1. SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA 32 SCRA 188 (2970) FACTS: Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem. School.

He was adjudged 3rd Honors (3rd placer). 3 days before graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor students. They filed a CERTIORARI case against the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating honors. They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of official discretion because they claim that: o The 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival of Santiago before, except in Grade 5 only. o That Santiago was a consistent honor student from Grade 1 to 5 o that the 1st placer was coached and tutored by grade 6 teachers during the summer (gaining unfair advantage) o The committee was composed only of Grade 6 teachers. o That some teachers gave Santos a 75% with an intention to pull him to a much lower rank o That in the Honors Certificate in Grade 1, the word first place was erased and replaced with second place o That the Principal and district supervisors merely passed the buck to each other to delay his grievances. The respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and that even assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (because the graduation already proceeded). Respondents also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions. (under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial functions) ISSUE: May judicial function be exercised in this case? What is judicial power?

HELD: A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist, (TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A TRIBUNAL OR BOARD EXERCISES JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS)

1) There must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and determination. , and 2) That the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision. 3) The tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive) It maybe said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy. The phrase judicial power is defined: As authority to determine the rights of persons or property. Authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication. The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them. The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students is neither judicial nor quasijudicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring therefrom is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of contending parties. There is nothing about any rule of law that provides for when teachers sit down to assess individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors. Worse still, the petitioners have not presented the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual for Teachers which was allegedly violated by the Committee. The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges. And for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions.

2. NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE 23 SCRA 405

FACTS: Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title. The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him to explain. Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES) Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)?

HELD: NO.If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank and privileges equivalent to Judges, the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over such officials. There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties. The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required

to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions. As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not include and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon the Courts recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution. The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid. Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the consultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions.

3. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY 57 Phil. 600 (1932) FACTS: The case at bar relates with a petition of the Manila Electric Company (MEC, pet), requesting the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the MEC and the compensation to be paid to the MEC by such transportation companies. Act NO. 1446, Section 11 Relates with the legal act of the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. ISSUE: Concerns the legal right of the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity. HELD: Act 1446, Section 11 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the SC, sitting as a board or arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the MEC. The decisions of the Board of Arbitration shall go through the regular court system (Trial Courts Court of Appeals SC). They will be reviewed by the lower courts and will ultimately be reviewed by themselves. The SC cannot sit as members of the Board of Arbitration because it is not within their jurisdiction to decided on cases on purely contractual situations

4. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS VS. ANG CHO KIO 33 SCRA 494 FACTS: Ang was convicted and was granted conditional pardon. He was never to return to the Philippines. In violation of his pardon, he returned. He was recommitted by order of the Executive Secretary. He filed a petition for habeas corpus. RTC denied. CA also denied it. But the CA made a recommendation that Ang may be allowed to leave the country on the first available transportation abroad. The Solgen assailed this CA decision, claiming that the recommendation by the CA should not be part of the decision, because it gives the decision a political complexion, because courts are not empowered to make such recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the exercise of judicial powers. The Solgen contends that allowing convicted aliens to leave the country is an act of the state exercises solely in the discretion of the Chief Executive. It is urged that the act of sending an undesirable alien out of the country is political in character, and the courts should not interfere with, nor attempt to influence, the political acts of the President. ISSUE: Whether the CA decision was proper? Can it make recommendations? HELD: NO.The case in the CA was for habeas corpus. The only issue there was whether the RTC correctly denied the petition. The CA was not called upon the review any sentence imposed upon Ang. The sentence against him had long become final and in fact, he was pardoned. The opinion should have been limited to the affirmance of the decision of the RTC, and no more. The recommendatory powers of the courts are limited to those expressly provided in the law, such as Art 5 RPC. (When an act is not punishable by law judge should report it to the executive). The CA was simply called to determine whether Ang was illegally confined or not under the Director of Prisons (for violating the pardon). It was improper for the CA justices to make a recommendation that would suggest a modification or correction of the act of the President. The matter of whether an alien who violated the law may remain or be deported is a political question that should be left entirely to the President, under the principle of separation of powers. It is not within the province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or a suggestion that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of an action by the President, which are purely political in nature.

After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the interpretation and application of the law. Judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably upon the competence and the propriety of their judicial actuations.

5. In re LAURETA 148 SCRA 382 FACTS: MaravillaIllustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics. Illustre also threatened in her letter that, there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from finished by a long shot. She threatened that she would call for a press conference. Illustres letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents. The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case. Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats to expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice. True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution. Atty. LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complaint to the press, without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC is charging them with contempt. They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor the court.

HELD: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court. There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession. Were not convinced that AttyLaureta had nothing to do with Ilustres letters, nor with the complaint filed with the tanodbayan. AttyLaureta repeated disparaging remarks such as undue influence, powerful influence in his pleadings. This was bolstered by the report that Laureta distributed copies of the complaint to the newspaper companies in envelopes bearing his name. He was also heard over the radio. Lastly, as Illustres lawyer, he had control of the proceedings. In short, SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the government because of separation of powers. The correctness of the SC decisions are conclusive upon other branches of government.

6. MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS 177 SCRA 668 (1989)

FACTS:

Ferdinand E. Marcos who was deposed from his seat through the EDSA people power revolution was forced into exile in 1986 and Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. When Marcos was dying, he wished to return to the country along with his family but Pres. Aquino stood in his way and contended that Marcos cannot return to the country considering that his return would be a threat to the stability of the government and the countrys economy. The Marcoses assert that their right to return to the country is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution and that under international law, the right of Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the president, as part of her residual power, can ban the return of Marcos and his family to the country considering the consequences which could pose a serious threat to national interest and welfare of the country. The Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved to the people.

7. UNITED STATES vs. Nixon 418 U.S. 683 (1974) FACTS: A subpoena was issued was issued to the President Richard Nixon of the United States. The subpoena directed the President to produce certain tape recordings and document relating to his conversation with aides and advisers. The court rejected the Presidents claim of absolute executive privilege.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President can use executive privilege as an excuse to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial? HELD: The Supreme Court does have the final voice in determining constitutional questions: no persons, not even the president of the United States, is completely above the law; and the President cannot use executive as an excuse to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial. In the Philippines, Judicial power is also vested in one Supreme Court and it is its duty to settle controversies such as presented in the case.

8. ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

FACTS: This is a petition to question the legitimacy of the assumption as President of the Philippines by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo claims she is the President. At about 12:00 noon of January 20, 2001, Chief justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm, petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacanang Palace. He issued the following press statement: STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society. It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country. I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people. MABUHAY! ISSUE: Whether or not the assumption of the Vice President on July 20, 2001 was constitutional? HELD: Yes, In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the

President and Vice President, the President of the Senate, or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

9. ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA 277 SCRA 268 (1997) FACTS: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee re port, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House.

HELD: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.

Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

10. INFOTECH FOUNDATION VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 159139 January 13, 2004 Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed R.A. 8046 (An act authorizing the COMELEC to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and pilot-test it in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and for other purposes). On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. 8436 (An act authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system in the May 11, 1998 national or local elections and in subsequent national and local electoral exercises, providing funds therefore and for other purposes). On October 29, 2002, COMELEC adopted its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three phases of its Automated Election System: namely, Phase I-Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II-Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase IIIElectronic Transmissions. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO No. 172, which allocated the sum of P 2.5 billion to fund the AES for May 10, 2004 elections. She authorized the release of an additional P 500 million, upon the request of COMELEC. The COMELEC issued an Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid. There are 57 bidders who participated therein. The Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) found MPC and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. Both were referred to Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). However, the DOST said in its Report on the Evaluation of Technical Proposals on Phase II that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 6074, awarding the project to MPC. Wherefore, petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines wrote a letter to the COMELEC chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. They protested the award of the contract to respondent MPC. However in a letter-reply, the COMELEC rejected the protest. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding the contract to MPC in violation of law and in disregard of its own bidding rules and procedure.

Held: The Court has explained that COMELEC flagrantly violated the public policy on public biddings (1) by allowing MPC/MPEI to participate in the bidding even though it was not qualified to do so; and (2) by eventually awarding the contract to MPC/MPEI. It is clear that the Commission further desecrated the law on public bidding by permitting the winning bidder to alter the subject of the contract, in effect allowing a substantive amendment without public bidding.

11. Mattel, Inc. v Emma Francisco G.R. No. 166886 July 30, 2008 FACTS: Jimmy A. Uy (Uy) filed a trademark application with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarksand Technology Transfer (BPTTT) for registration of the trademark "BARBIE" for useon confectionary products, such as milk, chocolate, candies, milkbar and chocolate candies Mattel, Inc. (Mattel), filed a Notice of Opposition against Uy's "Barbie" trademark as thelatter was confusingly similar to its trademark on dolls, doll clothes and doll accessories, toys and other similar commercial products. Public respondent Estrellita B. Abelardo, the Director of the Bureau of Legal Affairs, IPO, rendered a Decision dismissing Mattel's opposition and giving due course to Uys application for the registration of the trademark "Barbie" used on confectionary products. The Director held that there was no confusing similarity between the two competing marks because the goods were non-competing or unrelated. Mattel filed MR which was denied then it appealed the decision with the Director General. Public respondent Emma C. Francisco, the Director General, rendered a Decision denying the appeal on the ground that there was no proof on record that Mattel had ventured into the production of chocolates and confectionary products under the trademark "Barbie" to enable it to prevent Uy from using an identical "Barbie" trademark on said goods; that the records were bereft of the fact that the Director of the Bureau of Trademarks (BOT) had already declared the subject trademark application abandoned due to the non-filing of the Declaration of Actual Use (DAU) by Uy. ISSUE: Whether the application is deemed withdrawn or abandoned for failure to file the DAU. HELD: Uy's declaration in his Comment and Memorandum before this Court that he has not filed the DAU as mandated by pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 8293 is a judicial admission that hehas effectively abandoned or withdrawn any right or interest in his trademark. Section 124.2 of R.A. No. 8293 provides: The applicant or the registrant shall file a declaration of actual use of the mark with evidence to that effect, as prescribed by the Regulations within three (3) years from the filing date of the application. Otherwise, the applicant shall be refused or the marks shall be removed from the Register by the Director. Moreover, Rule 204 of the Rules and Regulations on Trademarks provides: Declaration of Actual Use. The Office will not require any proof of

use in commerce in the processing of trademark applications. However, without need of any notice from the Office, all applicants or registrants shall file a declaration of actual use of the mark with evidence to that effect within three years, without possibility of extension, from the filing date of the application.

12.

