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Activation of social norms in social dilemmas: A review of the evidence and reflections on the implications for environmental behaviour

Anders Biela and John Thgersenb,


a ,

Gteborg University, Department of Psychology, Haraldsgatan 1, SE-405 30 Gteborg, Sweden b Aarhus School of Business, Department of Marketing and Statistics, Fuglesangs Alle 4, 8210 Aarhus V, Denmark Received 23 August 2005; revised 3 February 2006; accepted 6 March 2006. Available online 11 May 2006.

Abstract
Taking rational choice theory for granted, cooperation in social dilemmas may be seen as mysterious. In one-shot dilemmas where subjects unknown to one another interact and make their decisions anonymously, cooperation could even be regarded as lunacy. Several authors have challenged this view, though. Research has also identified various factors that imply why people cooperate or defect in social dilemmas and what motivations that might guide the decision in one way or the other. Here, a closer look will be taken at social norms as a reason for departure from rational choice, a factor that rarely has been recognised in the social dilemma literature. Social norms imply that people should manifest a prescribed behaviour or not manifest a proscribed behaviour. Furthermore, social norms are often guiding behaviour in specific contexts, and many times they need to be activated. Such an activation process is often unconscious and once a norm has been activated, people tend to keep following the norm that has been primed. We wish to add to the social dilemma literature by suggesting what kinds of norms that are likely to be activated under different conditions such as one-shot vs. iterated dilemmas, but also separate domains of social life. Keywords: Social norms; Social dilemma; Environmental behaviour JEL classification codes: C710; Z130 Psychological classification codes: 3000; 4070

Fig. 1. Factors influencing the activation of norms in social dilemmas.

Article Outline
1. Introduction 2. Cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas and in iterated games 2.1. One-shot social dilemmas 2.2. Iterated games 3. General interaction norms 3.1. Norms elicited by the behaviour of others 3.2. Norms elicited by the situation 3.3. Implications for environmental behaviour 4. Benevolence norms 4.1. Norms elicited by the situation 4.2. Survey research 5. Summary and implications Acknowledgements References

1. Introduction

Taking rational choice theory for granted, cooperation in social dilemmas may be seen as mysterious. In one-shot dilemmas where subjects unknown to one another interact and make their decisions anonymously, cooperation could even be regarded as lunacy. Several authors have challenged this view on theoretical (e.g., Dawes, 1980 and Dawes, 1988) as well as on empirical grounds (Clark, 1998, Dawes and Thaler, 1988 and Frohlich et al., 2004), however. Research has also identified several factors that explain why people cooperate or defect in social dilemmas (e.g., Komorita & Parks, 1994) and what motives might guide the decision in one way or the other (Messick et al., 1983 and Wilke, 1991). Here, a closer look will be taken on social norms as a reason for departure from rational choice. Although attempts to give social norms a more prominent place in the explanation of cooperation are rare (Kerr, 1995) the significance of norms has been recognised in the social dilemma literature (Bicchieri, 1990, Bicchieri, 2002, Ostrom, 1990 and Von Borgstede, 2002). Social norms evolve to regulate social life. In particular, they arise when individual actions cause negative side-effects for others (Coleman, 1990) and serve the function of restricting egoistic impulses in favour of collective outcomes (Biel, Eek, & Grling, 1999). Social norms imply that (certain) people should manifest a prescribed behaviour or not manifest a proscribed behaviour. Violation of social norms is met by sanctions. Social norms may become internalised, in which case sanctions (in the form of guilt feelings or pride) are administered by the individual him or herself. Internalised norms are called personal norms (Schwartz, 1977 and Schwartz and Howard, 1982). As defined by Cialdini and Trost (1998, p. 152): Social norms are rules and standards that are understood by members of a group, and that guide and/or constrain social behaviour without the force of laws. Furthermore, social norms are often guiding behaviour in specific contexts, and many times they need to be activated. Such an activation process is More often than not unconscious, it does not involve much thinking or even a choice on the part of subjects and once activated, it will show some inertia, in the sense that unless a major change in circumstances occurs, people will keep following the norm that has been primed (Bicchieri, 2002, p. 198). Bicchieris characterisation of social norms has much in common with habitual behaviour. Just as habits are functional for the individual in reaching his or her goals, norms arise and operate in groups because they are functional for the group (Kerr, 1995). Habitual behaviour is activated by relevant cues in the environment and the sequence of acts reveal itself with little attention paid by the actor (Verplanken & Aarts, 1999). In social contexts, people search their memory to find similar situations and expectations about proper behaviour (Bettenhausen and Murnighan, 1991 and Pillutla and Chen, 1999). Two types of norms will be addressed: general interaction norms and benevolence norms (Kerr, 1995). The former kind of norms provides rules of interaction and exchange. They are based on shared beliefs about how people ought to behave in a given situation. Rewards and sanctions are administered by other group members or by the individual him or herself. While general interaction norms promote group members welfare indirectly, benevolence norms prescribe behaviour that benefits others directly. Benevolence norms are private and internalised prescriptive norms. These norms are activated when individuals believe that important values are threatened (e.g., Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999). Here, sanctions and rewards are initiated by the individual him or herself only.

