Hollingsworth vs Perry

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Supreme Court should defer to states rights in defining what parties may have standing. Because California law allows a third party to assert the states interest when state officials decline to do so, the California Supreme Courts decision regarding the petitioners standing is binding. He also argued that the majoritys decision does not take into account the particularities of Californias initiative system and the dynamics that may lead the state to allow proponents of an initiative to stand in for the state. Article III does not interfere with a states rights to allow such proponents to support an initiative in court. Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.

Facts of the Case In 2000, the citizens of California passed Proposition 22, which affirmed a legal understanding that marriage was a union between one man and one woman. In 2008, the California Supreme Court held that the California Constitution required the term marriage to include the union of same -sex couples and invalidated Proposition 22. Later in 2008, California citizens passed Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to provide that only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized by California. The respondents, a gay couple and a lesbian couple, sued the state officials responsible for the enforcement of Californias marriage laws and claimed that Proposition 8 violated their Fourte enth Amendment right to equal protection of the law. When the state officials originally named in the suit informed the district court that they could not defend Proposition 8, the petitioners, official proponents of the measure, intervened to defend it. The district court held that Proposition 8 violated the Constitution, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Do the petitioners have standing under Article III of the Constitution to argue this case? Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the state of California from defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman? Conclusion Decision: 5 votes for Hollingsworth, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: Article III No, the petitioners do not have standing. The Court did not reach the question on the merits of the case. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that federal courts only have the authority to decide cases in which there is an actual controversy, which means that the complaining party must have suffered a concrete and particularized injury that can be redressed through court action. In this case, because the petitioners had only a generalized grievance in the form of a desire to defend Proposition 8, they did not have standing under Article III. The Court also held that the petitioners could not invoke the standing of the state to appeal because a litigant must assert his/her own rights and cannot claim relief through the intervention of a third party. Because the petitioners did not have standing to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that court did not have jurisdiction to reach a decision on the case.

Hollingsworth vs Perry In November 2008, 52.3 percent of California voters approved Proposition 8, which added language to the California Constitution that defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman. In May 2009, a California District Court ruled that Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and temporarily prohibited its enforcement, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, affirming the District Courts ruling. The United States Supreme Court will now consider whether a state can define marriage solely as the union of a man and a woman, in addition to considering whether the proponents of Proposition 8 have standing to bring suit in federal court. The Courts ruling will implicate the rights of gay men and lesbians, the role of the government in structuring family and society, and the relationship between the institution of marriage and religion and morality. QUESTIONS PRESENTED: 1. Whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state of California from defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman. 2. Whether petitioners have standing under Article III, 2 of the Constitution in this case. ISSUES 1. Does a state violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by defining marriage solely as the union of a man and a woman? 2. Do the official proponents of a state ballot initiative have standing to appeal a judgment invalidating that initiative? FACTS In 2000, California voters adopted Proposition 22, which amended the states Family Codeto provide that only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California. In May 2008, the California Supreme Court invalidated Proposition 22, finding that it violated the dueprocess and equal-protection guarantees of the California Constitution. The California Supreme Court