VILLAROSA vs.HRET G.R. No. 143351 & 144129 September 14, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner VILLAROSA and Private respondent QUINTOS were the only candidates for the office of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of Occidental Mindoro in the 11 May1998 synchronized national and local elections. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed VILLAROSA as the winning candidate with a margin of 3,032 votes. QUINTOS filed an election protest against VILLAROSA contesting the results of the election in all the 882 precincts in the eleven municipalities of Occidental Mindoro. Petitioner is the wife of JOSE T. VILLAROSA, who was Representative of the District in question for two terms, the last of which ended on June 30, 1998; in his certificate of candidacy for the election of May 8, 1995,JOSE T. VILLAROSA wrote as his nickname or stage name: JOE-JTV. In her certificate of candidacy, Protestee wrote JTV as her nickname/stage name.HRET promulgated a resolution stating that with QUINTOS withdrawal of the remaining non-pilot protested precincts, QUINTOS impliedly limited the issue to WHETHER OR NOT THE JTVVOTES SHOULD BE COUNTED IN FAVOR OF PROTESTEE AMELITA C. VILLAROSA. HRET issued Resolution informing the parties that the Tribunal ruled, by [a] vote of 5 -4 of its members, not to count JTV and its variations as valid votes for Protestee Amelita C. Villarosa, the same being considered stray ballots.VILLAROSA filed with this Court a petition for certiorari . She alleged therein that the HRET gravely abused its discretion in (a) issuing the above-mentioned resolutions that it violated her right to due process when it disposed by a 5-4 ruling a vital election incident without stating therein the findings of fact and law on which the resolutions were based; and (b) treating JTV votes as stray and invalid, resulting in the disenfranchisement of the voters of Occidental Mindoro. She argued that JTV was her designated nickname in the official list of candidates submitted by the provincial election supervisor to the COMELEC in Manila; it was the nickname she used in her posters, handbills and other election propaganda throughout the campaign period. In her speeches during the rallies, she urged the voters who might have found her full name difficult to write to simply vote JTV, as she had decided to use that nickname as a shortcut of her name as a married woman under Article 370 of the Civil Code. HELD: We hold that VILLAROSA was not denied due process in this regard. As to the limitation of the issue, VILLAROSA has herself to blame. First, she sought no reconsideration of the pronouncement of the HRET in its 7 October 1999 Resolution that [w]ith Protestants withdrawal of the remaining non-pilot protested precincts, Protestant impliedly limited the issue to whether or not JTV votes should be counted in favor of protestee Amelita C. Villarosa. Second, at the oral argument before the HRET on 9 December 1999, VILLAROSAs counsel did not object to, but instead concurred with, QUINTOS submission that the case would rise or fall on how the Tribunal would

rule on the JTV votes.As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) there must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon the lawful hearing. The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of ones defense. To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one maybe heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process

13.

VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULO G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

FACTS: This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG. Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japa ns compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals. Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956. On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development. ISSUE: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

HELD: Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative the political departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed. From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of

both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By taking u p the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law. Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally. Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens. The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority

14.

Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI) 191 SCRA 288 , November 1990

FACTS: Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the products naphta cracker and naphta to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted private respondent BPCs application, stating that the investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project. ISSUE: Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the investors without considering the national interest RULING: The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock maintained. The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Courts judicial power to settle actual controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOIs action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government, could have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: .. he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. Justice Grio Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken because the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended application. She stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner should have appealed to the President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code. Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the

Constitution does not vest in the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.

15.

ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998

FACTS: The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime. He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions. In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659. The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director. In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground. The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections. The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegarays arguments. The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the petition.

Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory. ISSUE: 1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment? 2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?

3. 3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power? 4. 4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law? HELD: No 1st three issues. Yes to last. Petition denied. Ratio: 1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel. Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials. Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the

death convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs. Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated. First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever. Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment. Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely. What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:

2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court." The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes". Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document. 3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides a manual for the execution procedure. It was supposed to be confidential. The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.

4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659. "SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code." Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a genderbased discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law. Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.

16. Torrecampo vs. MWSS 649 SCRA 482 FACTS: Barangay Beda Torrecampo filed a petition for injunction in the Supreme Court regarding the c-5 Road Extension Project for the said project would result to injury to the petioner and 8 million residents of Metro Manila. The project would endanger the health of residents for aqueducts responsible for the water supply in the area could be damaged. ISSUE: Whether or not Torrecampo is entitled for injunction. HELD: Torrecampo is not entitled to an injunction for judicial review does not apply to matters concerning the executive branch.

17. LIBAN VS. GORDON 639 SCRA 709

FACTS: Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the QC Red Cross Chapter while Respondent is the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privatelyrun charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors fourfifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator. The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation. ISSUE: Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

HELD: [The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.] NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota (cause of action) of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation. The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case.

18. BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO 641 SCRA 244 FACTS: Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms ,is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has locus standi. HELD: Petitioner, through its three party-list representatives, contends that the issue of the validity or invalidity of the Agreement carries with it constitutional significance and is of paramount importance that justifies its standing. Cited in this regard is what is usually referred to as the emergency powers cases, in which ordinary citizens and taxpayers were accorded the personality to question the constitutionality of executive issuances. Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." Specifically, it is "a partys personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance." Locus standi, however, is merely a matter of procedure and it has been recognized that, in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters who actually sue in the public interest.

Consequently, in a catena of cases, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal stance on locus standi. In the case at bar, petitioners representatives have complied with the qualifying conditions or specific requirements exacted under the locus standi rule. As citizens, their interest in the subject matter of the petition is direct and personal. At the very least, their assertions questioning the Agreement are made of a public right, i.e., to ascertain that the Agreement did not go against established national policies, practices, and obligations bearing on the States obligation to the community of nations. At any event, the primordial importance to Filipino citizens in general of the issue at hand impels the Court to brush aside the procedural barrier posed by the traditional requirement of locus standi. The Court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.

19. MAGALONA VS. ERMITA 655 SCRA 476

FACTS: The antecedent facts of this case emerged upon the passing of Republic Act 3046 in 1961. The laws purpose is to demarcate the maritime baselines of the Philippines as it was deemed to be an archipelago. RA 3046 stood unchallenged until 2009, when Congress amended it and passed RA 9522. This amending law shortened one baseline and determined new base points of the archipelago. Moreso, it has identified the Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands", generating their own maritime zones. The petitioners filed a case assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522. To their opinion, the law has effectively reduced the maritime territory of the country. With this, Article I of the 1987 Constitution will be violated. The petitioners also worried that that because of the suggested changes in the maritime baselines will allow for foreign aircrafts and vessels to traverse the Philippine territory freely. In effect, it steps on the states sovereignty and national security. Meanwhile, the Congress insisted that in no way will the amendments affect any pertinent power of the state. It also deferred to agree that the law impliedly relinquishes the Philippines claims over Sabah. Lastly, they have questioned the normative force of the notion that all the waters within the rectangular boundaries in the Treaty of Paris. Now, because this treaty still has undetermined controversies, the Congress believes that in the perspective of international law, it did not see any binding obligation to honor it. Thus, this case of prayer for writs of certiorari and prohibition is filed before the court, assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522. ISSUE: Whether or not the RA 9522 is unconstitutional HELD: The Court dismissed the case. It upheld the constitutionality of the law and made it clear that it has merely demarcated the countrys maritime zones and continental shelves in accordance to UNCLOS III. Secondly, the Court found that the framework of the regime of islands suggested by the law is not incongruent with the Philippines enjoyment of territorial sovereignty over the areas of Kalayaan Group of Islands and the Scarborough. Third, the court reiterated that the claims over Sabah remained even with the adoption of the amendments. Further, the Court importantly stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.

With regard to the petitioners assertion that RA 9522 has converted the internal waters into archipelagic waters, the Court did not appear to be persuaded. Instead, the Court suggested that the political branches of Government can pass domestic laws that will aid in the competent security measures and policies that will regulate innocent passage. Since the Court emphasized innocent passage as a right based on customary law, it also believes that no state can validly invoke sovereignty to deny a right acknowledged by modern states. In the case of archipelagic states such as ours, UNCLOS III required the imposition of innocent passage as a concession in lieu of their right to claim the entire waters landward baseline. It also made it possible for archipelagic states to be recognized as a cohesive entity under the UNCLOS III. Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011

20. HACIENDA VS. PARC GR NO. 171101, NOVEMBER 22, 2011

FACTS: On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farm workers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their prited names. The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP? Held: NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP. [Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands

originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657. However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded. On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.

21. SANA VS. CESB GR No. 192926, November 15, 2011 FACTS: On 4 August 2010, petitioner Atty. Elias Omar A. Sana (petitioner) filed the present petition, contending that EO 883 and the subsequent appointment of the 13 executive officials to CESO rank are void for violating the constitutional ban on midnight appointment under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. Petitioner theorizes that appointments to positions and ranks in the CES are executive in nature and, if made within the period provided under Section 15, Article VII, fall under its prohibition. Petitioner submits that CESB Resolution No. 870 circumvents Section 15, Article VII by distinguishing the terms appoint and appointment. He contends that CESB Resolution No. 870 cannot give new meaning to presidential issuances, laws, and the Constitution. In its Comment, the CESB prays for the dismissal of the petition as the issue it raises was rendered moot by EO 3s revocation of EO 883. Alternatively, the CESB defends the vesting of CESO rank to the 13 officials based on an opinion given by Atty. Ferdinand Rafanan (Rafanan), head of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Law Department, that the appointment to a CES[O] rank is not equivalent to an appointment to an office since the latter entails the conferment of an authority to exercise the functions of an office whereas the former is merely a completion of a previous appointment. Rafanan further opined that such vesting of CESO rank is valid because it does not contemplate any hiring or appointment since it involves only the confe rment of a rank rather than a selection for a position. The CESB agrees with Rafanans view, invoking Article IV, Part III, paragraph (c) of the Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP), which states that [a]ppointment to appropriate classes in the Career Executive Service shall be made by the President from a list of career executive eligibles recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall be made on the basis of rank. Nevertheless, the CESB submits that the grant of CESO rank III or higher to lawyers in the executive service under EO 883 is not automatic because this needs prior guidelines from the CESB. The CESB points out that President Arroyo did not confer CESO rank to any official based on EO 883. Alternatively, the OSG argues that EO 883 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. The OSG adds that even if EO 883 is valid, it does not automatically confer CESO rank to lawyers holding CES positions. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 883 and EO 870 is unconstitutional.

