DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN ISRAEL

Introduction
The analysis of demographic trends is not a new theme in the political discussion among Israels policy makers. Demography has always played an important role, as it has always been characterized by a society divided in different sub-populations, each with its own values and tradition. Israel was founded in 1948 as the State where Jewish people can finally realizes its right to self-determination on the basis of Zionism, though this came at the expenses of the Arab population existing on the same territory. Thus, the discussion about the specific religious composition and their different effects on the population has gained as much relevant as the sustainability of a Jewish majority appears to be threatened in recent years. The demographic analysis is not only useful to address Israeli policy makers toward the right direction, but also helps us to understand the dynamics that had occurred in its sixty years of existence, which of course have socio-economic and political consequences. The peculiarity of this society gives birth to specific trends that cannot be explained without taking into account the cultural, religious and ideological context in which they take place. For this reason considering Israeli population as a whole could be misleading and some patterns are better explained making a differentiation among the constituent ethno-religious groups. This paper is aimed to highlight some of the major trends occurred in Israel since 1948: population changes, fertility and mortality transition, migration and age structure will be the main focus of this work.

CHAPTER 1
POPULATION CHANGES: PATTERNS AND FRAMEWORKS
From 1948 to 2010: The Population Size and Growth
The increasing trend that Israeli population had undertaken since the early 20 th century did not stop when the major political and social change occurred in Palestine: the end of the British Mandate and the consequent birth of Israel as independent State. On 14th May, 1948 Israel declared its independence within the boundaries fixed by the UN resolution n. 181, while Palestinians refused UN plan and called that day nakba meaning catastrophe. The creation of the State of Israel would have affected internal and international dynamics, giving birth to armed conflicts, social and ethnic struggles and important demographic changes in the country. The graph 1. shows how the curve of population rose up rapidly starting from 1950, maintaining a high level of increase until the present day.

Graph 1: TOTAL POPULATION

8.000.000 7.000.000 6.000.000 5.000.000 4.000.000 3.000.000 2.000.000 1.000.000 0

YEARS 1948 1950-1955 1955-1960 1960-1965 1965-1970 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010

TOTAL POP 806.000 1.449.166 1.867.124 2.265.636 2.650.680 3.039.332 3.509.363 3.882.995 4.225.038 4.820.077 5.621.424 6.242.240 6.926.634

% 80 29 21 17 15 15 11 9 14 17 11 11

In 60 years Israeli population has experienced an extraordinary growth, in terms of quantity as well as of quality. Dealing with the quantitative analysis, in 1948 the total population was 806.000 inhabitants1 which almost doubled between 1950 and 1955 reaching 1,4 million with a change of 80%. This was the biggest enlargement that Israeli population has accomplished, as the percentage variations in successive periods decrease and the increments of population size has been progressively smaller. In the years that followed the pace of growth eased, but it remained high. During 1990s it registered an increase in the percentage change, due to the second wave of mass
1

The data refers to the population of Israel within the boundaries established by the resolution n. 181, therefore it does not take into account the population of Jerusalem, the territory of West Bank and Gaza, neither the Golan Heights. This is an exception among the other data, which refer to the enlarged territory of Israel.

immigration from the former Soviet Union: at the end of 1980s the total population amounted to 4.2 million while in the early 1990s it was 5.6 million. After this wave of immigration, population growth reverted to the level of 1970s and 1980s. By the end of 2010 the country had a population of 6.9 million, so that the overall change in absolute numbers has been of 6.12 million from 1948 to 2010. An alternative way to get an impression of periodic changes in the size of Israeli population is to examine the population growth rate. Table 2 report the population growth rate from 1950 to 2010, showing how rapidly the population has increased. Table 2: POPULATION GROWTH RATE
YEARS 1950-1955 1955-1960 1960-1965 1965-1970 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 POPULATION GROWTH RATE (%)
6,25 3,91 3,76 2,44 3,16 2,31 1,73 1,94 3,39 2,41 1,87 2,32

