Unity and Diversity in Latin American History Author(s): Ian Roxborough Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Latin American

Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (May, 1984), pp. 1-26 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/157285 . Accessed: 05/03/2012 20:11
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J. Lat. Amer. Stud. I6, I-26

Printed in Great Britain

Unity and Diversity in Latin American History*

by IAN ROXBOROUGH

Introduction This article has its origins in a generalized feeling of dissatisfaction with current theories about political developmental trends in Latin America. It is an early statement of a series of arguments which will subsequently be developed in a forthcoming book.1 The veritable explosion of empirically grounded monographs in the last fifteen or twenty years has made the task of producing a synthetic account of Latin American development simultaneously more pressing and more difficult: more difficult because it has made simple explanatory models harder to sustain, and has opened up the accepted historiography to serious and widespread revisionist attack; more pressing because many, if not most, social scientists accept the need to develop a theory of social change which is historically grounded, capable of explaining large-scale social transformations. My concern in this article is with the methodological issues involved in the formulation of an adequate theory of Latin American development, rather than with establishing new facts. There is considerable historiographical controversy over many of the events discussed in this article, and in these cases I have made my own judgement about where, on balance, the evidence points. This is, naturally, a tentative and provisional matter, and future research, or sources of which I have not previously been aware, may well necessitate a reformulation of some of the propositions advanced below. The methodological points which form the core of this article are, however, a largely separate issue and must stand or fall on their own merits. The countries of Latin America have a rich and complex history. So
* Based on a section of Ian Roxborough's forthcoming book Latin America: Class, State and Developmentto be published by Macmillan, London and Basingstoke 1985. 1 bid.
LAS I6

Ian Roxborough

rich, complex and varied has this history been, indeed, that many scholars have seen the task of historians as that of producing twenty separate histories, eschewing any attempt at generalization for Latin America as a whole. Despite the temptations of what might be termed 'national empiricism', the common features of the republics of Latin America - inter alia an Iberian colonial past, approximately coterminous achievement of independence, integration into the expanding world economy of the late nineteenth century as producers of primary products, and seemingly similar patterns of economic and political development in the twentieth century - mean that there have been and will continue to be powerful pressures in the direction of producing a coherent and integrated account of the pattern of Latin American history as a whole. This article will attempt to survey some of the major approaches to this task, and will consider some of the methodological and empirical criticisms and considerations which arise. The chronological focus will be on the period since the mid-nineteenth century. Three principal approaches may be discerned. Firstly, there are histories of Latin America which claim to see a common theme or principle underlying the histories of the twenty republics. Overriding any national 'peculiarities' are the commonalities of the specifically Latin American experience. One writer has argued, for example, that the Latin American countries all share a common Iberian tradition of corporatism, and that this is the central factor explaining the distinctly Latin American pattern of development.2 Another has pointed to the 'centralist tradition' of government inherited from the Spanish and Portuguese colonists.3 From a dependency perspective, various writers have attempted to show how the nature of the economic system imposed by the Iberian conquest - the 'colonial heritage' - has perpetuated a syndrome of underdevelopment.4 Other explanations, cultural, racial, geographical, etc., may readily be found in the literature. From such a perspective, the history of Latin America is seen as the unfolding or acting out of some essence or demiurge, or possibly (though this is less common) of the dialectical interplay of two such essences or principles. Deviations from this model are seen either as variations on a theme or simply as deviations, to be
in Latin America (Boulder, Westview H. Wiarda, Corporatismand National Development Press, 198 ). 3 C. Veliz, TheCentralist Traditionin Latin America (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980). 4 S. Stein and B. Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America (New York, Oxford Veins of Latin America (New York, Monthly E. Galeano, Press, Open 1970); University Review Press, I973).
2

Unity and Diversity in Latin American History

ignored or explained in a purely ad hocmanner. I will refer to this approach to Latin American history as the 'essentialist' approach. The second approach discussed in this article is really a variant of the first. However, because of its widespread popularity, it merits separate treatment. This is the notion that the various nations of Latin America underwent a broadly similar and parallel development which may be described as a sequence of historical stages. Following Malloy, this will be termed the 'modal pattern' approach.5 Typically, it is claimed that the economies of the Latin American countries were first orientated toward production of primary products for the world market (the phase of 'development toward the outside'); as the stimulus of the world market faltered in the period between the outbreak of World War I and the close of World War II, the Latin American economies turned in on themselves and began to industrialize. By meeting domestic demand for manufactured goods from internal production, rather than through export revenues, they began the second phase, that of import-substitution industrialization (ISI). Finally, in recent decades, following certain internal problems associated with ISI and consequent on the massive penetration of the Latin American economies by multinational manufacturing corporations, it is held that some at least of the Latin American economies are entering a new phase which has variously been labelled 'associated dependent development', the 'Brazilian model', 'bureaucratic authoritarianism', etc.6 As in the essentialist approach, deviations from the modal pattern are seen as precisely that, deviations from the basic theme or pattern of Latin American history. The criticisms directed at both essentialist and modal pattern accounts of Latin American history, as will be seen in greater detail below, frequently hinge upon precisely this issue: how many exceptions can be tolerated before the explanatory paradigm must be discarded? To some extent, this must be a matter of judgement. Nevertheless, it is possible to break out of the dilemma by adopting a third approach. What is involved is a conscious attempt to steer a course between the Scylla of national empiricism and the Charybdis of essentialism by undertaking systematic comparisons of national histories. The waters of comparative history are poorly charted, and reefs and shoals abound. It is little wonder, then, that only a few scholars have ventured into this area. Indeed,
J. Malloy, 'Latin America: the Modal Pattern', in J. Malloy (ed.), Authoritarianismand Corporatismin Latin America (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977). 6 F. H. Cardoso, 'Associated Dependent Development' in A. Stepan (ed.), Authoritarian and Brazil (New Haven, Yale University Press, I973); G. A. O'Donnell, Modernigation Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973).
5
I-2

Ian Roxborough

to the best of the author's knowledge, there are only a handful of systematic attempts to reconcile the diversity of national experiences with a systematic and coherent theory for the region as a whole.7 Of these, the most important is, of course, the pioneering work of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, frequently cited and promptly ignored.8 The thrust of this article will be that it is to the methodology of Cardoso and Faletto that we must look for an adequate account of Latin American history but, as will be argued in detail below, their substantive account is in need of radical amendment. Having briefly stated the rival positions, we move now to a more leisurely examination of their respective merits and demerits.
Essentialist approaches: Claudio Velig

Rather than take a large number of writers, I will concentrate on a recent example of the essentialist approach to Latin American history. In so doing, I have attempted to select an author whose centrality and reputation precludes any possibility of attacking a straw man. In a recent and important attempt to synthesize Latin American history, Claudio Veliz has argued that 'a centralist tradition' has dominated the history of the continent.9 Latin America, in sharp contrast to its northern neighbour, was originally colonized by highly centralized monarchies. Colonial rule was authoritarian, and the interests and affairsof the colonies were subordinated to the directing influences of Spain and Portugal. The metropolitan societies sought to regulate colonial life in minute detail. This centralist tradition was further strengthened with the Bourbon and Pombaline reforms. As a result, Latin Americans learnt to look to the state for solutions to social, political and economic problems; rather than form free associations, the natural political response of Latin Americans was to orientate their action directly toward the state. This tradition, argues Veliz, survives today in the form of the centralized military governments which dominate the region. There was, however, according to Veliz, a 'liberal pause' in what has been an otherwise unbroken history of centralism and authoritarianism. The liberal pause began in the mid-nineteenth century, and started to
7

F. H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dependency and Developmentin Latin America (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979; original Spanish edition, 1969); F. S. Weaver, Class, State andIndustrialStructure (Westport, Conn, Greenwood Press, 1980); A. Cueva, El Desarrollodel Capitalismoen America Latina (Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1977); V. Bambirra, Capitalismo DependienteLatinoamericano (Santiago, CESO, 1973). The reasons for the practical neglect of the Cardoso-Faletto volume are unclear. It would be interesting to explore this topic from the point of view of the sociology of 9 C. Veliz, op. cit. knowledge.