HELD: We dismiss the petition on the threshold ground of mootness. The petition seeks a review of the constitutionality of EO 883 and CESB Resolution No. 870 for being repugnant to Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. At the time this petition was filed, however, President Aquino had already issued EO 3 revoking EO 883 expressly (under Section 1) and CESB Resolution No. 870 impliedly (under Section 2). EO 883 and CESB Resolution No. 870 having ceased to have any force and effect, the Court finds no reason to reach the merits of the petition and pass upon these issuances validity. To do so would transgress the requirement of case and controversy as precondition for the Courts exercise of judicial review. (Art. VIII: Judicial Department S.1) True, this Court had relaxed the case and controversy requirement to resolve moot issues. In those instances, however, the issues presented were grounded on peculiar set of facts giving rise to important constitutional questions capable of repetition yet evading review or indicating intent on the part of potential or actual parties to place a constitutional question beyond the ambit of judicial review by performing acts rendering moot an incipient or pending justiciable controversy. (Art. VIII: Judicial Department S.1) These factors do not obtain here. The question whether an appointment to a CESO rank of an executive official amounts to an appointment for purposes of the constitutional ban on midnight appointment, while potentially recurring, holds no certainty of evading judicial review as the question can be decided even beyond the appointments-ban period under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. Indeed, petitioner does not allege to have suffered any violation of a right vested in him under EO 883. He was not among the 13 officials granted CESO ranking by President Arroyo. The CESB itself stated that no conferment of CESO rank was ever made by President [Arroyo] in relation to EO 883. Hence, for the Court to nevertheless reach the merits of this petition and determine the constitutionality of EO 883 and CESB Resolution No. 870 despite their unquestioned repeal and the absence of any resulting prejudice to petitioners rights is to depart from its constitutional role of settling actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.

22. Gamboa vs. Teves 652 SCRA 690

FACTS: This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based investment management and holding company and a shareholder of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also involved an indirect sale of 12 million shares (or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares) of PLDT owned by PTIC to First Pacific. With the this sale, First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. This, according to the petitioner, violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners choice of remedy is proper. HELD: No. However, since the threshold and purely legal issue on the definition of the term capital i Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution has far -reaching implications to the national economy. The courts treats the petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus. It is well-settles that this court may treat a petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus if the issue involved has far-reaching implications.

23. Mantruste Systems, Inc. v. CA G.R. Nos. 86540-41 November 6, 1989 Facts: Mantruste System, Inc. (MSI) entered into an interim lease agreement with the Development Bank of the Philippines owner of the Bayview Plaza Hotel wherein the former would operate the hotel for a minimum of three month s or until such time that the said properties are sold to MSI or other third parties by DBP. On December 8, 1986 the President issued Proclamation No. 50 entitled Launching a Program for the Expeditious Disposition or Privatization of Cer tain Government Corporations and/or the (acquired) Assets thereof, and creating a Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust. The Bayview Hotel properties were among the government assets Identified for privatization and were consequently transferred from DBP to APT for disposition. To effect the disposition of the property, the DBP notified MSI that it was terminating the interim lease agreement. In a certificate signed by Ernesto S. Salgado, President and Chairman of the Board of herein private respondent the latter agreed to the termination. October 7, 1987 the APT sent a letter to MSI through Mr. Salgado granting the latter an extension of thirty days from October 18 within which to effect the delivery of the Bayview Prince Hotel to APT. The extension was given to allow (MSI) to wind up its affairs and to facilitate a smooth turn-over of the facilities to its new owners without necessarily interrupting the hotels regular operation. The signature of Mr. Salgado appears on the lower left hand of the letter under the word CONFORME. APTs response to this demand was equally firm. It informed MSI that APT has . . . not found any stipulation tending to support your claim that Mantruste System, Inc., as lessee, has acquired ... priority right to the purchase of Bayview Hotel . . . The Trust also pointed out that the Pre-Bidding Conference for the sale of the hotel has already been conducted such that for APT to favorably consider your (MSIs) req uest would not be in consonance with law, equity and fair play. On October 28, Salgado, speaking for MSI, wrote APT informing the latter of the alleged legal lien over the hotel to the amount of P10,000,000 (should be P12,000,000). Moreover, he demanded that the Trust consider MSI a very preferred bidder. Nevertheless, on November 4, 1987 herein private respondent allegedly prepared to submit its bid to the APT for P95,000,000.00 in cash or P120,000,000 in installment terms. On the same occasion, however, MSI asked the Trust for clarification on the following points: (1) whether APT had a clean title over the property; (2) whether the Trust knew the hotel had back taxes; (3) who should pay the tax arrears; and (4)

whether MSIS advances made in behalf of DBP would be treated as part of the bid offer. On November 13, 1981, herein private respondent filed a complaint with respondent lower court docketed as Civil Case No. 18319 praying among others for: (1) the issuance of a restraining order enjoining APT from approving the winning bid and awarding the Bayview property to private petitioners, and from ejecting MSI from the property or from terminating the contract of lease; (2) the award of the Bayview property in favor of MSI as the highest bidder. On December 15, 1937, the lower court, as already said, granted the writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A is unconstitutional as it impinges upon judicial power in violation of Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution HELD: Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of courts to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the legislature, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The President, in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution, issued Proclamation No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from issuing restraining orders and writs of injunction against the APT and the purchasers of any assets sold by it, to prevent courts from interfering in the discharge, by this instrumentality of the executive branch of the Government, of its task of carrying out the expeditious disposition and privatization of certain government corporations and/or the assets thereof (Proc. No. 50), absent any grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation, not being inconsistent with the Constitution and not having been repealed or revoked by Congress, has remained operative (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution). While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under the system of separation of powers set up in the Constitution, the power of the courts over the other branches and instrumentalities of the Government is limited only to the determination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion (by them) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the exercise of their authority and in the performance of their assigned tasks (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the

discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.

24. MALAGA VS. PENACHOS, Jr. 213 SCRA (1992) FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late. On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint. On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed. On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law. HELD: It was previously declared the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. On issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving

questions of law, courts could not be prevented by any law (in this case, P.D. No. 605) from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

25. Lupangco vs. CA 160 SCRA 848 FACTS: PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not courts of general jurisdiction have authority over administrative agencies depend on the statutes governing the subject. HELD: Where the statute designates the court having jurisdiction other than courts of general jurisdiction, then courts of general jurisdiction do not have authority. But where there is silence, the general rule applies.

26. RADIOWEALTH, INC. VS AGREGADO (1950) FACTS: A Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker were bought for Pho 585 and installed in the second and third floor of the Malacanang Annex which houses the Supreme Court. The Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee (appointed by the President) disapproved of the purchase and its installation invoking EO 302 which discontinues open market purchases. Petitioners also contend that Judicial functions do not include purchase of property. Radiowealth, Inc. (vendor) is now requesting that the payment be approved however, the Auditor of theSC refused to countersign the warrant for payment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Judicial Department can make purchases without the prior approval of the Executive? HELD: YES, they can. RD: Found in a ruling in Tarlac VS Gale All three departments are co-equal and co-important, each is independent from the other and cannot control or interfere with each other in the exercise of special functions. Judiciary has the power to maintain its existence and do whatever is necessary to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and ensure effectiveness in the administration of justice. Officials of the government who owe duty to the court under the law cannot deprive the courts of anything vital to their functions. Officials and boards are duty-bound to construct or purchase offices or court rooms and furnish them. They also have to insure that the character of these

rooms would permit the court to exercise its functions in a reasonably effective manner. In case of conflict to, the court shall overpower the officials as they will be the ultimate judge in determining what is necessary f or its efficiency. Officials have the power to assign a particular room or court room to the Court of First Instance and change the assignments provided that the new rooms are reasonable adequate. Courts have the power to refuse dispossession of the room if they deem that the new room would be inadequate in the exercise of their duties. If board refuses to furnish the articles mentioned by law, then the court would have the power either to purchase things directly or by proper proceedings to compel the officials to perform their duties to the law. Executive does not have power over the purchase of books and other office equipment needed for the convenient transaction of its business. Court could not maintain its independence and dignity if it executive could determine what the courts should have. They are of equal footing when it comes to the requisition of for fixtures, equipment and supplies.

27. Bengzon vs. Drilon 208 SCRA 133

FACTS: The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving monthly pensions under R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A. No. 1797. Section 3-A, which authorizes said pensions, of R.A. No. 1797 was repealed by President Marcos. The legislature saw the need to re-enact said R.A.s to restore said retirement pensions and privilege. President Aquino, however, vetoed House Bill No. 16297 as well as portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 of the Special Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts (GAA of FY 1992). ISSUES: 1. Whether the President may veto certain provisions of the General Appropriations Act.

2. Whether the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed to the Judiciary HELD:

1. The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the item veto power to avoid inexpedient riders from being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure. What was done by the President was the vetoing of a provision and not an item.

2. Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for the Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary. The veto of the specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice

must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed, which is provided for in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution.

28. . FORTICH VS. CORONA 312 SCRA 751 (1999)

FACTS: Concerns the MR of the courts resolution dated November 17, 1998 and motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. In previous case, the Court voted two-two on the separate motions for reconsideration, as a result of which the decision was affirmed. The Court noted in a resolution dated January 27, 1999 that the movants have no legal personality to seek redress before the Court as their motion to intervene was already denied and that the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is akin to a second MR which is prohibited. In this motion, both respondents and intervene ors prayed that the case be referred to the case in banc inasmuch as their earlier MR was resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision under the Constitution (3 votes) was not met.

ISSUE:

Whether or not failure to meet the three votes justifies the referral of the case to the court en banc

HELD:

No. A careful reading of the constitutional provision reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are decided while matters, which include motions, are resolved. Otherwise put, the word decided must refer to cases; while the word resolved must refer to matters, applying the rule of redden do singula singulis. With this interpretation, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the

resolution of a MR. Hence, the second sentence of the provision speaks only of case and not matter. The reason is simple. Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a MR, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998

29. People Vs. Dy 158 SCRA 111 FACTS: Pat. Padilla reported along with Benny Dy, with caliber .38 as suspect to the shooting incident at "Benny's Bar," at Sitio Angol, Manoc-Manoc Malay, Aklan (Boracay) situated on the Island which caused the death of Christian Langel Philippe, tourist, 24 years old and a Swiss nationale. He was charged with the Murder With the Use of Unlicensed firearms. Appellant alleges that he carried the victim to the shore to be brought to the hospital to save the latter, and who facilitated the surrender to Pat. Padilla a gun which his helper found the following morning while cleaning the bar. Accused posted bail which was granted. The accused denied having made any oral confession alleging that he went to Pat. Padilla not to report the incident but to state that a boy helper in the bar had found a gun on the sand floor while cleaning and that Pat. Padilla picked up the gun from the bar at his request. The Accused argues that even if he did make such a confession, the same would be inadmissible in evidence. He was found guilty in the RTC. Hence the appeal. ISSUE: Whether or Not the lower court correct in saying that the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case. HELD: YES. Appellant's assertion that the gun he had surrendered was merely found by a boy helper while cleaning the bar deserves no credence for, if it were so, it would have been absurd for him to have placed himself under police custody in the early morning after the incident. Sworn Complaint for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed by the Chief of Police also attests to Appellant's oral confession. That Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Appellant's voluntary surrender implies no violation as "no warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension of the accused for the reason that he is already under police custody before the filing of the complaint." What was told by the Accused to Pat, Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in ordinary manner. No written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation.

