Anti-Graft League of the Philippines vs. CA [G.R. No.

97787; August 1, 1996]

defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case. The CFI of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prison mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prison mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." This court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). Issue: WON the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case. Held: Yes. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, Page

Facts: PD 674 was issued by Pres. Marcos, establishing the Technological Colleges of Rizal. It directed the Board to provide funds for the purchase of a site and the construction of the necessary structures thereon. The Province was able to negotiate with respondent Ortigas & Co., Ltd. for the acquisition of four parcels of land located in Ugong Norte, Pasig. The projected construction, however, never materialized because of the decimation of the Provinces resources brought about by the creation of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) in 1976. Twelve years later, with the property lying idle and the Province needing funds to propel its 5-year Comprehensive Development Program, the then incumbent Board passed Resolution No. 87-205 dated October 15, 1987 authorizing the Governor to sell the same. The property was eventually sold to Valley View Realty Development Corporation. Issue: 1) WON the action is a taxpayers suit. 2) WON petitioner has locus standi.

has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. Cruz vs. DENR [G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000] Facts: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part. The Commission on Human Rights asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous people. It prays that the petition be dismissed. Held: There was NO MAJORITY VOTE reached as the Justices were equally divided at 7-7. The case was then redeliberated upon, but the voting still remained the same. Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED. Separate Opinions: KAPUNAN [dismiss] (1) The petition presents an actual controversy. (2) Petitioners have the requisite standing. As citizens, they possess the public right to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution. As taxpayers, they possess the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. MENDOZA [dismiss] (1) It is not a justiciable controversy. Judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or controversies without upsetting balance of power. (2) Petitioners do not have legal standing.

Held: 1) No. To constitute a taxpayers suit, two requisites must be met, namely, that public funds are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed, and that the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged ultra vires act. In the case at bar, disbursement of public funds was only made in 1975 when the Province bought the lands from Ortigas at P110.00 per square meter in line with the objectives of P.D. 674. Petitioner never referred to such purchase as an illegal disbursement of public funds but focused on the alleged fraudulent reconveyance of said property to Ortigas because the price paid was lower than the prevailing market value of neighboring lots. The first requirement, therefore, which would make this petition a taxpayers suit is absent. 2) No. As a taxpayer, petitioner would somehow be adversely affected by an illegal use of public money. When, however, no such unlawful spending has been shown, as in the case at bar, petitioner, even as a taxpayer, cannot question the transaction validly executed by and between the Province and Ortigas for the simple reason that it is not privy to said contract. In other words, petitioner has absolutely no cause of action, and consequently no locus standi, in the instant case. People vs. Vera [G.R. No. L-45685; November 16, 1937] Facts: Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the

In Tanada v. Tuvera, when the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest. But in this case, what public right is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them except in general and in common with other citizens? Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 148560; November 19, 2001] Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law. Issue: WON the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge. Held: No. On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not be invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.

Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit. Zandueta vs. De La Costa [G.R. No. L-46267; November 28, 1938] Facts: Francis Zandueta was presiding over a 5th Branch of Courts of First Instance of Manila. He received a new ad interim appointment issued (Commonwealth Act No. 145) to discharge the Office of Judge in the Court of First Instance of the 4th Judicial District with the authority to preside over the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan The ad interim appointment of the petitioner was disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. The President of the Philippines appointed Sixto Dela Costa (respondent), judge of 4th Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan. Dela Costas appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. Petitioner questioned the validity of the appointment alleging that C.A. No. 145 is unconstitutional. Issue: WON Zandueta may question the constitutionality of C.A. No. 145 by which the new ad interim appointment of judge of first instance of the 4th Judicial District, to preside over the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor Held: No. Zandueta is estopped by his own act questioning the constitutionality of C.A. No. 145. He should know that his ad interim appointment was subject to approval by the Page

Commission on Appointments. If the said commission disapproved, it would become ineffective and would cease him discharging the office. Zandueta is free from to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth. Nothing or nobody compelled him to do so. When a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, enters in the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of appointment, and he cannot question the constitutionality of the law by which he was last appointed. He is exempted from the said rule if he did not accept the new appointment or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies. De La Llana vs. Alba [G.R. No. L-57883; March 12, 1982] Facts: In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges not Congress. Issue: WON petitioners have legal standing. Held: Yes. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply demonstrated.