Unity and Diversity in Latin American History

crumble in the depression of the interwar period. However, it experienced something of a revival during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath. This liberal pause finally came to an end in the late 'sixties and early 'seventies. It is not unreasonable in any account of Latin American history to note that a dominant trend has been interrupted for a while. However, as Paul Cammack has noted, the 'liberal pause' acknowledged by Veliz runs from the mid-nineteenth century right up to the last decade or two.10 It covers virtually the entire period of national independence. Of the last 30 years of Latin American history (from 18 5 to 1980), perhaps some thirty years (a mere 23 % of the total) might be described as fitting Veliz's centralist model of political behaviour. As an explanation of post-colonial Latin American history, the notion of a centralist tradition is seriously deficient. In reality, for Veliz, only three periods of Latin American history are marked by authoritarian centralism: the colonial period; the period of state-building immediately following independence and prior to the definitive integration of the Latin American economies into the expanding capitalist world economy; and the recent period of military government. That there should be some similarity between the politics of military dictatorship and those prevailing under the colonial regime and under the early authoritarian attempts at state-building will surely cause little dispute. But this formal similarity does not imply the existence of a real tradition,given the century-long hiatus of the 'liberal interlude'. That is, this tradition cannot easily be seen as the cause of these forms of authoritarianism, given the existence of a liberal pause. As an explanatory device, tradition is only of interest to the extent that its continuity, embodied in institutionalized practices of socialization and cultural transmission, acts as an effective cause of system stability. Judged entirely in its own terms and on the basis of its own interpretation of the historical record, the theory of a centralist tradition must be found seriously wanting. There are, not surprisingly, other criticisms which could be adduced. For example, the colonial period was not one of unbroken centralism. During the seventeenth century and part of the eighteenth, imperial control over the American colonies was both lax and ineffective. Only with the absolutist reforms of the later eighteenth century was a consistent attempt made to control the colonies from the metropolis. It is, thus, by no means clear that even the period of colonial history can be accurately characterized by reference to the notion of a centralist tradition. Nor is it easy to use that notion to describe contemporary Latin America. The
10 P. Cammack, reviewof Vliz, 'CentralistTraditionin LatinAmerica',Durham University
Journal, vol. 75, no. 2 (1983), pp. II8-119.

Ian Roxborough

incidence of military rule has been uneven and, in some countries, the soldiers have returned to their barracks and allowed civilians to assume power. Taking Claudio Veliz as an example, I have argued that the notion that Latin America as a whole has some essential unity and persistence, both in time and space, is an inaccurate reading of the historical record, which is one of diversity and change. Similar criticisms could be made of other essentialist theories, though space precludes a fuller discussion in this article. The modal pattern The most widespread interpretation of Latin American history owes much to dependency theory. It links the stages of growth of the Latin American economies to their changing relations with the world economy. This framework has been utilized by a number of writers, among whom the and Osvaldo Sunkel works of Celso Furtado, Guillermo O'Donnell, deserve special mention.ll Here, the short article by James Malloy in his edited book, Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, will be taken as a representative statement of the basic position.12 The expansion of the world economy in the second half of the nineteenth century brought with it an increase in demand for foodstuffs and raw materials. The majority of Latin American countries took advantage of this increased demand from the metropolis and began to export growing quantities of primary products to Europe and the United States. In turn, they provided expanding markets for the manufactured goods of the industrial economies. From this period until the i930s, Latin American countries pursued a growth model orientated toward the outside. As the links between metropolis and satellite were weakened by the First World War, and then by the depression of the 1930S and the Second World War, the Latin American economies faced sharp drops in export revenues, and, hence, their import capacity was curtailed. This situation, together with tariff barriers and certain economic policies which effectively operated as
1

12

C. Furtado, EconomicDevelopmentof Latin America (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970); 0. Sunkel and P. Paz, El SubdesarrolloLatinoamericano y la Teora del Desarrollo(Mexico, Siglo XXI, 970); D. Collier (ed.), TheNew Authoritarianismin Latin America (Berkeley, University of California Press, I979). J. Malloy, op. cit. Naturally, many writers differ in significant aspects from the position put forward by Malloy. My claim is that writers in this tradition all share a broadly similar framework for the analysis of Latin American history; Malloy has been chosen because his work is perhaps the clearest and most succinct example of this approach.

Unity and Diversity in Latin American History

forms of the Keynesian multiplier, provided a stimulus for what became known as import-substitution industrialization. 13Beginning with consumer goods, items which had previously been imported were now manufactured in Latin America. However, capital and intermediate goods and raw materials for industry still had to be imported, and this - in the booming world economy of the post-war decades - led to the increasing penetration of Latin American economies by affiliates of manufacturing multinationals. This marked the beginning of a third phase of Latin American economic growth, conventionally dated from the mid-'fifties or 'sixties. The key feature of this third phase, which we will call, following O'Donnell, the bureaucratic-authoritarian (B-A) phase, lies in the changing composition of effective demand.14 In the ISI phase, locally manufactured goods (such as textiles and food-processing) were aimed at a broad spectrum of the population. In the B-A phase, the stimulus to economic growth was provided by the consumer durables sector: primarily cars and various electrical appliances. Since only the high-income sections of the population could be expected to afford such goods, continued economic growth required that increases in market demand be concentrated in the high-income strata. The logic of capital accumulation in this phase, it was argued, would lead to an increasingly regressive distribution of income. The contrast with the ISI phase could not be more stark: the earlier phase of industrialization depended on continually expanding the purchasing power of the bulk of the population, particularly lower income groups.15 These differences in the distribution of market demand had their political corollaries. The period of ISI was accompanied by a displacement of the old agrarian oligarchies from state power and by the mobilization of previously excluded classes and strata. A heterogeneous coalition of industrialists, the urban middle class, urban workers and migrants to the cities led this assault on the oligarchical state. Frequently with the aid of sections of the military, this coalition led to the installation of populist or Bonapartist regimes and to a new level of state autonomy from direct class pressures. Industrial expansion, growth in employment, and widespread rises in living standards were the material bases for the widespread support enjoyed by these populist governments.
13
14

C. Furtado, The Economic Growth of Brazil (Berkeley, University of California Press,

I965).

15

G. A. O'Donnell, Modernizationand Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, op. cit. Economic Commission for Latin America, Development Problems in Latin America (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1970).

