By: Alex J.

Tavarez

Why God Doesn’t Exist: Table of Contents

“19This then is how we know that we belong to the truth, and how we set our
hearts at rest in his presence 20whenever our hearts condemn us. For God is
greater than our hearts, and he knows everything. ............................................6

Why God Doesn’t Exist

Intro
A lot of people are always asking me why I’m an atheist – I tell them, well,
there’s no reason to believe! This is my basic response every time someone asks
me the question. I feel it’s a great summary of why I’m atheist, but isn’t completely
accurate either. The theists (those who believe in a god, or gods) who hear the
answer would disagree with my statement, or perhaps they would simply think that,
well, there’s no positive reason to disbelieve God exists either.

In other words, there are still a lot of things that remain un-answered. In order
to answer the question fully and accurately, I must not caricature it, and must
deliver not only a simple summary of why I don’t believe, but supply the theist with
various refutations to those arguments which are seen to supply a reason to believe
in God.

In informal situations, I in fact go about caricaturing god, God, or Gods, and

mostly Christianity, through analogizing them to things which no one in society
would believe so fervently or even consider believing beyond it being absurd.

But here I seek to be more elaborate and direct.

What is a god?
Before I start talking about my atheism, I must first make clear in what way I
am an atheist – I must be clear in what I mean by “disbelieving in a god or gods.” To
do this, I must define what exactly I am disbelieving, and I will simply leave it at the
following:
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A god or goddess is a deity, or any other entity, that exhibits consciousness

and of which the universe or a thing is somehow ontologically/causally/teleologically
dependent on. Meaning it is a conscious being on which all of the universe’s
existence and/or purpose/meaning is dependent on (but not in a solipsistic manner,
as this conscious being could be the object and not solely the self) as an efficient
cause and/or in an extrinsic manner. This is a broad definition of “god” and may
include any being that is corporeal, or immaterial, or anything of the sort. I usually
assume the god to be external from either the universe or the experiential world.

Thus Jehovah is a god, and so is Allah, etcetera. I think this definition is

sufficient and need not be broader, otherwise, it would apply to things which I do
agree already exist – like toenails. But perhaps it should be narrower – I am not sure
of this. But I’ll suffice with this definition.

TheoSemantic Trick
Now what do I mean by “theosemantics” here? Well, I am referring to the
semantics of “god” or “goddess.” I have seen many arguments that equivocate, and
use the word “God” to refer to something by which atheists, and actually,
religionists, would not identify as God. These arguments, to my understanding, are
simply a play on semantics and reference, used for the convenience of theists and
their God. The reason these things don’t work is because the atheist and the theist
result in talking about two different things, though the theist tries to claim that he
has proven a God exist when he may have only managed to prove something else
which is not what the atheists is arguing against.

These arguments also disregard the fact that the language spoken doesn’t
matter, only what is referenced – but when using a word whose definition, or
signifiers, is rather ambiguous, it becomes easy to switch the object of reference
without being entirely too sure it has been switched, at least by the observer.

An example of this trick through semantics would be the following:

Nails are used to join pieces of wood together.

You have nails on your hand.

Therefore, we do have a surplus of nails.

The only difference is that the semantic trick is obvious because the
definitions of the word “nail” in the argument above are precise, where in a
TheoSemantic Trick it’s quite the contrary:

Something that is finite needs a cause.

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The universe is finite.

The universe needs a cause.

To stop regress, the cause of the universe must be infinite.

This infinite cause is God.

Now, the argument above is not necessarily a TheoSemantic Trick because

one could say that the connector “is” in the conclusion is not equating “God” and
“infinite cause,” but rather making one a fulfillment of the other, id est “God fulfills
the condition of being an infinite first cause”; however, suppose it were
defining/equating God with infinite cause: it would be establishing the infinite cause,
which the argument concludes necessary in order to stop causal regression and
explain the origins of the universe, to be the definition of God, when an infinite
cause is not necessarily what the atheist is arguing against. The God the atheist is
arguing against may as well not be that which the argument says to be called God.

The biggest flaw of the TheoSemantic Trick can be illustrated through

replacing “God” with any other unbelievable artifice:

Something that is finite needs a cause.

The universe is finite.

The universe needs a cause.

To stop regress, the cause of the universe must be infinite.

This infinite cause is the Unicorn.

I am doing a semantic trick if I am equating the Unicorn and infinite cause as

full definitions of each other, because when another person talks about Unicorns
they speak of pink sissy horses with horny horns, not an infinite cause. Therefore
this doesn’t prove anything. It’s like calling my toenails Unicorns and then claiming
that therefore unicorns exist.

However, in the argument above, I may not be saying that a Unicorn is an

infinite cause, but that Unicorns can fulfill the condition of an infinite cause. If I am,
then I am no longer conducting a semantic trick, not just because of consensus
between those arguing as to what they mean by “Unicorn,” but also because it
conforms to the larger social setting in which the arguers are taking place.

Both theists and atheists have to keep the TheoSemantic Trick in mind so
they do not fall to arguments of equivocation. I have already taken a precaution to
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the TheoSemantic Trick by supplying the definition of “god” I’ll be working with
here, and that I usually work with, as an atheist.

The Judeao-Christian God: Why He Just Must Not Exist

Since it was the Judeo-Christian God (the God of the Jews and the God of
Christians) which I first started doubting and whose doubt led me to atheism, I’m
going to start this with this god. This God is the most famous of the United States,
which is why I address this god specifically the most.

There are a couple of things wrong with this god, basically: omnipotence
(which means being all-powerful), omnipotence vs. omniscience (omniscience
means being all-knowing), omniscience vs. free will, and omnibenevolence
(meaning all-benevolent, or all-good, or all-charitable) vs. suffering/evil.

The problem of omnipotence can be easily illustrated through the following

question: can God make a rock he cannot carry? Or, alternatively: can God do
anything illogical? This question supposes that omnipotence is necessarily illogical –
and that therefore to be omnipotent is to be impossible because it would be to be
illogical, thus false/invalid. Because of this, the Judeo-Christian God is so claimed to
be logically impossible. If God can make a rock he can’t carry, he can’t carry the
rock, so he can’t do everything, and thus is not omnipotent. If God can’t make a
rock he can’t carry, he still can’t do everything, and thus is not omnipotent.

I would say the argument just said is completely sensible; however, whether
or not theists (theists are people who believe in a god, or several gods) agree with
the argument being sensible, some theists choose to point to a logical omnipotence,
where God can do everything that is logical – which to me isn’t really omnipotence
at all, because God can only do everything that is logical, but let us just assume,
pretend, that the Judeo-Christian God has this logical omnipotence. Their still
remains the problem between omnipotence and omniscience. The omnipotence can
be completely logical, internally, yet be completely incompatible with omniscience
due to what both logical omnipotence and omniscience imply.

How are omnipotence and omniscience logically incompatible in other words,

how can a thing have those two characteristics at the same time? Well, if you are
omnipotent, it means that you are able to do anything (and if it is “logical
omnipotence,” [which I doubt is actually omnipotence at all] then it means you can
do anything as long as it is not illogical), and if you are omniscient it means you
know everything. If you can do anything that is not illogical, then a great example
would be changing your mind – that is not illogical. However, if you know everything
and have infinite knowledge, then it is impossible for you to be mistaken, because
then you are able to know whether or not your mistaken, and you’re able to know
whether or not your knowledge of your knowledge about being mistaken is not
mistaken, and you’re able to know whether that knowledge about not being
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mistaken in your knowledge about being mistaken in that knowledge is mistaken,

and it goes on and on. You would also know whether you would be wrong in the
future, and if you know that, then that means you would already know what is
actually true. This is why it’s called, alternatively, infinite knowledge. This is also
why infinite knowledge implies infallibility (infallibility means not able to make
mistakes). So, if God is omnipotent, or if he has logical omnipotence, he is able to
change his mind, and if he is omniscient, he is infallible. But if God is infallible, how
is he able to change his mind? If God can change his mind, he is not omniscient
(and is, consequentially, fallible [fallible is the opposite of infallible]), and if God
can’t change his mind, he is not omnipotent, and not logically omnipotent either for
that matter.

