial process and weakness of prosecution mechanisms results in influential people walking away free. On the other hand, some innocents or those accused of minor infringements of law are treated unfairly. A conundrum is presented when the government acts in strict accordance with well-established and clearly defined legal rules and still produces a result that many observers consider unfair or unjust. All written laws must conform with universal principles of morality, fairness, and justice. In this respect one can say that our laws are fairly egalitarian and liberal and are by and large framed in modern context. However, the administrative practices make a mockery of the moral interpretation of law. The discretionary powers with the political masters and the bureaucracy is most often exercised in a manner that the disadvantaged are still more disadvantaged and those with influence benefit at the cost of others. The only remedy lies in people demanding their rights more forcefully. The following links will make the issue clearer still. http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Rule+of+law; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_of_law Anil Prithvi asked: What are the English Journals with IDSA published in China? G C K Rai replies: We are getting following journals published in China:

Beijing Review China and World Economy China Economic News China Perspectives China Review Chinese Journal of International Politics Issues and Studies

Maitrayee asked: Can South Asia be called an independent geostrategic zone? Smruti Pattanaik replies: South Asia cannot be called independent geo-strategic zone. Countries of the region have different security and strategic outlook. These are governed by geographical location of each of the countries of the region and state of their economic health impinges on the way that these countries look at various strategic issues. Source of their threat perceptions are not confined to its geo-strategic space of South Asia, it is rather transnational. South Asia also does not act as a coherent geographical entity. For that matter no region can be called an independent geo-strategic zone. Politically and strategically it cannot be called as an independent geo-strategic zone. Countries of South Asia do not share a common strategic and security vision. There are two important countries i.e. US and China are deeply involved in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Chinese close defence tie with Pakistan is also aimed at India. Most of the countries have different perceptions on the role of US and China in this region.

In a globalizing world, independent geo-strategic zone are neither possible nor viable. Interests of the countries are overlapping and they have to pursue an overarching policy that takes into consideration dynamics of international politics. Bharath asked: How about a website for RAW and can we recruit more people from outside UPSC route? we got to change Rana Banerji replies: Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW)was not conceived as a Central Police Organisation. Initially, in-house slotting of IPS officers from within IB was done, partly on the basis of options and partly, by screening. The old boys network played its role in who joined or who got left behind. Recruitment to the Research & Analysis cadre (RAS) - began in 1971. Several lateral entrants got absorbed in this service in the first flush- from 1971 to 1977 -through an elaborately framed system of written examinations followed by personality and psychological test and interviews. A second phase of direct recruitment was taken up from 1985, through examinations and interviews for the first two years directly and then, from 1987 through the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). This continued till 1992. A combination of deputation from the IPS and other Central Services as well as direct recruitment through the UPSC continues to be the method of recruitment to R&AW till date. However, this practice has suffered from the tail-end syndrome in recent times. Only those at the bottom of the entrance lists, who get allotted to the not so popular, challenging or glamorous civil services are offered for interview and personality tests before the screening board set up for the purpose. The quality of these candidates is not always up to the mark. Many of the candidates finally selected do not join, preferring to remain with their parent services already assigned instead of opting for further training or language assignation, which follows selection to the R&AW. It is recommended that direct recruitment through the Union Public Service Commission, after a written examination and interviews be adopted as the method of recruitment to intelligence organizations as is now done in most advanced countries in the West. Rigorous security vetting is undertaken before final selection. With regards to the issue of a website - the mindset in most intelligence agencies in India is overwhelmingly security and secrecy centric. So unless there is a political decision in this regard, official websites are a far cry at present Venkat replies: Do India have any proposal regarding kashmir issue? Against Musharraf's proposals of 'demilitarization' and 'self-rule' Arpita Anant replies: Musharrafs four-point formula which was articulated in 2006 suggested that there would be no change in boundaries while allowing for free movement of people across the LoC; a phased withdrawal of troops; self-governance or autonomy for the region; and a joint supervision mechanism involving India, Pakistan and Kashmir. While there were some indications that the two

countries were close to an agreement on these proposals, no concrete agreement could be reached. In the meantime, in 2008 a democratically elected Government of Pakistan came to the helm of affairs. Shortly thereafter, talks between India and Pakistan stopped in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in November 2008. An attempt to resume these talks was made in 2010 with the visit of the Home Minister P. Chidambaram to Pakistan, followed by the meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries in July 2010. However, on 30 June 2010 Pakistans Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi clearly stated that Musharrafs four-point formula was his thinking had not been endorsed by the Parliament or Cabinet. Since the formula was thus rejected by the democratic government in Pakistan, an Indian response to it is not necessary. Moreover, any proposal regarding the Kashmir issue is also unlikely to be articulated unless the trust deficit between the two countries is bridged. J. Singh asked: What's the relation between China and Indonesia? Is it against India? Joe Thomas Karackattu replies: Last year marked the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between Indonesia and China. While the trivia on the history of bilateral ties can be found online in open-sources, the moot point is the tension, bordering on xenophobia in the past, between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians in Indonesian society, polity and the economy. This persecution could be traced to Suhartos coming to power in 1965 and lasted for close to three decades. It was only with Suhartos ouster from power in 1998 that free elections were held in Indonesia and the new President (Abdurrahman Wahid) relaxed the restrictions on ethnic Chinese (and celebration of their cultural festivals). The period of violence and discrimination described earlier was mirrored in the cold ties between China and Indonesia. Bilateral ties improved in the 1990s, driven by the thrust of Chinas rise as an economic engine for the region. Bilateral trade crossed the $30 billion mark last year (China is the second largest trading partner of Indonesia, after Japan). Despite the economic push to normalization of ties, the South China Sea territorial disputes remain an outstanding issue of concern between Indonesia and China. Indonesia has preferred to use a hedge strategy by its relationship with the United States (recall Obamas stop after India was Indonesia), and its participation in ASEAN, actively. India and Indonesia are both democracies, with deep historic ties. Recall that in 1947, Sutan Sjahrir (founding father of Indonesia) was flown in to attend the conference of Asian nations in Delhi by Pt Nehru in support of the Indonesian freedom struggle (against the Dutch). Both countries are key economic players in their respective regions (India is the bigger economy, of course). Ideologically and culturally Indonesians remain closer to India than China. Despite some military-level ties, one would be stretching ones reasoning and analyses too far if Chinas engagement with Indon esia is read as being targeted against India. All three countries have larger development issues to worry about. J. Singh asked: Which country is valuable for India if we are in war with China and why?

R. N. Das replies: Envisioning a war or a war-like situation with China, even though the two countries fought a war in 1962, and though there have been tensions and instances of border-incursions from time to time, is a hypothetical position. In fact, there was almost a war-like situation in 1986 in Sumdorong Chu incident, but it didnt precipitate into a war. For about 48 years now, the situation across the Sino-Indian border has not been allowed to precipitate to the brink of a war. Both India and China have claimed peace and tranquility across the line of actual control in the border. There have also been a number of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in various agreements signed between India and China, such as in 1993, 1996 and 2005, to meet any kind of situation and these CBMs have been working reasonably well. Besides, there have been meetings between the special representatives of the two countries to address the border issue, and there has been considerable progress in these meetings. There has also been constant engagement between leaders of the two countries, both bilaterally and multi-laterally. A hot line telephone connection is also being put in place to enable contact at highest political level. These engagements attempt to obviate any kind of acrimonious situations between the two countries, and minimizes the chances of a war breaking out between the two countries. In spite of all these CBMs, there is no laxity in defence preparedness to face any kind of challenge to Indias territorial integrity, security, and sovereignty from any quarter, including China. In addition, Indias diplomatic and strategic engagement with global powers has been strengthened to meet challenges to regional stability and Indias security and sovereignty. India today is not the India of 1960s, and has sufficient self-confidence and wherewithal to deal with any threat to its security on its own. Are there any Private military and security companies in India? If no, why? Ali Ahmed replies: There are companies in India offering military relevant services and others providing security. The latter are more visible and much in demand after 26/11. The former are fewer as they are catering to a narrower more specialised field. Nevertheless, they have figured in areas such as demining in Sri Lanka. Their profile is lower than similar companies in the US for instance, since India has the necessary military and paramilitary wherewihal in the state sector to provide the military related services, be it in terms of planning, management, logistics, consultation, maintenance, security etc. The profile of companies such as Xe Services etc is higher due to the outsourcing of many military relevant services to them by the US in the GWOT. This was done to reduce the visibility as a target of the US military and to reduce pressures and expenses on the US military. These companies hire an international staff. Indians also work for these companies. These companies undertake tasks such as logistics, maintaining bases, provisioning dining facilities and even protection of assets. They have come under controversy, especially where they have had to open fire. They blur the distinction between combatant and non-combatant and occupy questionable status in domestic law of the host country. Some dubious companies have been known to undertake politically sensitive missions earlier in the African continent. The case is India is considerably different and in prosecution of wars or internal security India would not depend on such companies. Also see http://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds_4_4_rkbhonsle.pdf (p. 54) D.C. Sekhar asked: Has India signed up for CSI ? Which Indian ports, any implementation schedule?

Sarabjeet Parmar replies: India has not signed up CSI. There are two areas of concern. Firstly the possible clash of jurisdiction as CSI requires US officials to be posted to CSI compliant ports. Secondly it is felt that the presence of US officials would affect the sovereignty of the nation. As per the initial plans JNPT has been selected for installation of CSI related equipment as a pilot project for further replication in other ports. The selection of JNPT was based on the fact that it caters for movement of 58% of India's outbound container traffic. Only 14% of the outbound containers are bound for the US. Some issues under deliberation with the US are:

The local government would have jurisdiction. Security rules of the local government would have to be followed. Indian personnel would carry out the pre-screening. US officials will not operate the facility but will only have access to findings. Pre-screening of containers by US officials would have to be requested for. Details such as container number, bill of lading etc would have to be submitted. Posting of Indian officials at US ports as a reciprocal gesture. Presently only Japan and Canada have their officials posted at US ports. An advantage India stands to gain is that the same equipment can be used to screen incoming containers as is being done in non US CSI compliant ports. Yoginder Rangi asked: Tell me the books related to China influence in South Asia and Indian national security? G C K Rai replies: 1. Dittmer, Lowell (ed) & Yu, George T (ed): China, the developing world, and the new global dynamic. Boulder. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2010. 2. Ramesh, Jairam: Making sense of Chindia. [reflections on China and India] New Delhi. India Research Press, 2005. 3. Dittmer, Lowell (ed.): South Asia's nuclear security dilemma. [India, Pakistan, and China] Armonk. M. E. Sharpe, 2005. 4. Acharya, Amitav & Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS): Seeking security in The Dragon's shadow. [China and Southeast Asia in the emerging Asian order] Singapore. Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), 2003. 5. Singhai Institute for International Studies: China and Asia's security. Singapore. Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005. 6. Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research: Balance of power in South Asia. Abu Dhabi. Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2000.

7. Leong, Ho Khai (ed.) & Ku, Samuel C Y (ed.): China and Southeast Asia. [global changes and regional challenges] Singapore. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005. 8. Keller, William W (ed) & Rawski, Thomas G (ed): China's rise and the balance of influence in Asia. Pittsburgh. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007. 9. Goh, Evelyn (ed) & Simon, Sheldon W (ed): China, the United States and Southeast Asia. [contending perspectives on politics security and economics] London. Routledge, 2008. 10. Beller-Hann, Ildiko (ed), Cesaro, M Cristina (ed), Harris, Rachel (ed) & Finley, Joanne Smith (ed): Situating the uyghurs between China and Central Asia. Hampshire. Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007. 11. Sengupta, Anita: Russia, China and multilateralism in Central Asia. Delhi. Shipra, 2005. 12. Sutter, Robert G: China's rise in Asia. [promises and perils] Lanham. Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. Neha Jha asked: I wanted to know about Armed Forces Special Powers Act Ali Ahmed replies: The AFSPA was based on a colonial era law enacted to face down the Quit India movement in 1942. Its immediate precedents were two similar Acts for East Punjab and Bengal in 1947 to come to grips with the Partition riots. Thereafter, to control the Naga insurgency that had broken out in the mid fifties, the Act was promulgated in September 1958 for operation in Assam and Manipur. It has since been enacted for Tripura in 1970, Manipur in 1980, Punjab in 1983 and J&K in 1990. The Act envisages the following powers for the military (Sections 4, 5) when employed in areas declared disturbed under Section 3 of the Act: 4. Special Powers of the armed forces Any commissioned officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer or any other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces may, in a disturbed area,(a) if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of public order, after giving such due warning as he may consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing of death, against any person who is acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being in force; (b) destroy any arms dump, prepared or fortified position or shelter; (c) arrest, without warrant, any person who has committed a cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists; (d) enter and search without warrant

The Act has been under scan for long. Writ Petitions which were filed in 1980 challenging the Central Act as well as the State Act were dismissed by the Delhi High Court. The Central Act was held to be not violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Courts verdict in the case dating to 1988 of Naga Peoples Movement of Human Rights vs Union of India, was essentially that Parliament was competent to enact the Central Act. However, the BP Jeevan Reddy committee examining it in relation to the North East in 2005 and the Veerappa Moily report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission of 2006 (Fifth Report), asked that the Act be repealed. The latter recommended that the substitute chapter for insertion into the UAPA suggested by the BP Jeevan Reddy Committee be applicable only for the North East, thereby defeating the intent of the BP Jeevan Reddy Committee. It came under intense critical scrutiny in 2004 with the custodial death of a Manipuri woman, Thangjam Manorama Devi, accused of being an underground operative. The Act has been under focus in J&K with the government favouring reframing of its application. Consequently, the Central government is in the midst of an exercise to rethink the Act. This could be through repealing it, refining the Act in a more humane manner or by incorporating its provisions in a diluted form in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008. The Ministry of Home Affairs had asked for comments from the Ministry of Defence. The MOD has reportedly asked for maintaining the Act in its current form. The issue was discussed in the meeting on the Cabinet Committee on Security. The Army and Air Chiefs have publicly made their position clear on retaining the Act and its provisions. The current status is one of status quo. Bharath Kumar asked: Will India increase its focus on other countries too or is it just happy with Pakistan and China? Rumel Dahiya replies: The question perhaps, points to the several discourses that takes place in strategic circles and in the press, about two of our neighbours, Pakistan and China. This also implies that India is less concerned with other countries including its other neighbouring countries. It is true that China and Pakistan are often in news in India and mostly for wrong reasons. That is only to be expected because Pakistan has always treated India as an adversary and has abetted terrorism against it. People in India are concerned about security implications of Pakistan's continuing intransigence while at the same time commonality of culture keeps their interest alive in knowing about happenings in that country. China became our largest immediate neighbour after it occupied Tibet. China and India have fought a war, have an unresolved boundary dispute besides few other serious differences on substantive issue. Yet the economic relations between the two countries are very robust. The combination of security and geopolitical concerns and expanding economic relations make it incumbent on India's part to know much more about China than what it knows so far. As China's Ambassador to India said on 13 December, India-China relations are fragile. They are indeed so because China is perceived to be least sensitive to India's concerns and being an authoritarian state and a closed society its intentions appear to be suspicious. In a way, India is forced to spend quite a lot of its diplomatic energy and military focus on current threat and/or future challenge that these countries present. However, many other countries like the USA, Russia, Iran, UK, Japan, ASEAN countries, Afghanistan,

Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh receive fair amount of attention in government, media and think tank circles. It is true that the focus shifts from time to time, based on events and their seriousness, both positive or negative. While Sri Lanka received greater attention in the strategic community during 2007 and 2008, nowadays Afghanistan and Nepal are rarely out of focus. USA also is very much part of the discourse because of the importance of the relationship between the two countries. Besides specific countries, regional and global issues are often of vital importance to India. Bharath Kumar asked: How is the indigenisation of defence production going on? Laxman Kumar Behera replies: Indias tryst with indigenisation of defence production has so far not yielded the desired result. This is reflected in the countrys huge arms import which runs into billion of dollars every year. According to US Congressional Research Service (CRS), India ranks third among the developing country, with total arms import valued at US$ 14.2 billion between 2002 and 2009. The heavy import dependency, which is now around 70 per cent, has promoted the Union Defence Minister to describe it as shameful and dangerous, Notwithstanding, the low level of indigenisation the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has taken several key measures, to revitalise the domestic defence industry. Through continuous revision of procurement procedures, the MoD has created more opportunity for the domestic industry to supply various items to the armed forces. Since 2001, the MoD has allowed the domestic private sector to participate fully in defence production. It is expected that the various reform measures taken so far and the on-going debate on initiating more reform measures, such as those pertaining to FDI in defence industry and creation of certain Champions in the domain of private sector, etc, will bear fruit in the coming years. Santosh Kumar asked: How did Obama's trip benefit India? Did this trip help in softening Obama's stand on outsourcing? Cherian Samuel replies: President Obamas visit afforded both tangible and intangible benefits to India. The tangible benefits, amongst others, included US backing for Indias quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and the removal of curbs on Indian defence and space related organisations from collaborating with their American counter-parts. The intangible benefits of the visit included the restoration of India-US relations to an even keel after a distinct cooling of relations between the two countries as the Obama Administration struggled to bring out its own distinct imprint on US foreign policy through initiatives such as the Af-Pak policy and the still-born G2 concept which envisaged close co-operation between the United States and China on global and regional issues. The wheel has now come full circle with President Obamas speech to the joint session of the Indian Parliament carrying forward the framework of partnership laid out in the Strategic Partnership Document of 2005. Obamas stand on outsourcing is partly the outcome of the fact that crucial support to the Democratic Party comes from the middle class and the trade unions, constituencies that have been badly affected by the Global Recession. With the US unemployment rate more than doubling from 4.4% in 2008(May) to 10.6% in 2010(Jan), the attacks against outsourcing have only grown shriller,

and the political class has had to respond with more than rhetoric and passed legislation largely affecting Indian outsourcing companies. With the end of mid-term state and national elections, President Obama took the first step to tone down the rhetoric in interactions in Mumbai and Delhi. Prime Minister Singh also took the opportunity to speak to an American audience during the joint press conference where he resolutely declared that Indians were not in the business of stealing American jobs. Whilst outsourcing will continue to be a thorny issue, both countries will have to find the middle path between the American view that outsourcing is a minor issue that should have limited place in discussions, and the reality in India of the outsourcing industry having acquired iconic status through catapulting India into its current position as an IT superpower, and the human element of increasing harassment of Indians workers in the United States through the new legislation and stricter enforcement of existing rules. Rahul Saini asked: Has India formulated any firm response to Chinese ASAT test? Ajey Lele: No. In India in recent past only one statement related with ASAT was made by the DRDOs Director General V K Saraswat on the sidelines of the 97th Indian Science Congress during Jan 2010. He is reported to have mentioned that "India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralise enemy satellites". However, no further details in this regard are known. Rahul Saini asked: Do you think that China's ASAT technology has enough teeth to cause tangible threat to Indian space based assets? Ajey Lele: On Jan 11, 2007 China has successfully demonstrated KKV (kinetic kill vehicle) technology as a part of its ASAT capability. It has also been reported that they have covertly developed and successfully test the jamming technologies which could be used for temporality or permanent jamming of enemy satellites. Also, there are unconfirmed reports about China having developed 'Parasitic satellite' which could be modified as space mines. Rahul Saini asked: Do you think that India should develop its ASAT capability to respond to Chinese ASAT test? Ajey Lele replies: Yes. Any ASAT test by India on the similar lines to the January 11, 2007 Chinese ASAT test is not advisable. What India could do probably is to conduct a test in the low altitudes (say around 150 to 250km above the earths surface, China conducted the test at 850km giving rise to huge amount of space debris dangerous for the health of other satellites) to avoid the problem of space debris. India could also invest into satellite jamming technologies. May I know why Indian government is unable to reform the Intelligence infrastructure, the way institutions work,the way of recruiting, etc Rana Banerji replies: This query begs greater elaboration however to put its simply three conditions conspire to thwart reform: conflicting motivations in those considering it, environmental challenges at initiation and failures of leadership. Any quest for meaningful reform in the intelligence machinery would then necessarily bring up issues uncomfortable to the Intelligence Establishment in the

country; such as whether it should remain the preserve of the Indian Police Service , whether recruitment and lateral intake policies should not be developed to take a look at the immense cross cultural talent available of political analysts, legal experts, linguists, financial wizards, social scientists , journalists and domain specialists who could be roped in to provide valued inputs based on acuity , ingenuity and contextualized insights of their own experience and wisdom ? For a world-class intelligence set-up to meet India s requirements as a global power, we need to equip our intelligence agencies to cope with these requirements. While the main role of intelligence collection will remain focused on collection of inputs (operations), compilation and assessment (analysis) but the kind of intelligence needed and the speed in obtaining it would be crucial. One of the questions that may need to be asked whether some of these requirements are better met or left to exclusive domain of Line Departments - e.g. Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) or Economic Offences Wing (EOW) under Ministry of Finance, Department of Science & Technology, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) ? Alternatively, if they want to attend to these tasks themselves, the question may well be posed whether their specialists have the requisite training or aptitude to handle this type of work? There is clearly, a growing perception in the media and amongst a widening spectrum of intellectuals and academics engaged in the study of national security related issues that a rigid and stodgy bureaucracy may have stood in the way of developing or enhancing desired core competence in the field of intelligence instead of using imaginative , unconventional approaches to fight against a natural inclination not to risk or gamble , yet equip and improve capacities to meet new threats as India copes with its emerging responsibilities as a global power. Arunoday Bajpai asked: In near future, what kind of security threat China poses before India? Prashant Kumar Singh replies: India does not perceive any immediate threat in terms of an attack from China. Presently though, China is engaged in infrastructural intimidation on the border and assertion of its claim over many Indian territories. In the security field, we see a growing Chinese presence around India. Its provocative military presence in Pak-Occupied-Kashmir is the latest example in this regard. India also has immediate concerns regarding use of disruptive technologies by China which may impinge on our cyber and space security. Besides, India suspects that China is using Pakistan as proxy to implement some of its own strategic designs against India. It is debatable whether China has succeeded in undermining Indias interests and reducing its global and regional influence? Chinas opposition to NSG waiver to India, its ambiguous stand on Indias entry into the UNSC, its earlier reservation about Indias entry into East Asia Summit and its opposition to ADB loan for a project in Arunachal Pradesh in India, its claim over entire Arunachal Pradesh in last couple of years and its decision to issue stapled visas to Indian citizens of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) all are pointers towards its intention to do so. The current war of nerves between India and China will remain limited only to diplomatic domain in the short-term. However, India needs to be extremely cautious in dealing with China.

Rahul Saini asked: What is the probability of China attacking India in near future? R. N. Das replies: The question is asked at a time when the both India and China are actively engaging and there is a political understanding between the two Prime Ministers to resolve all the difficult issues including the border dispute which continues to be the constant source irritation between the two countries. Going to war is not an easy option when even the big powers, nay, the one and only super power is trapped in a quagmire in Afghanistan and is desperately trying to wriggle out. In todays globalised world, China and India are mutually interdependent. It would be imprudent on part of China to think of a war against India.. Having said this I must hasten to add that there should not be any complacency about our defence preparedness to face any kind of challenge. War can take different form in modern times besides conventional and nuclear war, there can be cyberwar, and economic war also. India needs to be prepared in all these fronts to face with any kind of eventuality. Despite the prevailing threat perceptions emanating from China, the two states are closely working on confidence-building measures, and there is increasing political engagement at the highest level. Kovid Kumar asked: Why should not we encourage to our private sector to defence production rather than we enhancing our dependence on foreign industries? Laxman Kumar Behera replies: The government has in fact taken several measures to bring in the private sector and encourage them in defence production. In 2001, the government liberalised the defence industry, by allowing up to100 per cent participation by private companies in defence production and also allowed foreign direct investment up to 26 per cent. In DPP-2006, the Ministry of Defence introduced an offset policy to leverage Indias huge arms imports towards strengthening domestic industrial capability. In addition, the government has tried to revise its procurement procedures to create more space for the domestic companies to participate in defence production. The Make category and the recently announced Buy and Make (Indian) provide significant scope for domestic industry, including the private sector, in assuming the role of big system integrator. Although the government has so far tried its best to involve the private sector in defence industry, there are still few areas of concern that limit its greater involvement in defence production. These concerns are mainly in the form of governments favouritism towards its own enterprises, limited scope for attracting foreign technology, and government reluctance in announcing Raksha Udyog Ratnas (RURs). These concerns need to be addressed so as to create a vibrant defence industry in India, which could lead to higher self-reliance in defence production. Ganesh asked: What would be the status of India in restructuring Afghanistan after departure of NATO? Vishal Chandra replies: The US and NATO are likely to remain engaged in Afghanistan for years to come. I do not foresee complete withdrawal of American forces anytime soon. Even if the Obama Administration sticks to the July 2011 time frame, the withdrawal of American troops will still be a long drawn affair. Similarly, most of the European countries may pull out bulk of their troops in the next 2-3 years, but that would be no affirmation of West departing from the region. They are likely

to maintain minimal number of troops inside Afghanistan in support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the Afghan government. The pace of withdrawal will also depend on the ground situation in Afghanistan; threat perceptions among the Western countries; and the preparedness of the ANSF. Transfer of security responsibilities to the ANSF itself will take at least 4-5 years or even more. Both the US and NATO will have to fund and provide mentors and trainers for the ANSF for years to come. As for the Indian presence, much will depend on the security situation in Afghanistan, the strength of the Afghan government, and how Washington and Islamabad reconcile to each others interests. India is likely to continue with its reconstruction assistance to the Afghan people and government to the extent possible. As a neighbouring country, India is expected to take a long-term view of the Afghan situation. The current policy may not be sustainable if the West fails to manage and stabilize the Afghan situation. India response will thus depend on the situation as it evolves on either sides of the Durand Line. In all circumstances, Indian response and policy towards Afghanistan must factor in the views and perceptions of various sections of the Afghan people. India has to be patient and cautious in its response. Any misadventure will prove counter-productive and further work to the advantage of forces inimical to the Indian interests. Ganesh asked: Why India is not taking stringent actions against Pakistan in 26/11 case as it already proved Pakistan the culprit before international community? Ali Ahmed replies: The assumption in this reply is that 'stringent action' referred to in the question implies 'military action'. Other action available being diplomatic contact with the Pakistani authorities to facilitate the judicial process. In this context, periodic news on the exchange of folders, enquiries from the Pakistani side etc is released. A couple of serving ISI military officials have been identified as part of the conspiracy. The issue has been raised with the Pakistanis on several occasions of direct contact with the at all levels including during the meetings of the PMs, the foreign ministers, foreign secretaries and the home minister. The US has also expressed its concerns to Pakistan, testifying to the fact that our diplomacy is multipronged. In so far as more 'stringent action' is concerned, it is not being contemplated upon now and for good reasons. The judicial system in Pakistan is siezed of the case against those handlers arrested and would proceed at its own pace. Additional action that the Pakistani state can and should take such as against the infrastructure of terror and those inspiring and sustaining terror networks of LeT and the JM is being impressed on Pakistan. It would require to be prevailed upon through persuasion and argument of not only India, but also its friends such as the US. The Pakistani state may take such action in case the nexus identified between the anti India groups and the TTP and Al Qaeda deepens to threaten the Pakistani state itself. The argument the international community has been making is that it is in Pakistani interest to roll back the infrastructure of terror before it threatens the Pakistani state. Therefore, other alternatives require to be tried out more exhaustively, before 'stringent action' in terms of military action is contemplated or executed. In any case, military action cannot now be proceeded with in respect of 26/11. In case military action were to be taken, it would set off an unpredictable series of events within Pakistan that could jeopardise not only that state but also the international community's

efforts in Afghanistan. However, in case another 26/11 were to occur, then that option is a serious possibility. Santosh Kumar asked: What is your opinion regarding the handling of ongoing Kashmir crises by the central government? Rumel Dahiya replies: That the ongoing crisis in J&K has been badly mishandled needs no emphasis. In the first place, after the insurgency was brought under control by the security forces the political initiative should have had ensured that complete normalcy returned to J&K. The fact that vested interests were keen on creating trouble should have been clear from the way the Amarnath agitation was launched and conducted. An alert and responsive administration would have taken proactive steps in applying healing touch and by providing good governance. After one of the most peaceful and free state elections the leadership was 'appointed' on considerations other than political acumen and administrative ability. A state suffering from decades of misgovernance and scars of terrorism needs very careful and adept handling. The Chief Minister is obviously unable to connect with the people. That the leader was chosen and persisted with the consent of the ruling party at the Centre makes the Centre guilty of mishandling of the situation. Secondly, scores of deaths of young agitators should have been avoided by using non-lethal means of crowd control, which was not even attempted. The state police, under whose control CRPF also functions, had no clear political direction. Senior police officers were not seen to be involved in handling the agitating crowds. The agent provocateurs were neither identified nor arrested by the state or the central intelligence agencies. Thirdly, creating a political consensus is the first and most basic requirement for solving a political problem. Sending an all party delegation to J&K was a good idea which came too late and its programme was not planned properly and in any case, there was no consensus on its mission and role. The government has taken weeks to appoint the interlocutors and there is no way of knowing what mission has been assigned to them. There is also no clarity on the Centre's vision for resolving the crisis. It is perhaps hoped that the agitation will peter out after the Commonwealth games and US President's visit in early November but that hope is bound to be belied sooner than later. It is not safe to conclude that the people themselves will start opposing know that the government will come out with another financial package,when placed under sufficient pressure, in the name of compensating those who have suffered the economic consequences and for the families who have lost members to police firing. The crisis of this nature needs comprehensive set of measures. The first among those measures is to provide for a responsive and politically savvy leadership. Kovid Kumar asked: What are the reason our policy maker not thinking to abolish article 370? Arpita Anant replies: First, an important clarification, a constitutional provision cannot be abolished, it has to be amended or repealed, for which there is a procedure to be followed. The complexity relating to Article 370 requires greater appreciation. When instituted, Article 370 gave a Constitutional recognition to the letter and spirit of the Instrument of Accession, which was mainly regarding autonomy. Thus, Article 370 (1) (2) (3) governs the relationship between the Centre and the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Simplistically, the first clause of the Article relates to power sharing between the Centre and the State, while the second and third clauses pertain to the role of

the states Constituent Assembly in accepting the applicability of the Indian Constitution. The exceptions and modifications with regard to applicability of the Indian Constitution to the State are further detailed in the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1954. Since the adoption of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir in 1956 by the Constituent Assembly of the State, which vide Article 3 clearly lays down that it is an integral part of India, the latter two clauses of the Article could have been repealed, as also the part regarding it being a temporary, transitional and special provision under Part XXI of the Indian Constitution. This was not done. Then over the years, several changes and amendments were made to the Constitutional Order of 1954, to clearly define the relationship between Centre and the State. These are also an integral part of Article 370 and are spelt out in Appendix I and II of the Constitution of India. It is argued that several of these amendments have diluted the autonomy of the State. So at the present juncture, a full repeal of the Article may not be possible. An amendment to reflect the actual situation on the ground is desirable. However, even this requires political consensus, which appears elusive. M.Vivek asked: What was the impact of China's labour unrest on trade relations with countries who's firms had to shut shop? Smita Purushottam replies: While it is not always possible to establish a direct relationship or causality between domestic labour unrest/ firm bankruptcy - and bilateral trade relations, hugely competitive Chinese exports can and have hurt importing countries economies by contributing to medium/long term redundancy among the latters firms. Paul Krugman, a Noble prize winning economist, has called for revaluing the Chinese currency in order to redress some of the imbalance. Recent waves of labour unrest in China, including strikes in foreign invested enterprises such as the Japanese Honda company and the Taiwanese Hon Hai enterprise (which also witnessed multiple suicides due to poor labour conditions), have contributed to a revision in wages in many parts of China, particularly in the coastal, more developed regions. However it may be premature to jump to conclusions regarding the impact of rising wages on Chinas export juggernaut. In fact Chinas exports and trade surplus have continued to rise at a very fast clip in July this year. The trade surplus dipped in August as imports rose by 35.2% over the year before, indicating improvement in domestic demand (domestic demand being generally expected to strengthen when the currency appreciates and domestic wages rise, and there has been marginal appreciation in both in China), but exports also rose, though at 34.4% - at a marginally lower rate than imports. Also, Michael Porters theory of competitive advantage should be kept in mind. He says that higher wages may simply reflect higher productivity, which translates into rising exports. This explains Germanys success as an exporting country, despite its labour force being paid some of the highest wages on the planet. German products, which embody high technology, and which require an educated and well paid workforce to produce them, continue to command a high premium in export

markets. If China is following a high-technology path leading to rising Chinese exports in this segment - trade frictions resulting from bankruptcies in importing countries need not be a phenomenon of the past. Todays headlines in the Wall Street Journal http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870484710457553213155091774... clearly indicate that China is competing with western firms in the high tech sector. Economist Intelligence Unit annual trade figures for China: 2009 Exports of goods fob (US$ bn) Imports of goods fob (US$ bn) Current-account balance (US$ bn) TOTAL 2158.1 (Actual) 1,203.8 1,506.1 954.3 1,306.6 272.5 2010 (EIU estimate)