30. PEOPLE VS. EBIO GR No. 147750, September 29, 2004 FACTS: This refers to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused Gerry Ebio y Hermida of the Court's Decision dated October 14, 2002. The per curiam Decision affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his eleven-year old daughter, and sentencing him to death. In his motion for reconsideration, the accused calls the attention of the Court to the fact that only seven out of the fourteen Justices sitting in the Court signed the Decision. The other seven Justices were on official leave at the time. ISSUE: Whether the votes of only seven Justices of the Court sitting en banc can validly impose the death penalty and whether there is a need for a quorum when it sits en banc. HELD: Article VIII Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution provides the composition of the Court and the number of votes required to render a decision, thus: (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court

in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. There is no question that the Court's Decision in this case was concurred in by majority of the members of the Court who actually took part in the deliberations. It was in fact unanimously signed by the seven Justices who were present during the deliberations. The issue now is whether the seven constitute a quorum of the 14member Court. The term "quorum"' has been defined as "that number of members of the body which, when legally assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business, or, in other words, that number that makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass a law or ordinance or do any other valid corporate act." 1 The question of the number of judges necessary to authorize the transaction of business by a court is as a general rule to be determined from the Constitution or statutory provisions creating and regulating the courts, and as a general rule a majority of the members of a court is a "quorum" for the transaction of business and the decision of cases.2 The Constitution is clear on the quorum when the Court meets by Division. There should be at least three members present for the Division to conduct its business. This may be deduced from paragraph 3 of Section 4 Article VIII. There is no similar pronouncement, however, when the Court meets en banc. The second paragraph of Article VIII Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution does not expressly state the number of Justices required to be present to constitute a quorum of the Court en banc. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution are also silent on what constitutes a quorum when the Court is composed of only fourteen members. In case of doubt in a criminal case, especially where the death penalty is imposed, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. Thus, in this case, considering that the life of the accused is at stake, we deem it wise to resubmit the case to the Court en banc for re-deliberation. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court resolves to RECALL the Decision dated October 14, 2002 and RESUBMIT the case to the Court en banc for RE-DELIBERATION.

31. FIRESTONE CERAMICS V. CA GR No. 127245, June 28, 2000 FACTS: The government filed a case to annul the certificate of title of D covering forestland. X wanted to intervene believing that if Ds title would be annulled and after declassification of the forestland to alienable land, then his title over a portion of the property would become valid. Y also wanted to intervene because the cancellation of Ds title would allegedly pave the way for his free patent application.

ISSUE: Whether X and Y should be allowed to intervene.

HELD: No. Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows that he is qualified to intervene as provided under Sec. 1 of Rule 19. The legal interest of the intervenor must be of direct and immediate character and not merely contingent or expectant so that he will either gain or lose by the direct operation of the judgment. X and Y merely have a collateral interest in the subject matter of the litigation, thus, allowing intervention would not be justified.

32. TANO v. SOCRATES 278 SCRA 154 (997) FACTS: The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of:(1) Ordinance No. 15-92 entitled: " AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF"(2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending to engage in any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his possession any of the articles for which a permit is required to be had, to obtain first a Mayors and authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto Princesaand,(3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHI BITING THECATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIP MENT OF LIVE MARINECORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS The petitioners contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit. They also claim that it took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as the Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion Public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government's power under the general welfare clause; they likewise maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional HELD: In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and

468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.***Sec. 16.General Welfare . Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology , encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (emphasis supplied).It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. It imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniangpanlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penaltiesfor acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other fo rms of destructivefishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers andlakes or of ecological imbalance." The petition is dismissed.

33. LINA VS. PURISIMA 82 SCRA 344 (1978) FACTS: Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeper at PVB. Petitioner files for mandamus to compel Cabanos (President of Phil. Veterans Bank) to restore Lina to her position. Lina claims she was removed from office by Cabanos who acted in gadalej. It appeared from the annexes of the amended petition that Lina was dismissed by Cabanos pursuant to LOI # 13 / LOI # 19 for being notoriously undesirable. The RTC dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by the President pursuant to Proclamation 1081, the validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the courts to review, much less modify, or reverse. This is one of the express limitations upon the power of the Courts in GENERAL ORDER # 3 by President Marcos.

HELD: The petitioners right to redress is beyond dispute. When the RTC invoked General Order #3, it was nothing short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority. The judge was apparently unaware that the Court has always deemed General Order # 3 as practically inoperative even in the light of Proclamation 1081. There is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the Executive to determine whether or not We make take cognizance of any given case involving the validity of the acts of the Executive purportedly under the authority of martial law proclamations.

34. Angara v. Electoral Commission 63 PHIL 139 (1936)

FACTS: In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

35. Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority (NHA) 224 SCRA 236 (1993)

FACTS: Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He predicates his locust standi on his being a consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain (executed immediately after his retirement on 2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his being a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed." On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He maintains that, the instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law. He contends that there is no actual case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act as he does not state that he has property "being squatted upon" and that there is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing.

HELD: It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota presented. To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be

raised by a proper property, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. 9 A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants."

36. TAN VS. MACAPAGAL 43 SCRA 678 (1972)

FACTS: The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating Constitutional Convention was "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein." ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case HELD: No. At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolution that would radically alter the 1935 constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con has actually does something already. Then the court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body. Separation of power departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The Executive and the Legislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out their duties; judiciary may not interfere so that it may fulfill its duties well. The court may not interfere until the proper time comes ripeness

37. PACU vs. Secretary of Education 97 Phil 806 (1955) FACTS: The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A.) They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; B.) They deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C.) Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of Education. Petitioners reason out, this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education or his department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to fix the standard. In plain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the exclusive authority of the legislature to formulate standard . . . Also, the textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and honour of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the general policies of the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable. ISSUE: What are the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review? HELD: It is now firmly established that the power of judicial review is merely an aspect of judicial power. Hence, the first requisite for the exercise of judicial review is that there must be before the court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication, that is, the governmental act being challenged must have an adverse effect on the person challenging it.

38. GONZALES vs. MARCOS 65 SCRA 624

FACTS: The petitioner questioned the validity of EO No. 30 creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines, having as its estate the real and personal property vested in it as well as donations received, financial commitments that could thereafter be collected, and gifts that may be forthcoming in the future. It was likewise alleged that the Board of Trustees did accept donations from the private sector and did secure from the Chemical Bank of New York a loan of $5 million guaranteed by the National Investment & Development Corporation as well as $3.5 million received from President Johnson of the United States in the concept of war damage funds, all intended for the construction of the Cultural Center building estimated to cost P48 million. The petition was denied by the trial court arguing that with not a single centavo raised by taxation, and the absence of any pecuniary or monetary interest of petitioner that could in any wise be prejudiced distinct from those of the general public. ISSUE: Has a taxpayer the capacity to question the validity of the issuance in this case? HELD: No. It was therein pointed out as "one more valid reason" why such an outcome was unavoidable that "the funds administered by the President of the Philippines came from donations [and] contributions [not] by taxation." Accordingly, there was that absence of the "requisite pecuniary or monetary interest." The stand of the lower court finds support in judicial precedents. This is not to retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by People v. Vera, where the doctrine of standing was first fully discussed. It is only to make clear that petitioner, judged by orthodox legal learning, has not satisfied the elemental requisite for a taxpayer's suit. Moreover, even on the assumption that public funds raised by taxation were involved, it does not necessarily follow that such kind of an action to assail the validity of a legislative or executive act has to be passed upon. This Court, as held in the recent case of Tan v. Macapagal, "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained." The lower court thus did not err in so viewing the situation.

39. OPOSA VS. FACTORAN 229 SCRA792 FACTS: This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44children, through their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of their generation as well as those generations yet unborn. Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural lawand violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. ISSUE: Did the children have the legal standing to file the case? HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to file the case based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public welfare.

40.JOYA VS. PCGG 225 SCRA 568 (1993)

FACTS: Petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens, seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with a previously held auction sale of the Old Masters Paintings and 18 th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in custody of the Central Bank.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners have legal standing to file the petition

HELD: NO. Not owners, no public disbursement of funds. No personal and substantial interest such that they will sustain direct injury Interest of the party must be personal Having failed to show that they are the legal owners or that the subject pieces are publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.

41. KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995

FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have standing? HELD: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

42.

43. Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils. Vs. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337 Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in thePhilippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881. Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides: Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign. Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such. Issue: Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws. Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation.

Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them. The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

44. BAYAN VS. ZAMORA G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. ISSUE: Was the VFA unconstitutional? RULING: [The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.] NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

xxx

xxx

xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty. xxx xxx xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

45. AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 122846 January 18, 2005 FACTS: Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and its affiliated unions call upon the Supreme Court to exercise its power of judicial review to declare as unconstitutional an executive order assailed to be in derogation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. In an original action for certiorari, they invoke their status as labor unions and as taxpayers whose rights and interests are allegedly violated and prejudiced by Executive Order 185 dated 10 March 2003 whereby administrative supervision over the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), its regional branches and all its personnel including the executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. In support of their position, the Unions argue that the NLRC -- created by Presidential Decree 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, during Martial Law was an integral part of the Department (then Ministry) of Labor and Employment (DOLE) under the administrative supervision of the Secretary of Justice. During the time of President Corazon C. Aquino, and while she was endowed with legislative functions after EDSA I, Executive Order 292 was issued whereby the NLRC became an agency attached to the DOLE for policy and program coordination and for administrative supervision. On 2 March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor Code was expressly amended by Republic Act 6715 declaring that the NLRC was to be attached to the DOLE for program and policy coordination only while the administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and personnel, was turned over to the NLRC Chairman. The subject EO 185, in authorizing the Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and personnel, allegedly reverted to the pre-RA 6715 setup, amending the latter law which only Congress can do. Alberto Romulo (in his capacity as Executive Secretary) and Patricia Sto. Tomas (in her capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment), as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the petition on procedural and substantive grounds. ISSUE: Whether the Unions -- which contend that they are suing for and in behalf of their members (more or less 50,000 workers) -- has the requisite standing. HELD: No legal standing, not as taxpayer or citizen. The scope of authority of the Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers. An administrative in nature the subject does not pass beyond the limits of the departments to which it is directed, hence, it has not created any rights in third persons.

46. WHITE LIGHT CORP V. CITY OF MANILA G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2000

FACTS: On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 77 74 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City. ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

47.

GONZALES V. NARVASA G.R. No. 140835 August14, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of thepositions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the manner of implementing them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case

HELD: In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised. In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have thestanding to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, payers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power totransfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisersand assistants, the

petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular issue.

48.

49. CHAVEZ VS PCGG 299 SCRA 744 FACTS: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth, following reports bannered in broadsheets regarding the compromise agreement entered into between PCGG and Marcoses. Petitioner explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he has the legal personality to file the instant petition. Petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of transcendental importance to the public. He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of paramount public interest; and if they immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well -being of the people. On the other hand, the solicitor general, on behalf of respondents, contends that petitioner has no standing to institute the present action, because no expenditure of public funds is involved and said petitioner has no actual interest in the alleged agreement. Respondents further insist that the instant petition is premature, since there is no showing that petitioner has requested PCGG to disclose any such negotiations and agreements; or that, if he has, the Commission has refused to do so. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has standing to file the instant petition HELD: Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioners legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, petition at bar should be allowed.