The trend described is that of a diminishing growth, meaning that the population has increased progressively less with the passage of time. Between 1950 and 1955 the population growth rate was 6,25%, the higher level Israel has recorded in its sixty years of existence. From this point, population growth rate eased to 3,91% in the period 1955-1960 and to 3,76% between 1965 and 1970. The decreasing trend has been interrupted only by limited increases in the periods 19701975, 1990-1995 and 2005-2010. Some of the possible factors that had determined this path are: 1) a reduced number of immigrants as the effects of mass migration waves lessened over years; 2) the increase of emigration as consequence to a situation of disadvantage2 and finally 3) a reduced number of births, giving that women TFR began to slow down. However, this increase was not equally divided among all ethno-religious groups which constitute Israeli society. Some of them have grown more than others, accentuating the differences already existent in the country. Next paragraph highlights the differential growth of the two major groups, Jews and Arabs, stressing their diverse contribution to population changes.

Arab population has continued to leave the country because of discrimination and social cleavages. However we have to consider also the fact that not all immigrants decide to settle permanently in the country and the new generations could have pushed to emigrate for working reasons, as Israel was stricken by a severe economic crisis in 2001.

Population Growth and Composition by Religion

Israeli population can be divided in sub-groups according to religious affiliation. In this way we can distinguish between the national majority of Jews and other various minorities, which comprise Christians, Muslims, Druze and Ultra-Orthodox. In order to simplify a very complicated scenario I will consider only the distinction between Jews and Non-Jews3 populations. Table 3. reports the share of these groups on the total population4.

Table 3: Population by Religion, selected periods (percentage)

Analyzing these data it becomes clear that the increase occurred between 1948 and 2010 was not homogeneous among religious groups. Even though Jews had become the majority in the country, they represent a decreasing portion of the total population, falling from 85.7% in 1968 to 81.7% in 1988 and 75.6% in 2007. Conversely Non-Jews groups, of which Muslims were 70% in 1948 and 83% in 2007, represent the growing part, increasing from 14.3% in 1968 to 18.3% in 1988 and 20% in 2007. The analysis of the sources of population increase reveals that natural increase and migration balance had a different role in determining the size and the growth of each ethnoreligious group. Natural increase is evidently related to fertility regimes, while migration balance in Israel is deeply linked to Diaspora phenomenon. Thus, the contribution of natural increase is higher and more relevant for those groups which have a high TFR, whereas migration balance is more influent for groups whose members had left the country of origin, spreading in other States or even continents. Thus, natural increase was more significant for Muslim groups, while migration balance displayed its importance especially for Jewish population. The differential growth of these groups constitutes a challenge for Israel and its policy makers as the political debate has focused on their ratio since the Six-Day War in 1967. These two dimensions and their effects on Israeli demographic trends will be considered in more details in the next two chapter, devoted to fertility and migration trends.

3 4

Arab population comprises Christians, Druze and Muslims, which represent the majority in this category. Uzi Rebhun, Gilad Malach, Demographic trends in Israel, The Metzilah Center for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Thought, Jerusalem 2009, p.19-20. Source of data: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

CHAPTER 2
FERTILITY TRENDS
According to the World Factbook, in 2008 Israel had the highest birth rate in the West. This society confronts us with an unique paradox: in socio-economic terms Israel is modern because it harbors an industrial economy that generates a high per capita income, but in socio-cultural terms it might be considered a traditional society which preserves conservative family values 5. Therefore, Israel is characterized by large families as well as reproductive and marital behaviors that slightly represent a post-transitional situation with an excess of fertility over the average level of countries with other comparable characteristics. Data related to fertility trends show that the total fertility rate (TFR) has decreased in the past 60 years, even though it remain at high levels. Graph 2 represent the path of Israeli TFR since 1950.