In this paper we will review social dilemma research on the importance of these kinds of norms, focusing on research of interest for environmental behaviour in particular. Most research on general interaction norms is experimental by nature, although studies of local common-pool resource dilemmas add to the knowledge base. Most research on benevolence norms, on the other hand, is survey based. After a brief discussion of cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas and iterated games, we proceed with an examination of literature on the influence of norms on cooperation and comment upon its relevance for behaviour in environmental dilemmas. We also offer some suggestions about which kinds of norms that are likely to be activated under different dilemma conditions and how they might promote or obstruct environmentally friendly behaviour.

2. Cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas and in iterated games


2.1. One-shot social dilemmas
In a one-shot public-good social dilemma, participants can choose between keeping resources to themselves or contribute to a common pool. Given that enough participants contribute, the good is manifested and all are free to use it. In a resource dilemma, all participants can harvest from a common resource, but the group runs the risk of excessive harvesting, leading to depletion of the resource. Both kinds of dilemmas embrace a mixed motive. One can either pursue individual or collective interests. Furthermore, the decision situation is set up such that the individuals rational choice is to pursue his or her individual interest, defection, but if all or most participants defect, all are worse of than if they had cooperated and met the collective interest (Dawes, 1980). The one-shot character of the dilemma implies that choices are made simultaneously and privately. Over the years, experiments on one-shot social dilemmas show a cooperation rate somewhere between 40% and 60%.1 For example, Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994) reported a cooperation rate of 57%. In his meta-analysis of over 100 social dilemma experiments, Sally (1995) reported an average rate of cooperation of 47% across a wide variety of conditions. Of course, cooperation is contingent upon many things. For instance, contribution rates may differ between discrete contributions, all or none, and continuous contributions, where people can contribute any amount they wish. If anything, contributions seem to be greater in the latter than the former condition (e.g., Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992). Evidently, around 50% approach the experimental social dilemma with an intention to cooperate. It should be recognised that in experimental dilemmas participants are aware of the nature of the dilemma. Furthermore, the resource is represented by points or some small sum of money to gain or lose. The resource is of minor importance to those involved. Finally, the behaviour of others is unknown to the participants. Hence, the intention to cooperate can, loosely speaking, be attributed to individual characteristics. Cooperators have been characterized as persons that have a pro-social value orientation (cf. Van Lange, Otten, de Bruin, & Joireman, 1997) and/or put a trust in others propensity to cooperate (Yamagishi, 1986). Of prime interest in the present paper is how norms may contribute to this base-rate cooperation around 50%, and under what conditions they may contribute to an increase or decrease of the cooperation rate.

Several authors have noticed the positive effect of communication on the cooperation rate (Dawes et al., 1977, Ostrom, 1998 and Sally, 1995). This effect is not related to just any kind of communication, but only communication that is relevant for the situation at hand. In later studies (Dawes et al., 1988 and Orbell et al., 1988) the importance of group identity was emphasised to account for the higher rate of cooperation. As people communicate, a group identity is activated that enhances the importance of group welfare over individual welfare. This explanation was challenged by Bicchieri (2002), who instead proposed that communication elicits social norms. The supporting evidence comes from studies of iterated games.

2.2. Iterated games


Should group identity account for higher cooperation rates, then this effect would be visible whenever group identity is made salient. This is certainly not the case (Bicchieri, 2002). One piece of evidence put forth comes from a study of iterated games by Kiesler, Sproull, and Waters (1996). Here, the subject communicated or did not communicate with another subject; either a human confederate or a computer. The subject and the partner interacted in six rounds. In four of these, discussion took place. Discussion implied that a proposal about cooperation was put forth. In the rounds of no communication, the cooperation rate dropped significantly compared to when discussion took place. Bicchieri argues that should discussion trigger a group identity, then commitments to cooperate should have been carried over to rounds with no communication. Since it did not, a norm of commitment and promise keeping is a more credible explanation. Although it may take more than two persons to evoke a group identity, we do believe in Bicchieris general conclusion that norms act as default social rules in social dilemmas. Indirect evidence in support of this conclusion comes from studies showing that expectations about others cooperation and own cooperation are strongly interrelated (Dawes et al., 1977 and Messick et al., 1983). More direct evidence comes from a prisoners dilemma study where participants experienced cooperation or competition in repeated games (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991). Feedback about the other players behaviour, a confederate, contributed to the establishment of a norm for proper behaviour. In the next round of games, participants were paired with a new member; confederates excluded. Participants applied the norm when interacting with a new participant, and also expected others to do the same. Hence, in new and homogenous groups those who cooperated in the first round continued to do so, while those who defected stayed defectors. In heterogeneous groups, when the established norm was challenged, cooperation fell in between the two homogenous groups.

3. General interaction norms


3.1. Norms elicited by the behaviour of others
Based on work by James March and on Messicks (1999) AIR hypothesis, an appropriateness framework to decisions in social dilemmas was recently advanced (Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). This framework identifies three factors of significance for cooperation: classification of the situation, the identity of the decision maker, and identification of rules and heuristics that may guide behavioural choice.