A theist who believes in the “logical omnipotence” “interpretation” of

omnipotence could argue that logical omnipotence not only necessitates internal
consistency, but also logical adjustment to circumstances, and that, therefore, if one
can’t be omniscient while being able to change one’s mind, logical omnipotence
would “adjust” to that. In other words, logical omnipotence would allow for God to
do anything and everything as long as it doesn’t involve being incompatible to
something else, thus meaning as long as it doesn’t allow for changing one’s mind if
one is omniscient. But if you define this as “omnipotence,” then everything is
omnipotent, even humans, because humans can do anything and everything as
long as what they do is not incompatible (logically inconsistent) with, or contradicts,
their circumstances and their nature. If this is so, God’s power or ability to do
“everything” is no special thing at all.

Again, this is why, to me, the argument theists use of “logical omnipotence”
in order to make up for the impossibility of omnipotence and thus the possibility of
an omnipotent thing (like the Judeo-Christian God) is simply a semantic trick, and is
not omnipotence at all. Plus, by saying God has “logical omnipotence,” you’re
directly contradicting the Judeo-Christian God, which is your very own God if you’re
a Christian or Jewish theist, because the Judeo-Christian God is not “logically
omnipotent” by definition – he is omnipotent, and his potency is a special potency
that other things don’t have. So when you use the argument of “logical
omnipotence” when I say omnipotence and omniscience is incompatible, or that
omnipotence is essentially illogical, then I’ve basically won and have disproved the
existence of your Judeo-Christian God, because your argument can’t apply to
support the Judeao-Christian God, since he is not defined by logical omnipotence in
Christian philosophy. So the Judeao-Christian God can’t exist by definition. You might
be compelled to say that that is not the Judeao-Christian God’s definition, out of
pure desperation, and so that I am not arguing against the Judeao-Christian God.
But I do persist that I am speaking of the Judeo-Christian God, and that
omnipotence and omniscience are two of his essential and defining characteristics:
the Bible, in fact, says the Judeao-Christian God has the trait of omniscience.
By: Alex J. Tavarez

“19This then is how we know that we belong to the truth, and how we set our hearts
at rest in his presence 20whenever our hearts condemn us. For God is greater than
our hearts, and he knows everything.

21
Dear friends, if our hearts do not condemn us, we have confidence before God” 1
John 3:19-21

Anyone claiming to be Christian or Jewish that says otherwise isn’t Christian

or Jewish. Even if you were to be correct (which you’re not), it wouldn’t matter: the
point, then, that would remain is that a god who is omnipotent cannot exist, and
that a god who is both omnipotent/”logically omnipotent” while also being
omniscient cannot exist. I feel as though Judeo-Christian theists try to maintain at
least some form of theism, not necessarily Judeo-Christian, by constantly changing
the characteristics/attributes of a god; when they do so, they do so only to defend
themselves, and don’t actually show how this new characteristic or attribute they
use for defense is an actual characteristic/attribute of a hypothetically-existent god,
or of an actual existent god that they also need to provide proof for. In other words,
it’s an excuse – it doesn’t prove or justify anything because there’s no reason
provided for these new characteristics/attributes, and is simply defensive. It’s like if
I were to tell you Santa’s too fat to fit through a chimney, cannot carry all the gifts
for those who have been nice, that deer cannot fly, that Santa Claus started from a
political cartoon, and therefore is not real, and then you proceed to change these
characteristics/attributes and tell me that, well, then: Santa is super-slim, only
carries a few gifts to people while parents provide the rest, that Santa quietly rides
with his deer on the ground, and that Santa Claus bares absolutely no resemblance
to that political cartoon I’m talking about that started the stories because he
actually wears Gothic clothing – you still haven’t proven anything, because what
you just described isn’t Santa Claus, and you haven’t provided a reason for me to
believe that a guy like that exists either. When you do these things, it’s called an ad
hoc. At least that’s what I would call it.

Some theists claim that, instead of “logical omnipotence,” God is omnipotent

as long as he cannot limit his omnipotence. But it can be argued that if God were
omnipotent in this way, his omnipotence would still be illogical because it would still
result in illogical abilities that do not particularly limit his omnipotence like the “Can
God create a rock he can’t carry?” question implies. Another problem with this
claim, though, is that omnipotence that cannot limit itself is not omnipotence at all
(as omnipotence is defined as all-power), and if it could, it would then still be self-
contradictory. Because of this, omnipotence still remains logically impossible. And
so the Judeo-Christian God remains impossible.

But that’s not even the only reason why the Judeo-Christian God just must
not exist. Another reason, that I consider to be a little softer than my previous
reason, is the existence of suffering in the face of an omnibenevolent god such as
the Judeo-Christian one. “Omnibenevolence” – “Omni” means all, while
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“Benevolence” means of good will, and compassion. And “omnibenevolent”

therefore means: “all- good-willing” or “all-compassionate.” I am not sure if the
belief of God as omnibenevolent is essential of Judaism and/or Christianity, but most
Christians and Jews do claim that God is omnibenevolent.

The problem of evil addresses how there can be immorality in a world where
a God exists. If what God says is right because it is right, and not because He says
it, then why does God let things that are fundamentally evil in life continue to exist?
A theist might say that it is a form of challenge in order to strengthen us, but why
does god need the existence of evil to strengthen us? Does the world being good
somehow leave out any challenges to work on? Not necessarily, if we’re speaking of
a moral/ethical good. It could then be said that God made free will, which inevitably
led to the rise of evil as a possibility in the human social realm. If this is true, and if
God is retributive, he would punish those who are bad, and reward those who are
good in the world. He does not do this in the world, for good things happen to bad
people, and vice versa. Therefore, because of this, it is evident that God is not
omnibenevolent, as an omnibenevolent God is a good-willing God; if He is
indifferent, he is not good-willing. Thus, the Judeo-Christian God (who is
omnibenevolent) cannot exist.

Some theists, though, say that there cannot be good without evil – they are
correct, but only up to an extent. Yes, evil and good cannot exist without each other,
but they forgot to add one key thing: potential. Good cannot potentially exist
without the existence of evil, and evil cannot potentially exist without the existence
of good. However, just because evil must exist to make the good potentially
existent doesn’t mean good cannot exist without evil existing in actuality, since
good’s existence only implies a potential existence of evil that will not necessarily
turn into an actuality. Which means: God could make the world solely good in
actuality, while disallowing the actualization of evil in the world (evil could be
[potential], but God says it won’t be [disallowing evil’s actualization]). But he hasn’t,
since evil has been seen to have been actualized in the world. This would not be so
of a God who is not indifferent to such matters, but omnibenevolent. Thus, any
omnibenevolent God would not exist. And, as you can see, omnibenevolent gods
would be more engaged with the world and human affairs, which are often referred
to as personal gods. Some people would say that God says certain things are right
because whatever he says to be right is automatically right: whoever says this,
therefore, must condone mass murder (God killed all the firstborn), and/or would kill
and rape for God. A person who believes this needs serious psychiatric help, and
seems to ignore that “morality” and “ethics” are human categories, just like
language is also human and is what we use to create, claim, categorize, and
rationalize – if all of this is human, it is not necessarily from God. And if all of this is
human, it is naturally human to come up with morals – and if you do anything
anyone tells you, you have no morals as a human, because you do not manage to
independently distinguish one action from another in terms of being right or wrong
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when offered to you as something for you to do. Thus, ironically, if whatever God
says is right because God said it, then people wouldn’t have a conscience, which is
what you as a Christian claim we do have.

