WITHOUT PREJUDICE The Officer in Charge Traffic Camera Office 5 P.O.

Box 1916, Melbourne 3001 C/o Victorian Police

Victoria Police Centre, G.P.O Box 913 Melbourne, VIC, 3001, AUSTRALIA 10

17-7-2013

heidelberg.uni@police.vic.gov.au
Cc; Civic Compliance Victoria Traffic_Inquiries@tenixsolutions.com Brendan.Facey@justice.vic.gov.au robert.clark@parliament.vic.gov.au

15

Ethical Standards Department Victoria Police Unit Victoria Police Centre, 737 Flinders Street, Melbourne 3005 Phone 1300 363 101, Facsimile 9247 3498

20

Ref: Obligation Number 1106575301

Sir/Madam, . despite my initial request for the police to provide details of the alleged speeding of 5 kilometres an hours none was really provided, such as the type of camera used, the testing certificate issued by the Federal Government, if any, etc. 25 Moreover I was since subjected to an array of extortions and terrorism all designed to cause me to subject myself to their unconstitutional and illegal conduct. I deplore this kind of conduct totally and remind you that the Victorian Government was elected upon the principles of Law & order and not the abuse thereof.
International Finance Trust Company Limited v New South Wales Crime Commission [2009] HCA 49 (12 30 November 2009) QUOTE In 1864 the Supreme Court of the United States said: "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified."[193] Under Pt 2 of the Act, there is notification only after the defendant's rights are affected, and no provision for 35 any opportunity for defendants to argue that orders affecting them should be dissolved. In 1965 the Supreme Court of the United States said that the opportunity to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."[194] END QUOTE 40

HALSBURYS LAWS OF AUSTRALIA says under (130-13460):

Consent to summary

jurisdiction. The consent to be tried summarily must be clear and unequivocal and a failure to carry out the procedure for obtaining the consent will deprive the Court of Jurisdiction to determine the matters summarily.

The right for the public to be informed about the judicial process being properly applied or acts:
45 THE COMMENTS OF SIR JAMES MARTIN C.J., IN THE MATTER THE EVENING NEWS (1880) N.S.W. LR 211 AT 239.: QUOTE The right of the public to canvass fairly and honestly what takes place here cannot be disputed. Our practice of sitting here with open doors and transacting our judicial functions as we do, always in the broad light of day, p1 17-7-2011 INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0 PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by making a reservation, by fax 0011-61-3-94577209 or E-mail INSPECTOR-RIKATI@schorel-hlavka.com See also www.schorel-hlavka.com

would be shown of some of its value if the public opinion respecting our proceedings were at all times to be rigidly suppressed. We claim no immunity from fair, even though it be mistaken criticism. END QUOTE . 5 Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates QUOTE Sir JOHN DOWNER.I think we might, on the attempt to found this great Commonwealth, just advance one step, not beyond the substance of the legislation, but beyond the form of the legislation, of the different colonies, and say that there shall be embedded in the Constitution the righteous principle that the Ministers of the 10 Crown and their officials shall be liable for any arbitrary act or wrong they may do, in the same way as any private person would be. END QUOTE

