1 The Origin of Hegels Concept of Aufheben

The context for this inquiry and the questions by which I intend to examine it within my dissertation are conditioned by the relationship I suggest is held between Hegels Concept of Aufheben and his account of the appearance of the Absolute. My argument concerns the structure of this appearance in which, for Hegel, Aristotle and Kant illuminate the lacunae of each others philosophies and are able to resolve each others contradictions thereby. The immediate consequence of this simultaneous-resolution - which Hegel formulates as substance is subject - was the contravention of the three Classical Laws of thought: The Law of Identity, The Law of Non-Contradiction and The Law of the Excluded-Middle. What was almost as immediately apparent in the light of this resolution, however, was that this seeming contravention was actually just one aspect of a more profound determination of these laws, by which the absolute substance was to appear and, consequently, metaphysics was to be systematically redeemed. Hegels Concept of Aufheben originates with these first glimpses of redemption in which the loss of any founding law of reason becomes the very light by which reason finds itself. His vision of the absolutes appearance was bodied-forth in the circle drawn by his system. In turn, this circle attests to the dynamic truth of the Concept of Aufheben insofar as it reveals the determinate times and respects by which the contraventions of the Classical laws of thought constitute the categorical form of their appearance. The determination of the Classical Laws of thought, therefore, occurs in the systematic unity of these appearances that the circle entails, which Hegel formulates as appearance qua appearance. The origin of Hegels Concept of Aufheben lies principally within a vision that compelled him to remain steadfast to a course threatening his thought with inconsistency and triviality. The fulfillment of his vision required that he endure this threat in order to realize an enduring concept of truth, which the Concept of Aufheben designates. Having outlined this hypothesis in greater detail below, I will address the questions I shall be examining in order to develop it more fully within my dissertation.

2 Hegels view that everything is inherently contradictory stems from his conviction that between Aristotle and Kant - or substance and subject - the Absolute had appeared. What this appearance amounted to was the simultaneous resolution of the contradiction between finite and infinite substance that begged of Aristotles thought and the contradiction between the conceivability yet unknowability of things-in-themselves frustrating Kants. The three Classical Laws of Thought and the categories by which they are mediated, remain all but intact between Aristotle and Kant. Aristotle never explicitly formulates the Law of Identity as such, but , as Louis Groarke notes, there are several instances when he asserts its premise - that a thing should be identical with itself - and it is generally held that these laws gain their first clear articulation in Aristotles philosophy i . As Michelle Grier notes, Kant contested Aristotles claim that the Law of Non -Contradiction was the most fundamental of these laws; arguing that the Law of Identity should be regarded as such for being a positive principle; where the Law of NonContradiction, being negative, could not produce any actual identityii. Whilst these differences cannot simply be dismissed, more broadly, the laws these differences concern are regarded as the over-determination of one and the same principle of unity. Provisionally, I shall assume Kant has weighted this differently in order to bolster his own privileging of the subjective I. As Paul Redding argues, the major difference between Aristotle and Kant with respect to these laws - and this unity - pertains to the question of what constitutes their legitimate object iii . Through recourse to Aristotles concept of infinite substance, as that which produces itself whilst being complete in its producing (what Joe Sachs describes as a being-at-work-staying-the-same iv ), Hegel ventures to solve Kants problem by asserting that Substance is Subject. Challenging the certitude of substance metaphysics, Kant had reasoned that form lay on the side of the finite subject whilst content lay in the unknowability of the object. Where substance is posited as subject, the one pertains directly to itself as other as the immanent production of itself as its own content. By extension, the contradictions in Aristotles thought are resolved where Hegels formulation that Substance is Subject entails an infinite that only exists in the finite moments of its self-production.

3 This appearance of the Absolute between Aristotle and Kant had radical consequences for the Classical laws of thought and the unity these connoted. Firstly, it inverted the Law of Non-Contradiction, which argues that an attribute cannot be true and not-true of a thing at the same time and in one and the same respect; and is what led Hegel to argue that everything is inherently contradictory. Thereafter, where identity pertains essentially to its other, the Law of Identity, which states that a thing must be self-identical, had to be rephrased as: identity is the identity of identity and difference. This Identity - of identity and difference - is in this sense a third-term determined through the relationships between identity and difference. Consequently, the Law of the Excluded-Middle, which states that an affirmation or negation must either be true or false, was also inverted. Yet for all this Hegel did not simply contravene or abolish these laws through this inversion. He also preserved them by distinguishing between their ratiocinative use at the level of the Kantian understanding and their speculative use at the level of Reason liberated from the regulative function Kant had permitted it. By radicalizing the qualifications, at the same time and in the same respect that Aristotle prefaced with regard to the laws of thought, Hegel was able to articulate the times and respects in which it was not contradictory to assert that everything was inherently contradictory. By demonstrating that these times and respects coincided with the determinations of identity and difference ordered by the Categories, Hegel provided the Categories with an immanent unity in which the contradictions marring both Aristotle and Kant were resolved. Moreover, Hegels Determination of the systematic unity of the Categories, which he formulates as appearance qua appearance, raises the ratiocinative and speculative forms of thought up within the actual life of the absolute they determine and are determined by. It is an incipient aufgehoben, formulated as substance is subject, which lays out the path of its own fulfillment in the redemption of substance metaphysics, formulated as appearance qua appearance. Hegels adoption of the term Aufheben from the likes of Schiller is incidental to its immanent development in the abolishment, preservation and raising-up of the Classical Laws of Thought from which it originates.