Ian Roxborough

With the advent of the B-A phase, the picture altered radically. Now, working class wages were to be constrained and popular mobilization dampened. As a consequence, the transition from the ISI phase to the B-A phase was accompanied by an increase in state repression, often in the form of a military take-over of the government. Durable and long-term military-technocratic regimes were installed in one country after another:
BJrazilin I964, Argentina in I966, Chile and Uruguay in I973. The model

was elaborated in the wake of this series of military interventions, and was largely designed to provide an explanation for what was seen as a universal (or at least very widespread) phenomenon in Latin America. Thus, the modal pattern of Latin American development supposedly discerned by this influential body of scholars postulates three stages of economic growth, each of which has definite political correlates.
Table i. The 'modalpattern' for Latin America
Centre 1850/70-1930 Industrial maturity of G.B.
1930--I960

Periphery Export of primary products

Dominant classes Agrarian export oligarchy

National

State form Oligarchic parliamentarianism

Bonapartism

Political movements Middle-class radical challenge

Populist

U.S. dominance I.S.I.

i96o

bourgeoisie Late monopoly Neo-liberalism Associated M.N.C. monopoly capitalism: crisis of U.S. domination capital dominance

expansion Authoritarian Authoritarian corporatism exclusion

Three principal questions may be asked of this model: (i) Is the connection between the logic of capital accumulation and the economic and political policies actually adopted as determinate as the model suggests? That is, are the causal linkages in the chain of theoretical reasoning adequate? (2) Do any or all of the Latin American economies pass through this threefold sequence, and is the timing that specified by the model? (3) Is there empirically any association between these three phases of economic growth (assuming they exist) and forms of political behaviour? It can be argued that the modal pattern model is seriously deficient vis-d-vis all three objections, and that there are sufficient grounds, both logical and empirical, for rejecting it, even in terms of the countries which served as the point of departure for the formulation of the model. In this article, the focus will be on the third of these possible criticisms of the modal pattern: the existence or otherwise of a correlation between the economic and

Unity and Diversity in Latin American History

the political processes.16 Since the interest in any interpretative schema lies in linking economic, social and political processes, this third criticism is central. The countries which have inspired most theorizing in this vein have been Argentina and Brazil. Yet even here there are grounds for questioning the utility of the modal pattern model. Elsewhere, of course, there is even less fit between the model and historical reality. We will concentrate on two central issues: does populism occur in the period I930-6o?; and is there a trend towards corporatist exclusion in the period after I960? First it is necessary to define 'populism', a daunting task in itself. The term is often defined in a purely ostensive manner, namely populism is that which occurred during the governments of Cairdenas(I 934-40), Per6n (1946-5 5) and Vargas (1930-45). A somewhat broader focus is that of lanni, for whom everything that happened in Latin America between 1930 and I960 may be described as 'populist'.17 However, ostensive definitions are inherently unsatisfactory and ought to be replaced with stipulative definitions. There is some considerable controversy on this subject, with theorists falling into two broad camps. On the one hand, the 'classical' definition of populism sees it as a phenomenon combining a particular form of ideology with certain organizational and social structural features. For 'classical' theorists, populism is a loosely organized multiclass movement united by a charismatic leader behind an ideology and programme of social justice and nationalism. In their view this linkage of ideology and organization is the strengthof the definition; it links ideology with a definite mode of political participation. There is an implicit or explicit contrast with the supposedly class-orientated nature of politics in the advanced industrial societies of Western Europe. Popular participation in populist movements, it is asserted, does not take on a 'class' character. Either the subordinate strata compose a 'mass' or the working class does not yet have its own autonomous organizations. It tends, therefore, to be organized and led by
16

Other criticismsof the B-A model may be found in J. Serra,'Three MistakenTheses and AuthoritarianRegimes' in Regarding the Connection between Industrialization I. Roxborough, 'State, Multinationalsand D. Collier (ed.), TheNew Authoritarianism; the Working Class in Brazil and Mexico', in C. Lewis and C. Abel (eds.), Economic in Latin America(London, Athlone Press, forthcoming); M. Wallerstein, Imperialism 'The Collapseof Democracy in Brazil: its Economic Determinants', Latin American
Research Review, vol. 15, no. 3 (I980); K. Remmer & G. Merkx, 'BureaucraticAuthoritarianism Revisited', Latin American Research Review, vol. 17, no. 2 (I982);
no. 2 (1982).

Research vol. 17, G. O'Donnell, 'Reply to Remmerand Merkx', LatinAmerican Review,

17

0. Ianni, La Formaciondel Estado Populista en America Latina (Mexico, ERA,

1972).

Io

Ian Roxborough

other social classes or political forces in a heteronomous manner. The absence or weakness of an autonomous working class is central to the classical definition of populism.18 Opposing this definition, there is what might be called the 'discourse analysis' school of thought. For these theorists, populism is first and foremost an ideological phenomenon: populism is an ideology, or strand of an ideology, which asserts that political conflict is between 'the people' (who are seen as the 'nation') and the 'oligarchy' or 'imperialism'.19 Hence, whenever a political leader makes an appeal to 'the people' he or she is a populist, and his or her movement or government may by extension be described as 'populist'. In this definition, nothing is said about the causes of populism, about its social base, about its policies, or about its organizational style. Having defined the phenomenon with reference to a particular form of ideological appeal, it remains a matter of empirical enquiry as to whether this appeal to the people is associated with particular features in the genesis, structure, social base, and outcome of the movement. The 'discourse analysis' definition is, therefore, a minimal definition; while some theorists would argue that populism is more than this, none would argue that it is less than this. Moreover, if populism is an 'appeal to the people', it does not follow that those to whom this appeal is addressed actually heed it. Whether the subordinate classes and strata of Latin America support populist leaders because they accept the validity of this appeal to the people, or whether they support such leaders because this is a rational choice among alternatives, given their interests, remains an open matter. A corollary of this minimal definition of the term is that one must expect to find 'populism' in a wide variety of contexts, and this is, indeed, the case in Latin America. Populist appeals to the people were made by the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei in Chile in the i96os, by Mexican presidents throughout the twentieth century, by the Peruvian military
18

Clearly, a great variety of differing approaches fall under the 'classical' definition of populism. Essential to all of them is the contrast between the types of action and organization supposedly associated with class actors and that characteristic of situations of low 'classness'. 19 What I regard as the 'classical' position is represented by many of the works in G. Ionescu and E. Gellner (eds.), Populism(London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, I969), and, more recently, N. Mouzelis, 'Ideology and Class Politics', New Left Review, no. 112, (1978). The principal opposing view of populism (which I refer to as the 'discourse in Marxist Theory(London, analysis' approach) is set out in E. Laclau, Politics andIdeology New Left Review, I977); E. de Ipola, Ideologiay Discurso Populista (Mexico, Folios Ediciones, 1982); H. Osakabe, Argumentafaoe DiscursoPolitico (Sao Paulo, Kair6s, 1979); G. G. Debert, Ideologiae Populismo (Sao Paulo, Quieroz Editor, I979).