As I made clear, I had a right to challenge the accusations. As shown below a hearing must be in 15 an "open court" and I have a right to challenge any evidence, as unsworn evidence was abolished by the State of Victoria. QUOTE 25-6-2013 correspondence In reference to the purported correspondence of the Sheriff's Office dated 13-6-2013 I refer to my earlier correspondence dated 11 December 2011 (quoted below) and other correspondences 20 and also to: South Australia v Totani [2010] HCA 39 (11 November 2010)in which it was stated (I ADDED COLOURING AND BOLDNESS OF WORDING);
QUOTE http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2010/39.html 1. There is no doubt, and it was not contended otherwise, that the Magistrates Court of South Australia is a court in which the Parliament of the Commonwealth can invest federal jurisdiction under s 71 of the Constitution. Nor is there any doubt, and it was not contended otherwise, that a member of the Magistrates Court is a judge for the purposes of s 79 of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he federal jurisdiction of any court may be exercised by such number of judges as the Parliament prescribes"[138]. In 2008 there were no fewer than 72 Commonwealth statutes which conferred jurisdiction on the Magistrates 30 Court of South Australia[139]. Established as a court by the State, the Magistrates Court cannot be deprived by the State "of those minimum characteristics of the institutional independence and impartiality identified in the decisions of this Court"[140]. For, as appears below, the continuing existence of those characteristics is an assumption which underlies Ch III of the Constitution. Constitutional assumptions about courts 35 1. The essentials of the British justice system travelled to and settled in the Australian colonies long before the Federation movement began. The courts of Britain's colonies, including the Australian colonies[141]: "in exercising their power to hear and determine, ... did so in the manner of their judicial counterparts 40 in the place of the law's origin". As Windeyer J said in Kotsis v Kotsis[142]: 25 "The nature of a court and the functions of court officers were matters that were well known in England long before the Australian colonies began. The meaning of the word 'court' has thus come to us through a long history; and it is 45 by the light of that that it is to be understood in ss 71, 72 and 73 of the Constitution." 1. The 19th-century understanding of a "court of justice", extant at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, was explained in part in the frequently cited judgment of Fry LJ in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd v Parkinson[143]. His Lordship spoke of "the fairness and impartiality which characterize proceedings in Courts of justice, and are proper to the functions of a 50 judge"[144]. He described courts as "for the most part, controlled and presided over by some person selected as specially qualified for the purpose" and said "they have generally a fixed and dignified course of procedure, which tends to minimise the risks that might flow from [their] absolute immunity"[145]. The application of that concept to courts contemplated as repositories of the judicial power of the Commonwealth was accepted by Isaacs and Rich JJ in Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v J W 55 Alexander Ltd, citing Fry LJ in connection with the proposition that[146]: "the Federal Constitution is specific that judicial power shall be vested in Courts, that is, Courts of law in the strict sense". The understanding of what constitutes "Courts of law" may be expressed in terms of assumptions underlying ss 71 and 77(iii) in relation to the courts of the States. 60 p2 17-7-2011 INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0 PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by making a reservation, by fax 0011-61-3-94577209 or E-mail INSPECTOR-RIKATI@schorel-hlavka.com See also www.schorel-hlavka.com

1. There are three overlapping assumptions which, as a matter of history and as a matter of inference from the text and structure of Ch III, underlie the adoption of the mechanism reflected in s 77(iii) of the Constitution. The first is the universal application throughout the Commonwealth of the rule of law, an assumption "upon which the Constitution depends for its efficacy"[147]. The second is that the courts of 5 the States are fit, in the sense of competent, to be entrusted with the exercise of federal jurisdiction. As Professor Sawer observed[148]: "The State Supreme Courts were of a very high and uniform calibre a situation in marked contrast with that which obtained in the United States shortly after its establishment and there was no substantial ground for fearing that they would be biased or parochial in their approach to federal questions." 10 The generality of the wording of ss 71 and 77(iii) indicates that the assumption of competence extends to all courts of the States, albeit the supervisory role of the Supreme Courts, as was submitted by the Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth, reinforces the independence and impartiality of inferior State courts and contributes to the fulfilment of the constitutional imperative recognised in Kable[149]. 15 1. The third assumption is that the courts of the States continue to bear the defining characteristics of courts and, in particular, the characteristics of independence, impartiality, fairness and adherence to the open-court principle. This formulation is deliberately non-exhaustive. In considering the attributes of courts contemplated by Ch III of the Constitution it is necessary to bear in mind the cautionary observation of Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ in Forge that[150]: 20 "It is neither possible nor profitable to attempt to make some single all-embracing statement of the defining characteristics of a court." Nevertheless, as their Honours added[151]: "An important element, however, in the institutional characteristics of courts in Australia is their capacity to administer the common law system of adversarial trial. Essential to that system is the conduct of trial by an independent and impartial tribunal." At the heart of judicial independence, although not exhaustive of the concept, is decisional independence from influences external to proceedings in the court, including, but not limited to, the influence of the executive government and its authorities[152]. Decisional independence is a necessary condition of impartiality. 30 Procedural fairness effected by impartiality and the natural justice hearing rule lies at the heart of the judicial process[153]. The open-court principle, which provides, among other things, a visible assurance of independence and impartiality, is also an "essential aspect" of the characteristics of all courts, including the courts of the States[154]. 25 35 1. The Convention Debates reveal implicit reflection on the principle of separation of powers in the context of a provision, later omitted, which would have barred any person holding judicial office from being appointed to or holding any executive office[155]. The limited record of consideration of judicial independence by delegates to the Convention otherwise centred around debate about the mechanism for the removal of federal judges. A leading contributor in this respect was the South Australian Charles Kingston. He spoke of his desire "to preserve intact the absolute independence of the judges, both in relation to the Federal Executive and the Federal Parliament; that they may have nothing to hope for, and nothing to fear either; and that in doing their duty they may feel secure in their office"[156]. The absence of any recorded debate about the principle of independence enunciated by Kingston indicates that it was uncontroversial. The historical record does not indicate that the members of the Convention expressly adverted to the broader concept of the separation of judicial power in their debates[157]. However, that does not detract from the conclusion that the Constitution was framed on the basis of common assumptions, at least among lawyers of the day, about the nature of courts and their independence in the discharge of judicial functions. The assumption of the continuity of the defining characteristics of the courts of the States as courts of law is supported by ss 106 and 108 of the Constitution, which, by continuing the constitutions and laws of the former colonies subject to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, continued, inter alia, the courts of the colonies and their various jurisdictions. That continuity could accommodate the extension, diminution or modification of the organisation and jurisdiction of courts existing at Federation, the creation of new courts and the abolition of existing courts (other than the Supreme Courts). Those powers in State legislatures are derived from the constitutions of the States END QUOTE 25-6-2013 correspondence