4 In order to pursue this topic within my dissertation I intend to begin by examining the etymology and use of the notion of aufheben within the history of philosophy prior to Hegel; so as to develop a sense of the term in itself and to distinguish between the empirical genesis of this concept and any possible immanent origin in Hegels thought. Thereafter, I will examine the major philosophical problems faced by Hegel in the wake of Kants Copernican turn and the evidence to suggest he was drawn towards Aristotles metaphysics in this connection. In particular, how is it possible to suggest that Kants philosophy presented an unresolved contradiction with regard to his critique of metaphysics? Furthermore, how is it possible to suggest a contradiction in Aristotles philosophy between infinite and finite substance that, for Hegel, resonated with the contradiction in Kants? Is it possible to suggest that Aristotle and Kant are able to resolve each others contradictions? In order to address these questions I will examine Aristotle, Kant and Hegels assertions on the Categories and Classical laws of thought with regard to the relation between logic and metaphysics. There are a number of matters that I will aim to address here. I will begin by considering the relation between Aristotle and Kant exclusively of Hegel. Firstly, what relation does each philosopher posit between the determinations of thought and things-in-themselves? Secondly, to what extent can it be argued that these determinations remain all but intact between Aristotle and Kant? In particular, is the but of the all but I have asserted significant enough to contest the prospect of there being a commonality between Aristotle and Kant with regard to these determinations? Furthermore, is it possible to posit a meaningful opposition within any such commonality, with respect to the way each relates the determinations of thought to things-in-themselves? Concerning Hegel in exclusivity from either Aristotle or Kant, I intend to examine his stance on the relation of the determinations of thought to things-in-themselves with regard to his notion of Appearance and its bearing on the Absolute. Finally I will aim to establish whether it is possible to posit that Hegels formulation of substance is subject can be used to ground his appearance of the absolute in a suspension of the Classical Laws of Thought generated through the entwinement of the Aristotelian and Kantian problematics outlined above.

5 Next, I will examine the logical unity and structure of this suspension, aiming to establish whether there is any systematic coherence to the way each of these three laws was inverted and how the Aristotelian and Kantian terms of this inversion led to a corresponding preservation. In order to assess the raising-up or determination of these laws I will examine the correspondence between the categories in Aristotle and Kant with the determinate moments of Hegels Science of Logic. In particular, I will aim to examine whether it is possible to argue that this determination is consistent with a working out of the times and respects in which it is not contradictory to argue that everything is inherently contradictory; whether this working out is consistent with the qualifications given in Aristotles formulation of the Law of Non-Contradiction; and whether it finds its rightful element in the form of the categories. On this matter I will also aim to examine Hegels own views on his original system in which the Phenomenology of Spirit was to be regarded as the propaedeutic for the Science of Logic; conceived as the thought of the Absolute in and for itself. I will conclude this section by examining whether the notion of appearance qua appearance can be regarded as a formulation entailing the completion of the aufgehoben in which the classical laws of thought are finally resolved, and the appearance of the absolute is made manifest in its own element. My dissertation will conclude with a brief assessment of whether Hegels Concept of Aufheben can have any value outside of the circle of his system and what such an outside might be.

In summary, after an initial assessment of the etymology of the German aufheben and a survey of the philosophical climate Hegel was faced with, my argument will be divided into an examination of the suspension, preservation and raising-up - or determination - of the Classical Laws of thought in the light of the formulations of substance is subject and appearance qua appearance, posited in relation to Aristotelian and Kantian problematics metaphysics. concerning the conditions of possibility for substance

Groarke, L. F., Aristotle: Logic, checked on 12 June 2013, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-log/ ii Grier, M., Kants Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion , 2007, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.19 iii Redding, P., Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought , 2007, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 222 iv Sachs, J., Aristotles Metaphysics, 2002, Green Lion Press, Santa Fe 1981 Words Indicative Bibliography

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