297.1 2812.7

Partha Sarathy asked: Why did the Central Government remain silent during Manipur-Nagaland crisis involving muivah's visit to his village in Manipur? Namrata Goswami replies: Muivah's visit to his village in Manipur was not going to be a smooth affair; that was known to all parties involved, be it the Central government or the concerned states for three obvious reasons. First, the territorial discourse of the NSCN (IM) on Naga unification, which includes areas of Manipur is not supported by the Meiteis in Manipur. Second, Muivah's visit would have polarised the Nagas and the Meiteis even further politically. Third, vested political interests within Manipur would have hoped to gain political mileage by resisting Muivah's visit. In this context, the Central government after clearing Muivah's visit remained silent since it became a issue between Manipur and Nagaland. It must be stated that both the Manipur Chief Minister, Ibobi Singh and the Nagaland Chief Minister, Nipheu Rio, when consulted by the Central government about Muivah's intended visit to his village did not raise objections in Delhi. Only after Ibobi Singh reached Manipur did he raise objections to Muivah's visit based on the political climate in the Imphal valley. The Centre should have however intervened when the economic blocade of Manipur by Naga groups were imposed for nearly two months. Blockade of national highways is unconstitutional and must not be tolerated at any cost. Is China's aggressive buildup at borders / Indian ocean a tact to provoke India into doing the same, thereby bankrupting itself? R. N. Das replies: Chinas buildup at the border and in the Indian Ocean region is certainly a matter of concern for India, which has been articulated at the highest level. In recent past there has been a perceptible infrastructural development across the border in China and also Chinas engagement in the Indian Ocean, particularly in Sri Lanka where China is building a port at Hambantota, ostensibly for civilian purposes which however can have strategic implications on Indias security. It is only appropriate, on part of India to take measures to beef up its defence preparedness so as to meet

eventualities, if any. There are, however, a slew of confidence building measures (CBMs) between the two countries to defuse tension, and maintain and tranquility in the border, but going by Indias past experience of 1962 war, it would be imprudent to neglect defence preparedness . There can not be any room for complacency in matters of national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty. No doubt India spends a better part of its budgetary allocation for defence of the country, which is to increase further, but it would be presumptuous to say that it can lead to sort of bankruptcy. Ours is a resilient economy which has withstood many a crises in the past including the oil crisis and more recently the word financial crisis. Maneesh Aggarwal asked: What will be the impact for India if Bhutan allows Chinese to Chumbi valley and how India will encounter it? Medha Bisht replies: Chumbi Valley has historically been of economic value to India, Tibet and Bhutan. Given the Chinese posturing on Chumbi Valley, however it has been elevated to a strategic level. In the changing geo-political context, as China makes inroads into Southern Asia, suspicion over the Chineses intent therefore needs to be reckoned with. Chinese influence over the Chumbi valley could impact India in four ways. First, China proximity to Indias North-East and Siliguri Corridor which connects North-Eastern states to India and Nepal to Bhutan becomes closer. Second, it also gets closer to Bangladeshs periphery in the North as a narrow stretch of land divides Bangladesh from Bhutan. Third, China, will have a better hold over Tibet, thus weakening any potential cards which India would want to play at a later stage, and fourth, it get an offensive advantage to thwart Indias military posturing. Defence of Sikkim in this context would be important. Six roads so far have been built by China near Bhutans North and North -West areas. Some sources point out that by 2017, China can have a rail link going to the place. India first needs to look inwards and strengthen it its defence preparedness and infrastructure construction plans. Second, at the bilateral level focused effort are needed on engaging Bhutan as a strategic partner, thus sensitizing it of Indian concerns. Third, India should maximize its soft-power approach, providing an enabling environment in Sikkim for Buddhism to flourish. Bhujaya Bhowmik asked: Is not the crisis over "AFSPA" a result of some major strategic errors of the Government of India? K C Dixit replies: Indias approach in dealing with the separatists has been more than democratic and unusually humane, giving them considerable political space despite their abrasive anti-national postures. India has allowed them to meet external adversaries in its own capital city and travel to foreign countries for garnering political and financial support. India has always favoured a political solution to Kashmir problem. In 1947, India gave up the military option by appealing to the United Nations for a negotiated political solution. Again, in 1965 India chose the political way out to find a solution, even restoring the strategic Haji Pir Pass to Pakistan to show political flexibility. Yet again in 1971, India allowed its long term political considerations override short term perspectives. It did not stop here and agreed to the ambiguous 1972 Simla

Agreement. India has taken measures like visit to Pakistan by Prime Minister, de-escalation of Kargil conflict by non-retaliatory actions at the LoC, back-channel dialogue with Pakistan, allowing travel and trade across the LoC in J&K, running Lahore Bus Service etc. While the government feels that it is dealing with its own people, the separatists do not think they are Indians. Any revision or removal of AFSPA from selected valley districts rightly resisted by the armed forces is a red herring as the current protests have been provoked by the police and not military action. Any concession under duress will become the baseline for further demands by the separatists in the next phase of their agitation. India has been categorically rejecting the right to self-determination by the separatists and wants a solution within the framework of its constitution, which implies that the separatists must accept that J&K belongs to India and no dispute over its status exists. It is high time that the softness in handling separatists is examined fully in the interest of the nations sovereignty and any attempt to cha llenge Indian Statehood by the separatists be dealt with firmly, leaving no room for violence in the society. Kovid Kumar asked: How do we achieve economic integration in South Asia? Nitya Nanda (Fellow, TERI) replies: The question presumes that the level of economic integration in South Asia is very low compared to other regions of the world. This may appear so if one looks at the intra-regional trade in South Asia which is very often considered an indicator of regional integration. But this may not be the right indicator to measure the level of economic integration in South Asia due to its extremely skewed size distribution in the region as well as due to the fact that most countries do not share border with each other. In fact the level of trade integration of Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka is reasonably high with India. Indian investment is also quite high in these countries except Bangladesh. Thus even higher level of integration can happen only if there is better relationship between India and Pakistan. This will strengthen economic ties not only between India and Pakistan but also between India and Afghanistan as well as Pakistan and Nepal. There can also be sectoral cooperation, particularly in the fields of energy, telecom, transport, information technology and education. Economic integration also requires greater movement of people. As of now people can move freely betwen India and Nepal and India and Bhutan. Indians also get visa on arrival in Sri Lanka. India can also offer similar facility to Sri Lankans. Making movement of people between India and Bangladesh easier should not be too difficult. Overall, I would argue that the level of economic integration is not as low as is often made out to be. But the the key to furthur economic integration lies in the domain of politics, particularly in India Pakistan relationship. Abhishek Madhukar Chaudhari asked: Why is India is so selective in choosing partners in its neighborhood? E.g. Awami League of Bangladesh or Democracy in Pakistan? Smruti Pattanaik replies: I do not agree that India is selective in choosing its partners in neighborhood. India has always liked to see democratic and secular governments in the neighbouring countries that represent peoples aspiration. The military regimes in the neighbouring countries are antithesis of these values. In the past, India has however has done business with the military regimes. But that does not detract it from these core values.

India was closely associated with Awami League during the liberation struggle. Awami league represents some of the core principles that India represents and values democracy, pluralism and secularism. Moreover ALs feels cooperation with India would help Bangladesh. If one look s at the BNP and the political values it represents its hesitancy to develop good relations with India is clearly apparent. Therefore, it is just not Indias preference of one over the other it depends on the domestic constituencies of the political parties and their ideological underpinnings that define the response in the neighbourhood. In case of Pakistan, democratic regimes there believe that confrontation with India will strengthen the Army and would be detrimental to growth of democracy. India also feels that military regimes would not help the interest of peace. Therefore, response to Indias hand of friendship is determined by regime interest in the neighbouring countries. Syed Tahseen Raza asked: What is China's String of Pearl doctrine? Rukmani Gupta replies: China 's investments in India's strategic neighbourhood are seen by some as part of a concerted strategy by the Chinese PLA to limit, if not contain, India's power projection abilities. These investments stretch from the South China Sea to the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Sittwe and Coco Islands in Myanmar, alleged investments in port facilities in Thailand and Cambodia, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan along with investments in the Maldives are said to be components of this String of Pearls. Chinas military modernization, its pursuit of a blue-water navy along with the "String of Pearls" are believed to be indicators that China will seek an increasingly active role in the Indian Ocean Region. While there is no denying that these investments can be used to contain India's military force projection, they must also be seen for their utility in assuring China's economic and energy security in the long term. Maneesh Aggarwal asked: India has Andman & Nicobar and Lakshdweep, we can use them as our Naval and Airforce Strong base to guard India or break of String of Pearls S. S. Parmar replies: The 572 islands of the Andaman and Nicobar chain running in a north south direction of around 780 km long places this eastern most Outpost of India close to the South East Asian nations on Chinas radar scan. Although we have an integrated command based at Port Blair and a number of Naval, Air Force and Coast Guard bases, the assets (in this regards I refer to ships and aircraft) presently, are not sufficient to place the vast sea area and islands under surveillance. A number of the Islands are uninhabited and offer a safe haven for elements inimical to the security of India. As and when the required numbers of assets are available there would be the requirement of placing them at places that offer logistics support that would require the requisite infrastructure to be constructed. More importantly these places or bases would require to be in close proximity of navigable choke points so that the time required to reach the area would be the shortest.

There are two points to be kept in mind. Firstly, aircraft given the speed and potent reach are always considered an omni present threat. The nations adjoining the area would question our intentions. We may reason and give the rationale of anti piracy and anti smuggling but it may not go down well with them. Secondly infrastructure to support these assets would require to be constructed. There would be a requirement to duplicate and maybe triplicate similar infrastructure given the extent of the Island chain. This would be a costly affair. Arnab Dasgupta asked: Are there chances for Bhutan falling into Beijing's bag as was the case of Nepal? Medha Bisht replies: History is witness to the fact that Bhutan and India have always shared a robust relationship that encompasses trade and economics as well. Indeed, India is the largest trade partner of Bhutan and has greatly assisted Bhutan in its development goals. Moreover given the geographical context, India is a natural market for Bhutan in its hydal sector. This is important as export of hydroelectricity to India is a primary source of revenue generation. Having said this, I would argue that given this natural proclivity and inter-dependence between Bhutan and India, there are fewer chances for the Chinese having strategic leverage inside Bhutan. However one should keep in mind that China and Bhutan share a boundary dispute and border issues have provided Beijing a vital platform to engage Bhutan. India needs to be vigilant over the developments regarding the boundary issue as the North-Western boundary which China wants from Bhutan (particularly the Chumbi Valley) is an area of strategic interest to India. Maneesh Aggarwal asked: How an Indian can make a difference in improving India's defence systeme aganist China and Pakistan? Rumel Dahiya replies: Every Indian can and should make a contribution in making India a strong and prosperous country in which all of us feel secure and live harmoniously. This can be done by doing our best in which ever field of activity we are involved in. Hard working, tech savvy and productive citizens are essential for India's sustained economic growth. A strong economy will generate resources for development as well as for defence. Technological advances will contribute towards better defence systems. There are many career choices which can be made if one wants to make direct contribution towards developing defence systems, both in PSUs and in private sector. One can make innovation in any field and it will have a direct or indirect positive impact in improving India's defence potential. Obviously, no defence system is designed with an eye on a particular adversary or potential adversary. Arnab Dasgupta asked: Why India is not following a pro-active policy towards Taiwan as a counterweight to China? Jaganath Panda replies: India officially endorses the one-China policy. That means; India officially recognizes the legitimacy of the PRC as the legitimate entity of both mainland China and Taiwan. Hence, the diplomatic and strategic space for India is limited as far as Taiwan is concerned. Besides, India's relations with China are more important strategically than Taiwan. It is not a wise move for

any modern, rational state like India to use this kind of proxy. This is for two reasons: (a) India would not like to damage its relationship with China by unnecessarily pursuing a pro -active policy towards Taiwan; (b) no major country in the world would like to use this tactic, given the importance China holds in world politics. As far as Taiwan is concerned, India has good economic, social and cultural linkages; but political/strategic relations will always remain a restricted one. What is the deterrence against 'Terrorism'? S. Samuel C. Rajiv replies: A wide range of drivers influence individuals/groups to employ violent methods against state authority socio-economic, ethnic, ideological, religious, among others, As such, there cannot be a single magic bullet to deter terrorist actions. Nimble and vigilant security structures are essential as are measures to address the causes of their real or perceived grievances. Shakil Husain asked: May India develop a military industrial complex? What are the prospects? Ali Ahmed: The term 'military-industrial complex' acquired negative connotations since its use as such by Eisenhower in his farewell address. The apprehension is that such a complex would acquire its own interest and thereby fuel armaments and arms racing. This is what transpired in the US in its arming across breadth and depth in both the nuclear and conventional dimensions. Clearly, this is not how India views itself or envisages its future. Instead, it prefers the term 'defence industrial base'. Its history of conquest and as a once colonised state is attributed, among other reasons, to deficiencies in military technology. Consequently it is resolved to be better prepared in defending its freedoms. The template for this endeavour was set up early, in the Nehruvian period itself. Today, India has a technological edge conferred by the DRDO, as also a production system based on OFB and major PSUs. It has decided to reduce the external content in its armaments to 30 per cent. Given that its growing economy permits greater resources for allocation to defence (even though the percentage is maintained at 2-2.5 per cent of the GDP), it has evolved its Defence Procurement Procedure over the last half a decade so as to bring in private sector participation in defence production. The private sector is enabled to do so in partnership with foreign defence companies. Additionally, the companies from abroad are required to broaden the defence production base by transfer of technology through the programme of offsets. These measures would enlarge India's capacity. India would nevertheless require to be alert to the phenomenon observed elsewhere of armaments build up acquiring its own logic. Yoginder Rangi asked: Tell me Indo-Bangladesh relations during Indra-Mujib Smruti S. Pattanaik replies: Indias role in the liberation of Bangladesh, its diplomatic initiative to highlight Pakistan Army atrocities and its willingness to hold two million refugees from East Pakistan and the goodwill it generated therefrom shaped relations between the two countries. India extended all possible help to the new state which includes economic and administrative support. Bangladesh constitution which declared secularism as one of the foundational principles cemented the relations between the two countries which share liberal and pluralistic culture and societal values. Indian forces were withdrawn from Bangladesh in March 1972 and Indira Gandhi paid an official visit and the two countries signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1972.

