Yao Kee vs Gonzales (Art.

11-12) Facts: Sy Kiat, a chines national died in Caloocan City, leaving behind his real and personal properties in the Philippines worth P 300,000 more or less. Aida Sy-Gonzales, et. al. filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration claiming among other things that they are children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina. The petition was opposed by Yao kee who alleged that she is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in China and that one of her children, Sze Sook Wah, should be the administrator of the deceased. The CFI decided in favor of Yao Kees petition but was modified and set aside by the court of appeals.

Issue: Whether or not Sy Kiats marriage to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese Law and Custom conclusive.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that evidence may prove the fact if marriage between Sy Kiat and Yao Kee is valid, but it is not sufficient to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law and custom. A custom must be proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence and that a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence. In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law of China on marriage. In the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as that of the Philippines. The Supreme Court affirmed (all of them were acknowledged as natural children, hence given equal rights) the decision of the Court of Appelas.

G.R. No. L-50654 November 6, 1989 RUDY GLEO ARMIGOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CRISTITO MATA, and JUDGE L. D. CARPIO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V, respondents. FACTS: Private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against Rudy Gleo Armigos with the Municipal Court of Digos, Davao del Sur for the collection of damages and attorney's fees. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Cristito Mata. A copy of the decision was received by Armigos on June 8, 1977, and the following day, June 9, 1977, he filed a notice of appeal with the said municipal court, and on June 24, 1977, he completed the other requirements for the perfection of an appeal, including the filing of an appeal bond and the payment of the appellate court docket fee. But the presiding judge of Court of First Instance, Judge L.D. Carpio dismissed the appeal for it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Armigos filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus with preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals, claiming that from June 8, 1977, when he received a copy of the decision of the municipal court, to June 24, 1977, when he perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed so that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to law. The petitioner contended that the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he received copy of the decision, so that the first of the 1 5-day period comprising 24 hours is: from 4pm of June 9, 1977 to 4pm of June 10, 1977 and the last day, from 4pm of June 23, 1977 to 4pm of June 24, 1977. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour of the receipt of the decision. Whether or not Armigos filed his appeal on time. HELD: No. The Court of Appeals rejected Armigos interpretation for it would result in many confusing situations and many unreliable testimonies as to the time a copy of a decision, order or pleading.
In the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Encarnacion, the Court held that when a law was to be effective upon approval by the President and the President signed the same on June 16, 1950, the law should be considered to have taken effect not on the exact hour when the President signed the same on June 16, 1950 but from the very first minute or hour of said day of June 16, 1950.

No. Because it was filed beyond the reglementary period. He should have filed it on June 23, 1977 for his appeal to st be valid. Art. 13 of the NCC, provides that in computing period, the 1 day is excluded, the last day is included. The Petition is DENIED.