Unity and Diversity in Latin American History

government of the late 'sixties and early 'seventies, and by a motley host of civilians and military men in a wide variety of contexts. The proponents of the modal pattern model, however, adopt the 'classical' definition of populism, and see in the paradigmatic cases of Per6n, Vargas and Cardenas attempts to mobilize subordinate strata from above into multiclass coalitions behind an industrial-developmentalist project of the State and/or the national bourgeoisie. The available evidence, however, suggests that the fit between the classical definition of populism and these three cases is open to question. Indeed, of the three paradigmatic examples of 'populism' (according to
the ostensive definition), one of them - the 1930-45 Vargas government -

fails even to fit the minimal definition. During the period from his seizure of power up to the calling of elections after the Second World War, Getulio Vargas' discourse was not noted for the frequency of its appeals to the 'people'. His was a conservative, authoritarian and demobilizing regime that is hard to describe as 'populist' under any definition.20 It was only with the advent of competitive politics in the period after 945 that Vargas made any sustained appeal to the people. In this second period, indeed, Vargas may justly be described as a populist, and the heyday of Brazilian populism may perhaps be dated as 1945-64. But Brazilian ISI was well under way in the I930S and had begun considerably earlier. The 'fit' between economics and politics in this paradigmatic case is rather loose. In the cases of Cardenas and Peron there is little doubt that they meet the minimal definition of populism. But the definition of populism used by theorists working within the modal pattern framework goes beyond this minimal definition to include the notion that mass support for populist movements was not organized primarily along class lines. That is, the support for populist leaders was not a multi-class alliance, with independent trade unions lending the support of an autonomously organized working class to a Bonapartist figure, but rather an amorphous mass movement or coalition with direct ties between individuals and the charismatic leader.21
20

T. Harding, 'The Political History of Organized Labor in Brazil', Ph.D., Stanford I make a distinction here between 'alliance' and 'coalition' which is seldom made explicit by 'classical' theorists of populism. Most political forces are coalitions in the sense that their supportersare drawn from a variety of classes; to talk about class of only one 'alliances', however, suggests that organizationswhich are representative class (e.g. tradeunions) deliberatelyand consciously form a compact with other social actors to furthertheir mutualinterests.
University, 1973, p. 127; A. C. Bernardo, Tutela e autonomiasindical: Brasil (Sao Paulo, Quieroz Editor, I982).
i90o-I94y

21

I2

Ian Roxborough

This analysis springs basically from Weber (charisma) and Durkheim via mass society theory.22 For the classic definition of populism to have any utility, it must be demonstrated that we are dealing with a situation in which subordinate classes or strata are organized into the populist coalition in a heteronomous manner. If this is not the case, then we are dealing with an alliance of classes, rather than with populism. The available evidence suggests that, at least in the early phases, both Per6n and Cardenas were supported by autonomously organized working class institutions, i.e. relatively independent trade unions. These movements may, therefore, be analysed in terms of more or less explicit and deliberate alliances of the working class with individuals holding state power. No reference to the concept of populism is necessary to explain this, nor does the notion of populism add anything to the analysis. It is only at a later stage that the unions lose their autonomy and the working class becomes subordinate to the state.23 Empirically, neither early Peronism nor the Cardenas government fit into a classicial definition of populism. In the case of the early Peronist movement, Juan Carlos Torre has shown how the supposedly 'spontaneous' demonstration of the poor people of
Buenos Aires on
I7

October 1945 to demand the release of Peron had been

called for and organized by the principal trade-union confederation, the CGT.24 Moreover, at the meeting of the CGT's executive committee where that decision was taken, the union leaders were deeply divided over their attitudes to Peron. On the one hand were those who wished to have nothing to do with Per6n; in a slight majority were those who, despite considerable distrust and misgivings, decided to support Peron as a lesser evil.25 Moreover, the notion that it was recent migrants to Buenos Aires from the interior - a 'new' working class - which provided Per6n with his principal base of support has come under sustained attack.26Little, and
22 23

See W. A. Kornhauser,ThePoliticsof MassSociety (Glencoe, The Free Press, i959). J. Horowitz, 'The Impact of the Pre-1943 Labor Union Traditions on Peronism',
Journal of Latin American Studies, vol.

Research vol. I6, no. Review, Organizationand Politics in Argentina', Latin American
(1981). 1976).

5, part i (I983); T. Di Tella, 'Working-Class

2

24
25

J. C. Torre,' Sobreas Origens do Peronismo',Estudos CEBRAP, no. i6 (Abril-Junho Ibid.On the originsof Peronism,see also W. Little, 'The PopularOriginsof Peronism', in the Twentieth in D. Rock (ed.), Argentina Century (London, Duckworth, I975), and del Peronismo, vol. SobreLos Or/genes M. Murmis and J. C. Portantiero(eds.), Estudios The classical statement concerning the role of the migrants from the interior is G. enunaEpocade Transicion Germani,PoliticaySociedad (Buenos Aires, Paidos, 1968). See
i (Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI, I97I).

26

Unity and Diversity in Latin American History

13

Murmis and Portantiero have argued that Per6n's support was drawn from all sectors of the working class; repressed by conservative governments since 193o, Argentina's urban workers and trade union leaders saw in Peron a potential, if ambiguous, ally. There was, therefore, considerable continuity in working-class political behaviour, at least during the early phase of the regime.27 Of course, this was all to change. Union leaders erred in supposing that they could retain control over relatively independent unions in the face of a deliberate strategy by Per6n to establish complete state control over labour. It is at this point, as di Tella has suggested, that the mobilization of previously non-participating sections of the working class may have some role in explaining the nature of Peronist control over the trade unions.28 In any case, the evidence suggests that with Peronism we are dealing with an attempt at an alliance between the working class and the state, an alliance in which the state gradually gained the upper hand and increasingly subordinated the working class to its control. By conflating the later subordination of the unions to the state (1947-5 5) with the the period of genesis of the Per6n-union alliance (I943-7), modal-pattern model seriously understates the autonomy of working class action and, by describing this phenomenon as 'populism', implicitly ascribes motives and orientations to the working class which were less than rational. There is no doubt that Peron's discourse, at least until 1952, was populist.29 However, to infer from Peron's massive support that this appeal was successful is to make a series of possibly unwarranted assumptions about working-class motives. Similar considerations apply to the Cardenas period. Most analysts have argued that the Mexican unions were in a state of disarray when Cardenas came to power in 1934 and that, in any case, the Mexican working class had a long tradition of state tutelage. In a bid to break away from the power behind the throne exercised by Plutarco Elias Calles, the new President actively mobilized working-class and peasant support on his behalf. The outcome of this was the reorganization of the dominant party along de Trabajadores de corporatist lines and the formation of the Confederacion
also G. Germani, Authoritarianism, Fascism and National Populism (New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 1978); G. Germani, 'El Surgimiento del Peronismo', Desarrollo Econdmico,vol. 13, no. 51 (I973). Some of the critics include Little, op cit.; Murmis and Portentiero, op. cit.; T. Halperin, 'Algunas observaciones sobre Germani, el surgimiento de peronismo y los migrantes internos', Desarrollo Econdmico,vol. 14, no. 56 (I975); E. Kenworthy, 'Interpretaciones ortodoxas y revisionistas del apoyo inicial del peronismo', Desarrollo Econdmico,vol. 14, no. 56 (1975). 28 di Tella, op. cit., pp. 49-5 I Horowitz, op. cit. de Ipola, op. cit., p. 154.