TFR
4,50 4,00 3,50 3,00 2,50 2,00 1,50 1,00 0,50 0,00

Between 1950 and 1955 the total fertility rate was 4,28 children per woman and it continued to decrease slowly until 2010 when it was 2,91. Despite the diminishing trend, Israeli TFR has not yet reached the replacement level (2,1 children per woman) and it appears to have stabilized around 2,9 since 1990s, so that it is difficult to forecast a consistent decrease in the future. There are some country-specific features that slow the diffusion of modern fertility regimes in Israel, at least in some of its sub-groups. These are linked to the particular socioeconomic, cultural and religious structure, which translates in the division of Israels society in different ethno-religious groups. It is true that the tendency to relatively large families reflects norms widely espoused by all groups, but Israel has always had distinct sub-groups with very high birth rates that made an especially large contribution to the countrys high level of fertility and the overall growth of its population.
5

Evgenia Bystrov, The second dempgraphic transition in Israel:one for all?, Demographic Research, 2012, Volume 27, article 11 p. 263.

Religious affiliation and religiosity are important factors that affect reproductive behaviors. Affiliation with a certain religious social group implies belonging to a community with different worldviews, values, cultural norms, interests and goals in life which penetrate the individual private sphere, creating moral imperatives and widespread conventions which influence family attitudes and behaviors. Religiousness is positively correlated to fertility rates: the higher is the level of religiosity among the members of a group, the higher is the level of their TFR and birth rate. Religiosity allows us to trace a continuum, whose poles are represented by conservative groups and secular groups. This differentiation is particularly relevant for Jewish population, as it allows to distinguish the Ultra-Orthodox group from the vast majority of the national population. Along this continuum various reproductive behaviors characterized by different degrees of modernization can be found: conservative groups have slightly changed their family attitudes over times, which remain largely at a pre-transitional stage, whereas secular groups have gradually adopted new fertility regimes and alternative family styles. The following analysis is devoted to highlight fertility trends of major ethno-religious groups and their changes over time. Table 5 reports the TFRs of different groups from 1955 to 2007.

Fertility in the Jewish sector: Jews and Ultra-Orthodox group.

Jewish fertility rate fell at moderate pace over the years. The most conspicuous decrease occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, when the TFR settled at three children or fewer 6. In 2000 the total fertility rate was 2,66 children per woman, lower than the overall TFR in the same year. In 2007 it was 2,80, the first increase in forty years. The upturn of Jewish TFR appears to be due, at least in part, to the growing share of haredi among Israeli Jews at large7, since the increasing share of lowfertility immigrants from FSU and the cutback of child-allowances in 1990s suggested a reduction of TFR instead of an increase. Ultra-Orthodox is the most conservative group among Jews, characterized by high levels of fertility, around eight children per woman8. Thanks to their high TFR and the early age upon

Uzi Rebhun, Gilad Malach, Demographic trends in Israel, The Metzilah Center for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Thought, Jerusalem 2009, p. 33. 7 Ibid. 8 Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, a special study on haredim population.

marriage and the birth of the first child9, haredi population grew quickly between 1990 and 2007. However, after many years of increase, the haredi fertility rate has dropped in the last decade (2002-2006). This decrease is apparently due to the social, cultural and economic changes that haredi society is undergoing and it was primarily triggered by the consistent cutback in child allowances and the consequent growing labor-force participation by haredi women and men10.