Mujibs failure to deal with his opposition, address issues of corruption by his party members and his adoption of Islamic symbolism to enhance his Islamic credentials had implications for IndiaBangladesh relations. To enhance his political credibility, since he was seen as a major ally of India, he started blaming India for his failures that solely arose from the misgovernance of his government. His tendency to centralize power in the form of BAKSAL also created resentment in the country. India was critical of Mujibs assassination and the subsequent military takeover in Bangladesh. This added to an already deteriorating bilateral relations. Shakil Husain asked: Don't you think that naxalism is no longer a socio economic problem. P. V. Ramana replies: The Naxal challenge is essentially a political issue with strong socio-economic underpinnings and has, lately, acquired a pronounced law and order dimension. Lavneet Singh asked: What is the role played by missiles (Prithivi etc.) in implementing Cold Start doctrine of our forces? Ali Ahmed replies: The term 'doctrine' appended to Cold Start is a misnomer. Instead, Cold Start is one strategy option the government has to exercise in case it so desires in an India-Pakistan context. The details of Cold Start are not officially out in the open domain. Instead there has been much informed reflection on this including by Gen. (Retd.) VP Malik, Brig. (Retd.) Gurmeet Kanwal and Brig. (Retd.) Arun Sahgal. You may like to peruse their writings. An interesting article on the theme is Waltar Ladwig's in International Security (32:3) 'A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Armys New Limited War Doctrine'. In a nutshell, the strategy involves launch of proactive limited offensives by integrated battle groups comprising assets of both pivot corps and strike corps where available. Depending on the situation, strike corps forming up simultaneously may be launched later. The term Cold Start implies early launch of offensives, thereby undercutting the time delay that had taken place in Operation Parakram. In so far as missiles are concerned, their role has not been dwelt on in any great detail in open literature. This owes to missiles being taken as strategic delivery capability. However, Prithvi missile which you refer to is capable of carrying a conventional warhead and can be so employed. However, given the linkage with nuclear capability of missiles, these may not be used in a conventional limited war scenario due to their escalatory potential. A limited war can be limited along many parameters, such as time, aims, spread and weapons used. In case missiles are not used, it would be limitation along the weapons used dimension. This does not rule out their being used in a conventional role however, depending on the progress of the war. It may entail escalation of sorts, but not necessarily provocative of a nuclear escalation. In a conventional role, these could be used to supplement the firepower resources available to the land and air forces (Prithvi missiles are available with both services of differing range). The variety of warheads available indicates their utility. In so far as the other ballistic missiles are concerned, they are more directly related to the strategic capability and therefore are unlikely to be used in limited war scenario. Ashish Shukla asked: What is the impact of US Pak antiterror cooperation on Pakistani Society? What is the prospect of Pakistan becoming the other Afghanistan?

Ashok K Behuria replies: Pakistan has pursued its counter-terror policy in a half-hearted manner, in spite of coordinating such policy with the US. It has tried to forge it with its other more enduring policy of seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan and striking parity with India. In the process it still considers many of the terrorist groups as strategic assets which could be used against India at will. Moreover, due to uncertainty of the US commitments in Afghanistan, it plans to benefit from its continued association with such groups, which also includes the Taliban, in case of eventual US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Thus, it has been hunting with the hound (the US) and running with the hare (the Taliban) all through. Interestingly, the US has demonstrated astonishing patience with Pakistani duplicity. Pakistan's halfhearted approach has led to a blow-back within Pakistan. The constituency of Islamic radicalism has certainly grown substantially imperiling internal security in places away from the tribal belt. While India-focused jihadi groups pretend to stay within the control of the establishment, they are quietly working with the extremist groups of all shades, Taliban and Al Qaeda included. Most of these groups depend upon a common pool of radical elements swearing loyalty to one but working for all. The ideological differences among these outfits have been effectively blurred leading to a wild universe of radical elements eager to sacrifice their lives for the sake of a holy crusade. This has posed a critical challenge to the state and society in Pakistan. There is a view that unless the Pakistani state and security establishment wakes up to this reality soon, the days are not far off when they will be left with no other choice but to concede ground to these retrograde forces and turn into another Afghanistan. It may so happen also that their continued hobnobbing with these forces may lead to radical change in the outlook of the security agencies and turn Pakistan into a Islamic praetorian state, armed with nuclear weapons a veritable threat to world peace. It is imperative therefore to work closely with the Pakistan army and dissuade it from continuing to pursue its suicidal policies. Sanket Telang asked: Why doesn't India recognize Kosovo as a sovereign Country? Alok R. Mukhopadhyay replies: The question is raised at the most opportune time. On July 22 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague has delivered a comprehensive ruling of 45 pages on this issue. By ten vote to four, the ICJ concluded, declaration of indep endence of Kosovo adopted on 17 February 2008 did not violate international law. But legalities apart there is still no consensus about the independence of Kosovo and its recognition. Even some European nations are not in favour of the independence of Kosovo. Parallels could also be drawn with the instances when as a fallout of the Russia-Georgia War in 2008, Russia unilaterally recognized the two Georgian provinces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. India has been silent about this contentious issue of unilateral declarations by some break-away or renegade provinces, and prefers to wait for an international consensus to emerge. Realistically, recognising Kosovo as a sovereign country is neither a top priority nor a foreign policy challenge for India. Jai Singh Shekhawat asked: In view of the Chinese cyber war doctrine do we need a dedicated cyber command/institution under MOD. Its organistaion and likely charter?

Cherian Samuel replies: Cyberspace as a theatre of war is still in its infancy, but one of its axioms is that offensive capabilities are easier to create than defensive capabilities. While many countries are developing offensive capabilities, accompanying strategies or doctrines are yet to make an appearance, with the exception of the Chinese who have developed a concept of informationised war. The absence of a doctrine inhibits the creation of an institutional structure as seen in the several false starts on the part of the US military before the establishment of the US Cyber Command in May 2010. Its mission statement, to direct the operations and defence of specified Department of Defense information networks and; prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries suggests that its primary objective is to build up a defensive capability. A cyber command has many negative connotations, and India is not inclined to be a party to the militarization of cyberspace, preferring instead to work towards considering cyberspace on the lines of existing global commons such as sea and space. That the emphasis is on preserving the integrity of defence information networks is seen in the statement of the Defence Minister in the Lok Sabha on July 26, 2010. However, even such a limited mandate might be difficult to fulfill given the fact that there is already a profusion of agencies within the military dealing with this, ranging from the Corps of Signals, to the A-CERT (Army Computer Emergency Response Team), to the IT Departments of the various HQs and the IDS. Even though the Defence Minister referred to the Defence Information Assurance and Research Agency (DIARA) as being the nodal agency mandated to deal with all cyber security related issues of Tri Services and Ministry of Defence, the increasing magnitude of cyber threats necessitates both consideration and co-ordination of responses at a much higher level. Sanket Telang asked: Why doesn't India develop better ties with Taiwan? Can't we use it as Leverage against China? Jagannath P. Panda replies: India has good relations with Taiwan. But the scope for improvement in security and strategic issues is limited because of official/diplomatic constraints. Officially, India endorses the one-China policy. That means, India officially acknowledges the legitimacy of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) as the legitimate entity of both mainland China and Taiwan. Despite this, India-Taiwan relations have expanded at commercial, cultural and scientific levels. Using Taiwan against China was an old strategic choice for India. India didnt really focus on this aspect when the pro-independence movement was at its peak during the DPP regime in Taiwan. Nevertheless, I am not sure if India would like to pursue this strategy in future. Taiwan is slowly moving towards mainland China; and sooner or later both the PRC and Taiwan would be preparing the ground for unification. In that context, it is incorrect to argue that India can use Taiwan as leverage against China. One must not forget here that the USA has followed this type of strategy with Taiwan over the years, but not been quite successful in its China policy. What is the centre's stand on recent Kashmir violence? What can the centre and state do together for a permanent solution?

Arpita Anant replies: The Centres stand on the recent violence in Kashmir is that it was a result of young people being misled by Pakistanbased anti-national forces linked to the Lashkar-e-Taiyyaba. Instigated by these forces, large mobs indulged in stone pelting and defied curfew orders. This provoked a reaction from the CRPF and Jthe ammu and Kashmir Police, which resulted in the unfortunate loss of lives. The Centre therefore instructed these forces to adopt maximum restraint in dealing with rioting crowds and simultaneously maintain law and order. The Unified Command, which brings together the Centre and the State security apparatuses, must ensure that the channels of instigation resulting in such serious law and order problems are blocked. Moreover, since the intellectuals and the media of the Valley have explained the summer unrest as a spontaneous uprising against mis-governance, it is important for the Centre and the State Government to work towards an all-party consensus on improving governance and identifying immediate developmental priorities for the State. The consensus thus achieved must be made known to the people of the state and sincerely followed through. A similar consensus on engaging with the separatist leadership and the Government of Pakistan and its follow-up may lead to a permanent solution to the problem in Kashmir. K Raka Sudhakar Rao asked: Do we have any memorial or a commission for missing army men on the lines of Fromelles war graves committee? Ali Ahmed replies: There is no commission for missing army men. Instead the matter is dealt with by the Adjutant General's Branch. There is the interesting case of an aircraft having crashed in the early sixties. The Army by sending expeditions to the mountainous area has recently retrieved bodies. This was done earlier in Himachal Pradesh as also recently in Arunachal Pradesh. On the Line of Control and Line of Actual Control, if troops go missing, flag meetings are held to ascertain if they have strayed across. There is no War Graves Commission. This owes to the policy of sending mortal remains of martyrs back to the native place, as was the case in the Kargil War and is the case in counter-insurgency operations. The transportation is done by the service and civil aviation. A solemn military ceremony is done at the native place in case military resources are close at hand. If not, then the local police and administration undertake the same. This has helped maintain the military's engagement in far flung areas in the public consciousness. The public gathering and presence of family gives a befitting farewell to the martyr. As to whether this is feasible in a high intensity war is debatable. In such a case, the military has procedures for collection and disposal of mortal remains with due dignity and care. The details are recorded and personal effects sent to Next of Kin. There is no equivalent of a War Cemetery, since in the Hindu tradition cremation is undertaken. Nevertheless, across India's borders and areas where the Army has operated, there are small memorials put up in memory of those who have departed. These could be individuals on the spot or as part of efforts of formation at headquarters. Many citizens committees across India, energised by veterans, have also erected memorials honouring those who have represented that locality or city in various battlefields and disturbed areas. A recent news report had it that the Chief is pursuing the

issue of a memorial for martyrs in the central vista in Delhi. Apparently the case has been under discussion for some years. It would be very inspiring if the memorial were to materialise soon. Sanket Telang asked: Shouldn't India send Troops to Afghanistan as it is strategically most important country to India? Won't it Increase our Leverage? Vishal Chandra replies: No. India has a very clear and a well-stated position on this issue. Time and again, relevant Indian authorities have made it amply clear that India does not have any intention or plans to deploy troops in Afghanistan. It is to be understood that deployment of troops in a neighbouring country has its own dynamics and is not without local and regional repercussions. Presence of Indian troops on Afghan soil would be a rallying point for forces inimical to the Indian presence in Afghanistan, especially for the Pakistan-based and backed militant Islamist groups. Moreover, Indias assistance to Afghanistan is fully in accordance with the will and wishes of the people of that country. Indias contribution to capacity building and human resource development is very much appreciated by the Afghan people. As a friendly neighbouring country, India is expected to take a long-term view of its relationship with the Afghan people. K Raka Sudhakar Rao asked: Is there any material or books available on how terrain is helping terror in J&K? P K Gautam replies: I do not know of any book. Mountainous and jungle terrain helps insurgents as not all areas can be patrolled or kept under surveillance. It has natural camouflage and cover.Technology cannot provide all the solutions given the frequent rain or snow fall or mist. However there is a correlation between say forest cover and insurgency and also roots of insurgency related to forests or its products. In Jammu and Kashmir illegal felling may be one source of funds for insurgents . At times the antinationals elements generate a discourse on logging by the state to bring in the green agenda and thus grab international attention. The Indian Army through its Operation Sadbhavana has a green mission wherever possible. However there is a serious environmental degradation in Kashmir valley due to changes in rainfall and snow patterns, neglect of wetlands and pollution due to urbanisation. The deteriorating state of the Dal lake is a case in point . Forests that is not only in quantity but quality are important for the water recycling regime. In naxal affected forest region the relationship is more direct. Tribals depend not only on trees or forests but also on forest related products such as mahua , tendu leaf, etc. Their cultural and livelihood practices are related to NTFP (No timber forest product). The naxal struggle is one manifestation of the clash of perceptions on forest and mineral wealth pitted against the needs of an industrialising India. Jens Heinrich asked: Why is nuclear (and conventional) arms control a "non-issue" in the current (and past) talks between India and Pakistan?

A. Vinod Kumar replies: Nuclear or conventional arms control could figure as a key element in a dialogue only when it amounts to be the most potent point of contention between the two states or when it makes a drastic transformation in the equation. In the case of India and Pakistan where the core political issues are terrorism and Kashmir, quasi-political matters like water-sharing, arms control or nuclear confidence-building measures could only follow a larger political understanding. It could be noted that this point has not been achieved in the Indo-Pak talks. Another factor is the element of stability that is perceivably existent in the nuclear equation of these two countries. Though Pakistan had fought a limited war in Kargil and has undertaken a prolonged low-intensity conflict, both under nuclear conditions, and notwithstanding the Western notion of South Asia as a nuclear flashpoint, there were very few opportunities when both countries went the extra mile on nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) the two instances being the agreement to abstain from attacking nuclear facilities and giving prior notice of missile tests. While the potential for nuclear or conventional CBMs to dramatically impact this relationship is minimal when the core political issues remain unresolved, such measures could be significant when there is threat of conflict escalation, leading to nuclear brinkmanship. Besides, there are conditions like an Indian push for ballistic missile defences, which could prompt Pakistan to seek countermeasures or push for arms reductions in the region. V Subrahmanyam asked: Is the world going to be multipolar, if so who could be the players in the coming days? Smita Purushottam replies: There is near unanimity that the world is evolving towards a multipolar order and there are many theories regarding the candidates, or the Poles. As early as 1997, Henry Kissinger had predicted the decline of the unipolar order and the rise of Russia, Japan, China and even India. More recently Parag Khanna (Second World) felt that there would be three power blocs the US, China and the EU. Chinese experts in the year 2000 debated the role of the US, China, Russia, Japan and India in a future order. The Goldman Sachs BRIC report predicted that the BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China) would be bigger than the G6s in 2050. Several questions arise. Are the criteria for being defined a Major Power/Pole purely economic, or economic, technological and military? How could Black Swan events - unanticipated developments such as major wars, climate change related disasters, and technological breakthroughs [clean energy such as fusion energy, artificial intelligence, robotics and biotechnology - which could increase life spans engendering massive societal changes (George Bernard Shaws Back to Methuselah provides an inkling of what is in store!)] - transform future scenarios? Will they upset all calculations regarding futuristic power configurations (remembering that these breakthroughs are more likely to occur in advanced economies anyway)? The economic factor is the most reliable clue for predicting power quotients, and has been so throughout history (see Paul Kennedys Rise & Fall). Nations which have quietly built up economic strength outlast their rivals through War and other calamities. The other historically revolutionary force is Technology. The major Poles in the future will thus most probably be growing and innovative powers such as China, US, India, Japan, Germany, Russia, Brazil and South Africa.