GR No. 97995 January 21, 1993 Philippine National Bank, petitioner vs Court of Appeals and BP Mata and Co., Inc, respondents FACTS: The petitioner for the case is the Philippine National Bank who on February 4, 1982, filed a civil case for collection and refund of US$14,000.00 against BP Mata and Co., Inc. arguing that based on constructive trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, it has a right to recover the said amount which it erroneously credited to the respondent. On February 21, 1975, Security Pacific National Bank (SEPAC) of Los Angeles which had an agency arrangement with Philippine National Bank (PNB), transmitted a cable message to the International Department of PNB to pay the amount of US$14,000 to Mata by crediting the latter's account with the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA). Upon receipt of this cabled message on February 24, 1975, PNB's International Department noticed an error and sent a service message to SEPAC Bank. The latter replied with instructions that the amount of US$14,000 should only be for US$1,400. On February 24, 1975 Cashier's Check No. 269522 in the amount of US$1,400 (P9,772.95) representing reimbursement from Star Kist, was issued for the account of Mata on February 25, 1975 through the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA). Fourteen days after or on March 11, 1975, PNB effected another payment through Cashier's Check No. 270271 in the amount of US$14,000 (P97,878.60) purporting to be another transmittal of reimbursement from Star Kist, private respondent's foreign principal. Six years later, PNB requested Mata for refund of US$14,000 (P97,878.60) after it discovered its error in effecting the second payment. A civil case was then filed for collection and refund of US$14,000 against Mata arguing that based on a constructive trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, it has a right to recover the said amount it erroneously credited to respondent Mata. The Regional Trial Court of Manila rendered judgment dismissing the complaint ruling that the instant case falls squarely under Article 2154 on solutio indebiti and not under Article 1456 on constructive trust. In affirming the lower courts decision, the appellate court added in its opinion that under Art. 2154 on solutio indebiti, the person who makes the payment is the one who commits the mistake vis-vis the recipient who is unaware of such a mistake. Consequently, recipient is duty bound to return the amount paid by mistake. But the appellate court concluded that petitioner's demand for the return of US$14,000 cannot prosper because its cause of action had already prescribed under Article 1145, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code. Hence, the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can still claim the US$14,000.00 it erroneously paid to the respondent under a constructive trust. HELD: The Court ruled in the negative stating that although only seven (7) years lapsed after the petitioner erroneously credited private respondent with the said amount and that under Art. 1144, petitioner is well within the prescriptive period for the enforcement of a constructive or implied trust, the petitioners claim cannot prosper because it is already barred by latches. If it is to be construed as a case of payment by mistake or solutio indebiti, then the prescriptive period for quasi-contracts of six years applies, as provided by Article 1145. As pointed out by the appellate court, petitioner's cause of action thereunder shall have prescribed, having been brought almost seven years after the cause of action accrued. However, even assuming that the instant case constitutes a constructive trust and prescription has not set in, the present action has already been barred by laches. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches deals with the effect of unreasonable delay. The Court also finds it amazing that it took petitioner almost seven years before it discovered that it had erroneously paid private respondent. Petitioner would attribute its mistake to the heavy volume of international transactions handled by the Cable and Remittance Division of the International Department of PNB. Such specious reasoning is not persuasive. It is unbelievable for a bank, and a government bank at that, which regularly publishes its balanced financial statements annually or more frequently, by the quarter, to notice its error only seven years later. As a universal bank with worldwide operations, PNB cannot afford to commit such costly mistakes. Moreover, as between parties where negligence is imputable to one and not to the other, the former must perforce bear the consequences of its neglect. Hence, petitioner should bear the cost of its own negligence.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. Case Digest

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. 139 SCRA 139

Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no community property.

Issue: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter.

Ruling: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera Case Digest

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653

Facts: Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper.

Ruling: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Christensen vs. Garcia 7 scra 95 Nationality Principle Internal and Conflict Rule FACT: Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law. ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the successional rights of his heirs. HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings the determination of the successional rights under Philippine law only.

Globe mackay cable and radio corp vs CA gr no 81262 august 25 1989 FACTS: Resitituto Tobias was employed by Globe mackay cable and radio corp as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations managers. When a fictitious purchase was discovered, henry, the vice president and general manager of the company confronted him stating that he was a number one suspect concerning the matter and ordered him to take one week off, leaving his drawer open and his office keys. After one week has elapsed, henry went to him again and called him a crook and swindler and ordering him to take a lie detector and other test which the results are negative. Subsequently he was suspended and despite the reports, he was sued for estafa but was dismissed. When he was terminated, he applied to retelco and without the request of the company; henry gave a character evaluation stating that Restituto was dismissed from their company due to dishonesty. This event lead restituto to file a case for damages against Globe mackay cable and radio corp alleging the unlawful, malicious, oppressive and abusive acts of Globe mackay cable and radio corp. the lower court rebered the judgement in his favour as well as the ca. hence this appeal. The Globe mackay cable and radio corp said they cant be held liable because they have conducted the an a lawful dismissal while the restituto contended that because of their abusive manner is dismissing him and inhuman treatment, they are held liable for damages. ISSUE: Can Globe mackay cable and radio corp be held liable for damages resulting to abuse of right? HELD: It is expected from the employer to be firm and to resolve to uncover the truth but the treatment they have given to resituto during his employment was uncalled for. Despite of the evidence held, they accused restituto guilty without a basis and harass him which are the standard of human conduct under art 19 of the civil code. The right of the employer to dismiss an employee should both be confused with the matter in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing form it. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. It is clearly indicated that the Globe mackay cable and radio corp failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Resituto, as result, they are held liable for damages under article 21 of the civil code which render the remedies for article 19. For the tortuous acts committed by the corporation such as calling him name which held no basis and the letter sent by them to retelco alleging resitituto was dismissed due to dishonesty, they are also held liable for art 2176 of the civil code