27 29

I4

Ian Roxborough

Mexico (CTM) in 1936. Such an account is not, however, entirely accurate. Although the earlier union movement had been subordinated to the state through Luis Morones' CROM, there had always existed independent dissident unions. By 1933, together with breakaway elements from the CROM, the CGT and the Communist Party unions (the CSUM) were experiencing a period of growth and revived militancy. When Cardenas was elected President, the union movement - after considerable initial hesitation - rallied to his support in the struggle against Calles. This switch in the position of organized labour was in part due to the change in Comintern tactics in 9 35 towards a policy of popular fronts.30 Even when the CTM was formed, the Communists and independent leftists retained considerable support within the union movement as a whole, and it was only with the purges of 1948 that the union movement was definitively brought under state control.31 As in the case of Peronism, we have here an independent labour movement entering into alliance with the state and subsequently being subordinated to that state. The notions of a' mobilizable mass' or of a coalition involving a heteronomous working class - crucial to the classical definition of populism - are inapplicable. The empirical evidence, then, does not lend strong support to the notion that the governments of Cardenas, Peron and Vargas can reasonably be described as 'populist'. In all cases the organizational features held to be defining characteristics of populism (in the classical version of the definition) are absent. In terms of the minimal definition of populism (i.e. a particular type of ideological appeal), both the Cardenasand the Peronist governments may be labelled as 'populist'. The result, however, of using such a minimal definition, as Laclau has argued, is that a great many otherwise diverse movements, including Nazi Germany, must also be labelled 'populist'.32 The utility of the notion of 'populism' as a description for a particular stage in the development of Latin American societies is, therefore, open to serious question. On the second major issue, the structural causes of the military interventions of the I96os and 1970S, the evidence is equally problematic in terms of the modal pattern model. The three countries of Latin America
30

31

32

S. Le6n, 'Alianza de clase y cardenismo', Revista Mexicana de CienciasPoliticasy Sociales, no. 89 (I977); S. Le6n, 'El Comite Nacional de Defensa Proletaria', Revista Mexicana de Sociologia,vol. 40, no. 2 (1978). F. Barbosa Cano, 'El charrazo contra el STPRM', in J. Woldenberg et al., Memoriasdel EncuentroSobre Historia del MovimientoObrero(3 vols. Puebla, Universidad Aut6noma del Autoritarismo: Historia de Puebla, 1980), vol. 2; L. Medina, Civilismoy Modernigacion de la Revolucidn Mexicana, vol. 20 (Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico, i979). Laclau, op. cit.

Unity and Diversity in Latin American History

15

which have developed sufficiently to enter the B-A phase are Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Of these three, perhaps only Argentina stands up well to an examination of the empirical evidence. The Mexican case is a difficult one in that there have been no clear discontinuities either of forms of political domination or of the model of capital accumulation since the early fifties. It is difficult to point to a clear rupture with the ISI phase or model. In Brazil, although there appears to have been a sharp break in the pattern of development in 1964, with the installation of a long-term military regime and the implementation of a drastic and successful stabilization programme, followed by a period of economic growth of the order of 9 % per annum, the detailed evidence suggests that the discontinuity is more apparent than real. In a recent article, Jose Serra has criticized three of the central postulates of the B-A model in this area.33First, he argues that there was no sudden alteration in the rate of economic growth after the military coup of 1964; rather, Brazilian economic history displays a long-term growth rate of some 6 % per annum since the I930S. Secondly, within this secular trend, there are naturally cyclical movements in the economy, and the sharp recession of 1964-7 was followed by a spectacular boom in the economy, giving rise to theories about the 'Brazilian miracle' and the relationship between rapid rates of capital accumulation and authoritarian regimes. Thirdly, Serra also argues that there was no noticeable increase in the 'deepening' of capital as claimed by the theorists of bureaucratic-authoritarianism. In short, the trends in capital accumulation date back to the 1930s, and the arrival of the military in 1964 does not produce a radical shift in the developmental model. Similar arguments may be made about the behaviour of the wages of urban workers. One of the implications of the theory of bureaucraticauthoritarianism is that the requirements of capital accumulation in the new phase of capitalist development necessitated greater control over the labour force. Real wages must remain stagnant (or even fall), unions must be controlled, and strikes reduced in frequency and scope. Once again, the long-run evidence in the case of Brazil fails to support the model fully. The trend of real wages for the urban working class since the I930S has been one of slow improvement, and the advent of the military coup merely marks a short-term reversal of the rapid growth of real wages under the government of Joao Goulart (i961-4).34 In Mexico, real wages plummeted
33

34

J. Serra, op. cit.; A. Villela and W. Suzigan, 'Government Policy and the Economic Growth of Brazil, 1889-1945 ', Brazilian EconomicStudies, no. 3 (x975). J. Wells, 'Industrial Accumulation and Living Standards in the Long-run: The Sao Paulo Industrial Working Class, 193-75 ', Journal of DevelopmentStudies, vol. I9, nos. 2 and 3 (January and April I983).

I6

Ian Roxborough

during the Second World War, remained more or less stable until the early 'fifties, and then rose steadily until the mid-I970s.35 Although the distribution of income in both of these countries has steadily deteriorated, rapid economic growth has meant that this could occur without producing a long-run fall in workers' real wages. In summary, then, the empirical record does not suggest strong support for the modal pattern model as regards the relationship between stages of economic growth and forms of political activity. This is so in the more important countries, the countries which ought to provide the strongest support for the theory. It follows, a fortiori, that the case for the modal pattern model as a general description of Latin American development as a whole is weaker still. The principal reasons for the inadequacies of the modal pattern model seem to be twofold: on the one hand, even in the supposedly typical cases of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, the model is inaccurate in its depiction of political and economic events; complex processes are glossed over and reduced to pre-defined formulae which, upon careful empirical examination, fail to support the contentions of the model. In the second place, the attempt to impose a uniform pattern on all of Latin America simply avoids the great range of variation. To present a model which will fit all Latin American countries, the modal pattern model necessarily has recourse to a simplified theoretical construct which can no longer adequately describe even the countries on the basis of whose experience it was first formulated. Multiplepaths: Cardosoand Faletto In 1969 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto published a short interpretative account of Latin American history.36 It should be noted that it is by no means clear whether the authors intend to develop a general
35

36

Econdmica,no. 4 (1977). J. Bortz, 'El salario obrero en el Distrito Federal', Investigacion Since the mid-7os, real wages have tended to fall. F. H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, op. cit. In this article I have used the 1979 English translation. As Robert Packenham, 'Plus Sa Change... The English Edition of Cardoso and Faletto's DependenciayDesarrolloen America Latina', Latin American ResearchReview, vol. I7, no. I (I982), points out, there are a number of differences between the 1969 (Spanish) and the 1979 (English) editions. These consist principally in the addition of illustrative material to the chapters discussed in this article (chapters 3 and 4) and a post scriptum. As Packenham notes, the addition of this material does not alter the authors' argument. Moreover, to judge by the footnotes, Cardoso and Faletto do not seem to have assimilated the monographic literature published after 969; only two new sources are mentioned, one from 1972 (dealing with Peru) and one from 1970 (dealing with Mexico). These do not alter either the authors' arguments or the criticisms presented in the present article.