Ankur asked: What is the probability of success of a attack on Taiwan by PLA in coming decade or so? Jagannath P. Panda replies: I dont think the PLA would be really plotting for an attack on Taiwan in coming times. Currently, the Cross-Strait ties are at their best after the KMTs victory in Taiwan in last general election. China would like to consolidate this trend, instead of planning for an attack. Since the day Ma Ying-Jeous party has come to power in Taiwan, Cross-Strait ties have improved a lot, and the normal public discussion in Taiwan is to maintain the status -quo, and improve bilateral relations with mainland China instead of advocating for independence. In fact, the Taiwanese are progressively realizing the implications of Rise of China in global politics today; particularly in economic terms. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed recently between China and Taiwan is indicative of this. For its part, the Chinese government is happy to see TaiwanChina. For Chinese political leaders, the integration of Taiwan with mainland China is one of the top long-term foreign policy objectives. The latest ECFA is seen as a prelude to the peaceful unification process in the longer term. Many Chinese leaders and experts feel that unification with Taiwan is just a matter of time, and they could achieve this task without really using force or plotting an attack. Peaceful unification is a long-term strategy in Chinese foreign policy dialogue. That would also help China to consolidate its image as a responsive and responsible power at many levels, especially when the PRC aims to become a super power. Gopi Krishnan asked: Is the decision to stop subsidies on Petro-products a leverage to open up Indian markets? Won't this affect the common man adversely? Shebonti Rad Dadwal replies: There are several factors contributing to the decision to stop subsidies: 1. Oil marketing firms were losing a lot of money as they had to market products at subsidized rates but had to buy crude at international rates. 2. The decision to dismantle the administered pricing mechanism was taken a long time back - 2001-02, but was only partially implemented at the time and then held in abeyance after international crude prices began escalating till 2007 since it was believed that the fallout would have adverse political implications for the government at the time, since elections were round the corner. Also opposition parties were opposed to a price hike. 3. If India wants to implement reforms and attract investments in the oil sector, a subsidy regime is not conducive to the same. 4. If market forces are to be allowed to play in the Indian oil sector, then it is necessary to provide the private sector a level playing field. Some private companies which had entered the retail sector had closed down their operations due to difficulty in making profits because of the subsidy regime. With the lowering/removal of subsidies, they can now start their operations again. 5. In the short term, higher prices will affect the common man. However, in the long run, it will, or should, lead to more efficient functioning of the oil sector, it will prevent black marketeering, and it will force people to use energy more efficiently. 6. To alleviate the burden on the common man caused by higher oil prices, government could restructure the tax regime on fuels. Taxes comprise some 51% of motor fuels price.

Karun Mukherji asked: What is the truth behind Barbarossa? Was Stalin planning to invade Germany in summer of 1941? Kalyanaraman replies: Nazi Germany was determined to establish its primacy in Europe, which meant defeating both the Western powers and the Soviet Union in the East. The Soviet Union was committed to bringing about a world of communism, and like Russians of previous and subsequent decades, Soviet leaders were acutely conscious of the geopolitical imperative of exercising control over their periphery in Eastern Europe. In November 1940, talks between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union centred on Moscow joining the Tripartite Pact (between Germany, Italy and Japan) while at the same time Germany insisted that Soviet Russia not focus on eastern Europe and instead concentrate on territories to its south towards the Indian Ocean. But this was not acceptable to Soviet Russia. This is the backdrop against which we should look at the outbreak of conflict between these two powers. It is known that Hitler had ordered preparations for a war against the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of the defeat inflicted on France in the summer of 1940. And after the November 1940 talks failed to make progress, on 18 December 1940, Hitler signed a formal directive to ensure that preparations for a war against Russia be completed by 15 May 1941. For his part, Stalin surely made his own military preparations; but mainstream historians have not so far given credence to the argument that Stalin had plans to change the Soviet military's orientation from a defensive mode into an offensive mode for a invasion of Germany. Rohan Kusnur asked: What can be done to counter the increasing Chinese influence in our neighborhood? I mean diplomatically. Arvind Gupta replies: The answer is to increase our own influence in the region without giving the impression of being a hegemon. India should leverage the geography and culture of south Asia. It should develop close interdependence with its neighbours. In particular it should contribute to the well being of its neighbours and also of the region. It should be sensitive to their concerns and yet firm on its security interests. Finally, it should let China know that India has legitimate interests in South Asia. Is Israel planning to attack Iran? Very little is known about Tehran's military capability. Does it have the ability to strike back? Arvind Gupta replies: It seems unlikely that Israel will attack Iran at the present moment. An Israeli attack on Iran will open an entirely new front for the US and complicate matters at a time when it wishes to extricate itself from Iraq and Afghanistan. Israel falls within the striking range of Iranian missiles. Iran can also block the Strait of Hormuz and disrupt oil supplies from the Persian Gulf. Deepak Bisht asked: Are there any books on water security of China? Sreeradha Datta replies: These are some books on the subject: 1. Elizabeth Economy, Asia's Water Security Crisis: China, India, and the United States

2. Nevelina I. Pachova, Mikiyasu Nakayama, Libor Jansky, eds. Water Security: Domestic Threats and Opportunities Akash asked: What is the new perception management doctrine for Army? S. K. Chatterji replies: The doctrine published is by the Integrated Defence Staff, the apex Joint Services HQ of the Indian Armed Forces. The doctrine addresses Perception Management and Psychological Operations. It is not a doctrine published by the Indian Army. Indian Army has an existing doctrine on Information Warfare, which also addresses Psychological operations. Perception Management and Psychological Operations address common issues, the latter being a precursor of the former. The doctrine being classified, cannot be commented upon. However, perception management operations are essentially endeavours at shaping attitudes and inclinations of a target populace. They include messages that are truthful and activities that address the apprehensions and causes of alienation of the targeted segment. These operations are launched at all three levels: Strategic, Operational and Tactical, and serve to reduce the need of application of kinetic means of war. It is also not uncommon for militaries to have both joint doctrines for tri-service joint operations, and also service specific doctrines. The US Armed Forces have both joint and service specific doctrines on numerous operational disciplines. At times, these do not even conform fully with each other. Gopi Krishnan asked: Is China's economic development sustainable? Once the wages increase? Smita Purushottam replies: This question is increasingly being asked in the wake of the economic crisis, which China coped with by investing in massive domestic stimulus packages, but which contributed to overheating in the property market and greater indebtedness in the banking sector. Chinas exports to the developed world, which fell at the height of the crisis in 2009, are also projected to face challenges (though first half yearly 2010 trade statistics show a rebound at 43 per cent, with the trade surplus shrinking by 42.5 per cent), as the latter shift to savings over consumption, boost exports, and maintain pressure for yuan appreciation. In addition, inflation, inequalities (Chinas GINI coefficient is 0.47), environmental and societal problems, demographics and related dips in savings rates - are the near to long term challenges for China (please see http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-06/29/content_10032151.htm). However, Chinas economy has a robust base. Chinese reforms in the 1980s were directed at building a strong infrastructure and supporting Chinas manufacturing and export sectors. The Chinese manufacturing sector thus got its factor inputs at relatively lo wer rates than Indias - cheaper electricity, currency, land, labour, and capital - and is 48 per cent of GDP compared to Indias 29 per cent. This led to creation of many virtuous cycles and assets like a competitive workforce. China later shifted to a more high-tech production strategy. Its export basket now more closely approximates the export baskets of advanced economies (after making allowances for processing trade i.e. exports minus imported inputs) than Indias.

To tackle these problems China has announced it will encourage greater consumption, manufacture more high value-added manufactures/exports to cope with currency appreciation, invest in Chinas less developed, western regions, etc. Rising wages are being seen as a means to increase domestic consumption and shift to a more high value added economy. It may be recalled that a 2000 projection by Chinese strategic experts had forecast a US $2.5 trillion economy in 2010, but, in reality, nominal GDP has reached nearly US$5 trillion (at current prices) in 2010. As mentioned above, there are problems in the Chinese economy with Chinese growth rates expected to moderate to 8-9 per cent. The challenge will lie in managing the issues raised in the transition as the economy is restructured and slows down. Sasi asked: Is it viable for India to set up military bases abroad? Which are the other countries with bases abroad and where all? Harinder Singh replies: A military base is a facility established or operated by the military or one of its branches that shelters military equipment and personnel, and facilitates training and operations, in pursuit of a country's national security objectives. More than 1,000 military bases and installations exist around the world; most of these are operated by the United States, which has a military presence in over several dozen countries (details of which can be surfed on the internet). These range from vast installations, like Guantanamo Bay, to smaller military bases or training camps, nuclear missile sites, rest and recuperation camps and refuelling stations. In addition, the US and some of its NATO allies complement this vast military presence with an even more elaborate network of port-of-call rights, and landing rights for military aircraft. In so far as India is concerned, it has traditionally engaged in defence cooperation with friendly foreign countries as an important component of the national security strategy. It encompasses visits, contacts, exchanges, exercises, port calls and training facilitation to build and maintain trust in the interests of mutual security. The Indian Navy in particular has been forging strong partnerships with a number of navies in the Indian Ocean region, the more notable ones being the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Singapore, Vietnam and Japan. In this regard, India has also been engaging the island nations strategically located in the Indian Ocean region. Akash asked: What is the impact of removal of Gen. McChrystal on Af-Pak policy? How does it affect India? Vishal Chandra replies: The exit of Gen. McChrystal, commander of 100,000 plus US/NATO forces in Afghanistan, is not likely to have any notable impact in the near-term, either on the ground situation in southern and eastern Afghanistan or on the US Af-Pak policy, certainly not until the year-end when the US will be reviewing its war strategy. The violence is not likely to abate in the near future. While Western forces have been winning the battles, the Taliban have not been losing the war, adding to the stalemate in Afghanistan.

One of the biggest challenges before Gen. David Patreaus, who succeeds Gen. McChrystal, will be to break the monotony of the Afghan war. It is also to be seen whether Gen. Patreaus would be able to win the support of Kabul the way Gen. McChrystal did. Today, the US Administration is far more constrained by the differing perceptions among its allies, be it NATO, Islamabad, or Kabul, over the Afghan war; and also by the growing differences within the American establishment. As for India, it remains committed to the idea of a strong and an independent Afghan state. Gen. McChrystals exit is not going to affect Indias position in the near -term. However, in the last few years, Indias reconstruction projects have been increasingly hampered due to deteriorating security in parts of Afghanistan, which to a great extent is dependent on the way America and NATO conduct war against the Taliban and allies. In times to come, the response of Kabul and Washington to Islamabads growing thrust for a greater role in stabilising Afghanistan will be critical to Indias position and role in Afghanistan. Sanket Telang asked: Why doesn't India Buy F-16s and F-18s from U.S.A? Is that not better than complaining about U.S selling arms to Pakistan? Cherian Samuel replies: India has no objections to buying the above mentioned aircraft from the USA; in fact, both Lockheed Martinss F-16 Fighting Falcon and Boeings F-18 Super Hornet are among the six shortlisted contenders for the Indian Air Forces intended purchase of 126 Medium Multi -Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) worth $ 8.5 billion. There are merits and demerits to purchasing US aircraft; while these aircraft are cheaper than the other European manufactured aircraft in the fray, there are many limitations imposed by US laws and regulations governing export of sensitive technologies that reduce the capabilities of the aircraft on offer. While the US says it is willing to ensure that these aircraft come with the latest technologies, this is contingent on India signing a number of agreements, something the Indian government is unwilling to do, since they contain clauses that would impinge on our strategic autonomy. Problems with earlier purchases of weapons arising out of such clauses also raise questions of the reliability of the US as an arms supplier. These issues would have to be settled before India can go in for purchases. The issue of the US selling F-16s to Pakistan is a separate issue altogether. India has objected to the fact that the United States is funding weapons purchases by Pakistan, going up from $700 million in 2010 to 1.5 billion in 2011, ostensibly for its counter-insurgency efforts. While much of these could be used in a conflict against India, it also frees up Pakistan to use its own funds to buy US armaments such as F-16s, thus indirectly fuelling an arms race in the sub-continent. The ultimate beneficiary of such an arms race would be armament manufacturers, be it in the US or elsewhere. Anand asked: What is China real motive behind nuclear deal with Pakistan? What may the reaction of India in this context? Jaganath Panda replies: Chinas nuclear deal with Pakistan by and large implies two things: first, the Chinese plan of empowering Pakistan and preserving a counter-balancing posture to the rising IndoUS strategic engagement. In that context, the nuclear deal is a constructive assurance from the Chinese that it remains an all-weather friend to Islamabad. Second, the Chinese intention is to

balance the regional order and slowly make a productive impact on smaller countries in the South Asian region through strategic agreements and deals. It is a progressive Chinese attempt to revitalize its current South Asia policy and uphold regional supremacy. The impact of this deal is huge. The deal would facilitate states that falls outside the nonproliferation purview and accord them the amenities and rights originally intended for members who follow nonproliferation rules, and may prompt a severe arms race in South Asia. As far as India is concerned, there is bound to be concerns as the nuclear deal between China and Pakistan would free-up Pakistani resources for research reactors at Khusab, which would result in greater quantities of plutonium available for the nuclear weapons programme. At the same time, India is also worried about Pakistans vulnerable domestic political situation and poor proliferation record which could de-stabilize the region. Varon B K Sharma asked: What purpose was served by Home Minister P Chidambram going to Pakistan? Ashok Behuria replies: Indian Home Minister Mr. P. Chidambaram visited Pakistan (on 26 June 2010) primarily to attend the SAARC Home Ministers meet in Islamabad. This meeting concluded with a joint resolution for cooperation against terrorism in the region. It called for early adoption of the United Nations Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, an initiative that is being pursued actively by India at the moment. Moreover, there was also a "commitment" to implement the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and its Additional Protocol and a joint expression of resolve to ratify the SAARC Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. There is a provision for extradition in this convention and if Pakistan ratifies this, it will be obliged to cooperate with India on various issues relating to terrorism. Pakistans Prime Minister, Mr. Gilani, has, in the meanwhile, asked Interior Minister Malik to implement the declaration in letter and spirit. This is thus a positive development. However, it remains to be seen whether the Pakistan military will allow it. Chidambaram's meeting with his counterpart in Pakistan, Mr. Rehman Malik on the sidelines has drawn mixed response. Primarily aimed at addressing the issue of trust deficit, on the face of it the meeting may not have made much difference to the prevailing atmosphere in which efforts are being made to restart bilateral talks. The Pakistani media called it a 'delicate diplomatic dance' and many in India were angered by Malik's statement that Pakistan cannot stop Hafiz Muhammad Saeed from delivering his hate-speeches. This only suggests the continuing disinclination of the Pakistani military to take action against jihadist elements operating on Pakistani soil against India and the incapacity of the civilian government to take any positive step to address Indian concerns. The argument driving Indias approach is that Pakistan has to be engaged in spite of all this because disengagement has not served the purpose. Such diplomatic engagement can go hand in hand with (and without lowering our guard on) Indias efforts to strengthen its security machinery to counter the asymmetric threats emanating from across the border. Sanket Telang asked: How Should India deal with recent sanctions imposed by UN, US, EU on Iran? What methods can India adopt to protect her interests in Iran?