40

45

50

55

When the purported Infringement Registrar issued his orders it was done without prior notification to myself of such hearing and neither was it an "open court" hearing as demanded in
p3 17-7-2011 INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0 PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by making a reservation, by fax 0011-61-3-94577209 or E-mail INSPECTOR-RIKATI@schorel-hlavka.com See also www.schorel-hlavka.com

law for any Chapter III (of the constitution) court. As it is alleged that the Infringement Court is part of the magistrates Court then it is part of the chapter III court and so must be accessible. I requested a "review" of the purported Infringement Registrars decision and this was refused by the Registrar, this even so the High Court of Australia held;
5 http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/1991/9.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query="otherwise%20fell%20outside%20its%2 0jurisdiction%20" Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84 (17 April 1991) 10 QUOTE The Full Court on appeal from Maxwell J. held that the review of the Deputy Registrar's decision was confined to an inquiry whether the parties did in fact consent to the terms of the order and whether the terms agreed upon were in a form appropriate to the type of order sought and were enforceable. But the order made by the Deputy Registrar must have been made pursuant to s.79 - the section which confers power upon the 15 Court to order a settlement of or an alteration in the property interests of the parties. The Court could not make an order which otherwise fell outside its jurisdiction merely because the parties consented to it and it follows, a fortiori, that a Registrar, exercising a delegated power, could not do so. Thus, for instance, under s.80(1)(j) of the Act the Court may make an order by consent, but only in exercising its powers under Pt VIII. Section 37A(1)(g) allows the delegation to the Registrar of the power to make an order by consent, 20 but only where it is a power of the Court. And O.36A, r.2(1)(n) delegates to the Registrar the power referred to in s.37A(1)(g). END QUOTE Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84 (17 April 1991) 25 QUOTE CCH 92-217 page 78485 (1991) The Court could not make an order which otherwise fell outside its jurisdiction merely because the parties consent to it.. END QUOTE 30

35

In my view, an Infringement Court that operates without judicial supervision is not a court at all as it lacks the legal requirements of a judge supervising a registrar. The refusal by the purported Infringement Registrar for the review in itself made the orders and subsequent warrant issue unconstitutional and if anything the purported Infringement Registrar place the status and the credibility of the Court in question. This is akin to CONTEMPT OF COURT. The question now to be answered is who was the purported Infringement Registrar? After all, a computer cannot make a decision that requires an assessment of details. The Police in their sub missions should have made clear that I would oppose their case. Hence the police prosecutor, if there was any, would have been bound to follow the Foster principle:

40 Foster (1950) S.R. (N.S.W.) 149, at p151 (Lord Denning, speaking on the role of an advocate) QUOTE As an advocate he is a minister of Justice equally with a judge, A Barrister cannot pick or choose his clients...He must accept the brief and do all he honourably can on behalf of his client. I say 'All he honourably can' because his duty is not only to his client. He has a duty to the court which is 45 paramount. It is a mistake to suppose that he is a mouthpiece of his client to say what he wants: or his tool to do what he directs. He is none of those things. He owes his allegiance to a higher cause. It is the cause of truth and Justice. He must not consciously misstate the facts. He must not knowingly conceal the truth. He must not unjustly make a charge of fraud, that is, without evidence to support it. He must produce all relevant authorities, even those that are against him. He must see that his client 50 discloses, if ordered, all relevant documents, even those that are fatal to his case. He must disregard the specific instructions of his client, if they conflict with his duty to the court. END QUOTE . Taylor v. Taylor (1979) Fam LR 5, 289289 at 290 298 and 300 HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA. 55 QUOTE Although the Family Court is a court created by statute, it never the less possesses an inherent jurisdiction to set aside a judgement obtained by default - there is no indication in the Family Law Act of an intention to displace this inherent jurisdiction. END QUOTE p4 17-7-2011 INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0 PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by making a reservation, by fax 0011-61-3-94577209 or E-mail INSPECTOR-RIKATI@schorel-hlavka.com See also www.schorel-hlavka.com