Among these three factors, classification of the situation is the principal point. Is this a dilemma situation or not? In terms of norm activation, the appropriateness framework has much in common with how Bicchieri frames the dilemma situation. In any situation, an individual will search for cues to interpret the situation. This is often done as an instance of a well-known schema, mentally stored. Once a situation is categorized as fitting a particular schema, behavioural norms and role expectations will be elicited (see also Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991). The question is then: which cues will elicit which schemas? Since behaviour often takes place in a social context, the behaviour of others is likely to influence which behavioural decision an individual takes. If people are kind to you, you are likely to respond with kindness. A favour is often reciprocated. Part of the reason may be that by observing the behaviour of others social rules are inferred. In contrast to a one-shot dilemma where people act once and simultaneously, social interaction reflects that behaviour unfolds over time. Without invoking a norm explanation, the difference between simultaneous and real-time contributions was investigated in a public-good dilemma (Goren, Rapoport, & Kurzban, 2004). Under real-time conditions, participants are informed about the decisions of other participants as they make the decision (i.e., real time) rather than just the aggregate result after all participants have made their decision, as is usually the case in laboratory research. One major finding was considerably higher levels of contribution under real-time than simultaneous contributions. Since the former procedure more closely mirrors real-life contributions to voluntary public goods, earlier studies using simultaneous contributions could have overestimated free-riding tendencies. We suggest that the difference between real-time and simultaneous contributions conditions could be the result of the norm of reciprocity being made more salient under real-time conditions. Seeing others contribute would require one to cooperate in kind. Before we turn to the norm of reciprocity, the consistency norm and norms about fairness will be briefly discussed. Above, the importance of communication for cooperation was spelled out. It has been suggested that communication in groups elicit a commitment norm (Kerr, 1995). Once people have committed themselves to a course of action, they are expected and likely to act consistently (Cialdini, 2001). The importance of this principle is evident in social dilemma research. A study by Orbell et al. (1988) found a strong relationship between commitment and cooperation rates. To the extent that group members in the discussion groups promised to cooperate, the actual proportion cooperating was high. Similarly, did they promise to defect they also defected. Keep in mind that promises were public, while the actual choice was made anonymously. As proposed by Kerr (1995), to free-ride in a social dilemma is to violate the norm of equity. In order to receive something from a public good, one should contribute with some kind of input. Furthermore, if group members experience that inequity exists in a resource dilemma, those that are treated wrongly are prepared to take action (Allison & Messick, 1990). In line with a welfare state ideology, studies also show that to the extent that citizens perceive that resources for social welfare are distributed in a fair manner they are also willing to contribute the resource (Biel et al., 1999 and Eek and Biel, 2003). In addition, people who are better off contribute more than people with smaller endowments. Taken together, norms for distributive justice seem to have a double entrance. Once a decision situation is recognised as a social dilemma, norms

about fair contributions and distribution tend to be elicited. These norms may differ depending on which particular situation people are in and which goals they wish to pursue. This is a further indication that norms act as default social rules in social dilemmas. Elicited norms are then matched or evaluated with regard to peoples actual behaviour. If people perceive that fairness is upheld, they tend to contribute to the common good or refrain from overusing a common resource. If not, they are prepared to punish others for their defective behaviour, or refrain from contributing themselves. In a recent article, Schroeder, Steel, Woodell, and Bembenek (2003) proposed a sequential model of justice in social dilemmas. People attend to the allocation of resources among group members; distributive justice. When resources are perceived to be distributed in an unfair manner, group members may try to change allocation rules or the procedure. Despite fair procedures, some group members may continue to defect. To recognise justice and bring defectors back on the right track, a sense of justice has to be restored. Those who have been harmed should be compensated by the defectors. If procedural changes and restoration fail, retribution will follow. Retribution is primarily a mechanism to prevent future violations of justice. The model by Schroeder et al. suggests that social dilemmas are embedded in justice concerns at various phases in the management of common-pool resources. Justice motives do not only concern own contributions in public-good dilemmas or harvest behaviour in resource dilemmas, but also the behaviour of others. This brings us to the norm of reciprocity. The norm of reciprocity calls for positive responses to positive actions, but negative responses to unfavourable treatment. In her studies of local common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas, Ostrom emphasises the importance of the reciprocity norm for cooperation (Ostrom, 1998). She lists five ingredients of reciprocity strategies that apply to social dilemmas: identify who else is involved, asses the likelihood that others are cooperators, cooperate given that others can be trusted to cooperate, do not cooperate with those who do not reciprocate, and punish those who betray trust. In local communities where the behaviour of others can be monitored, cooperators and defectors might be identified. Unless earlier behaviour of those involved is known, people have to infer from a more general base of behaviour in society whether they can trust others to cooperate or not. This implies that the higher the proportion of people that act in a selfinterested way there is in society, the less trust in one another and the less likely it is that positive reciprocity evolves. No exact estimate can be given for what should be considered a high or a low figure. That around 50% cooperate initially in a one-shot dilemma under anonymity indicates that this is the figure in some Western countries. As for the fourth ingredient, cooperation rates should vary with the amount of contribution of others. Several experiments support this idea of conditional cooperation. Finally, there is clear evidence that reciprocity norms are enforced by sanctions (for a review, see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). People may even be prepared to reward those who behave in a fair manner and punish unfair behaviour despite entailing costs to themselves and no present or future material rewards. This kind of strong reciprocity (Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gchter, 2002) towards defectors is upheld by means of altruistic punishment (Fehr & Gchter, 2002). In a repeated public-goods experiment, Fehr and Gchter ruled out direct reciprocity and reputation formation. Never-the-less, participants imposed costly punishment on defectors. Moreover, the cooperation rates were much higher in a condition of punishment than in a no punishment condition. This was also true for punished non-cooperators. The sanctioning of defectors is also observed in local common-pool resources dilemmas (Ostrom, 1990).