Arvind Gupta replies: The impact of the latest round of UN sanctions on India-Iran relations will at best be moderate. However, US and EU sanctions could affect some Indian companies engaged with Iran in the energy sector. India will have to follow the UN resolution imposing sanctions on Iran. Iran is strategically important to India. We must, therefore, continuously engage Iran. This is already happening. Iran's Foreign Minister visited India in November 2009; India's Foreign Secretary visited Tehran in February 2010; India's Minister of External Affairs visited Iran in May 2010 and called on his counterpart as well as President Ahmadinejad. India imported 22 million tonnes of crude oil worth $10 billion in 2009. India-Iran trade during 2008-09 was $13 billion. There are a number of joint ventures between the two countries. The next meeting of India-Iran Joint Economic Commission is being held in New Delhi in July 2010. As a result of this engagement, it is hoped that India will be able to protect its interests in Iran despite sanctions imposed by the UN, US and EU. What role can India play in Israel-Palestine conflict? Shouldn't India fully Support Israel as both of us are victims of Terrorism? V Krishappa replies: Despite India 's considerable footprint in global affairs, its willingness and ability to play a direct role in the Israeli-Palestine conflict is limited. India 's geo-strategic and political interests require that it carefully balance its growing economic and strategic relations with Israel with that of other actors in the region including the Palestinian Authority. Besides, the ability of external actors to foster peace has been severely tested in the past two decades. The 'religion of peace process', seductive as it is, has yielded no tangible results despite the best efforts of President Clinton and now Obama. Given limited resources and lack of leverages with major stake holders it is advisable that India limits its current policy of humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people and political support in international institutions for the promotion of a two-state solution while continuing to improve strategic and economic relations with Israel. India should leverage its growing influence in the world to counsel Israel to exercise restraint and move towards a two-state solution. It should continue to use it voice in the United Nations and work with major sates in the world towards that end without directly participating in the peace process. India is a victim of terrorism as is Israel, but there is an important difference. Israels occupation of Palestinian lands has been questioned by not only the Palestinian people but also by the Arab and Muslim world as well as the larger international community. Israel is quick to use excessive force and treat the Palestinian population with contempt. It has often shown utter disregard to human rights violations. India cannot and should not imitate Israeli counter-terrorism practice. India has an evolved and unique approach to the menace of terrorism. It is better served by sticking to its first principles - deliberate use of force, democratic co-option, operate within the bounds of law, and use time and patience as strategic tools. India has a long standing political position on the Palestinian question. Any dilution of Indias historical stand will be detrimental to its interests, larger aspirations and its self image as an inclusive democracy. Sumit Sinha asked: What are the characteristics of amphibious operations doctrine of Indian defence organizations?

Ali Ahmed replies: The joint amphibious operations doctrine for the Indian Armed Forces has been laid down by HQ IDS. It is based on the existing excellent pamphlet on these operations. The issue is also covered in brief in India's Maritime Doctrine published last year. An amphibious operations capability is necessary in light of India's island territories, interests in the Indian Ocean and for an out of area capability if necessary. The formations and assets that are to be employed are earmarked and rehearsed in their roles. The Andaman & Nicobar Command has a major responsibility in this. ANC's Army brigade is readily available for the task. In addition, as in the eighties, it is possible that Army formations in the peninsula are also dual tasked accordingly. The air assets can be assembled with ease, given the flexibility inherent in the Air Force. The Navy has INS Jalashwa and other ships that can take part. Exercises have been held periodically beginning with Trishakti of the mid-eighties. The amphibious operations capability is also relevant in possible future conflicts and would be deployed for posturing, even if not actually employed. The major characteristics would be flexibility, speed of deployment, security both physical and of information, vulnerability both at sea and on landing, etc. The nuclear factor cannot be discounted as well. Anil Prithvi asked: What are the Chinese security interests in South Asia? Ramesh V Phadke replies: Chinese Security interests in South Asia: 1. Support close ally Pakistan to achieve its strategic objective of keeping India hobbled in South Asia. 2. Expand its influence in the region. 3. Build economic and strategic relationships with the smaller countries for future contingencies. 4. Assist Myanmar government to maintain reasonable stability so that the roads, gas pipe lines and port facilities developed by China can remain safe, secure and operational. 5. Build relations with Sri Lanka and Maldives to get access to the Indian Ocean Region. 6. Maintain good relations with Bangladesh by meeting its security needs like weapons, ships and aircraft. 7. Ensure a stable and China friendly Nepal. 8. Assist Afghanistan to exploit its natural and mineral resources and maintain a degree of stability there with the help of Pakistan. 9. The ultimate objective is to shape the future and enhance China's overall strength to challenge the world hegemon, the United States of America. Faisal asked: I am a 16 year old boy and I want to know what exactly is defense analysis and whether military analysis and defense analysis are the same thing? S. Kalyanaraman replies: Defence Analysis and Military Analysis are one and the same thing. The word 'defence' came to be increasingly used during the course of the 20th century, instead of the earlier preference for 'war' which is seen as indicating an offensive mentality. Thus, for instance, Ministries of War became Ministries of Defence. As a subject, Defence Analysis relates to the study of military concepts, military organisation and structures, and military technologies. Military concepts guide the use of armed forces and their weaponry as well as the strategies and tactics used in various

contingencies like all-out war, limited war, intervention in a third country, counter-insurgency, peacekeeping operations, etc. Military organisation refers to how the armed forces are structured to meet the requirements laid out by a particular defence policy. And military technologies are those developed and used to increase military power. Faisal asked: How do I pursue a degree in defence analysis in India? P. K. Gautam replies: Several colleges and universities offer courses in Defence/Strategic Studies in India. Some of these are: University of Pune, University of Chennai, Panjabi University Patiala, Punjab University Chandigarh, Deen Dayal Upadhyay Gorakhpur University, Maharishi Dayanand University Rohtak, University of Jammu, Allahabad University, H.N. Bahuguna Garhwal University, Chaudhary Charan Singh University Meerut, Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar University Agra Yoginder Rangi asked: What are the causes of Bangladesh's independence? Smruti Pattanaik replies: Factors that contributed to the creation of Bangladesh are: economic disparity between East and West Pakistan, and disparity in the representation in the civil service and Army of Pakistan. Two other factors contributed to the disenchantment among East Pakistanis. First, the concept that the defence of the East (Pakistan) lies in the West (Pakistan) led to investment in infrastructure and communication network in West Pakistan. This was in spite of East Pakistan's larger contribution to the economy. In the 1965 Indo-Pak war East Pakistan was left defence-less and at the mercy of India. Second, the one unit formula introduced by President Ayub Khan made West Pakistan equal to East Pakistan though East Pakistan had 53 per cent of population in terms of political representation at the centre. Many prominent Bangladeshis feel the 1971 liberation war and creation of Bangladesh was the actual implementation of the 1942 Lahore resolution which spoke of 'independent states' for Muslims in the north and the East. Ankur asked: What are objectives US want to achieve by selling arms to Taiwan on a regular basis? Cherian Samuel replies: US Relations with Taiwan are governed by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), passed by the US Congress in 1979. Inter alia, the Act requires the United States "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character" and "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan." China has resolutely objected to these arms sales, pointing out that they go against the grain of the Joint Communique of 1982 between the PRC and the US in which the United States reiterated that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, and it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution. That notwithstanding, both domestic and international compulsions, including increasing Chinese military power commensurate with its growing economic might, have led the US to increase arms sales to Taiwan. It sold $6 billion worth in 2008, followed by the recently announced sale of a further $6 billion worth of arms this year. The US maintains that these sales are carefully calibrated, keeping the provisions of the TRA in mind,

pointing out that it has again deferred a long-pending request by Taiwan for F-16 aircraft which would be a force-multiplier. The most important message that the US wishes to convey through these arms sales is that the US stands by those dependent on its security umbrella in the region. Yoginder Rangi asked: What are the major irritants between India and Bangladesh and how do they really affect Indian security? Smruti Pattanaik Replies: There are several major irritants between India and Bangladesh. For example: demarcation of land and maritime boundary, exchange of enclaves, illegal migration, balance of trade, transit, and sanctuary to Indian insurgent groups. The issues that India considers as major irritants are not the same as that of Bangladesh. For India, shelter to Indian insurgent groups, ISI activities, transit and illegal immigration are major irritants that need to be addressed by Dhaka. For Bangladesh balance of trade, firing across the border, and demarcation of boundaries are more important. These irritants affect India's security in a decisive manner. Hosting of Indian insurgents by Bangladesh and illegal migration of Bangladeshis impinges on India's security. Dhaka in the past took a stand that there no insurgent groups are provided sanctuary in Bangladesh and that there is also no illegal migration. However, things have changed after the Awami League has assumed power. Sumit Sinha asked: What is the logic for raising of Mountain Strike Corps in the East and how does it affect the Balance of Power given Chinas numerical superiority? Rumel Dahiya replies:India shares land borders in the North East with Bangladesh, Myanmar, China, Bhutan and Nepal. The terrain is mountainous which requires a higher density of troops for defence. Presently, only six mountain divisions are deployed in the North East. Considering the length of the land border to be defended and the involvement of the Army for internal security duties it was felt that the force levels have to be augmented. India does not covet the territory of its neighbours. However, it must be prepared at all times to defend its own territory against any hostile neighbour. Since its formations on the Western borders will take time to redeploy in case of war in the North East, it was assessed that additional formations will have to be raised and located in the North East itself. The formations being raised are neither China specific nor earmarked for an offensive inside Chinas territory. However, these could be employed both for defensive and offensive operations depending upon the requirement. It is true that China has upgraded its communication and logistic infrastructure in TAR tremendously, which gives it a capability to move a large number of offensive formations to the Indo-Tibet border in a relatively short period and sustain them logistically over a long period. The terrain across the border also facilitates this movement and sustenance. Although relations with China are improving gradually, but the build of Chinese capability and the opacity of its decision making process and rapid pace of military modernisation lead to suspicion about its intentions.

Looking at the military balance, even after raising the two mountain divisions, the numerical superiority in manpower alone will still be favourable to China by a factor of at least 1:2, if not more. And since the military balance is not a factor of number of troops alone, the overall superiority in combat potential will continue to be enjoyed by China till India upgrades its infrastructure, improves long range fire power, C4I2 capability, its air power and missile capability. It is felt that the two divisions being raised will merely suffice to plug gaps in Indias defensive deployment in the North East for the present. Maitrayee Guha asked: What steps should India take to tackle the problem of Illegal Immigration? Namrata Goswami replies: India can take three specific steps to tackle the problem of Illegal Immigration: 1. India needs to fence its borders especially on its eastern side. Border posts must be established and professionalism of the border security forces need to be upgraded. 2. Work permits can be issued to those from neighbouring countries wanting to work in India. 3. Bilateral arrangements with neighbouring countries need to worked out so that illegal immigration is checked from both sides of the international border. States like Assam, Tripura, and Mizoram should be an integral part of a unified border management institution.

China has been developing area denial capabilities. I want to ask whether this is a long term strategy or a stop gap method for short term gain. Ramesh V. Phadke replies: Obviously not. "No Chinese strategy is ever short term and hence area denial is also not short term. In fact, China's westward expansion and its quest to control the whole of South China Sea, has far bigger consequences as they would slowly, gradually but surely severely constrain the elbow space that India has or needs to conduct its foreign relations. India would find itself in what I can only term a 'grid lock'. Faud asked: Can you explain the growing numbers of foreign forces in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean? Ruchita Beri replies: The escalation in the number of piracy attacks in recent years has increased the presence of foreign navies in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean Region. In 2008, recognising the growing danger posed to international shipping by pirates, the UN Security Council passed several resolutions to allow countries to send warships to the region. Several countries, including the United States, members of the European Union, Japan, China, Russia, Iran, United Kingdom and India have deployed warships in the region to secure the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs). Collective efforts include deployments by the European Union and the multinational coalition task force, Combined Task Force (CTF 151) and the CTF -150. CTF 151 was established in January 2009 with a special mandate to conduct counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia. While the CTF 150, established in 2001 at the beginning of US

launched War on Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), has a wider mandate and conducts maritime security operations not just in the Gulf of Aden but also the in Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy, deployed in the Gulf of Aden since 2008, has recently crossed the milestone of escorting 1000 ships through piracy infested waters. Sanket Telang asked: About unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang and Implications for India Jagannath Panda replies: It is unwise to use the term unrest with regard to Tibet and the situation in Xinjiang. Both are different types of conflicts and could be termed probably as ethnic crisis-driven areas of China. The Tibet issue has special importance for Indian security as almost 120,000 Tibetan exiles live in India; and also because the Tibetan factor is inextricably linked with the Sino-Indian border dispute. At the same time, the Xinjiang issue also came to the fore when violence broke out between Uyghurs and Hans and the consequent crackdown on Uyghurs by the Chinese government. India of course is naturally more concerned about the situation in Tibet because of the large Tibetan exile community living in India and how their activities might evolve in the post-Dalai Lama period. As for Xinjiang, Indian worries centre on the connections between Uyghur militants and transnational jihadist groups. Above all, the most important implication for India is in terms of the geographical proximity of both Xinjiang and Tibet. Xinjiang borders Ladakh region of India. The eastern part of Ladakh became a disputed area between China and India in the wake of the Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin in 1962. Kovid Kumar asked: What are the future prospects of India and Japan maritime relations? Rajaram Panda replies: The present level of cooperation between India and Japan in the maritime domain is good and the future could be better. Both are heavily dependent on imports of oil from the Persian Gulf. Therefore securing critical energy supply routes provides scope for close naval cooperation. Indias geographical position qualifies it to play a critical strategic role in ensuring maritime safety. The Indian Navy has proved its usefulness in this regard and the Japanese are grateful for the Indian Navys rescue of the Japanese vessel MV Alondra Rainbow which was hijacked by pirates in November 1999. The Eight-fold Initiatives for Strengthening Japan-India Global Partnership of April 2005 provides the framework for joint exercises against piracy, information sharing, technical assistance, cooperation between Coast Guards, etc. As threats to maritime trade and energy supplies from State and non-State actors continue to increase, one can envisage consolidation of the existing cooperation between India and Japan as well as the further strengthening of such cooperation in future. Ankur asked: What is the most important objective that China wants to achieve through the development of ASBM? Ramesh V Phadke replies: If by ASBN you mean the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile DF-21 modified to carry a conventional warhead to target a moving ship/carrier battle group on the high seas, then it is to deter any involvement of the US Navy in a possible future Taiwan conflict.

Sudhakaran asked: What role do the noble ideals of the Indian constitution have in the practical formulation of strategic domestic and foreign policies? Arvind Gupta replies: The Indian Constitution encompasses the noble ideas of democracy, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity etc. The Constitution has made India a sovereign democratic republic. Every citizen has certain fundamental rights. The rights of minorities are also protected under the Constitution. All policies of the government, domestic or foreign, derive their legitimacy from the Constitution. Article 51, which forms part of the Directive Principles of State Policy, deals with international interests and foreign policy. It requires the state to promote international peace and security, maintain just and honourable relations between nations, have respect for international law, fulfill treaty obligations and encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration. This Article forms the basis of India's foreign policy which promotes peace and cooperation. Ankur asked: How are we going to deal with a rising PLAN in the Indian ocean? Pankaj Kumar Jha replies: If we analyse the modernisation trends of PLAN in the last five years, it is clear that the stress is more on smart frigates, anti-ship missiles, nuclear submarines and nuclear submarines with ballistic missile launch capability. These acquisitions are meant for sea denial and creating deterrence. The Indian plan of action is two pronged. Firstly, India is trying to strengthen multilateral forums like Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) to create common consensus on maritime issues, thereby creating a cooperative security framework. At the same time it is also engaging important players through biennial liaison meetings like MILAN, in which more than 16 navies participated last year. Secondly, India is trying to enhance its maritime capabilities through induction of stealth frigates, a new aircraft carrier and the naval version of Brahmos. Lately, India successfully test-fired Brahmos on a moving vessel. Indias Maritime Strategy Doctrine of 2009 has listed the nine sea lanes of communication as vital maritime interests and areas of influence. Also, naval cooperation with countries like Oman, South Africa, Maldives and Indonesia, as well as exercises in South China Sea show that India has a strategic plan of action in place. Maitrayee Guha asked: To what extant is Illegal Immigration a Security Issue? Namrata Goswami replies: To the extent that illegal immigration threatens to overshadow the population of a particular state. For instance, illegal immigration has threatened to change the demography of states in India and several other states in the world, so much so that there is a pervasive fear in these societies that the states' ethnic composition will change in favour of the migrant . Additionally, illegal immigration becomes a security issue when their names are added to a country's voter list. Linkages found between illegal immigrants and underground gangs, terrorist organisations and insurgent groups are also of serious security concern. Worse of all, since immigration is illegal, it is difficult to trace their networks and secret locations in order to bring the guilty to justice.

