PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

83. Agullo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 132926, July 20, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner, Elvira, was charged of malversation germinated from an audit conducted on 14 July 1986 by Ignacio Gerez, Auditing Examiner III, as a result of which a P26,404.26 cash shortage was discovered on petitioners accountability. In the course of the pre-trial, petitioner Agullo conceded the fact of audit and admitted the findings in the Report of Cash Examination and the facts set forth in the Letter of Demand. In effect, she admitted the fact of shortage in the amount stated in the Information. Notwithstanding, petitioner Agullo, at all stages of the criminal indictment, persistently professed her innocence of the charge and categorically denied having malversed or converted the public funds in question for her own personal use or benefit. With petitioners admission of the fact of cash shortage, the prosecution then rested its case For its part, the defense, in its bid to overturn the presumption of malversation and shatter the prima facie evidence of conversion, offered the testimony of the following witnesses: petitioner Elvira Agullo; Rene Briones Austero, Cashier III of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Region VIII; and Engracia Camposano-Camaoy, Barangay Captain of Hinabuyan, Dagame, Leyte. Striking down the defense as incredible and without basis, the Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed decision, convicting petitioner Agullo of the crime of malversation of public funds, ratiocinating principally that no evidence has been presented linking the loss of the government funds with the alleged sudden heart attack of the accused (herein petitioner).

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of his right to be presumed innocent HELD: YES The Supreme Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked certain evidence of substance which, to a large extent, bear considerable weight in the adjudication of petitioners guilt or the affirmation of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Upon thorough scrutiny of the evidence adduced by both prosecution and defense, we hold that petitioner Agullo has satisfactorily overcome and rebutted by competent proof, the prima facie evidence of conversion so as to exonerate her from the charge of malversation. To this end, petitioner presented evidence that satisfactorily prove that not a single centavo of the missing funds was used for her own personal benefit or gain. Notably, the Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner, obviously relied more on the flaws and deficiencies in the evidence presented by the defense, not on the strength and merit of the prosecutions evidence This course of action is impermissible for the evidence of the prosecution clearly cannot sustain a conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude meant only to embellish the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of doubt. (Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz in People vs. De Guzman)

84. People vs. Bato, G.R. No. 113804, January 16, 1998 FACTS: This postulate is applied by this Court in reversing the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding Sergio and Abraham Bato guilty of murder and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua. Both accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. On January 26, 1994, the said Court promulgated the assailed Decision affirming their guilt but increasing the penalty to reclusion perpetua. Appellants raised the defense of denial, they maintained that their

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identification as the alleged perpetrators of Ernestos murder is merely an afterthought, necessitated by a death of strong evidence on the part of the prosecution. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. HELD: The Supreme Court held that pursuant to the doctrine that appeals involving reclusion perpetua are subject to a review de novo,this Court pored over the entire records of both lower courts and concluded, after careful deliberation, that the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. The circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution fails to evoke moral certainty that appellants are guilty. The totality of the prosecution evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused. The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Where the State fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption, the accused is entitled to an acquittal regardless of the weakness or even the absence of his defense. By constitutional fiat, the burden of proof is accordingly vested on the prosecution. In acquitting the herein appellant, this Court is not decreeing that he did not participate in the killing. It is merely ruling that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.

85. People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 186498, March 26, 2010 FACTS: This is an appeal by Ronaldo De Guzman in a decision of the trial court found De Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) in a Decision dated June 26, 2008. He argues that the prosecution failed to show that the police officers complied with the mandatory procedures under R.A. No. 9165. In particular, he points to the fact that the seized items were not marked immediately after his arrest; that the police officers failed to make an inventory of the seized items in his presence or in the presence of his counsel and of a representative from the media and from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and that no photographs were taken of the seized items and of appellant. Appellant also claims that the unbroken chain of custody of the evidence was not established. Further, appellant contends that the failure of the police officers to enter the buy-bust operation in the police blotter before the said operation, the lack of coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and the failure to observe the requirements of R.A. No. 9165 have effectively overturned the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers duties. The findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great respect, even finality when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that some facts and circumstances of weight or substance that could have affected the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the degree of proof has been met HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that contrary to De Guzmans contention, the trial court correctly found that the buy-bust transaction took place. The buyer (SPO1 Llanillo) and seller (De Guzman) were both identified and the circumstances of how the purported sale of the illegal drugs took place were clearly demonstrated. Thus , the prosecution successfully established the first and third elements of the crime. However, there is a problem in the prosecutions effort to establish the integrity of the corpus delicti. In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. The failure to

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follow the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR must be adequately explained. The justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. In this case, it was admitted that it was SPO3 Yadao, the assigned investigator, who marked the seized items, and only upon seeing the items for the first time at the police station. Moreover, there was no physical inventory made or photographs of the seized items taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. There was also no mention that representatives from the media and from the DOJ, and any elected official, were present during this inventory. The prosecution never explained the reasons for these lapses. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the failure to observe the proper procedure negates the operation of the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers. As a general rule, the testimonies of the police officers who apprehended the accused are accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. But when the performance of their duties is tainted with failure to comply with the procedure and guidelines prescribed, the presumption is effectively destroyed. Thus, even if the defense evidence is weak, the prosecutions whole case still falls. The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.