Unity and Diversity in Latin American History

theoretical model of Latin American development, or whether they are merely applying a particular kind of methodology to a series of concrete historical cases without any attempt to develop such a general theory. At the very minimum, however, Dependency and Development indicates the key variables which, according to the authors, enable the analyst to make sense of the multiplicity of developmental paths followed by Latin American countries. Their starting point is a differentiation of types of export economies in the nineteenth century into two basic types: (i) enclave economies and (2) economies with national control of the productive system. The enclaves which Cardoso and Faletto have in mind are mining or plantation enclaves. Although the image conjured up by the notion of an enclave is of a geographically separate entity, the key feature for these authors appears to be not the geographical situation of the productive enterprise but rather whether ownership is foreign or domestic. Now it is certainly the case that most plantations and mining concerns in Latin America have been owned by foreign intersts, and that agricultural activities which have been more widely diffused across the national territory have generally been owned by nationals. Nevertheless, it is important for the logic of the explanation not to conflate the locational characteristics of the enterprise with the nationality of its owners. This said, Cardoso and Faletto claim that this difference in the structure of the export sectors led to different trajectories for these two groups of countries. The key question facing Latin American states in the early twentieth century was how the middle classes were to be incorporated politically. In the enclave economies the state was under the exclusive domination of the oligarchy. As a consequence, the incorporation of the middle classes could proceed either by a breakdown of the oligarchic order, as in the Mexican revolution, or as a result of conflicts among the dominant classes, enabling a middle-class challenge to succeed. In this path, characteristic of Chile, the role of the state was a key to the success or otherwise of this project. In the societies where there was national control of the productive system, the state reflected a co-existence of the oligarchy and the bourgeoisie. Here also there were two possible routes to the incorporation of the middle classes. Where there was a substantial degree of unity among the dominant classes, the incorporation of the middle classes would occur under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. According to Cardoso and Faletto, Argentina illustrates this case. In countries where the dominant classes were fragmented, such as Brazil, there was only a partial incorporation of the middle classes. In both enclave and nationally owned export

18,

Ian Roxborough middle-class challenges to the system of oligarchic fail, due to the resistance of the oligarchy and/or the middle classes. Such was the case in Peru and

sector situations, domination might weakness of the Colombia. Such, in brief, Variations in the

is the basic schema outlined by Cardoso and Faletto. structure of the dominant class are used to explain defined in terms of the varying modes of outcomes, differing political of the middle classes. Condensing the account presented in incorporation and in this manner Dependency Development naturally runs the risk of doing Table 2. The Cardoso-Faletto scheme
Type of dependent economy Enclave economies Successfulmiddle-class challenge Unsuccessfulmiddle-class challenge Successfulmiddle-class challenge (dominant class unity) Successfulmiddle-class challenge (dominant class divided) Unsuccessfulmiddle-class challenge Middle-class challenge Outcome Breakdownin oligarchic domination (Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela) Middle-classaccess to oligarchic-bourgeois domination (Chile) Maintenanceof oligarchic domination (Peru) Middle-classincorporation under bourgeois hegemony (Argentina) Partialincorporationof middle class (Brazil) of oligarchic Maintenance domination (Colombia)

Nationally owned export sector economies

serious injustice to the complexities and richness of their historical account. This difficulty is doubly compounded by the fact that Cardoso and Faletto have written a text which, in many places, is elliptical to the point of opacity. As I shall attempt to demonstrate below, their account is open to a number of objections. Throughout their account the key terms 'middle classes', 'bourgeoisie' and 'oligarchy' are left undefined and often without any clear empirical referent. The result is a rather shadowy portrayal of socio-economic conflict in which individuals, governments, policies or political parties are held to 'represent' the class forces supposedly in conflict. The existence of these class forces, and of the conflicts of interest among them, is asserted or inferred rather than demonstrated empirically. This is particularly crucial since the key issues in the model presented by the authors revolve around the degree of unity or disunity of the dominant classes and the

Unity and Diversity in Latin American History

19

relationship between dominant classes and the state. If there is no independent measure of these variables, then we are likely to be presented with an analysis which is both reductionist and tautological: reductionist because political forces are taken to indicate the presence of social classes; tautological because the evidence for the existence of classes is the existence of political actors. The signal advance of the Cardoso-Faletto model over both the essentialist theories and the modal pattern model is that, on the basis of two dichotomous variables (national v. foreign ownership of export sectors, and degree of dominant class unity), a number of different political can traced.37 The essentialist and modal be paths pattern approaches both a which all Latin American countries postulate singledevelopmental path follow more or less closely. These approaches treat 'deviations' as just that; and account for them in an ad hoc manner. In contrast, the Cardoso-Faletto model is based on the interaction of previously specified theoretical variables which in turn specify alternative paths. In addition, the Cardoso-Faletto model has the advantage of being a social action approach: as an integral part of the theory, social actors are faced with real choices, and hence outcomes are not deterministic. This feature of the model also moves the analyst toward a consideration of multiple paths. The Cardoso-Faletto model, then, offers a theoretically satisfactory account of the diverse political trajectories of the nations of Latin America. However, as we shall see, while the Cardoso-Faletto methodology might be acceptable, their empirical analysis suffers from a number of serious problems. Clearly Cardoso and Faletto had a certain body of empirical material in mind when in the mid-sixties they wrote their short book. There is, indeed, evidence concerning the structure of dominant classes in Latin America, and this can be brought to bear on the propositions advanced by Cardoso and Faletto. Interestingly, such evidence as is presently available suggests that many of the claims and assumptions concerning the nature of dominant classes put forward in Dependency and Development are mistaken. on evidence this it must be both noted, (The topic is, sparse and replete with methodological problems. Until further studies are published, however, we have no choice but to work on the basis of the existing material.) In Argentina, Cardoso and Faletto refer to 'class unity'. While Cardoso
37 At various points the authorsalludeto other differentiating factors, such as the degree of diversity of the export system, though these variablesappearto be of secondary importance.Ibid.,pp. 80-8 .

20

Ian Roxborough

and Faletto note the existence of a variety of fractions of the dominant classes in Argentina, they assert that 'the agro-livestock-exporting sector' constituted a hegemonic dominant class.38 The work of Peter Smith and of Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero, however, suggests that the dominant classes in Argentina were sharply divided.39 In the agrarian sector, there was a division between the breeders of the interior provinces and the fatteners of the pampa near Buenos Aires. Similarly, Argentine industrialists were divided into those closely linked to foreign enterprises and those concerned primarily with the domestic market.40 In their remarks on Brazil, Cardoso and Faletto make the claim that the division within the ranks of the dominant classes was one between the coffee oligarchy and the industrialists. They also assert that there was considerable state autonomy with regard to the industrialization programme. With regard to the first claim about the disunity of the Brazilian dominant class, it does, indeed, appear to be the case that there was considerable fragmentation and conflict among dominant classes. The conflict, however, was not between the coffee oligarchy and industrialists. As the work of Warren Dean indicates, Brazilian industrialists came from the ranks of the coffee planters, particularly in the state of Sao Paulo, and retained close ties with them.41 Moreover, it is difficult to point to sectoral clashes between coffee exporters and industrialists during this period. Rather than a sectoral division, the Brazilian dominant classes were divided along regional lines.42 This had its origins in the changing pattern of Brazil's exports, the historical development of which meant that regions - and with them, regional oligarchies - rose and fell as their
38
39

Ibid., p. 83. M. Murmis and J. C. Portantiero, op. cit.; P. Smith, Politics and Beef in Argentina (New York, Columbia University Press, I969). 40 J. Teichman, 'Interest Conflict and Entrepreneurial Support for Peron', Latin American ResearchReview, vol. 16, no. i (I98i). 41 W. Dean, The Industrializationof Sdo Paulo (Austin, University of Texas Press, I969). 42 On the regional oligarchies in Brazil see, inter alia, R. Faoro, Os Donos do Poder (2 vols, Porto Alegre, Editora Globo, 1979, st ed. 1957); J. Love et al., 'O Poder dos Estados' in B. Fausto (ed.), Historia Geral da Civili.afao Brasileira, vol. 8 (I977); J. L. Love, Rio Grandedo Sul and Brazilian Regionalism,r882-I93o (Stanford, Stanford University Press, I971); J. L. Love, Sio Paulo in the Brazilian Federation, i889-1937 (Stanford, Stanford in the Brazilian Federation,I889-1937 University Press, i980); R. M. Levine, Pernambuco (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1978); J. D. Wirth, Minas Gerais in the Brazilian Federation,i889-1937 (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1977); E.-S. Pang, Bahia in the First Brazilian Republic, i889-i934 (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1979); V. Nunes Leal, Coronelismo (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977); F. Uricoechea, Patrimonial Foundations of the Brazilian BureaucraticState (Berkeley, University of California Press, I980).