Some Christians even go as far as to say that it is the devil that causes the
evil in the world, and therefore that God is not responsible for it. If so, then explain
to me this:

“11 This is how you are to eat it: with your cloak tucked into your belt, your sandals
on your feet and your staff in your hand. Eat it in haste; it is the LORD's Passover.
12
‘On that same night I will pass through Egypt and strike down every firstborn—
both men and animals—and I will bring judgment on all the gods of Egypt. I am the
LORD. 13 The blood will be a sign for you on the houses where you are; and when I
see the blood, I will pass over you. No destructive plague will touch you when I
strike Egypt.’” Exodus 12:11-13

You might say that God has the right to destroy what he consequently is
responsible for being existent (the firstborns), but would you say a parent would be
able to kill his 13-year-old son simply because he was responsible for his creation in
some way, if God didn’t exist?

Explain to me how God used Job as a play-toy to play with Satan, and how He
made it so those who have nothing to do with what Adam and Eve did, suffer for
their sin. Plus, even if the devil were the only perpetrator of evil, God still holds
responsibility for this evil by being the creator and the motivator of the devil to
tempt people. If He is omniscient, he would’ve known that one of his angels, Lucifer,
would’ve fallen and become Satan, to tempt people into evil. Yet he sat back and let
it happen, even though he is omnipotent. And this is if God were able to be
omniscient and omnipotent, which is what Christians claim, even though I have
already shown why I think that being both omniscient and omnipotent is impossible.
This is why it is impossible for the Judeo-Christian God who Jews and Christians
claim to be omnibenevolent to exist.

There’s also what I call the Problem of Suffering, which is very similar to the
Problem of Evil, but not the same. The problem of suffering asks how can there be
suffering in the world if there’s an omnibenevolent God. Theists, again, might
respond that it is to challenge us, but suffering isn’t needed to be challenged: one
can have difficulty achieving a certain goal without having to be suffering through
it. It could be said that suffering is the challenge itself, and that the goal is
happiness: but what’s the point of this if God could grant this happiness to us? You
could respond that it is because then we wouldn’t have to work for it – the point of
working for something is to achieve it. If you’ve already achieved it, there’s no need
to employ a means to achieve it. So I don’t see why God needs to cause us to
suffer, and how “giving us challenges” makes him need to cause us to suffer – thus,
this doesn’t really explain why God chose to let us suffer. Again, theists will try to
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say that we suffer because of free will, but free will could exist without having the
consequence of suffering upon the human mind. They might further say that
without suffering, such as guilt, humans wouldn’t be able to identify what is evil
(even though they haven’t even yet explained how and why an omnibenevolent
God would allow evil to happen). But if God is omnipotent, this wouldn’t be true.
Again, as you can see, the Judeo-Christian God, who is omnibenevolent, omnipotent,
omniscient, and allows evil/suffering, simply cannot exist.

And there’s even more problems! Omniscience cannot allow free will to be
possible, because omniscience leading to God’s infallibility leading to God’s 100%
certain knowledge would imply that human action is deterministic. This means that
all human action is planned, not necessarily by God, but just planned and
determined by things 100%. This means that humans aren’t really free to make
choices, because their choices were already planned and determined. They cannot
fall out of this plan or determined path because then it wouldn’t be determinism.
Because omniscience implies this determinism, it also implies that free will cannot
exist. So if God is omniscient, free will wouldn’t be possible. But the Judeo-Christian
God is omniscient and created free will, according to Judeo-Christianity, and so
because this isn’t possible, the Judeo-Christian God is impossible. There’s also the
fact that if a thing is perfect, it does not have flaws – if it does not have flaws, it
cannot make things with flaws, because to do that assumes a flaw in the creator. It
could be said that the universe ahs various flaws, and thus that the Judeo-Christian
God cannot exist, as he is supposed to be perfect.

The Judeo-Christian God, therefore, just must not exist, because of his
inconsistency and impossibility as summarized in the problems aforementioned,
being: omnipotence, omnipotence vs. omniscience, omniscience vs. free will,
omnibenevolence vs. God’s Biblical immorality, and omnipotence-omniscience-
omnibenevolence vs. the existence of evil.

Thus, the Judeo-Christian God is the only god I just know doesn’t exist, which
would include the Muslim God, and the Mormon God. Most other gods I do not know
do not exist, but disbelieve to exist. In the following sections, the capitalized word
“God” will not be referring specifically to a Judeo-Christian God but any god, gods,
or goddesses – as the following arguments are not solely used in support of one
religion or denomination.

The Ontological Argument

The ontological argument is any argument that has God’s greatness or
perfection somehow in its premises (a premise is a proposition that tries to support
its conclusion), and has its conclusion as God’s existence. The argument basically
goes like this: God is the greatest thing there is; nothing else can be greater than
God; God exists in the understanding; it is greater to exist in reality than just in the
understanding; therefore, God exists. The argument can also be formed in this way:
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God is the greatest thing there is; nothing else can be greater than God; it is greater
to be necessary in existence than to be contingent (i.e. not needed); therefore, God
necessarily exists.

There’s a big problem with this – it assumes that existence is a part of the
essence of God. But what essence does is that it simply describes a concept, or
reduces it into basic necessities of the concept in order to identify it with a real
thing. Thus, when one says the essence of a thing, then it is only if that thing exists
that the essence would apply to it; the necessary judgments of propositions that
describe an objects essence as applying to it have nothing to do with the object’s
real existence. For example: if you say “a triangle has 3 sides” (i.e. describing an
object’s essence as applying to itself), the proposition is and may be necessarily
true (i.e. one may make a judgment of that proposition), without that triangle
having to exist. The existence of things precedes their essence, while the essence of
things is used to form other essences and identify those things in existence. So
when you say “a triangle has 3 sides,” you are really also saying “if a triangle exists,
it has 3 sides,” not that it exists.

So if you say God’s essence is his being existent, then what you are saying is:
“if God exists, then God is necessarily existent.” So you would be saying that God
has to exist if and only if he exists. But then if he doesn’t exist, he wouldn’t have to
exist, because he would necessarily exist only if he existed. So when the ontological
argument states that God is the greatest thing by essence, and that therefore, by
essence he must exist, what it is saying is that “if God exist, then God is necessarily
existent; therefore, God exists.” Because of this, the ontological argument is flawed:
it has not shown that the condition of his existence is true, which is what needs to
be true in order for him to be necessarily existent, which is what they must show if
they assume his essence as being existent or necessarily existent. In other words,
they haven’t shown how God is really existent, because by saying his essence is to
be existent, they are just saying that his existence is what is used to identify him in
his real existence (which is something in the understanding), not proving his real
existence (his existence in reality). So then that means that you aren’t proving he
exists by making his essence his existence – as you haven’t actually shown God
really exists by saying that his essence is his existence. This is true of any other
thing: if I define Santa Claus as the greatest thing ever, and say existence is greater
than non-existence, it doesn’t follow from that that he exist; I’m simply saying his
essence is existence, which does not show that he is really existent, because his
“essence of being existent” is only used to identify him as really existent, not prove
his real existence. “God as being the greatest” or “having the essence of being
existent” remains in the understanding and doesn’t identify anything in reality.