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ordered that marriage be made available to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and, in the wake of this order, California issued over 18,000 marriage licenses to same-sex couples. In response to the California Supreme Court decision on Proposition 22, five California residents (Proponents) collected voter signatures and filed petitions with the state to pl ace Proposition 8 on the November 2008 ballot. Proposition 8 proposed to add the same statutory language from Proposition 22 to the California Constitution, again defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman. After a contentious campaign, 52.3 percent of California voters approved Proposition 8, and it took effect as an amendment to the California Constitution. In May 2009, after being denied marriage licenses, two California same-sex couples filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that Proposition 8 violated the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee of the United States Constitution. Because the State of California refused to argue in favor of Proposition 8s constitutionality, the District Court allowed the original Proponents of Proposition 8 to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) to defend the lawsuit. After a lengthy bench trial, the District Court ruled that Proposition 8 violated the Fourteenth Ame ndments Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses and enjoined its enforcement. The Proponents appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit held that the Proponents had standing to appealin other words, authority to defend Proposition 8 when state officials declined to do so but it affirmed the District Courts decision that Proposition 8 violated the Fourteenth Amendment. After the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing, the Proponents appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court grantedcertiorari on December 7, 2012 to determine whether the Proponents have standing in the case and whether Proposition 8 violates the Fourteenth Amendments Equal Protection Clause. DISCUSSION This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to consider whether a state can define marriage solely as the union of a man and a woman. Hollingsworth argues that a state may do so because this definition is a bedrock social institution that advances societys vital interest in responsible procreation and childrearing. Perry contends that gay men and lesbians should have fundamental and equal rights to marry and that [r]esponsible procreation is not the defining purpose of marriage. The Supreme Courts resolution of the case implicates vigorous debates over optimal familial and societal structure as well as religion and morality. OPTIMAL FAMILIAL AND SOCIETAL STRUCTURE Hollingsworth and numerous amici argue that limiting marriage to a union between a man and a woman (traditional marriage) optimizes responsible procreation and childr earing.For example, Indiana and nearly twenty other states contend the basic rationale for traditional marriage is to encourage biological

parents to remain together for the sake of their children. According to these states, traditional marriage promotes cohabitation and mutual dedication of biological parents, a behavior that is exclusive to opposite-sex couples, necessary for their childrens welfare and protection, and optimal for family structure as well as society as a whole. The states maintain that traditional marriage among the infertile or elderly does not undermine the institutions basic purpose, because married, opposite -sex couples without children model the optimal behavior for other opposite-sex couples who may have children. They also emphasize that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples makes a positive statement about its benefits, rather than a negative statement about the ability of same-sex couples to raise children. Perry and supporting amici, including the United States, counter that excluding same-sex couples from marriage destabilizes and stigmatizes their relationships and thereby harms their children. The American Psychological Association (APA) and several supporting medical and social welfare organizations assert that homosexuality is immutable and that gay men and lesbians form stable, committed relationships; deserve the social, psychological, and health benefits of marriage; and are as fit and capable of parenting as heterosexuals. In particular, the APA and supporting organizations emphasize that child development is not dependent upon parental gender or sexual orientation and that there is no scientific basis for concluding that children raised by homosexual parents suffer any emotional or psychological harm. Several social science professors object to the APAs scientific conclusions, asserting that studies finding no detriment to children raised by homosexual parents are methodologically flawed. The professors instead point to other studies supporting the notion that a stable biological mother and father provide the best environment for raising children. RELIGION AND MORALITY Many of Hollingsworths supporters present religious and moral arguments in favor of limiting marriage to between a man and a woman. For example, the NAE and several supporting religious organizations explain that their religions extol the personal, familial, and social virtues of traditional marriage, while condemning hatred and mistreatment of homosexuals. NAE frames religious and moral support for traditional marriage as a rational position in an honest debate and argues that the debate should be resolved through democratic processes like state ballot initiatives, rather than by judicial decision. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) agrees, asserting that Proposition 8 should not be invalidated because it was informed by religious and moral viewpoints. USCCB further cautions that defining marriage to include homosexual unions burdens religious liberty and marginalizes individuals who morally disagree. In its support of Perry, the United States maintains that homosexual marriage does not burden religious liberty and asserts that mere use of the democratic process cannot render discriminatory laws legal. The Anti-Defamation League, meanwhile, argues that some religious and moral justifications for traditional marriage are simply a pretext for discrimination and that religious and moral views about marriage are changing. Indeed, numerous religious amici support homosexual marriage and argue that