Sanket Telang asked: Why Doesn't India Develop Dual use Port Facilities with countries like Vietnam and Cambodia like China is doing in IOR? Udai Bhanu Singh replies: The Indian Navy (IN) has both security and economic interests in seeking out port facilities in countries like Vietnam and Cambodia. IN regularly holds naval exercises (Milan) with other navies (including from Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand). IN ships frequent Vietnamese ports like Ho Chi Minh City and Haiphong; recently, between May 30 and June 2, 2010, INS Ranjit and INS Kulish docked in these ports. India has an arrangement with Vietnam for this purpose. Usually, advance information is sought for berthing facility and logistic supplies. It forms part of INs diplomatic exercise in peace time. (Interactions such as these at their basic level may be viewed as a CBM and at their most intense as an alliance partnership). It is assumed that the commitments that nations make for war time eventuality would be of a different order. Sumit Sinha asked: What are Indias capabilities in out of area contingency Ops in terms of force levels and strategy? Ali Ahmed replies: Indian forces see their primary role as defending national territory and sovereignty. Increasingly, an out of area capability is being sought in order to progress and defend national interests resulting from stability of the global order and India's emerging economic interests such as energy security. Considerable capability for this is being developed by all three services. The Army can nominate any of its infantry formations that are not deployed to this task. It has special forces units, the paratroopers having converted to special forces role over the last decade. The Air Force has an Il 76 squadron for transportation. It has additionally acquired the Il 78 refuelling aircraft for extending fighter based air cover. The presence of Su aircraft operating from the mainland in an exercise in the A&N Command area recently indicates the reach. It is also acquiring six C130 Hercules aircraft. It may also acquire ten C 17 Globemaster aircraft. The Navy has acquired the INS Jalashwa, an amphibious landing ship from the US. Its maritime reconnaissance capability and aircraft carriers also buttress the capability. What role can India play in Current Crisis in Korean Peninsula? Shouldn't India support South Korea as it is our major trading partner? Rajaram Panda replies: Indias role in the recent developments in the Korean peninsula is limited. True, South Korea is one of our major trading partners and India is sympathetic to South Korean cause vis--vis North Korea. In fact, the MEA appreciated the restraint with which South Korea handled the findings of the investigation team that found Pyongyang s hand in the sinking of South Korean naval vessel Cheonan in March 2010. While India has diplomatic relations with North Korea, it is concerned about Pyongyangs suspected nuclear links with Myanmar and Pakistan. Our economic ties with South Korea are strong. South Koreas commitment in the Indian market can be discerned from the fact that POSCO has not withdrawn from the over Rs. 50,000 crore steel project from Orissa despite it failure to acquire the 5,000 acres of land for the project. Therefore political turbulence in the Korean peninsula will have little impact on Indo-South Korean economic ties and Indias role will remain limited in the political domain.

Kovid Kumar asked: How much Japans national interest affects the Indian Ocean? Rajaram Panda replies: Peace and tranquillity at sea is of utmost importance for Japan as it is a maritime nation. Maritime security, therefore, is intrinsically connected with Japans economic lifeline. Any disruption in the maritime traffic will drastically affect Japans economy. Being a resource deficient country, no other country in the East Asian region is more dependent than Japan on maritime transport for sourcing critical raw materials and exporting manufactured goods. In particular, the Strait of Malacca is the main passage between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea and therefore a vital lifeline for Japans international trade. As much as 33 per cent of international trade and 50 per cent of the worlds oil pass through the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz. Also 90 per cent of Japans oil requirements come from the Persian Gulf. Because of Constitutional limitations, Japans naval role to tackle issues of piracy and maritime terrorism and securing the SLOC is limited. Japan, therefore, sees India as a strategic asset for naval cooperation. Multilateral naval exercises are also important for Japan. Seen from this perspective, Indian Ocean in Japans national interests is hugely important. R P Singh asked: Can we define "minimum" in India's nuclear doctrine of minimum nuclear deterrence? K. Subrahmanyam replies: The minimum deterrent should spread over three media, air, land and sea (under the sea). It should be sufficient to absorb a first strike by the adversary and then retaliate. It should be sufficient to deter two adversaries who have a nuclear proliferation relationship of over 34 years. This cannot be less than hundred but the optimum figure is a matter of strategic judgement. Sudhakaran asked: How can the armed forces effectively protect national security interests with commitment towards an impeccable human rights agenda? Ali Ahmed replies: The military is committed to following national policy on human rights as defined in the Human Rights Act of 1993. It is a mistaken impression that national security would tend to suffer in any form were the military to affirm its human rights commitments. On the contrary, a military that is in sync with societal culture and national policy is one that is more combat effective. Human rights would not so much come into play in conventional war as would humanitarian law. The military is cognisant of the humanitarian laws, in particular the 1960 Geneva Conventions Act. In so far as subconventional conflict, especially counter insurgency is concerned, adherence to human rights is a force multiplier. It reduces alienation and discredits insurgent propaganda. This enables easier access to intelligence from the people and thereby intelligence based operations. This cycle leads to a lesser imposition on human rights. Therefore, national security is served by adherence to human rights commitments. Akash asked: How has Chinese military strategy undergone change in last five years due to modernisation? R. V. Phadke replies: Chinese military modernisation has helped the PLA change its war fighting doctrine in substantive terms. Gone are the days when the PLA followed the Peoples War Doctrine

that was essentially defensive and allowed the enemy to come in deep before a counter attack was launched. Post 1991 Gulf War the PLA realised that modern weapons would not permit the PLA the luxury to absorb the first attack as its forces could well be decimated. With modern aircraft, ships, and Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) or Fist Units, the PLA would in all probability begin the so called informationised war with a pre-emptive strike when an attack appears imminent. It would also use cyber and psychological warfare and space based assets for reconnaissance, surveillance and possibly offensive operations. Nitin asked: Present Chinese Military force structure in Tibet & implications for India? Jagannath P. Panda replies: Though Chinas military build-up in Tibet is primarily to take control of the region and make it one of Chinas most powerful province; some of its new reach in terms of strategic bombers and long-range missiles would easily enable it to overcome Indias existing detection capabilities. The current plan of missile deployment is attached to the Chinese strategy of its rail linkages offering advantages to the Chinese troops to deploy the rail-car missiles along the border. The PLAs capacity to move these missiles on wheels and aircraft easily in the Tibetan region indicates the logistical and mechanical revolution that is undergoing in PLA. The completion and execution of the QinghaiTibet railway and the expanded railway network up to the Nepal border poses some concerns too. On the Tibetan plateau, a number of new major airbases along with the innumerable newly developed satellite airstrips provide the Chinese Air Force capability to execute offensive operations over the Himalayas. In the west, the Chinese military has invested in logistical build-ups like a metallic highway capable of carrying battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and other technological equipment in Lhasa. Akash asked: How does changing chinese miliary strategy affect India? Ramesh V Phadke replies: Chinas military strategy is part of its overall political design to build its Comprehensive National Power (CNP) to ultimately challenge US supremacy in t he region and later the world. Its application is, however, very subtle and carefully calibrated. China s claims to Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin in India, and Taiwan, Paracels and Spratleys Islands in South China Sea are part of its National Reunification strategy. By selectively befriending smaller countries through generous injections of economic and military assistance and in the case of Pakistan and Iran nuclear and missile know-how it is determined to build a bulwark of anti-American powers in the region and is also ensuring that no middle rung power like India is allowed to become powerful enough to challenge Chinese hegemony in the region. Arnab Dasgupta asked: What are the prospects of cooperation between India and China on securing equity oil abroad? Shebonti Ray Dadwal replies:Joint Holdings of Chinese and Indian Firms in Foreign Oil/Gas Blocks and Equity Assets in Oil Firms Project Country Chinas Participation India's Participation

Yadvaran Oil Field (Iran) Omimex De Columbia Limited (Acquisition of company with oil assets (Colombia) Greater (Sudan) Nile Oil Project

Sinopec 51%

ONGC(OVL) 29%

Sinopec 50%

ONGC(OVL) 50%

CNPC 40% Joint holding of 37% with Sinopec Jt bidding of CNPC with DMCC9RIL and Pluspetrol of Argentina

ONGC(OVL) 25% Joint holding of 37% with ONGC Joint bidding of DMCC(RIL) with CNPC and Pluspetrol of Argentina

Petro Canada's 37% stake in Syrian oil field (Syria) Exploration right of gas block 155 (Peru)

In December 2005, oil companies from the two countries teamed up for the first time to purchase 37 per cent of oil assets in Syria that belonged to the Canadian Oil Co. at a cost of $573 million. ONGC is also working with China Petroleum and Chemical Corp in Iran to exploit the Yadavaran oil field, in which China holds 50 per cent and India holds about 30 per cent in shares. In August 2006, China and India worked again to buy 50 per cent of the shares of an oil field in Colombia. (See table above). On February 22, 2005, GAIL signed an agreement with China that India would invest $243 million in China Gas Co. It became the first-ever cooperation between listed companies of the two countries. In January 2006, former Indian Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar led an Indian natural gas delegation to China, during which five agreements were signed. Also, the multilateral dialogue on energy has become a stage for Sino-Indian cooperation. Vivek asked: Cannot the humble radio (MW/SW) be used to counter the "indoctrination" machinery of Naxal-leadership? P. V. Ramana replies: Certainly, radio and other media could be used to effectively counter Naxal propaganda. As part of its plan to deal with the Naxalites, the government has in place a practice known as Public Perception Management. The technique involves taking up a publicity drive to expose unlawful activities and misdeeds of naxal outfits and their leaders, futility of violence caused by naxalite cadres, absence of development activities in the affected areas due to fear and extortion of naxal cadres, etc. This has to be done subtly and in a concerted way. The media, including radio, has so far not been fully exploited by the government in countering Naxal propaganda. Arnab Dasgupta asked: What are the latest books on India's energy security (oil and natural gas)? G. C. K. Rai Ligia Noronha and Anant Sudarshan, eds., India's Energy Security (Routledge, 2009). replies:

Bhupendra Kumar Singh, India's Energy Security: The Changing Dynamics (Pentagon Press, 2010).

Lakshman Prasad, Energy Security for India: Some Perspectives (LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, 2009). Prashant Agrawal, China and India: A Comparative Analysis of Approaches to Energy Security (Vij Books, 2009). Shebonti Ray Dadwal, Rethinking Energy Security in India (Knowledge World International, 2008). What are your views regarding China's expansionist goals in the north-east and what military strategy would they pursue to achieve them? Anand Kumar replies: China and India have been discussing the unresolved boundary issue at the official level for a long while. From time to time Chinese officials, media and academics lay claim on Arunachal Pradesh, particularly Tawang. India needs to engage China to deepen the bilateral ties and minimize the potential for conflict. An outright military action is unlikely in the near future. In a positive development, the President paid a useful and constructive visit to China. The Chinese have supported northeast insurgents in the past but there are no confirmed reports of their continuing such support. Sambit Patra asked: Are we compromising on financial security, on the advent of a pro-liberalised FDI structure? Are we that dependent on rest of the world? Comment N. S. Sisodia replies: No, Sir. Indias approach to liberalization has been gradual and measured; and its prudential regulation in the financial sector cautions. On the whole, our economy and the financial sector remain robust, with the principal challenges being fiscal health and deficient social and economic infrastructure. While we are not dependent on other countries, our measured integration with the global economy has helped our economic growth. FDI can help provide resources to finance our huge development needs and accelerate growth. In brief, an open economy with proper regulation, economic reforms which promote inclusive economic growth and resolute efforts for meeting internal challenges on fiscal and social and infrastructural front should keep us financially secure. Arnab Dasgupta asked: What I can read about India's energy security ventures in Latin America? Sreeradha Datta replies: Suggested readings for this would include the website of India's Ministry of External Affairs www.mea.gov.in. You can also look up the published reports of the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, www.ongcindia.com and of ONGC Videsh Limitedwww.ongcvidesh.com. Not much has otherwise been written on this except for media reports which are all accessible on the internet. India and the NPT: what next?

The possibilities of India joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State are bleak. However, no-one will want to see the treaty undermined by accommodating India as a Nuclear Weapons State. The only option available which serves the interests of both India and the NPT is to maintain the status quo The recently concluded Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) has renewed the call for the universalisation of the treaty. The NPT RevCon has asked India along with Pakistan and Israel - the three non-signatory states to the NPT- to unilaterally disarm and join the treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). However, India possesses nuclear weapons. The 2008 Civilian Nuclear Agreement between India and USA, also called the Indo-US nuclear deal, has accepted India as a country with advanced nuclea r technology - a tacit acceptance of its weapon capabilities. It has provided India with a special status of being the only country outside the NPT which has been allowed to commerce in sensitive nuclear technology and material. Article III of the NPT prohibits nuclear trade with non-NPT states. This exception is further strengthened by the IAEA-India Safeguards agreement. The agreement allows India to have both civilian and military nuclear programmes. Under NPT only Nuclear Weapon States - states whose possession of nuclear weapons is accepted under Article I of the NPT- have this privilege. Against this backdrop, the call for universalisation throws open exciting questions about Indias future engagement with the NPT. It attempts to deal with three possible scenarios:

India joins NPT as a NNWS India joining the NPT as a NWS India remains outside the treaty while following the principles and norms of the NPT. This for India would be the status quo on the NPT Historical Underpinnings From an Indian standpoint, the history of NPT can be divided into three time periods: the periods of engagement, disengagement and reengagement. The period of engagement stretches from 1954 to 1970. India called for a standstill agreement on all nuclear testing in 1954 and signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. It was one of the members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission (ENDC) which started negotiating the NPT in July 1965. However, as the negotiations unfolded, Indian excitement diminished. The treaty allowed possession of nuclear weapons to states that had imploded nuclear devices before 1 January 1967. However, it did not address the question of reductions of the arsenals of the NWS adequately. As is evident in article VI of the treaty, NWS only promised to negotiate in good faith towards nuclear disarmament. India also felt threatened when China, with which it has a border dispute, was included in the treaty as a NWS since China had conducted nuclear tests in 1964. By the time the treaty came into force in 1970, Indias period of disengagement had begun.