There’s also the fact that a self-contradiction arises if the subject of

something is affirmed while its predicate (the thing expressed which makes the
subject what it is) is denied, or vice versa (for example, “Triangles don’t have 3
sides” would be self-contradictory because its subject is affirmed [“triangles”] while
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the predicate is denied [“have 3 sides” is denied]). I am not claiming that this is
what the ontological argument is doing, but that denying God exists does not result
in a self-contradiction, since a self-contradiction requires the subject to be affirmed
while the predicate denied or vice versa. To say that “God is nonexistent” is
therefore not a self-contradiction even when God’s essence is being existent, since
when we say something is nonexistent we are denying both the subject and its
predicate as being represented in reality (or “reality’s existences”). Thus, even were
the essence of God his being existent, his existence can and could be denied, as
well as affirmed. So, the ontological argument ends up amounting to nothing. The
ontological argument becomes null and irrelevant to the “Does God exist?”
discourse.

Also, if we define something as being existent, then saying that it is

“therefore existent” is redundant, since we are simply repeating ourselves. And
because of this, we are not making a judgment of God’s existence in reality and
joining it to our conceptual definition of God as being existent.

As you can see, “existence” (if when we say “existence” we are referring to
something’s existence in reality) can’t really be an essence, or predicate, then,
because it doesn’t say anything about the thing or the subject, but the
correspondence of an object in reality with a concept (a subject plus its predicate).
The reason we say a horse exists and a unicorn does not, is not because the horse
is defined as existing or has the essence of existence while the unicorn is not
defined as such or have such an essence, but because there are objects in reality
corresponding to the concept of a horse while there are currently none
corresponding to the concept of a unicorn.

If necessary existence is a predicate, even though plain existence isn’t, then

you have yet to prove that God is necessarily existent. You might say that he is
necessarily existent because he is the greatest thing, and necessary existence is
greater than contingent (not-needed) existence. But what do you mean by “he is
the greatest thing”? If this is his essence, then if I say the greatest thing in the
world is the moon, then you’re saying God is consequently a moon. But if this is not
his essence, then you’re making the judgment that God is the greatest thing.
There’s a problem with this, though: you can only describe an object as the greatest
if it exists and can be compared to other things that exist. You are assuming God is
great, and then that he exists – when it is when he exists that he becomes greatest.
In other words, when you say God is greatest, you are speaking of him conceptually
in comparison with other things as concepts – a conceptual comparison is not a
comparison with those things in reality, as, if existence is greater than non-
existence, things in reality may be greater than God because God is only greater
than those things conceptually, and so God may not actually exist in reality.

But, why are we assuming existence is greater than non-existence in the

ontological argument in the first place?
By: Alex J. Tavarez

There’s a different version of the ontological argument that states that

whatever is possible occurs in different dimensions or universes in existence, and
that since God is something possible (which I have shown the Judeo-Christian God is
not, but let us suppose he is), he must therefore exist in one of these universes
where the potential of God to exist is actualized, and therefore God exists. There are
at least two or three problems with this version of the argument: first, you have to
prove that it is true that other universes exist which actualize possibilities of this
universe. Unfortunately, this statement is quite un-founded. Second, it is also
possible for God to not exist, and therefore, he must not exist in at least one
existent universe that makes up for the possibility of his non-existence. But then,
this would result in a contradiction (God exists and doesn’t exist) unless there were
one universe without God and one with it. If this is so, then our universe doesn’t
necessarily have a God, and so you haven’t proven that God exists to us. If you say
this is proof that he exists to us, then you are saying that his existence in another
universe does not just apply to that universe, but to ours. But if this is so, so does
his non-existence in another universe apply to ours, which makes it end up being
self-contradictory.

The Cosmological Argument

The cosmological argument is another argument used by theists to try to
prove that God, or a god, exists. This argument basically says that the universe
needs a cause, and with a ton of other premises, comes, somehow, to the
conclusion that a God exists. There are several versions of this argument. Here they
are:

Argument 1:

1. Everything has a cause.

2. (From premise 1) The universe has a cause.

3. God fulfills this need of a cause.

4. Therefore, God exists.

Argument 2:

1. All contingent things (a contingent thing is something whose existence is

not necessary) have a cause.

2. The cause or explanation for this contingent thing must ultimately go all
the way back to something that is not contingent, but necessary.

3. Therefore, a necessary being exists, and this being is assumed to be God.

Argument 3:
By: Alex J. Tavarez

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence.

2. The universe began to exist.

3. Therefore, the universe was caused.

4. There have not been provided [or, alternatively, cannot be provided] any
scientific efficient causes.

5. Therefore, the cause must be “personal” [meaning a “conscious” or

“concerned” or “supernatural” entity].

What’s wrong with these arguments for God’s existence? Well,

Argument 1 is a non-sequitur: it does not follow that, because the universe must
have a cause (and thus has one), that this cause is God. There are still many
possibilities as to what this cause might be – as to what exactly does fulfill this
causal function. I could easily use this version of the cosmological argument to
justify the existence of a Giant Flying Spaghetti monster that made the world with
his saucy delicious noode-ly appendages. This argument is flawed, and can’t justify
the existence of anything. It doesn’t prove anything. The first premise of this
argument is also objectionable: things that are necessary wouldn’t need a cause
because the nature of that thing’s existence would explain its being existent,
without having to refer to efficient causes. This means that not everything needs a
cause.

There’s also the possibility that even contingent things don’t need a cause. I
will (or have) addressed this in the metaphysics section of the site, under: Causality.
A short summary of that would be: contingent things do not logically need a cause,
for that thing’s existence is sufficient to itself, though not making itself necessary,
and so causal explanations are un-necessary; contingent things can also not be
caused, which is different from saying that it was caused even if by nothing – it is a
logical possibility for a non-caused universe to exist, while nothing causing X is
logically impossible. The jump from something being contingent to it being
necessarily caused efficiently seems rather big, as it is not inductive or abductive in
reasoning, and is therefore deductive – which, at its most basic, would make it a
syllogistic argument. But syllogistic arguments have two premises, not one – so,
there’s a hidden premise in this judgment, and though I don’t know what it is, I
suspect it is the key premise that needs to be justified, or this hidden premise or the
statement “contingent things need a cause” that need to be shown to be
axiomatic/self-evident through analytic analysis. Which it hasn’t. You might claim it
to be inductive, as a prediction from our everyday “observances” of things having
causes, but this prediction couldn’t apply in this case, as it would be in turn
committing the fallacy of composition. It also would be, as said, a prediction
By: Alex J. Tavarez

applying to those contingent things we haven’t necessarily yet shown a cause for,
and so would in no way prove that a cause is necessary for contingent things.