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state recognition of the practice does not interfere with other religious organizations freedom not to sanction it. In sum, this case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to determine whether a state can define marriage solely as the union of a man and a woman. The Courts ruling will implicate the rights of gay men and lesbians, the role of the government in structuring family and society, and the relationship between the institution of marriage and religion and morality. ANALYSIS Before reaching the issue whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibits California from defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman, the Court must determine whether petitioners have standing to bring the suit before the Court. Hollingsworth argues that he has standing as an official proponent of Proposition 8 to defend the constitutionality of the initiative in lieu of state officials who have refused to do so. Perry contends that proponents of Proposition 8 have suffered no injury and have no continuing stake in the litigation, and thus do not have standing. Once the Court determines the issue of standing, Hollingsworth urges the Court to overturn the Ninth Circuit and hold that Proposition 8 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Hollingsworth asserts that Proposition 8 is rationally related to the governments inte rest in promoting responsible procreation and childrearing. Perry counters that the amendment should be subjected to heightened scrutiny because sexual orientation is a suspect classification, but contends that Proposition 8 fails any standard of revieweven rational basis. DO PETITIONERS HAVE STANDING? Under Article III of the Constitution, plaintiffs must have suffered some injury to bring suit in federal court. Respondents argue that because petitioners have never asserted suffering any harm, they have no direct stake in the outcome of the litigation and thus do not have standing on appeal. Hollingsworth, however, notes that California has a clear interest in the continued enforceability of its laws and has standing to defend the constitutionality of those laws.Because, according to petitioners, the state has failed to defend the constitutionality of Proposition 8, proponents of the amendment have standing to defend the initiative as agents of the people of California. Hollingsworth analogizes this case to Karcher v. May, in which the Supreme Court held that the presiding officers of the New Jersey legislature had standing to defend a state statute when neither the state attorney general nor named defendants would do so. Here, Proposition 8 was a ballot initiative and constitutional amendment (rather than a statute), and Hollingsworth and his fellow petitioners were official proponents of Proposition 8 (not legislators); but Hollingsworth contends that California courts routinely permit the official proponents of an initiative to appear in defense of that initiative in Court. Petitioners distinguish this case from Arizonans for Official English v. Arizonain which the Supreme Court expressed grave doubts about the standing of Arizonan initiative sponsors noting that here, as opposed to Arizona, California

law does grant standing to initiative supporters. Finally, petitioners argue that if the Supreme Court determines that proponents of Proposition 8 do not have standing, the opinions of the Ninth Circuit and the district court must be vacated, and any relief by default judgment must be limited to the four named plaintiffs. Perry asserts that proponents of Proposition 8 will suffer no judicially cognizable harm if same-sex couples are allowed to marry. Lacking any showing or even assertion of harm, Perry claims that Hollingsworth does not have a sufficient stake in the litigation to justify standing. Relying on the Courts grave doubts in Arizonans, Perry claims that mere status as a proponent of an initiative is insufficient to confer Article III standing. Perry distinguishes this case from Karcher, arguing that proponents of a ballot initiativewho, unlike the officers of the New Jersey legislature in Karcher, are not public officialsdo not have a close enough relationship to the state to act on its behalf in litigation. Perry further argues that if Hollingsworth lacks standing, the district courts injunction invalidating Proposition 8 statewi de is still valid because Hollingsworth failed to object to the scope of the injunction in the district court and further waived the issue by failing to raise it in their petition for certiorari. Furthermore, Perry contends that irrespective of waiver, the district courts injunction was appropriate because the injunctive relief does directly redress the named plaintiffs injuries and because Proposition 8 imposes an identical injury on all gay men and lesbians in California. DOES PROPOSITION 8 VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT? WHAT LEVEL OF SCRUTINY SHOULD APPLY? Under the Equal Protection Clause, laws that categorize people on the basis of suspect classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny. Laws that categorize based on some other classification must only pass rational-basis review. Racial classifications must pass strict scrutiny, which mandates that such classifications be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, whereas intermediate scrutiny requires that classifications based on sex be substantially related to an important government interest. Rational-basis review merely requires that a law be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Hollingsworth argues that sexual orientation is not a suspect classification, so the Court should subject Proposition 8 to rational-basis review. Hollingsworth argues that Proposition 8 only classifies based on a biological distinction between opposite-sex couples, who are capable of having children together, and same-sex couples, who are not. Thus, Hollingsworth contends that the Court need not determine what level of scrutiny might apply to laws that treat people differently based on sexual orientation alone. Perry claims that Proposition 8 creates unequal access to marriage based on sexual orientation. Thus, Perry argues that the law should be subjected to heightened scrutiny because gay men and lesbians share many characteristics with other recognized suspect classes. Perry asserts that gay men and lesbians have faced and continue to face severe discrimination, citing the fact that in twenty-nine states