Fertility in the Muslim Sector: Muslims and Negev Bedouins

Israels Muslim population has always had a higher TFR than the Jewish population, justifiable by their different cultures and traditions. Muslims fertility rate increased in Israels first twenty years from 7,96 children per woman to 8,95 in 1970. During the 1970s, the rate began to diminish due to the modernization of the Arab sector11. The total fertility rate stopped to decrease in the mid1980s and rested at 4,7 children per woman until 2000. Several explanations were offered for this phenomenon: the change in Israels child-allowances policy, the stabilization toward an equilibrium between tradition and modernity, or the struggle between Jews and Palestinians, which kept Muslim fertility high. After fifteen years, Muslim total fertility rate started to decline slowly in 2002, and more rapidly since 2004, reaching the level of 3,9 children in 2007. This pace reflects the combination of three major factors: the continuation of modernization trends, the harsh economic conditions that prevailed in 2001-2004 (economic crisis) and the reduction of child-allowances that increased the costs of rising children. Another important factor to be considered is that Muslim population includes also Negev Bedouins, who have kept their fertility rate high. In 2000 the average number of children per woman was 9,77 as against the average 4,7 for Muslims women at large. However this population too has undergone a rapid modernization since 1990s and the effects on reproductive behaviors are evident: from 9 children per woman in 2000, the TFR was reduced to 7 in 2007, with a total change in 2000-2007 of 29%12.

Fertility among Christian and Druze

The Christian fertility rate has undertaken a path comparable to that of Jewish sector. Between 1950 and 1970 it shifted from 4,85 to 3,62 children per woman, slightly larger than the Jewish one. Further decreases have taken place in the following years, reaching the replacement level in 2007 with an average number of children per woman of 2,13. The religious group that underwent the most meaningful change is the Druze: from 7,46 children per woman on average in 1970 to only 3,07 in 2000 and 2,49 in 2007, below Jewish fertility rate 13.

CBS data show that in 2001 the avarege age upon marriage was 20 among haredi women as against 25 among the Jewish population at large. 10 Uzi Rebhun, Gilad Malach, Demographic trends in Israel, The Metzilah Center for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Thought, Jerusalem 2009, p. 34. 11 Uzi Rebhun, Gilad Malach, Demographic trends in Israel, The Metzilah Center for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Thought, Jerusalem 2009, p. 35. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid.

Fertility among Secular and Not classified by religion groups

In Israel there are also groups of people who have accomplished the first demographic transition with a TFR below the replacement level, and are going to experience the second fertility transition characterized by a further reduction of fertility rates, postponement of marriage and of the first birth, the rise of alternatives types of living arrangement and of late and out-of-wedlock childbearing. These groups are the more secular ones or the groups of people not classified by religion, which include for example immigrants from former Soviet Union, whose TFR was already below 2,1 in 1990s. Even though these are minorities today, their share on the total population is expected to grow as the modernization of Israeli society proceeds and a growing number of Jews are not characterized by high level of religiosity.

CHAPTER 3
MIGRATION TREND
One of the most significant aspects related to Israels demographic dynamics is the continuous interaction between trends occurred locally and those characteristics of Diaspora populations. International migration has played a key role in Israel, since the phenomenon of diaspora has characterized both the Jewish and the Arab populations, even though in very different ways. The analysis of Israeli migration balance can help to clarify how and to which extent international migration has contributed to define Israels population patterns. Table 6 reports the net migration rate expressing the net number of migrants per thousand population.

YEARS 1950-1955 1955-1960 1960-1965 1965-1970 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010

NET MIGRATION RATE ()

35,23 17,60 18,10 5,39 10,73 3,53 0,13 3,05 18,59 8,65 3,26 7,81

Looking at these data some evidences can be highlighted. Firstly, the net migration rate has always been positive. This means that the number of immigrants has always exceeded the number of emigrants. The smallest value Israel has registered was between 1980 and 1985, when the migration balance was 0,13, indicating that the number of immigrants was almost equal to the number of emigrants. Secondly, the migration balance has a fluctuating trend, growing in certain periods and decreasing in others. This trend reflects both the patterns of Jewish immigration, which resulted more consistent in 1950s and 1990s, and Palestinians emigration. In its first twenty years Israel received an unprecedented volume of Jewish immigration, which is represented by a net migration rate of 35,23. This exceptionally high volume in a very short period of time reflected several factors. First, there was a large number of Jews in European countries, many of whom were in refugee camps and for whom immigration to Israel was the only political alternative. In addition, there was a large number of Jews in Arab countries who wanted to migrate to the Jewish state because of religious and ideological reasons and because their political future in some Arab countries was no longer secure. Equally important, Israel encouraged Jewish immigration promulgating the Law of Return which authorized the unlimited entrance of Jews in the country. After these early years of mass immigration, the number of immigrants declined and