50. IBP VS ZAMORA 342 SCRA 449 FACTS: In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. The manner by which the joint visibility patrols was conducted ,Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement. The Solicitor General defended the constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not IBP has legal standing to question the deployment and utilization of Marines. 2. Whether or not the question of deployment of marines is proper for judicial scrutiny. HELD: The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely

vested in his wisdom. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.

51. FRANCISCO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 415 SCRA 44 FACTS: On June 22, 2002, the HR adopted a resolution to investigate the disbursement of funds of the JDF under Hilario Davide. In June 2, 2003, former President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. The House Committee on Justice ruled that the impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. A day after dismissing the first impeachment complaint, a 2 nd complaint was filed against Davide based on the investigation of fund disbursement of JDF under Davide. Petitions were filed to declare the 2nd impeachment unconstitutional for it violates the provision that no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated twice against the same official. Petitions also claim that the legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary. Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution." Petitioners plea for the SC to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint. ISSUE: WON judicial review power extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings HELD: Power of judicial review is the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. Separation of powers is not absolute. The SC is the final arbiter to determine if acts by the legislature and the executive is in violation of the Constitution. Moreover, the power of judicial review is expressly stated in the Constitution.

52. DE AGBAYANI VS PNB 38 SCRA 429 FACTS: In 1939, De Agbayani obtained a loan from PNB secured by Real Estate Mortgage. Said loan matured in 1944 but could not be collected because of war. In 1945, Pres. Osmena issued EO 32 (Debt Moratorium Law) suspending payment of loans for 4 years due to ravage of war. In 1948, the same was extended for another 8 years by virtue of RA 342 which was subsequently declared unconstitutional. When PNB instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against De Agbayani to recover unpaid loans in 1959 or 15 years after maturity of loan, De agbayani raised the defense of prescription. PNB argued that if the period of debt moratorium under EO 32 and RA 32 which was subsequently declared unconstitutional were to be considered in the computation, then the right to foreclose still subsist. ISSUE: Whether or not a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional shall have legal effects. HELD: Yes. The statute subsequently declared unconstitutional shall have legal effects. It is an accepted doctrine that prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality the acts is operative fact to which legal consequence attached. Because the judiciary is the organ which has the final say on the validity of the act, a period of time may have elapsed before it could exercised the power of judicial review that may lead to declaration of nullity.

53. David v Arroyo GR No. 171396 May 3, 2006 FACTS: As the nation celebrated EDSAs 20th anniversary, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and thereby commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. This declaration led to cancellation of all programs and activities related to the EDSA People Power I celebration. Rally permits were revoked and warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including the media, were implemented. Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. Along with the dispersal, petitioner was arrested without warrant. A week after PP 1017, PP1021 was issued lifting the state of emergency. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case subject for judicial review. Whether or not there petition is with legal standing particularly on his qualification to sue. HELD: The Solicitor Generals refute that the case has been moot and academic was not upheld by the Court. According to the Supreme Court, courts will decide cases otherwise found moot and academic if: there is grave Constitutional violation, the situations exceptional character and paramount public interest involved, issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public, and lastly it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Petitioner was found to be of legal standing on the grounds that his personal rights were involved. The petitioner qualifies under the direct injury test. The personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury qualifies him to impugn the validity of the statute. To wit some of these direct injuries he sustained are the illegal arrest and unlawful search he experienced. Given this fact, the court entertained his petition as he has adequately shown that he entitled to judicial protection. However, the court does not liberally declare statutes as invalid although they may be abused and misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees, taking into consideration that legislative power is vested only in congress. The Court partly grants the petitions. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it allows the President to call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless

violence. However, commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence are declared unconstitutional. Such proclamation does not also authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utilities or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. General Order No. 5 is constitutional as it is a standard on how the AFP and PNP would implement PP1017, but portion where acts of terrorism has not been defined and punishable by congress is held unconstitutional. Furthermore, the following acts of the government were held unconstitutional: warrantless arrest of the petitioner, dispersal and warrantless arrests of rallyists in the absence of proof that said petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, or violating BP 800; imposition of media standards and any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as warrantless search of the Tribune Offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for public.

54. PEOPLE VS. MATEO 433 SCRA 540

FACTS: On October 30, 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, were filed against appellant Efren Mateo. The lower court found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General, however, assails the factual findings of the trial court and recommends an acquittal of the appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case should directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of the express provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death

HELD:

The case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records are ordered to be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659, as well as procedural rules contained in Section 3 of Rule 122, Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of rule 124 and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court. It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.

55. MARIANO JR. VS. COMELEC GR No. 118577, March 7, 1995 FACTS: Petitioners contend that Sec. 2, 51, and 52 of RA 7854 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: Sec. 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, as required by Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, in relation to Sec. 7 and 450 of the LGC; Sec. 51 attempts to alter or restart the three - consecutive term limit for local elective officials; Sec. 52 increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (not what is provided for in Art. VI, Sec. 5(4), Consti), not expressed in the title of the bill, and survey is 450,000 people only.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 52, RA 7854 is unconstitutional.

HELD: Negative. Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as a charter of a new city.

56. DUMLAO vs. COMELEC 95 SCRA 392

FACTS: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution which provides that .Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. He likewise alleges that the provision is directed insidiously against him, and is based on purely arbitrary grounds, therefore, class legislation. ISSUE: Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid. HELD: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial. The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to the same class. WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.

57. Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority GR No. 102782, December 11,1991 FACTS: On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. Even the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed or allowed by the decree. After no motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed the judgment became final and executor. Withstanding the Gonong decision still violations of the said decision transpired, wherein there were several persons who sent complaint letters to the Court regarding the confiscation of drivers licenses and removal of license plate numbers. On May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself to detach license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a resolution regarding the matter which stated that the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court, and that the Court has received several complaints against the enforcement of such ordinance. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 are valid in the exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only as agents of the national legislature? HELD: No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMA and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating drivers licenses for traffic violations within the said area. To test the validity of said acts the principles governing municipal corporations was applied, according to Elliot for a municipal ordinance to be valid the following requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not

prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. In the Gonong decision it was shown that the measures under consideration did not pass the first criterion because it did not conform to existing law. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such sanctions. Thus Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of the principal. In the case at bar the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

58.

59.

ANTERO

ET

AL

VS. COURT OF 153 SCRA 728

FIRST

INSTANCE

OF

CAVITE

FACTS: Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, had three children with Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico and Willie (herein petitioners). He also had four children with Anselma Diaz namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein private respondents). These children are all natural children since neither of their mothers was married to their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died. During the pendency of the administration proceedings with the CFI-Cavite involving the estate of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning the decision of CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedly without hearing) in the amount of Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes tuition fees, clothing materials and subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the administrator. The petitioners opposed said decision on the ground that private respondents were no longer studying, that they have attained the age of majority, that all of them except for Miguel are gainfully employed, and the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said expenses. Before the Supreme Court could act on saod petition, the private respondents filed another motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which included Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito, all surnamed Santero, as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz, praying that a sum of Php 6,000.00 be given to each of the seven children as their allowance from the estate of their father. This was granted by the CFI-Cavite. Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended order directing Anselma Diaz, mother of private respondents, to submit a clarification or explanation as to the additional three children included in the said motion. She said in her clarification that in her previous motions, only the last four minor children were included for support and the three children were then of age should have been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the administrator to get back the allowance of the three additional children based on the opposition of the petitioners. ISSUE: Are the private respondents entitled to allowance? Was it proper for the court a quo to grant the motion for allowance without hearing?

HELD: Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or married should not be regarded as the determining factor to their right to allowance under Articles 290 and 188 of the New Civil Code. Records show that a hearing was made. Moreover, what the said court did was just to follow the precedent of the court which granted previous allowance and that the petitioners and private respondents only received Php 1,500.00 each depending on the availability of funds.

60. DAMASCO VS. LAGUI 166 SCRA 215 FACTS: Atty. Damasco was charged with grave threats. He pleaded not guilty but was convicted only of light threats. He was ordered to pay a fine of P100. Damasco filed a motion to rectify and set aside the dispositve portion of the decision. He claims that he cannot be convicted of light threats, necessarily included in the grave threats charge, as the lighter offense had already prescribed when the information was filed. (light offenses prescribe in 2 mos, but the information was filed 70 days after). The lower court denied the motion, explaining that since the Court had acquired jurisdiction to try the case because the information was filed within the prescriptive period for grave threats, the same cannot be lost by prescription, if after the trial what has been proven is merely light threats.

HELD: Prescription of a crime is the loss or waiver by the State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited or punished by law. While it is a rule that an accused who fails to move to quash before pleading is deemed to waive all objections, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, which under Art 69 of the RPC extinguishes criminal liability. To apply the suggestion could contravene said Art, which is part of substantive law. This position is further strengthen by the Rules on Crim Pro, which added the extinction of offense as one of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the effects of a failure to assert a ground of a motion to quash. The claim that when an accused has been found to have comm itted a lesser offense includible within a graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of a lesser offense if it has already prescribed can only be done through an overhau l of some existing rules on criminal procedure to give prescription a limited meaning (ie, a mere bar to the commencement of criminal action and therefore waivable). But this will have to contend with the Constitutional provision that while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of rights.. such rules shall not diminish, modify or increase substantive rights. The action has prescribed. Petition is granted.

61. PEOPLE VS. LACSON 400 SCRA 262 Lacson et al were charged with multiple murder for shooting and killing 11 male persons who were members of the KuratongBaleleng. SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a "rub-out" or summary execution and not a shootout. The Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan11 Informations for MURDER, against respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of them were charged as principals. Upon motion of the Lacson, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. The participation of Lacson was downgraded from principal to accessory. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayanordered the cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court. Arraignment then followed and respondent entered a plea of not guilty. On March 29, 1999 Judge Agnir issued a Resolution dismissing Criminal Cases because: With the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants, there is no more evidence to show that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof. On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter. Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation. Judge Pasamba denied the TRO (meaning the case could continue). The decision stated that the preveious dismissal of Criminal Cases is not one on the merits and without any recorded arraignment and entered plea on the part of the herein petitioners. The arraignment had with the Sandiganbayan does not put the case in a different perspective since the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be without any jurisdiction to try the cases. It is the People of the Philippines who is the complainant in the Kuratong Baleleng case and remains to be the complainant. Thus, June 6, 2001 11 information for Murder were again filed before the RTC Judge Yadao.