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it is legal to fire an employee and deny housing on the basis of sexual orientation. Furthermore, Perry argues that sexual orientation, like race or sex, is an immutable characteristic that has no bearing on an individuals ability to contribute to society. Finally, Perry highlights the relative political powerlessness of gay men and lesbians, citing their inability to eliminate significant statutory disadvantages at both the state and federal level. Based on these characteristics, Perry argues that gay men and lesbians require heightened scrutiny to protect them from discrimination. CAN PROPOSITION 8 BE SUSTAINED UNDER RATIONAL-BASIS REVIEW OR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY? Hollingsworth makes no claim that Proposition 8 could withstand heightened scrutiny, instead insisting that rational-basis review is the only appropriate standard. Perry, on the other hand, asserts that heightened scrutiny is appropriate because sexual orientation is a suspect class, but she has tailored her argument to rational-basis review, acknowledging that if Proposition 8 fails rational-basis review it necessarily fails heightened scrutiny. Hollingsworth claims that the government has a legitimate interest in promoting opposite-sex marriage in furtherance of responsible procreation and childrearing.Drawing on historical, sociological, and philosophical writings, Hollingsworth claims that the purpose of marriage as a civil institution is the encouragement of responsible procreation and childrearing, which is tied to the biological reality that opposite-sex couplesand not same-sex couplescan produce children. Hollingsworth claims that Proposition 8 is rationally related to t he governments interest because it channels potentially procreative conduct into stable, committed relationships. Hollingsworth highlights several sociological studies showing that children raised in households where the biological parents are married fare better than children raised in single-parent families. Because same-sex couples cannot have children, Hollingsworth argues that the same-sex relationships do not implicate the governments interest in the same way that opposite-sex relationships do. Thus, Hollingsworth contends that distinguishing between same- and opposite-sex couples does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the distinction is relevant i.e., rationally relatedto the governments interests. In support, Hollingsworth cites Johnson v. Robison, which states that a classification will be upheld when the inclusion of one group promotes a legitimate governmental purpose, and the addition of ot her groups would not. Hollingsworth also contends that the state has an interest in proceeding with caution before redefining a bedrock social institution, suggesting that the institution may be deeply upset by the inclusion of same-sex couples.Furthermore, Hollingsworth stresses the value of the democratic process in determining an issue of such vital importance to the people of California. Perry disputes that the amendment is at all concerned with the promotion of opposite-sex marriage or procreation, instead arguing that Proposition 8 only serves to exclude same-sex couples from marriage. Perry points to the fact that in light of the California Supreme Courts decision in In re Marriage Cases recognizing a state right to marriage for same-sex couples, the only effect of Proposition 8 was to eliminate the ability of same-sex couples to marry in California. Perry argues that prohibiting same-sex couples from entering into relationships designated as marriage is not rationally related to the states