3.2. Norms elicited by the situation


Not only are people receptive to the behaviour of others. Situations that an individual encounters may also vary with regard to which particular norm that is evoked. In his work on distributive justice, Deutsch, 1975 and Deutsch, 1985 proposed that there is a match between principles of distributive justice and the goals that people wish to achieve. When personal development and well-being is the primary goal, an allocation based on relative need should manifest itself. If a group is oriented towards economic productivity, it should embrace an allocation norm that encourages efficiency and distribute resources based on past contribution; equity. When a group wish to support relationships among its members, an equality norm that signals equal status among its group members is expected to be applied. Others have pointed at difference between the market and policy (Lane, 1986). While equality is expected to be a prime norm in policy, equity is often adhered to in the market. What these authors emphasise is that different norms of conduct are expected to be elicited in business and in policy. Lane also makes a distinction between fairness, as a criterion for allocation, and justice, referring to the outcome of the process. Connecting this to the sequential model of justice (Schroeder et al., 2003), different social norms are expected to be appropriate in the business and the policy frame. In the market, people would be concerned about equity as a fairness principle, and then mainly in relation to allocation procedures. In the policy, not only must procedures be fair. Outcomes must also be just. Distributive justice will mainly be measured against the norms of equality and need. Moreover, in the policy domain, but not in the market, there may be calls for redistribution (Lane, 1986). This would imply that restorative justice is a concern under a policy frame but not under a market frame. Finally, retributive justice is by Schroeder et al. associated with procedural rules (p. 383). Hence, retributive justice may be an issue both in a business and a policy frame and human concern for retribution might be guided by the norm of reciprocity. In a study on social norms and cooperation, Pillutla and Chen (1999) predicted that people would behave more competitively in dilemmas involving economic as compared to non-economic decisions. Given that self-interested behaviour is the implicit norm in an economic context, people are more likely to defect than in a non-economic context. They designed two vignettes where participants, taking on the role of an investment manager, where asked either to invest in a private or a common good. Both vignettes were framed within a business setting. The economic decision concerned investing in a joint investment fund, while the non-economic decision involved a contribution to a social fund. Results supported their hypothesis. Furthermore, participants expected larger contributions, i.e., cooperation, in the non-economic than in the economic context. A second example comes from a study by Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999). Again, a public-good dilemma was set up. Two groups of subjects took the role of managers that were asked to allocate part of their budget in running scrubbers that would reduce airborne emissions. If most managers did so, the goal of the company would be reached. In one of the two groups, a weak sanctioning system was introduced. If managers in this group did not comply with the companys policy, there was a small risk that they would be met with sanctioning costs. No commitments were asked for or given in advance. In the group without sanctions around 75% of the managers cooperated, while less than 50% did so in the sanctioning group. Evidently, the critical cue here is the sanctioning

system. Without sanctions, the decision was seen by the managers as an ethical one. One should stand up for the common good. However, when sanctions were introduced it turned into a business decision. Although the expected costs for not running the scrubbers where somewhat higher in the sanctioning group, the costs were still so low that it paid not to run the scrubbers. Both these studies show that in the domain of business different social norms may potentially guide behaviour than in policy or private domains. However, once a business frame is adopted the likelihood of a cost benefit process increases while the tendency to cooperate decreases. This implies that should strong sanctions be introduced, the rate of cooperation would increase under a business frame. This is exactly what Tenbrunsel and Messick found. Money incentives do not only affect cooperation rates in business. As shown by Frey and Jegen (2001), economic incentives can crowd out moral motives among ordinary citizens. The test case was an upcoming referendum about acceptance of a repository for spent nuclear fuel in the home canton of the participants. On a direct request, just over 50% of the respondents were in favour of the location. In a second stage, monetary compensation was introduced. The sum amounted to between CHF 2500 and CHF 7500. Once compensation was introduced, the acceptance rate dropped to 25%. Without money, procedural fairness surrounding the location decision predicted acceptance. With compensation, procedural fairness no longer had any effect. Rather, economic consequences for the voters determined their decision. To show that different norms reside on the market and in the policy, Eek, Biel and Grling in an experimental study (2001) manipulated the provision holder of child-care, which was either provided by the municipality or by a private business. Two different principles for distributing quality of child-care were described. One principle stated that all children receive equally good care, regardless of how much their parents pay (equality) and another that children whose parents pay more receive better care than do children whose parents pay less (equity). Although equality was the dominating principle, equity was regarded more fair under private than municipal provision holder, while equality was rated as fairer when the municipality was provision holder rather than a private business. Taken together, these studies show that variations in the social dilemma are paired with the elicitation of different social norms. Sometimes, such variations contribute to the adoption of a business frame. Adoption of a business frame implies that people adhere to calculating costs and benefits for themselves, while at the same time paying less attention to ethical aspects. As a result, tendencies to cooperate decline. This should not be interpreted such that social norms are absent in economical settings, however. The norm of reciprocity is pervasive and could, for example, affect how wage offers from employers are responded to in terms of work efforts by employees (Kirchler, Fehr, & Evans, 1996). Tax compliance could also be related to social norms in that a strong social and national identity appears to go hand in hand with adherence to norms of taxpaying behaviour (Wenzel, 2004). Rather, their relative importance is weaker under a business than under a societal frame.