So, besides the first premise of Argument 1 being objectionable, so is the first
premise of Argument 2 objectionable. But even if that premise be true, the second
one can also be objected to: could there not be an infinite regress or amount of
causes? I do not see how this is impossible; however, infinity does seem like a very
difficult concept to grasp, and that compels me to speculate that infinity may be
impossible. But I do not have any justification to say so, so far. And even if we
assume both of these premises are true, the only thing those premises would lead
to is the conclusion that a necessary being or object must exist – not that God
exists. God could possibly fulfill this role, but according to the definition of a god
from which we began this discourse, the argument’s conclusion that a necessary
being is needed to make up for the necessitated efficient cause of contingent things
is not a sufficient condition as to say this thing is God or equivalent to Him. Thus,
the assumption that this necessary cause/being/object is God is completely
unfounded and has no basis. Some say that a conscious being/object best explains
the contingent thing which is the universe; however, I do not see how it is the best
explanation. Both un-conscious and conscious objects are equally able to account
for the universe.

Argument 3’s first premise is objectionable, as it has the same problem as did
the first premise of Argument 2: why must something that began to exist have a
cause? If the universe can possibly pop out of existence because of its contingency,
so might it be able to begin without a cause. The initiative of a cause is not what
makes the beginning of the effect, rather, it is the beginning of the cause and the
beginning of the effect that allow them to exist and then relate to each other
through this causal relationship. It is the beginning of a thing, and the beginning of
another thing that allow them to exist and be associated to each other causally. If
nothing exists outside of that thing, and that thing began, an efficient cause cannot
be assigned to it. Thus, it is possible for a thing to begin and yet have no cause.
Also, the universe is space-time, so there cannot be anything outside of the
universe because there would be no space in which it would reside and no time in
which we could inquire of it as cause of the universe. There is also the fact that the
conclusion does not follow from premise 4: it is a non-sequitur. The lack of scientific
efficient causes for the universe does not in any way support the probability and
does not in any way show the favorability of a personal efficient cause to account
for the universe’s existence. Scientists don’t just select possible efficient causes as
true because of a lack of truth in other causes – scientists don’t assume any of
these as true if they are not proven true. The same is true in any other epistemic
journey: one cannot say one option is better than the other when none of the
options have any direct justification for each other that make them more or less
improbable. Thus, you cannot say that because there are no scientific efficient
causes there must be a “personal” efficient cause instead. Why? Because there
By: Alex J. Tavarez

have been no “personal” efficient causes justified to be true either – you can’t use
the lack of justification you have for such a conclusion as its justification by saying
something else hasn’t made any claim justified to be true. And, again, there doesn’t
need to be an efficient cause either, so a “personal” efficient cause is not the only
alternative to scientific efficient causes: Argument 3 is therefore assuming a false
dichotomy right through the process of coming to its conclusion.

Pascal’s Wager
Pascal’s wager is a wager for God’s existence originally made by Blaise
Pascal. Pascal’s Wager basically states that it is better to believe in God than to
disbelieve him. It says this because it claims that belief may result in infinite bliss
or, if God doesn’t exist, no significant loss, and that disbelief would result in either
hellfire or no loss.

The problem with this argument: it ignores the probability of these options
being true and therefore the probability that one of the results of these options will
come about and be fulfilled. The way probability is shown is by using the limited
information/data/conditions you do have and what outcome they most account for.
The thing is, though, that the probability of God existing or not existing is equal, as
God’s existence has no amount of data which directly supports it, and God’s non-
existence, by virtue of the nature of non-existence, cannot have any supporting
data. This lack of data makes both options equal. If both options are equally
probable, the wager cannot be based upon probability. Because both of these
options and their corresponding results are equally probable, they must be chosen
by another criterion: a non-pragmatic criterion, one that is epistemic. This criteria is
the burden of proof, which, since the burden of proof is on the positive claim,
because of the nature of the negative claim, the lack of proof for the positive makes
a default fall-back on the negative or rather perhaps the skepticism of the positive:
God doesn’t exist (the negative claim), or rather perhaps the disbelief in God’s
existence (skepticism of the positive claim that God exists).

What Pascal’s Wager ignores is the fact that pragmatics and epistemology
can be very related through probability and result-based decision making also being
related. Plus, if you accept Pascal’s Wager, that in turn does not lead you to belief in
God’s existence, as belief is an epistemic stance that needs epistemic reasons and
belief by definition can arguably said to not be able to be based on pragmatics. So,
in other words, you would remain an atheist pretending to be a theist. Thus, if it is
true that such a God that gives such a reward and such a punishment exists, you
would still receive punishment as, by believing through will-power, you do not
actually believe – it is no longer really belief.

There are also a couple of other flaws: Pascal’s Wager assumes there are only
two options. People may refine it, and say that the only options actually deal with
those God’s which reward infinite bliss for belief and hellfire for non- or disbelief.
By: Alex J. Tavarez

They say this because options outside of that are irrelevant due to their insignificant
consequences. But it remains that if there are many possible gods who may share
this similarity, not believing in any one of them will result in hellfire. So, there’s the
problem of choosing the correct God. Then again, one could say that people need
not believe in any specific God while disbelieving others, but simply believe in a
generic God that gives hellfire and rewards with infinite bliss – this is still a problem,
because believing in a God that solely gives hellfire and rewards infinite bliss would
still result in denying similar Gods. Also, the more Gods there possibly could be, the
more likely it is that the specific God you believe in is mistaken. So, this also results
in any of these Gods being true being very unlikely. Thus, the likelier truth becomes
the non-existence of each of those Gods, and thus the hypothetical result of atheism
if such a rewarding/punishing God exists becomes null as a reason for theism (belief
in God, a god, or goddesses).

Miracles Don’t Prove God’s Existence

I’ve heard and seen many theists, particularly Christians of the monotheistic
religions, point to miracles (a violation or interruption in physical/natural laws of the
universe) as a form of affirmation or support for their belief in God’s existence.
Miracles, however, don’t prove God’s existence: to say that a miracle happened,
and therefore God exists, is almost like saying a miracle happened, and therefore
ghosts exist. This shows how absurd the notion that miracles somehow point to the
divine is.

You might ask me, then, how would you explain miracles? Well, who says I
have to? The point is that a random guess in order to explain the genesis of
something does not make it so that that something proves that random guess’s
veracity. So, while we guess these things, we must also admit ignorance as to what
truly is the origin of miracles.

But my view on miracles is, so far, that a violation of the laws of nature is
completely possible; the laws of nature are not the same as the laws of logic. While
a violation of logic is completely impossible, the laws of nature are conditional and
based on consistent experience. In other words, we generalize from previous
experience to present and future experience. So, the laws of nature are able to be
“violated,” though it’s not really a violation: a miracle is more like new information
and data that is introduced and that may require a change in our view or formation
of the laws of nature. The laws of nature come from observation of nature and so
when nature contradicts the laws of nature, the laws of nature must be changed.
Laws of nature abide to nature, not vice versa. This is why it is completely possible
for “miracles” to happen.

Miracles, then, are possible conceivable independent occurrences, and they

do not need to have any “origin,” as they are simply part of the organic function of
the universe, which humans can’t ever fully grasp as fixed. To see more on miracles
By: Alex J. Tavarez

as interruptions of the laws of nature, please visit the Metaphysics section of the
site.

The Teleological Argument

The teleological argument is an argument that states that the supposed
design, purpose, or complexity of the universe can only be explained by the
existence of a designer or creator (which also implies that this being has intent, and
thus consciousness – a conscious being by which the universe is extrinsic to, and
therefore claims that it can only be explained through god). This argument is
flawed, because it assumes that design and purpose is something observed simply
in the world – something which we acquire from mere observance of the universe. I
disagree with this. “Order” is a human concept that is logically valid and can be
used to describe or classify the universe but is not seen in the universe. “Order” is
not empirically verifiable because it is not found in the world; they are given to the
world by humans. “Order” results from the interaction of the subject with the object,
and is not an intrinsic thing observed from the object. So, because order is not of
the universe, but to the universe, one cannot use “order” to promote the existence
of a creator or designer.