varied between low and moderate levels. The collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 gave new emphasis to Jewish immigration and consequently the net migration rate increased from 3,05 to 18,59 in the first half of 1990s. In general Jewish immigration was very heterogeneous since it comprised people coming from distinct countries and even continents characterized by different levels of economic development, social and cultural structure. For this reason, despite the common religious heritage and tradition, immigration involved a large amount of social friction, problems of absorption and the accumulation of social gaps, which required an active State intervention with specific policies. In any case, during most of the 20th century Jewish immigration constituted a main engine of economic growth and modernization in the whole area 14, stimulating economic changes and allowing further social developments. The Palestinian migration experience was in a sense symmetric and reverse since the development of a large-scale diaspora was a recent phenomenon. International dispersal mostly followed the 1948 war and to a lesser extent the 1967 war. It has been estimated that after the first IsraeliPalestinian conflict in Israel remained only 156.000 Palestinians. As consequence of Israeli declaration of independence a large number of Arab-Palestinians left their houses and were received by Arab neighboring countries with the status of refugees. Palestinians life conditions worsened as they were organized in refugees camps in countries as Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, whose economic systems were not able to face this kind of emergency. Instead of being a temporary solution, life in camps lasted years giving birth to a severe humanitarian crisis. However, Palestinians exodus did not occur only because they did not want to live in a country which makes Zionism and Judaism its raison dtre, but also because Israel take active measures aimed to remove physically Arabs from their territories and to impede them to return. The last two decades seem to trace a change in the trend of international migration in Israel. On one hand, Jewish immigration has decreased since the previous waves have reduced the number of Jews living in other countries, while an increased number of Israeli Jews has left the country as consequence of the economic crisis and the beginning of the second intifada. On the other hand, the generous family unification policy adopted by Israel on the wake of Oslo Accords in 1990s, allowed the return of Arabs in Israel. However in 2002, in the aftermath of the second intifada, the government decided to amend the Citizenship Law, limiting this phenomenon involving inhabitants of Palestinian Authorities areas. Despite this restriction Palestinian refugees remain today the main source for future immigration in Israel, a situation which will constitute a serious challenge for Israel, which has to face also the pressure imposed by the international community to find a solution to improve their conditions.

14

Uzi Rebhun, Gilad Malach, Demographic trends in Israel, The Metzilah Center for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Thought, Jerusalem 2009, p. 34.

CHAPTER 4
MORTALITY TRENDS
If the decrease and the change of fertility regime has not been homogeneous in all sectors of Israeli population, mortality data highlight a situation where the mortality transition has completed its path. The incidence of infectious disease and their ability to kill at younger ages diminished, while deaths at older ages due to degenerative diseases increased. Infant mortality has decreased considerably and life expectancy has increased for both sexes and for both Jewish and Arab populations. Pattern of morbidity and mortality have changed from those characteristics of Middle East to those commonly seen in developed countries. How these changes occurred? In the following paragraphs I will try to answer this question, focusing first on the evidences provided by mortality indicators15 and then, on the main sources of mortality decrease.

1. Mortality Indicators
1.1 The Crude Death Rate
YEARS 1950-1955 1955-1960 1960-1965 1965-1970 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 crude death rate (per thousand population)
6,25 6,02 6,12 6,39 6,65 6,69 6,61 6,33 6,15 5,95 5,73 5,65