This process lasted from 1970 to 1998. During this period, India distanced itself from the treaty. India had developed a sophisticated nuclear programme since the mid 1940s and the NPTs failure in meeting Indias expectations provided it with a motivation to go nuclear. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, euphemistically called a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion. Following the blast, all international nuclear-related trade with India was heavily sanctioned. In May 1998, it conducted five nuclear tests, declaring to the world its military nuclear programme. However, with the coming of the bomb, came a period of reengagement, informed by two important developments. First, having gone nuclear and thus being reassured of its nuclear status, India joined the other NWS in looking at non-proliferation from the perspective of a state with nuclear weapons. It realized, for example, the destabilizing impact of the nuclear proliferation business between North Korea, China and Pakistan on the South Asian region. Just before the 2000 NPT RevCon, the Indian government for the first time supported the principles of the NPT, though it declined to join it as a NNWS. Again in 2005, the Indian Minister for External Affairs Natwar Singh appealed for strengthening the NPT and called India a responsible nuclear power. This pattern was visible in the address of the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in the recently held Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC where it became evident that India has now become one of the pivotal members of the non-proliferation regime. A shift in Indias stance on the NPT has resulted in India being brought into the non-proliferation regime from the backdoor. Today, India stands at crossroads: part of the non-proliferation regime and yet not a part of the NPT, either as a NNWS or a NWS. Might India join the NPT as a NNWS? India can only be accepted as a NNWS in the NPT if it unilaterally disarms and gives up its military nuclear programme. However, having been recognized as a de facto NWS, a responsible nuclear power and a state with advanced nuclear technology under the Indo-US nuclear deal, this is nearly impossible. Since the 1998 tests, Indian foreign policy has taken a realpolitik bent. As Raja Mohanpointed out in his 2007 study, India realizes that in the foreseeable future nuclear weapons will remain active tools of international diplomacy and may well decide the contours of power politics. Even President Obama conceded the importance of nuclear weapons for US security in his Prague Speech. Also, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review underlines the salience of nuclear weapons in the contemporary world. In this scenario, India would very much like to hold onto its nuclear weapons. Will India join the NPT as a NWS? Many in India and abroad have deliberated on this issue and have responded in favour of bringing an amendment to the NPT under the provisions of Article VIII in order to accommodate India as a NWS member. Legally possible, such a proposal is politically myopic. Bringing an amendment to the NPT is easier said than done. More than one-third of the NPT member states must support any plea for amendment, and a successful amendment to the treaty requires the solid backing of all five NWS as well as a majority of the NNWS.

Consensus among the NNWS is highly problematic. Egypt, which heads the Non-Alignment Movement in the NPT, has described cooperation under the Indo-US nuclear deal as a direct contravention of Article I of the treaty and provisions of Para 12 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension conference. It has also underlined the negative impact of the deal on the overall structure of the NPT. Iran has said that the deal has already severely damaged the NPT. Indias incorporation as a NWS would be even more disconcerting for these countries. Even the NWS understand that such a development may lead to the erosion of NPTs legitimacy. All NWS have an inherent interest in maintaining the sanctity of the NPT. NPT has a near universal membership with 189 members. More than 26 countries, such as South Africa, Brazil and Argentina, have rolled back their nuclear programmes and have become members of the NPT. Only North Korea has proliferated while remaining inside the treaty. Iran is suspected of doing so. Seen against the backdrop of the proliferation fears expressed by President Kennedy in his speech in the United Nations General Assembly in 1961, the NPT has indeed made huge strides towards restraining many states from going nuclear. This explains why the Obama administration is so persistent about the universalisation of the NPT, despite the apparent contradiction, as many in India see it, with the US position in the Indo-US nuclear deal. The constant advocacy for universalisation of the NPT as reflected in the NPT RevCons Final Declaration is a manifestation of a collective interest in preserving the NPT. The above arguments underline the fact that both NWS and NNWS will not wish to see the structure of the NPT changed to accommodate India as a NWS. What about the status quo option? Soon after negotiations on the nuclear deal were initiated, the North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan requested that the US Assistant Secretary of State, Christopher Hill, treat us (North Korea) in the way you treat India(Quoted, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia p.198 - emphasis added.) It means that following the Indian example, North Korea also wants its weapons programme to be legitimized. Hence, the history of Indias engagement, disengagement and reengagement with the NPT has become a model for states who want to go nuclear. In other words, India today offers a complete breakout package to those disgruntled with progress under the NPT ( Ibid, p.199). Incorporation will not only embolden aspirations to follow this model for proliferation but would also provide a fundamental motivation to proliferate. Incorporating India as a NWS into the NPT would suggest that the NWS are only concerned with horizontal proliferation (the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to countries that have not previously held them), not with vertical proliferation (the increase in size of an existing WMD arsenal). This is bolstered by the fact that Indias continued stockpiling of weapons -grade plutonium has received far less attention than proliferation attempts by Iran and North Korea. The impression thus rendered - by the US-India nuclear deal were India were to be granted NWS status - is that once a state crosses the nuclear threshold, the international community will, sooner or later, accept its nuclear status.

The Indo-US nuclear deal was an exception to the rule of the non-proliferation regime. So far, if the damage done by the deal has been limited, this is because of the widespread legitimacy the NPT enjoys in the international arena. However, any further meddling with the NPT will certainly lead to unpalatable outcomes. Even if the NPT has been so far successful in restraining its members from proliferating, continued assault on its core normative underpinnings may lead to its disintegration. This fear, as was indicated by the UN High Level panel on Threats, Challenges and Change did not solely emanate from clandestine activities of states such as North Korea and Iran. It also arose from the constant undermining of the values of the NPT by the great powers, as made evident in the IndoUS civilian nuclear agreement and in the ongoing sidelining of the NWSs disarmament commitments. Indias incorporation into the NPT as a NWS would further strengthen the Indian Model of Proliferation and rekindle motivations to proliferate among other states. Order, in a world with a number of nuclear powers, will be hard to maintain. Therefore, it is in Indias interest as a growing power in the international scene to maintain the status quo on the NPT. Conclusion Under these conditions, the only available option for India and the NPT members is to maintain the status quo. However, maintaining the status quo can only act as a temporary fix in the international nuclear order, given the NPTs inherently discriminatory nature. Diplomat ic wrangling on the issue of universalisation of the NPT will continue until and unless the categories of NWS and NNWS are eliminated. This will only be possible in a world free of nuclear weapons. In a nuclear weapons world, these categories will persist, representing discrimination and injustice, and hence a reason for rivalry and contention amongst states. Anti-Naxal Operations: Employment of Armed Forces The massive naxal strike on CRPF personnel in Chintalnar recently led to public anguish and media frenzy. The noise has died down quickly enough with not much follow up action in sight. Unconfirmed media reports about the findings of the one-man fact finding mission by an eminent police officer indicate that there was an element of command failure, perhaps at the level of a Deputy Commandant, and lack of coordination between the state police and the CPO i.e. CRPF. More will be known when the report is placed in the public domain. But the problem is much deeper and requires greater understanding and more concerted effort than what is visible today. Remarks by the Army Chief and Air Chief about the inadvisability of involving the Army and the Air Force in anti-naxal operations led to some controversy in the press. Sadly, the criticism was not based on objective analysis of the context in which the remarks were made nor the reasons on which their views were based. Some people went to the extent of questioning the Chiefs right to comment on an issue which is the prerogative of the civilian authority to decide.

The coverage of the ill-informed views of some commentators would have been less unfortunate if instead of using the term civilian they had used the term political leadership. In our context the use of the term civil-military makes it appear that those who wear the uniform and those who do not are on opposite sides of the unbridgeable divide. It is not so. The Armed Forces belong to the country. They are Indias Armed Forces. They have the good of the country at heart and the people are aware of their sacrifices for ensuring that our countrymen are secure from external and internal threats. Indias Armed Forces also understand and respect the centrality of politics to issues of war and peace. But they are also stakeholders in Indias stability and growth, being equal citizens of the country. If they have to step in to restore order where disorder has resulted from poor or no governance then good governance is their business too. They have a right to state their views and the people of India, the real sovereigns, are entitled to know those views. Of course, the Chiefs know that once a decision is taken by the political leadership despite reservations expressed by the former in the consultation phase, they are expected to ensure its success. That is what has always been done. Whether to Employ Armed Forces or Not? The decision to employ the Army and the Air Force in anti-naxal operations is, and will remain, a political decision. But one has to see its impact in short and long term and also explore alternatives to arrive at the best decision under the circumstances. A short term quick fix solution with a long term adverse fall out is something to be avoided. The naxal problem is not a short term problem nor is a simple solution readily available. Naxals will not be too unhappy if the Armed Forces are employed against them because it would be an acknowledgement of their prowess and reach. Any successful attack against an isolated Army detachment or patrol will add to their aura of invincibility. And the country will be left asking the question what next? Naxals will fabricate stories of Army atrocities like the insurgents elsewhere have done, which will only demoralise the troops. We all know that the people affected by naxalism are poor and neglected. They enjoy a degree of sympathy among civil society. Once the Army is employed in such areas it will hurt Indias image very adversely. There are operational and management issues as well. The Indian Army, particularly its infantry and supporting arms, have been continuously involved in counter insurgency or counter terrorism operations since the early fifties. The Army is experienced in such operations but is also stretched to limits. The field peace turnover ratio, i.e., the time spent alternately in field and peace, is greater than one. Troops spend more time away from peace stations than in them. Stay with their families gets reduced further due to absence from their base due to training exercises and other requirements and inadequacy of married accommodation in peace stations. How much more can you stretch the sword arm of Indias Army without the stress and strain showing adversely? If it was a short term engagement then the matter would have been different.

But anti-naxal operations are going to be an extended affair because our decision making processes, disputes on turf and responsibility and abysmal implementation skills make it impossible for any policy to succeed in a short time. The Armed Forces have brought the situation under control in J&K but the political initiative to restore total normalcy is not making headway. Gains of Operations Bajrang and Rhino were frittered away thus prolonging peoples agony for decades. In any case, long term involvement of the Army is bound to affect its conventional capability and we can hardly afford that. Fortunately, the political leadership understands this and is not in favour of employing Armed Forces in anti-naxal operations, at least for now. In case one or more Chintalnar type incidents take place in future, political considerations may dictate involvement of the Armed Forces. Even then it will not be a wise decision. The Alternative We need to examine as to why different organisations with same weapons and manpower and from same background perform differently in anti-terrorist and anti-insurgency operations. Difference in performance is due to leadership, age profile, manner of employment, professional ethos, logistics, and camaraderie, chain of command and its responsiveness. Presently the CRPF is employed in company and platoon lots and often attached to police stations or to the district police. There is no specific area of operations assigned to CRPF battalions under the command of their commanding officer. Companies are often commanded by inspectors in their 50s who neither have the energy and stamina nor motivation to fight an invisible opponent with thorough knowledge of terrain and enjoying local support. There is no intelligence grid and definitely no inter-state intelligence sharing about the organisation or movement of militants who cross unhindered from one state to another. The leadership from battalion level upwards is not involved in operations with troops, leaving the latter resentful and demotivated. It is of course important to provide defensive gear and reliable weapons systems to the personnel involved in combating naxals but it is even more important to train them in all aspects of combat networking with the population, population control, intelligence collection and sharing, combat operations and coordinated development activities. Grouping of public health, education, public works, irrigation and agriculture specialists with the CRPF to form cohesive multidisciplinary task forces will send a message of the governments seriousness in addressing the basic problems of the people along with the resolve to deal with violence. Since the threat has become too large it cannot be tackled all at once. The Government could either follow the drying up the swamp approach by trying to gain control of the areas most affected by naxalism, like Bastar Region, Malkangiri etc, or by adopting an outside in approach by stabilising moderately affected areas and then trying to converge on to the most troubled areas. It is felt that the latter approach would pay better dividends because it would be possible to deploy a whole range of governmental resources to win over peoples support by improving their lot. Focus on roads, agro industries, smaller projects which can employ local people. Increase the reach gradually. Let the

people see who is harming their interests. Let the state machinery bond with the people. This recommendation flows from the assumption that common people seek safety, security and progress and will not support naxals if their basic needs are met. The differences in quality of life of those under naxal influence and those supporting the Government will inspire the former to turn against naxals. It may be necessary in the interim not to devote resources for restoring facilities destroyed by naxals in the areas under their strong influence. This is not a tool for imposing collective punishment on people for supporting naxals but a means to use finite resources to better effect and also win a psychological battle with the naxals. In the short run identifying and capturing or eliminating known naxal leaders needs to be given a serious thought. The key to success of this endeavour lies in the success of law enforcement agencies and counternaxal forces to restore order in naxal affected areas. There is therefore the imperative need to conceptualise, plan and conduct operations with clarity of aim, strategy and determination. Reiteration of commitment is not enough. The strategy has to be made to succeed. The anti-naxal forces have to be organised properly with clear command and control set up, trained and properly led. It is possible to do so. It will be necessary to provide better leadership at all levels, separate CI force from law & order force, post fitter and younger jawans to anti-naxal forces, provide adequate young leaders, train them together and employ capable senior leaders. It is necessary to select young officers for long tenures. Those who can work in a team should be preferred. Ideally, it must be mandatory for every police and PMF officer to serve with infantry units deployed in counterinsurgency operations for the first three to five years of their initial service. This will equip them mentally to face the internal security challenges and lead their subordinates with lan. Specific operational responsibility needs to be assigned to CPO units and ranges. The bases need to be secure for them to venture out. Let them develop intelligence, ensure inter-state coordination, and receive cooperation from states - particularly its police force. The principle of unity of command has to be ensured and the operational area assigned based on operational synergy rather than constrained by state boundaries. Whereas employing Army (and Air Force) is inadvisable, taking their help in training, operational advice, coordination and development of intelligence, manning key appointments in unified headquarters, streamlining logistics, etc. will help fight the naxal menace successfully. We also have to ensure that the administration learns its lessons and improves on governance rather than falling back on old habits of mismanagement and corruption. Choking of funds flow by controlling the contractors, mine owners, businesses and unscrupulous government officials will also be required. The authority of the state is being challenged openly and action is needed to reestablish state authority. The question is how the authority was lost? Have we learnt our lessons so that we never let this authority be lost again? Often enough the lower level government functionaries are blamed for messing up things but what about loss of oversight and lack of timely correctives. Simultaneous action on revamping administration and bringing in accountability in governance cannot be deferred.

Some respected security analysts have been recommending lateral entry of Armed Forces personnel into CPO and PMF after a couple of years of service. The Sixth Pay Commission also recommended absorption of PBOR, who retire at a much younger age than police and PMF personnel, into these organisations. Indeed it is a wise recommendation and must be introduced but with related issues also factored in. In case the leadership is the key to success then there is no use sending young soldiers to serve under leaders who have neither the experience of counter insurgency nor share the ethos of the organisations in which the soldiers have been performing well. They have to be placed under officers who share similar ethos. Short service commissioned officers must also be given the option to move laterally into the CPO and PMF. Similarly the officers at middle and senior levels who also retire earlier than their civilian counterparts must have an option for lateral absorption. Select them for their suitability and matching job profile. Place them under similarly sidestepped officers, under early retiree senior officers. Raise a separate wing to fight insurgency with adequate number of units to be able to rotate, not under district police or police stations but with an assigned area of responsibility. The Assam Rifles model can be tried out too. It works under MHA and its operational record has been very good. An NSG-type arrangement is highly unsatisfactory and breeds resentment amongst highly skilled commandos even if at the tactical level they are commanded by selected Army officers. In the Army, commandos are not commanded even by normal infantry officers. Army deputationists in NSG may not mind a comparatively better family life, deputation allowance, fewer combat situations, higher profile, greater freedom than what Army life can afford them but it does not mean it is ideal or an even satisfactory arrangement. No one can claim that operations in Mumbai post 26/11 were conducted in the best possible manner. Conclusion Naxalism poses a major challenge to the country. That it will not succeed in overthrowing the Government is a given fact. But if allowed to fester it will cause grave damage to the country. It will affect the nations economy, internal cohesion, damage its social fabric and impede overall progress. Whereas employing Armed Forces may appear to be an attractive idea in the face of inability of state and central police forces and PMF to control the menace, the adverse effects of long term commitment of Armed Forces, particularly on the Army, needs to be understood. We should attempt to improve the operational capability of PMF and CPOs to undertake the operations on their own and supplement the effort by toning up the administration and developing political consensus. Armed Forces should be used only sparingly for internal security duties. This has not been the case so far. Their involvement in anti-naxal operations will seriously affect their combat readiness to face external security challenges which we can ill afford. We need to develop other potent alternatives for which adequate scope exists.