Lacson now assails the decision of Judge Pasamba mainly on the ground of : illegality of the proceedings of the respondent State Prosecutors as they cannot revive complaints which had been dismissed over two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued. He claims, under Section 8, Rule 117, cases similar to those filed against the petitioner and others (where the penalty imposable is imprisonment of six (6) years or more) cannot be revived after two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued. ISSUE: Whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the KuratongBaleleng gang. The rule of provisional dismissal took effect only on December 1, 2000 (in between the period of dismissal and revival). More specifically, 1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period. HELD: NO. NOT BARRED. 1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; 4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing

amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. 8 The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case9 or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal10 does not amount to express consent. In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the cases. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses. The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of the cases. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal the cases or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing. There is as well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the hearing. Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-9981679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the respondent. Even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal, and all the heirs of the victims were notified before the hearing the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the States substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the State had twenty years within which to file the criminal complaints against the accused. However, under the new rule, the State only had two years from notice of the public prosecutor of the order of dismissal within which to revive the said cases. When the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had one year and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The period for the State to charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. In case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former should prevail.

The time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. 35 The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law.36 It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. If a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused because the trial is not concluded within the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code are not thereby diminished.40 But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, the effect is basically the same. Also, It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court. In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State. A mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence. 55 He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.56 The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. These is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent

injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.

62.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS. G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998

FACTS: Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00. Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martins Funeral Home and in January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter took over the management of the business. Amelita made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and therefore his office had no jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the NLRC are appealable to the Court of Appeals. HELD: The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the SC were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action for certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsusplumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action for certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the SC are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of the Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495. Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to

mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

63. PEOPLE VS. GUTIERREZ FACTS: This is the case of Bingbong Crisologo. A group of armed men set fire various inhabited houses in Bantay,Ilocos Sur. Bingbong was charged but pleaded not guilty. AO 221 the Secretary of Justice authorized Judge Anover of San Fernando La Union, to hold special term in Ilocos Sur. AO 226 Secretary of Justice authorized Judge Gutierrez (Vigan) to transfer the case to Judge Anovers Court in La Union. Prosecution moved that Judge Gutierrez allow a transfer of the case to the La Union Circuit Court by virtue of said AOs and for security and personal safety of the witnesses. The accused obviously opposed the transfer of the case, claiming that the transfer of the case would be railroading them into a conviction. Judge Gutierrez denied the transfer. Prosecution now imputes gadalej on Judge Gutierrez. HELD: The Secretary of Justice has no power to assign cases to be heard. Any such power even in the guise of AOs trenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and Judiciary. The law creating the transfer of cases to Circuit Criminal Courts should be effected by raffle. Nevertheless, the COURT WILL ORDER THE TRANSFER. There is a justified refusal by the witnesses in Ilocos Sur to testify where they felt their lives would be endangered. Judge Gutierrez failed to consider the possibility of miscarriage of justice may result. The witnesses had earlier manifested of the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial outside of Ilocos Sur, in the interest of truth and justice, and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side. Here, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process. The exigencies of justice demand that the general rule should yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor. Anyway, regardless of the place where the case is tried, the prosecution will always be obligated to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On of the incidental and inherent powers of the courts is that of TRANSFERRING THE TRIAL OF CASES from one court to another of equal rank, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice so demands. Judicial power includes the transfer of cases. It is one of the incidental or inherent attributes necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government.

64. In re: Cunanan 94 Phil. 534 (1954) FACTS: In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunananet. Al petitioners. In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave. of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 75%).Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams. ISSUES: Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court. Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to cure are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.

Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting todo so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rulesmade by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparablefrom the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void. HELD: Under the authority of the court: 1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect. 2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.

65. ECHEGARAY VS. SEC. OF JUSTICE January 19, 1999

FACTS: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve. ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function. HELD: No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

66.

67. IN RE ADMISSION TO THE BAR: ARGOSINO BAR MATTER 712, 246 SCRA 14 (1995)

FACTS:

This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant. Argosino was previously involved with hazing that caused the death of Raul Camaligan but was sentenced with homicide through reckless imprudence after he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with 2 years imprisonment where he applied for a probation thereafter which was granted by the court with a 2 yr probation. He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to allow him to take the attorneys oath of office averring that his probation was already terminated. The court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was terminated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Argosino may take oath of office.

HELD:

The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Hence he was asked by the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and have become a responsible member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession. The court also ordered that said a copy of the proceeding be furnished to the family/relatives of Raul Camaligan.

68.

FABIAN VS. DESIERTO GR 129742September 16, 1998

FACTS:

Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business w/ Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman. Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him. A case ensued which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman who inhibited himself later the case led to the deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the SC. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)1 [Effective November 17, 1989.] pertinently provides that -In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE:

Whether or not sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

HELD:

Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this

Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

69. IN RE: DE VERA (2003)

FACTS: Petitioner argues that this Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy, contending that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP. ISSUE: Whether or not this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy. HELD: Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, thus: Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied) Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the election of its officers.

70. BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS vs. Judge GR No. 165922, February 26, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is a credit cooperative organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. Article 62(6) of RA 6938 exempts cooperatives: from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such action is brought by the Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative. In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City (trial court) a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as amended. Under Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as amended, petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on the value of the mortgagees claim. Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought exemption from payment of the fees. ISSUES: Whether or not petitioners application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees under Article 62(6) of RA 6938. How was the 1987 Constitution affected the rule making power of the Court? HELD: Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioners foreclosure proceeding. The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court [under] Section 5(5), Article VIII. The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to

promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.

71.

REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON GR No.166429, February 01, 2006

FACTS: Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the Government, through expropriation filed a petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending that a mere deposit of the assessed value of the property with an authorized government depository is enough for the entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court). ISSUE: The rules of court require deposit of 15% of the value of the property before an expropriator can enter. Can Congress amend this? HELD: R.A. 8974, however, creates an exception in expropriation cases involving public works and requires full payment before entry in public works projects. In answering to the question, since expropriation involves both procedural and substantive matters, the substantive aspect is always subject to legislation.

72. MANIAGO VS. CA GR No. 104392, February 26, 2010 FACTS: Maniago was the owner of a shuttle bus which provides transportation to the employees of Texas Instruments, Baguio. In January 1990, his driver, while performing his job, figured in a vehicular accident with a jeepney which seriously injured the jeeps passengers. A criminal case was filed against the driver by the jeeps owner Alfredo Boado. Boado filed a separate civil action against Maniago for damages. Maniago averred that Boado cannot file a separate civil action against him because he did not reserve it prior to the institution of the criminal case; this is pursuant to Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Boado argued that there is no need to reserve it because under Art 32, 33 & 34 of the CC, a civil action for damages can be filed independent of the criminal case. Boado cited a long list of cases decided by the SC strengthening his case. Judge Ayson of the lower court ruled in favor of Boado. The issue was elevated to the CA which affirmed Aysons decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Boado can file a separate civil action. HELD: The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear in providing that a separate civil action must be reserved prior to the institution of a criminal case. Without such reservation, it would be deemed that a complainant has agreed to have the civil action for damages be included in the criminal suit.

73.

Maniago v. CA G.R. No. 104392, February 20, 1996

FACTS: Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority. In 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries against petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya. A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner Maniago. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver and because no reservation of the right to bring it (civil case) separately had been made in the criminal case. But the lower court denied petitioners motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action. ISSUE: Whether or not despite the absence of reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the following provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. HELD: No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. To begin with, 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise from the offense charged. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action. On the basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action,

is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.

74.

Javellana vs. DILG

GR No. 102549, August 10, 1992

FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a public official to engage in the practice of his profession while employed in the Government. Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for:

(1) violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority.

Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department. On the other hand, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground mainly that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 9081 are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.

ISSUE: WON Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution

HELD: Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DILG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice oftheir profession, in those instances where the law allows it. Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.

76.

GARRIDO vs. GARRIDO AC No. 6593, February 4, 2010

FACTS: The petitioner, the respondents legal wife, filed a complaint-affidavit and a supplemental affidavit for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P.Valencia before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Discipline, charging them with gross immorality, in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01, of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complaint arose after the petitioner caught wind through her daughter that her husband was having an affair with a woman other than his wife and already had a child with her; and the same information was confirmed when oner of her daughters saw that her husband walking in a Robinsons mall with the other respondent, Atty. Valencia, with their child in tow. After a much further investigation into the matter, the time and effort given yielded results telling her that Atty. Valencia and her legal husband had been married in Hong Kong. Moreover, on June 1993, her husband left their conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence, and has since failed to render much needed financial support. In their defense, they postulated that they were not lawyers as of yet when they committed the supposed immorality, so as such, they were not guilty of a violation of Canon1, Rule 1.01. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Garridos and Valencias actions constitute a violation of Canon 1, Rule1.01 and thus a good enough cause for their disbarment, despite the offense being supposedly committed when they were not lawyers. HELD: Yes. Membership in the Bar is a privilege, and as a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers, be they academic or moral. In the present case, the Court had resolved to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for the reason of their blatant violation of Canon 1,Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Furthermore, The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers when they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions; good moral character was already required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. As a lawyer, a person whom the community looked up to, Atty. Garrido and Valencia were shouldered with the expectation that they would set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When they violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, not only did their actions discredit the legal profession. Such actions by themselves, without even

including the fact of Garridos abandonment of paternal responsibility, to the detriment of his children by the petitioner; or the fact that Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of his other marriages to two other women including the petitioner, are clear indications of a lack of moral values not consistent with the proper conduct of practicing lawyers within the country. As such, their disbarment is affirmed

77. Maceda vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993 FACTS: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

HELD: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

78. JUDGE CAOIBES, Jr VS. OMBUDSMAN G.R. No. 132177, July 19, 2001

FACTS:

May 23, 1997, Respondent Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the RTC of Las Pinas City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority alleging that: He requested petitioner on May 20, 1997 to return the executive table he borrowed from respondent; Petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking, petitioner blurted "Tarantado ito ah," and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eye glasses unserviceable; Respondent had the incident blottered with the Las Pias Police Station. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner. June 13, 1997, Respondent Judge lodged an administrative case with the SC praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer using the same facts as above. June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within10 days from receipt thereof. Petitioner filed on July 7, 1997 an "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court," praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of the case, and refer the same to the SC which is already investigating what transpired on May 1997. Petitioner contended that the SC, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control. August 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for referral to the SC stating that it is within its jurisdiction to investigate on the criminal charges.