3.3. Implications for environmental behaviour


Given this rather bright picture of social norm application and cooperation in experimental social dilemmas and local CPR dilemmas, how come that proenvironmental behaviour is not more frequent? As was spelled out above, in experimental studies the resource is of little value to the participants. Hence, to cooperate involves small costs. With increasing costs or efforts, cooperation rates may drop. This is a general conclusion that Stern, 1992 and Gardner and Stern, 2002 draws. Attitudes and norms have more effect on behaviours that are relatively inexpensive or easy to perform (see also Diekmann & Preisendrfer, 2003). Further evidence comes from the study by Bettenhausen and Murnighan (1991). In pairs that had established cooperation, a structural change was introduced. This implied that defection became more profitable. As a result, the earlier norm supporting cooperation was no longer effective and cooperation rates decreased drastically. Research on CPRs shows a different pattern. Despite high cooperation costs, reciprocity norms seem to uphold cooperation. At the same time, negative effects of defection may be prominent. Participants are part of a social group that interacts over time and with which they identify. To defect may not only be met by sanctions, but also entails the risk of being turned into an out-cast. Simultaneously, users are highly dependent on the resource for an extended time period. An inefficient use could undermine opportunities for future support. It should also be recognised that in experimental studies, as well as in local CPRs, group members pay attention to the resource and, in repeated situations, receive feedback about its status. Many of the most pressing environmental issues, such as ameliorating climate change, concern large-scale resources where cause and effect are separated both in space and time. Hence, users may not be able to watch over the condition of the resource. Should such be the case, information from experts and mass media may be vital. Presently, most experts seem to agree that the average temperature increase on earth during the last 100 years is exceptional. Most also attribute part of the cause to an increase in CO2 in the atmosphere with the implication that the temperature rise is (partly) people-induced. Whether this attribution will affect environmental behaviour in the positive is unclear. A field study of a water draught in California (Talarowski, 1982; cited in Samuelson, Messick, Wilke, & Rutte, 1986) showed that consumers who thought that the draught was caused by nature consumed less water than those who thought that the shortage was people-induced. Presumably, if shortage was attributed to the behaviour of other people this was considered unfair. Benefits and burdens were not divided in an equitable manner. If the shortage was nature-induced one could hope that others would act in a fair manner. However, in most large-scale environmental dilemmas general interaction norms may have a minor role to play. Rather, to acknowledge the importance of environmental values and a personal responsibility for acting in a benevolent manner may foster individual restraint.

4. Benevolence norms
Unfortunately there is not much experimental evidence to support (or reject) assertions about the importance of benevolence norms (i.e., private and internalised prescriptive norms) for showing restraint (i.e., cooperation) in social dilemmas. More indirect evidence speaks in favour of such an assertion, however. Notably, the base-rate cooperation of about 50% in one-shot dilemmas is difficult to explain by other than

private, internal characteristics. There is also plenty of evidence linking cooperation in one-shot dilemmas to a pro-social value orientation (e.g., Van Lange et al., 1997) and to benevolence values (Schwartz, 1996).2 Another class of evidence links defection in social dilemmas to defence strategies that individuals apply when moral and non-moral costs and benefits of available actions are perceived as relatively balanced and they therefore experience a decisional conflict (Schwartz and Howard, 1982 and Schwartz and Howard, 1984). In a prisoners dilemma context, Schwartz and Howard (1982) found that defectors justify their uncooperativeness by denying their responsibility for the outcome. And in a step-level public goods context, Kerr and his colleagues found that defectors tend to convince themselves that they probably couldnt have made a difference anyway (e.g., Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997). The fact that defectors apply defence strategies in order to justify their defection to themselves strongly suggests that they struggle with an internal norm-pressure to cooperate. When specifying the benevolence norms that might account for cooperation being a valued choice by the individual, Kerr, 1995 and Kerr, 1996 mentions the norm of social responsibility (Berkowitz, 1972) and the norm of in-group favouritism (Tajfel, 1970). Here, we use the term benevolence in a broad sense, including actions aiming to preserve and enhance the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact as well as actions where the goal is to benefit all people and nature (termed universalism by Schwartz, 1992). The former type of benevolent actions is especially relevant in local, small-scale CPR dilemmas, such as the commons dilemma described by Hardin (1968). Cooperation in close-knit contexts such as this is mostly a matter of conventional decency and thoughtfulness (Schwartz, 2005) guided by benevolence values such as responsible, helpful, and forgiving. Cooperation in large-scale social dilemmas involving a large social group of anonymous others, such as other commuters using the same roads or other householders using the same landfill, on the other hand, is more likely to be guided by values such as social justice, equality, and protecting the environment (Schwartz, 2005 and Thgersen and lander, 2002). It is assumed that these and other benevolence values are activated by situational cues suggesting a discrepancy between the actual and a desired state (Schwartz & Howard, 1984); a need. In an experiment involving manipulations to prime benevolence values, Verplanken and Holland (2002, Experiment 1) found that environmentally friendly behaviour (i.e., cooperating) increased when values relevant for such behaviour were primed, hence supporting the assumption that benevolence values are not necessarily chronically accessible in people, but may need to be activated.