There’s also the fact that the subject, the human, can only see order in those
things which he has categorized and organized through symbolic representation and
logical reasoning in thought. If the human has not done this, or is unable to do this,
the object of his inquiry, to him, seems disordered and to have no sign of design –
he cannot see purpose if the ends of something seems inconceivable or
unfavorable. The appearance of “order” in the universe is therefore a completely
subjective phenomena corresponding with the human ordering of the universe. The
order of the universe thus does not need any explanation through an efficient
cause, since the order of the universe has its origins in us.

Things that lack knowledge can be said not to be able to achieve an end
unless guided by an intelligent hand; however, the “end” of things, just as they are
imagined by the painter unto his painting, is imagined to those natural things which
lack knowledge. A thing that lacks knowledge to achieve a goal doesn’t need an
intelligent guidance, because that thing does not have a goal due to its lack of
intelligence to assign one, and therefore no need for guidance – we do have this
intelligence to assign goals, though, and so we are the ones who assign it a goal
and say it has one. In other words, one could say things that lack knowledge have
goals and achieve them, but this goal is not personal to that thing which lacks the
knowledge to achieve the goal. Thus, this thing needs not assistance in achieving
something which it cannot conceive a means to achieve and of which it cannot
conceive the end of that means.

Complexity also does not imply design, as a series of small random/unguided

occurrences, when enlarged, and looked at collectively, can seem very complex.
By: Alex J. Tavarez

Also, to explain a complex piece, it would require a much more complex

origin – but since the argument from teleology assumes that complexity requires
design, this would lead to an absurd infinite regress (in other words, every designer
you come up with will need a designer) that would be easily discarded of as
epistemologically insignificant (not important in terms of knowledge or belief or
truth) through the method of Occam’s Razor (where un-necessary explanations or
amounts of explanation are discarded off as useless to address).

There’s also the fact that we get our idea of “design” through nature. In order
to call something designed, we must compare to something natural. Nature,
therefore, provides the basis by which we can judge something as designed. We can
only judge things as design insofar as we can distinguish characteristics of that
thing which is called design and that which is natural. Thus, to claim that nature
was designed is to completely destroy the basis of comparison that we must use to
identify design. By saying nature is designed, which is the basis on which we judge
design, you’re destroying the concept of design and thus can’t apply it any more,
or, rather, it could be said, you are broadening the concept of design to an extent in
which it becomes null or meaningless.

The Transcendental Argument

The transcendental argument basically states that logic, morality, the
sciences, and etcetera, cannot make sense or are not justified unless God is
assumed to exist or that his existence is true. They also claim that logic and
morality and etcetera are not created by God, but are a reflection of God’s nature –
id est, they are part of God’s nature. And, that, because of this, without God, one
cannot consistently establish any of these things. However, I disagree with this, by
stating that this is simply a way to explain away why there can be these absolute
and objective truths despite their dependence on God as subject, and does not in
any way show how God is needed to assume these things. The point is that logic
and morality don’t need to be dependent on God’s existence, whether or not God’s
nature is conceptually defined as logic, morality, and the sciences. One could still
assert logic, morality, and the sciences while denying God because they can be
independent of him while remaining stable and consistent, just like God can remain
stable and consistent and fixed in his nature as having logic, morality, and the
science as part of his nature.

Logic is a self-sustaining and closed system, and also the guiding system for
figuring out things included in all other topics, like morality, and the sciences. Thus,
logic can be independent and doesn’t need to have a basis on God, and neither do
other subjects/topics, as they are encompassed by logic in their understanding.
By: Alex J. Tavarez

Proponents of this argument have yet to show how exactly an atheistic system
would remain inconsistent unless it summons the existence of God.

The Christological Argument(s)

The Christological argument basically tries to prove God’s existence through
the nature of Christ. A particular version of it is one that states that, based on
Christ’s wisdom and character; it is likely that whatever he says is correct. Christ
said God exists; therefore, it is likely that it is true that God exists. The flaw with this
version of the argument is that it is essentially an appeal to authority, on matters of
principle, and by disregard of the actual claim itself. Wisdom and character do not
point to the impossibility of getting something wrong, but rather point to the
likeliness of getting it right. But, this still isn’t proof that it isn’t true – Jesus had
shown no proof, and this actually makes his claim not able to be backed up. The
summons of an authority on certain claims is only valid if that authority also has
provided a form of proof for a claim, many other authorities support him, and his
logic is sound. The proof part of the authorization is much more significant than the
other three criterions. Jesus didn’t show proof, he did not show any of his logic that
is able to be evaluated, and he wasn’t even an authority or authoritative source
outside of theology (so relying on him for judging whether god exists would end up
being circular reasoning, for we would already be assuming theology, in which he is
an authoritative source, is true), which already goes by the assumption of God’s
existence. The three criterion I presented don’t actually even support the veracity of
a claim itself (except for the proof criterion, which is the first one, though not
necessarily the authoritative account or anecdote of the proof if it is empirical), but
simply makes the claim able to be relied on – it is pragmatic support for its use in an
argument or in a practice, not empiric or logical support for its veracity.

Another version of the argument, one which C.S. Lewis came up with, says
that Jesus claimed to be God, and that he was a wise and moral teacher. C.S. Lewis
than goes on to say that Jesus either lied, is deluded, or really is God. As a wise
moral teacher, Jesus did not lie and was not deluded. Thus, Jesus was God, and
therefore, God exists. The problem with this version of the argument is that it
assumes there are only three options: Jesus lied, is deluded, or is telling the truth –
there’s also the possibility that he was simply mistaken. Also, judging Jesus as moral
and wise comes from observances and evaluations of his behavior – so, the
behavior you’ve seen from him so far points to him being wise and moral, but
perhaps there is behavior that is unknown that may have been otherwise from wise
and/or moral. So, the options of deceit and/or delusion are still available as being
true.

The Argument from Beauty/Love

Beauty. The argument from beauty basically says that there are compelling
reasons to believe that beauty is transcending its physical manifestations, that
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reductionist materialism asserts that nothing can transcend its physical

manifestations, that beauty is a quality of God that transcends physical
manifestations, and that thus that theism is more plausible than materialism. So,
basically, beauty is transcendent, and God having beauty as a transcendent being,
makes it so that God’s existence is more possible than materialist assertions. The
problem with this argument is the first premise: what are these compelling reasons
supporting the transcendence of beauty? There’s also the fact that just because
beauty may transcend, this does in no way prove or justify belief in God, even if it is
more plausible than materialism as the conclusion validly says.

But, the first premise: some theists have supplied this claim of beauty
transcending physical manifestations with many reasons. Some of these reasons:
beauty is assumed to have an objective existence when spoken of, and can have no
coherence being spoken about if it is assumed otherwise; beauty can be found in
things which have no evolutionary advantage; there is a great intuition that beauty
does transcend its physical manifestations. The first reason is false, as ordinary
language is not a great guide as to these things – besides, is there any real
difference between how we talk about subjective and objective experiences? Both
of these can be spoken of imprecisely and inaccurately. Beauty is not something
observed directly on or of the object, rather something observed to the object: the
sense of beauty is in the observer, regardless of its association with the object in
itself as being simultaneously experienced and the sense of beauty focused. The
sense of transcendent beauty is also found in the subject, and it, as an intuition,
therefore, is not sufficient to support such a claim of transcendence. The subject,
however, is a transcendent thing, and therefore, his experiences (such as of beauty
and of love) also constitute as transcendent (if by transcendent you mean
exceeding physical limits, extensions, or manifestations) – I will admit that. So, I
agree that beauty (and love) be transcendent, but this does not in any way show
how materialism is implausible, neither how reductionist materialism is implausible,
compared to theism. Materialism could still be true despite the existence of
transcendent things, and reductionist materialism is not invalidated by
transcendent existence, as transcendent existences can still be translated to the
level of materialism through logical association (if you’re defining transcendence as
“beyond physical manifestation”).