79. LOURDES S. ESCALONA vs. CONSOLACION S. PADILLO A.M. No. P-10-2785, September 21, 2010 FACTS: Lourdes Escalona filed a complaint charging Consolacion Padillo with Grave Misconduct. It was alleged by Escalona that she was referred by the president of their homeowners association to Padillo to assist her in filing a case against her neighbor. Padillo allegedly promised to prepare the necessary documents and asked for P20,000 purportedly as payment for the prosecutor. Escalona requested that the amount be reduced to P15,000. Padillo received the P15,000 at the Little Quiapo Branch Better Living Subdivision. Thereafter, Escalona received a text message from Padillo informing her that the prosecutor was not amenable to the reduced amount of P15,000. Escalona later on gave the balance of P5,000 to Padillo allegedly for the service of the warrant of arrest. Escalona was also asked to submit a barangay clearance and to first take an oath before Prosecutor Antonio Arquiza, Jr. and later before Prosecutor Napoleon Ramolete. However, subsequent verification from the Prosecutors Office showed no record of a case filed against Dalit. Escalona confronted Padillo who promised to return to her the money. Padillo reneged on her promise. Escalona later on, withdrew her complaint against Padillo in a Sworn Affidavit of Desistance alleging that Padillo already returned to her the P20,000. This notwithstanding, then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock sent two notices to Padillo requiring her to submit her comment to the complaint of Escalona. The Court required Padillo to explain why she should not be administratively dealt with for her failure to submit the required comment and reiterated the directive on Padillo to submit her comment to Escalonas complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not Padillo is guilty of misconduct for soliciting money from Escalona HELD: The Court Administrator, in his Memorandum dated 8 December 2009, found Padillo guilty of grave misconduct for soliciting money from Escalona in exchange for facilitating the filing of a case against Dalit. Padillos act of soliciting money from Escalona is an offense which merited the grave penalty of dismissal from the service. However, considering that Padillo tendered her resignation, a month after the complaint was filed but did not and has not filed any claim relative to the benefits due her, the Court Administrator recommended that all benefits due her, except accrued leave credits, be forfeited and that she be disqualified from reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations. We agree with the Court Administrator that this Court could no longer impose the penalty of dismissal from the service because Padillo resigned a month after the filing of the administrative complaint. However, her resignation did not render the complaint

against her moot. Resignation is not and should not be a convenient way or strategy to evade administrative liability when a court employee is facing administrative sanction.[4]

80. Re:

Non-disclosure Before the Judicial and Bar Council of the Administrative Case Filed Against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, in His Capacity as the then Asst. Regional Director of the National Police Commission, Regional Office XI, Davao City.

JBC No. 013 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO-MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, VELASCO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated:

August 22, 2007 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION PER CURIAM:

Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City on May 17, 2003.1[1] Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office 11, Davao City, as a result of which he was dismissed from the service per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10, 1995. In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)2[2] submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain declared that there were five criminal

cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439, 22812, 22813, and 22814) filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No administrative case was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS. To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Christopher O. Lock (now Court Administrator) requested from the Sandiganbayan certified copies of the Order(s) dismissing the criminal cases.3[3] On even date, letters4[4] were sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting for certified true copies of documents relative to the administrative complaints filed against Judge Quitain, particularly A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 dismissing him from the service. Likewise, DCA Lock required Judge Quitain to explain the alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed before the JBC.5[5] In a letter6[6] dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a copy of A.O. No. 183 showing that respondent Judge was indeed dismissed from the service for Grave Misconduct for falsifying or altering the amounts reflected in disbursement vouchers in support of his claim for reimbursement of expenses. A.O. 183 partly reads:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 183

DISMISSING FROM THE SERVICE ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR JAIME VEGA QUITAIN, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 11 This refers to the administrative complaint against Jaime Vega Quitain, Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office No. 11, Davao City, for Grave Misconduct (Violation of Art. 48, in relation to Arts. 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and Art. IX of the Civil Service Law) filed by the NAPOLCOM. xxxx After circumspect study, I am in complete accord with the above findings and recommendation of the NAPOLCOM.

It was established that the falsification could not have been consummated without respondents direct participation, as it was upon his direction and approval that disbursement vouchers were prepared showing the falsified amount. The subsequent endorsement and encashment of the check by respondent only shows his complete disregard for the truth which per se constitutes misconduct and dishonesty of the highest order. By any standard, respondent had manifestly shown that he is unfit to discharge the functions of his office. Needless to stress, a public office is a position of trust and public service demands of every government official or employee, no matter how lowly his position may be, the highest degree of responsibility and integrity and he must remain accountable to the people. Moreover, his failure to adduce evidence in support of his defense is a tacit admission of his guilt. Let this be a final reminder to him that the government is serious enough to [weed out] misfits in the government service, and it will not be irresolute to impose the severest sanction regardless of personalities involved. Accordingly, respondents continuance in office becomes untenable. WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the NAPOLCOM, Assistant Regional Director Jaime Vega Quitain is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of pay and benefits, effective upon receipt of a copy hereof. Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of April in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-five.

81. KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007

FACTS: Special Provision No. 1 of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under Republic Act No. 7180, allocates a specific amount of government funds for infrastructure and other priority projects and activities. In order to be valid, the use and release of said amount should have the following mandatory requirements: (1) Approval by the President of the Philippines; (2) Release of the amount directly to the appropriate implementing agency; and (3) List of projects and activities.

Respondent Cesar Sarino, the then DILG Secretary, requested for authority to negotiate, enter into, sign Memoranda of Agreements with accredited NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in order to utilize them to implement the projects of the CDF provided for under R.A. No. 7180. Respondent Franklin Drilon, the then Executive Secretary, granted the abovementioned request of Secretary Sarino. Such an authority was extended to all the Regional Directors of the DILG. Pursuant to the above-described authority granted him, respondent Tiburcio Relucio, on April 24, 1992, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with an accredited NGO known as the Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc. (PYHSDFI). COMELEC received from petitioner Kilosbayan a letter informing the former of two serious violations of election laws, among them that the amount of P70 million was released by the Budget Department, shortly before the elections of May 11, 1992, in favor of PYHSDFI a private entity, which had reportedly engaged in dirty election tricks and practices in said elections and requesting that these offenses and malpractices be investigated promptly, thoroughly, impartially, without fear of favor.

ISSUE:

Based on recommendations by the Comelec Law Department, the Commission en banc dismissed the letter-complaint for lack of evidence. HELD:

The constitutional and statutory mandate for the Comelec to investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election laws translates, in effect, to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information in court and helping the Judge determine, in the course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued. Although only a low quantum and quality of evidence is needed to support a finding of probable cause, the same cannot be justified upon hearsay evidence that is never given any evidentiary or probative value in this jurisdiction.

82.

83. NITAFAN VS. CIR 152 SCRA 284 (1987)

FACTS: Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. In a nutshell, they submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that (d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased, even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not tax deductions withheld from the salaries of petitioners are illegal as they contravene Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution prohibiting diminution of salaries of judicial officers

HELD:

No. The Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those

appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission. 84. VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA 80 PHIL 297 (1948)

FACTS: Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. Resolution No. 1 proposes an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes (approved by the vote of 122 to 5) Resolution No. 2 deals with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly (vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention) Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections (vote of 148 to 2 with 1abstention). The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. The suits were filed March 3, 6 and 12, 1981, respectively.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose amendments and how such may be exercised if ever. HELD: All petitions dismissed. The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualificationsas the interim National Assembly and the regular

National Assembly and the Members thereof."- One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in

accordance with the Article on Amendments.- When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body, it acted by virtue of such competence. Its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed.

85. Vargas v. Rilloraza 80 PHIL 297 (1948) FACTS: Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. Resolution No. 1 proposes an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes (approved by the vote of 122 to 5) Resolution No. 2 deals with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly (vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention) Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections (vote of 148 to 2 with 1abstention). The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. The suits were filed March 3, 6 and 12, 1981, respectively. ISSUE: Whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose amendments and how such may be exercised if ever. HELD: All petitions dismissed. The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualificationsas the interim National Assembly and the regularNational Assembly and the Members thereof."- One of such powers is precisely that of proposingamendments.The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisionsvested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments.- When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body, it acted by virtue of such competence. Its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed.

86. De La Llana v. Alba 112 SCRA 294 (1982) FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking ti enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. ISSUE: Whether or not BP 129 is unconstitutional for impairing the security of tenure of the justices and judges in this case? HELD: It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.

87. People v. Gacott 246 SCRA 52 (1995) FACTS: On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition pointing out that the AntiDummy Board has already been abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge granted the motion espousing the position that the Letter Of Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the law contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18, 1994 held that the City Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute the case and ordered that the case be quashed. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely abused his discretion as to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari. HELD: Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI No. 2 reads: Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23, 1972, Reorganizing the Executive Branch of the National Government, the following agencies of the Department of Justice are herebyreorganized or activated in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the following instructions: . . . (emphasis supplied).

General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the former President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by former President Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly revised, revoked, or repealed, both continue to have the force and effect of law. Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution explicitly ordains: Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.

88. In Re Judge Manzano 166 SCRA 246 FACTS: Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary. ISSUE: What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned? HELD: The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution). Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence . Administrative functions as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Governments executive machinery and its performance of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.

89. Consing v. Court of Appeals 177SCRA 14 (1989) FACTS: Merlin Consing (pet) sold a house and lot to Caridad Santos. Provided in their contract of sale were particular terms of payment in which the purchase price shall be paid (installment basis, plus interest). In the process, Santos defaulted in her payments. Consing demanded for her payment and had planned to resort to court litigation. Santos expressed her willingness to settle her obligation. However, this is upon the condition that the Consings comply with all the laws and regulations on subdivision and after payment to her damages as a consequence of the use of a portion of her lot as a subdivision road. In response, the Consings submitted a revised subdivision plan. CFI Decision Santos was fully justified in refusing to pay further her monthly amortizations because although Consing submitted a revised plan and may have corrected irregularities and/or have complied with the legal requirements for the operation of their subdivision, he cannot escape liability to Santos for having sold to her portions of the roads or streets denominated as right-of-way. Contention c/o Consing : CA did not comply with the certification requirement. Purpose of certification requirement: To ensure that all court decisions are reached after consultation with members of the court en banc or division, as the case may be, To ensure that the decision is rendered by a court as a whole, not merely by a member of the same, To ensure that decisions are arrived only after deliberation, exchange of ideas, and concurrence of majority vote HELD: The absence of certification does not invalidate a decision. It is only evidence for failure to observe the requirement. There could be an administrative case on the ground of lack of certification.

90. PEOPLE V. ESCOBER 157 SCRA 541 (1988) FACTS: Escober, Punzalan and 3 others were accused of committing robbery with homicide in Balintawak, QC on Dec. 3, 82. Mr. Vicenta Chuas office was robbed of P5K and his children were stabbed to death. Escober was company guard & alleged mastermind. Abuyen was former guard relieved due to absence & found sleeping on duty. ISSUES: 1. 2 3. Whether or not RTC conformed with Art. 9, Sec 9 of the Constitution. Whether or not Escober is guilty. Whether or not Punzalan is guilty.