interest in channeling more opposite-sex couples into marriage. Perry rejects Hollingsworths claim that rational-basis review permits excluding groups that the state views as not pertinent to its objective from a state-conferred benefit. Instead, Perry contends that the line petitioners have drawn excluding same-sex couples bears no relation to Hollingsworths objective of tying marriage to procreation. Noting that many opposite-sex couples are unwilling or unable to procreate and thus as unlikely to procreate as same-sex couples, Perry contends that Proposition 8 is so overly underinclusive as to undermine the credulity of Hollingsworths purported state interest in procreation.Similarly, Perry argues that by excluding an entire population from marriage, Proposition 8 actually subverts petitioners objective of ensuring that children are raised in stable, two-parent households.Perry also rejects petitioners unsubstantiated fear that marriage equality may destabilize the institution of marriage, arguing that public concerneven longstanding or historical concernabout equal treatment alone cannot justify a denial of equal treatment. Perry argues that petitioners claims regarding the value of the democratic process in this case misconstrue the role of the judiciary in equal-protection cases. According to Perry, the Equal Protection Clause protects insular minorities from exactly this kind of oppression by the majority. Finally, Perry claims that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional because it was motivated by a bare desire to make gay men and lesbians unequal citizens and express moral disapproval of their relationships. CONCLUSION In this case, the United States Supreme Court will consider whether a state can define marriage solely as the union of a man and a woman and whether the proponents of Proposition 8 have standing to bring suit in federal court. The Court must also determine whether Proposition 8 violates the Equal Protection and Due Process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Courts ruling will f orever impact the rights of gay men and lesbians, the governments role in structuring families, and the relationship between the institution of marriage and religion and morality. Hollingsworth v. Perry (formerly known as Perry v. Brown and Perry v. Schwarzenegger) Summary Perry v. Schwarzenegger (now known as Hollingsworth v. Perry) was filed on behalf of two same-sex couples by attorneys Ted Olson and David Boies in May 2009, asking for a preliminary order blocking Prop 8. When California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and Attorney General Jerry Brown declined to defend Prop 8 substantively, Judge Vaughn R. Walker allowed the initiatives proponents to enter the case to defend it. Lambda Legal, NCLR and ACLU filed a friend-of-the-court brief for the preliminary hearing complementing plaintiffs briefing by explaining why Prop 8 should be held invalid regardless of the level of constitutional review. At the preliminary injunction hearing Judge Vaughn R. Walker requested evidence on numerous important issues. After party counsel expressed a preference for a decision based only on legal arguments, Lambda Legal and co-counsel asked to intervene on behalf of three LGBT community organizations to present evidence of the diverse harms of marriage discrimination and expert testimony about antigay discrimination generally. After party counsel and the City and County of San Francisco

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offered to present similarly comprehensive evidence, Judge Walker denied the LGBT community groups intervention request. Lambda Legal and co-counsel continued to assist with trial preparation behind the scenes and as amicus. History

March 2011 Lambda Legal, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, Equality California and the ACLU of Northern California jointly file a friend-of-the-court brief with the Ninth Circuit supporting the plaintiffs' request that the Court allow same-sex couples to marry while the case is on appeal. The Court declines. April 2011 Prop 8 proponents file motion to vacate Judge Walker's ruling because he has been in a relationship with another man for 10 years. May 2011 Lambda Legal, NCLR, Equality California and the ACLU of Northern California file a friend-of-the-court brief urging the court to reject Prop 8 proponents' motion. June 2011 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denies the motion to vacate, ruling that a judge's sexual orientation and relationship status do not disqualify him or her from hearing a case involving constitutional rights held by all individuals. September 2011 California Supreme Court hears oral argument on whether proponents have an interest in defending the initiative. November 2011 Lambda Legal and other LGBT rights organizations file a friend-of-the-court brief urging the Ninth Circuit to uphold the District Court decision rejecting Prop 8 proponents' motion to vacate Judge Walker's ruling. November 2011 California Supreme Court rules that, as a matter of state law, Prop 8 proponents have an interest in defending the initiative. December 2011 Ninth Circuit hears oral argument on whether to vacate the ruling striking down Prop 8. February 2012 Victory! Ninth Circuit upholds Judge Walker's August 2010 ruling declaring Prop 8 unconstitutional, but on narrower grounds, applying only to California. Prop 8 backers ask the Ninth Circuit to have a larger panel of judges review the decision. June 2012 The Ninth Circuit denies Prop 8 backers' request to rehear the case. December 2012 The U.S. Supreme Court agrees to hear the case. March 2013 The U.S. Supreme Court hears oral argument in the case. June 2013 Victory! The U.S. Supreme Court rules that proponents of Prop 8 had no right to appeal the district court ruling. The freedom to marry resumes in California.

May 2009 Attorneys Ted Olson and David Boies file Perryin U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of two same-sex couples who had been denied a marriage license earlier that month. June 2009 Judge Vaughn R. Walker grants a motion to intervene by proponents of Prop 8 and declines to rule on a request by plaintiffs for an immediate injunction staying the marriage ban. July 2009 Judge Walker calls for presentation of evidence and factual findings following a trial on numerous important issues including the purported justifications for Prop 8 and the effects of the initiative for same-sex couples and their families, and for married, different-sex couples and their families. Counsel for plaintiffs and the intervenor-defendants (Prop 8's proponents) say the case instead should be resolved quickly in the district court based on legal briefs without evidentiary findings. July 2009 Lambda Legal, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR) ask permission to intervene on behalf of three LGBT community organizations with broad knowledge of the harms to same-sex couples and their families from marriage discrimination, and offer to present evidence about those harms and the other issues identified by Judge Walker. August 2009 Lawyers for the City and County of San Francisco also request permission to intervene to offer evidence similar to that proposed by plaintiffs' counsel. Party counsel on both sides offer evidence on the full range of issues, as requested by Judge Walker, and oppose the LGBT groups' motion to participate. August 2009 Judge Walker denies the LGBT groups intervention in the case. Lambda Legal continues to provide information and advice to plaintiffs counsel behind the scenes and remains as an amicus. January 2010 Trial begins. February 2010 LGBT Legal Groups submit friend-of-the-court brief, urging Court to strike Prop 8. August 2010 Victory! Judge Walker strikes down Prop 8, finding it violates due process and equal protection rights. Prop 8 defendants filed an immediate appeal of the decision. December 2010 Hearing before a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. January 2011 Three-judge panel asks the California Supreme Court to clarify whether California law grants initiative proponents a particularized interest in the validity of a measure they put on the ballot that might entitle them to appeal a ruling that the measure is unconstitutional if state officials do not appeal. February 2011 California Supreme Court agrees to answer the question.

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OPOSA VS FACTORAN Nature of the Case: Class action seeking the cancellation and non-issuance of timber licence agreements which allegedly infringed the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Section 16); non-impairment of contracts; Environmental law; judicial review and the political question doctrine; inter-generational responsibility; Remedial law: cause of action and standing; Directive principles; Negative obligation on State

made a statement that economic, social and cultural rights are not real rights (see, Brigido Simon v Commission on Human Rights, G. R. No. 100150, 5 January 1994).

Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. 101083 Fact: a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

Summary: An action was filed by several minors represented by their parents against the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cancel existing timber license agreements in the country and to stop issuance of new ones. It was claimed that the resultant deforestation and damage to the environment violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health (Sections 16 and 15, Article II of the Constitution). others of their generation as The petitioners asserted that they represented as generations yet unborn. well

The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

Finding for the petitioners, the Court stated that even though the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the rights enumerated in the latter: [it] concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. The right is linked to the constitutional right to health, is fundamental, constitutionalised, self -executing and judicially enforceable. It imposes the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

1] Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; 2] Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action? HELD: YES

The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a class suit both for others of their generation and for succeeding generations as the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the countrys forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.

Keywords: Oposa et al. v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. et al (G.R. No. 101083), Environmental, Right Significance of the Case: This case has been widely-cited in jurisprudence worldwide, particularly in cases relating to forest/timber licensing. However, the approach of the Philippino Supreme Court to economic, social and cultural rights has proved somewhat inconsistent, with some judgments resulting in the enforcement of such rights (e.g., Del Rosario v Bangzon, 180 SCRA 521 (1989); Manila Prince Hotel v Government Service Insurance System, G. R. No. 122156 (3 February, 1997) but at least one instance in which the Court

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment INSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY, CONSTRUED. ?

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The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right ? the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: "SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: "SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self?preservation and self?perpetuation ? aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners ? the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well?founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come ? generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to selfpreservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment. It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question. Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi. Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit. Whether or not the TLAs can be out rightly cancelled. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed. Held: As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites

Oposa Vs. Factoran Case Digest Oposa Vs. Factoran, Jr. 224 SCRA 792 G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 Facts: Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, nonstock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

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for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy: The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right. Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

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