Unity and Diversity in Latin American History

exports prospered and declined in the world market. The conflicts within the dominant classes in Brazil in the early twentieth century were between the oligarchies of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais (the famous cafe con laite alliance) and the weaker oligarchies of Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, and the states of the north-east. It was conflicts among these states which explain Vargas' assumption of power in 1930 and the subsequent Paulista Civil War of 1932, alliances and conflicts which cannot easily be described in sectoral terms.43 As to the question of the relative autonomy of the state under Getiilio Vargas (1930-45), this is a matter of some controversy, and it is somewhat premature to pronounce a judgement on the ongoing debate on this topic. However, it cannot be disputed that the claim that this was a period of relative autonomy for the state has been subjected to sustained attack.44 In the case of Chile, Cardoso and Faletto, following the widely known analysis of Claudio Veliz, assert that conflicts among dominant groups were responsible for the particular pattern of development followed in that country.45 However, the bulk of recent empirical evidence suggests that the dominant class in Chile was remarkably homogeneous. As both Zeitlin and his associates46 and Kirsch47 demonstrate, there were considerable ties of ownership between bankers, merchants, industrialists and landowners. As Zeitlin and Ratcliff note: The contradictions between agrarian and industrial capital, and the clashes over state policies affecting them...did not arise between ontologically 'real' class interestsand social segments of large landowners and capitalists. For contradictory within the dominant class did not coincide; rather, the dominant agrarian cleavages
43

The 1932 civil war has sometimes been interpreted in a way which suggested that there was a clash of economic or class interests between Sao Paulo and the Federal Government, e.g. P. Flynn, BraZil: a Political Analysis (London, Ernest Benn, 1978), but such a position is hard to reconcile with the data on the close links between coffee planters and industrialists. 44 E. Diniz, Empresariado,Estado e Capitalismono Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1978); E. Diniz and R. Boschi, Empresariado Nacional e Estado no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, Editora Forense Universitaria, 1978). 45 C. V6liz, 'La Mesa de Tres Patas', Desarrollo Economico, vol. 3, nos. I-2 (AprilSeptember I963); J. Carriere, Landownersand Politics in Chile (Amsterdam, CEDLA, I981). 46 M. Zeitlin and R. Ratcliff, 'Research Methods for the Analysis of the Internal Structure of Dominant Classes', Latin American ResearchReview, vol. io, no. 3 (1975); M. Zeitlin et al., 'Class Segments - Agrarian Property and Political Leadership in the Capitalist Class of Chile', American SociologicalReview, vol. 41, no. 6 (1976). 47 H. Kirsch, Industrial Development in a Traditional Society (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1977); see also T. C. Wright, Landownersand Reform in Chile, ii99-4o (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, I982); and A. J. Bauer, Chilean Rural Society (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975).

22

Ian Roxborough

and industrialelements were internallyrelated, if not 'fused', in so complex a

pattern that neither of thempossessedspecificautonomyor distinctivesocial identity.48

[Emphasisin original.]

Thus, while there is a great deal to commend the Cardoso-Faletto model on methodological grounds, in the key countries of Chile, Brazil and Argentina, and on the key question of the unity/fragmentation of the dominant classes, it must be found lacking both in its empirical assertions and in the lack of conceptual clarity in the definition of key terms. The central division made by the authors between enclave economies and nationally owned productive systems obscures what is, in fact, the key variable: foreign v. national control of the export sector; and the values assigned to the second key variable (unity/disunity of the dominant classes) are, in a number of instances, empirically incorrect.
Towards an adequate model

The argument of this article has been that an adequate conceptualization of Latin American history must take into account the diversity of historical experiences of the various republics. Of the various models reviewed here, only the Cardoso-Faletto model adequately meets this criterion. That particular model, however, is seriously flawed in a number of ways, both conceptually and empirically. Its methodology, however, can serve as the foundation for the construction of a better model. The task of elaborating such a model is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, some suggestions as to a possible way forward will be made. The key variables of the Cardoso-Faletto model had to do with the structure of the dominant classes. This derived from the nature of the productive system, in particular, from the organization of the export sectors and their linkages with the world market. This seems an indispensable starting point. It enables the analyst to incorporate into a single theoretical framework both a concern for situations of external dependency and a focus on the productive structure of the particular Latin American country. This means that it is not necessary to treat the Latin American economies as simple adjuncts or reflexes of the metropolitan economies, as was done with some of the earlier and less sophisticated writing on dependency.49 However, this model needs to be complemented with variables relating
48

M. Zeitlin and R. Ratcliff, 'Research Methods for the Analysis of the Internal Structure of Dominant Classes', Latin American ResearchReview, vol. Io, no. 3 (1975), p. 54. 49 F. H. Cardoso, 'The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States', Latin American ResearchReview, vol. 12, no. 3 (1977).

Unity and Diversity in Latin American History

23

to the structure of subordinate classes. As Colin Henfrey has noted, with its exclusive focus on dominant classes, the Cardoso-Faletto model is in danger of becoming a one-class model of history.50 On the contrary, social change is better analysed in terms of conflicts, tensions, and accommodations between and within both dominant and subordinate classes (and strata, quasi-classes, etc.). Even in those situations where subordinate classes appear to have little or no political input and where politics appears to be entirely an intra-elite affair, a two-class model is still called for.51 The passivity or quiescence of subordinate classes and strata is something which requires explanation. The model, then, calls for two key variables (or sets of variables) defining the structure of both dominant and subordinate classes.52 The model proposed here is a simple one; it assumes that the of the economy will bring with it the emergence and development of new classes or subclasses, and that these will press for development inclusion in the political arena. Existing power holders will respond to these challenges in one way or another, and this will constitute the core of political conflict.53 There is nothing novel about such a model; most of its features appear in the other models examined in this article. At the level of empirical specification, however, this model differs sharply from the others. 50 C. Henfrey, 'Dependency, Modes of Production and the Class Analysis of Latin
29;

'A Summaryof "Problemsand Perspectivesof DependencyTheory"', LatinAmerican 51 When I refer to a 'two-class model' I mean to imply that the basic dynamic factors in the model derive from the interaction of the two classes. In this sense they are indispensable startingpoints or buildingblocks. Naturally,in anyconcreteinvestigation it will be necessaryalso to take into account other social classes and strata, as these will have some impact on the outcomes of political conflicts. It is possible to go on addingextrafactorsto an analysis,makingit morecomplexandtherebyexplainingmore of a concrete situation.The additionof these extra factors is, however, a theoretically quite differentmatterfrom the question of whether the model begins simply with the dominantclass(es)(a one-classmodel), or with both dominantand subordinateclasses (a two-class model). 52 It should not be thought that this is a simple matter. A description of the structure of a class is an exceedinglydifficultand complex task. There are many factorsinvolved in the structuration of socialclasses.One would wish to know a greatdeal about labour markets,social mobility, residentialpatterns,ethnicity, religion, etc. 53 L. Binder et in Political Development al., Crisesand Sequences (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971); J. S. Valenzuela,'Labor Movement Formationand Politics: the Chileanand FrenchCasesin Comparative Perspective',Ph.D., Columbia,1979; C. andtheWorking Class(Austin, Universityof Texas Press, 1982); Weisman,Modernization C. Anderson, PoliticsandEconomic in Latin America(New York, Van Nostrand, Change
I967).

vol. 8, nos 3 and 4 (1981), p. America', Latin American Perspectives,

cf. also A. Cueva,

Perspectives,vol. 3, no. 4 (1976), p. I4.