HELD: 1. No. Art 9. Sec 9 states that decision should have facts, not present in decision. Generalizations and conclusions without detailed facts as basis. Appellate court cant check if findings were sufficient and logical. Justice and fairness over speed. People v. Banayo: decision should show evidence, facts based on evidence and supporting jurisprudence and authority

2. No. Opening of gate is normal when someone knocks especially if you know him. He might have lacked better judgment or laxity in performance of duties though. The firing of the gun as a ritual to avoid suspicion is too risky a ritual. It can kill. 5-10 minutes too short a time to plan a conspiracy. Abuyen even asked Punzalan to kill Escobar. Then Abuyen pointed the gun at Escobar and asked Punzalan to tie him; he also tries to shoot him. Offering the information that he was not hit was also just to assure employer who seemed concerned. Mrs Chuas statement may have been

confused cause it was taken last. Perhaps she forgot details due to agitation.

3. Yes. Extrajudicial confession is inadmissible because it was not properly performed and was without counsel. Conspiracy was proven. He was fetched and he fled with suspects. He shouldve gone to the police if innocent. People vs. Rogel: Homicide through robbery, all principals in robbery are liable for homicide unless they tried preventing it.

91.Air France v Carrascoso 18 SCRA 155 (1966) FACTS:

Air France issued to Carrascoso, a civil engineer, a 1st class round trip ticket from Manila - Rome. During the stopover at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the 1st class seat because there was a "white man" who had better right to the seat. As a result, he filed a suit against Air France where the CFI Manila granted him moral and exemplary damages. ISSUE:

Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class seat and consequently, whether or not he was entitled to the damages awarded. HELD:

Yes to both.

To achieve stability in the relation between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket issued is desirable. Quoting the court, "We cannot understand how a reputable firm like Air France could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of the tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not." Evidence of bad faith was presented without objection on the part of the Carrascoso. In the case, it could have been easy for Air France to present its manager

to testify at the trial or secure his deposition but defendant did neither. There is also no evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a 1st class seat, worse he imposed his arbitrary will. He forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to tourist class just to give way to another passenger whose right was not established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal is conduct, injurious language, indignities and abuse from such employees. Any discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment fits into the condition for exemplary damages that defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. *Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose

92. HERNANDEZ VS. CA 208 SCRA 429 (1993)

Facts: Danilo introduced by aunt to Remedios de Leon, who was in the business of buying and selling jewelry 1st transaction: paid in cash for jewelry, Subsequent transactions: paid in cash or post-dated checks. Assailed transactions 5 transactions, jewelry paid for using post-dated checks (except of 1, same date as transaction, but bank already closed at the time): 4 BPI checks signed by Danilo, 1 ASB check signed by a certain Enrique Araneta, 3 BPI checks drawn against insufficient funds, 1 BPI check drawn against a closed account, 1 ASB check drawn against a closed account

Danilo subsequently charged in 9 information with the ESTAFA and for violations against BP Blg. 22 [Bouncing Check Law], with Cavite City RTC Information consolidated, heard in a joint trial, Danilo convicted of 9 charges in joint decision. Danilo appealed to CA, CA affirmed 8 convictions; Danilo elevated case to Supreme Court. Sec. 14, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefore. Art. 315, RPC [Crime of Estafa], Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below. BP Blg. 22 [Bouncing Check Law]

ISSUE:

Did the CA err in not disclosing complete findings of fact, contrary to Sec. 14, Art VIII? HELD: NO. Petitioner assigned 8 errors, but CA did not make a complete finding of fact as to the last two. Unnecessary to make separate findings of fact: last two errors were necessary consequences of previously enumerated assigned errors. CA simply adopted SolGens statement of facts, thus did not make its own independent judicial opinion Consti. mandate: only requires that the decision should state the facts on which it is based: no prescription against adoption of narration of facts of one of the parties [as found in briefs, memoranda, etc.] CA, in concluding that there was no cogent reason that could justify the modification/reversal of the decision of the trial court, relied on a decision not supported by evidence Petitioner alleged that the de Leon testimony was self-serving, thus inadmissible Self-serving: made out of court; cannot be crossexamined. Thus, encourages fabrication of testi. But the material testimonies were made in court, under oath Yolanda dela Rosa, for ex., testified for the prosecution . Even of de Leons was the sole testimony would have been enough, Vis--vis credibility of a witness: witnesses are to be weighed, not counted Petitioner ordered to pay civil indemnity, but no evidence presented to prove the existence, ownership, and worth of the pieces of jewelry. EXISTENCE of jewelry: established by the de Leon testimony as per testimony, Hernandez even selected pieces of jewelry before buying them . OWNERSHIP: not a necessary element of estafa

93.

94. NICOS vs. CA 206 SCRA 127 FACTS: NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan from UCPB and to secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land. The mortgage was foreclosed for non-payment of the loan. A sheriffs sale was held without re -publication of the required notices after the original date for auction was changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor. UCPB was the highest and lone bidder and the mortgaged lands were sold to it. UCPB sold all its rights to the properties to private respondent Manuel Co. The latter transfer said rights to Golden Star Industrial Corporation, another private respondent, and a writ of possession was issued. NICOS and other petitioners filed their action for annulment of sheriffs sale, recovery of possession, and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Golde Star filed a 7-page demurrer to the evidence where they argued that the action was a derivative suit that came under the jurisdiction of the SEC; that the mortgage had been validly foreclosed; that the sheriffs sale was in accordance with Act 3135; that the notices had been duly published in a newspaper of general circulation; and that the opposition to the writ of possession was not filed on time. No opposition to the demurrer having been submitted despite notice to the parties, Judge Nestor Dantes considered it submitted for resolution. Petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. They also stress that the sheriffs sale was irregular because the notices thereof were published in a newspaper that did not have general circulation and that the original date of the sheriffs sale had been changed without its consent, the same having been allegedly given by a person not authorized to represent NICOS. ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned order violates Art. VII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution. HELD: YES. It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is

especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.

95. Borromeo vs. CA 186 SCRA 1 FACTS: In a complaint for damages filed with the RTC of Cebu, Joaquin Borromeo charges the Division Clerk of Court, Assistant Division Clerk of Court of the Third Division and the Chief of the Judicial Records Office of RTC Cebu with usurpation of judicial functions for allegedly maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and unconstitutional Resolution and Entry of Judgment in G.R. No. 82273. This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against officials of the court. In several letters-complaints filed with the court and the Ombudsman, Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he suffered injustices because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to the SC which were resolved by minute resolutions allegedly in violation of Section 4,13 and 14 of Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His invariable complaint is that the resolutions which disposed of his cases do not bear the signatures of the Justices who participated in the deliberations and resolution and do not show that they voted therein. He likewise complained that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not state the facts and the law on which they were based and signed only by the clerks of court and therefore null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 14 of the Constitution was violated. HELD: No. Resolution disposing of petitions fall under the constitutional provision which states that, No petition for review...shall be refused due course...without stating the legal basis therefor (Sec. 14, Art. VIII, Constitution). When the court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent courts decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirements. Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the chief justice. For to require members of the court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly

delay the issuance of its resolutions nut a great amount of their time would be spent on functions more properly performed by the clerk of court and which time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character.

96. Francisco vs. Permskul 173 SCRA 324 FACTS: Petitioner leased his apartment to private respondent for a period of one year for the stipulated amount of P3,000.00 a month. Private respondent deposited P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased premises. After one year, private respondent vacated the property and requested the refund of his deposit minus the sum ofP1,000.0o, representing the rental for the additional ten days of his occupancy after the expiration of lease. Petitioner rejected his request and claimed that the lessee still owed him for other charges, including electricity and water bills and the repainting of the leased premises. Private respondent sued in the MTC of Makati. A summary judgment was rendered sustaining the complainant. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff the balance of the deposit after deducting the water and electicity charges. The decision was appealed to the RTC of Makati which affirmed the same. This was done in a memorandum decision which states that: After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same. WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto. Defendant appealed to the CA but his petition for review was denied and so was his motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the memorandum decisions violate Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution. HELD: NO. There is no question that the purpose of the law in authorizing the memorandum decision is to expedite the termination of litigations for the benefit of the parties as well as the courts themselves.

97. Velarde vs.Social Justice Society G.R.No. 159357 April 2009 FACTS: The petition prayed for the resolution of the question whether or not the act of a religious leader, like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate is violative of the letter or spirit of constitutional provisions. They alleged that the questioned decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion. ISSUE: What is the standard form of a decision? Did the challenged decision comply with the aforesaid form? HELD: The decision shall be in writing, personally, and directly prepared by yhe judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court. In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of the case; (2) statement of the facts; (3) issues or assignments of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and finally, (5) dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especially in cases in which controversial issues are involved. No. The assailed decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitutuion, because it made no findings of facts and final disposition.

98. Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan AM No. 008-8-05-SC, November 28, 2001

FACTS: Submitted to the Court for consideration is a resolution of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter, the IBP) recommending an inquiry into the causes of delays in the resolution of incidents and motions and in the decision of cases pending before the Sandiganbayan. ISSUES: (1) What is the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must decide/resolve cases falling within its jurisdiction? (2) Are there cases submitted for decision remaining undecided by the Sandiganbayan or any of its divisions beyond the afore-stated reglementary period? (3) Is Supreme Administrative Circular No. 1094 applicable to the Sandiganbayan? HELD: The three month period for deciding cases, not the twelve month period given to appellate courts, applies to the Sandiganbayan because the Sandiganbayan is a trial court.

99.

Edano Vs. Asdala AM No. RTJ-06-2007, December 6, 2010

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint for violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics, misconduct, rendering an erroneous decision, and rendering a decision beyond the 90day reglementary period filed by Carmen Edao (complainant) against Judge Fatima G. Asdala (respondent judge). The complainant claimed that the respondent judge made it appear that Civil Case No. Q-97-30576 was decided on March 22, 2005, although the records show that she (respondent judge) still ruled on several motions relating to this case even after that date. The complainant further alleged that the respondent judge erred in denying her notice of appeal ISSUE: Whether the rendering of decision beyond the 90 day reglementary period by the respondent judge subject to disciplinary action. HELD: Yes. DOCTRINES: JUDGES MUST DECIDE ALL CASES WITHIN 3 MONTHS FROM DATE OF SUBMISSION . . . Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution requires judges to decide all cases within three (3) months from the date of submission. This Constitutional policy is reiterated in Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay; and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the same Code provides that a judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

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Sesbreo Vs. CA GR No. 161390, April 16, 2010

FACTS: The motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner that the respondent must affirm with the decision of the trial court due to long delay in deciding CA-G.R. No. 43287. ISSUE: What effect does the lapse of the reglementary period have on cases filed before the effectivity of the constitution. HELD: The court, under the 1987 Constitution, is now mandated to decide or resolve the case or matter submitted to it for determination within specified periods. Even when there is delay and no decision or resolution is made within the prescribed period, there is no automatic affirmance of the appealed decision. The appellate court, therefore, cannot be faulted in not affirming the RTCs decision. While we do not tolera te delay in the disposition of cases, we cannot dismiss appealed cases solely because they had been pending in court for a long period, especially when the appeal is highly meritorious as in the present case.