The use of “transcendent” or “transcendental” by some theists, I would say,

is rather vague or imprecise. “Transcendent” or “transcendental” would mean
beyond a certain domain, but what domain is this? Luckily in this argument it was
clarified, but in others, it remains vague.

Some theists have replaced the first premise with the premise: there are
compelling reasons to believe that the level of beauty of the universe is greater
than it would be under materialism. Again, beauty is a subjective and projected
By: Alex J. Tavarez

quality that says nothing about the object; thus, one cannot use it to speak of the
object objectively – the universe wouldn’t be either less or more beautiful under
materialism or without it. The universe is not either, objectively, and the term
“beauty” is only a subjective projection.

Love. The argument from love is basically the same as that of the argument
of beauty, and the reasons submitted by theists to support its primary premise, only
that love replaces beauty. As I have already refuted the argument of beauty, I refute
the argument of love in the exact same way: love is an occurrence of the
subject/self, which is one of the things, if not the only thing, that is immaterial and
yet objectively existent by realization and acknowledgment of the subject and that
is “transcendent.” I plan to explain this further in the Metaphysics section of the
site.

Love and beauty are objectively existent to the extent that they are in the
subject who objectively exists [they are ontologically objective], but the love and
beauty do not have an existence outside of the subject and don’t have a subject-
less objective existence, and thus cannot be seen as epistemologically objective
[epistemic objectivity would be that the knowledge claim is one of the object rather
than of the subject and to the object], which is what I assume people mean when
they say “objective existence.” Love and beauty can still maintain their value
without having to have a subject-less objective existence. When we speak of things,
we usually speak of them at the subject-less objective level of existence, and this is
the only way in which we can make judgments of objects themselves. So, you
cannot say that beauty and love are part of the universe – well, you can, but you
must understand that it is not ontologically so at the subject-less objective level of
existence, and thus cannot apply when speaking of the universe with epistemic
objectivity.

The Argument from Morality/Consciousness

Morality. The argument from morality simply takes the form of questioning
how objective morals exist, or how moral sentences can be cognitive without the
existence of God, and goes on to conclude that there is a God in order for us to
support the existence of objective morals (morals that are true regardless of the
subject). But this is self-contradictory, as, by assuming God exists, one is making
the truth of morals come from a conscious being – the consciousness of a being,
and therefore the subject, while claiming that it is this subject that gives the morals
their epistemic objectivity. Thus, morals would remain as epistemologically
subjective as they were from the start.

Proponents of this argument also claim that in an atheistic world-view, morals

could not be objective or transcendent. But they are assuming that morals are
transcendent in the first place, which I say is a half-truth, if this “transcendence”
means “beyond physical manifestations.” They are beyond physical manifestations,
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but they have totally nothing to do with the pure physical world, and instead have
to do with the social world or the world of the individual to the social – this is what
they address, though prescriptively. Morality is epistemologically objective, though
restrained by concepts not found in the world, but articulated from the world to the
ideal. Morality is epistemologically objective because it is knowledge of the object,
though it is through the subject and his concepts which are not found in reality (but
remain rational and logical) – for example, the concept of “ought to.” A more
accurate way of describing morality would be that it’s a type of epistemic objectivity
that requires “subjectful” concepts not found in the world but derived from it, and
thus logical and rational. Therefore, when one speaks of morality, its truths are
automatically restrained and independent of the subject beyond its need of the
subject in order for the rational concepts therein to be recognized or actualized in
order to address the world in this way (unlike “love” and “beauty” who are concepts
not derived from reality or who make logical connections between things in
ontological subject-less objective existence, but that simply references the subject’s
experience). Judgment is collaboration between the subject and the object, while
Truth is the result of that collaboration, and that Truth is (epistemologically)
objective as long as the subject references the object and examines its parts and
other relevant objects, and (epistemologically) subjective so long as the subject is
referencing things in himself and examining its parts and relation to other relevant
objects.

Consciousness. The argument from consciousness simply states that the

nonphysical mind exists, and goes on to say that a scientific explanation for
consciousness’ or this mind’s origins/function cannot be provided scientifically, and
that it must therefore have a “personal” explanation for mind is therefore
preferable. If there is a personal explanation, it assumes theism.

There are problems with this argument: the first premise assumes a
mind/body dualism, which I am not sure is correct, which is merely ontological, not
epistemic (in other words, the problem is one of being, rather than one of
knowledge – we may already know how to explain or reduce the mind to the body
[thus, mind-body problem is already epistemologically solved], but they are still two
separate beings who are independent in the world [ontologically], though not in
judgment [epistemologically]), thus dualism is not in any way a problem that needs
an explanation or solution if it is simply an ontological truth, and it is
epistemologically irrelevant as the connection can be rationally drawn. When you
ask someone to explain or solve something, your already involving him in the act of
judgment and in judgment both are connected through the rational act of the
subject. To have ontological judgment you must judge, but purely to get to know of
“in-the-world” (e.g. there is mind and body in the world – the mind acknowledges
itself as existent prior to acknowledging the other or the body in the world), not
“about-the-world” (e.g. body causes mind in X way, or mind corresponds body in X
way [though not in the world], and therefore the body is sufficiently explanatory of
By: Alex J. Tavarez

the mind). The second premise must be somehow demonstrated. The conclusion
assumes that theism is the only option left, and that there must be an explanation,
when theism and science may as well both fail to account for the mind-body
“problem” fully. Yeah, mind is transcendent – what’s the “problem” with this?

The Argument from Degree

The argument from degree states that things have properties from a greater
to a lesser extent, that if an object has a property has a property to a lesser extent,
there is an object holding this property to the maximally greatest extent, so there is
an entity with infinite properties, hence God exists. However, comparative analysis
of things can take a conceptual form, and not be comparative of things in reality, or
things in-the-world. Thus, the greatest heat, or cold, for example, would be limited
to the line of things which do already exist. One cannot claim something which is
defined as maximally great in reality if it has not yet existed in reality – one can only
describe such a thing conceptually if you are comparing it to other things in reality
at the same level of conceptualization. Thus, the existence of comparatives does
not require the existence of a conceptualized object holding the superlative form of
a property, but merely may apply to a thing already existent. One cannot infer from
a thing’s properties in comparison to others to its existence, but only vice versa.
Also, even if they could, these “properties,” being able to be objects themselves at
once, could be superlative on their own without having another object to hold them,
and therefore, the conclusion of the argument becomes a non-sequitur.

The Argument from Desire: All Objects of Human Desire Exist

The argument from desire basically states that all human desires are directed
toward an already existent object, that there is a natural desire for the divine, and
thus that it exists, if not in this world, in another. Again, one can desire for a
conceptual thing to be truly existence, which either is derived from the world,
though not existent in it, utilizes a bunch of existent things in a certain association
as to create a new non-existent object, or utilizing other concepts. For example, the
unicorn, though not existent, is desired, but it would be impossible for it to be
desired, it is agreed, if the things the unicorn essentially comprises of were not
existent in reality or derived from it or were not concepts themselves further broken
down to units found in reality or derived from it.