And
Taylor v. Taylor (1979) Fam LR 5, 289289 at 290 298 and 300 HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA QUOTE In my opinion, the words 'false evidence' in s79A(1) do not mean evidence which is wilfully false. The sub5 section should be read according to its terms. To say that 'false evidence should be read as 'wilful false evidence' is to introduce a provision not expressed by the provision; cf s6H of the Royal Commission Act 1902 which speaks of a witness 'who knowingly gives false testimony'. This interpretation is reinforced by reference elsewhere in s79A(1) to the separate grounds of fraud and suppression of evidence which would comprehend cases of wilful false evidence. At common law, a judgment will be set aside if it has been 10 obtained by fraud. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, it has been held that an applicant must show something more than perjury, ie. new facts (Baker v. Wadsworth [1898] 67 LJQB 301; Everett V. Ribbands [1946] 175 LT 143). This tends to suggest that the words 'false evidence' should be given their literal meaning END QUOTE 15 Taylor v. Taylor (1979) Fam LR 5, 289289 at 290 298 and 300 HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA QUOTE In my opinion, the words 'false evidence' in s79A(1) do not mean evidence which is wilfully false. The subsection should be read according to its terms. To say that 'false evidence should be read as 'wilful false evidence' is to introduce a provision not expressed by the provision; cf s6H of the Royal Commission Act 20 1902 which speaks of a witness 'who knowingly gives false testimony'. This interpretation is reinforced by reference elsewhere in s79A(1) to the separate grounds of fraud and suppression of evidence which would comprehend cases of wilful false evidence. At common law, a judgment will be set aside if it has been obtained by fraud. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, it has been held that an applicant must show something more than perjury, ie. new facts (Baker v. Wadsworth [1898] 67 LJQB 301; Everett V. Ribbands 25 [1946] 175 LT 143). This tends to suggest that the words 'false evidence' should be given their literal meaning END QUOTE

And
Taylor v. Taylor (1979) Fam LR 5, 289289 at 290 298 and 300 HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 30 QUOTE In my opinion, the jurisdiction extends not only to the setting aside of judgments which have been obtained without service or notice to a party (Craig v. Kanssen [1943] KB 256 at 262 - 263) but to the setting aside of a default or ex-parte judgment obtained when the absence of the party is due to no fault on his part. I can find no indication in the Family Law Act of an intention to displace this inherent jurisdiction. 35 END QUOTE QUOTE R.V. Crimmins (1959) VR 270 Suppression of relevant evidence END QUOTE 40 . QUOTE Byrne v Byrne (1965) 7 FLR 342 at 343 Fraud: Usually takes the form of a statement of what is false or the suppression of what is true. END QUOTE

it must therefore be clear that if the police concealed from the purported Infringement Court that I challenged their allegation then this would in my view constitute "fraud" and "CONTEMPT IN FACE OF THE COURT" as to deceive the court in making an order upon what was submitted to the court rather then upon all relevant details that ought to have been submitted. In my view such kind of illegality by the Police can never be sanctioned, this also because the general community would lose trust in the police force and it would undermine the 50 independence of the Courts and so its integrity, if the police could manipulate the court as a tool for its own purposes.
45

I understand that in the case of MORIATY v LONDON, CHATMAM & DOVER RY Queens Bench 1870 L.R. 5 Q.B. 314;39 L.T.Q.B. 109;22 L.T. 163;34 J.P. 692;18 W.R. 625 in which the 55 plaintiff sued a railway company for personal injuries sustained and this plaintiff has gone about suborning false evidence and it was held by the Court that even so the plaintiff would have had a
p5 17-7-2011 INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0 PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by making a reservation, by fax 0011-61-3-94577209 or E-mail INSPECTOR-RIKATI@schorel-hlavka.com See also www.schorel-hlavka.com

genuine and justify to case to sue normally, by the plaintiff conduct to suborn false evidence this was seen by the Court that this conduct amounted to an admission that he had no case.
5

The police having concealed relevant evidence from the purported Infringement Court by this must be deemed to have conceded not to have a case. I have been informed that the Sheriff's Office will seek to prevent my vehicle to be renewed for registration. This conduct to me would be unlawful as it relies upon unconstitutional legislation and also unconstitutional purported court order.