4.1. Norms elicited by the situation


Schwartz, 1977 and Schwartz and Howard, 1984 suggested that situational cues indicating a need for action may initiate considerations about the implications of action alternatives for ones moral values, which then generate feelings of moral obligation to perform or refrain from specific actions. It is these feelings of moral obligation that he terms personal norms. The evidence supporting the importance of situational cues for activating personal norms includes Verplanken and Hollands (2002) priming experiment, mentioned above, as well as research on bystander helping in an emergency showing that the likelihood of helping depends on his or her visual proximity to the victim (Piliavin & Piliavin, 1973; cited in Schwartz & Howard, 1984) and on how clearly the need for help is spelled out (Schwartz, 1970). The valence of situational cues

also seems to play a role. For instance, it has been found, in a social dilemma context, that a hurt frame (i.e., one that makes salient that defection leads to negative consequences) is more likely than a help frame (i.e., one that makes salient that cooperation leads to positive consequences) to activate a personal norm for cooperation (e.g., Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997). This finding is consistent with other research, which has found that negative information (e.g., information about a negative event, such as an accident) is more likely to catch attention than positive (Carretie, Mercado, Tapia, & Hinojosa, 2001) and that negative information influences peoples evaluations more than comparable positive (e.g., Grankvist et al., 2004 and Ito et al., 1998). Awareness of a need for action is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the activated benevolent value(s) to be transformed into a personal norm for a particular behaviour (Schwartz and Howard, 1982 and Schwartz and Howard, 1984). In addition, the person needs to be aware of actions that he or she could do to help, a non-trivial condition outside the laboratory, and he or she needs to feel able to execute a relevant action. The importance of the latter condition for initiating action towards a goal and for persisting in goal striving is well documented (e.g., Ozer & Bandura, 1990), also with regard to environment-friendly action (e.g., Allen and Ferrand, 1999, Ellen et al., 1991 and Pelletier et al., 1999). Without awareness of relevant action(s) which the person feels able to carry out, an identified need may still lead to affective arousal, but it will not be transformed into a feeling of obligation to do something to relieve the need. Further, as mentioned earlier, in cases where following the activated personal norm is costly a psychological defence reaction may set in with the purpose of neutralizing the norm. Kerr and his colleagues documented the propensity of defectors to convince themselves that they couldnt have made a difference anyway (e.g., Kerr & KaufmanGilliland, 1997), but the defence repertoire is broader, including denying the need for action (Opotow & Weiss, 2000) and denying ones personal responsibility for solving the problem (Schwartz & Howard, 1980).

4.2. Survey research


Most of the research investigating the influence of benevolence values, and of norms generated from these values, on cooperation is based on survey research. Some studies have reported a positive correlation between benevolence values and a specific environment-friendly behaviour, such as recycling (e.g., Dunlap et al., 1983 and Thgersen and Grunert-Beckmann, 1997), reducing personal car use (e.g., Garvill, 1999 and Nordlund and Garvill, 2003), buying green products (e.g., Grunert & Juhl, 1995), or political action for environmental protection (e.g., Stern et al., 1999). Others have reported a positive correlation between benevolence values and an index or indexes based on a broad range of environment-friendly behaviours (e.g., Karp, 1996, Nordlund and Garvill, 2002 and Stern et al., 1995). Thgersen and lander (2006b) used structural equation modelling-based partial correlation analysis to show that the positive correlations between different environment-friendly behaviours can be accounted for by their common roots in environmental concern and benevolence values. In another study based on a two-wave cross-lagged panel analysis, Thgersen and lander (2002) found that the positive correlation between benevolence values and an index based on 17 environment-friendly behaviours reflects a causal influence of the former on the latter, rather than vice-versa.