24

Ian Roxborough

First, with respect to the emergence of new classes and the nature of their challenge, the model presented here differs in a number of important ways. For a start, to talk of a 'middle class' challenging the oligarchy may be misleading. 'Middle class' is a portmanteau term; its object needs careful dissection into its component parts and, indeed, serious thinking and research on this topic is urgently needed.54 Until very recently also, most analyses of Latin American history have tended to accord a very restricted role to the urban working class, arguing either that it has been bought off in a populist coalition with the middle classes, or that it has effectively been disarticulated as a potential political actor by the corporatist intermediation of the state, or by divisions within the working class itself deriving from the opposing interests of a highly paid labour aristocracy and a mass of unorganized workers. Such an interpretation of the Latin American experience does, however, have a number of problems. As Tom Skidmore has noted, it involves something of a paradox: on the one hand, one of the main factors in the genesis of military intervention in Latin America has been the militancy of organized labour; on the other hand, the accepted wisdom in the field is that labour movements in Latin America are generally weak and/or conservative. Skidmore asks, 'How have Latin American workers, once considered eminently manipulable, been able to frighten the guardians of national security ?'55There is, in fact, a good deal of evidence that the urban working classes of Latin America have by no means been so politically passive or so incapable of pursuing their own class interests as some authors would have us believe, though naturally this varies from country to country.56 In the preceding discussion of the modal pattern model, the 'classical' definition of populism was examined in some detail. It was argued that this notion failed to describe accurately the nature of political processes in the Cardenas, Vargas and Peron governments. A more accurate account, it was argued, could be derived from a study of the working class, the state, and dominant classes. The outcomes could be explained by postulating the relatively rational pursuit of class interests by the various actors.
54 I find the position taken by E. O. Wright, Class Structureand IncomeDetermination(New York, Academic Press, 1979), particularly suggestive on this topic. 55 T. Skidmore, 'Workers and Soldiers: Urban Labor Movements and Elite Responses in Twentieth Century Latin America', in V. Bernhard (ed.), Elites, Masses, and Modernizationin Latin America (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 86. 56 This is a point made by T. Skidmore, ibid., and by I. Roxborough, 'The Analysis of Labour Movements in Latin America', Bulletin of Latin American Research,vol. i, no. i (October, I98 ).

Unity and Diversity in Latin American History

Differences in outcomes were the result of differences in the nature of these social classes, in terms of their internal unity, etc., and in the varying relations between these social actors and the state. Attention having been drawn to the importance of the working class as part of the explanation, this needs to be qualified immediately. The process of incorporation of the working class is only of relevance when the working class (a) exists as a class actor and (b) appears to pose a serious threat ':o elite politics. This does not always occur, and in some countries or at certain times it is the peasantry rather than the working class that should be the focus of attention. However, the working class emerged as a significant political force at an early stage in the history of Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Argentina and Chile.57 Cardoso and Faletto are correct in focusing on crises of incorporation as the key events in a theoretically informed account of historical development in Latin America. However, rather than look primarily at the incorporation of the middle classes, it seems more useful to focus on the incorporation, first, of the industrial bourgeoisie and second, of the working class. Since we are dealing with at least two crises of political incorporation, the typology of political outcomes must also be rather more complex than that suggested by Cardoso and Faletto. Neither process of incorporation is ever necessarily 'solved' in a definitive manner. Incorporation may be partial and conditional. It may also be reversed at a later stage by exclusion of an actor from the political process. There is, moreover, a major difference between the two processes of incorporation. Incorporation of the industrial bourgeoisie into the system of oligarchic domination need not involve a high level of conflict. Indeed, through family ties and interlocking patterns of ownership, there may be such a degree of integration between these two classes that they form a single, fused class of owners. This variable, the degree of unity/disunity of the dominant classes(es) is, as we have seen, one of the key differentiating
57 On the origins of Latin American labour movements, see inter alia, P. Blanchard, The Originsof thePeruvianLabor Movement (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1982); B. Fausto, TrabalhoUrbanoe ConflitoSocial(Sao Paulo, DIFEL, 1977); P. DeShazo, Urban Workersand Labor Unions in Chile I902-1927 (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, I983); P. S. Pinheiro and M. M. Hall (eds.), A Classe Operaria no Brasil, vol. i (Sao Paulo, Alfa-Omega, 1979); R. Anderson, Outcastsin their Own Land: Mexican Industrial Workers 90o6-I9II (de Kalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 1976); J. Oddone, El Gremialismo ProletarioArgentino(Buenos Aires, Galema, 1949); S. Marotta, ElMovimiento Sindical Argentino (Buenos Aires, Libera, I960); H. Spalding, La Clase Trabajadora Argentina (Buenos Aires, Libera, I960).

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Ian Roxborough

factors in the account presented by Cardoso and Faletto, and has been considered at length by a number of authors. Unlike the issue of the nature of dominant classes, the process of incorporation of the working class has, until recently, been relatively neglected. A rather unsatisfactory reference to populism has tended to be substituted for a considered analysis of the varying modalities of working class incorporation into the system. It would, therefore, seem appropriate to have as an integral part of the analysis a study of dominant class reactions to the threat posed by the growing urban working class. Their reactions to this threat varied, and this in turn is a function of four factors: (I) the existence (or not) of divisions within the dominant classes and the nature of those divisions; (2) the nature of the (real or perceived) threat from the working class, which would depend in part on the historical development of that class, its degree of internal unity, etc.; (3) the relation of various classes to the state, and the power and coherence of the state. (The extent to which the state is autonomous of, or directly responsive to, social classes - both dominant and subordinate - varies from one situation to another. It is a matter for empirical investigation, not apriori pronouncements and finally, (4) dominant class reactions will depend on the actions of other subordinate and intermediate classes, such as the peasantry and the middle classes. Underlying these constellations of class forces are, of course, a number of economic forces which, over time, have constrained the formation of social classes. The account suggested here need not be an economic determinist one. While due weight ought to be given to the economic forces shaping the formation of social classes, there are many other factors, both political and cultural, at play. The purpose of this article has been mainly critical; an alternative history of Latin America has not been presented. Only the barest bones of an outline of such an history have been indicated. This should not be taken as an indication that such a task is not possible; on the contrary, scholarship in this area is advancing rapidly. Out of the flood of detailed monographic studies there are beginning to emerge the materials for a coherent account of the histories of the countries of Latin America. The process is a slow and hesitant one, and will involve constant returns to previous attempts at synthesis, partly to build on the very real achievements of previous scholarship, but partly also to free ourselves from the methodological shortcomings that have resulted from attempting to fit twenty separate histories into a single Procrustean bed.