Looking at these data the first impression is that the crude death rate has varied slightly in the period between 1950 and 2010, from 6,25 to 5,65. Small changes have taken place in each period, even though their relative weight on the overall trend is modest since they are on the order of decimals. Moreover, Israeli death rate was at low levels already in 1950s, meaning that Israel had already started the transition by the mid-century. A comparison between Israeli death rate and that of its neighbors (Jordan, Egypt and Syria) in the same period, proves that Israel was at an advanced stage of the mortality transition vis--vis the other Middle Eastern countries. The graph below shows the pattern of the crude death rate of Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria. From 1950 to 2010 Jordan, Egypt and Syria experienced a great decline in their crude death rates, falling
15

The source of all data about mortality rates and life expectancy is the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011): World Population Prospect: the 2010 Revision.

from respectively 19, 22 and 20 to 4, 5 and 3,5. Jordan and Syria reached Israeli levels of mortality only in the first half of the 1980s, while Egypt later at the end of 1990s.

Comparison of Crude death rates: Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Syria

25,00

20,00

15,00 Egypt 10,00 Jordan Syria 5,00 Israel

0,00

1.2 Infant Mortality

In the past 60 years, infant mortality is one of the element of the overall Israeli mortality trend that had shown the most consistent decrease. From high levels in 1950s the infant mortality rate has fallen to low levels in most recent years. The path that infant mortality has undertaken is similar to that of Western European countries in the same period, so that once again, Israel diverges from the common trend of the Middle Eastern region. Moreover, in 1950s Israels levels of infant mortality were already lower tha n those of some Southern European countries, such as Italy where the infant mortality rate was 60 between 1950 and 1955. Infant mortality rate continued to decrease over time: at the end of 1960s it was 24, 17 in the late 1970s, 8 between 1990 and 1995 and 4 in the period 2005-2010. The graph gives an idea of the diminishing trend that has characterized Israels infant mortality.

INFANT MORTALITY RATE

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

1.3 Life expectancy at birth

A comparative analysis of Israeli life expectancy with that of other developed countries shows their likeness, in particular with the trend of Northern American and Western European countries. Life expectancy at birth between 1950 and 1955 was 68,95 years considering both sexes combined. In the following years life expectancy at birth increased at a rhythm of about one additional year of life every five calendar years. In the period 1970-1975 life expectancy at birth was on average 72,60 years and 77,10 years between 1990 and 1995. From 2005 and 2010 it reached 80,69 years.
YEARS 1950-1955 1955-1960 1960-1965 1965-1970 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 LIFE EXP. AT BIRTH
68,95 70,06 70,99 71,76 72,60 73,61 74,64 75,86 77,10 78,42 79,62 80,69

MALE LIFE EXP. AT BIRTH

67,56 68,64 69,56 70,27 70,99 71,89 72,85 73,98 75,10 76,23 77,40 78,36

FEMALE LIFE EXP. AT BIRTH

70,43 71,58 72,52 73,33 74,29 75,39 76,44 77,74 79,07 80,48 81,68 82,87

A common trait of both Jewish and Palestinian health patterns is the uniquely narrow gap between male and female longevity, which remains on the order of 3 or 4 years. According to other sociodemographic and economic indicators, this small difference appears to result from especially low male mortality rather than high female mortality16. These results lead us to consider how Israel has reached these advanced levels and which are the main factors that had hastened the transition.

2. Sources of Mortality Transition

The main sources that allowed mortality to decline are two: the British domination between 1920 and 1948, and the waves of immigration after the establishment of Israel as independent State. British administration started to develop infrastructures and gave a positive impulse to the economy, improving agricultural productivity and industrial sectors. Labor market was expanding so that even in those years Palestine was receiving immigrants, who came especially from Arab countries. The economic growth that characterized the first half of the 20 th century benefited both Jews and Arab populations, and it created the conditions for a further development in the aftermath of Israels independence. In this period a major role was played by Jew ish mass
16

Sergio DellaPergola, Demography in Israel/Palestine: Trends, Prospects, Policy Implications , IUSSP XXIV General Population Conference Salvador de Bahia, 2001, p.11

immigration, which has improved health patterns. Immigrants brought about not only better personal health standards, as they were largely coming from more advanced European countries or United States, but they also imported know-how related to medical and health training, enhancing the development of new, more efficient health services. Jewish immigrants were a crucial element also in the improvement of educational system, and this was much more relevant for women, who became aware of the possible risks for mothers and children. In general a better education brings about more healthy lifestyle. Thus, these factors, enhancing public and private hygiene and introducing better economic conditions, new technologies and knowledge, made possible the decline of mortality, before other Middle Eastern countries, heightening Israel at the level of advanced societies.