A few studies have investigated, and confirmed, the assumed mediation of the influence of benevolence values on behaviour through the formation of a personal norm (e.g., Nordlund and Garvill, 2002, Nordlund and Garvill, 2003, Stern et al., 1999 and Thgersen and Grunert-Beckmann, 1997). The main bulk of survey studies investigated only the relationship between personal norms and behaviour, however. The study of the behavioural implications of felt moral obligation (i.e., a personal norm) to perform a pro-social behaviour started in the area of one-to-one helping (see the reviews in Schwartz, 1977 and Schwartz and Howard, 1982). However, by now there is plenty of evidence linking environment-friendly behaviour to personal norms as well, including, but not limited to, the previously mentioned mediation studies. A positive correlation between everyday environment-friendly behaviour and personal norms has been reported for (a) waste-handling behaviours such as (abstaining from) littering (Heberlein, 1972), participation in a recycling programme (e.g., Hopper and Nielsen, 1991, Thgersen, 2003 and Vining and Ebreo, 1992), and (refraining from) yard burning (Van Liere & Dunlap, 1978), (b) consumer purchases of environmentfriendly products such as lead-free petrol (Heberlein & Black, 1976), environmentfriendly packaging (Thgersen, 1999), organic food products (Thgersen & lander, 2006a), and eco-labelled products (Grankvist, 2002), and (c) energy-saving behaviours such as turning down the thermostat (Black, Stern, & Elworth, 1985) and using other means of transportation than a private car (Garvill, 1999, Hunecke et al., 2001 and Nordlund and Garvill, 2003) (but see also Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003). A positive relationship has also been reported for political action for environmental protection, such as joining or donating money to an environmental NGO, writing to a congressman in support of an environmental cause and voting in support of environmental legislation (Stern et al., 1999). No effects of personal norms were found for larger investments in energy saving (Black et al., 1985), however. A number of these studies also measured perceptions about social norms for the specific behaviour in ones relevant reference groups and they generally found that, although there was a significant and positive bivariate correlation between perceived social norms and behaviour, the correlation was strongly attenuated and in most cases became insignificant when personal norms were controlled (e.g., Black et al., 1985, Hopper and Nielsen, 1991 and Thgersen, 1999). There are exceptions to this general finding, though, such as Hunecke et al. (2001) with regard to travel mode choice and Vining and Ebreo (1992) with regard to recycling. But it seems that, in studies of activities involving a goal of improving the (biophysical) environment, a positive correlation between perceived social norms and behaviour usually only reflects that perceived social norms and personal norms are positively correlated.3 A number of studies of environment-friendly behaviour, usually applying modified versions of the theory of reasoned action or the theory of planned behaviour, have controlled for a measure of the attitude towards the behaviour (e.g., Thgersen, 2002), and in some cases also for perceived control (e.g., Bamberg and Schmidt, 2003 and Harland et al., 1999), in addition to perceived social norms. The general finding in most of these studies is that, when adding personal norms to these other predictors, the amount of explained variance in behavioural intentions or behaviour increases.4 The same has been found with regard to morally relevant behaviours in other areas (for a review, see Ajzen, 1991). In an attitude theory context, the personal norm may be

understood as a special type of attitude, but conceptually distinct from other attitude constructs in the type of evaluations they refer to (Schwartz & Howard, 1984). When the inclusion of a measure of personal norms leads to an increase in explained variance, after controlling for the attitude towards the behaviour, it not only indicates that the persons evaluation of the behaviour in terms of its moral worth to the self has behavioural implications, but also that this type of evaluation is not fully integrated in the usual measures of the attitude towards the behaviour. It appears from this review of the literature that although there is strong evidence linking personal norms to a host of environment-friendly behaviours, there are cases, such as larger investment decisions (Black et al., 1985), where they play a less significant role, and with regard to some other behaviours (such as travel mode choice, e.g., Bamberg and Schmidt, 2003, Garvill, 1999 and Nordlund and Garvill, 2003) the evidence is mixed. The exceptions and mixed evidence come from cases where prosocial behaviour is quite costly. It should come as no surprise that the persons nonmoral values and evaluations are more important for behaviour under high-cost than under low-cost circumstances. In addition, it may be that in some of these cases the need for pro-social action is either not noticed or the person feels unable to perform any relevant behaviours that might help solving the need and, therefore, a cooperative personal norm is not activated (Schwartz and Howard, 1982 and Schwartz and Howard, 1984). Another possibility is that a personal norm is activated, but since non-moral costs are very salient a process of protective denial and redefinition of the situation is initiated, as demonstrated, for instance, by Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1997).

5. Summary and implications


There is plenty of evidence supporting the assertion that social norms play an important role for cooperation in social dilemmas. When finding themselves in a social dilemma, a large share of the population perhaps even a majority spontaneously intends to cooperate. Cooperation is consistent with their moral values and when perceiving a need for action, knowing what to do, and feeling able to do it, they feel a personal obligation to act accordingly. Hence, they form a personal norm for cooperation in the specific situation. In social dilemma research, individual variation in value priorities is often conceptualized as different social value orientations with regard to the distribution of a common resource (Messick & McClintock, 1968). Some people have a cooperative social value orientation (usually referred to as pro-socials). For pro-socials, equal distribution is a fundamental goal and equality is a highly prioritized value. Others approach the dilemma with an individualistic or competitive orientation (pro-selfs). They are guided by goals such as individual achievement and wealth, and achievement and power are among their highly prioritized values. Hence, individual variations in the activation of personal (benevolence) norms may either be related to the importance attached to benevolence values or to social values in general. Such situationally activated personal (benevolence) norms can explain the widespread deviation from rationality reflected in a base-rate cooperation of about 50% in one-shot social dilemmas. However, the evidence regarding the importance of personal (benevolence) norms for cooperation is mostly indirect and/or survey based. There is a need for more research providing unambiguous experimental evidence on this issue.

Further, and complicating matters, a number of situational factors seem to moderate the influence of norms on behaviour. Under some circumstances, cooperation norms fail to be activated, or they may be repressed through a process of defensive denial. Other circumstances can activate additional norms, which reinforce cooperation. Cooperation norms are not activated if the individual fails to notice a need, or its relevance to his or her moral values, or effective action that he or she can master. Especially, the importance of need salience and activation of moral values for norm activation has been demonstrated repeatedly in the cited research. In a laboratory environment and in local CPRs need salience and knowledge of effective action are generally high because the resource is prominent as is, via feedback, the effects of behaviour on the resource. In large-scale dilemmas such as air pollution, resources are less visible and environmental uncertainty is likely to play a larger role. In addition, feedback mechanisms may be lacking. For instance, effects of transport in terms of greenhouse gases do not present themselves to the actors. This implies that in experimental studies and in small-scale property regimes, the dilemma perspective is salient, while in large-scale dilemmas it is regarded less appropriate. The finding that cooperation depends on the framing of the situation, and especially that a business framing leads to less cooperation than a policy framing or a private-sphere framing, also becomes more meaningful in this context. The framing influences which aspects of the situation are most salient and it thereby determines which values become primed. And a business framing tend to activate non-moral values rather than any of the moral values that can lead to norm formation. Finally, even if they have been activated, benevolence norms dictating cooperation may be neutralized, again due to defensive denial. This happens in cases where cooperation is costly, which explains the frequent finding that norms are less predictive of environment-friendly behaviour in high-cost than in low-cost situations. Another distinguishing feature between laboratory environment and local CPRs vs. large-scale dilemmas is that in the latter, face-to-face communication is improbable and, as a result, the social group identity vague (Dawes, 1991). Hence, social norms of fairness and reciprocity may not play as important a role as in the laboratory or in local CPRs. This boils down to that in large-scale environmental dilemmas, people are more likely to choose the primrose path than the narrow way. Along this path, they are unlikely to be exposed to rules that govern interpersonal interaction and encourage cooperation. To the extent that people promote the common good, their behaviour is determined by benevolence norms. However, it should not be ignored that under some circumstances, general interaction norms may be activated and support cooperation. Especially, in local common-pool dilemmas, when there are opportunities to communicate among participants in the dilemma, and they use the opportunity to make commitments to cooperate, most individuals will honour the commitments made, thus adhering to a general commitment norm. Also, when individuals understand that they also benefit from the public good or from the conservation of the resource, a general equity norm may be activated, which (in this case) reinforces cooperation. Further, experiencing that others cooperate may elicit a general reciprocity norm, which again reinforces cooperation.

Under some circumstances, the two latter norms may make a participant in a social dilemma defect, however. Individual participants who perceive that the distribution of costs and/or benefits is unfair, and that they are not receiving their equitable share, may defect out of concern for equity, even in situations where it would be rational to cooperate (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). And in situation where they experience others defecting, the influence of the reciprocity norm may make them defect, even though they would prefer to cooperate. To summarize, both personal and situational factors are relevant for the activation of norms in social dilemmas. Personal and situational factors are linked to a somewhat different pattern of norm activation, however; see Fig. 1. The most distinctive feature is that situational factors, including the behaviour of others, are associated with norms related to cooperation, whereas personal factors are associated with felt obligation to protect the resource at hand (i.e., a norm of environmental responsibility). Whereas behaviour guided by social considerations (norms related to cooperation) have an indirect effect on the environment only, behaviour guided by environmental values have a direct effect. Need salience, emanating from the situation, is expected to have an impact on environmental responsibility, but only in conjunction with environmental values.

(40K) Fig. 1. Factors influencing the activation of norms in social dilemmas.

Above, we have emphasised the importance of framing. In particular, the difference between a business frame and a policy frame has been demonstrated repeatedly in the cited research. A distinction has been made between market justice and political justice (Lane, 1986). In the market, justice is more or less tantamount to equity, while equality and need are associated with the policy sphere. Future study of justice and fairness in social dilemmas should address different functions that norms may serve under these conditions. Such research could also have implications for policy instruments like emission trading, that brings collective goods to the market. It appears from this review of the literature that social norms in general tend to support cooperation in social dilemmas, sometimes also in large-scale dilemmas involving environmental problems. Further, there are actions that issue entrepreneurs can take in order for people to recognise the social dilemma and promote cooperation. In order to facilitate the activation of relevant benevolence norms, they can communicate to the general public about existing environmental problems, how they relate to everyday behaviour, and what the individual can do to help solving the problem(s) (see, e.g., Thgersen, 2005). Also, it needs to be realized that sometimes the relevant individual cooperative actions are perceived as too costly. In these cases, the structural characteristics of the dilemma need to be changed in a way that favours cooperation (Messick et al., 1983 and Van Vugt, 1999). Finally, due to the high degree of anonymity characterizing participation in large-scale social dilemmas, there can be much gained by informing participants about others cooperative behaviour (Aronson and OLeary,

19821983 and Schultz, 1999), thus activating general equity and reciprocity norms in support of cooperation.

Acknowledgements
This research was supported by a grant from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (I-25-01) to the first author and by a grant from the Danish Social Science Research Council (24-03-0020) to the second author.

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In repeated dilemmas, as long as the resource is not abused by others cooperation rates tend to decline as the dilemma progresses (Komorita & Parks, 1994). 2 As one would expect, these two measures of personal values are positively correlated (Grling, 1999). 3 This latter correlation might be due to measured personal norms to some degree reflecting internalised social norms, as suggested by Schwartz (e.g., 1977), or to perceptions about social norms in reference groups being inferred from ones own personal norms. 4 There are exceptions, though, such as Bamberg and Schmidts (2003) study of German students car use for travels to the university.

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