10 Uniform Tax \case, 1942 (65CLR 373 at 408) 23-7-1942 QUOTE Common expressions such as: 'The Courts have declared a statute invalid'," says Chief Justice Latham, "sometimes lead to misunderstanding. A pretended law made in excess of power is not and never has been a 15 law at all. Anybody in the country is entitled to disregard it. Naturally, he will feel safer if he has a decision of a court in his favor, but such a decision is not an element, which produces invalidity in any law. The law is not valid until a court pronounces against it - and thereafter invalid. If it is beyond power it is invalid ab initio. END QUOTE 20 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally; Re Wakim; Ex parte Darvall; Re Brown; Ex parte Amann; Spi [1999] HCA 27 (17 June 1999) QUOTE For constitutional purposes, they are a nullity. No doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel can prevail 25 against the Constitution. Mr Gould is entitled to disregard the orders made in Gould v Brown. No doubt, as Latham CJ said of invalid legislation, "he will feel safer if he has a decision of a court in his favour". That is because those relying on the earlier decision may seek to enforce it against Mr Gould. END QUOTE . 30 As I indicated in previous correspondences that once legislation has been challenged to be

ULTRA VIRES then it is so from time of enactment unless a court pronounces against it that it is INTRA VIRES. this never eventuated, hence it remains ULTRA VIRES. . Further, my previous correspondences also set out that "officials" as like ministers can be sued 35 like any other person where the act outside their legal powers. As the purported Infringement Court was some kind of computer generated court order, operated not by the Magistrates Court of Victoria itself but as I understand it some private company then this makes it even more serious of impersonating a public official, including a court official, the 40 Sheriff's Office, etc. . 120125 Recording, 2nd system file 29:50 From 5.00 to 11:50 CASE NUMBER C10728398
45 QUOTE MAGISTRATE: Evidence in this court is not received by way of affidavit - and, in any event, should it be received by affidavit, then the deponent of the affidavit - that's you, the person swearing the affidavit, must then - then - make themselves available for cross-examination on the issues that are raised on that affidavit evidence. Otherwise, the - the affidavit cant be relied on by me as evidence in your case. 50 END QUOTE Marriage of Baines (No. 2) (1981) 7 Fam LR 232 at 237;QUOTE We recognise that each party is entitled to a Fair and Proper trial and to an adequate opportunity to adduce 55 relevant evidence and to test the quality and veracity of the evidence adduced by the other party. END QUOTE

.
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As the State of Victoria abolished "unsworn statements" and anyone depositing "evidence" must be available for cross-examination, then clearly this was not observed either by the purported Infringement Court. At no time was I provided with the details of what the Police placed before the purported Infringement Court, and neither an opportunity to attend let alone then cross5 examine the police on this alleged evidence, etc.
International Finance Trust Company Limited v New South Wales Crime Commission [2009] HCA 49 (12 November 2009) QUOTE 1. The central issue. If there is no procedure by which the person subject to a s 10(2) restraining 10 order made ex parte may approach the Court to have it set aside once that person has learnt of the order, the effect of s 10 is to compel the Supreme Court of New South Wales to engage in activity which is repugnant to the judicial process in a fundamental degree. END QUOTE 15

A man who exercises his rights harms no one a Legal Maxim. It must be clear that before a man can defend himself against allegations against his person he must be given all relevant details upon which his accuser relies upon and sufficient time as to prepare any defence he may wish to rely upon. Clearly this was never provided for.

20

The onus was upon the prosecutor, as the accuser, to prove every legal requirement had been followed before the Court was requested to sanction the police conduct against the accused, this never eventuated either. I understand that there is currently a litigation before the High Court of Australia challenging the validity of speed camera's, and I view that it would also be impertinent for anyone to persist in enforcement where this matter is before the highest court in the Commonwealth of Australia. . As I have indicated also in the past my 80 year old wife is terrified that while I am driving her to 30 hospital or doctors somehow the police/Sheriff Office may intercept us and take unilateral action ignoring the rule of law upon which I rely. This is a kind of terrorism that never should be part of law enforcement and cannot be so either or deemed to be so in view of what I have outlined above and so in previous correspondence. How dare you to cause such form of terrorism upon seniors? How indeed can you expect the youth of today to respect Law & Order when those task 35 it is to appropriate enforce it show a total disregard to doing so, and willing to use any manipulation, extorsion and act of terrorist to achieve their gaols.
25

40

This correspondence is not intended and neither must be perceived to address all issues and/or details.
.

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

.

(Our

name is our motto!)

.

45

Awaiting your response,

G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Friends call me Gerrit)

p7 17-7-2011 INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0 PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by making a reservation, by fax 0011-61-3-94577209 or E-mail INSPECTOR-RIKATI@schorel-hlavka.com See also www.schorel-hlavka.com