CHAPTER 5
AGE STRUCTURE
The way in which population is distributed among specific age groups has a major effect on the planning of welfare, education and healthcare services. This is true for all countries, despite the level of economic development and the stage they have reached in the demographic transition. The analysis of Israels population by age groups reveals that Israeli population has begun to age, with the increase of life expectancy. However Israel has not reached yet the level of the most developed countries, whose population pyramids no longer appear as a triangle but have a more rectangular shape. Israels population pyramids witness first the growth of population since 1950, second the ageing of the population with an increase of longevity and finally, the continuous expansion of the younger groups, due to the peculiar fertility regime. Figure 1 reports Israeli pyramids in 1950 and 2010, according to DESA sources.

The increase of population between 1950 and 2010 is evident, since all age groups have enlarged. Another evidence is that there is no big difference in the age distribution between male and female populations: their share on the total population is almost equal until the older age groups, where the female portion is higher than the male one, giving that women tend to have a longer life expectancy. According to the increase of life expectancy occurred in these years, older age groups (over 65) has also become more consistent, with a larger number of people living up to 80 years and over. The aging of Israeli population is clarified by the analysis of child and old-age dependency ratios, expressing the number of dependants per 100 persons of working age (15-64).

In the graph below the trends of child and old age dependency ratios between 1950 and 2010 are represented.

DEPENDENCY RATIOS (%)

70,0 60,0 50,0 40,0 30,0 20,0 10,0 0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 child dependency ratio old age dependency ratio

Child dependency ratio, after a period of increase in which it swelled from 49% in 1950 to 61% in 1960, has begun to decrease, even though it remains at high levels: it was 54% in 1970, 52% in 70,0 1990, 45% in 2000 and 43% in 2010. Conversely, the old age dependency ratio has increased since 1950, from 60,0 6% to 16% in 2010. The increase of old age dependency ratio as against the decrease of child dependency ratio 50,0the rising of life expectancy and means, essentially, the aging of the population. witnesses However, despite the trends shown in the graph, the difference between child and old age child dependency ratio 40,0 dependency ratios is still high: younger people continue to represent a bigger portion of the old age dependency ratio population 30,0 than the older people. High fertility rates among all ethno-religious groups, has largely contributed to the growth of younger cohorts in Israeli population. 20,0 Data presented above have shown that Israel today still has a young population, while the phenomenon of aging will gain more relevance in the future years, when the portion of aged 10,0 constitute a challenge for the State. UN projections, taking the median variant as the people will most probable scenario, forecast that the child dependency ratio will continue to decrease, while 0 old age dependenc y 1960 ratio is 1970 expected to increase in the next 40 years. In this way Israels 1950 1955 1965 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 population pyramids would have a more rectangular shape by 2050, becoming more similar to those of advanced countries.