The Witness Argument/Argument from Religious Experience

The argument from religious experience has under it the presupposition that
certain experiences validate or are contacts with spiritual realms of reality or
spiritual realities. It states that because classical theism states that God endows
humans with the power to have these religious experiences, theism is true or
probable.
By: Alex J. Tavarez

The problem with this argument is the first premise – we have many
experiences, but to term them “religious” is already presupposing that they are
somehow personal accounts of the truths of their religion. Most of these “religious
experiences” can be psychologically, medically, or socially explained, and explained
in many other ways – ontologically, the existence of these experiences are sufficient
for their own existence and do not need any divine attribute or anything else in
order to be understood. Music, I personally believe, can provide similar “religious”
experiences as do some Churches. Thus, though classical theism could work as an
explanation, it is not a necessary one, and one must first show God existent and
having this connection to these particular experiences, not assume they are true
simply because it is possible. There’s also the fact that with which religion these
religious experiences correspond with, is yet not clear, and if clear, vary amongst
people of different socio-religious circumstances.

The Argument of Fideism: “But You’ve Just Got to Believe!

Have Faith!”
As a rationalist, with empirical fervor, and an epistemological foundationalist
who believes in the self-sustenance of logic, faith is a pitiful action to take when
confronted with a proposition. Pragmatics is a nice position to take in terms of
acting on the proposition. But no faith, nay. Faith is for the gullible. If you make a
claim of the world, make sure you therefore demonstrate it of the world, otherwise
you can’t say it is of the world, and therefore is no longer knowledge of the world –
neither is it knowledge of the subject, as the concept of God does not reference
something in the subject. It is therefore completely irrational to take such claims, for
example, of God’s existence, on faith. Doing so is not, therefore, out of the Truth,
but out of personal power to pretend and suspend disbelief as to the claim. Am I
ever asked to have faith in the Easter Bunny, Santa Claus, Thor? Then I don’t see
how it is any different to take faith that the concept of “God” corresponds to reality.
Good look believing God is existent in reality while disregarding reality in relation to
the claim that God exists altogether. You can’t assume X about something without
at all looking at that something. You would probably understand my stance more
once the Epistemology section of the site is elaborated.

Other Worthless Stupid Arguments by Theists

Why is there something instead of nothing? If I summon a God as a cause for
this (something), he is himself something, and thus is part of the something which
you are already wondering the cause of. So by saying God is the cause, or anything
for that matter, I am not really answering the question adequately. If you say he is
actually part of nothing, since “no-thing” is the negation of a concept, then you are
negating God’s existence – you’re saying he doesn’t exist. If you said he’s part of
By: Alex J. Tavarez

nothing, thank you for agreeing! Why do you assume that nothing is default, and
that something needs a mover in order to begin in the first place?

How can so many people be wrong? Because people can be stupid – reference
to how many people believed in the flat-earth theory, believed the sun rotated
around the earth, etcetera.

You cannot say anything about God, because you can only understand him
if you believe! It’s not that I don’t understand him; it’s just that he doesn’t make
any sense. And, if I believe in Him already, wouldn’t that break the whole point of
trying to understand or find out whether he does or does not exist? You might say
that you don’t need to find that out ever, but in order to already believe in him, I
must find it out – otherwise, my reliance on the belief is essentially non-intellectual
and therefore not knowledge or belief.

Atheists are arrogant. And are also apparently on the right track. I think theists
are much more arrogant, because many atheists actually say “God probably doesn’t
exist,” while theists have just claimed “God exists.” I say “God probably doesn’t
exist” unless it’s the Judeo-Christian God; if it’s the Judeo-Christian God, I just say
“God doesn’t exist.”

You are being deceived by Satan. Yes, outline your disapproval of us through
another concept that has no real existence.

You cannot know that God does not exist. Yes, but you can sure disbelieve He
exists also!

Hitler, Stalin, etcetera, were atheists. What’s your point?

How can you live a good life if you’re an atheist? So you’re saying because I
don’t have the cage of Jesus and the shackles of hellfire, I cannot be a good person?
I think you should see a psychiatrist soon for your psychological projection.

How is there meaning in life if there is no God? How is there meaning in life if
there was? The meaning of life is subjective to a certain extent, and it’s “meaning”
need not be an extrinsic value.

Atheists don’t exist. Hmmmm…nope, I’m here.

No one, even those who claim to be, is really an atheist. And you are not a
theist.

Subconsciously/unconsciously, you are a theist. Right, and

subconsciously/unconsciously, you are a pineapple! A pine apple!

It just is true that he exists. Circular reasoning: it just isn’t. Lets prove how
Johnny is actually a criminal: he is.
By: Alex J. Tavarez

[Cite bible scripture] You know, if I don’t believe God exists, how the hell is the
source of the statement going to change it? These scriptures, specifically the Bible
and Mormon scriptures have been edited like hell, and some Christian doctrine has
absolutely no basis on the Bible because it ignores socio-historical contexts of the
Bible, its endless editing, and poor translation. Parts of the original Bible have also
been omitted – so our current Bible is some arbitrarily defined “Truth,” practices
upheld in the past by the church dropped because of societal pressure, and
doctrines changed due to social climate and others made to gain support.

That Bible quote is out of context. Then put it in context! And then show me
how that context in any way somehow changes that particular parts meaning at all.
And, I do usually put things in context (usually two sentences – one before, one
after, the particular text addressed; don’t raise the goalpost and tell me you need
the whole friggin’ chapter – might as well buy the Bible). Usually when theists say
this, they don’t offer any explanation.

Oh, it’s symbolic. Usually the events that are said to be symbolic by theist
somehow are also said by theists to have spiritual effects (for example, Genesis’
Adam and Eve leading to original sin, even though the story was just symbolic),
when, if it is a symbol, it wouldn’t have any – only, perhaps, that which it
symbolized could, especially if an actual historical event.

You can’t prove God doesn’t exist! I don’t need to, and it is not what I am doing
– I am simply justifying skepticism towards God’s existence (i.e. “soft” atheism)
because of the lack of proof He does exist, not saying that he actually doesn’t, if
you can tell the difference. You can’t prove something doesn’t existence, because
you can only test it by continuously searching for it until it is found – but if it is not
found, perhaps you need to search more, and if you find him, then you were wrong.
Because then the search would be infinite, which makes it impossible to humanly
fulfill, and because the only way the search is done, humanly, is if the theory of the
thing’s non-existence is disproven by the justification of its existence. Thus, the only
way the claim of non-existence can be contested is by the claimer of existence
proving his claim of existence. Thus, the burden of proof is on the positive claim (in
this case, the claim of existence), and the negative claim (in this case, the claim of
non-existence) remains default. So, as an atheist, hard or soft, I can easily argue
that the burden of proof is on the theist, and I don’t need to prove anything, simply
refute arguments attempting to prove the theist’s position. Also, the Judeo-Christian
God, being self-contradictory in properties, has already been disproved in existence
in such a way as to be said to have been proven non-existent.

Just shut up already, you dirty atheist! Dirty? Go to Church to the _________
priest in your local town with your children so he can stick his ____ in your children’s
mouths in order so that they get all _________ and want to come and get it a second
time. You filled in the blanks, not me! What I really meant was (you sicko): Go to
Church to the holy priest in your local town with your children so he can stick his
By: Alex J. Tavarez

Eucharist in your children’s mouths in order so that they get all spiritual and want to
come and get it a second time.