People vs Ramos May 9, 1978 FACTS: On September 3, 1965, two criminal cases No. 80006 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch III, and No. 80007 also of the same Court, Branch XIV identical in every respect, except for the fact that they pertain to different editions of the same textbook, were filed against Socorro C. Ramos, for alleged violations of Act 3134, otherwise known as the Copyright Law, as amended. That on or about July to September, 1963, in the City of Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, as the proprietor aid general manager of the National Book Store, as enterprise engaged in the business of publishing, selling and distributing books, did then and there, wilfully and illegaly sell and distribute spurious and pirated copies of the high school textbook, entitled General Science Today for Philippine School, First Year, by Gilam, Van Houten and Cornista, said accused knowing that said book was duly copyrighted by the Phoenix Publishing House, Inc., and was being distributed exclusively by its sister corporation, Alemar's or Sibal and Sons, Inc. On September 7, 1965, identical motions to quash were filed by accused Ramos on the ground of prescription, alleging therein, inter alia, that: Consequently, the delivery of the alleged offense was made as early as July 17, 1963 and all subsequent knowledge or discoveries of posterior sales and possession of said books by the respondents, including that involved in the police search of September 4, 1963 were only confirmatory of the first. Under 91 of the Revised Penal Code and in the light of the afore-quoted ruling announced in the Pangasinan Trans. Co. case, supra; the prescriptive period, therefore, commenced to run on the day after such discovery on July 17, 1963 and, accordingly, the offense has long since prescribed since under the Copyright Law, Act 3134: Sec. 24. All actions, suits, or proceedings arising under this Act shall be originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance of the Philippine Islands and shall prescribe after two years from the time the cause of action arose. Assuming arguendo, that the last actual sale should be the starting point of computation, again the offense charged has prescribed, since, as already pointed out, the documented evidence on this point shows that the last sale was made on August 30, 1963. The prosecution, also in both cases, filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash raising two issues, to wit: 1. That the issue of prescription in this case can be resolved only after the presentation of evidence and hence, it is premature to raise that issue before trial 2. That, as the violation committed by the defendant was a continuing offense, the two-year prescriptive period may be counted from September 3, 1963, or one day before the search in defendants' premises , which confirmed her possession of spurious and pirated copies of the textbook in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not the offense has long since prescribed HELD: . It was held in 1969 in Namarco vs. Tuazon that February 28 and 29 of a leap year should be counted as separate days in computing periods of prescription. Thus, this Court, speaking thru former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that where the prescriptive period was supposed to commence on December 21, 1955, the filing of the action on December 21, 1965, was done after the ten-year period has lapsed since 1960 and 1964 were both leap years and the case was thus filed two (2) days too late. Since this case was filed on September 3, 1965, it was filed one day too late; considering that the 730th day fell on September 2, 1965 the year 1964 being a leap year. Finally, there is no merit in the allegation that the reckoning of the prescriptive period should start from September 4, 1963. This was the date when the police authorities discovered several pirated books in accused's store. But the accused was charged, in both Criminal Cases Nos. 80006 and 80007, with having allegedly sold anddistributed spurious and pirated copies of the textbook in question, not of illegal possession of the same. The prosecution's claim that the preliminary investigation proceedings in the Manila City Fiscal's Office and in the prosecution Division of the Department of Justice interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, is also without merit. We held in People vs. Tayco 30 that the running of the period of prescription is interrupted not by the act of the offended party in reporting the offense to the final but the filing of the complaint or information in court. WHEREFORE, the order dated October 7, 1965 of the Court of First Instance of Manila Branch XIV in Criminal Case No. 80007 dismissing the case on the ground of prescription, is AFFIRMED. The order dated December 23, 1965 of the same court, Branch III, in Criminal Case No. 80006, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the case is DISMISSED, on the ground that the crime charged therein had already prescribed. Without pronouncement as to costs.