CONCLUSIONS
Israel has been characterized by specific trends resulted by a unique combination of social, economic, cultural and religious factors, which is difficult to find in any other country. Since 1948 Israel has experienced an extraordinary growth, in terms of population size, economic development and social modernization. Israeli population has increased from 806 thousands to 6,9 million inhabitants, pushed by two major mechanisms: natural increase and immigration waves. The great increase of the population has had significant repercussions over the main aspects of Israelis life, being simultaneously a potential for economic development and a source of conflict among different socio-cultural classes. Indeed, the growth of Israeli population was not homogeneous among these ethno-religious groups, causing changes in the ratio between them and enhancing their ideological competition. The division of Israeli society proves its significance particularly dealing with fertility trends, which are greatly different according to which ethnoreligious groups we are considering. The analysis of the overall TFR has revealed that fertility behaviors reflects a rather traditional society as its level, despite the fact that it has diminished over time, remains high for all ethno-religious groups. Jews and Christians have stabilized their TFRs around the replacement level, while Muslims, Bedouins, Druze and Ultra-Orthodox maintain a higher TFR, which only in the last two decades has started to decrease. Processes of cultural and social modernization occurred in recent years, so that secular and non-religious groups, with family attitudes similar to those of developed countries, can be distinguished. This is not surprising since the process of secularization is one of the requisites for the decline of fertility. These great differences in reproductive behaviors can only be explained taking into account the cultural and religious context, which primarily affects fertility regimes largely dependent on individual choices. International migration has affected Israel and its demographic makeup since ancient times. Diaspora populations have always constituted a source of growth for Israel, even though the timing and the dynamics have been very different for Jewish and Muslim populations. Since the late 19th century a progressive return of Jews in their Promised Land has characterized immigration trend, which became more consistent in the second half of the 20 th century where we can distinguish two major waves of Jewish immigration: the first in the late 1940s and the second in 1990s. In these periods migration balance constituted the main source of population growth in Israel, changing dramatically the ratio between Jews and Muslims. Palestinians migration was reversed as it began with the establishment of Israel and consisted of a real exodus headed toward Muslim neighboring countries. The humanitarian crisis that followed these events is not a new issue as several reports of international organizations has highlighted. However, in the last two decades Jewish immigration has slowed down while refugees return constitute the main potential source of immigration. The continuous renewal of Israeli population due to immigrants from more developed countries was a crucial element for the decline of mortality, as they imported medical knowledge and technics, and improved economic growth. Data presented above demonstrate that at any rate, over the second half of the 20th century health and mortality patterns of Israel definitely entered into the realm of the more developed countries. Infant mortality has decreased consistently and in general mortality has started to follow the natural chronological hierarchy. Thus, the mortality transition involved was also an epidemiologic one, with the decrease of

infection diseases and the increased incidence of degenerative ones. The improvement of survivorship is also witnessed by the increase of life expectancy at birth, which has reached 80 years in 2010. Finally the analysis of the age structure of Israeli population has revealed that Israel still has a young population, thanks to high fertility rates which maintain large the base of the pyramid and contribute to its triangular shape. The ageing of Israeli population is reflected by the increase of the old age dependency ratio, even though it remains much lower than the child dependency ratio. It seems that the ageing phenomenon is not yet an issue for Israeli policy makers, as it can be in the future. The demographic analysis reveals an heterogeneous as well as complex scenario where traditional features coexist with others more contemporary. The processes of economic and social modernization played an important role in shaping Israel current profile. International immigration has participated actively to Israels patterns. Fertility trends appear to be the dimension which is more influenced by the ethno-religious composition of Israeli society, resisting somewhat to modernization. Because of the complexity of Israels society and dynamics strictly connected with the size and the composition of the population, demographic analysis should be taken into account whenever the political discussion implies changes in social and economic policies, as well as cultural and religious considerations.

REFERENCES

DellaPergola Sergio, Demography in Israel/Palestine: Trends, Prospects, Policy Implications, IUSSP XXIV General Population Conference Salvador de Bahia, 2001. Evgenia Bystrov, The second dempgraphic transition in Israel:one for all?, Demographic Research, 2012, Volume 27, article 11. Friedlander Dov, Fertility in Israel: is the transition to replacement level in sight?, Department of Population Studies, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Friedlander Dov, Mass Immigration and Population Dynamics in Israel, Demography, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Nov., 1975), pp. 581-599 Uzi Rebhun, Gilad Malach, Demographic trends in Israel, The Metzilah Center for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Thought, Jerusalem 2009.

Data sources
United Nation Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospect: the 2010 Revision. Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics